On page 89 of the Warren report it states that the "Single Bullet Theory" was reached on the morning of November 23, 1963 in a phone call from Dr. Humes at Bethesda Hospital to Dr. Perry at Parkland Hospital In Dallas.
There goes the Single Bullet Theory.
these attendees had already attended a meeting on January 27th 1964
to study the Zapruder film. Redlich,
Eisenberg and Specter for the Warren Commission met with FBI photographic expert
Lyndal Shaneyfelt, FBI visual aids expert Leo Gauthier and Secret Service
Inspector Thomas Kelley (5H 141). Obviously,
no conclusions had been reached otherwise there would have been little need for
the “strange conferences”.
produced a three-page memo (not in the Warren Commission Report or any one of
the 26 volumes), later obtained by Weisberg, which speaks for itself.
Even Dr. Humes was in attendance.
Even Dr. Humes was in attendance.
April 22, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Melvin A. Eisenberg
Subject: Conference of April 14, 1964, to determine which
frames in the Zapruder movies show the impact of
the first and second bullets
On April 14, 1964, a conference was held to determine which
frames in the Zapruder film portray the instants at which the first
and second bullets struck.
Present were: Commander James J. Humes, Director of
Laboratories of the Naval
Commander J. Thorton Boswell, Chief Pathologist, Naval
Pathology Branch, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology; Dr. F.W. Light,
Jr. Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division at
Division; Dr. Oliver, Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of the
Biophysics Division at
Shaneyfelt, and two other unidentified agents of the FBI; Messrs.
Kelley and Howlett of the Secret Service; and Messrs. Redlich, Specter
and Eisenberg of the Commission staff.
A screening was held of the Zapruder film and of slides
prepared by LIFE from the film. Each slide corresponded with a
separate frame of film, beginning with frame 171. The consensus of
the meeting was as follows:
(a) The President had been definitely hit by frames 224-225,
when he emerges from behind a sign with his hands clutching his
(b) The reaction shown in frames 224-225 may have started at
an earlier point - possibly as early as frame 199 (when there appears
to be some jerkiness in his movement) or, with a higher degree of
possibility, at frames 204-206 (where his right elbow appears to be
raised to an artificially high position).
(c) If the reaction did not begin at 199 or 204-206, it
probably began during the range of frames during which the President
is hidden from Zapruder's camera by a sign, namely, frames 215-24.
cc: Mr. Rankin Mr Belin
Mr. Willens Mr. Specter
Mr. Redlich Mr. Eisenberg
(d) The President may have been struck by the first bullet as
much as two seconds before any visible reaction began. In all
likelihood, however, the maximum delay between impact and reaction
would be under one second, and it is possible that the reaction was
instantaneous. Putting this in terms of frames, the President may
have been struck as much as 36 frames before any visible reaction is
seen. If the visible reaction begins at 199, the President may have
been struck as early as 163; if the visible reaction begins at
204-206, he may have been struck as early as 168-170; if the visible
reaction begins while the President is behind the sign, he may have
been struck as early as 179-188.
(e) The velocity of the first bullet would have been little
diminished by its passage through the President. Therefore, if
Governor Connally was in the path of the bullet it would have struck
him and (probably) caused the wounds he sustained in his chest cavity.
Strong indications that this occurred are provided by the facts that
(1) the bullet recovered from Governor Connally's stretcher does not
appear to have penetrated a wrist and (2) if the first bullet did not
hit Governor Connally, it should have ripped up the car, but
apparently did not. Since the bullet recovered from the Governor's
stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a wrist, if he was hit by
this (the first) bullet, he was probably also hit by the second
(f) If Governor Connally was hit by the first and second
bullets, it is impossible to say definitively at what point, or by
what point, he had been hit by the second bullet.
(g) Governor Connally seems to straighten up at frames
224-226, and may be reacting to a wound at this point. (If so, it
would be a wound from the first bullet).
(h) Governor Connally seems to begin showing an expression of
anguish around 242. If he was hit with two bullets, this expression
may have resulted from his second wound.
(i) After Governor Connally straightened up at frames 224-26,
he starts to turn to the right. As a result of this turn, at no time
after frame 236 was Governor Connally in a position such that a bullet
fired from the probable
site of the assassin would have caused the wound in his chest cavity
which Governor Connally sustained--that is, after frame 236, the
Governor presented a side view to the assassin rather than a back
(j) It is not possible to say whether prior to 236 Governor
Connally was ever in a position such that one bullet could have caused
the five wounds he sustained.
(k) As in the case of the President, Governor Connally could
have conceivably been hit two seconds before he begins to react, but
the maximum likely time interval between hit and reaction is one
second, and the reaction may have been instantaneous. The likelihood
of an instantaneous reaction is particularly great in regard to the
wrist wound, since pain is usually felt more quickly in a limb than in
*/ Mr. Specter disagrees with this, and feels the Governor was in
position to receive the chest wound up to 242.
memo is hugely destructive to the SBT for the following reasons:
the fifteen people there, including five doctors (three of whom were experts in
wounds) and two FBI photographic experts, only Specter, the architect of the SBT,
dissented from the three bullets, three hits conclusion.
The man either had guts or he knew that some powerful people were on his