JFK-NAM-1954
The
Truth About
Indochina
Senator John Kennedy
April 6, 1954
Mr. President,
the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth
about
Indochina
.
I am reluctant
to make any statement which may be misinterpreted as unappreciative
of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere; or as
partisan criticism of our Secretary of State just prior to his
participation in the delicate deliberations in
Geneva
. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of the
Congress which have been briefed -- if not consulted -- on this
matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
of the situation.
But to pour
money, material, and men into the jungles of
Indochina
without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously
futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of
"united action" assumes the inevitability of such victory;
but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of
confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and
which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining
the extent of American participation.
Despite this
series of optimistic reports about eventual victory, every member of
the Senate knows that such victory today appears to be desperately
remote, to say the least, despite tremendous amounts of economic and
materiel aid from the
United States
, and despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
of the outcome at
Dien Bien Phu
. It is, of course, for these reasons that many French are reluctant
to continue the struggle without greater assistance; for to record
the sapping effect which time and the enemy have had on their will
and strength in that area is not to disparage their valor. If
"united action" can achieve the necessary victory over the
forces of communism, and thus preserve the security and freedom of
all
Southeast Asia
, then such united action is clearly called for. But if, on the
other hand, the increase in our aid and the utilization of our
troops would only result in further statements of confidence without
ultimate victory over aggression, then now is the time when we must
evaluate the conditions under which that pledge is made.
I am frankly of
the belief that no amount of American military assistance in
Indochina
can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time
nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has the sympathy
and covert support of the people.
Moreover,
without political independence for the Associated States, the other
Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of
colonialism; and the "united action" which is said to be
so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up
as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention, without
participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia,
without the support of the great masses of the people of the
Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on
the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of
our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in the
type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
This is not a
new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon my return
from the
Far East
as follows:
"In
Indochina
we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime
to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general
support of the native
Vietnam
government among the people of that area. To check the southern
drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the
force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native
non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a
spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de
Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately
nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure."
In June of last
year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which would
have provided for the distribution of American aid, to the extent
feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence
desired by the people of the Associated States My amendment was
soundly defeated on the grounds that we should not pressure France
into taking action on this delicate situation; and that the new
French government could be expected to make "a decision which
would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment or
resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our
great ally,
France
, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
Every year we
are given three sets of assurances: First, that the independence of
the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence
of the Associated States will soon be completed under steps
"now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent
limitations upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign
states remain; and the fact that military victory has not yet been
achieved is largely the result of these limitations. Repeated
failure of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the
frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to
delay definitive action until now the opportunity for any desirable
solution may well be past.
It is time,
therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the difficult
situation before us without the false hopes which predictions of
military victory and assurances of complete independence have given
us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first, that without
the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States,
without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
officer corps, a military victory, even with American support, in
that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
If the French
persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and
freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if
those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the
conflict, as they have in the past, then it is my hope that
Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at Geneva, will
recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into
that hopeless internecine struggle.
The facts and
alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a
nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy
can be effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and
atomic retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no
avail, once such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to
doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may
well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very
continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this
decision to the people, then, as Thomas
Jefferson
once said: "If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take
it from them but to inform their discretion by education."
VIETNAM (PULLOUT)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3Icbzk8mg8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UN6r7MTTf9Y
Thank Gil Jesus for the
following>>>
