VEITNAM

                           THE WHITE HOUSE

                              WASHINGTON

                                               November 26, 1963

         NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273

         TO:    The Secretary of State
                The Secretary of Defense
                The Director of Central Intelligence
                The Administrator, AID
                The Director, USIA

Here is the audio on Withdrawal from NAM Below

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         The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which
         occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with
         Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued
         to all concerned:

              1. It remains the central object of the United States in South
         Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win
         their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist
         conspiracy. The test of all U. S. decisions and actions in this area
         should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

              2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal
         of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House state-
         ment of October 2, 1963.

              3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the
         present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted
         in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public
         support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves width this
         objective in view.

              4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government
         will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established
         U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it
         is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance
         that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be
         scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government
         and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the
         following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu
         meeting, of November 20. The offices of the Government to which
         central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.


                                                    (page 1 of 3 pages)

Page 2 November 26, 1963

              5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible
         we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate
         its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentra-
         tion should include not only military but political, economic, social,
         educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide
         not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only
         the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where
         the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.

         (Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of
         the Ambassador.)

              6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be
         maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the
         eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained
         by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not
         exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to
         accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are
         possible as between MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special
         attention should be given to the expansion of the import, distribution,
         and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.

         (Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )

              7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased
         activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:

                 A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;

                 B. The plausibility of denial;

                 C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;

                 D. Other international reaction.

         Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
         (Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )

              8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed and submitted
         for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line
         up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for
         minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it
         is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should

                                                       (page 2 of 3 pages)

Page 3 November 26, 1963

         pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined
         method of political guidance for such operations, since their timing
         and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating
         situation in Laos.

         (Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

              9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is
         of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent
         that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence
         upon that country. In particular a plan should be developed using
         all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the
         Cambodians that the recent charges against us are groundless.

         (Action: State.)

              10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired
         that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible
         to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is
         controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and
         other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version
         of the Jorden Report, as powerful and complete as possible.

         (Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)


                                          s/ McGeorge Bundy
                                          McGeorge Bundy
                                                cc:
                                                    Mr. Bundy
                                                    Mr. Forrestal
                                                    Mr. Johnson
                                                    NSC Files
                                                         (page 3 of 3 pages)

[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET
Auth: EO 11652
Date: 6-8-76
By: Jeanne W. Davis
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ]

NSAM 288 (Below

NOW, LET'S GO BACK TO 1954.

JFK-NAM-1954

The Truth About Indochina
Senator John Kennedy

April 6, 1954

Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina .

I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in Geneva . Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of the Congress which have been briefed -- if not consulted -- on this matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation of the situation.

But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining the extent of American participation.

Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory, every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States , and despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu . It is, of course, for these reasons that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the security and freedom of all Southeast Asia , then such united action is clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions under which that pledge is made.

I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has the sympathy and covert support of the people.

Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention, without participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.

This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon my return from the Far East as follows:

"In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure."

In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which would have provided for the distribution of American aid, to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence desired by the people of the Associated States My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation; and that the new French government could be expected to make "a decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland] assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great ally, France , toward the freedom of the people of those states."

Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain; and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may well be past.

It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions of military victory and assurances of complete independence have given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first, that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable officer corps, a military victory, even with American support, in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and, second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.

If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.

The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people, then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education."

VIETNAM (PULLOUT)

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Thank Gil Jesus for the following>>>

Even the GI's knew it through the "Stars and Stripes".

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