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Malley was sent to Dallas to stop the DPD from talking to the press. But, Nobody tried to stop the FBI from talking to he press.
FBI
JAMES MALLEY HSCA Volume III TESTIMONY OF
JAMES R. MALLEY Chairman
STOKES. Please stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. MALLEY. I
do. Chairman
STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair
recognizes counsel for the Committee, Mr. James McDonald. Mr. MCDONALD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you
please state your full name for the record? Mr. MALLEY. My
full name is James R. Malley. Mr. MCDONALD.
And were you employed by the FBI, Mr. Malley? Mr. MALLEY.
From 1937 until 1971. Mr. MCDONALD.
And in what capacity did you begin your service with the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. As
a special agent. Mr. McDONALD.
What was your position in November 1963? Mr. MALLEY. I
had been designated as inspector at the time and was working as an
assistant or No. 1 man, you might say, to Assistant Director Alex Rosen,
in charge of the General Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD.
What did your duties entail? Mr. MALLEY. My
actual duties were very broad. I was supposed to try to keep track of
everything going on in the General Investigative Division, handle
routine matters I did not feel was necessary to send into the Assistant
Director, also see all mail that was going to him and, in general, to
double check on things that were going on in four different sections in
the Bureau's General Investigative Division. Page 463 463 Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, let me direct your attention to November 22, 1963. You were
employed then as the inspector for Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. McDONALD.
That was a Friday. Were you working that day? Mr. MALLEY. I
was working that day. Mr. MCDONALD.
And when did you learn of the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr.
MALLEY. Returning from lunch I turned on a radio that was available
while I was sitting in Mr. Rosen's office in his absence. I turned on
the radio to catch, I believe it was the 12:30 news. That was the first
time I learned anything about it. Mr. MCDONALD.
And what did you do in an official capacity? Mr. MALLEY.
Before I had any opportunities to do anything, and I can't recall the
exact time, I was contacted by Associate Director Al Chairman
STOKES. Excuse me just a moment. We are having a little difficulty
hearing you. Mr. Malley, if you can put that mike a little closer. Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think you want me to talk louder; you merely want it a little
closer? Chairman
STOKES. Right. Thank you very much. Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Belmont was in the same position that everyone else was in. He knew, I
knew, that we had no actual jurisdiction. He did indicate to me that he
had been in touch with Mr. Shanklin, who was the Special Agent in charge
of Dallas, and that he would be back in touch with me as soon as there
was more definite information available. That was about it for the time
being. Later in the
day, and I presume it must have been close to 3 o'clock, I was either
told be telephone or asked to come down to Belmont's office, I cannot
recall which, at which time he informed me that the General
Investigative Division would be handling the assassination case of
President Kennedy. Following that,
and still not having many details to go on, I started lining up
personnel that would be available on a round-the clock basis to handle
whatever might develop. Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any specific instructions as to what your role would be? Mr. MALLEY. Not
at that time. Mr. McDONALD.
And your immediate supervisor was Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. McDONALD.
Was he present that day? Mr. MALLEY. He
was not. He was scheduled to go on annual leave that morning and instead
of taking off as he had planned to leave the city, he was ill and did
not leave the city at all. He eventually came back to the office
sometime the following week. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you have any meetings with Mr. Hoover on that day? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. McDONALD.
What were the next set of instructions you received on Friday afternoon? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I received any instructions on that particular
afternoon. In reading this statement, Mr. Blakey Page 464 464 has mentioned
that there was a lot of confusion. There was. Because up until around 7
o'clock, if my memory is correct, there was a definite uncertainty as to
what jurisdiction the Bureau had. As I understand
it, Belmont had instructed the Dallas office to be certain that they
stayed in a position where they would know exactly what was going on and
what the Dallas police were doing so that possibly nothing would be
interfered with in the way of evidence and nothing lost. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did there come a time when you proceeded to go to Mr. MALLEY.
There was. On Sunday, after the shooting of Ruby, I am sorry, of Oswald
by Ruby, I heard it on television. I had been at the office all morning
and had just gone home around 12 o'clock. My wife heard it on television
while I was changing clothes, mentioned there was going to be a rerun. I
listened to that and immediately dressed and started back to the office
and arrived around 2 o'clock. When I arrived
there, Courtney Evans was sitting in Mr. Belmont's office, who had not
had time to get to the office yet. He was talking to Mr. Hoover.
Following that call I was told that I was on my way to Mr. McDONALD.
And who is Courtney Evans? Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Evans at that time was an Assistant Director in charge of the Special
Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any instructions on going to Mr. MALLEY.
There was no time for instructions. I was told to get the first plane
that I could and Evans commented that undoubtedly by the time you arrive
in Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you receive any instructions when you got to Mr.
MALLEY. I did. As I recall, I arrived in the Mr. MCDONALD.
Did Mr. Belmont relate to you anything specific as far as what President
Johnson wished to have told to these individuals?
Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my recollection, it was simply a statement
that the President was extremely unhappy and desired that the
individuals be requested to stop talking about the assassination. Mr. MCDONALD.
And did you in fact relay those instructions? Mr. MALLEY. As
soon as I was able to contact each one of them by telephone I did so. I
was unable to reach the District Attorney for some time because about 2
minutes before an agent tried to Page 465 465 reach him in
his office, he had left to appear on television, and again for some time
related different things that he felt were important to the
assassination. Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, tell us what happened upon your arrival in Mr. MALLEY. In
answering you truthfully I couldn't tell you what the status was. I had
so many telephone calls when I arrived there that I had to take care of
that it was some time before I had a chance to even ask questions. Shortly after
contacting the three individuals that I have mentioned to you, I had a
telephone call from Mr. Belmont telling me that a detailed memorandum
setting forth all information that was known concerning the
assassination was to be prepared and be back in
It was
mentioned that two men from Mr.
McDONALD. Who was directing the investigation in Mr.
MALLEY. It was under the overall direction of the SAC, Gordon Shanklin. Mr. McDONALD.
What role did you play? Mr. MALLEY. I
was supposed to oversee the entire thing, to make sure that the Bureau's
interests were properly looked after, to make sure that there were no
unnecessary delays on anything, and that everything possible was done to
find out exactly what the correct facts were. Mr. MCDONALD.
You had been working on the case over the weekend prior to going to Mr. MALLEY. I
had been in the office a great deal. When you say working on it, I saw a
great many teletypes, a lot of other information, files were being
checked in Washington for any possible helpful information there, and I
couldn't tell you right now exactly what I did over that weekend before
I left for Dallas. Mr.
MCDONALD. Did you in fact convey President Johnson's instructions to
each of the three men you mentioned? Mr.
MALLEY. I did. Mr.
McDONALD. What was their reaction? Mr.
MALLEY. The Chief of Police was very cordial, said he would be glad to
do it but he didn't know how to go about it, and if my memory serves me
correctly, I suggested that he had no problem, all he had to do was
either say he had no comment to make or the matter is under
investigation and I do not care to discuss it. The
Sheriff was extremely cordial and said he didn't recall that he had been
making many comments but we would see that he didn't if he had.
Page 466 466 In
speaking with Henry Wade it was a little bit different story. He
informed me that he had been a former FBI agent, which I was well aware
of, that he had been district attorney for a number of years, that he
felt that he was qualified to decide what statements he could make and
what ones he should not make. If
I remember correctly, I said, you are certainly entitled to your opinion
but in this instance the President of the Mr. McDONALD.
Now, you have testified you arrived in Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
When you arrived at the Mr. MALLEY. I
just answered you, Mr. McDonald; from the time I got there I had so many
things to do I would have no idea. It was a number of hours after I was
there that I was even able to start asking questions. Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to your going to Mr. MALLEY. I
hadn't formed any ideas of any kind. The President had been shot on
Friday; Oswald was shot on Sunday; it was much too early to form any
ideas. Mr.
McDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to read to you from a memorandum that
was prepared by Walter Jenkins to President Johnson--Mr. Blakey also
referred to it in his narration--the memorandum reflecting a phone call
with J. Edgar Hoover, and the memorandum is dated November 24, 1963, two
days after the assassination. The pertinent paragraph quoting Mr. Hoover
states: "The thing that I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach,
is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is
the real assassin."
What would your comments be on that? We are talking about two days after
the assassination. This is probably being written contemporaneously with
your arriving in Mr.
MALLEY. Not having talked to Mr. Hoover, I certainly am not in a
position to say what was going on in his mind. I can give you my
interpretation of what he would have meant by it. That would simply mean
that because of such a crime of that magnitude, he was talking to either
the President or Jenkins, whichever it was, saying that the public needs
to be settled down.
As far as saying that Oswald is the man and nobody else, I don't think
you can take that interpretation from such a one sentence remark such as
that. Mr.
MCDONALD. I am looking at a memo dated November 26, 1963, from Mr. Evans
to Mr. Belmont and it is titled "The Assassination of President
Kennedy," and it says--this is dated 4 days later, "From the facts
disclosed in our investigation, there is no question that we can submit
in our report convincing evidence, beyond any doubt, showing Oswald was
the man who killed President Kennedy."
Then at the bottom of this page there is handwriting, which has been
identified as Mr. Hoover's. And in the last line Mr. Evans is
Page 467 467
making reference that a case of this magnitude cannot be fully
investigated in a week's time. And Mr. Hoover has written underneath,
"just how long do you estimate it will take."
Then under that he went on to write, "it seems to me we have the basic
facts now."
Again, we are 4 days after the assassination. You were in Mr.
MALLEY. I don't recall that I was asked by anyone how long it was going
to take. If I had been I would have told them I had no idea because of
the magnitude of what needed to be done in If
I recall correctly, it was either Tuesday or Wednesday following the
assassination that I was asked if we had sufficient personnel, and I
requested that 40 more agents along with clerical help, stenographic
help, be sent into Dallas to assist those who were already there. So
certainly I did not feel it was going to be completed within any week. Mr. McDONALD.
You were asking for additional agent personnel, and as reflected in
these memos, at the top level, at least there was an opinion being
formed that the case essentially was wrapped up. Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with you because I don't know what they were doing in Mr.
McDONALD. I will quote one more memorandum to you, and that is dated 29
November 1963, which is found in the Senate Intelligence Committee's,
the Church Committee's, Book 5 Report on page 34. In it, the memorandum
is by Mr. Hoover, recounting a telephone conversation he had that day
with President Johnson. And he says, "I advised the President that we
hoped to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have
it before the first of the week, as another angle had developed. Again
we are getting an example of at the top level the case being in a sense
completed.
Now, again, from your Mr.
MALLEY. Well, again, I say that when people say that they hoped to have
it completed and so on, I don't think for a minute they were talking
about having every facet fully and exhaustively investigated. I think
what they are saying is that, based on the information that was
available at that time, the essential facts of the investigation had
been developed. It doesn't mean it was over by any means. Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Chairman, the memorandums that I have just quoted from have been
marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459. I move that they be
received into the record at this time. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this
point. [The above marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459 follow:] Page 468 468 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 Page 469 469 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 470 470 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 471 471 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 472 472 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 473 473 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 474 474 JFK EXHIBIT
F-458 Page 475 475 JFK EXHIBIT
F-458 cont. Page 476 476 JFK EXHIBIT
F-459
Page 477 477 Mr.
MCDONALD. When you were in Mr.
MALLEY. That existed from the minute it happened. I can't say that I saw
a memorandum to this effect or a memorandum to that effect or a
telephone call, but I do know that it was on everybody's mind, was there
somebody else involved. It was an essential part of the investigation to
find out. Mr. MCDONALD.
These discussions of conspiracy, were they active in the Mr. MALLEY. You
are asking me a question that dates back 15 years ago and I am not in a
position to truthfully answer you and say this happened or that happened
in the way of some conversation I had. Mr. McDONALD.
In light of Evans memo to Belmont with Mr. Hoover's writing, his
handwriting, saying essentially we have got it all wrapped up, in your
opinion, would that affect the investigation ongoing in the field, if
Mr. Hoover was saying that he felt the investigation was essentially
closed? Would that have an effect, in your opinion, on the way the
Bureau handled the conspiracy aspects to the case? Mr. MALLEY. To
start off, I was handling 90 percent of the telephone calls between
Washington and Dallas after I arrived, there may be a higher percentage.
I know that I never received any comments from Belmont, the Director, or
anyone else in Mr. McDONALD.
You stated that you arrived in Mr. MALLEY.
Around 7:30 to 8 o'clock on Sunday night. Mr.
MCDONALD. Did this event have any effect on the Bureau's relationship
with the Dallas Police Department? Mr.
MALLEY. I do not recall hearing of any friction that developed while I
was in Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall after the shooting of Oswald, did you yourself
participate in any discussions as to the possibility of whether it was a
related event, directly related to the murder of the President. In other
words, if it involved a larger conspiracy, the possibility of a larger
conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you refering to other personnel in the Mr. MCDONALD.
Either in the
Mr. MALLEY. You
gentlemen have had access to the file. I think you will find that
teletype, if my memory is accurate, sent by the people at the seat of
Government telling the Dallas office to not overlook the possibility and
check thoroughly to see whether it could have been any police
involvement in the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. Page 478 478 Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, I am going to direct your attention to an organizational
chart that we have prepared that I showed you before the hearing. If the
clerk could display the organizational chart for us. It has been
designated JFK exhibit F-456. If you would walk over to the easel we
have a clip-on microphone. If you would give us a rundown of the
organizational structure in the Bureau at the time of the assassination. [JFK exhibit
F-456 was received into the record.] JFK EXHIBIT
F-456 Page 479 479 Mr. MALLEY. In
1963, at the time of the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover, as you heard
previously, was the Director. The Associate Director was Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes. If you would stand on the other side of the easel. Mr. MALLEY. Be
glad to either way.
Mr. McDONALD.
Thank you. Mr. MALLEY.
Under Mr. Belmont was the Domestic Intelligence Division, whose Director
was William C. Sullivan; the General Investigative Division, whose
Assistant Director was Al Rosen, and a Laboratory and Special
Investigative Division, and I am not going to identify those people
unless you want me to. Mr. McDONALD.
No, that is fine. Mr. MALLEY. I
failed to mention that under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover was an Inspection
Division whose Director at that time was Mr. James Gale. Under the
Domestic Intelligence you had an inspector, No. 1 man in charge, Joseph
A. Sizoo, another inspector, No. 2 man, Donald E. Moore, the Espionage
Section under a section chief by the name of William A. Branigan, and
there were a number of individual agent-supervisors who were assigned to
this case. Do you want their names mentioned? Mr. McDONALD.
Not at this time, thank you. Mr.
MALLEY. In the General Investigative Division, I happened to be the No.
1 man, and as you heard, I was assigned to handle liaison with the, oh,
you haven't heard yet, I was assigned to handle liaison with the Warren
Commission. There was also
a criminal section, whose section chief was James Hanley. An individual
by the name of Henry Schutz was a unit chief, under which was bank
robberies and a number of other rather important criminal
investigations, and there were two individuals that did work quite a bit
on this particular case, by the name of Richard Rogge and Fletcher
Thompson. Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, regarding Rogge and Thompson, you just said that they worked
closely with you on the case. Mr. MALLEY.
They did in the early stages. They were the two individuals who were
sent to Dallas to write the first two memorandums that I told you about,
and we also had a civil rights section, which was under a section chief
by the name of Clement McGowan. Does that cover what you have? Mr. MCDONALD.
That is fine, thank you. Mr. Malley, in
the investigation of the assassination how did the various divisions
participate in the case? First of all,
which was the primary division to run the case, the assassination case,
and who was in charge of that investigation? Mr. MALLEY. As
far as the actual assassination is concerned, it was definitely in the
General Investigative Division. When you say who is responsible, are you
referring to what section it was being handled and what supervisor was
primarily responsible? Mr. MCDONALD.
Which person was primarily responsible at the top to begin with? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, because of what happened when I got back from Page 480 480 Mr. MCDONALD.
What happened when you got back from
Mr. MALLEY. Well, I had been told before I left Dallas, sometime in the
afternoon, that the Warren Commission had been established, they would
be functioning almost immediately, and that I was to return to
Washington on the first plane that I could get out of Dallas. I came
back that night, and the next morning I had a little note from the
Director that I was to get in touch with Mr. J. Lee Rankin as soon as
possible, with the telephone number on it. I didn't succeed for a day or
two but I did make an effort continuously for the next days until I got
it. I
then went up to see him and introduced myself. We had a rather long chat
about things in general but nothing concerning any real developments
because neither one of us were in a position to talk about it.
Mr. MCDONALD. On what date was this again?
Mr. MALLEY. Strictly from memory, I think I returned from Mr. EDGAR.
Would the counsel yield? Mr. McDONALD.
Yes. Mr. EDGAR.
Would the witness talk into the microphone? Mr. MALLEY. I
am sorry, beg your pardon. Mr. MCDONALD.
So you stated that you returned from Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
What duties were you to do? What were your duties going to be? Mr.
MALLEY. Well, very generally, I was to handle all contacts by telephone
or in person with the Mr. MCDONALD.
Now, prior to December 12, the Bureau released its report on the
assassination?
Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, sir. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you play a role in the preparation of that report? Mr. MALLEY. In
that report I have to say no. I told you that two memorandums were
prepared in Mr. McDONALD.
When you refer to memorandum you are referring to the report? Mr. MALLEY. I
am not. I am referring to a piece of paper similar to this, consisting
of around 15 pages, I believe, on Mr. Ruby, I mean on the assassination
of President Kennedy and around 8 or 9 on the shooting of Oswald by
Ruby. Page 481 481 Mr. McDONALD.
Well, the report came out in early 1963, prior to the 12th, and the
report said in essence that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President
alone. Do you know why
this report was put out so rapidly? Mr. MALLEY. I
can only tell you that based on what I was told in Mr. MCDONALD.
They wanted to. Mr. MALLEY. It
was strictly on the basis of letting the President, the Attorney General
and a few others that they felt needed to know immediately what the
facts were as of that time. It was my
understanding that information was going to be disseminated long before
it was. Mr. MCDONALD.
Were you aware-- Mr.
MALLEY. I do not know what occurred in Mr. McDONALD.
Prior to your return to Mr. MALLEY. I
don't remember whether 1 ever heard that there was a possibility of the I have no way
of thinking back and recalling whether I did or didn't. Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, as you knew, what the Bureau's reaction to the formation
of such a commission was? Mr. MALLEY. I
never heard of anything one way or the other until you showed me a
memorandum on it. The last time I talked to you I might have indicated
to you the Director was unhappy. I don't interpret that memo that way. Mr. McDONALD.
So, it is your testimony you have no personal knowledge of what the
Bureau's reaction, specifically Mr. Hoover s, was to the creation of the Mr.
MALLEY. I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his
office after I returned from Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, in the overall investigation of the assassination, what was
the interaction between the various divisions in the Bureau,
specifically general investigative and domestic intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my knowledge, there was complete cooperation between all the
various people working on the assassination or the domestic intelligence
aspect, and in the civil rights angle. Mr. McDONALD.
What was your relationship with William Sullivan, the Director of
Domestic Intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to this individual case? Page 482 482 Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think I had very many conversations with Sullivan on this
particular case. I usually dealt with the section chief, Mr. Brannigan,
or the individual supervisor. Mr. MCDONALD.
What was the domestic intelligence section, what were they doing
regarding the assassination case? Mr. MALLEY. As
you Saw, they had five or six supervisors. To go back and tell you
exactly what they were doing at this time, I cannot. I do know that they
all had specific assignments in it and one of the fundamentals, again,
was to prove or disprove whether there was any possibility that they
could come up with of a conspiracy. It was also to develop all aspects
of Oswald's personal life, where he had been from the time he returned
from Mr. MCDONALD.
And this division handled the conspiracy aspect within that division? Mr. MALLEY.
There, again, it is difficult to say that they were the only ones doing
it. They were primarily, because of their knowledge with various
nationality groups, et cetera, and the fact they were looking into his
entire personal life, they would have been in a better position to come
across something than somebody handling criminal aspects. Mr. MCDONALD.
You were in the General Investigative Division? Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
Would you have any direct knowledge or supervision over what was being
done in the Domestic Intelligence Division as far as the assassination
was concerned, considering your role as liaison with the Warren
Commission? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, I would, in that every report that was sent to the Mr. MCDONALD.
When you say Division 5, what are you referring to? Mr. MALLEY.
That's the Domestic Intelligence Division, I beg your pardon. Likewise,
any teletypes that came to them, whether it seemed to refer to our work
or not, teletypes were sent to the General Investigative Division for
information so if there was anything that could be tied in, they could
do it. Mr.
MCDONALD. Well, I am going to refer to the book 5 of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, the Church committee report, where they are
speaking of a supervisor in Domestic Intelligence Division who was
reported to be the leading Cuban expert within the Bureau at that time,
and he testified before the Church committee that he was never
informed--first of all, he never even knew of any CIA assassination
attempts against Fidel Castro. And this supervisor testified before that
committee that he had no recollection of any Bureau investigation of
Cuban involvement in
Page 483 483 the
Kennedy assassination. He was asked a question: "Were there ever any
meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or
not the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And
he answered, "No; I don't recall. I would say no." And
they questioned, "Do you know if that possibility was investigated?"
Answer: "Well I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't.
Question: "Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda or
instructions that Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any
Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And
he answered, "There were no such communications, to my knowledge, ever
sent out from headquarters." And
they asked him: "If they were sent out, in all likelihood, would you
have known about it?" And he said, "Yes."
Now, this was the investigations being conducted, as you say, in
Division 5, the Domestic Intelligence, and this is the leading Cuban
expert in the Bureau at the time saying that during the assassination
investigation, he wasn't even contacted to consider this aspect. As
liaison to the Mr.
MALLEY. I don't know how good his memory was. I do know that their
division had the responsibility for keeping their own people aware of
what was going on and if he didn't know what was going on in that
section, I would say somebody was remiss. Mr.
MCDONALD. I am sorry. Mr.
MALLEY. Somebody was remiss in not keeping him aware. I can't possibly
answer what went on over in their division on a day-to-day basis. You
know, and I know that there was an investigation concerning the
possibility of Cuban involvement, if you reviewed the material. It would
be impossible for me to think that he wasn't aware of it. Mr.
MCDONALD. Is it your testimony the investigation would have been
conducted by Division 5, Mr.
MALLEY. That part of it. Mr.
MCDONALD. And we have this statement given in 1976 that the leading
Cuban specialist wasn't involved. Mr.
MALLEY. That's his statement. I can't answer for him.
Mr.
MCDONALD. OK. Turning now to
the Special Investigative Division that you referred to on the chart,
what was that division's responsibility? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think they had any specific assignment. Courtney Evans, at that
time, as I mentioned, was an Assistant Director and he was handling
liaison with the Department, primarily with Robert Kennedy and other top
officials of the Department. Mr. McDONALD.
Was part of their jurisdiction organized crime? Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my memory, yes. Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, after the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, what consideration
was given at that point to the possibility of organized crime
involvement, either in the Ruby shooting of Oswald or the overall
assassination of the President? Page 484 484 Let me ask one
question further before you answer that. After Ruby shot Oswald, how
long did it take the Bureau to learn about Jack Ruby himself, his
background, his associates, the kind of person he was? Mr.
MALLEY. Well, from the standpoint of the type of person he was, I am
sure that within an hour or so before we ever got near the
investigation, the Bureau was probably well aware of the fact that he
was running a night club which amounted to sort of a striptease place.
And beyond that, I am not able to tell you when we really developed his
full background data except that we did start so-called civil rights
investigation on the basis that he had been shot while in custody of the
police department, and that did give us the basis for jurisdiction. Mr. MCDONALD.
So, this investigation was handled by the General Investigative Civil
Rights Division? Mr. MALLEY.
General Investigative Division in the Civil Rights Section. Mr. McDONALD.
What consideration was being given at the time to the possibility of
Jack Ruby being involved with organized crime in the commission of
either of the shootings? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't tell you what they were doing back in Mr. MCDONALD.
As you pointed out, Courtney Evans was the Assistant Director of that
division and he has appeared before this committee in deposition and
interview. When he was asked whether his division had ever been asked to
render assistance in the investigation of Jack Ruby or any organized
crime aspects of the case, he said to us, I am quoting from an
interview, "They sure didn't come to me. I know they sure didn't come to
me. We had no part in that that I can recall." This committee,
in our look at this case, spoke to Mr. Charles Stanley. Do you know who
he is?
Mr. MALLEY.
Yes; I do. Mr. MCDONALD.
He was Evans' principal assistant in 1963. And he was asked whether that
division was ever asked to participate in the investigation of the
assassination. And he told us: I don't think
we had one thing to do with it. To my knowledge, we were never brought
in on that. I don't recall a thing coming through our division on Ruby
or Oswald. And then we
spoke to Jack Danahey; do you know who he is? Mr.
MALLEY. I believe he was working in Mr.
MCDONALD. In 1963, he was the assistant special agent in charge in your Page 485 485 And lastly, we
spoke to Mr. Al Staffeld, who is another official in the organized crime
section and he was asked essentially the same question and he gave
essentially the same answer, that he had no recollection of any
involvement or any information or request for assistance coming to that
division by those handling the assassination case. With that in
mind, could you explain to us how the General Investigative Division
would have been handling any organized crime aspects, the possibilities,
if there were some, to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. As
briefly as I can, if any name showed up either in the investigation of
the assassination of President Kennedy or in the investigation being
conducted by the civil rights section of the shooting of Oswald, there
is no question in my mind, and you would have to doublecheck with the
supervisors, but if a criminal figure of any known standing had been
mentioned or any criminal figure that had a lot of information in the
files on him, I don't have any doubt they would have discussed it with
the individual supervisors down in the organized crime unit. That would not
necessarily have been called to the attention of either Mr. Stanley or
Mr. Evans, and it might not even have been called to the attention of
Staffeld. If there was any reason to send any memorandum or letters or
anything else through them to be initialed by that division, it
certainly would have been done. I do know that
in the civil section--civil rights section--I was told they were in
touch with him many times on individual names that came up in connection
with possible criminal figures. Mr.
MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, after the creation of the Warren Commission, first
of all, what was the Bureau's relationship to the Commission, and you
being the one essentially in the middle, how would you categorize the
relationship? Mr.
MALLEY. Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no
unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours.
If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we
want further explanations, we will get them from you.
There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. At least, it
didn't rub off on me if there was. Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to the creation of the Commission, the Bureau was handling the
case on its own. The directives were coming out from Washington or
Dallas, or wherever, to cover leads. Did this change after the Mr. MALLEY. Not
for quite a long, long time. After the Warren Commission had had an
opportunity to review the large number of reports that had been sent to
them, they eventually started asking a few questions and in many
instances, their questions were answered by saying, if you will look at
the report of so and so on a certain page, the information is there and
you haven't located it yet. In a few instances, they sent us letters or
made telephone calls and said we have checked into this aspect; we feel
that maybe it would be well to conduct a little further investigation
and they would outline what they wanted. As far as
directing the investigation, they did not attempt to take over what we
were doing. We continued to do our own investigation Page 486 486 on everything
we thought was necessary the entire time that they were in existence and
up until the time I retired in 1971. Mr. MCDONALD.
And you are saying that the Bureau continued its own investigation, you
did not respond only to leads from the Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I'm saying. We did our own work. Whenever they had any
questions, we tried to answer them for them. They did not give us
directives, you do this, you do that, you do this. When they had
specific items they wanted to check on, they did tell us. Mr. MCDONALD.
You stated you were in Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say I was told before I got back from
Mr. MCDONALD. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover was involved in
the, I guess we could say, the blocking of the first choice for the
Warren Commission general counsel, a man by the name of Warren Olney.
Were you aware of that situation?
Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told that.
Mr. McDONALD. Did you learn of it subsequently?
Mr. MALLEY. I don't remember it. If I did know it, I don't remember it
now.
Mr. McDONALD. One of the other items that has come up over the years
regarding the
Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told. It seems to me it would
be a normal procedure if you were dealing with a large number of staff
members and committee members, that it would be well to know exactly
what was transpiring on each one, from your standpoint of your dealings
with him.
If one of them said this on a certain date, contradicted himself on
another date, certainly, it would be well to have had a record of what
was going on. So, when you refer to a file, a dossier on each one, I can
well understand why they might have had such a thing.
Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, I just have one further question. And that is
with the benefit of hindsight of 15 years and looking back on what went
on, in your opinion, was the overall investigation of both the
assassination of the President and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald
handled properly?
Mr. MALLEY. Well, I might turn that around just a little bit and say you
have had the benefit of the Church Committee investigations, you have
had the benefit of the
Page 487
487
Mr. MCDONALD. Well, we appreciate you trying to turn the table on
us--but, we are here to ask you questions.
Mr. MALLEY. No, I am not trying to turn the tables. I am just asking you
what you feel we did wrong and if I am not entitled to that, well,
that's that.
Mr. MCDONALD. I am not here to answer questions. So with that, Mr.
Chairman, I have no further questions.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Counsel. The procedure at this point will be
that the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after
which we will then operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr.
Malley, one thing I would appreciate you clearing up for me that you
just stated to Counsel for the committee, do I understand you to say
that the Commission did their work and we did ours; is that your
statement? Mr.
MALLEY. That is correct.
Chairman STOKES. And by that, what do you mean? Mr.
MALLEY. I meant, Mr. Stokes, exactly what I said, in that we were not
asked to be leg-runners or do every little thing that they might think
of. If they did have something to come up, we did it. We were operating
independently on our own investigation, but definitely under
instructions from Mr. Hoover that if they needed any clarification or
had any requests to make of us, that we carry them out fully.
Chairman STOKES. Then, for further clarification, anyone having the
understanding that in terms of the Commission's investigation that was
being directed by them and the FBI was pursuing leads under their
direction, that would not be true; is that right? Mr.
MALLEY. It would be true if they asked us. But the numbers of requests
they made was minimum. They were reviewing reports, anything else that
we sent to them and proceeding on their own to evaluate it and whenever
they made a request, we did do it. You can say that we are an
investigative arm when they needed us. But beyond that, we were not
under their direction.
Chairman STOKES. So, the basic investigation was being completed under
the total direction, then, of the FBI itself?. Mr.
MALLEY. That's right.
Chairman STOKES. In terms of your responsibilities, what was your
relationship with Assistant Director William Sullivan? Mr.
MALLEY. As I mentioned awhile ago, and I don't know whether you
understood me, I said I do not recall very many conversations that I had
with Sullivan in connection with the assassination and the Oswald case.
I did have direct communication with other people in his division.
Chairman STOKES. You know, of course, that Assistant Director Sullivan
is now deceased? Mr.
MALLEY. Yes.
Chairman STOKES. Let me read to you some excerpts from an interview with
former Assistant Director Sullivan that was conducted by another House
committee in 1975 after which I will ask for your comment. In
the interview, Mr. Sullivan was asked to recall Director Hoover's
relationship to the
Page 488 488
"did not like to see the In
this same interview, Mr. Sullivan went on further and said this, and I
again quote "From what I saw and what I heard, what I understood, he,
Mr. Hoover, was not pleased about the creation of the
Having heard this statement by Mr. Sullivan, would you concur in his
observations on this point? Mr.
MALLEY. I would not, because I have no knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan
was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation
and so on. The only comment I have heard along that line is the one that
Mr. McDonald read awhile ago based on the telephone conversation with
the White House. And I never personally heard him object to the
Chairman STOKES. In this same interview, Mr. Malley, Mr. Sullivan was
asked whether he had seen anything in the files to indicate that Oswald
had any relationship to the CIA. In response to this question, Mr.
Sullivan answered in a rather ambiguous manner, and I quote his
testimony at that point: "No
I think that has been discussed. I think there may be something on that,
but you asked me if I had seen anything. I don't recall having seen
anything like that, but I think there is some thing on that point.
Whether it is valid or not I don't know It rings a bell in my mind."
Now, it would seem that Director Sullivan was not giving a clearly
negative response to that type of a question. And I wonder, from your
investigation of this matter, whether you would make some comment with
reference to that point. Mr.
MALLEY. I am not trying to avoid your question. I have difficulty
answering it because when I was before the Church Committee, I was asked
about some CIA material that had allegedly been delivered to the Bureau
and that it had not been furnished by the Bureau to the Warren
Commission. The
material they referred to me, I had no recollection of it at the time.
Subsequently, I was shown a letter which was sent on November 23d to the
President--it may have gone to the Attorney General--where it referred
to a source in Mexico giving some information which related to the fact
that Oswald had been in Mexico and had been in communication with the
Soviet Embassy. I
do not know for sure. I can only assume where it came from. But I had no
knowledge of it at the time I was before the Church Committee, that I
can recall. Whether Mr. Sullivan had knowledge, he is the only one who
could answer the question, or maybe somebody in his division who worked
with him. I don't know what Mr. Sullivan did as far as any materials
such as this.
Chairman STOKES. On that specific point, that is as much light you can
shed on that point? Mr.
MALLEY. That is all I know about it. Page 489 489 Chairman
STOKES. Let me now make reference to another segment of the same
interview with Assistant Director Sullivan in 1975. This segment relates
to what Mr. Sullivan perceived as gaps in the Bureau's investigation
into the possibility of whether Lee Oswald was involved with others in
the assassination. Keeping in mind
that Mr. Sullivan was the man in charge of directing the Bureau's
investigation of any conspiracy aspects of the case, let me refer to
these further comments by him. "To my
recollection, we never developed any conclusive evidence that would tie
or bind Mr. Oswald to any foreign nation or to the instructions of any
foreign nation directly or indirectly in connection with the
assassination of President Kennedy. Now, there are gaps here that I
would like to make very clear. These gaps certainly bothered the men in
my division and they bothered me. And I am sure they bothered some of
the men in the "For example,
there is a gap as to what transpired when Mr. Oswald was in From your own
investigation, did you find the same or similar gaps? Mr. MALLEY. If
my memory is correct, another Government agency, who had access to
information about Oswald's activities in Russia, furnished to the Warren
Commission--my memory is not good enough to tell you that I had access
to every word of it--but I would presume if they furnished it to the
Warren Commission, it was given to us. That would have been given to the
Domestic Intelligence Division inasmuch as it related to their
activities, rather than the actual assassination. Chairman
STOKES. What about Mr. Sullivan's comment that there were other men in
the division who found such gaps disturbing. Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing I can tell you, and I repeat what I have said before, there
was very, very close coordination between the men, and I say that
regardless of what Mr. Sullivan may have said because I know it of my
knowledge. And if there
were any such gaps in anyone's mind, they certainly had an obligation to
discuss it with the men in both divisions to see to it that they were
cleared up, if possible. Chairman
STOKES. You are saying, then that no one discussed those gaps with you?
Mr. MALLEY. No.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, let me again quote Mr. Sullivan during the
course of interview. He says, "It is my understanding from conversations
on this subject, that he,
And then when asked if he believed that the Dallas FBI's secret
destruction of a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald could have been one of
the things that Mr. Hoover was afraid the Warren Commission might
uncover, Mr. Sullivan further stated as follows, and I quote him again:
"Well, that could be, but it didn't happen to come
Page 490
490
to my mind when you raised the question. I do think, though, and this is
only an opinion, I do think that what he had in mind went beyond that.
If he did have that in mind, it went to something more basic, that we
might have failed to discover a relationship between Oswald and the
Cubans, and if we had failed to discover a relationship between the two
and the Warren Commission did, then we would, indeed, as a Bureau be in
serious trouble."
Can we ask for your reaction to this point brought up by Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. MALLEY. With regard to the first part, where he is saying the
Director was opposed to this, that and the other thing, I don't know if
it was the first day I was back in Washington or the second, Mr. Hoover
called for Belmont, his associate director, and myself, to come to his
office. We were told in very firm conversation by the Director that we
were to exhaustively pursue every aspect of any lead that developed, no
matter how small it appeared to be, and to leave nothing to doubt.
If that sounds like the Director, who was trying to short-circuit the
investigation, I can't understand plain English. I think that is a very,
very important thing for you gentlemen to understand, that where I was
concerned, Mr. Hoover never said anything except go forward to the nth
degree on anything that comes to your attention.
Where Mr. Sullivan gets his information, I cannot tell you. He is dead
and I am not going to make any statements that I can't back up
personally.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, we have learned in the years since the
assassination that Director Hoover secretly disciplined 17 Bureau
officials for what he regarded as mistakes and deficiencies in their
pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald. The
fact that these Bureau officials were punished for these deficiencies in
the Oswald investigation was never revealed to the And
I quote him: "I suggested that the disciplinary action was arbitrary but
calculated rather than capricious. It was calculated, it was thought out
as a means of Mr. Hoover protecting himself against any indictment that
he was at fault in the assassination of President Kennedy. That the FBI,
under his direction, had made mistakes and, therefore, he was culpable
and apparently his reasoning, as we interpreted it at the time, was that
if he ordered disciplinary transfers and letters of censure to a large
number of men and then if he was charged with culpability in the
assassination of President Kennedy, he could say these men are the ones
responsible, and I have already taken disciplinary action against them." Do
you believe that this was true? Mr.
MALLEY. Again, I don't know where Mr. Sullivan got his information. I
know that I was not made aware nor did I ever see the memorandum which
you are referring to concerning the disciplinary action. I did hear that
some had been recommended, but I
Page 491 491 was
never made aware of what went on. I think you would have to talk to
somebody else who had more knowledge about it that I do.
Chairman STOKES. Were you personally familiar with any disciplinary
action relative to Mr. Hosty, James Hosty? Mr.
MALLEY. Yes, in that there were certain things that occurred in
One
other thing. You mentioned this note. The first time I ever heard about
the note was after it appeared in the newspapers. I believe it was a
year ago this summer. I was questioned at that time by the Bureau when
they were conducting their own investigation to find out who might have
known about it at the time, and didn't reveal it.
Chairman STOKES. The first time you heard about the note was a year ago? Mr.
MALLEY. That's correct, when it came out in the newspapers. Chairman
STOKES. Thank you. I have no further questions. The gentleman from Mr. DODD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley, for being here this morning. I would like to
go back to the very first question that Chairman Stokes raised to you. I
didn't write down your exact quote when you responded, but it struck me.
You talked about the relationship between the Bureau and the It occurred to
me that we had a commission that was set up by the President of the I sensed, in
your response, and this is my opinion, but I sensed in your response
that the creation of the Warren Commission was a source of embarrassment
to the Bureau because it, in effect, was saying that we can't rely on
the Bureau to do a thorough and complete investigation of this matter,
and we have to set up a separate commission. Would I be
incorrect in assuming that that was not an uncommon feeling among upper
echelon people within the Bureau that, in fact, the creation of the
Warren Commission was, in effect; a black eye; that the very fact it was
created was a black eye for the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. The
only answer I can give you on that is no official--- Mr. DODD. Is no
what? Mr. MALLEY. No
official higher than I has discussed their feelings with me about the
creation of the Page 492 492 Director's
feeling that we should cooperate fully and do anything we could to help,
which we did. Mr. DODD. Your
answer now has a bit of a different twist to it than it did when you
originally answered it. Mr. MALLEY. No,
you are indicating that I felt there was something wrong, that I was not
in agreement that the Commission should be created. If I gave that
impression, I am sorry because it was none of my business whether they
did or did not have a commission. Mr. DODD. Let
me ask you this: You talked about it as a business relationship, and I
presume by that you mean that since you, the agency, the Bureau, was the
body responsible for the collection of data, evidence and so forth, in
effect, the Bureau was the investigating arm of the Commission. The
Commission did not have a separate group of investigators. It relied
upon the Bureau for the collection of information; isn't that correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct. Mr. DODD. Am I
to assume further from your response to Mr. Stokes' question that unless
the Commission asked for something specifically, unless they asked for
certain data and evidence, that the Bureau was not forthcoming on its
own with information--- Mr. MALLEY. No,
that's a completely erroneous impression. We were constantly turning
over reports, every time that one was received from the field, to the So, when you
say that we were not doing anything unless they asked us, that is
completely wrong. Mr. DODD. The
Bureau volunteered information? Mr. MALLEY. We
kept doing it up until the day they disbanded the Commission. Mr.
DODD. Why didn't you give them the Hosty letter? Mr.
MALLEY. Because I didn't know about it. If I had I certainly would have. Mr.
DODD. I am not suggesting you yourself, I am talking about the Bureau.
If the Bureau was cooperating in giving information to the Warren
Commission, you were aware of the Hosty letter, that is the Bureau was,
why didn't the Bureau in the sense of cooperation you are describing,
turn over the Hosty letter to the Warren Commission? Mr.
MALLEY. I can't answer the question because not knowing about it, I
don't know what the thinking was of the people who had it or knew about
it. Mr.
DODD. So, using that example, there was not a full sense of cooperation
in terms of making the information available? Mr.
MALLEY. Well I would have to say, is there a man in this room who never
made a mistake in judgment? Mr.
DODD. I am not suggesting that there is a mistake in judgment. You are
talking about a letter written in the hand of the man who has been
accused of assassinating the President to an FBI agent in Mr.
MALLEY. I can't answer your question any more than saying what I have
already. Page 493 493 Mr. DODD. Did
you have any, or to your knowledge, did anyone in the Bureau have any
kind of a special relationship with anyone who was a member of the Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I am aware of. There is a possibility that somebody may have been
very friendly and talked to them, but I don't know of any special
request that was ever made to anyone to keep them advised. Mr. DODD. You
never made any requests? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. DODD. To
your knowledge, no one else made any requests of any member of that
Commission to report on what the activities of the executive
sessions of that Commission were?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I can recall. Mr. DODD. Mr.
Chairman, I think my 5 minutes may be up. I will come back. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. McKINNEY.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley,
during the original investigation in Dallas, and when you were first
brought in, was there a tremendous amount of pressure from the Bureau to
get it done? Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on how you interpret the comment that you have just made.
There was all kinds of pressure to get everything under control as fast
as you could. Everybody was reading things from the news media, radio,
television and so one, questions were being asked, what about this, what
about that, and no matter how much pressure you were getting, a group of
men can only do so much in a given time in handling investigative work;
whereas as far as I am concerned, I repeat again, I was never given any
time limit that we had to have anything finished. Mr. McKINNEY.
In other words, at that stage in your investigation you did not feel
that there was pressure being brought to bear that resulted in the
investigation being anything but complete? Mr. MALLEY. Not
where I am concerned. Mr. MCKINNEY.
Did you hear through general gossip columns of the FBI or your fellow
colleagues, of any inordinate pressure being brought upon the FBI by the
Attorney General or by anyone else in the administration, including the
Director, to speed it up at any cost? Mr. MALLEY. No. Mr. McKINNEY.
After the
Mr. MALLEY.
Truthfully, I cannot remember that such comments were made. It wouldn't
have had any effect whatsoever on what Page 494 494 the Bureau did
at that time regardless of whether they wanted to wind it up or whether
they didn't. We were working on something and we would have continued it
until we thought we had fully exhausted it. Mr. McKINNEY.
You made a statement earlier that you were sending reports to the Did you feel,
as an individual and as a long-term agent, and I gather a specialist in
your field which was Communism in the United States, that the Warren
Commission was brought to a close too soon, before it had all of the
information the FBI had? Or, did you feel that it should have been
continued longer? Mr. MALLEY. The
best answer I can give you on that is that the majority of reports that
were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of
the summer, 1964, were rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous
allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. I am not in a
position to give you examples, but just things that would have to be
checked out to see if there was anything to them. I do think that
the Mr. McKINNEY.
The Mr.
MALLEY. Well, when you say his ties with organized crime, the only
comment I could make is from what I remember reading in reports. I do
remember reading that there were several individuals, possibly high
school associates of Ruby, that did eventually become pretty well known
in organized crime. To the best of my--- Mr. McKINNEY.
Wasn't it pretty well known to the FBI that Jack Ruby, No. 1, was a
member of organized crime, No. 2, he ran a strip joint and has been
somewhat commonly referred to as a supplier of both women and booze to
political and police figures in the city of Dallas. Didn't you find
it a little difficult to accept the Mr. MALLEY. You
are saying the final findings. All I know is that every effort was made
to check out his activities completely and anything that we checked was
given to them. Now, I am not
in a position to criticize what the Warren Commission findings were and
I can't say that I agree or disagree with what they found, it is too
many years ago. Mr.
McKINNEY. Do you think that the push for speed and a resolution to the Mr.
MALLEY. Well, based on my conversations with Mr. Rankin I think if he
felt we were shortchanging him on time that he would have made a
statement for the record at that time to say so. Page 495 495 Mr. MCKINNEY. I
have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. FORD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley,
yesterday, Mr. Kelly, with the Secret Service, testified that on
December 9, 1963, they were instructed to turn over the assassination to
the FBI. To what extent was this investigation continued by the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to what Secret Service was doing or what? Mr. FORD. No;
when they turned the investigation over to the FBI on December 9, after
receiving orders from the White House, to what extent was this
investigation continued from that point on? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I don't know whether I interpret your question correctly because
we were already doing everything we possibly could. We continued to do
so. Mr. FORD. Mr.
Kelly said yesterday that the Secret Service considered the case
practically closed when Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested. I think you said
earlier that the FBI did not feel that way, and so I am asking at this
point what steps or how did you continue the investigation? Mr. MALLEY. We
never changed our position one way or the other. Just because Secret
Service was dropping out of it we went right ahead with everything that
we could possibly do to definitely establish not only the information we
thought was correct, namely, Oswald was probably involved, but to firmly
show it and see if there was anyone else involved, which we had in mind
constantly. Mr. FORD. Memos
were coming from Director Hoover instructing that the case be wrapped up
as soon as possible, is that correct, Mr. MALLEY.
That is what you are telling me. I wasn't in Mr. FORD. One
final question. Could Director
Hoover's attitude toward the Kennedys have had any effect or influence
on the investigation of the assassination? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think I am going to say this for about the third or fourth time.
He told me not to stop at anything, to go all out and do everything to
thoroughly exhaust every possibility. That certainly wouldn't indicate
that any relationship he had would have had any effect on our
investigation. Mr. FORD. Thank
you. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana,
Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
review again exactly the structure of authority in Is it your
testimony that you were put in charge and that Shanklin and Hosty
reported to you during their days out there? Mr. MALLEY.
Hosty did not report to me directly at any time. As far as Mr.
Shanklin's position, he was the agent in charge of the office, I was
sent down there to help coordinate the activities, to help him out in
any way I could. There were a
number of days where I think that both of us were on the phone close to
16 to 18 hours a day, and beyond that, I don't know whether I know
exactly what your question is. Page 497 496 Mr. FITHIAN.
Well, who made decisions? Mr. MALLEY. If
there were any decisions to be made, if Shanklin was the one who
received the information, he discussed it with me. If we agreed, fine.
If we didn't agree, it was up to me to say yes or no. Mr. FITHIAN.
So, in other words, you were the authority in Mr. MALLEY. As
far as from the sLandpoint of making any decisions on that level. Mr. FITHIAN.
OK. At the time you were conducting your investigation, did you know,
were you aware that when Oswald killed Officer Tippit, presumably, that
he was in about the most direct walking route that one could lay out
between his apartment and Jack Ruby's Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I knew it immediately. It did come out because of
checks that were made to try and tie in whether or not Ruby and Oswald
had ever had any relationship of any kind, friendship, working
relationship, or anything else, the Bureau's investigation did not ever
reveal the slightest indication of a tieup between Ruby or they were
ever--- Mr. FITHIAN. I
understand that. I am just asking whether or not you were aware at the
time the investigation was----- Mr. MALLEY.
Sometime during the investigation I definitely was. Mr. FITHIAN.
And were you aware of a memorandum from Evans to Belmont, or the
substance of that memorandum, dated November 26, 1963, which I believe
is JFK F-457, in which it is clearly acknowledged, that at least there
are rumors, this is not evidence, there are rumors, people want to know
and it says "There have also been allegations that Oswald and Ruby were
known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been further
alleged Oswald was killed to silence him." Just to clarify
for you in the record, I am not now espousing the theory that
necessarily Ruby killed Oswald to silence him. What I am doing is this.
This data was in the possession of the Bureau, that is, it was no news
to you or anybody else that there were rumors that these two men were
associated and, therefore, it seems to me rather pertinent that the
chief investigative officer there on behalf of the Bureau would have
known that, to the layman at least, it appears that Oswald might be
walking from his apartment to Jack Ruby's at the time that he
inadvertently came upon police officer Tippit. My question is
whether or not you at the time you were conducting the investigation
were aware of that? Mr. MALLEY.
There is no way that I can go back 15 years and tell you when I became
aware of it. While I was in Dallas I certainly went out and retraced the
steps from here to here to here, to the rooming house he stayed in, and
so on and so forth. Mr. FITHIAN. So
you were aware of it sometime before December 10th? Mr. MALLEY. I
think I left on the 12th. Mr. FITHIAN. On
the 12th, when you returned, you were aware of it some time? Mr. MALLEY. I
am reasonably sure I would have had to be. Mr. FITHIAN.
Let me move to another question. Page 497 497 I think you
testified that you were not aware of a threatening note from Oswald to
the Bureau in Mr. MALLEY. Had
I known about it I would certainly have done something about it. I am
sorry, he didn't tell me. Mr. FITHIAN.
Did you recommend to the Bureau any kind of censure or punishment or
reprimand for either Hosty or Shanklin as a result of subsequently
finding out that this had been destroyed and that, you while in charge,
were not informed? Mr. MALLEY.
First of all, I didn't find out about it until a year ago, when I had
been out of the Bureau for some 6 years. So I would not be making any
recommendations as to what should be done about it. Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORD [now
presiding]. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. FITHIAN.
Were you made aware at any time during your stay in Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that on Friday, November 22. I had not had a chance to see the file
before I left to go to Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you. I would like
now to ask a question of a much more general nature and perhaps would
call upon sort of your general philosophy and review of your thoughts
while you were in the Bureau. Yesterday we
had some interesting testimony here from the Secret Service. One of the
important aspects of that testimony was a rather clear indication on the
part of the witness that he believed Oswald to be some kind of a nut,
and it seemed to have emanated from this witness' view that anybody who
attempted the assassination of the President of the United States would
have to be psychopathic or he would have to be mentally out of order. Would you
concur with that general line of interpretation? Mr. MALLEY. I
am not in a position to give you a very direct answer. All I can tell
you is that there are many people around the country that you would
never know what their thoughts were or what they were capable of doing,
and that because one does something on a spur of a moment or with a few
days of deliberation, I don't know how you can describe the individual. We do know that
Oswald, 6 months before he killed Kennedy, took a shot at Oswald, I mean
at General Walker. So the man's mentality must have been one of wanting
to either do something where he would feel proud of himself, or
something of that nature, Page 498 498 but that is not
a very direct answer to what you have asked me. I just don't know how to
answer you. Mr. FITHIAN. I
was just wondering if ever in any of the times when you were talking
over coffee and---- Mr. MALLEY. The
only thought that I have ever had on the matter is that from the very
early stages of Oswald's life he seemed to be a complete loner,
completely independent, and resented taking instructions from anyone. Mr. FITHIAN.
What I was trying to get at is whether or not you and the other high
officials in the Bureau, when discussing this, either after the Kennedy
case, after the Kennedy assassination, or before, generally tend to
believe that the only person capable of actually trying to undertake the
assassination of a President or a high official in the United States
would have to be mentally unbalanced or off or different? Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say that that is a complete necessarily correct situation. You do know
that where Oswald is concerned he did some planning on his own. You can
say that he was mentally unbalanced. He was certainly smart enough to do
a little figuring on that particular situation. He did manage to get
away from the building, not for long, but he did manage to get away. Who
is to say whether the man is unbalanced or whether he has just got a
temporary point that he wants to make for himself and make some history,
whether he is going to be prosecuted, killed or what himself, I don't
know. Mr. FITHIAN.
Mr. Chairman, the reason I raise this question, is that I guess that I
was increasingly disturbed by yesterday's testimony and I really kind of
wanted to go back to that witness or to those witnesses, both of these
agencies, and ask whether or not either agency would in retrospect have
been able to detect or identify a politically motivated, apart from a
pathologically motivated, psychopathically motivated, type of an
assassination. I guess I am
not sure that we are fully aware that there are terrorists who for
political reasons these days do things which cannot be normally
attributed to somebody who is just mentally off. Maybe we would have
thought that 15 years ago, that anybody who hijacked a French airliner
or who did many of the kinds of sensational terrorist things that have
happened in the last 5 years, or so, maybe we would have thought that
only someone who was mentally warped could have done that, but my
question, which is very ill phrased, and ineptly phrased, is whether or
not, either then or now, the Bureau and the Secret Service and other
agencies are really thinking in the dimension of today's world in terms
of real terrorists, who act for political, not personally unbalanced
reasons, and it disturbs me that that kind of thinking might have
prevailed then and therefore, the whole investigation by the FBI was put
in that direction rather than to immediately question and thoroughly
investigate the potential of either a politically inspired collaborative
thing or one in which organized crime was involved? There are two
or three other kinds of lines of investigation that seem to me to be
rather inadequate by the Bureau and the Secret Service and the Warren
Commission, as for as that is concerned, and that is why I was wondering
what your philosophy was, where you were coming from? Page 499 499 Mr. MALLEY.
Well, the only thing that I can say to you is that at that time and
today you have literally hundreds of people walking around the streets
that may be capable of violence or terrorist activities at any time. I
don't know how the Government could afford to spend the money that would
be necessary to keep a surveillance on everyone that they thought had
the potential to do something out of the question. Mr. FITHIAN.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to this question but I am going to
have to run and vote or miss that vote. Thank you very much. Mr. EDGAR [now
presiding]. I yield back to the Chairman and then I will ask some
questions. Chairman
STOKES. The gentleman from Mr. EDGAR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley, who
is in charge of the Monday after Oswald's assassination by Jack Ruby, of
the FBI's investigation into the death of President Kennedy? Mr. MALLEY. Who
was actually in charge of it? In Mr. EDGAR. OK,
let's start with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think you would say Mr. Alan Belmont, Associate Director under
Mr. Hoover, was actually overseeing the entire investigation. Mr. EDGAR.
Again, would you sit closer to the mike? Mr. Alan Belmont? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. EDGAR. In
your opinion, Mr. Alan Belmont was in charge of the investigation? Mr. MALLEY.
Overall. Mr. EDGAR. For
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. What was your relationship with
him? Mr. MALLEY. I
described my prior position. I was, therefore, working under Mr. EDGAR. At
any time in the days following the assassination of President Kennedy,
did you suggest or did you participate in a meeting to develop an
investigative plan of where the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
going to go in analyzing this particular case? Mr. MALLEY. To
say that that particular question, the purpose of a meeting, I cannot do
it. I do know that I had many, many conferences with Mr. Belmont by
myself, many with the supervisory staff that was working in the Division
that I was from, as well as supervisors from the Domestic Intelligence
Division. Mr. EDGAR. Did
the FBI have a plan? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, there was a definite plan, namely, the purpose of the
investigation, as we have said five times already, was to find out
whether there was any conspiracy involved and to make sure whether or
not Oswald did actually kill the President.
Mr. EDGAR. Was
that plan written down anywhere? Mr. MALLEY. If
it was, I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. Now,
you have just indicated that the FBI had a plan and that that plan was
not written down anywhere but---- Page 500 500 Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say it wasn't. I said I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. You
did suggest, though, that the verbal plan was to check out conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly. Mr. EDGAR. What
part did the FBI play in trying to coordinate the information of the CIA
and Secret Service? Mr. MALLEY. If
we received any information from the Secret Service or the CIA we would
have taken it into consideration in our own investigation. Following the
creation of the
Mr. EDGAR. Why
wouldn't you have suggested that the FBI sit down with the CIA and the
Secret Service to find out what information they had and to share with
them what information you had about Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, or
anything relating to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY.
With respect to the Secret Service, while I was in As to CIA
relationships, that would have been handled by Mr. Sullivan's division
and I can't offhand say what they did with CIA. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you talk to Mr. Kelly about the scope of the FBI's investigative plan? Mr. MALLEY. I
do not remember that I did. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
chairman, I ask unanimous consent to continue for 3 additional minutes. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
Kelly testified yesterday that his agency checked out Lee Harvey
Oswald's rifle in Chicago, and the purchase of that rifle, and
discovered that the FBI had already been there and that some information
was shared with the proprietor of the shop indicating that the FBI had
said don't talk to anyone else about this. Do you know if that is
accurate? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have the slightest idea. I am not ignoring your question, I just
don't know. Mr. EDGAR. Just
a few moments ago you said that the purpose of the Was that your
testimony? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I said the purpose. I may have been asked a question
where I said I would presume that they were asked to make certain what
the FBI did and whether it was complete and thorough and so on. Page 501 501 Mr. EDGAR. Was
that the attitude of the FBI at the time of the Mr. MALLEY. We
just went through this a little while ago, and I can't tell you of
anybody that had any attitudes as such. They may have talked among
themselves, I don't know what they did. All I know is that nobody tried
to convince me that we were to do anything other than a very thorough
job and cooperate fully with the Mr. EDGAR. But
if the prevailing attitude were that of the same phraseology that you
have just shared, it would indicate to me that the FBI was a bit
paranoid about the Warren Commission in that it was in a sense looking
over its shoulder and doublechecking it and looking at its
investigation, and that is backed up by some comments that I just read
in a report that we have in our folder here, the final report, book V of
the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
reference of the intelligence agencies. It goes through a whole litany
of concerns that the FBI had about the overseeing of its investigation
and the things that the Did it ever
occur to you that the Warren Commission may have been formed to provide
a coordinated function of putting together a puzzle and that rather than
being a doublecheck of the FBI it was m essence using the FBI as its
investigative arm, and it was looking at the Secret Service and the CIA
and Oswald and Ruby and just trying to figure out what in fact took
place in Dallas, and what it could tell the American people about that
particular event, with no malice
or intention of doing anything to the FBI. Is that a possibility? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, unless I saw the instructions that were given to Mr. Rankin and
the entire Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
in order that the record may be complete--and I welcome Mr. Malley here
today--Mr. Malley, you and I have been acquainted for something in
excess of 35 years, isn't that right? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And
you and I were both assigned to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. DEVINE. I
believe you were in a supervisory capacity and I was just an ordinary
special agent; is that right? Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say an ordinary, Mr. Devine, I would say you were assigned
there and were doing your job. Mr. DEVINE. I
believe that Assistant Director Belmont was also assigned to the Page 502 502 Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And
he has since deceased? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. How
long ago did he pass away? Mr. MALLEY. I
believe it was a year ago this spring, but I may be wrong. Time goes by
fast.
Mr. DEVINE.
Yes. Mr. Malley, I
am sorry that these rollcalls require us to be absent from time to time,
and I understand that our chairman and perhaps our counsel questioned
you about the statements attributed to Mr. Sullivan. Are you in a
position--you may have answered this--are you in a position to state
whether or not Mr. Sullivan was looked upon with disfavor by the
majority of your personnel? I don't mean to put you on the spot. Mr. MALLEY. I
said before--Mr. Sullivan is dead, he can't speak for himself--I will
repeat what I have told the two men from your committee, that I said to
them, Mr. Sullivan was not an easy man to get along with and on a
personal situation. I think I am correct in saying that three out of
five telephone calls I ever had with him I ended up hanging up after a
discussion where there was no possibility of discussing anything
sensibly. It all comes
down to the fact that Mr. Sullivan had a very strong attitude, that if I
say something, I am correct, and if you don't agree with me, you are
wrong. Mr. DEVINE. Are
you in a position to say the circumstances under which he left the
Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I
had left the Bureau prior to that time so I am really not capable of
saying. It would be strictly hearsay on my part. I do know from rumors
that there were some difficulties encountered. Mr. DEVINE. Mr.
Malley, I think I know what your answer will be to this but I think it
should be made clear for the record. Did the Bureau
have any preconceived notion on who was responsible for the Kennedy
assassination and then conducted an investigation to confirm that
preconceived idea? Mr. MALLEY.
Other members of your committee have indicated they might feel that we
did that. That is not correct. As far as people who were working on the
assassination, they had an open mind and still had an open mind up to
the time that I left the Bureau in 1971 that there could be somebody
else involved. Mr. DEVINE. So
that in this investigation the Bureau followed its time-tested policy of
being purely a factfinding organization, seeking facts and not making
recommendations, letting the chips fall where they may; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE.
Finally, Mr. Malley, I would like to refer to the narration our chief
counsel, Mr. Blakey, when he was giving pretty much the history of the
Bureau. In one place he indicated that J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct
priorities were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected
FBI progress, and the positive image of the Bureau. Page 503 503 He also had,
according to some, two glaring blindspots in the areas of civil rights
and organized crimes, which put him at odds with the Kennedy
administration. Are you in a
position to make any comment upon the activities of the Bureau in the
area of civil rights up to and including this time? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, I think I am. Mr. DEVINE.
Would you state that, please? Mr. MALLEY.
Personally, while I was in the field, before I was called into the seat
of government, I had several occasions where I was asked, not asked,
told, to conduct civil rights investigations, which I did. Back in the
late middle-forties, while I was assigned as an assistant agent in
charge in Houston, Tex., I attended a number of schools for police and
sheriffs, where one of the topics to be discussed was the civil rights
statutes, and explained to the police officers who were present the full
details of why the investigations were being made on civil rights
matters and the necessity of changing their ways, if they were engaging
in any activities whereby they would be in violation of the civil rights
statutes. On returning to
or coming back to I also know
that some claims were made concerning our attitude and when you say that
we didn't take over and do things until the Kennedys came in, I remember
one instance, which I would like for your record to show, namely, that
certain people in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
felt that they had a perfect right to have agents assigned to them to go
out in the field and they would direct all of the agent's activities and
not be in a position to do what they felt needed to be done except on
the departmental attorney's instructions. The Director
flatly refused to assign personnel under those circumstances but did
say, "you tell us the cases you want investigated, we will do them, turn
the results over to you, and if your have any problems with our
investigation we will do as much more or anything else that you want to
ask us to do, but we will conduct our original investigation." Beyond
that, I think I have covered it. Mr. DEVINE. The
second part of the question, Mr. Malley, had to do with organized crime
and some conflict with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position
to comment on that? I know you were not assigned to the criminal
division at that time. Mr. MALLEY. I
am not really in a position to comment about any conflict. I do know
that following the Kennedy assassination, I am sorry, the Kennedy
administration taking power, more emphasis was placed on organized
crime. Beyond that I am not in a position to comment. Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Page 504 504 Mr. Malley,
with reference to some of the answer's you have just given Mr. Devine
with reference to the attitude of the department with reference to civil
rights, were you still with the department when the COINTEL program was
initiated? Mr. MALLEY.
That was in another division. I did hear references to it. I was not
thoroughly familiar with it. Chairman
STOKES. Well, since you have left the department are you now familiar
with the COINTEL program? Mr. MALLEY.
Only what I have read in the newspapers. No other way could I be
familiar with it since I left the Bureau. Chairman
STOKES. Are you aware of the fact that as a result of a Senate committee
uncovering the COINTEL program, it has been described as being one of
the most disgraceful activities to ever be conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation against people like Dr. Martin Luther King, and
other civil rights persons? Mr. MALLEY. I
saw it in the paper that there was a lot of criticism. Chairman
STOKES. And having seen that in the paper, does that in any way impact
upon your statements here this morning with reference to the great civil
rights attitude of the department? Mr. MALLEY I
didn't hear your last part Chairman
STOKES. From what you have read, then, about the impact upon the
statements that you have made here about the fine attitude of the
department toward civil rights? Mr. MALLEY.
When you say department, are you referring to the Justice
Department or do you mean a department in the FBI? Chairman
STOKES. I am talking about the FBI. Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing that I can tell you is what I did say, that we were
interested in conducting civil rights investigations. What was
handled under the COINTEL program I cannot comment on because I don't
know exactly what was going on. Chairman
STOKES. Another point with reference to Mr. Sullivan. It seems to me
that the underlying question here is not whether he was a difficult man
to get along with. The question, it seems to me, is as you knew him, was
he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't cite instances. I would say there are a number of recollections
where I felt to myself that that is not the way I understood the
situation to be when I read certain things that he had prepared. Chairman
STOKES. That is not my question, sir. My question is, as you knew him,
was he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I
wasn't acquainted with him on a social basis. As far as official
dealings with him, I did not always believe everything that he tried to
convince me of. That still is not a direct answer. That is the only way
I can answer it. Chairman
STOKES. Well, let's put it another way. From all that you knew about
him, would you disbelieve him under oath? Mr. MALLEY. I
think that if it looked to Mr. Sullivan like it was to his advantage to
say what he was thinking he might say it and I don't know whether he
would even be aware whether he' was fabricating or not. Page 505 505 Chairman
STOKES. Mr. Malley, I think the question I am putting to you is a fairly
simple question and really requires a fairly simple answer. From all you
know about him. Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him. Chairman
STOKES. Beg pardon? Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him, if that is a better answer for you. Chairman
STOKES. There is a difference between trust and credibility. Mr. MALLEY. Let
me say then that I don't think his credibility was as high as most
people that I was acquainted with in the Bureau. Chairman
STOKES. You don't care to answer my question, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say that he lied deliberately at any time. All I know is that I
had many dealings--- Chairman
STOKES. I just asked you sir, from all you knew about him, would you
believe him under oath?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
necessarily. Chairman
STOKES. Now, Mr. Hoover was a powerful man, wasn't he. Isn't that a fair
statement? Mr. MALLEY. I
would regard it as true. Chairman
STOKES. And throughout the Bureau, by the men in the Bureau, he was
regarded as being a powerful man, was he not? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes. Chairman
STOKES. And it will be a fair statement to say that in his imposing
position he intimidated men who worked in that Bureau, isn't that true? Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with that statement. Some fellows may have felt that way. I
felt that if I didn't like what Mr. Hoover was doing I had a right to
walk out any time I wanted to. He didn't ask me to come to work, I asked
him to work there. Chairman
STOKES. Well, with reference to other men in the Bureau, wasn't it
commonly known that he intimidated men? Mr. MALLEY. All
I can answer there is to say that if something went wrong your agents
knew they would probably be receiving disciplinary action. If you call
that intimidation, maybe it is. Chairman
STOKES. And with reference to that disciplinary action, because of the
fear of incurring his wrath, wasn't it commonly known in the Bureau that
field supervisors would often cover up the mistakes of their men so as
not to incur his wrath? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have knowledge of that. I was a field supervisor for 4 1/2 years
and I don't remember that I ever covered up for anybody. Chairman
STOKES. Well, I am not asking you what you did, I am asking, wasn't it
common knowledge? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what other people did. When you say common knowledge, I
don't know that to be common knowledge. Chairman
STOKES. I have no further questions. The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr.
Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
yield to Mr. Sawyer. Chairman
STOKES. I am sorry. I didn't realize the gentleman had gotten back. The
gentleman from Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Page 506 506 As I understand
your job of liaison entailed reading carefully anything that went from
the Bureau to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. SAWYER. At
least that was part of the job? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes. Mr. SAWYER.
What was the purpose of your reading carefully everything that went to
the Mr. MALLEY. To
make certain that everything was properly, thoroughly, and exhaustively
run out. Mr. Belmont and I had the same assignment, and in reading
reports, et cetera, I know that I did it, and I am sure that Belmont
made notes reading reports to double check back and see what the
preliminary investigation was on certain matters, whether it had been
completely followed through. If there wasn't
a definite answer, to see to it that further investigation was made,
check with the supervisors to find out whether more investigation was
being conducted. Mr. SAWYER. Did
you have authority to decide, after reading something, that it wasn't
going to go to the
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. There was nothing that came through, as far as the Bureau was
concerned, that did not eventually go to the Mr. SAWYER.
When you say eventually, what do you mean eventually? Mr. MALLEY.
What I am saying is that if a report came through and it was obviously
incomplete and had not been thoroughly looked into, we sent it back to
the field to get a more complete investigation and then sent over a
completed product. Mr. SAWYER. Did
you do that, did you exercise any discretion with respect to things
that, in your judgment, might be embarrassing to the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. SAWYER. Was
that part of your job? Mr. MALLEY. As
I said before, we were told to hold nothing back from the Mr. SAWYER. But
you were told to read carefully anything before it went? Mr. MALLEY. And
to make sure it was accurate and fully investigated. Mr. SAWYER. You
operated somewhat as a censor, then, between the Bureau and the Mr. MALLEY. No,
sir. When you say a censor, you are inferring I would have the right to
take this out and take that out, and I am saying that my only purpose in
reading material was to make certain that the investigation was
complete. Mr. SAWYER. So
you only had authority to add in and not take out, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. And
the additions would only be to get further data to explain what the
thing was all about. Mr. SAWYER. And
you never in the course of this saw this Hosty letter either? Mr. MALLEY. I
have said four times I never saw the letter until-am sorry, you were
out, maybe you didn't hear me--I never knew Page 507 507 anything about
the Hosty letter until 1 year ago when it came out in the newspapers. Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you. I have nothing
further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana,
Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, let me
just make sure I am correct. You were the first person assigned, you
were initially assigned as the liaison to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. FITHIAN.
And did anyone else serve as the liaison throughout its existence? Mr. MALLEY. Not
to my knowledge, unless there was some situation where I was ill or
might have taken a day off, and I don't recall that occurring. Mr. FITHIAN.
And you told us that you reviewed documents and all matters that went to
the Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. I
would now like to direct your attention to the Oswald address book and
ask you whether or not you saw that document prior to its going to the Mr. MALLEY. To
be specific, I can't recall that I saw the address book as such. I saw
the results of everything that was in his address book in a report form
and I believe that I was shown the actual address book. Mr. FITHIAN.
And did you satisfy yourself that it was authentic and complete; that
is, did you look at the report that was going from the Bureau to the
Warren Commission, compare that with the address book itself?. Mr. MALLEY. I
had to use a little reliance on people who were working with me. To take
the time to go through everything that was in Oswald's notebook and
compare item by item, I could not take the time to do it. Mr. FITHIAN. So
that we can be completely accurate, then, it would be inaccurate to say
that you read everything that was forwarded from the Bureau to the Mr. MALLEY. I
did make the comment that I read any letters and all reports that went
from the Bureau. Mr. FITHIAN.
Are you aware that a particular page from the Oswald notebook was not
forwarded and that that page included agent Hosty's name and address and
license number? Mr. MALLEY. I
had no recollection of it. I was told by one of your staff members that
that occurred. Mr. FITHIAN. Do
you have any comment for the committee as to how that could have
occurred? Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not in a position to answer you because I knew nothing about it. Mr. FITHIAN. Is
it your professional judgment that the book once acquired by the FBI
always remained in the possession of the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. It
would be most unusual if it did not. Page 508 508 Mr. FITHIAN.
And, therefore, would it be fair for the committee to conclude--- Mr. MALLEY. May
I interrupt you there? Mr. FITHIAN.
Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I
do not know if this is one of the items of evidence that was picked up
by the Dallas Police Department prior to the time that it was turned
over to the FBI. Mr. FITHIAN.
Who would have given you the book? Mr. MALLEY. One
of the supervisors in Mr. FITHIAN.
Does the Bureau retain some kind of chain of custody within the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY.
Generally speaking, when a piece of evidence is picked up in the field,
it is handled by the agent who picked it up until he dictates his
material. It is then put in an evidence envelope. If it is coming to Mr. FITHIAN. So
it would be reasonable, would it not, to believe that the only possible
alteration of the contents of the book would have to have been done by
somebody in the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. All
I can tell you is that we did receive a lot of material from the Dallas
Police Department. When that book may have been turned over, if it was
turned over by them, I don't know. Mr. FITHIAN. I
should correct this by saying it is the transcription that has the page
removed. Mr. MALLEY. Not
from the actual report, and not from the actual notebook. Mr. FITHIAN.
No, I believe it is; I have to check with counsel on this, but I believe
it is the transcription of the address book, that which was prepared by
the Bureau, the transcription prepared to go through you to the Warren
Commission, is that not correct, and so it would be a page of that
transcription that is missing.
Mr. MALLEY. I
would have no way of knowing. Mr. FITHIAN.
Who would have prepared the transcription and signed off on it? Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on the agent's name that was on the report or whether it
was an insert prepared by an agent. Mr. FITHIAN.
But when it got to you, you would verify that someone had, even if you
didn't check it yourself, line by line, you would verify that somebody,
some responsible authority in the Bureau, had signed off on the
document, wouldn't you, isn't that the way you keep your custody
straight? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring now to keeping the evidence straight or are you referring
to this transcription? Mr. FITHIAN.
You see, I am not a lawyer, but it just seems to me that when the
President of the United States is killed and documents are transmitted
from one person to another or one agency to another, certainly documents
as important as those belonging to the alleged assassin--- Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly. Mr. FITHIAN
[continuing]. That there would have to be some kind of clear chain of
travel for the document. I don't think it just appears in your hand, and
so my question is: Was there not some Page 509 509 system in the
Bureau whereby each person who had that and prepared the transcript and
brought it to you as the supervisor, as the liaison to the Warren
Commission, would have signed off on it? And your responsibility to the
supervisor would have been to ascertain that, in fact, someone had
attested to you in one form or another that that was a bona fide
document, a complete document before it went to the Mr. MALLEY. You
are dealing with an entirely different situation in this instance. It
was usually handled in the field; namely, most pieces of evidence went
direct from a field office to the As far as
signing a document of some kind, to say this one handled it or that one
handled it, I don't know of any time the Bureau followed that much of a
clerical procedure. Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask for unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr.
Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog* nized. Mr. FITHIAN.
Let me review this, then. Since it has now been demonstrated that a
page, in fact, of the transcription was missing and since reasonable
evidence is that it came to the Bureau complete, the alteration, the
omission would have to come either at the Dallas office level, at the
Washington supervisor level, or by you or by the Warren Commission prior
to publication. That's the only four stops that it made; isn't that
correct? Mr. MALLEY.
Correct. Mr. FITHIAN.
And your testimony is that you did not know of the omission. Is that
correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I said. Mr. FITHIAN.
Now, there is additional evidence that the page, in fact, was not only
missing, but that it was retyped so as to appear to be a complete
record. What kind of penalty, what kind of reprimand might be reasonably
expected to come down from the top, from you or someone, for the person
who had made such an alteration? Wouldn't there be some kind of
discipline? Mr. MALLEY. If
it had been known, there would have been a thorough check made and
recommendations made. Mr. FITHIAN.
The way it appears to the casual and perhaps to even the careful
observer is that the Hosty note was destroyed because it reflected badly
on the Bureau, that the Oswald transcription was altered because it
reflected badly on the Bureau and a number of other things were done so
as to put the Bureau in the best possible light. Can you give us
any hard evidence as to why we should not believe that that is the case;
that is, that various things were altered, omitted, or drafted in such a
way as to put the Bureau in the very best possible light rather than to
give the complete information to the Warren Commission? Page 510 510 Mr. MALLEY.
Concerning your second comment, that Hosty's name was left out of this
transcription, I know of no good reason that it would have been left
out. Hosty, at one time, was handling the investigation of Oswald. The
fact he had gone out and talked to his wife would be no reason to try to
eliminate Hosty's name that I know of. So, I am not in
a position to say why anyone would eliminate it. I have to let you draw
any conclusions you want to as to why these things were done because I
do not know about them. Mr. FITHIAN.
And you are not prepared to offer any hard information as to why that
kind of conclusion might be drawn by someone reviewing the documents? Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not; I am not. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman
from Mr. EDGAR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to
the questioning of our chairman, Mr. Stokes, and the questioning of Mr.
Devine about both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover, could you describe Mr.
Hoover's personality to the committee as you understood it? Mr. MALLEY.
With regard to what? Mr. EDGAR. What
was he like to work for as an individual? Mr. MALLEY. He
was a very domineering individual who wanted the job done by everybody
that was involved. As far as I am concerned, demanded as much excellence
that was possible to obtain. Mr. EDGAR. In
the course of your many years in the FBI, did you see any changes in Mr.
Hoover's personality?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think so. Mr. EDGAR. So,
he was the same in 1955 as he was in 1963 and the same as he was in
1968? Mr. MALLEY. As
far as I am concerned. Mr. EDGAR. It
has been pointed out through a number of documents that we have had
access to that Mr. Hoover became concerned at some point that the FBI
would not be looked upon favorably by the Warren Commission. Is that
your impression of Mr. Hoover's concern during the end of 1963 and early
1964? Mr. MALLEY. I
have previously stated that I saw nothing to indicate that Mr. Hoover
was worried about what the
You say you
have these indications; I know nothing about them. Mr. EDGAR.
Well, on an April 3, 1964, memorandum to William Sullivan, he handwrote
the note, "Their so-called compliments of the Bureau's work are empty
and have no sincerity." It goes on to point out several other
memorandums and notes where Mr. Hoover was concerned about how the
Bureau would be seen. I do note that there was by one agent--well,
here's another quote of Mr. Hoover, "In any event, such gross
incompetency cannot be overlooked for administrative action postponed,'
and this was a handwritten note on the 17 agents that were going to be
disciplined secretly. Did you know of that disciplinary action? Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that Mr. Gale had been requested to conduct an investigation. I
didn't know when he completed it, nor did I Page 511 511 know all
details about it. I don't recall that I ever saw the memorandum that
recommended it. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever bring to the attention of the Mr. MALLEY. I
just got through telling you that I never saw the note, memorandum. I
wasn't aware of all the details and I, therefore, would not have had
anything to do with bringing it to their attention. Mr. EDGAR. It
seems to me that what you are saying by that answer is, even though you
were the liaison person for the FBI, there was information available to
the FBI not available to you that was not transmitted to the Mr. MALLEY. As
I said, I was not shown the memorandum. I couldn't have made any
recommendations about it going any place, not knowing whether it had
ever been completed. Mr. EDGAR. I
can respect that. From the indications that 1 am receiving from reading
these documents, Mr. Hoover was angry that those agents did not put Mr.
Oswald on the security index and yet Mr. Hoover, at least, did not
direct you to transmit that information, and the reasons for that
feeling on his part to the Warren Commission; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what Mr. Hoover thought. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever transmit to the Mr. MALLEY. No;
not to my recollection. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. SAWYER. You
knew Agent Hosty was suspended or otherwise disciplined for his conduct
in connection with the Oswald affair; did you not? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall the exact date. I do know that eventually for some time he
was suspended, but I don't remember when it was. Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to the original investigation? Are you referring to the
Hosty note or what are you referring to? Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why he was suspended--Agent Hosty? Mr. MALLEY. If
I knew, I would be glad to tell you. I do not know. Mr. SAWYER. And
it was then, in your view, just happenstance that Hosty was eliminated
from this transcription of the notebook? Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say that. I said I do not know why it would have been because I
see no reason for it to have been. Mr. SAWYER. You
don't think that reason could have been connected with the same reason
that Hosty was suspended for his activities? Mr. MALLEY. I
really can't say that I would take that attitude because it was very
obvious from the reports that were available that Mr. Hosty had been
involved in the investigation of Oswald. I don't know why they would
want to try to eliminate his name just from a notebook. Mr. SAWYER. I
have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Page 512 512 Mr. Malley, as
a witness before our committee, at the conclusion of your testimony, you
are entitled to 5 minutes at which time you may, in any way, explain any
portion of your testimony, you may comment upon it, you may expand upon
it in any way. On behalf of
the committee, I, at this time, extend to you 5 minutes for that
purpose. Mr. MALLEY. I
have no further comments I desire to make. Chairman
STOKES. There being nothing further, on behalf of the committee, we
thank you for having appeared here and giving us your testimony today. Thank you very
much. You are excused. [Witness
excused.] Chairman
STOKES. The Chair now recognizes Professor Blakey. Contact Information tomnln@cox.net
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Malley was sent to Dallas to stop the DPD from talking
to the press. But, Nobody tried to stop the FBI from talking to he
press.
FBI
JAMES MALLEY HSCA Volume III TESTIMONY OF
JAMES R. MALLEY Chairman
STOKES. Please stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. MALLEY. I
do. Chairman
STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair
recognizes counsel for the Committee, Mr. James McDonald. Mr. MCDONALD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you
please state your full name for the record? Mr. MALLEY. My
full name is James R. Malley. Mr. MCDONALD.
And were you employed by the FBI, Mr. Malley? Mr. MALLEY.
From 1937 until 1971. Mr. MCDONALD.
And in what capacity did you begin your service with the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. As
a special agent. Mr. McDONALD.
What was your position in November 1963? Mr. MALLEY. I
had been designated as inspector at the time and was working as an
assistant or No. 1 man, you might say, to Assistant Director Alex Rosen,
in charge of the General Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD.
What did your duties entail? Mr. MALLEY. My
actual duties were very broad. I was supposed to try to keep track of
everything going on in the General Investigative Division, handle
routine matters I did not feel was necessary to send into the Assistant
Director, also see all mail that was going to him and, in general, to
double check on things that were going on in four different sections in
the Bureau's General Investigative Division. Page 463 463 Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, let me direct your attention to November 22, 1963. You were
employed then as the inspector for Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. McDONALD.
That was a Friday. Were you working that day? Mr. MALLEY. I
was working that day. Mr. MCDONALD.
And when did you learn of the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr.
MALLEY. Returning from lunch I turned on a radio that was available
while I was sitting in Mr. Rosen's office in his absence. I turned on
the radio to catch, I believe it was the 12:30 news. That was the first
time I learned anything about it. Mr. MCDONALD.
And what did you do in an official capacity? Mr. MALLEY.
Before I had any opportunities to do anything, and I can't recall the
exact time, I was contacted by Associate Director Al Chairman
STOKES. Excuse me just a moment. We are having a little difficulty
hearing you. Mr. Malley, if you can put that mike a little closer. Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think you want me to talk louder; you merely want it a little
closer? Chairman
STOKES. Right. Thank you very much. Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Belmont was in the same position that everyone else was in. He knew, I
knew, that we had no actual jurisdiction. He did indicate to me that he
had been in touch with Mr. Shanklin, who was the Special Agent in charge
of Dallas, and that he would be back in touch with me as soon as there
was more definite information available. That was about it for the time
being. Later in the
day, and I presume it must have been close to 3 o'clock, I was either
told be telephone or asked to come down to Belmont's office, I cannot
recall which, at which time he informed me that the General
Investigative Division would be handling the assassination case of
President Kennedy. Following that,
and still not having many details to go on, I started lining up
personnel that would be available on a round-the clock basis to handle
whatever might develop. Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any specific instructions as to what your role would be? Mr. MALLEY. Not
at that time. Mr. McDONALD.
And your immediate supervisor was Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. McDONALD.
Was he present that day? Mr. MALLEY. He
was not. He was scheduled to go on annual leave that morning and instead
of taking off as he had planned to leave the city, he was ill and did
not leave the city at all. He eventually came back to the office
sometime the following week. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you have any meetings with Mr. Hoover on that day? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. McDONALD.
What were the next set of instructions you received on Friday afternoon? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I received any instructions on that particular
afternoon. In reading this statement, Mr. Blakey Page 464 464 has mentioned
that there was a lot of confusion. There was. Because up until around 7
o'clock, if my memory is correct, there was a definite uncertainty as to
what jurisdiction the Bureau had. As I understand
it, Belmont had instructed the Dallas office to be certain that they
stayed in a position where they would know exactly what was going on and
what the Dallas police were doing so that possibly nothing would be
interfered with in the way of evidence and nothing lost. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did there come a time when you proceeded to go to Mr. MALLEY.
There was. On Sunday, after the shooting of Ruby, I am sorry, of Oswald
by Ruby, I heard it on television. I had been at the office all morning
and had just gone home around 12 o'clock. My wife heard it on television
while I was changing clothes, mentioned there was going to be a rerun. I
listened to that and immediately dressed and started back to the office
and arrived around 2 o'clock. When I arrived
there, Courtney Evans was sitting in Mr. Belmont's office, who had not
had time to get to the office yet. He was talking to Mr. Hoover.
Following that call I was told that I was on my way to Mr. McDONALD.
And who is Courtney Evans? Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Evans at that time was an Assistant Director in charge of the Special
Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any instructions on going to Mr. MALLEY.
There was no time for instructions. I was told to get the first plane
that I could and Evans commented that undoubtedly by the time you arrive
in Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you receive any instructions when you got to Mr.
MALLEY. I did. As I recall, I arrived in the Mr. MCDONALD.
Did Mr. Belmont relate to you anything specific as far as what President
Johnson wished to have told to these individuals?
Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my recollection, it was simply a statement
that the President was extremely unhappy and desired that the
individuals be requested to stop talking about the assassination. Mr. MCDONALD.
And did you in fact relay those instructions? Mr. MALLEY. As
soon as I was able to contact each one of them by telephone I did so. I
was unable to reach the District Attorney for some time because about 2
minutes before an agent tried to Page 465 465 reach him in
his office, he had left to appear on television, and again for some time
related different things that he felt were important to the
assassination. Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, tell us what happened upon your arrival in Mr. MALLEY. In
answering you truthfully I couldn't tell you what the status was. I had
so many telephone calls when I arrived there that I had to take care of
that it was some time before I had a chance to even ask questions. Shortly after
contacting the three individuals that I have mentioned to you, I had a
telephone call from Mr. Belmont telling me that a detailed memorandum
setting forth all information that was known concerning the
assassination was to be prepared and be back in
It was
mentioned that two men from Mr.
McDONALD. Who was directing the investigation in Mr.
MALLEY. It was under the overall direction of the SAC, Gordon Shanklin. Mr. McDONALD.
What role did you play? Mr. MALLEY. I
was supposed to oversee the entire thing, to make sure that the Bureau's
interests were properly looked after, to make sure that there were no
unnecessary delays on anything, and that everything possible was done to
find out exactly what the correct facts were. Mr. MCDONALD.
You had been working on the case over the weekend prior to going to Mr. MALLEY. I
had been in the office a great deal. When you say working on it, I saw a
great many teletypes, a lot of other information, files were being
checked in Washington for any possible helpful information there, and I
couldn't tell you right now exactly what I did over that weekend before
I left for Dallas. Mr.
MCDONALD. Did you in fact convey President Johnson's instructions to
each of the three men you mentioned? Mr.
MALLEY. I did. Mr.
McDONALD. What was their reaction? Mr.
MALLEY. The Chief of Police was very cordial, said he would be glad to
do it but he didn't know how to go about it, and if my memory serves me
correctly, I suggested that he had no problem, all he had to do was
either say he had no comment to make or the matter is under
investigation and I do not care to discuss it. The
Sheriff was extremely cordial and said he didn't recall that he had been
making many comments but we would see that he didn't if he had.
Page 466 466 In
speaking with Henry Wade it was a little bit different story. He
informed me that he had been a former FBI agent, which I was well aware
of, that he had been district attorney for a number of years, that he
felt that he was qualified to decide what statements he could make and
what ones he should not make. If
I remember correctly, I said, you are certainly entitled to your opinion
but in this instance the President of the Mr. McDONALD.
Now, you have testified you arrived in Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
When you arrived at the Mr. MALLEY. I
just answered you, Mr. McDonald; from the time I got there I had so many
things to do I would have no idea. It was a number of hours after I was
there that I was even able to start asking questions. Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to your going to Mr. MALLEY. I
hadn't formed any ideas of any kind. The President had been shot on
Friday; Oswald was shot on Sunday; it was much too early to form any
ideas. Mr.
McDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to read to you from a memorandum that
was prepared by Walter Jenkins to President Johnson--Mr. Blakey also
referred to it in his narration--the memorandum reflecting a phone call
with J. Edgar Hoover, and the memorandum is dated November 24, 1963, two
days after the assassination. The pertinent paragraph quoting Mr. Hoover
states: "The thing that I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach,
is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is
the real assassin."
What would your comments be on that? We are talking about two days after
the assassination. This is probably being written contemporaneously with
your arriving in Mr.
MALLEY. Not having talked to Mr. Hoover, I certainly am not in a
position to say what was going on in his mind. I can give you my
interpretation of what he would have meant by it. That would simply mean
that because of such a crime of that magnitude, he was talking to either
the President or Jenkins, whichever it was, saying that the public needs
to be settled down.
As far as saying that Oswald is the man and nobody else, I don't think
you can take that interpretation from such a one sentence remark such as
that. Mr.
MCDONALD. I am looking at a memo dated November 26, 1963, from Mr. Evans
to Mr. Belmont and it is titled "The Assassination of President
Kennedy," and it says--this is dated 4 days later, "From the facts
disclosed in our investigation, there is no question that we can submit
in our report convincing evidence, beyond any doubt, showing Oswald was
the man who killed President Kennedy."
Then at the bottom of this page there is handwriting, which has been
identified as Mr. Hoover's. And in the last line Mr. Evans is
Page 467 467
making reference that a case of this magnitude cannot be fully
investigated in a week's time. And Mr. Hoover has written underneath,
"just how long do you estimate it will take."
Then under that he went on to write, "it seems to me we have the basic
facts now."
Again, we are 4 days after the assassination. You were in Mr.
MALLEY. I don't recall that I was asked by anyone how long it was going
to take. If I had been I would have told them I had no idea because of
the magnitude of what needed to be done in If
I recall correctly, it was either Tuesday or Wednesday following the
assassination that I was asked if we had sufficient personnel, and I
requested that 40 more agents along with clerical help, stenographic
help, be sent into Dallas to assist those who were already there. So
certainly I did not feel it was going to be completed within any week. Mr. McDONALD.
You were asking for additional agent personnel, and as reflected in
these memos, at the top level, at least there was an opinion being
formed that the case essentially was wrapped up. Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with you because I don't know what they were doing in Mr.
McDONALD. I will quote one more memorandum to you, and that is dated 29
November 1963, which is found in the Senate Intelligence Committee's,
the Church Committee's, Book 5 Report on page 34. In it, the memorandum
is by Mr. Hoover, recounting a telephone conversation he had that day
with President Johnson. And he says, "I advised the President that we
hoped to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have
it before the first of the week, as another angle had developed. Again
we are getting an example of at the top level the case being in a sense
completed.
Now, again, from your Mr.
MALLEY. Well, again, I say that when people say that they hoped to have
it completed and so on, I don't think for a minute they were talking
about having every facet fully and exhaustively investigated. I think
what they are saying is that, based on the information that was
available at that time, the essential facts of the investigation had
been developed. It doesn't mean it was over by any means. Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Chairman, the memorandums that I have just quoted from have been
marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459. I move that they be
received into the record at this time. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this
point. [The above marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459 follow:] Page 468 468 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 Page 469 469 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 470 470 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 471 471 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 472 472 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 473 473 JFK EXHIBIT
F-457 cont. Page 474 474 JFK EXHIBIT
F-458 Page 475 475 JFK EXHIBIT
F-458 cont. Page 476 476 JFK EXHIBIT
F-459
Page 477 477 Mr.
MCDONALD. When you were in Mr.
MALLEY. That existed from the minute it happened. I can't say that I saw
a memorandum to this effect or a memorandum to that effect or a
telephone call, but I do know that it was on everybody's mind, was there
somebody else involved. It was an essential part of the investigation to
find out. Mr. MCDONALD.
These discussions of conspiracy, were they active in the Mr. MALLEY. You
are asking me a question that dates back 15 years ago and I am not in a
position to truthfully answer you and say this happened or that happened
in the way of some conversation I had. Mr. McDONALD.
In light of Evans memo to Belmont with Mr. Hoover's writing, his
handwriting, saying essentially we have got it all wrapped up, in your
opinion, would that affect the investigation ongoing in the field, if
Mr. Hoover was saying that he felt the investigation was essentially
closed? Would that have an effect, in your opinion, on the way the
Bureau handled the conspiracy aspects to the case? Mr. MALLEY. To
start off, I was handling 90 percent of the telephone calls between
Washington and Dallas after I arrived, there may be a higher percentage.
I know that I never received any comments from Belmont, the Director, or
anyone else in Mr. McDONALD.
You stated that you arrived in Mr. MALLEY.
Around 7:30 to 8 o'clock on Sunday night. Mr.
MCDONALD. Did this event have any effect on the Bureau's relationship
with the Dallas Police Department? Mr.
MALLEY. I do not recall hearing of any friction that developed while I
was in Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall after the shooting of Oswald, did you yourself
participate in any discussions as to the possibility of whether it was a
related event, directly related to the murder of the President. In other
words, if it involved a larger conspiracy, the possibility of a larger
conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you refering to other personnel in the Mr. MCDONALD.
Either in the
Mr. MALLEY. You
gentlemen have had access to the file. I think you will find that
teletype, if my memory is accurate, sent by the people at the seat of
Government telling the Dallas office to not overlook the possibility and
check thoroughly to see whether it could have been any police
involvement in the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. Page 478 478 Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, I am going to direct your attention to an organizational
chart that we have prepared that I showed you before the hearing. If the
clerk could display the organizational chart for us. It has been
designated JFK exhibit F-456. If you would walk over to the easel we
have a clip-on microphone. If you would give us a rundown of the
organizational structure in the Bureau at the time of the assassination. [JFK exhibit
F-456 was received into the record.] JFK EXHIBIT
F-456 Page 479 479 Mr. MALLEY. In
1963, at the time of the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover, as you heard
previously, was the Director. The Associate Director was Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes. If you would stand on the other side of the easel. Mr. MALLEY. Be
glad to either way.
Mr. McDONALD.
Thank you. Mr. MALLEY.
Under Mr. Belmont was the Domestic Intelligence Division, whose Director
was William C. Sullivan; the General Investigative Division, whose
Assistant Director was Al Rosen, and a Laboratory and Special
Investigative Division, and I am not going to identify those people
unless you want me to. Mr. McDONALD.
No, that is fine. Mr. MALLEY. I
failed to mention that under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover was an Inspection
Division whose Director at that time was Mr. James Gale. Under the
Domestic Intelligence you had an inspector, No. 1 man in charge, Joseph
A. Sizoo, another inspector, No. 2 man, Donald E. Moore, the Espionage
Section under a section chief by the name of William A. Branigan, and
there were a number of individual agent-supervisors who were assigned to
this case. Do you want their names mentioned? Mr. McDONALD.
Not at this time, thank you. Mr.
MALLEY. In the General Investigative Division, I happened to be the No.
1 man, and as you heard, I was assigned to handle liaison with the, oh,
you haven't heard yet, I was assigned to handle liaison with the Warren
Commission. There was also
a criminal section, whose section chief was James Hanley. An individual
by the name of Henry Schutz was a unit chief, under which was bank
robberies and a number of other rather important criminal
investigations, and there were two individuals that did work quite a bit
on this particular case, by the name of Richard Rogge and Fletcher
Thompson. Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, regarding Rogge and Thompson, you just said that they worked
closely with you on the case. Mr. MALLEY.
They did in the early stages. They were the two individuals who were
sent to Dallas to write the first two memorandums that I told you about,
and we also had a civil rights section, which was under a section chief
by the name of Clement McGowan. Does that cover what you have? Mr. MCDONALD.
That is fine, thank you. Mr. Malley, in
the investigation of the assassination how did the various divisions
participate in the case? First of all,
which was the primary division to run the case, the assassination case,
and who was in charge of that investigation? Mr. MALLEY. As
far as the actual assassination is concerned, it was definitely in the
General Investigative Division. When you say who is responsible, are you
referring to what section it was being handled and what supervisor was
primarily responsible? Mr. MCDONALD.
Which person was primarily responsible at the top to begin with? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, because of what happened when I got back from Page 480 480 Mr. MCDONALD.
What happened when you got back from
Mr. MALLEY. Well, I had been told before I left Dallas, sometime in the
afternoon, that the Warren Commission had been established, they would
be functioning almost immediately, and that I was to return to
Washington on the first plane that I could get out of Dallas. I came
back that night, and the next morning I had a little note from the
Director that I was to get in touch with Mr. J. Lee Rankin as soon as
possible, with the telephone number on it. I didn't succeed for a day or
two but I did make an effort continuously for the next days until I got
it. I
then went up to see him and introduced myself. We had a rather long chat
about things in general but nothing concerning any real developments
because neither one of us were in a position to talk about it.
Mr. MCDONALD. On what date was this again?
Mr. MALLEY. Strictly from memory, I think I returned from Mr. EDGAR.
Would the counsel yield? Mr. McDONALD.
Yes. Mr. EDGAR.
Would the witness talk into the microphone? Mr. MALLEY. I
am sorry, beg your pardon. Mr. MCDONALD.
So you stated that you returned from Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
What duties were you to do? What were your duties going to be? Mr.
MALLEY. Well, very generally, I was to handle all contacts by telephone
or in person with the Mr. MCDONALD.
Now, prior to December 12, the Bureau released its report on the
assassination?
Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, sir. Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you play a role in the preparation of that report? Mr. MALLEY. In
that report I have to say no. I told you that two memorandums were
prepared in Mr. McDONALD.
When you refer to memorandum you are referring to the report? Mr. MALLEY. I
am not. I am referring to a piece of paper similar to this, consisting
of around 15 pages, I believe, on Mr. Ruby, I mean on the assassination
of President Kennedy and around 8 or 9 on the shooting of Oswald by
Ruby. Page 481 481 Mr. McDONALD.
Well, the report came out in early 1963, prior to the 12th, and the
report said in essence that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President
alone. Do you know why
this report was put out so rapidly? Mr. MALLEY. I
can only tell you that based on what I was told in Mr. MCDONALD.
They wanted to. Mr. MALLEY. It
was strictly on the basis of letting the President, the Attorney General
and a few others that they felt needed to know immediately what the
facts were as of that time. It was my
understanding that information was going to be disseminated long before
it was. Mr. MCDONALD.
Were you aware-- Mr.
MALLEY. I do not know what occurred in Mr. McDONALD.
Prior to your return to Mr. MALLEY. I
don't remember whether 1 ever heard that there was a possibility of the I have no way
of thinking back and recalling whether I did or didn't. Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, as you knew, what the Bureau's reaction to the formation
of such a commission was? Mr. MALLEY. I
never heard of anything one way or the other until you showed me a
memorandum on it. The last time I talked to you I might have indicated
to you the Director was unhappy. I don't interpret that memo that way. Mr. McDONALD.
So, it is your testimony you have no personal knowledge of what the
Bureau's reaction, specifically Mr. Hoover s, was to the creation of the Mr.
MALLEY. I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his
office after I returned from Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, in the overall investigation of the assassination, what was
the interaction between the various divisions in the Bureau,
specifically general investigative and domestic intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my knowledge, there was complete cooperation between all the
various people working on the assassination or the domestic intelligence
aspect, and in the civil rights angle. Mr. McDONALD.
What was your relationship with William Sullivan, the Director of
Domestic Intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to this individual case? Page 482 482 Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think I had very many conversations with Sullivan on this
particular case. I usually dealt with the section chief, Mr. Brannigan,
or the individual supervisor. Mr. MCDONALD.
What was the domestic intelligence section, what were they doing
regarding the assassination case? Mr. MALLEY. As
you Saw, they had five or six supervisors. To go back and tell you
exactly what they were doing at this time, I cannot. I do know that they
all had specific assignments in it and one of the fundamentals, again,
was to prove or disprove whether there was any possibility that they
could come up with of a conspiracy. It was also to develop all aspects
of Oswald's personal life, where he had been from the time he returned
from Mr. MCDONALD.
And this division handled the conspiracy aspect within that division? Mr. MALLEY.
There, again, it is difficult to say that they were the only ones doing
it. They were primarily, because of their knowledge with various
nationality groups, et cetera, and the fact they were looking into his
entire personal life, they would have been in a better position to come
across something than somebody handling criminal aspects. Mr. MCDONALD.
You were in the General Investigative Division? Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct. Mr. MCDONALD.
Would you have any direct knowledge or supervision over what was being
done in the Domestic Intelligence Division as far as the assassination
was concerned, considering your role as liaison with the Warren
Commission? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, I would, in that every report that was sent to the Mr. MCDONALD.
When you say Division 5, what are you referring to? Mr. MALLEY.
That's the Domestic Intelligence Division, I beg your pardon. Likewise,
any teletypes that came to them, whether it seemed to refer to our work
or not, teletypes were sent to the General Investigative Division for
information so if there was anything that could be tied in, they could
do it. Mr.
MCDONALD. Well, I am going to refer to the book 5 of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, the Church committee report, where they are
speaking of a supervisor in Domestic Intelligence Division who was
reported to be the leading Cuban expert within the Bureau at that time,
and he testified before the Church committee that he was never
informed--first of all, he never even knew of any CIA assassination
attempts against Fidel Castro. And this supervisor testified before that
committee that he had no recollection of any Bureau investigation of
Cuban involvement in
Page 483 483 the
Kennedy assassination. He was asked a question: "Were there ever any
meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or
not the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And
he answered, "No; I don't recall. I would say no." And
they questioned, "Do you know if that possibility was investigated?"
Answer: "Well I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't.
Question: "Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda or
instructions that Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any
Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And
he answered, "There were no such communications, to my knowledge, ever
sent out from headquarters." And
they asked him: "If they were sent out, in all likelihood, would you
have known about it?" And he said, "Yes."
Now, this was the investigations being conducted, as you say, in
Division 5, the Domestic Intelligence, and this is the leading Cuban
expert in the Bureau at the time saying that during the assassination
investigation, he wasn't even contacted to consider this aspect. As
liaison to the Mr.
MALLEY. I don't know how good his memory was. I do know that their
division had the responsibility for keeping their own people aware of
what was going on and if he didn't know what was going on in that
section, I would say somebody was remiss. Mr.
MCDONALD. I am sorry. Mr.
MALLEY. Somebody was remiss in not keeping him aware. I can't possibly
answer what went on over in their division on a day-to-day basis. You
know, and I know that there was an investigation concerning the
possibility of Cuban involvement, if you reviewed the material. It would
be impossible for me to think that he wasn't aware of it. Mr.
MCDONALD. Is it your testimony the investigation would have been
conducted by Division 5, Mr.
MALLEY. That part of it. Mr.
MCDONALD. And we have this statement given in 1976 that the leading
Cuban specialist wasn't involved. Mr.
MALLEY. That's his statement. I can't answer for him.
Mr.
MCDONALD. OK. Turning now to
the Special Investigative Division that you referred to on the chart,
what was that division's responsibility? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think they had any specific assignment. Courtney Evans, at that
time, as I mentioned, was an Assistant Director and he was handling
liaison with the Department, primarily with Robert Kennedy and other top
officials of the Department. Mr. McDONALD.
Was part of their jurisdiction organized crime? Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my memory, yes. Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, after the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, what consideration
was given at that point to the possibility of organized crime
involvement, either in the Ruby shooting of Oswald or the overall
assassination of the President? Page 484 484 Let me ask one
question further before you answer that. After Ruby shot Oswald, how
long did it take the Bureau to learn about Jack Ruby himself, his
background, his associates, the kind of person he was? Mr.
MALLEY. Well, from the standpoint of the type of person he was, I am
sure that within an hour or so before we ever got near the
investigation, the Bureau was probably well aware of the fact that he
was running a night club which amounted to sort of a striptease place.
And beyond that, I am not able to tell you when we really developed his
full background data except that we did start so-called civil rights
investigation on the basis that he had been shot while in custody of the
police department, and that did give us the basis for jurisdiction. Mr. MCDONALD.
So, this investigation was handled by the General Investigative Civil
Rights Division? Mr. MALLEY.
General Investigative Division in the Civil Rights Section. Mr. McDONALD.
What consideration was being given at the time to the possibility of
Jack Ruby being involved with organized crime in the commission of
either of the shootings? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't tell you what they were doing back in Mr. MCDONALD.
As you pointed out, Courtney Evans was the Assistant Director of that
division and he has appeared before this committee in deposition and
interview. When he was asked whether his division had ever been asked to
render assistance in the investigation of Jack Ruby or any organized
crime aspects of the case, he said to us, I am quoting from an
interview, "They sure didn't come to me. I know they sure didn't come to
me. We had no part in that that I can recall." This committee,
in our look at this case, spoke to Mr. Charles Stanley. Do you know who
he is?
Mr. MALLEY.
Yes; I do. Mr. MCDONALD.
He was Evans' principal assistant in 1963. And he was asked whether that
division was ever asked to participate in the investigation of the
assassination. And he told us: I don't think
we had one thing to do with it. To my knowledge, we were never brought
in on that. I don't recall a thing coming through our division on Ruby
or Oswald. And then we
spoke to Jack Danahey; do you know who he is? Mr.
MALLEY. I believe he was working in Mr.
MCDONALD. In 1963, he was the assistant special agent in charge in your Page 485 485 And lastly, we
spoke to Mr. Al Staffeld, who is another official in the organized crime
section and he was asked essentially the same question and he gave
essentially the same answer, that he had no recollection of any
involvement or any information or request for assistance coming to that
division by those handling the assassination case. With that in
mind, could you explain to us how the General Investigative Division
would have been handling any organized crime aspects, the possibilities,
if there were some, to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. As
briefly as I can, if any name showed up either in the investigation of
the assassination of President Kennedy or in the investigation being
conducted by the civil rights section of the shooting of Oswald, there
is no question in my mind, and you would have to doublecheck with the
supervisors, but if a criminal figure of any known standing had been
mentioned or any criminal figure that had a lot of information in the
files on him, I don't have any doubt they would have discussed it with
the individual supervisors down in the organized crime unit. That would not
necessarily have been called to the attention of either Mr. Stanley or
Mr. Evans, and it might not even have been called to the attention of
Staffeld. If there was any reason to send any memorandum or letters or
anything else through them to be initialed by that division, it
certainly would have been done. I do know that
in the civil section--civil rights section--I was told they were in
touch with him many times on individual names that came up in connection
with possible criminal figures. Mr.
MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, after the creation of the Warren Commission, first
of all, what was the Bureau's relationship to the Commission, and you
being the one essentially in the middle, how would you categorize the
relationship? Mr.
MALLEY. Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no
unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours.
If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we
want further explanations, we will get them from you.
There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. At least, it
didn't rub off on me if there was. Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to the creation of the Commission, the Bureau was handling the
case on its own. The directives were coming out from Washington or
Dallas, or wherever, to cover leads. Did this change after the Mr. MALLEY. Not
for quite a long, long time. After the Warren Commission had had an
opportunity to review the large number of reports that had been sent to
them, they eventually started asking a few questions and in many
instances, their questions were answered by saying, if you will look at
the report of so and so on a certain page, the information is there and
you haven't located it yet. In a few instances, they sent us letters or
made telephone calls and said we have checked into this aspect; we feel
that maybe it would be well to conduct a little further investigation
and they would outline what they wanted. As far as
directing the investigation, they did not attempt to take over what we
were doing. We continued to do our own investigation Page 486 486 on everything
we thought was necessary the entire time that they were in existence and
up until the time I retired in 1971. Mr. MCDONALD.
And you are saying that the Bureau continued its own investigation, you
did not respond only to leads from the Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I'm saying. We did our own work. Whenever they had any
questions, we tried to answer them for them. They did not give us
directives, you do this, you do that, you do this. When they had
specific items they wanted to check on, they did tell us. Mr. MCDONALD.
You stated you were in Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say I was told before I got back from
Mr. MCDONALD. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover was involved in
the, I guess we could say, the blocking of the first choice for the
Warren Commission general counsel, a man by the name of Warren Olney.
Were you aware of that situation?
Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told that.
Mr. McDONALD. Did you learn of it subsequently?
Mr. MALLEY. I don't remember it. If I did know it, I don't remember it
now.
Mr. McDONALD. One of the other items that has come up over the years
regarding the
Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told. It seems to me it would
be a normal procedure if you were dealing with a large number of staff
members and committee members, that it would be well to know exactly
what was transpiring on each one, from your standpoint of your dealings
with him.
If one of them said this on a certain date, contradicted himself on
another date, certainly, it would be well to have had a record of what
was going on. So, when you refer to a file, a dossier on each one, I can
well understand why they might have had such a thing.
Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, I just have one further question. And that is
with the benefit of hindsight of 15 years and looking back on what went
on, in your opinion, was the overall investigation of both the
assassination of the President and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald
handled properly?
Mr. MALLEY. Well, I might turn that around just a little bit and say you
have had the benefit of the Church Committee investigations, you have
had the benefit of the
Page 487
487
Mr. MCDONALD. Well, we appreciate you trying to turn the table on
us--but, we are here to ask you questions.
Mr. MALLEY. No, I am not trying to turn the tables. I am just asking you
what you feel we did wrong and if I am not entitled to that, well,
that's that.
Mr. MCDONALD. I am not here to answer questions. So with that, Mr.
Chairman, I have no further questions.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Counsel. The procedure at this point will be
that the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after
which we will then operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr.
Malley, one thing I would appreciate you clearing up for me that you
just stated to Counsel for the committee, do I understand you to say
that the Commission did their work and we did ours; is that your
statement? Mr.
MALLEY. That is correct.
Chairman STOKES. And by that, what do you mean? Mr.
MALLEY. I meant, Mr. Stokes, exactly what I said, in that we were not
asked to be leg-runners or do every little thing that they might think
of. If they did have something to come up, we did it. We were operating
independently on our own investigation, but definitely under
instructions from Mr. Hoover that if they needed any clarification or
had any requests to make of us, that we carry them out fully.
Chairman STOKES. Then, for further clarification, anyone having the
understanding that in terms of the Commission's investigation that was
being directed by them and the FBI was pursuing leads under their
direction, that would not be true; is that right? Mr.
MALLEY. It would be true if they asked us. But the numbers of requests
they made was minimum. They were reviewing reports, anything else that
we sent to them and proceeding on their own to evaluate it and whenever
they made a request, we did do it. You can say that we are an
investigative arm when they needed us. But beyond that, we were not
under their direction.
Chairman STOKES. So, the basic investigation was being completed under
the total direction, then, of the FBI itself?. Mr.
MALLEY. That's right.
Chairman STOKES. In terms of your responsibilities, what was your
relationship with Assistant Director William Sullivan? Mr.
MALLEY. As I mentioned awhile ago, and I don't know whether you
understood me, I said I do not recall very many conversations that I had
with Sullivan in connection with the assassination and the Oswald case.
I did have direct communication with other people in his division.
Chairman STOKES. You know, of course, that Assistant Director Sullivan
is now deceased? Mr.
MALLEY. Yes.
Chairman STOKES. Let me read to you some excerpts from an interview with
former Assistant Director Sullivan that was conducted by another House
committee in 1975 after which I will ask for your comment. In
the interview, Mr. Sullivan was asked to recall Director Hoover's
relationship to the
Page 488 488
"did not like to see the In
this same interview, Mr. Sullivan went on further and said this, and I
again quote "From what I saw and what I heard, what I understood, he,
Mr. Hoover, was not pleased about the creation of the
Having heard this statement by Mr. Sullivan, would you concur in his
observations on this point? Mr.
MALLEY. I would not, because I have no knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan
was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation
and so on. The only comment I have heard along that line is the one that
Mr. McDonald read awhile ago based on the telephone conversation with
the White House. And I never personally heard him object to the
Chairman STOKES. In this same interview, Mr. Malley, Mr. Sullivan was
asked whether he had seen anything in the files to indicate that Oswald
had any relationship to the CIA. In response to this question, Mr.
Sullivan answered in a rather ambiguous manner, and I quote his
testimony at that point: "No
I think that has been discussed. I think there may be something on that,
but you asked me if I had seen anything. I don't recall having seen
anything like that, but I think there is some thing on that point.
Whether it is valid or not I don't know It rings a bell in my mind."
Now, it would seem that Director Sullivan was not giving a clearly
negative response to that type of a question. And I wonder, from your
investigation of this matter, whether you would make some comment with
reference to that point. Mr.
MALLEY. I am not trying to avoid your question. I have difficulty
answering it because when I was before the Church Committee, I was asked
about some CIA material that had allegedly been delivered to the Bureau
and that it had not been furnished by the Bureau to the Warren
Commission. The
material they referred to me, I had no recollection of it at the time.
Subsequently, I was shown a letter which was sent on November 23d to the
President--it may have gone to the Attorney General--where it referred
to a source in Mexico giving some information which related to the fact
that Oswald had been in Mexico and had been in communication with the
Soviet Embassy. I
do not know for sure. I can only assume where it came from. But I had no
knowledge of it at the time I was before the Church Committee, that I
can recall. Whether Mr. Sullivan had knowledge, he is the only one who
could answer the question, or maybe somebody in his division who worked
with him. I don't know what Mr. Sullivan did as far as any materials
such as this.
Chairman STOKES. On that specific point, that is as much light you can
shed on that point? Mr.
MALLEY. That is all I know about it. Page 489 489 Chairman
STOKES. Let me now make reference to another segment of the same
interview with Assistant Director Sullivan in 1975. This segment relates
to what Mr. Sullivan perceived as gaps in the Bureau's investigation
into the possibility of whether Lee Oswald was involved with others in
the assassination. Keeping in mind
that Mr. Sullivan was the man in charge of directing the Bureau's
investigation of any conspiracy aspects of the case, let me refer to
these further comments by him. "To my
recollection, we never developed any conclusive evidence that would tie
or bind Mr. Oswald to any foreign nation or to the instructions of any
foreign nation directly or indirectly in connection with the
assassination of President Kennedy. Now, there are gaps here that I
would like to make very clear. These gaps certainly bothered the men in
my division and they bothered me. And I am sure they bothered some of
the men in the "For example,
there is a gap as to what transpired when Mr. Oswald was in From your own
investigation, did you find the same or similar gaps? Mr. MALLEY. If
my memory is correct, another Government agency, who had access to
information about Oswald's activities in Russia, furnished to the Warren
Commission--my memory is not good enough to tell you that I had access
to every word of it--but I would presume if they furnished it to the
Warren Commission, it was given to us. That would have been given to the
Domestic Intelligence Division inasmuch as it related to their
activities, rather than the actual assassination. Chairman
STOKES. What about Mr. Sullivan's comment that there were other men in
the division who found such gaps disturbing. Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing I can tell you, and I repeat what I have said before, there
was very, very close coordination between the men, and I say that
regardless of what Mr. Sullivan may have said because I know it of my
knowledge. And if there
were any such gaps in anyone's mind, they certainly had an obligation to
discuss it with the men in both divisions to see to it that they were
cleared up, if possible. Chairman
STOKES. You are saying, then that no one discussed those gaps with you?
Mr. MALLEY. No.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, let me again quote Mr. Sullivan during the
course of interview. He says, "It is my understanding from conversations
on this subject, that he,
And then when asked if he believed that the Dallas FBI's secret
destruction of a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald could have been one of
the things that Mr. Hoover was afraid the Warren Commission might
uncover, Mr. Sullivan further stated as follows, and I quote him again:
"Well, that could be, but it didn't happen to come
Page 490
490
to my mind when you raised the question. I do think, though, and this is
only an opinion, I do think that what he had in mind went beyond that.
If he did have that in mind, it went to something more basic, that we
might have failed to discover a relationship between Oswald and the
Cubans, and if we had failed to discover a relationship between the two
and the Warren Commission did, then we would, indeed, as a Bureau be in
serious trouble."
Can we ask for your reaction to this point brought up by Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. MALLEY. With regard to the first part, where he is saying the
Director was opposed to this, that and the other thing, I don't know if
it was the first day I was back in Washington or the second, Mr. Hoover
called for Belmont, his associate director, and myself, to come to his
office. We were told in very firm conversation by the Director that we
were to exhaustively pursue every aspect of any lead that developed, no
matter how small it appeared to be, and to leave nothing to doubt.
If that sounds like the Director, who was trying to short-circuit the
investigation, I can't understand plain English. I think that is a very,
very important thing for you gentlemen to understand, that where I was
concerned, Mr. Hoover never said anything except go forward to the nth
degree on anything that comes to your attention.
Where Mr. Sullivan gets his information, I cannot tell you. He is dead
and I am not going to make any statements that I can't back up
personally.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, we have learned in the years since the
assassination that Director Hoover secretly disciplined 17 Bureau
officials for what he regarded as mistakes and deficiencies in their
pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald. The
fact that these Bureau officials were punished for these deficiencies in
the Oswald investigation was never revealed to the And
I quote him: "I suggested that the disciplinary action was arbitrary but
calculated rather than capricious. It was calculated, it was thought out
as a means of Mr. Hoover protecting himself against any indictment that
he was at fault in the assassination of President Kennedy. That the FBI,
under his direction, had made mistakes and, therefore, he was culpable
and apparently his reasoning, as we interpreted it at the time, was that
if he ordered disciplinary transfers and letters of censure to a large
number of men and then if he was charged with culpability in the
assassination of President Kennedy, he could say these men are the ones
responsible, and I have already taken disciplinary action against them." Do
you believe that this was true? Mr.
MALLEY. Again, I don't know where Mr. Sullivan got his information. I
know that I was not made aware nor did I ever see the memorandum which
you are referring to concerning the disciplinary action. I did hear that
some had been recommended, but I
Page 491 491 was
never made aware of what went on. I think you would have to talk to
somebody else who had more knowledge about it that I do.
Chairman STOKES. Were you personally familiar with any disciplinary
action relative to Mr. Hosty, James Hosty? Mr.
MALLEY. Yes, in that there were certain things that occurred in
One
other thing. You mentioned this note. The first time I ever heard about
the note was after it appeared in the newspapers. I believe it was a
year ago this summer. I was questioned at that time by the Bureau when
they were conducting their own investigation to find out who might have
known about it at the time, and didn't reveal it.
Chairman STOKES. The first time you heard about the note was a year ago? Mr.
MALLEY. That's correct, when it came out in the newspapers. Chairman
STOKES. Thank you. I have no further questions. The gentleman from Mr. DODD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley, for being here this morning. I would like to
go back to the very first question that Chairman Stokes raised to you. I
didn't write down your exact quote when you responded, but it struck me.
You talked about the relationship between the Bureau and the It occurred to
me that we had a commission that was set up by the President of the I sensed, in
your response, and this is my opinion, but I sensed in your response
that the creation of the Warren Commission was a source of embarrassment
to the Bureau because it, in effect, was saying that we can't rely on
the Bureau to do a thorough and complete investigation of this matter,
and we have to set up a separate commission. Would I be
incorrect in assuming that that was not an uncommon feeling among upper
echelon people within the Bureau that, in fact, the creation of the
Warren Commission was, in effect; a black eye; that the very fact it was
created was a black eye for the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. The
only answer I can give you on that is no official--- Mr. DODD. Is no
what? Mr. MALLEY. No
official higher than I has discussed their feelings with me about the
creation of the Page 492 492 Director's
feeling that we should cooperate fully and do anything we could to help,
which we did. Mr. DODD. Your
answer now has a bit of a different twist to it than it did when you
originally answered it. Mr. MALLEY. No,
you are indicating that I felt there was something wrong, that I was not
in agreement that the Commission should be created. If I gave that
impression, I am sorry because it was none of my business whether they
did or did not have a commission. Mr. DODD. Let
me ask you this: You talked about it as a business relationship, and I
presume by that you mean that since you, the agency, the Bureau, was the
body responsible for the collection of data, evidence and so forth, in
effect, the Bureau was the investigating arm of the Commission. The
Commission did not have a separate group of investigators. It relied
upon the Bureau for the collection of information; isn't that correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct. Mr. DODD. Am I
to assume further from your response to Mr. Stokes' question that unless
the Commission asked for something specifically, unless they asked for
certain data and evidence, that the Bureau was not forthcoming on its
own with information--- Mr. MALLEY. No,
that's a completely erroneous impression. We were constantly turning
over reports, every time that one was received from the field, to the So, when you
say that we were not doing anything unless they asked us, that is
completely wrong. Mr. DODD. The
Bureau volunteered information? Mr. MALLEY. We
kept doing it up until the day they disbanded the Commission. Mr.
DODD. Why didn't you give them the Hosty letter? Mr.
MALLEY. Because I didn't know about it. If I had I certainly would have. Mr.
DODD. I am not suggesting you yourself, I am talking about the Bureau.
If the Bureau was cooperating in giving information to the Warren
Commission, you were aware of the Hosty letter, that is the Bureau was,
why didn't the Bureau in the sense of cooperation you are describing,
turn over the Hosty letter to the Warren Commission? Mr.
MALLEY. I can't answer the question because not knowing about it, I
don't know what the thinking was of the people who had it or knew about
it. Mr.
DODD. So, using that example, there was not a full sense of cooperation
in terms of making the information available? Mr.
MALLEY. Well I would have to say, is there a man in this room who never
made a mistake in judgment? Mr.
DODD. I am not suggesting that there is a mistake in judgment. You are
talking about a letter written in the hand of the man who has been
accused of assassinating the President to an FBI agent in Mr.
MALLEY. I can't answer your question any more than saying what I have
already. Page 493 493 Mr. DODD. Did
you have any, or to your knowledge, did anyone in the Bureau have any
kind of a special relationship with anyone who was a member of the Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I am aware of. There is a possibility that somebody may have been
very friendly and talked to them, but I don't know of any special
request that was ever made to anyone to keep them advised. Mr. DODD. You
never made any requests? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. DODD. To
your knowledge, no one else made any requests of any member of that
Commission to report on what the activities of the executive
sessions of that Commission were?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I can recall. Mr. DODD. Mr.
Chairman, I think my 5 minutes may be up. I will come back. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. McKINNEY.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley,
during the original investigation in Dallas, and when you were first
brought in, was there a tremendous amount of pressure from the Bureau to
get it done? Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on how you interpret the comment that you have just made.
There was all kinds of pressure to get everything under control as fast
as you could. Everybody was reading things from the news media, radio,
television and so one, questions were being asked, what about this, what
about that, and no matter how much pressure you were getting, a group of
men can only do so much in a given time in handling investigative work;
whereas as far as I am concerned, I repeat again, I was never given any
time limit that we had to have anything finished. Mr. McKINNEY.
In other words, at that stage in your investigation you did not feel
that there was pressure being brought to bear that resulted in the
investigation being anything but complete? Mr. MALLEY. Not
where I am concerned. Mr. MCKINNEY.
Did you hear through general gossip columns of the FBI or your fellow
colleagues, of any inordinate pressure being brought upon the FBI by the
Attorney General or by anyone else in the administration, including the
Director, to speed it up at any cost? Mr. MALLEY. No. Mr. McKINNEY.
After the
Mr. MALLEY.
Truthfully, I cannot remember that such comments were made. It wouldn't
have had any effect whatsoever on what Page 494 494 the Bureau did
at that time regardless of whether they wanted to wind it up or whether
they didn't. We were working on something and we would have continued it
until we thought we had fully exhausted it. Mr. McKINNEY.
You made a statement earlier that you were sending reports to the Did you feel,
as an individual and as a long-term agent, and I gather a specialist in
your field which was Communism in the United States, that the Warren
Commission was brought to a close too soon, before it had all of the
information the FBI had? Or, did you feel that it should have been
continued longer? Mr. MALLEY. The
best answer I can give you on that is that the majority of reports that
were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of
the summer, 1964, were rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous
allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. I am not in a
position to give you examples, but just things that would have to be
checked out to see if there was anything to them. I do think that
the Mr. McKINNEY.
The Mr.
MALLEY. Well, when you say his ties with organized crime, the only
comment I could make is from what I remember reading in reports. I do
remember reading that there were several individuals, possibly high
school associates of Ruby, that did eventually become pretty well known
in organized crime. To the best of my--- Mr. McKINNEY.
Wasn't it pretty well known to the FBI that Jack Ruby, No. 1, was a
member of organized crime, No. 2, he ran a strip joint and has been
somewhat commonly referred to as a supplier of both women and booze to
political and police figures in the city of Dallas. Didn't you find
it a little difficult to accept the Mr. MALLEY. You
are saying the final findings. All I know is that every effort was made
to check out his activities completely and anything that we checked was
given to them. Now, I am not
in a position to criticize what the Warren Commission findings were and
I can't say that I agree or disagree with what they found, it is too
many years ago. Mr.
McKINNEY. Do you think that the push for speed and a resolution to the Mr.
MALLEY. Well, based on my conversations with Mr. Rankin I think if he
felt we were shortchanging him on time that he would have made a
statement for the record at that time to say so. Page 495 495 Mr. MCKINNEY. I
have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. FORD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley,
yesterday, Mr. Kelly, with the Secret Service, testified that on
December 9, 1963, they were instructed to turn over the assassination to
the FBI. To what extent was this investigation continued by the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to what Secret Service was doing or what? Mr. FORD. No;
when they turned the investigation over to the FBI on December 9, after
receiving orders from the White House, to what extent was this
investigation continued from that point on? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I don't know whether I interpret your question correctly because
we were already doing everything we possibly could. We continued to do
so. Mr. FORD. Mr.
Kelly said yesterday that the Secret Service considered the case
practically closed when Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested. I think you said
earlier that the FBI did not feel that way, and so I am asking at this
point what steps or how did you continue the investigation? Mr. MALLEY. We
never changed our position one way or the other. Just because Secret
Service was dropping out of it we went right ahead with everything that
we could possibly do to definitely establish not only the information we
thought was correct, namely, Oswald was probably involved, but to firmly
show it and see if there was anyone else involved, which we had in mind
constantly. Mr. FORD. Memos
were coming from Director Hoover instructing that the case be wrapped up
as soon as possible, is that correct, Mr. MALLEY.
That is what you are telling me. I wasn't in Mr. FORD. One
final question. Could Director
Hoover's attitude toward the Kennedys have had any effect or influence
on the investigation of the assassination? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think I am going to say this for about the third or fourth time.
He told me not to stop at anything, to go all out and do everything to
thoroughly exhaust every possibility. That certainly wouldn't indicate
that any relationship he had would have had any effect on our
investigation. Mr. FORD. Thank
you. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana,
Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
review again exactly the structure of authority in Is it your
testimony that you were put in charge and that Shanklin and Hosty
reported to you during their days out there? Mr. MALLEY.
Hosty did not report to me directly at any time. As far as Mr.
Shanklin's position, he was the agent in charge of the office, I was
sent down there to help coordinate the activities, to help him out in
any way I could. There were a
number of days where I think that both of us were on the phone close to
16 to 18 hours a day, and beyond that, I don't know whether I know
exactly what your question is. Page 497 496 Mr. FITHIAN.
Well, who made decisions? Mr. MALLEY. If
there were any decisions to be made, if Shanklin was the one who
received the information, he discussed it with me. If we agreed, fine.
If we didn't agree, it was up to me to say yes or no. Mr. FITHIAN.
So, in other words, you were the authority in Mr. MALLEY. As
far as from the sLandpoint of making any decisions on that level. Mr. FITHIAN.
OK. At the time you were conducting your investigation, did you know,
were you aware that when Oswald killed Officer Tippit, presumably, that
he was in about the most direct walking route that one could lay out
between his apartment and Jack Ruby's Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I knew it immediately. It did come out because of
checks that were made to try and tie in whether or not Ruby and Oswald
had ever had any relationship of any kind, friendship, working
relationship, or anything else, the Bureau's investigation did not ever
reveal the slightest indication of a tieup between Ruby or they were
ever--- Mr. FITHIAN. I
understand that. I am just asking whether or not you were aware at the
time the investigation was----- Mr. MALLEY.
Sometime during the investigation I definitely was. Mr. FITHIAN.
And were you aware of a memorandum from Evans to Belmont, or the
substance of that memorandum, dated November 26, 1963, which I believe
is JFK F-457, in which it is clearly acknowledged, that at least there
are rumors, this is not evidence, there are rumors, people want to know
and it says "There have also been allegations that Oswald and Ruby were
known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been further
alleged Oswald was killed to silence him." Just to clarify
for you in the record, I am not now espousing the theory that
necessarily Ruby killed Oswald to silence him. What I am doing is this.
This data was in the possession of the Bureau, that is, it was no news
to you or anybody else that there were rumors that these two men were
associated and, therefore, it seems to me rather pertinent that the
chief investigative officer there on behalf of the Bureau would have
known that, to the layman at least, it appears that Oswald might be
walking from his apartment to Jack Ruby's at the time that he
inadvertently came upon police officer Tippit. My question is
whether or not you at the time you were conducting the investigation
were aware of that? Mr. MALLEY.
There is no way that I can go back 15 years and tell you when I became
aware of it. While I was in Dallas I certainly went out and retraced the
steps from here to here to here, to the rooming house he stayed in, and
so on and so forth. Mr. FITHIAN. So
you were aware of it sometime before December 10th? Mr. MALLEY. I
think I left on the 12th. Mr. FITHIAN. On
the 12th, when you returned, you were aware of it some time? Mr. MALLEY. I
am reasonably sure I would have had to be. Mr. FITHIAN.
Let me move to another question. Page 497 497 I think you
testified that you were not aware of a threatening note from Oswald to
the Bureau in Mr. MALLEY. Had
I known about it I would certainly have done something about it. I am
sorry, he didn't tell me. Mr. FITHIAN.
Did you recommend to the Bureau any kind of censure or punishment or
reprimand for either Hosty or Shanklin as a result of subsequently
finding out that this had been destroyed and that, you while in charge,
were not informed? Mr. MALLEY.
First of all, I didn't find out about it until a year ago, when I had
been out of the Bureau for some 6 years. So I would not be making any
recommendations as to what should be done about it. Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORD [now
presiding]. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. FITHIAN.
Were you made aware at any time during your stay in Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that on Friday, November 22. I had not had a chance to see the file
before I left to go to Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you. I would like
now to ask a question of a much more general nature and perhaps would
call upon sort of your general philosophy and review of your thoughts
while you were in the Bureau. Yesterday we
had some interesting testimony here from the Secret Service. One of the
important aspects of that testimony was a rather clear indication on the
part of the witness that he believed Oswald to be some kind of a nut,
and it seemed to have emanated from this witness' view that anybody who
attempted the assassination of the President of the United States would
have to be psychopathic or he would have to be mentally out of order. Would you
concur with that general line of interpretation? Mr. MALLEY. I
am not in a position to give you a very direct answer. All I can tell
you is that there are many people around the country that you would
never know what their thoughts were or what they were capable of doing,
and that because one does something on a spur of a moment or with a few
days of deliberation, I don't know how you can describe the individual. We do know that
Oswald, 6 months before he killed Kennedy, took a shot at Oswald, I mean
at General Walker. So the man's mentality must have been one of wanting
to either do something where he would feel proud of himself, or
something of that nature, Page 498 498 but that is not
a very direct answer to what you have asked me. I just don't know how to
answer you. Mr. FITHIAN. I
was just wondering if ever in any of the times when you were talking
over coffee and---- Mr. MALLEY. The
only thought that I have ever had on the matter is that from the very
early stages of Oswald's life he seemed to be a complete loner,
completely independent, and resented taking instructions from anyone. Mr. FITHIAN.
What I was trying to get at is whether or not you and the other high
officials in the Bureau, when discussing this, either after the Kennedy
case, after the Kennedy assassination, or before, generally tend to
believe that the only person capable of actually trying to undertake the
assassination of a President or a high official in the United States
would have to be mentally unbalanced or off or different? Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say that that is a complete necessarily correct situation. You do know
that where Oswald is concerned he did some planning on his own. You can
say that he was mentally unbalanced. He was certainly smart enough to do
a little figuring on that particular situation. He did manage to get
away from the building, not for long, but he did manage to get away. Who
is to say whether the man is unbalanced or whether he has just got a
temporary point that he wants to make for himself and make some history,
whether he is going to be prosecuted, killed or what himself, I don't
know. Mr. FITHIAN.
Mr. Chairman, the reason I raise this question, is that I guess that I
was increasingly disturbed by yesterday's testimony and I really kind of
wanted to go back to that witness or to those witnesses, both of these
agencies, and ask whether or not either agency would in retrospect have
been able to detect or identify a politically motivated, apart from a
pathologically motivated, psychopathically motivated, type of an
assassination. I guess I am
not sure that we are fully aware that there are terrorists who for
political reasons these days do things which cannot be normally
attributed to somebody who is just mentally off. Maybe we would have
thought that 15 years ago, that anybody who hijacked a French airliner
or who did many of the kinds of sensational terrorist things that have
happened in the last 5 years, or so, maybe we would have thought that
only someone who was mentally warped could have done that, but my
question, which is very ill phrased, and ineptly phrased, is whether or
not, either then or now, the Bureau and the Secret Service and other
agencies are really thinking in the dimension of today's world in terms
of real terrorists, who act for political, not personally unbalanced
reasons, and it disturbs me that that kind of thinking might have
prevailed then and therefore, the whole investigation by the FBI was put
in that direction rather than to immediately question and thoroughly
investigate the potential of either a politically inspired collaborative
thing or one in which organized crime was involved? There are two
or three other kinds of lines of investigation that seem to me to be
rather inadequate by the Bureau and the Secret Service and the Warren
Commission, as for as that is concerned, and that is why I was wondering
what your philosophy was, where you were coming from? Page 499 499 Mr. MALLEY.
Well, the only thing that I can say to you is that at that time and
today you have literally hundreds of people walking around the streets
that may be capable of violence or terrorist activities at any time. I
don't know how the Government could afford to spend the money that would
be necessary to keep a surveillance on everyone that they thought had
the potential to do something out of the question. Mr. FITHIAN.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to this question but I am going to
have to run and vote or miss that vote. Thank you very much. Mr. EDGAR [now
presiding]. I yield back to the Chairman and then I will ask some
questions. Chairman
STOKES. The gentleman from Mr. EDGAR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley, who
is in charge of the Monday after Oswald's assassination by Jack Ruby, of
the FBI's investigation into the death of President Kennedy? Mr. MALLEY. Who
was actually in charge of it? In Mr. EDGAR. OK,
let's start with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think you would say Mr. Alan Belmont, Associate Director under
Mr. Hoover, was actually overseeing the entire investigation. Mr. EDGAR.
Again, would you sit closer to the mike? Mr. Alan Belmont? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. EDGAR. In
your opinion, Mr. Alan Belmont was in charge of the investigation? Mr. MALLEY.
Overall. Mr. EDGAR. For
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. What was your relationship with
him? Mr. MALLEY. I
described my prior position. I was, therefore, working under Mr. EDGAR. At
any time in the days following the assassination of President Kennedy,
did you suggest or did you participate in a meeting to develop an
investigative plan of where the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
going to go in analyzing this particular case? Mr. MALLEY. To
say that that particular question, the purpose of a meeting, I cannot do
it. I do know that I had many, many conferences with Mr. Belmont by
myself, many with the supervisory staff that was working in the Division
that I was from, as well as supervisors from the Domestic Intelligence
Division. Mr. EDGAR. Did
the FBI have a plan? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, there was a definite plan, namely, the purpose of the
investigation, as we have said five times already, was to find out
whether there was any conspiracy involved and to make sure whether or
not Oswald did actually kill the President.
Mr. EDGAR. Was
that plan written down anywhere? Mr. MALLEY. If
it was, I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. Now,
you have just indicated that the FBI had a plan and that that plan was
not written down anywhere but---- Page 500 500 Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say it wasn't. I said I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. You
did suggest, though, that the verbal plan was to check out conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly. Mr. EDGAR. What
part did the FBI play in trying to coordinate the information of the CIA
and Secret Service? Mr. MALLEY. If
we received any information from the Secret Service or the CIA we would
have taken it into consideration in our own investigation. Following the
creation of the
Mr. EDGAR. Why
wouldn't you have suggested that the FBI sit down with the CIA and the
Secret Service to find out what information they had and to share with
them what information you had about Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, or
anything relating to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY.
With respect to the Secret Service, while I was in As to CIA
relationships, that would have been handled by Mr. Sullivan's division
and I can't offhand say what they did with CIA. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you talk to Mr. Kelly about the scope of the FBI's investigative plan? Mr. MALLEY. I
do not remember that I did. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
chairman, I ask unanimous consent to continue for 3 additional minutes. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
Kelly testified yesterday that his agency checked out Lee Harvey
Oswald's rifle in Chicago, and the purchase of that rifle, and
discovered that the FBI had already been there and that some information
was shared with the proprietor of the shop indicating that the FBI had
said don't talk to anyone else about this. Do you know if that is
accurate? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have the slightest idea. I am not ignoring your question, I just
don't know. Mr. EDGAR. Just
a few moments ago you said that the purpose of the Was that your
testimony? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I said the purpose. I may have been asked a question
where I said I would presume that they were asked to make certain what
the FBI did and whether it was complete and thorough and so on. Page 501 501 Mr. EDGAR. Was
that the attitude of the FBI at the time of the Mr. MALLEY. We
just went through this a little while ago, and I can't tell you of
anybody that had any attitudes as such. They may have talked among
themselves, I don't know what they did. All I know is that nobody tried
to convince me that we were to do anything other than a very thorough
job and cooperate fully with the Mr. EDGAR. But
if the prevailing attitude were that of the same phraseology that you
have just shared, it would indicate to me that the FBI was a bit
paranoid about the Warren Commission in that it was in a sense looking
over its shoulder and doublechecking it and looking at its
investigation, and that is backed up by some comments that I just read
in a report that we have in our folder here, the final report, book V of
the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
reference of the intelligence agencies. It goes through a whole litany
of concerns that the FBI had about the overseeing of its investigation
and the things that the Did it ever
occur to you that the Warren Commission may have been formed to provide
a coordinated function of putting together a puzzle and that rather than
being a doublecheck of the FBI it was m essence using the FBI as its
investigative arm, and it was looking at the Secret Service and the CIA
and Oswald and Ruby and just trying to figure out what in fact took
place in Dallas, and what it could tell the American people about that
particular event, with no malice
or intention of doing anything to the FBI. Is that a possibility? Mr. MALLEY.
Well, unless I saw the instructions that were given to Mr. Rankin and
the entire Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
in order that the record may be complete--and I welcome Mr. Malley here
today--Mr. Malley, you and I have been acquainted for something in
excess of 35 years, isn't that right? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And
you and I were both assigned to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. DEVINE. I
believe you were in a supervisory capacity and I was just an ordinary
special agent; is that right? Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say an ordinary, Mr. Devine, I would say you were assigned
there and were doing your job. Mr. DEVINE. I
believe that Assistant Director Belmont was also assigned to the Page 502 502 Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And
he has since deceased? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. How
long ago did he pass away? Mr. MALLEY. I
believe it was a year ago this spring, but I may be wrong. Time goes by
fast.
Mr. DEVINE.
Yes. Mr. Malley, I
am sorry that these rollcalls require us to be absent from time to time,
and I understand that our chairman and perhaps our counsel questioned
you about the statements attributed to Mr. Sullivan. Are you in a
position--you may have answered this--are you in a position to state
whether or not Mr. Sullivan was looked upon with disfavor by the
majority of your personnel? I don't mean to put you on the spot. Mr. MALLEY. I
said before--Mr. Sullivan is dead, he can't speak for himself--I will
repeat what I have told the two men from your committee, that I said to
them, Mr. Sullivan was not an easy man to get along with and on a
personal situation. I think I am correct in saying that three out of
five telephone calls I ever had with him I ended up hanging up after a
discussion where there was no possibility of discussing anything
sensibly. It all comes
down to the fact that Mr. Sullivan had a very strong attitude, that if I
say something, I am correct, and if you don't agree with me, you are
wrong. Mr. DEVINE. Are
you in a position to say the circumstances under which he left the
Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I
had left the Bureau prior to that time so I am really not capable of
saying. It would be strictly hearsay on my part. I do know from rumors
that there were some difficulties encountered. Mr. DEVINE. Mr.
Malley, I think I know what your answer will be to this but I think it
should be made clear for the record. Did the Bureau
have any preconceived notion on who was responsible for the Kennedy
assassination and then conducted an investigation to confirm that
preconceived idea? Mr. MALLEY.
Other members of your committee have indicated they might feel that we
did that. That is not correct. As far as people who were working on the
assassination, they had an open mind and still had an open mind up to
the time that I left the Bureau in 1971 that there could be somebody
else involved. Mr. DEVINE. So
that in this investigation the Bureau followed its time-tested policy of
being purely a factfinding organization, seeking facts and not making
recommendations, letting the chips fall where they may; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. DEVINE.
Finally, Mr. Malley, I would like to refer to the narration our chief
counsel, Mr. Blakey, when he was giving pretty much the history of the
Bureau. In one place he indicated that J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct
priorities were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected
FBI progress, and the positive image of the Bureau. Page 503 503 He also had,
according to some, two glaring blindspots in the areas of civil rights
and organized crimes, which put him at odds with the Kennedy
administration. Are you in a
position to make any comment upon the activities of the Bureau in the
area of civil rights up to and including this time? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes, I think I am. Mr. DEVINE.
Would you state that, please? Mr. MALLEY.
Personally, while I was in the field, before I was called into the seat
of government, I had several occasions where I was asked, not asked,
told, to conduct civil rights investigations, which I did. Back in the
late middle-forties, while I was assigned as an assistant agent in
charge in Houston, Tex., I attended a number of schools for police and
sheriffs, where one of the topics to be discussed was the civil rights
statutes, and explained to the police officers who were present the full
details of why the investigations were being made on civil rights
matters and the necessity of changing their ways, if they were engaging
in any activities whereby they would be in violation of the civil rights
statutes. On returning to
or coming back to I also know
that some claims were made concerning our attitude and when you say that
we didn't take over and do things until the Kennedys came in, I remember
one instance, which I would like for your record to show, namely, that
certain people in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
felt that they had a perfect right to have agents assigned to them to go
out in the field and they would direct all of the agent's activities and
not be in a position to do what they felt needed to be done except on
the departmental attorney's instructions. The Director
flatly refused to assign personnel under those circumstances but did
say, "you tell us the cases you want investigated, we will do them, turn
the results over to you, and if your have any problems with our
investigation we will do as much more or anything else that you want to
ask us to do, but we will conduct our original investigation." Beyond
that, I think I have covered it. Mr. DEVINE. The
second part of the question, Mr. Malley, had to do with organized crime
and some conflict with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position
to comment on that? I know you were not assigned to the criminal
division at that time. Mr. MALLEY. I
am not really in a position to comment about any conflict. I do know
that following the Kennedy assassination, I am sorry, the Kennedy
administration taking power, more emphasis was placed on organized
crime. Beyond that I am not in a position to comment. Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Page 504 504 Mr. Malley,
with reference to some of the answer's you have just given Mr. Devine
with reference to the attitude of the department with reference to civil
rights, were you still with the department when the COINTEL program was
initiated? Mr. MALLEY.
That was in another division. I did hear references to it. I was not
thoroughly familiar with it. Chairman
STOKES. Well, since you have left the department are you now familiar
with the COINTEL program? Mr. MALLEY.
Only what I have read in the newspapers. No other way could I be
familiar with it since I left the Bureau. Chairman
STOKES. Are you aware of the fact that as a result of a Senate committee
uncovering the COINTEL program, it has been described as being one of
the most disgraceful activities to ever be conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation against people like Dr. Martin Luther King, and
other civil rights persons? Mr. MALLEY. I
saw it in the paper that there was a lot of criticism. Chairman
STOKES. And having seen that in the paper, does that in any way impact
upon your statements here this morning with reference to the great civil
rights attitude of the department? Mr. MALLEY I
didn't hear your last part Chairman
STOKES. From what you have read, then, about the impact upon the
statements that you have made here about the fine attitude of the
department toward civil rights? Mr. MALLEY.
When you say department, are you referring to the Justice
Department or do you mean a department in the FBI? Chairman
STOKES. I am talking about the FBI. Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing that I can tell you is what I did say, that we were
interested in conducting civil rights investigations. What was
handled under the COINTEL program I cannot comment on because I don't
know exactly what was going on. Chairman
STOKES. Another point with reference to Mr. Sullivan. It seems to me
that the underlying question here is not whether he was a difficult man
to get along with. The question, it seems to me, is as you knew him, was
he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't cite instances. I would say there are a number of recollections
where I felt to myself that that is not the way I understood the
situation to be when I read certain things that he had prepared. Chairman
STOKES. That is not my question, sir. My question is, as you knew him,
was he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I
wasn't acquainted with him on a social basis. As far as official
dealings with him, I did not always believe everything that he tried to
convince me of. That still is not a direct answer. That is the only way
I can answer it. Chairman
STOKES. Well, let's put it another way. From all that you knew about
him, would you disbelieve him under oath? Mr. MALLEY. I
think that if it looked to Mr. Sullivan like it was to his advantage to
say what he was thinking he might say it and I don't know whether he
would even be aware whether he' was fabricating or not. Page 505 505 Chairman
STOKES. Mr. Malley, I think the question I am putting to you is a fairly
simple question and really requires a fairly simple answer. From all you
know about him. Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him. Chairman
STOKES. Beg pardon? Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him, if that is a better answer for you. Chairman
STOKES. There is a difference between trust and credibility. Mr. MALLEY. Let
me say then that I don't think his credibility was as high as most
people that I was acquainted with in the Bureau. Chairman
STOKES. You don't care to answer my question, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say that he lied deliberately at any time. All I know is that I
had many dealings--- Chairman
STOKES. I just asked you sir, from all you knew about him, would you
believe him under oath?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
necessarily. Chairman
STOKES. Now, Mr. Hoover was a powerful man, wasn't he. Isn't that a fair
statement? Mr. MALLEY. I
would regard it as true. Chairman
STOKES. And throughout the Bureau, by the men in the Bureau, he was
regarded as being a powerful man, was he not? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes. Chairman
STOKES. And it will be a fair statement to say that in his imposing
position he intimidated men who worked in that Bureau, isn't that true? Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with that statement. Some fellows may have felt that way. I
felt that if I didn't like what Mr. Hoover was doing I had a right to
walk out any time I wanted to. He didn't ask me to come to work, I asked
him to work there. Chairman
STOKES. Well, with reference to other men in the Bureau, wasn't it
commonly known that he intimidated men? Mr. MALLEY. All
I can answer there is to say that if something went wrong your agents
knew they would probably be receiving disciplinary action. If you call
that intimidation, maybe it is. Chairman
STOKES. And with reference to that disciplinary action, because of the
fear of incurring his wrath, wasn't it commonly known in the Bureau that
field supervisors would often cover up the mistakes of their men so as
not to incur his wrath? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have knowledge of that. I was a field supervisor for 4 1/2 years
and I don't remember that I ever covered up for anybody. Chairman
STOKES. Well, I am not asking you what you did, I am asking, wasn't it
common knowledge? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what other people did. When you say common knowledge, I
don't know that to be common knowledge. Chairman
STOKES. I have no further questions. The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr.
Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
yield to Mr. Sawyer. Chairman
STOKES. I am sorry. I didn't realize the gentleman had gotten back. The
gentleman from Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Page 506 506 As I understand
your job of liaison entailed reading carefully anything that went from
the Bureau to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. SAWYER. At
least that was part of the job? Mr. MALLEY.
Yes. Mr. SAWYER.
What was the purpose of your reading carefully everything that went to
the Mr. MALLEY. To
make certain that everything was properly, thoroughly, and exhaustively
run out. Mr. Belmont and I had the same assignment, and in reading
reports, et cetera, I know that I did it, and I am sure that Belmont
made notes reading reports to double check back and see what the
preliminary investigation was on certain matters, whether it had been
completely followed through. If there wasn't
a definite answer, to see to it that further investigation was made,
check with the supervisors to find out whether more investigation was
being conducted. Mr. SAWYER. Did
you have authority to decide, after reading something, that it wasn't
going to go to the
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. There was nothing that came through, as far as the Bureau was
concerned, that did not eventually go to the Mr. SAWYER.
When you say eventually, what do you mean eventually? Mr. MALLEY.
What I am saying is that if a report came through and it was obviously
incomplete and had not been thoroughly looked into, we sent it back to
the field to get a more complete investigation and then sent over a
completed product. Mr. SAWYER. Did
you do that, did you exercise any discretion with respect to things
that, in your judgment, might be embarrassing to the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. Mr. SAWYER. Was
that part of your job? Mr. MALLEY. As
I said before, we were told to hold nothing back from the Mr. SAWYER. But
you were told to read carefully anything before it went? Mr. MALLEY. And
to make sure it was accurate and fully investigated. Mr. SAWYER. You
operated somewhat as a censor, then, between the Bureau and the Mr. MALLEY. No,
sir. When you say a censor, you are inferring I would have the right to
take this out and take that out, and I am saying that my only purpose in
reading material was to make certain that the investigation was
complete. Mr. SAWYER. So
you only had authority to add in and not take out, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. And
the additions would only be to get further data to explain what the
thing was all about. Mr. SAWYER. And
you never in the course of this saw this Hosty letter either? Mr. MALLEY. I
have said four times I never saw the letter until-am sorry, you were
out, maybe you didn't hear me--I never knew Page 507 507 anything about
the Hosty letter until 1 year ago when it came out in the newspapers. Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you. I have nothing
further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana,
Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, let me
just make sure I am correct. You were the first person assigned, you
were initially assigned as the liaison to the Mr. MALLEY.
That is correct. Mr. FITHIAN.
And did anyone else serve as the liaison throughout its existence? Mr. MALLEY. Not
to my knowledge, unless there was some situation where I was ill or
might have taken a day off, and I don't recall that occurring. Mr. FITHIAN.
And you told us that you reviewed documents and all matters that went to
the Mr. MALLEY.
That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. I
would now like to direct your attention to the Oswald address book and
ask you whether or not you saw that document prior to its going to the Mr. MALLEY. To
be specific, I can't recall that I saw the address book as such. I saw
the results of everything that was in his address book in a report form
and I believe that I was shown the actual address book. Mr. FITHIAN.
And did you satisfy yourself that it was authentic and complete; that
is, did you look at the report that was going from the Bureau to the
Warren Commission, compare that with the address book itself?. Mr. MALLEY. I
had to use a little reliance on people who were working with me. To take
the time to go through everything that was in Oswald's notebook and
compare item by item, I could not take the time to do it. Mr. FITHIAN. So
that we can be completely accurate, then, it would be inaccurate to say
that you read everything that was forwarded from the Bureau to the Mr. MALLEY. I
did make the comment that I read any letters and all reports that went
from the Bureau. Mr. FITHIAN.
Are you aware that a particular page from the Oswald notebook was not
forwarded and that that page included agent Hosty's name and address and
license number? Mr. MALLEY. I
had no recollection of it. I was told by one of your staff members that
that occurred. Mr. FITHIAN. Do
you have any comment for the committee as to how that could have
occurred? Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not in a position to answer you because I knew nothing about it. Mr. FITHIAN. Is
it your professional judgment that the book once acquired by the FBI
always remained in the possession of the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. It
would be most unusual if it did not. Page 508 508 Mr. FITHIAN.
And, therefore, would it be fair for the committee to conclude--- Mr. MALLEY. May
I interrupt you there? Mr. FITHIAN.
Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I
do not know if this is one of the items of evidence that was picked up
by the Dallas Police Department prior to the time that it was turned
over to the FBI. Mr. FITHIAN.
Who would have given you the book? Mr. MALLEY. One
of the supervisors in Mr. FITHIAN.
Does the Bureau retain some kind of chain of custody within the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY.
Generally speaking, when a piece of evidence is picked up in the field,
it is handled by the agent who picked it up until he dictates his
material. It is then put in an evidence envelope. If it is coming to Mr. FITHIAN. So
it would be reasonable, would it not, to believe that the only possible
alteration of the contents of the book would have to have been done by
somebody in the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. All
I can tell you is that we did receive a lot of material from the Dallas
Police Department. When that book may have been turned over, if it was
turned over by them, I don't know. Mr. FITHIAN. I
should correct this by saying it is the transcription that has the page
removed. Mr. MALLEY. Not
from the actual report, and not from the actual notebook. Mr. FITHIAN.
No, I believe it is; I have to check with counsel on this, but I believe
it is the transcription of the address book, that which was prepared by
the Bureau, the transcription prepared to go through you to the Warren
Commission, is that not correct, and so it would be a page of that
transcription that is missing.
Mr. MALLEY. I
would have no way of knowing. Mr. FITHIAN.
Who would have prepared the transcription and signed off on it? Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on the agent's name that was on the report or whether it
was an insert prepared by an agent. Mr. FITHIAN.
But when it got to you, you would verify that someone had, even if you
didn't check it yourself, line by line, you would verify that somebody,
some responsible authority in the Bureau, had signed off on the
document, wouldn't you, isn't that the way you keep your custody
straight? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring now to keeping the evidence straight or are you referring
to this transcription? Mr. FITHIAN.
You see, I am not a lawyer, but it just seems to me that when the
President of the United States is killed and documents are transmitted
from one person to another or one agency to another, certainly documents
as important as those belonging to the alleged assassin--- Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly. Mr. FITHIAN
[continuing]. That there would have to be some kind of clear chain of
travel for the document. I don't think it just appears in your hand, and
so my question is: Was there not some Page 509 509 system in the
Bureau whereby each person who had that and prepared the transcript and
brought it to you as the supervisor, as the liaison to the Warren
Commission, would have signed off on it? And your responsibility to the
supervisor would have been to ascertain that, in fact, someone had
attested to you in one form or another that that was a bona fide
document, a complete document before it went to the Mr. MALLEY. You
are dealing with an entirely different situation in this instance. It
was usually handled in the field; namely, most pieces of evidence went
direct from a field office to the As far as
signing a document of some kind, to say this one handled it or that one
handled it, I don't know of any time the Bureau followed that much of a
clerical procedure. Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask for unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr.
Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog* nized. Mr. FITHIAN.
Let me review this, then. Since it has now been demonstrated that a
page, in fact, of the transcription was missing and since reasonable
evidence is that it came to the Bureau complete, the alteration, the
omission would have to come either at the Dallas office level, at the
Washington supervisor level, or by you or by the Warren Commission prior
to publication. That's the only four stops that it made; isn't that
correct? Mr. MALLEY.
Correct. Mr. FITHIAN.
And your testimony is that you did not know of the omission. Is that
correct? Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I said. Mr. FITHIAN.
Now, there is additional evidence that the page, in fact, was not only
missing, but that it was retyped so as to appear to be a complete
record. What kind of penalty, what kind of reprimand might be reasonably
expected to come down from the top, from you or someone, for the person
who had made such an alteration? Wouldn't there be some kind of
discipline? Mr. MALLEY. If
it had been known, there would have been a thorough check made and
recommendations made. Mr. FITHIAN.
The way it appears to the casual and perhaps to even the careful
observer is that the Hosty note was destroyed because it reflected badly
on the Bureau, that the Oswald transcription was altered because it
reflected badly on the Bureau and a number of other things were done so
as to put the Bureau in the best possible light. Can you give us
any hard evidence as to why we should not believe that that is the case;
that is, that various things were altered, omitted, or drafted in such a
way as to put the Bureau in the very best possible light rather than to
give the complete information to the Warren Commission? Page 510 510 Mr. MALLEY.
Concerning your second comment, that Hosty's name was left out of this
transcription, I know of no good reason that it would have been left
out. Hosty, at one time, was handling the investigation of Oswald. The
fact he had gone out and talked to his wife would be no reason to try to
eliminate Hosty's name that I know of. So, I am not in
a position to say why anyone would eliminate it. I have to let you draw
any conclusions you want to as to why these things were done because I
do not know about them. Mr. FITHIAN.
And you are not prepared to offer any hard information as to why that
kind of conclusion might be drawn by someone reviewing the documents? Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not; I am not. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman
from Mr. EDGAR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to
the questioning of our chairman, Mr. Stokes, and the questioning of Mr.
Devine about both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover, could you describe Mr.
Hoover's personality to the committee as you understood it? Mr. MALLEY.
With regard to what? Mr. EDGAR. What
was he like to work for as an individual? Mr. MALLEY. He
was a very domineering individual who wanted the job done by everybody
that was involved. As far as I am concerned, demanded as much excellence
that was possible to obtain. Mr. EDGAR. In
the course of your many years in the FBI, did you see any changes in Mr.
Hoover's personality?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think so. Mr. EDGAR. So,
he was the same in 1955 as he was in 1963 and the same as he was in
1968? Mr. MALLEY. As
far as I am concerned. Mr. EDGAR. It
has been pointed out through a number of documents that we have had
access to that Mr. Hoover became concerned at some point that the FBI
would not be looked upon favorably by the Warren Commission. Is that
your impression of Mr. Hoover's concern during the end of 1963 and early
1964? Mr. MALLEY. I
have previously stated that I saw nothing to indicate that Mr. Hoover
was worried about what the
You say you
have these indications; I know nothing about them. Mr. EDGAR.
Well, on an April 3, 1964, memorandum to William Sullivan, he handwrote
the note, "Their so-called compliments of the Bureau's work are empty
and have no sincerity." It goes on to point out several other
memorandums and notes where Mr. Hoover was concerned about how the
Bureau would be seen. I do note that there was by one agent--well,
here's another quote of Mr. Hoover, "In any event, such gross
incompetency cannot be overlooked for administrative action postponed,'
and this was a handwritten note on the 17 agents that were going to be
disciplined secretly. Did you know of that disciplinary action? Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that Mr. Gale had been requested to conduct an investigation. I
didn't know when he completed it, nor did I Page 511 511 know all
details about it. I don't recall that I ever saw the memorandum that
recommended it. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever bring to the attention of the Mr. MALLEY. I
just got through telling you that I never saw the note, memorandum. I
wasn't aware of all the details and I, therefore, would not have had
anything to do with bringing it to their attention. Mr. EDGAR. It
seems to me that what you are saying by that answer is, even though you
were the liaison person for the FBI, there was information available to
the FBI not available to you that was not transmitted to the Mr. MALLEY. As
I said, I was not shown the memorandum. I couldn't have made any
recommendations about it going any place, not knowing whether it had
ever been completed. Mr. EDGAR. I
can respect that. From the indications that 1 am receiving from reading
these documents, Mr. Hoover was angry that those agents did not put Mr.
Oswald on the security index and yet Mr. Hoover, at least, did not
direct you to transmit that information, and the reasons for that
feeling on his part to the Warren Commission; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what Mr. Hoover thought. Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever transmit to the Mr. MALLEY. No;
not to my recollection. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Mr. SAWYER. You
knew Agent Hosty was suspended or otherwise disciplined for his conduct
in connection with the Oswald affair; did you not? Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall the exact date. I do know that eventually for some time he
was suspended, but I don't remember when it was. Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why? Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to the original investigation? Are you referring to the
Hosty note or what are you referring to? Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why he was suspended--Agent Hosty? Mr. MALLEY. If
I knew, I would be glad to tell you. I do not know. Mr. SAWYER. And
it was then, in your view, just happenstance that Hosty was eliminated
from this transcription of the notebook? Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say that. I said I do not know why it would have been because I
see no reason for it to have been. Mr. SAWYER. You
don't think that reason could have been connected with the same reason
that Hosty was suspended for his activities? Mr. MALLEY. I
really can't say that I would take that attitude because it was very
obvious from the reports that were available that Mr. Hosty had been
involved in the investigation of Oswald. I don't know why they would
want to try to eliminate his name just from a notebook. Mr. SAWYER. I
have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Page 512 512 Mr. Malley, as
a witness before our committee, at the conclusion of your testimony, you
are entitled to 5 minutes at which time you may, in any way, explain any
portion of your testimony, you may comment upon it, you may expand upon
it in any way. On behalf of
the committee, I, at this time, extend to you 5 minutes for that
purpose. Mr. MALLEY. I
have no further comments I desire to make. Chairman
STOKES. There being nothing further, on behalf of the committee, we
thank you for having appeared here and giving us your testimony today. Thank you very
much. You are excused. [Witness
excused.] Chairman
STOKES. The Chair now recognizes Professor Blakey. Contact Information tomnln@cox.net
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