CHANGE ROUTE
Volume XI
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
APPENDIX TO
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
VOLUME XI
THE WARREN COMMISSION
CIA SUPPORT TO THE WARREN COMMISSION
THE MOTORCADE
MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
MARCH 1979
Printed for the use of the Select Committe on Assassinations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 052-070-04981-2
Page ii
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut
District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan
California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the
Assassination of Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr. John F Kennedy
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman
HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE
FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE
STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER
LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio
(II)
Contents
Page iii
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
The Warren Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Analysis of the support provided to the Warren Commission by the Central
Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
Politics and Presidential protection: The motorcade 505
Possible military investigation of the assassination 539
(III)
Foreword
Page v
Foreword
(1)* During the course of its investigation, the committee conducted an
extensive examination and evaluation of the Warren Commission's investigation of
1964 and final report. As the most authoritative document ever produced on the
assassination of President Kennedy, the Warren Commission report stands as the
assassination must be weighed.
(2) The committee carefully examined the work of the Warren Commission, its
structure and operations, conclusion-drawing process, and production of a final
report. This staff report is in two parts. The first addresses the operations
and performance of the Commission. The second looks at the Commission's
relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Commission's report sets forth the testimony of various key members of
the Warren Commission staff, as well as those members of the Commission who were
still living at the time of the committee's investigation. The former members
and staff of the Commission have, by and large, refrained from any substantive
comment on their past work on the Commission, during the 15 years since their
investigation took place. The following staff report based primarily upon their
testimony, sets forth a review and narrative of the Commission's work by those
most familiar with it at the time.
---------------------------
(v)
The Warren Commission
Page 1
THE WARREN COMMISSION
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(1)
Contents
Page 2
CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. Operations and procedures --------------------------------------- (4)
Creation of the Warren Commission ------------------------------- (4)
Purposes of the Warren Commission ------------------------------- (22)
Organization of the Warren Commission --------------------------- (44)
Independent investigators --------------------------------------- (59)
Communication among the staff ----------------------------------- (71)
Interaction between the Warren Commission and the staff --------- (74)
Pressures ------------------------------------------------------- (88)
II. Relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation:
A. Perspective of the Warren Commission:
Attitude of the Commission members ----------------- (113)
Attitude of the Commission staff ---------------------- (144)
Predispositions regarding the agencies -------------- (144)
Attitude of the staff toward the investigation ------ (152)
Initial staff impressions of the agencies ----------- (160)
Attitude of the staff during the course of the
investigation -------------------------------------- (163)
Dependence on the agencies: Staff views ------------- (183)
B. Attitude of the FBI and the CIA toward the Warren Commission:
General attitude -------------------------------------- (188)
The FBI ----------------------------------------------- (188)
The CIA ----------------------------------------------- (205)
Examples of attitudes and relationships --------------- (216)
Introduction --------------------------------------- (216)
Inadequate follow-up --the Odio-Hall incident ------ (218)
Unreasonable delays -------------------------------- (228)
Misleading testimony ------------------------------- (238)
Withheld information ------------------------------- (240)
Attachment A: The Warren Commission ---------------------------- (278)
Attachment B: Monthly progress of the Warren Commission
investigation ------------------------------------------------- (279)
Attachment C: Days worked by Warren Commission staff--1964 --(280)
Attachment D: Transcript of the executive session testimony of Arlen
Specter, W. David Slawson and Wesley Liebeler before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, November 8, 1977 ----------------- (281)
Attachment E: Transcript of the executive session testimony of W. David
Slawson and Wesley Liebeler before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations November 15, 1977 --------------------------------- (282)
Attachment F: Transcript of the executive session testimony of Judge
Burt W. Griffin and Howard P Willens before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations November 17, 1977 --------------- (283)
Attachment G: Transcript of the executive session deposition of J. Lee Rankin by
the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
August 17, 1978 ----------------------------------------------------- (284)
Attachment H: Transcript of the depostion of Howard P. Willens by
the House Select Committee on Assassination, July 28, 1978 ---- (285)
Attachment I: Letter and attachments from Judge Burt W. Griffen
to G. Robert Blakey, November 23, 1977 --------------------------- (286)
Attachment J: Letter from Howard P. Willens to G. Robert Blakey,
December 14, 1978 ---------------------------------------------------- (287)
(2)
Operations and Procedures
Page 3
I. OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
CREATION OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
(4) On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President
Johnson became President. President Johnson was immediately faced with the
problem of investigating the assassination. On November 23, 1963, J. Edgar
Hoover forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him. This
report detailed the evidence that indicated Lee Harvey Oswald's guilt. (1) On
November 24, 1963, Hoover telephoned Presidents Johnson aide Walter Jenkins and
stated:
The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach* is having something
issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin. Mr
Katzenbach thinks that the President might appoint a Presidential Commission of
three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I countered with a
suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney General with
pictures, laboratory work, and so forth. Then the Attorney General can make the
report to the President and the President can decide whether to make it public.
I felt this was better because there are several aspects which would complicate
our foreign relations, if we followed the Presidential Commission route. (2)
(5) Former Attorney General Katzenbach told the committee* that there were a
number of factors that led to his belief that some kind of statement regarding
the absence of a conspiracy should be issued without delay. Katzenbach recalled:
I think*** speculation that there was conspiracy of various kinds was fairly
rampant, at that time particularly in the foreign press. I was reacting to that
and I think reacting to repeated calls from people in the State Department who
wanted something of that kind in an effort to quash the beliefs of some people
abroad that the silence in the face of those rumors was not to be taken as
substantiating it in some way. That is, in the face of a lot of rumors about
conspiracy, a total silence on the subject from the Government neither
confirming nor denying tended to feed those rumors. I would have liked a
statement of the kind I said, that nothing we had uncovered so far leads to
believe that there is a conspiracy, but investigation is continuing; everything
will be put out on the table.(3)
----------------------
(3)
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(6) Katzenbach further stated:
I had numerous reports from the Bureau of things that were going on. Again, I
cannot exactly tell you the time frame on this, but there were questions of
Oswald's visit to Russia, marriage to Marina, and the visit to Mexico City, the
question as to whether there was any connection between Ruby and Oswald, how in
hell the police could have allowed that to happen.
Those were the sorts of considerations at least that we had during that period
of time, I guess. The question as it came along as the result of all those
things was whether this was some kind of conspiracy, whether foreign powers
could be involved, whether it was a right-wing conspiracy, whether it was a
leftwing conspiracy, whether it was the right wing trying to put out the
conspiracy on the left wing or the lef wing trying to put the conspiracy on the
right wing, whatever that may have been.
There were many rumors around. There were many speculations around, all of which
were problems. (4)
(7) Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach also indicated his desire to have
"everyone know that Oswald was guilty of the President's assassination."(5) On
November 25, 1963, Katzenbach write a memorandum to Presidential aide William
Moyers in which he stated:
It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's
assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United
States and abroad. That all the facts have been told and that a statement to
this effect be made now.
1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not
have confederates who are still at large; that the evidence was such that he
would have been convicted at trial.
* * * * * * * * * *
3. The matter has been handled thus far with neither dignity nor conviction;
facts have been mixed with rumor and speculation. We can scarcely let the world
see us totally in the image of the Dallas police when our President is murdered.
I think this objective may be satisfied and made public as soon as possible with
the completion of a thorough FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. This
may run into the difficulty of pointing to inconsistency between this report and
statements by Dallas Police offcials; but the reputation of the Bureau is such
that it may do the whole job. The only other step would be the appointment of a
Presidential commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the
evidence and announce its conclusion. This has both advantages and
disadvantages. I think it can await publication of the FBI report and public
reaction to it here and abroad.
I think, however, that a statement and the facts will be
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5
made public property in an orderly and responsible way; it should be made now;
we need something to head off public speculation or congressional hearings of
the wrong sort.(6)
(8) Recalling that memorandum, Katzenbach stated:
Perhaps I am repeating myself, but everybody appeared to believe that Lee Harvey
Oswald had acted alone fairly early. There were rumors of conspiracy. Now,
either Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone or he was part of a conspiracy, one of the
two, or somebody else was involved.
If he acted alone and if that was in fact true, then the problem you had was how
do you allay all the rumors of conspiracy. If he, in fact, was part of a
conspiracy, you damned well wanted to know what the conspiracy was, who was
involved in it, and that would have given you another set of problems.
The problem that I focused on for the most part was the former one because they
kept saying he acted alone. How do you explain? You have to put all of this out
with all your explanations because you have all of these associations and all of
that is said, you put out all the facts, why you come to that conclusion. I say
this because the conclusion would have been a tremendously important conclusion
to know.
If some foreign government was behind this, that may have presented major
problems. It was of major importance to know that. I want to emphasize that both
sides had a different set of problems. If there was a conspiracy, the problem
was not rumors of conspiracy. The problem was rumors. Everything had to be gone
into.(7)
(9) On November 25, 1963--the same date as the Katzenbach memorandum President
Johnson directed the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of all the circumstances surrounding the brutal assassination of
of President Kennedy and the murder of his alleged assassin." (8)
(10) Then, 2 days later, Senator Everett M. Dirksen proposed in Congress that
the Senate Judiciary Committee conduct a full investigation. Congressman Charles
E. Goodell proposed that a joint committee composed of seven Senators and seven
Representatives conduct an inquiry. In addition to the proposed congressional
investigations, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr announced that a court of
inquiry, authorized by Texas law, would be established to investigate the
assassination. In his oral history, Leon Jaworski described the creation of the
Texas Court of Inquiry:
I saw Lyndon Johnson within a few days after he assumed the Presidency. Waggoner
Carr had been *** [interruption]*** heard was that naturally the
President--President Johnson--was tremendously concerned over what happened in
Dallas from the standpoint of people understanding
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what really happened. Here and in Europe were all kinds of speculations, you
know that this was an effort to get rid of Kennedy and put Johnson in, and a lot
of other things. So he immediately called on Waggoner Carr who was attorney
general of Texas. Waggoner Carr, follwing President Kennedy's funeral, appeared
on all the networks and made an announcement to that effect.(9)
(11) On November 29, 1963, Walter Jenkins wrote a memorandum to President
Johnson, which stated:
Abe [Fortas] has talked with Katzenbach and Katzenbach has talked with the
Attorney General. They recommend a seven man commission--two Senators, two
Congressmen, the Chief Justice, Allen Dulles, and a retired military man
(general or admiral). Katzenbach is preparing a description of how the
Commission would function***.(10)
(12) This memorandum also included a list of possible members of the Commission
and asked Johnson if they were satisfactory. This list was in fact apparently
satisfactory since all of the people noted were appointed to the Commission.
(13) Former Attorney General Katzenbach told the committee:
I doubted that anybody in the Government, Mr. Hoover or the FBI or myself or the
President or anyone else, could satisfy a lot of foreign opinion that all facts
were being revealed and that the investigation would be complete and conclusive
and without any loose ends.
So, from the beginning, I felt that some kind of commission would be desirable
for that purpose***that it would be desirable *** for the President to appoint
some commission of people who had international and domestic public stature and
reputation for integrity that would review all of the investigations and direct
any further investigation.(11)
(14) On the same day, President Johnson told Hoover that, although he wanted to
"get by" on just the FBI report, the only way to stop the "rash of
investigations" was to appoint a high-level committee to evaluate the
report.(12) That afternoon President Johnson met with Chief Justice Earl Warren
and persuaded him to be chairman of a commission to investigate the
assassination. Johnson explained his choice of Warren by stating,"*** I felt
that we needed a Republican chairman whose judicial ability and fairness were
unquestioned."(13) Although Warren had previously sent word through a third
party that he opposed his appointment as chairman,(14) President Johnson
persuaded him to serve. In "The Vantage Point," President Johnson stated he told
Warren:
When this country is confronted with threatening divisions and suspicions, I
said, and its foundation is being ricked, and the President of the United States
says that you are the only man who can handle the matter, you won't say "no"
will you?(15)
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(15) In his memoirs, Earl Warren stated that on November 29, 1963, Katzenbach
and Solicitor General Archibald Cox met with him and attempted to persuade him
to chair the Commission. Warren refused. He related:
***about 3:30 that same afternoon I received a call from the White House asking
if I could come to see the President and saying that it was quite urgent. I, of
course, said I would do so and very soon therafter I went to his office. I was
ushered in and, with only the two of us in the room, he told me of his proposal.
He said he was concerned about the wild stories and rumors that were arousing
not only our own people but people in other parts of the world. He said that
because Oswald had been murdered, there could be no trial emanating from the
assassination of President Kennedy, and that unless the facts were explored
objectively and conclusions reached that would be respected by the public, it
would always remain an open wound with ominous potential. He added that several
congressional committees and Texas local and State authorities were
contemplating public investigations with television coverage which would compete
with each other for public attention, and in the end leave the people more
bewildered and emotional than at present. He said he was satisfied that if he
appointed a bipartisan Presidential Commission to investigate that facts
impartially and report them to a troubled Nation that the people would accept
its findings. He told me that he had made up his mind as to the other members,
that he has communicated with them, and that they would serve if I would accept
the chairmanship. He then named them to me. I then told the President my reasons
for not being available for the chairmanship. He replied, "You were a soldier in
World War I, but there was nothing you could do in that uniform comparable to
what you can do for your country in this hour of trouble." He then told me how
serious were the rumors floating around the world. The gravity of the situation
was such that it might lead us into war, he said, and, if so, it might be a
nuclear war. He went on to tell me that he had just talked to Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara, who had advised him that the first nuclear strike against us
might cause the loss of 40 million people.
I then said, "Mr. President, if the situation is that serious, my personal views
do not count. I will do it." He thanked me, and I left the White House.(16)
(16) In his oral history, Warren related a similar version of the meeting.(17)
(17) In his appearance before the committee, former President and Commission
member Gerald R. Ford, also recalled the appointment of Chief Justice Warren as
chairman. He testified:
I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assignment from President
Johnson for precisely the same reason that the other six of us did. We ere asked
by the President to undertake this responsibilty, as a public duty and service,
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and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or operations
we accepted, and I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the
Chief Justice.(18)
(18) In "The Vantage Point", President Johnson presented two considerations he
had at the time. He believed the investigation of the assassination should not
be done by an agency of the executive branch. He stated, "The Commission had to
be composed of men who were beyond pressure and above suspicion."(19) His second
consideration was that the investigation was too large an issue for the Texas
authorities to handle alone.(20)
(19) Apparently, Earl Warren also did not want Texas to conduct the court of
inquiry that had been announced earlier by Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr.
In his oral history, Leon Jaworski discussed Warren's attitudes and actions
regarding the court of inquiry:
I came on to Houston, and then I began to get calls from Katzenbach and from Abe
Fortas telling me that they were having a Presidential Commission appointed to
go into this matter. This would be to keep Congress from setting up a bunch of
committees and going in and maybe having a McCarthy hearing or something like
that. The next thing I knew they were telling me, "Leon, you've got to come up
here." This was Katzenbach and Fortas both. "Because the Chief (Chief Justice
Warren, who had accepted the appointment from the President) doesn't want any
part of the court of inquiry in Texas. And I said, "Well, as far as I can see
it, there's no need in our doing anything that conflicts-- let's work together."
He said, "Well, he doesn't want any part of Waggoner Carr, the attorney general
down there, because he said it would just be a political matter." He said, "He
respects you and so***
In and event I then went up to Washington, and I had the problem of working this
matter out. I must say that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach was a great help;
Solicitor General Archie Cox was of great help. Those two promarily and Waggoner
Carr and I worked with them--Katzenbach saw the Chief Justice from time to time,
bringing proposals to him from me; the Chief Justice was willing to talk to me
without Carr present--I could'nt do that. It finally evolved that--from all
these discussions, there finally evolved a solution that we would all meet. We
did meet in the Chief's office, and the Chief addressed all his remarks to me
and ignored Waggoner Carr, but I would in turn talk to Carr in his presense and
direct the question to him and so on. What we did is agree that we would not
begin and court inquiry, but that we would be invited into hearings; would have
full access to everything.(21)
(20) After this meeting, Leon Jaworski related to President Johnson that the
matter of the Texas court of inquiry had been resolved
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satisfactorily. The President appeared to have been pleased with the result.
Jaworski stated:
When we got through with that, I called Walter Jenkins and told him that we
thought we had solved it properly, and that I ought to have a word with the
President. He said, "By all means. The President is waiting to hear from
you."*** I went on over there and he was in the pool; he came immediately to the
edge of the pool and shook hands with me. Then I told him what had happened, and
that we had worked it out and had worked it out in great shape, and we were
going to work together, and everybody was happy and shook hands and patted each
other on the back and so on. And that even the Chief Justice had warmed up to
Waggoner Carr before the conference broke up. Then Lyndon Johnson looked at me
and he said, "Now, Leon, you've done several things for me--many things in fact
for me. Now, it's my time to do something for you." I said, Mr. President, there
is nothing I want. I don't want you to do anything for me." And so he looked at
me and he said, "All right, I'll just send you a Christmas card then."(22)
(21) On the evening of November 29, 1963, President Johnson issued Executive
Order No. 11130 that created the President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy, hereinafter the Warren Commission. The Commission was
composed of seven people:
Hale Boggs--Democratic Representative from Louisiana;
John Sherman Cooper--Republican Senator from Kentucky, former Ambassador to
India;
Allen W. Dulles--former Director of the CIA;
Gerald R. Ford--Republican Representative from Michigan;
John J McCloy--former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and former president of
the World Bank;
Richard B. Russell--Democratic Senator from Georgia, and Earl Warren, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.
PURPOSE OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
(22) The purpose of the Warren Commission, as stated in Executive Order No.
11130, were:
To examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any
additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by Federal
or State authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds
desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such
assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with
the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions.
(23) Although this may be an accurate statement of some of the purposes of the
Warren Commission, there were indications that there wee additional tasks that
it was to perform.
(24) It is apparent from some of the statements previously quoted that many
members of Government were concerned about convincing
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the public that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone.(23) In addition
to the memoranda, referred to earlier, on December 9, 1963, Katzenbach wrote
each member of the Warren Commission recommending that the Commission
immediately issue a press release stating that the FBI report, which had been
submitted to the Warren Commission that same day, clearly showed there was no
international conspiracy and that Oswald was a loner.(24)
(25) The Commission did not issue the requested press release. Although in their
testimony several of the Warren Commission staff members indicated they were not
aware of these memoranda, (25) it is apparent that this purpose was clearly in
the minds of some of the people who were in contact with the Warren Commission
and the members of the Warren Commission could not have been unaware of the
pressure.
(26) Another purpose of the Warren Commission, which was at least apparent to
Chief Justice Warren and to President Johnson, was the quashing rumors and
speculation. President Johnson was conserned that the public might believe his
home State of Texas was involved in the assassination. He was also aware of
speculation about Castro's possible participation. President Johnson expressed
his consern in "The Vantage Point":
Now, with Oswald dead, even a wounded Governor could not quell the doubts. In
addition, we were aware of stories that Castro, still smarting over the Bay of
Pigs and only lately accusing us of sending CIA agents into the country to
assassinate him, was the perpetrator of the Oswald assassination plot. These
rumors were another compelling reason that a thorough study had to be made of
the Dallas tragedy at once. Out of the Nation's suspicions, out of the Nation's
need for facts, the Warren Commission was born. [Italic added](26)
(27) On January 20, 1964, at the first staff meeting of the Warren Commission,
Chief Justice Warren discussed the role of the Commission. A memorandum about
this meeting described Warren's statements:
He (Warren) placed emphasis on the importance of quenching rumors, and
precluding further speculation such as that which has surrounded the death of
Lincoln. He emphasized that the Commission had to determine the truth, whatever
that might be.(27)
(28) At this meeting, Warren also informed the staff of the disscussion he had
had with President Johnson, including the fact that the rumors could lead to a
nuclear war which would cost 40 million lives. (28) Both the Chief Justice and
President Johnson were obviously concerned about the rumors were not quashed.
(29) World reaction to the assassination, and its coverage in the media, may
have reinforced this concern. An editorial on November 23, 1963, in the New York
Times stated that President Johnson "must convince the country that this bitter
tragedy will not divert us from
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our proclaimed purposes or check our forward movement." On November 24, 1963,
the New York Times reported that Pravda was charging right-wingers in the United
States of trying to use the assassination of President Kennedy to stir up
anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria. The same article stated:
The Moscow radio said Oswald was charged with Mr. Kennedy's slaying after 10
hours of interrogation, but there was no evidence which could prove this
accusation.
(30) On November 25, 1963, Donald Wilson, acting director of the United States
Information Agency, submitted a memorandum to Bill Moyers that discussed world
reaction to Oswald's slaying. This memorandum went through each major city and
summarized newspaper articles that had appeared regarding Oswald's death. A Tass
dispath released after Oswald was killed concluded:
All the circumstances of President Kennedy's tragic death allow one to assume
that this murder was planned and carried out by the ultrarightwing, fascist, and
racist circles, by those who carried out by those who cannot stomach any step
aimed at the easing of international tensions, and the improvement of
Soviet-American relations.(29)
(31) On the same day, the New York Times stated in an editorial:
The full story of the assassination and its stunning sequel must be placed
before the American people and the world in a responsible way by a responsible
source of the U.S. Government *** The killing of the accused assassin does not
close the books on the case. In fact, it raises questions which must be answered
if we are ever to fathom the depths of the President's terrible death and its
aftermath. An objective Federal commission, if necessary, with Members of
Congress included, must be appraised of all and tell us all. Much as we would
like to obliterate from memory the most disgraceful weekend in our history, a
clear explanation must be forthcoming. Not in a spirit of vengeance, not to
cover up, but for the sake of information and justice to restore respect for
law.(30)
(32) An editorial in the Washington Post stated:
President Lyndon Johnson has widely recognized that energetic steps must be
taken to prevent a repetition of the dreadful era of rumor and gossip that
followed the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. A century has hardly
sufficed to quiet the doubts that arose in the wake of that tragedy.(31)
(33) On November 27, 1963, the New York Times reported a Tass dispatch that
severly criticized the Dallas police. On the same day the Washington Post
reported that Castro had accused American reactionaries of plotting the
assassination to implicate Cuba. The Times also reported that the general
feeling in India was that Oswald had been a "tool" and silenced
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by "enemies of peace." (32) Throughout the world, identical sentiments were
being voiced, probably impressing Johnson with the fact that something had to be
done.
(34) The Testimony of several staff members of the Warren Commission supported
the conclusion that the Warren Commission had multiple purposes. Staff members
testified that the purpose of the Warren Commission was to ascertain the facts
of the assassination and to submit a report to the American people.(33) The
staff was however, also aware of Chief Justice Warren's fellings. Staff counsel
David Slawson stated:
His [Warren's] idea was that the principal function of the Warren Commission was
to allay doubts if possible. You know, possible in the sense of being
honest.(34)
Staff counsel Arlen Specter described his reaction to Warren's concern about
rumors by stating:
*** that was a matter in our minds but we did not tailor our findings to
accommodate any interest other than the truth.(35)
Staff consel Norman Redlich believed that the objective of allaying public fears
was "a byproduct of the principal objective which was to discover all the
facts."(36)
(35) While their statements reflected that staff members were concerned with
getting at the truth, there was an additional motive for finding the truth.
Staff consel Bert Griffin stated:
I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects my feeling, and it was
certainly the feeling that I had of all my collegues that we were determined, if
we could find something that showed that there had been sommething sinister
beyond what appeared to have gone on.*** (37)
Slawson stated:
I think it is hard to remember 13 years ago what the timing of all these things
was but among the staff members themselves, like when I talked to Jem Liebeler
and Dave Belin and Bert Griffin particularly we would sometimes speculate at to
what would happen if we got firm evidence that pointed to some very high
official. It sounds perhaps silly in retrospect to say it but there was even
rumors at the time, of course, that President Johnson was involved. Of course,
that would present a kind of frightening prospect, because if the President or
anyone that high up was indeed involved, they clearly were not going to allow
someone like us to bring out the truth if they could stop us. The gist of it was
that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to bring it out and
would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth was. The only question in
our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at all credible how would we
be able to protect it an bring it to the proper authorities? (38)
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(36) Although the staff members' promary concern was the truth, the memers of
the Warren Commission, and not the members of its staff, were the final
decisionmakers with regard to what exactly went into the report. There was some
testimony that indicated Earl Warren's concern about rumors did affect the
writing of the report. When asked why some statements were made that were more
definitive than the evidence, Slawson stated:
I think because Earl Warren adamant almost that the Commission would make up its
mind on what it thought was the truth and then they would state it as much
without qualification as they could. He wanted to lay at rest, doubts. He made
no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a
judge.(39)
Slawson also stated:
I suppose he did not think that an official document like this ought to read at
all, tentatively, it should not be a source of public speculation if he could
possibly avoid it. (40)
(37) Staff counsel Wesley J. Liebeler, when asked about some of his critical
memoranda that he wrote regarding the galley proof of the final report, stated:
I think also part of the problem was, as I said before, a tendency, at least in
the galleys of chapter IV, to try and downplay or not give equal emphasis to
contrary evidence and just simply admit and state openly that there is a
conflict in the testimony and the evidence the Commission could conclude
whatever the Commission could conclude. (41)
Liebeler also stated:
Once you conclude on the basis of evidence we had that Oswald was the assassin,
for example, taking that issue first, then obviously it is in the interest of
the Commission, and I presume everyone else, to express that conclusion in a
straightforward and convincing way.***(42)
(38) Former President Ford stated that there were in fact differences between
the proposed language of the report's conclusions as drafted by the staff and
what the Commission finally approved. Ford recalled that one such difference
pertained to the wording of the Commission's conclusion about possible
conspiracy:
There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be summarized
this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin.
No.2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic.
The Commission, after looking at this suggested language from the staff decided
unanimously that the wording should be much like this, and I am not quoting
precisely from the Commission staff, but I am quoting the substance:
No. 1, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No. 2, the Commission has found
no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic.
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The second point is quite different from the language which was recommended by
the staff. I think the Commission was right to make that revision and I stand by
it today.(43)
(39) In his appearance before the committee, former Commission member John J.
McCloy stated that he had come to hold a different belief regarding the
possibilty of a conspiracy than he had at the time of the Commission's probe in
1964. He stated that he had come to believe there was in fact some evidence
outweighed the Commission's conclusion. McCloy said:
Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there hs been so much talk about
that. I don't think I need to dwell on it any longer. I no longer feel we had no
credible evidence or reliable evidence in regard to a conspiracy, but I rather
think the weight of evidence was against the existence of a conspiracy (44)
(40) The late Senator Richard B. Russell, the senior member of the Warren
Commission selected from the Congress, voiced much stronger feelings regarding
the possibility of conspiracy before his death in early 1971. In a television
interview reported by the Washington Post January 19, 1970, he stated that he
had come to believe that there had in fact been a conspiracy behind the
President's murder. With respect to Lee Harvey Oswald, Senator Russell stated,
"I think someone else worked with him." He also stated that there were "too many
things" regarding such areas as Oswald's trip to Mexico City, as well as his
associations, that "caused me to doubt that he planned it all by himself."
Russel believed the Warren Commission had been wrong in concluding that Oswald
acted alone.
(41) J. Lee Rankin, the Commission's general counsel, recalled that toward the
end of the Commission's investigation, he encountered serious difficulty in the
process of coordinating the staff's writing of the report:
The one factor that I did not examine with regard to the staff as much as I
would from my having had this experience was their ability to write and most of
them had demonstrated a considerable ability to write and most of them had
demonstrated a considerable ability to write in Law Review or other legal
materials by their record but my experience taught me that some people are
fluent in writing and others while they are skilled at it have great difficulty
in getting started and finishing and getting the job completed. I don't know
just how I would have tried to have anticapated that problem and worked it out
but it became a serious difficulty for me in my work as general counsel. Looking
back on it I would have much preferred that I had not only all the skills that I
did in the staff but the additional one that as soon as we had completed the
investigation they would go right to work and write a fine piece in which they
described their activities and the results.(45)
(42) Although the Executive order authorized the Warren Commission to conduct
further investigations if the Commission found it desirable,
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Chief Justice Warren did not believe further investigation beyond what the
investigative agencies had provided would be needed. He stated at the first
execution session of the Warren Commission:
Now I think our job here is essentially one for the evaluation of evidence as
distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe at the outset
at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the reports of the
various agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter, the FBI,
the Secret Service, and others that I may know about at the present time.(46)
In fact, the Warren Commission did rely extensivly on the investigative agencies
rather than pursuing an independent investigation. (The effects of this reliance
is discussed in another section of this report.)
(43) The evidence indecated, therefore, that the Warren Commission not only had
as its purposes those stated in the Executive order but it also had additional
purposes that may have affected the conduct of the investigation and the final
conclusions. The desire to establish Oswald's guilt and thus to quash rumors of
a conspiracy may have had additional effects on the functioning and conclusions
of the Warren Commission.
ORGANIZATION OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
(44) The Warren Commission investigation was divided into six areas, with two
attorneys assigned to each. Area I was "Basic Facts of the Assassination";
Francis Adams and Arlen Specter were the two lawyers were Joseph Ball and David
Belin. Area III was "Lee Harvey Oswald's Background" to be handled by Albert
Jenner and Wesley J. Liebeler Area IV, "Possible Conspiratorial Relationships"
was given to William Coleman and W. David Slawson. Area V was "Oswald's Death,"
and Leon Hubert and Burt Griffin were assigned to it. Area VI was "Presidential
Protectin." Samuel Stern was assigned was assigned to this area. The General
Counsel of the Commission, Lee J. Rankin, was to assist Stern. Norman Redlich
worked on special projects. He drafted the procedural rules for the Commission,
prepared for the Marina Oswald testimony, and worked with Ball, Belin and
Specter on the investigation of the assassination itself. He also attended as
many Commission hearings as possible and reviewed and edited the drafts of the
report. Howard Willens assisted Rankin in organizing the work, staffing the
Commission, reviewing the materials received from the investigative agencies,
and requesting further information where necessary.
(45) The organization of the Warren Commission staff is important because it, in
fact, determined the focus of the investigation. Four of the areas (I, II, III,
and IV) were concerned primarily with Oswald--his activities on November 22,
1963, and his background. Only one area, representing one-sixth of the available
personnel, was devoted to the investigation of Ruby's role. This area was also
framed in terms
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of Oswald--it was called "Lee Harvey Oswald's Death." No area specifically
focused on the investigation of pro- or anti-Castro Cuban involvement, organized
crime participation, or even the investigative agencies' role in the
assassination. The area of domestic conspiracy was considered as part of Area
III, "Lee Harvey Oswald's Background," which again focused the issue of
conspiracy on Oswald.
(46) Former President Ford testified that he had been critical of Chairman
Warren's selecting a general counsel without first consulting the other members
of the Commission. Ford stated that he beieved Warren was attempting to place
too much control over the Commission in his own hands:
After my appointment to the Commission, and following several of the
Commission's organizational meetings, I was disturbed that the chairman, in
selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the
direction of a one-man commission. My views were shared by several other members
of the Commission.
The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would
be approved by the Commission as a whole.(47)
(47) In his testimony, Howard Willens explained the rationale for the
organization of the staff:
I believe the rationale is readily stated. In order to begin and undertake a
project of this dimension, there has to be some arbitrary allocation of
responsibilities. There is no way to do it that eliminates overlap or possible
confusion but this was an effort to try to organize the work in such a way that
assignments would be reasonable clear, overlaps could be readily identified, and
coordination would would be accomplished among the various members of the
staff.(48)
(48) The staff members who testified before the committee generally believed the
organization was effective. Specter stated, "Yes, I think the categories were
adequate to finding the truth."(49) Redlich said, "The procedures and the
organization were an important part in introducing the end result which I
thought was professional and thorough investigation of the assassination."(50)
Only Griffin expressed dissatisfaction with the organizational structure:
GRIFFIN. As far as I was concerned, I did not feel that it operated in a way I
felt comfortable.
STAFF COUNSEL. How would you have done it differently?
GRIFFEN. Let me first of all preface it Hubert and I began to feel after a
couple of months that perphaps there was not a great deal of interest in what we
were doing, that they looked upon the Ruby activity, based upon information that
they saw as being largely peripheral to the questions that they were concerned
with. We did have a disagreement, pretty clear disagreement, on how to go about
conducting the investigation and I think that again was another reason why
perhaps I would say the operation was not as effective as I would have liked to
have seen it (51)
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(49) The pay records of the Warren Commission staff indicate that several of the
senior attorneys did not spend much time working on the investigation, and the
testimony of staff members supported this fact. Arlen Specter stated:
I would prefer not to ascribe reasons but simply to say some of the senior
counsel did not participate as extensively as some of the junior counsel. (52)
He added:
It is more accurate to say I ended up as the only counsel in my area.(53)
(50) When asked if the senior cousels devoted much time to the investigation,
Slawson stated:
A few did not. The majority of them did--and I think contributed very valuably.
They did not, with a couple of exceptions, spend as much time as the younger men
did, especially as the investigation wore on. Some of them, I understand, were
hired with the promise that turned out not to be the case.(54)
(51) Howard Willens stated, when asked about the accuracy of the chart
describing the pay records:
I think in the roughest terms this gives a fair picture of the days spent during
the period by members of the staff. I think that with reference to my earlier
comment you should note that several of the senior counsel felt that their
primary responsibility was to work in the investigative stages of the
Commission's work.(55)
(52) The failure of the senior attorneys to participate fully is attributed to
the impression they had that their role on the Commission did not require their
working full time and that their participation would only be needed for 3 to 6
months. Griffen supplied another reason for at least one senior cousel's leaving
early:
A third reason was, however, that Hubert was disenchanted with some of the
things that were going on in that he didn't feel he was getting the kind of
support that he wanted to get, and he expressed to me a certain amount of
demoralization over what he felt was unresponsiveness that existed between
himself and particulary Mr. Rankin.(56)
(53) Some of the staff members testified that the staff were qualified people
and that there were a sufficient number of lawyers to conduct the investigation.
The testimony also indicates, however, that there was some dissatisfaction and
that the failure to work full time on the part of the senior counsels probably
affected the investigation. When Redlich was asked if the staff, not
participating full time affected the work, he stated:
Any time someone is not able to spend full time it had that effect. It means
that that work which might have been done during the course of that full-time
work gets picked up by
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others *** I don't think on balance any of that had a permanent harmful effect
because I believe that the entire staff taken as a whole, managed to conduct
what I consider to be a thorough inquiry. Obviously, as anyone who has conducted
an investigation knows, you always would like to have everyone there all the
time. That was not possible during a substanntial portion of the Warren
investigation.(57)
(54) Slawson responded to the same question:
As I said before, I felt overworked and I think many of the staff members felt
the same way. I think the main problem was one of the great underestimation of
the size of the task at the time. As I said, we were told, we were telephoned
and asked to come in; it would be 3 to 6 months. It is my recollection they said
it would be only 3 to 6 months on the outside and of course we ended up taking
about 8. There was a reluctance, once we were there, to admit--again this is a
matter of once you have made a decision you don't like to admit you were
wrong--but people did not like to admit that we probably needed more help and
more time.(58)
(55) The pay records indicated that from the diddle of January to the end of
September, Francis Adams, a Commission counsel, worked a total of 16 8-hour days
and 5 additional hours. Adams held one of the single most important positions
with the Commission, serving as senior attorney in the area of basic facts of
the assassination. Arlen Specter, when asked if this affected his performance,
stated:
I don't think it did although it would have been helpful if my senior counsel,
Francis Adams, had an oppurtunity to participate more extensively.(59)
(56) J. Lee Rankin told the committee:
There is one member that you can see that did not attend hardly at all and I
certainly should have gotten rid of him really.*** That was Francis Adams and he
really didn't contribute anything.(60)
(57) Lieber also indicated he did not work closely with the senior attorney in
his area, Albert Jenner. He stated:
My recollection is that during the early part of the Commission's work that Mr.
Jenner was concerned, I believe he was interested in becoming president of the
American Bar Association and I believe he spent some time on that issue.(61)
(58) While describing the organization of the work in his area, Liebeler stated:
It was difficult for Mr. Jenner and me to work out a general relationship on
that question at that time. Since I was a so-called junior staff member at that
time, Mr. Jenner was not, I was quite unsure when I started as to how to handle
the problem. I finally just decided to do my own thing and basically went ahead
and did most of that original work, myself. Mr. Jenner and I never actually
worked very closely together. He worked on projects and I worked on
projects.(62)
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INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS
(59) As stated earlier, the Warren Commission staff was primarily composed of
attorneys, with a few assistants drawn from other agencies of the Government. It
had no independent investigators, but relied primarily upon Government agencies
to supply leads and perform a large majority of the field investigation.
(60) The Commission's former general counsel, J. Lee Rankin, told the committee
that he believed it would have been difficult to assemble an independent
investigative staff. Rankin recalled:
Well, I gave some thought to that and I finally conluded that I would lose more
than I would gain, that the whole intelligence community in the Government would
feel that the Commission was indicating a lack of confidence in them and that
from then on I would not have any cooperation from them; they would universally
be against the Commission and try to trip us up.(63)
(61) J. Lee Rankin told the committee that the decision not ot have the
Commission employ its own investigators:
* * * was a decision of the Commission, although I recommended that kind of a
procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside
investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them,
find out what their expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle
sensitive information in the Government, and it might be a very long time before
we could even get a staff going that could work on the matter, let alone have
any progress on it.(64)
(62) Slawson stated:
We had special people assigned from CIA, FBI, and Secret Service who were with
us more or less full time, especially the Secret Service who were
investigators.(65)
(63) There was one indication that the Warren Commission used some independent
experts for the examination of the physical evidence. Slawson stated:
I think that some of the areas of investigation such as that headed by Dave
Belin, which was the immediate circumstances of the shooting in Dallas, employed
private investigators at various points to cross-check and give an independent
evaluation.(66)
(64) Redlich stated:
My recollection is that in ballistics I believe we used someone from the
government of Illinois, either handwriting or fingerprinting. I am not sure it
was not someone from the New York City Police Department.(67)
(65) There was also some indication that the staff would have preferred to have
had independent investigators. Spector said:
If [in] organizational structure you include the personnel available, I think
that everyone would have much preferred to
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have had a totally independent investigative arm to carry out the investigative
functions of the Commission, but I believe the Commission concluded early on,
and I was not privy to any such position from my position as assistant counsel,
that it would be impractical to organize an entire investigative staff from the
start so that use was made of existing Federal investigative facilities * * *
there would be an observation [among the staff] from time to time how nice it
would be if we had a totally independent staff.(68)
(66) When asked if any consideration was given to hiring independent
investigators, Redlich replied:
I have no clear recollection of that. Certainly during the time of the
investigation from time to time staff members talked to Mr. Rankin about what it
might have been like if we had had a completely independent staff. I think that
we reached the conclusion then, with which I still agree, that while using the
existing investigatory arms of the United States had certain disadvantages, on
balance it was still the right decision to make. There were certain tradeoffs
*** I don't think there was any happy, completely happy solution to that
dilemma.(69)
(67) John McCloy stated that he did not believe the Commission suffered from an
insufficient investigative capacity:
* * * it is not true we didn't have our own investigative possibilities. There
was a very distinguished group of litigating lawyers [on staff] that we called
on *** We had a very impressive list and they did great work. So it is not true
we relied entirely on the agencies of the Goverment.(70)
(68) Former President Ford told the committee that he believed the Commission's
decision not to employ an investagative staff was correct:
It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission
followed was the correct one and I would advocate any subsequent Commission to
follow the same.
For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experienced
[investigative] staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information,
to establish the organization that would be necessary for a sizable number of
investigators, would have been time-consuming and in my opinion would not have
answered what we were mandated to do.
It is my, it is my strong feelings that what we did was the right way. We were
not captives of, but we utilized the information from the in-house agencies of
the Federal Government * * *.(71)
(69) Ford also told the committee:
The FBI, and I use that as an example, undertook a very extensive investigation.
I don't recall how many agents but they had a massive operation to investigate
everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some additional
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staff people, then drew upon all of this information which was available, and
we, if my memory serves me accurately, insisted that the FBI give us everything
they had. Now that is a comprehensive order from the Commission to the Director
and to the FBI. I assume, and I think the Commission assumed, that athat order
was so broad that if they had anything if they had anything it was their
obligation to submit it. Now if they didn't, that is a failure on the part of
the agencies, not on the part of the Commission. (72)
(70) In his testimony, Burt Griffin supplied anther explanation for the
Commission's decision to rely upon the investigative agencies:
* * * there was a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such a way
as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the
Government. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done. Second,
it was important to keep the confidence of the existing investigative agencies,
and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own investigation, that it
would generate a paranoia in the FBI and the other investigative agencies which
would not only perhaps be politically disadvantageous, it would be bad for the
country because it might not be justified but it might also be
counterproductive. I think there was a fear that we might be undermining *** My
impression is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than
mine.(73)
COMMUNICATION AMONG THE STAFF
(71) The testimony of the staff members indicated that there generally was no
problem of communication among the areas. Specter stated that the information
was "funneled" by Rankin and he had no reason to believe the process was
unsuccessful. (74) Willens described the procedures for facilitating the
exchange of information:
One way of dealing with the separate areas within which the lawyers were dealing
was to make certain that all the materials that came in the office were reviewed
in one central place and that any material that bore even remotely or
potentially on an area. It was frequently the case that materials in our
possession were sent to three or four areas so that each of the groups of
lawyers could look at the same material from that group's perspective and decide
whether it had any relevance in the part of the investigation for which those
lawyers were reponsible. I continued this function throughout the Commission and
always erred on the side of multiple duplication so as to make certain that the
members of the staff in a particular area did get the papers which I thought
they needed. Another way of coordinating among the staff was by the circulation
of summary memoranda, which happened on a regular basis throughout the
Commission's work * * * The third way of coordinating among the staff was
perhaps more informal and related primarily to the ease with which the members
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of the staff could get together to discuss a problem in which more than one area
had particular interest.(75)
(72) Griffin also commented the communication between the staff members:
We had very few staff meetings of a formal nature. We did have two or three,
maybe four or five. The bulk of the communication was on a person-to-person ad
hoc basis. There were some memos, I believe, passed back and forth. (76)
He expressed some dissatisfaction with the communication he and Hubert had with
Rankin:
I suppose that it would not be fair to say that we did not have direct access to
Rankin. I cannot say at any point when we tried to see Rankin that we couldn't
see him. I don't recall any situation where we were formally required to go
through someone else to get there. There was no doorkeeper in a certain sense.
All of those communications that were in writing that went to Rankin went
through Howard Willens, but as a practical matter, and I am not sure entirely
what the reasons are, Hubert and I did not have a lot of communication with
Rankin. We really communicated with him personally infrequently. We had certain
amount of communication at the beginning. I do remember at the outset Hubert and
I had a meeting with Rankin in which we discussed the work of the mission that
we had, but I would say that by the first of April we had relatively little
communication with Rankin. That is, we might not speak to Rankin maybe more that
once every 2 weeks. Mr. Rankin is a formal person. Hubert and I did not feel
comfortable in our relationship with him. I point this out because I think our
relationship with Rankin was different than some of the other staff members. I
think a number of them would genuinely say, and I would believe from what I saw,
that they certainly had much better communication than we did. Whether they
would regard it as satisfactory I don't know.(77)
(73) The staff also indicated that they would communicate informally in the
evenings. Specter stated:
There was a very informal atmosphere on the staff so that there was constant
contact among all the lawyers both during the working day and those of us who
were around the evenings. We would customarily have dinner together, the virtual
sole topic of conversation was what each of us was doing. So there was a very
extensive exchange albeit principally informal among members of the staff as to
what each was doing. (78)
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE STAFF
(74) In his testimony, Howard Willens stated that the majority of the
communication between the staffmembers and the Warren Commission members was
through Rankin. Direct contact with members of the Warren Commission was
minimal:
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Apart from those occasional meetings with the Chief Justice most of the staff's
dealings with the members of the Commission occurred on a sporadic and limited
basis.(79)
(75) Norman Redlich stated:
However, in terms of informal relationship between the staff and the Commission
in the sense of the staff being present at the Commission meetings in a formal
way, that did not exist. I was not present at any meeting of the commission. I
was not privy to any formal meetings of the commission. Mr Rankin was the
official line of communication between the Commission and the staff.(80)
(76) Burt Griffin stated:
I had almost a total lack on contact with the Commission members. I have some
thoughts in retrospect now about some of the perceptions, total conjecture but
based on other things that have happened, but at the time I did feel senator
Russell was genuinely concerned about conducting the investigation. (81)
(77) Redlich also indicated that some of the staff were not satisfied with their
relationship with the members of the Warren Commission:
I believe that perhaps some members of the staff would have preferred to have
had a more direct ongoing formal relationship with the Commission. (82)
(78) Arlen Specter described the relationship with the members of the Warren
Commission as "Cordial, somewhat limited." (83)
(79) There is at least one exception to this formal relationship between staff
members and the Commission. W. David Slawson indicated he often met with Allen
Dulles:
Allen Dulles and I became fairly close I think. He had aged quite a bit by the
time he was on the Warren Commission and was also sick. I have forgotten, he had
some kind of disease that made one of his legs and foot very painful. So he was
not effective sometimes but when he was he was very smart and I liked him very
much. Because of my particular assignment of course he spent a lot of time with
me. We talked informally quite a bit. (84)
(80) In spite of this lack of contact between the staff and the Commission
members, some of the staff members believed that the Commissioners were
reasonably well informed and the interaction was satisfactory. Arlen Specter
thought the Commissioner were generally well informed about the facts of the
case. (85) When asked if the Commissioners were informed, Redlich responded:
I think some of them were tremendously well informed. the Chief Justice was
extremely well informed. I believe that former President Ford was extremely well
informed. Mr. Dulles attended a great many hearings. I believe that on the broad
areas of the Commission's inquiry the Commission was informed. They were
obviously not as informed of some
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of the specific enormous factual data in connection with the assassination as
was the staff. I have never known a staff that thought that group that it worked
for was as well informed as the staff was, and the Warren Commission was no
exception. (86)
(81) Wesley Liebeler, discussing a statement he was alleged to have made
regarding the Warren commission, stated:
What I had intended to convey to Mr. Epstein (the author of a book on the
Commission) was the idea that in terms of developing the investigation, the
direction in particular of the investigation, and in drafting the report, the
Commissioners themselves were not directly involved, and they were not. (87)
(82) Despite Liebeler's statement that the commissioners were not involved in
writing the report, the drafts of the report wee in fact circulated among the
Commission members for their review, suggestions and approval. The Commissioners
made comments and criticisms at this point and the drafts wee rewritten to
conform with their desires. (88)
(83) The Warren Commission had no formal sessions from June 23, 1964 to
September 18, 1964. This was the period during which the final report was
written. Had the commissioners participated to a greater extent during the
investigative stages and had they had more interaction with the staff members,
there might have been additional discussion and comments about the content of
the report might have been substantially different. Additional issues might have
arisen. For example, in his testimony, Specter stated:
* * * the Commission made a decision as to what would be done which was not
always in accordance with my own personal view as to what should be done, for
example, the review of the X-rays and photographs of the assassination of
President Kennedy. I thought that they should have been observed by the
Commission and by me among others perhaps having responsibility for that area
and I said so at the time. (89)
(84) John McCloy told the committee that he had also voiced objections over
Chief Justice Warren's decision not to have the commission view and evaluate
these materials during the investigation:
I think we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of
those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he
was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to
have put into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays there.
(90)
(85) During the final stages of the Warren Commission, the Commissioners were
almost evenly divided on the question of whether the single-bullet theory was
valid. To resolve this conflict, the Commissioners had the report worded in such
a way that was no conclusive answer. The report stated:
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Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission to
determine just which shot hit Governor Connally, there is very persuasive
evidence from the experts to indicate that the same bullet which pierced the
President's throat also caused Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor
Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some
difference of opinion as to this probability but there is no question in the
mind of any member of the Commission that all the shots which caused the
President's and Governer Connally's wound were fired from the sixth-floor window
of the Texas School Book Depository. (91)
(86) Of the controversy over the single-bullet theory, John Sherman Cooper
recalled:
We did have disagreements at times in the Commission and, I as I recall, I think
the chief debate grew out of the fact or the question as to whether there were
two shots or three shots or whether the same shot that entered President
Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally.
I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life
of the Commission that there had been three shots and that a separate shot
struck Governer Connally. (92)
(87) Had the Commissioners been close to the investigation and more aware of the
questions and issues regarding the ballistics evidence, they might have agreed
to examine the photographs and X-rays. Instead, probably because of the time
problem, the issue was resolved by the use of agreeable adjectives, rather than
by further investigation.
PRESSURES
(88) The Warren Commission was created on November 29, 1963. By the end of
January 1964, the staff of the Warren Commission had been completely assembled.
The hearings began on February 3, 1964, and were completed on June 17, 1964. The
summer of 1964 was spent writing and editing the report. On September 24, 1964,
the Warren report was submitted to President Johnson. The Warren Commission,
therefore, lasted a total of 10 months, with approximately 3 to 4 months spent
on the investigation itself and the remaining months, as previously stated, on
writing the report and organizing the staff.
(89) Time and political pressures were much in evidence during the course of the
Warren Commission and may have affected the work of the Commission. While some
staff members testified that there was no time pressure others indicated that
time was a concern and was inextricably combined with political pressures.
(90) There definitely was a desire to be prompt and the complete the
investigation as soon as possible. Specter stated:
* * * The attitude with respect to time perhaps should be viewed in November of
1977 as being somewhat different from 1964 to the extent that the Commission was
interested in a prompt conclusion of its work. It did not seek to sacrifice
completeness for promptness. When the Commission started its job there was no
conclusion date picked. My recollection
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is that it was discussed in terms of perhaps as little as 3 months, perhaps as
much as 6 months. As we moved along in the investigation there were comments on
attitudes that we should be moving along, we should get the investigation
concluded, so that the scope of what we sought to do and the time in which we
sought to do it had as its backdrop an obvious attitude by the Commission that
it wanted to conclude the investigation at the earliest possible date.(93)
(91) Specter also stated:
It is hard to specify the people or Commissioners who were pushing for a prompt
conclusion, but that was an unmistakable aspect of the atmosphere of the
Commission's work.(94)
(92) When asked if there was enough time, Willens responded:
I think the time was sufficient to do the work of the Warren Commission. I
cannot deny that the work could have gone on for another month or two or six.
(95)
(93) In spite of the desire for promptness, Specter and Redlich also believed
there was still enough time to complete their work. (96) At one point in his
testimony, Slawson stated this:
* * * although at times I was afraid there wouldn't be. There was time pressure
on all of us. I think that all members of the staff were bothered and somewhat
resented the fact that we were pushed to work at such a rapid pace, but we
resisted any attempts to make us finish before we felt we were ready to be
finished. When the report came out neither I, and I don't think anybody else,
felt that there was anything significant that we had not been able to do in the
time.*** But the amount of paper that we had to go through to do our job well
was tremendous *** I had so many documents to get through and try to understand
and try to put together. They continued pouring in from the ongoing
investigation after that. There weren't that many of us. So we had more than
enough to do, I would say. (97)
(94) Later, when asked about some of the problems with the footnotes of the
report. Slawson indicated one effect that time pressure had on the work of the
Commission:
I took, and I think everyone else did, as much care as we could. But the time
pressure was severe. With the mass of material that we had I am sure that errors
of numbering, and perhaps what footnote A should have had, footnote B did, and
vice versa, occurred. I don't think that the kind of crosschecking that normally
goes into a good professional publication, for example, ever went into this (98)
(95) Griffin also indicated some concern about the amount of work that had to be
done within the short period of time:
*** But Hubert and I, we had a completely, we had a scope of investigation that
was as great as all the other people put together, because we were investigating
a different
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murder. We had two people who were investigating a conspiracy from one man's
point of view and we had a security question, how did he get into the basement,
and so forth. (99)
(96) In his testimony before the committee, former general counsel J. Lee Rankin
gave his perception of the time factor:
Well, we had pressures from the beginning of the time element because the
country was anxious to know what had happened and whether there was any
conspiracy involved. I was assured by the Chief Justice that it would only take
me 2 or 3 months at the outside in this job and that is all the time I would be
away from my law practice, and properly, but also to get back to my other work
and, on the other hand, the first meeting we had with the staff, I told them
that our only client was the truth and that was what we must search for and try
to reveal, and I think we adhered to that, that we never departed from that
standard, any of the Commission or myself or the staff. (100)
(97) Rankin recalled further:
I didn't think there was any pressure. There was an expression by some members
of the Coommission that it would be better if the problem of the assassination
and whether any conspiracy was involved and what had happened, who the assassin
was, as the Commission found, all of those questions were not injected into the
various political conventions, but there was no indication at any time that we
should try to get it out for any such purpose and not adequately make a report
or investigate whatever sources we were able to find.(101)
(98) In an interview with the committee, John McCloy stated that while he
believed the Commission had been falsely accused of a "rush to judgment" in its
investigation, he did in fact believe there had been "a rush to print." In his
public appearance before the committee, McCloy stated:
We had no rush to judgment. We came to a judgment. There were some questions of
style in regard to the preparation of the report that I would like to have had *
* * another crack at to make it a little more clear * * *
*** I had a feeling at the end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to
get to print rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived at
the conclusions. (102)
(99) Chief Justice Warren stated in his oral history that there was no deadline,
as illustrated in the following exchange:
Q. You never did feel a deadline pressure so that you hurried your work?
A. No, sir, we did not.
Q. You were just going to get through whenever you finished.
A. Absolutely not [sic], there was no deadline of any kind for us, no deadline
of any kind.(103)
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(100) When asked if the fact that it was an election year affected the Warren
Commission, Warren replied:
WARREN. This wasn't an election year that we did this, was it? This was in 1963.
Q. No, it was November 30, after Kennedy was shot---
WARREN. Of 1962?
Q. Of 1963. And then Johnson had to run in 1964.
WARREN. My gosh, I guess that's right.
Q. It must not have been much of a factor.
WARREN. No, no, really it was no factor. It was no factor at all, no factor at
all.(104)
(101) Chief Justice Warren also stated:
The White House never gave us an instruction, never, never even looked at out
work until I took it up to the President. Never commented---
Q. The President never made suggestions?
WARREN. Never once in any way, shape, or form. In fact we didn't talk to him
about it.(105)
(102) The staff members of the Warren Commission did not perceive the question
of time exactly in the same way as Chief Justice Warren did. Slawson stated:
His [Warren's] main motivation in wanting the work done, and which he repeated
several times to different members of the staff, was that he wanted the truth
known and stated to the public before the Presidential election of 1964 because
he didn't want the assassination in any way to affect the elections. I am not
sure at all how he thought it would, but he didn't want any possibility of it.
That was his principal reason for having it finished. (106)
(103) Griffin stated that initially the report was to be completed by the
Democratic National Convention, which was in the summer of 1964:
It was also indicated at the outset that the hope was that the report would be
completed prior to the Democratic National Convention, that essentially had been
indicated by the White House, that it was the President's feeling.(107)
(104) Later in his testimony, Griffen stated:
Let me say it was never communicated to us that it was the Commission that
wanted to curtail things. There were two communications that were made as to
where this pressure was coming from. The most prominent one was the White House,
that there was a general, unspecified reference to the fact that the White House
wanted this report out before the convention. That was said to us many, many
times. I think the convention was in June.(108)
Griffen also indicated another deadline developed during the course of the
Warren Commission:
Second, just by way of human interest, color, perhaps another date began to be
set because the Chief Justice had a
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trip scheduled to go to Europe and the hope was that it could be bompleted
before he went on his trip to Europe.(109)
(105) Willens explained the concern about the election and the convention in the
following way:
In part the concern was media concern. There were numerous conversations with
media representatives who were apprehensive about being scooped by the report
being published at a time when their facilities were being allocated to covering
some other major political event. That obviously was not a decisive concern but
it was something that was brought to the attention of the Commission and various
other officials as the Commission's report seemed to be working toward its
conclusion. The concern about the election may be difficult to understand now.
At the time there were ugly rumors and apprehensions regarding the work of the
Commission and the nature of the conspiracy that may have occured to have caused
the assassination of President Kennedy. It was feared, perhaps without
justification, that the report might become a campaign issue if it had not been
published in advance of the election***. the other concern was that if it were
postponed until after the election it would be assumed it had been repressed so
as to avoid disclosures that might affect the candidacy of the President.(110)
(106) In this instance, it was clear that the concern for quashing rumors and
speculation, discussed earlier in this report, affected the timing of the Warren
Commission's work. It was a political concern in that President Johnson did not
want the issues raised by the assassination to be raised at election time. The
rumors, therefore, had to be quashed, and they had to be quashed prior to the
election.
(107) In addition to the concern of completing the report either prior to the
election or the convention, there were other political concerns that arose
during the course of the Warren Commission. Griffin expressed some of these
concerns of the Warren Commission.
I felt then, and I still feel, despite a lot of misgivings that I had, that the
purpose was genuine purpose, to find the truth behind the assassination. I do
think, however, that there were major political considerations that dictated how
this work was conducted. The time frame that was set initially for the work was
a political consideration. This investigation was carried on during a period
when everyone was vividly aware of the results of the 1950's when Senator
McCarthy held a prominent position. There was a great deal of concern that we
not conduct an investigation that would have overtones of what people called
McCarthyism. So that a lot of decisions that were made in terms of how we
proceeded I think were made against that kind of background. (111)
(108) Another concern, which was discussed earlier in this report, was that of
convincing the public that Oswald was the lone assassin. When asked if they were
aware of the December 9, 1963, Katzenbach memorandum to the members of the
Warren Commission requesting a press release stating that Oswald was the
assassin, Redlich, Specter, and
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Griffin all replied they had never heard of it. (112) When asked if they were
aware of Hoover's November 24, 1963, phone call to the White House in which
Hoover discussed "convincing the public that Oswald was the real assassin,"
Leibeler and Slawson stated they were not aware of that conversation.(113) Only
Howard Willens indicated that he was aware of these sentiments immediately after
the assassination.(114) Four members of the staff who testified stated there was
no preconceived belief among the staff members that Lee Harvey Oswald was the
assassin or that the goal of the Warren Commission was to convince the public
that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. (115) Although Slawson testified that
"Everybody was of course a possible suspect,"(116) he also stated that the
concern to convince the public that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin may have
played a role in his area of investigation, particularly with some of the
obstacles he encountered dealing with foreign governments.(117)
(109) Cooper stated that he did not believe that external pressures or outside
considerations played any part in the Commission's work, recalling:
We were not pressured in any way by any person or by any organization. We made
our own decisions, as the President had asked us to do, and as we determined to
do on the basis of what we thought was right and objective.(118)
(110) During an executive session meeting of the Commission on June 4, 1964,
Gerald R. Ford had voiced strong concern over potential outside pressure that he
believed may have been directed at the Commission. Nevertheless, at the time of
his testimony, Ford said he did not believe that any such pressure had in fact
affected the conclusion reached during the investigation:
I have no recollection of that particular June 4 meeting or any pressure that
the Commission received for any definitive conclusion. As other members of the
Commission, I think, will testify, we had a unanimous vote as to the fact that
Lee Harvey Oswald committed the assassination and all other decisions of the
Commission were also unanimous.
There was no pressure. We operated as a unit of seven members who fortunately
all agreed. (119)
(111) Although it was clear that political concerns did exist, it was difficult
to ascertain exactly how these pressures affected the Warren Commission. The
pressure to maintain the respectability and legitimacy of the agencies, along
with the pressure to complete the investigation prior to the election, probably
interacted to cause the Warren Commission to rely almost entirely upon the
investigative agencies. The political concern of completing the report prior to
the election or the convention influenced the commission to define severely the
time frame in which there job was to be completed. The time pressure may have
caused the Warren Commission to brush over issues that were important, i.e., the
Ruby investigation. Despite these possibilities, however, some staff members did
not believe that the pressure affected their work.
(112) Redlich stated that his greatest regret was that the majority of the
American public apparently believed that various pressures had
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in fact influenced the conclusions of the Warren Commission. (120) He indicated,
however, that he believed there were other factors that have influenced the
widespread nonacceptance by the public of the Commission's conclusions:
I think there are simply a great many people who cannot accept what I believe to
be the simple truth, that one rather insignificant person was able to
assassinate the President of the United States. I think there are others, who
for reasons that there are less pure have consciously tried to deceive. I think
that since there is a residue of public sentiment that finds it very hard to
accept the conclusion, that becomes a further feeling, for those who have found
it in their interest, to pursue the attacks on the Commission.
I do not mean to imply that all of the critics of the Commission have bad
motives. I think that there is n this country, fortunately, a healthy skepticism
about government.
I believe that that was certainly true during the Watergate period. The
assassination is a complex fact, as you will see when you investigate it. It was
not an easy thing to investigate. Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were two
people with most unusual backgrounds. They did a variety of things.
That they should meet in the basement of the Dallas Police station and one shoot
the other is something that does strain the imagination.
I think it is very unfortunate that the Warren Commission has been subject to
the kinds of attack that it has. We did what we felt was completely honest
professional and thorough task.
I have done a lot of things in my public service in my life. I regard my service
on the Warren Commission as an extremely important, perhaps the most important
thing that I have done, because I believe I was instrumental in putting before
the American people all of the facts about the assassination of President
Kennedy.
That significant numbers of Americans don't believe it remains to me a source of
great disappointment.(121)
Relationship Between the Warren Commission and the FBI and the CIA
Page 31
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
A. PERSPECTIVE OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
Attitude of the Commission members
(113) The initial attitude of the Warren Commission members toward the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was one of trust and a willingness to rely on it.
As the investigation progressed, however, the members expressed some
dissatisfaction with and distrust of the Bureau. Nevertheless, nothing was ever
done to redirect the investigation or improve the Commission's relationship with
the Bureau.
(114) The Warren Commission initially avoided using the facilities of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but eventually did so, though reluctantly.
They did not ask them to do much beyond answer
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specific request for information. The members were generally satisfied with the
performance of the CIA.
(115) There were 36 request for information from the Commission to the CIA on
file at the National Archives. Of these, 10 dealt with publication of the Warren
report, 7 with Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union, 4 with Lee
Harvey Oswald, and 2 with the Soviet Union. There was one request each for
information on Jack Ruby and Cuba, the Oswald information allegation, the de
Mohrenschildts, President protection, Yuri Nosenko, and the photograph shown to
Mrs. Marguerite Oswald by FBI Special Agent Odum. Four of the requests were
still classified.
(116) The manner in which the Warren Commission members perceived the
investigative agencies and their relationship to those agencies is reflected in
the transcripts of the executive sessions of the Commission.
(117) The Commission met for the first time on December 5, 1963. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, who chaired the Commission, expressed his initial attitude toward
the Commission's task and their relationship to the agencies:
Gentlemen, this is a very sad and solemn duty that we are undertaking, and I am
sure that there is not one of us but what would rather be doing almost anything
else that he can think of than to be on a commission of this kind. But it is a
tremendously important one. *** Now, I think our job here is essentially one for
the evaluation of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering
evidence, and I believe that at the outset at least we can rely upon the reports
of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter,
the FBI, the Secret Service, and others that I may not know about at the present
time.(122)
(118) Chief Justice Warren went on to say that he did not believe that the
Commission needed independent investigators or the power of subpena.(123) He was
overruled by the other Commission members on the question of obtaining subpena
power.(124) Congress passed a joint resolution on December 13, 1963, granting
the Commission that power.(125) The Commission never did hire its own staff of
investigators.
(119) Even at this first meeting, some Commission members expressed concern
about some actions by the FBI. There had been numerous stories leaked to the
press attributed to FBI sources while the Commission was still awaiting the
first FBI report. Senator Russell asked rhetorically:
How much of their findings does the FBI propose to release to the press before
we present the findings of this Commission?(126)
(120) The Commission met again on December 6, 1963. At this meeting, the
Commission members kept wondering what the FBI was doing and if the CIA knew
anything about the assassination. Allen Dulles informed the Commission that he
had been in touch
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with the CIA and dis tributed a pamphlet that the CIA had written on the
reaction of the foreign press to the assassination.(127) Commissioner McCoy
asked Warren if he had been in touch with the CIA, and the following exchange
took place:
CHAIRMAN. No; I have not, for the simple reason that I have never been informed
that the CIA had any knowledge about this.
Mr. McCLOY. They have.
CHAIRMAN. I'm sure they have, but I did not want to put the CIA into this thing
unless they put themselves in.
Mr. McCLOY. Don't we have to ask them if we're on notice that they have?
CHAIRMAN. We have to do it with all of them. *** We have not done it with any of
them yet because we have not been in that position *** I think we have to ask
them.(128)
(121) The Commission received the FBI's report on the assassination on December
9, 1963. It met again on December 16,1963. At this meeting, the FBI was
criticized for several things. The members were upset because there was nothing
in the FBI report that had not already appeared in the press. (129) They were
also upset because some parts of the report were "hard to decipher."(130)
Representative Boggs thought the report left "a million questions."(131)
(122) It was at this meeting that the Commission members decided that they could
not rely solely on the FBI report, but would have to do their own analysis of
the raw data on which the report was based.(132) Chief Justice Warren admitted
that he had been too optimistic at the first Commission meeting.(133) The
members also considered that they may have been wrong in not hiring their own
staff of investigators. General Counsel Rankin put it this way:
The Chief Justice and I finally came to the conclusion, after looking at this
report, that we might have to come back to you and ask for some investigative
help, too, examine special situations, because we might not get all we needed by
just going back to the FBI and other agencies because the report has to look for
in order to get the answers that it wants and it's entitled to. We thought we
might need some investigative staff.(134)
(123) Rankin went on to say that the main reason they might need an independent
staff of investigators was that there would be some areas that the Commission
had to deal with that were "tender spots" for the FBI.(135) As will become
apparent, the Commission did not go much beyond the agencies in investigating
the anticipated "tender spots."
(124) The Commission had finally gotten in touch with the CIA. The Agency had
told them, as reported by Warren, that it did not have a big report to make, but
did have some "communications" to present to the Commission.(136) They would do
this when Rankin let them know that the Commission was ready. Dulles said that
the CIA had
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not seen the FBI report and that it would really help them in its work if it had
access to it.(137) He also suggested that the CIA could be very helpful in
certain areas, such as Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, where it had
expertise.(138) Essentially the Commission would have to evaluate the CIA's
evidence on that matter and would have to get the FBI's information to the CIA.
This problem led to a general discussion of the relationship between the various
Government agencies. The following exchange occured:
Mr. DULLES. We can expedite the CIA report, I know, because I can give them, or
the FBI can pass to them these exhibits about Oswald being in Russia. This is
going to be a pretty key business, the analysis of those reports.
CHAIRMAN. Haven't the CIA any contact with the FBI?
MR. DULLES. I don't think they'll do it because the FBI has no authority to pass
these reports to anyone else without this Commission's approval.
Mr. McCLOY. The CIA knows everything about it. I don't know how they know it but
John McCone knows everything.
Mr. DULLES. He has not seen the reports because I've checked with people
yesterday at great length. I have no authority to give it to them and he has not
seen the exhibits that we now have, that describe Oswald while he was Russia.
CHAIRMAN. I see no reason why we should not give John McCone a copy of this
report and let him see it. He can see mine if he wants to...
Mr. DULLES. I can make mine available. I wouldn't want to do it without approval
of this Commission.
Senator RUSSELL. I have never been able to understand why it is that every
agency acts like it's the sole agency in the Government. There is very little
interchange of information between the departments in the United States
Government. The entire view is that they are a separate closed department, and
there is not interchange of information.(139)
(125) The problem of a lack of communication and cooperation between the parts
of the Federal investigative bureaucracy bothered the Commission. At one point
Chief Justice Warren suggested:
* * * perhaps we ought to have a thorough investigation * * * as to the
relationship between the FBI and the Secret Service and the CIA in connection,
not only with this matter, but in matters of this kind so that we can do
something worthwhile in the future. (140)
(126) Such a thorough investigation was never done. The Commission eventually
asked the various agencies for recommendations on how to improve communications
among them so as to protecht the President better in the future.(141)
(127) The problem of trying to investigate areas that wee "tender spots" with
the agencies was brought dramatically to the Commission's attention on January
22, 1964. On athat day, Chief Justice Warren had called a special meeting to
advise the Commission that Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr had information
that Lee Harvey
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Oswald may have been an informant for the FBI. No more tenderer spot would ever
come to the Commission's attention.
(128) General Counsel Rankin first explained the allegation to the Commission.
They then speculated about what mission the FBI could have been using Oswald
for. (142) The discussion then turned to the implications of the allegation. The
discussion then turned to the implications of the allegation. The pressure that
the Commission was under to come out in support of the FBI's conclusions,
coupled with the implications of this allegation, stunned the Commission:
Mr. RANKIN. I thought first you should know about it. Second, there is this
defector to that is somewhat an issue in this case, and I suppose you are all
aware of it. That is that the FBI is very explicit that Oswald is the assassin
or was the the assassin, and they are very explicit that there was no
conspiracy, and they are also saying in the same place that they are continuing
their investigation. Now in my experience of almost 9 years, in the first place
it is hard to get them to say when you think you have got a case tight enough to
convict somebody, that that is the person that committed the crime. In my
experience with the FBI they don't do that. They claim that they don't do that.
Second, they have not run out of all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia and
so forth which they could probably *** they haven't run out all the leads on the
information and they could probably say--that isn't our business. *** But they
are concluding there can't be a conspiracy without those being run out. Now that
is not (normal) from my experience with the FBI***. Why are they so eager to
make both of those conclusions *** the original report and their experimental
report, which is such a departure. Now that is just circumstantial evidence, and
it doesn't prove anything about this, but it raises questions. We have to try to
find out what they haven't said that would give any support to the story, and
report it to you***.
When the Chief Justice and I wee just briefly reflecting on this we said if that
was true and it ever came out and could be established, then you would have
people think that there was a conspiracy to accomplish this assassination that
nothing the Commission did or anybody could dissipate.
Representative BOGGS. You are so right.
Mr. DULLES. Oh, terrible.
Representative BOGGS. Its implications of this are fantastic, don't you think
so?
CHAIRMAN. Terrific.
Mr. RANKIN. To have anybody admit to it, even if it was the fact, I am sure that
there wouldn't at this point be anything to prove it.
Mr. DULLES. Lee, if this were true, why would it be particularly in their
interest--I could see it would be in their interest to get rid of this man but
why would it be in their interest to say he is clearly the only guilty one? I
mean I don't see that argument that you raise particularly shows an interest***.
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Mr. RANKIN. They would like to have us fold up and quit.
Reprensentative BOGGS. This closes the case, you see. Don't you see?
Mr. DULLES. Yes, I see that.
Mr. RANKIN. They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The Commission
supports their conclusions, and we can go on home and that is the end of it.
Mr. DULLES. But that puts the burden right on them. If he was not the killer,
and they employed him, they are already it, you see. So your argument is correct
if they are sure that this is going to close the case, but if it don't close the
case, they are worse off than ever by doing this.
Representative BOGGS. Yes, I would think so. And of course, we are all even
gaining in the realm of speculation I don't even like to see this being taken
down.
Mr. DULLES. Yes. I think this record ought to be destroyed. Do you think we need
a record of this?(143)
(129) On January 24, 1964, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr, Dallas County
District Attorney Wade and Assistant District Attorney William Alexander flew to
Washington, D.C., to meet with General Counsel Rankin and Chief Justice
Warren.(144) At this meeting, the Texans set out the basis of the informant
allegations.
(130) On January 27, 1964, the Commission met to decide how to deal with the
rumor that Oswald had been an FBI informant. The first method discussed was
asking the Attorney General to check into the rumor. Rankin reported that the
officials at the Justice Department were reluctant to take that approach:
* * * it is the feeling of the department, not the Attorney General because he
is not there, but Mr. Katzenbach, and Mr. Miller, the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the criminal division, that such a request might be embarrasing,
and at least would be difficult for the Attorney General, and might, if urged
while we would get the information we desired, make very much more difficult for
him to carry on the work of the Department for the balance of his term.(145)
(131) Rankin next suggested that he talk to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the
FBI. He would explain that the Commission desired to put the rumor to rest.
(146) He would inform the Director that a statement from him would not be
sufficient and that the Commission desired "whatever records and materials they
have that it just couldn't be true."(147) Rankin would also seek Hoover's
permission to do an independent investigation should that prove necessary in
putting the rumor to rest. (148) Rankin said:
We do have a dirty rumor that is very bad for the Commission, the problem and it
is very damaging to the agencies that are involved in it and it is very damaging
to the agencies that are involved in it and it must be wiped out insofar as it
is possible to do so * * *.(149)
(132) Chief Justice Warren was not completely happy with this approach.(150) He
saw that they had a choice between investigating the rumor and then approaching
the Bureau, or just letting the
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Bureau handle it. He reported that he and Rankin had argued about the approach
and that Rankin had thought it "the better part of cooperation" to ask the FBI
first.(151) Warren said that he rather dislikes the idea of going to them
without investigating the rumor first.(152) Senator Russell was worried that if
a statement was elicited from the FBI before an investigation, then a subsequent
investigation would appear to be an attempt to impeach the FBI.(153)
Representative Boggs echoed Russell's concern when he said:
If you get a statement from responsible officials in that agency and then you
say, "Well we are not going to take this statement on face value, we are going
to go behind it," this could become a matter of grave embarrassment to
everybody. (154)
(133) The discussion then turned to the problem of proving or disproving the
rumor, as well as how to approach the problem:
Senator RUSSELL. If Oswald never had assassinated the President or at least been
charged with assassinating the President and had been in the employ of the FBI
and somebody had gone to the FBI they would have denied he was an agent.
Mr. DULLES. Oh, yes.
Senator RUSSELL. They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done
the same thing.
Mr. DULLES. Exactly * * *.
Senator COOPER. If you have these people up (from Texas) and examine them the
FBI will know that.
Mr. RANKIN. They already know about this apparently * * * I just don't think
that they (Texas officials) are going to come out and say they fabricated this,
if it is a fabrication. It is too serious for that.
Representative BOGGS. Of course, we get ourselves into a real box. You have got
to do everything on Earth to establish the facts one way or the other. And
without doing that, why everything concerned, including everyone of us is doing
a very grave disservice * * *.
Senator COOPER. * * * before you asked Mr. Hoover you present us with all the
proof to the contrary, because as you say, if he presents all this proof to the
contrary, then the situation changes a little bit. It would appear to him that
you are trying to impeach his testimony * * *.
Mr. McCLOY. Do we have a statement from Mr. Hoover that this man was not an
agent? Was that communicated in the record?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes * * *.
Mr. McCLOY. I would like to examine again this relationship between the
Department of Justice and the FBI. Just who would it be embarrassing for the
Attorney General of the United States to inquire of one of his agencies whether
or not this man who was alleged to have killed the President of the United
States, was an agent. Does the embarrassment supersede the importance of getting
the best evidence in a situation as this?
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Mr. RANKIN. Well, I think it is a question of whether we have to put him into
that position in order to get the job done, because there is in my opinion, not
any question but what there will be more friction, more difficulty with his
carrying out his responsibilities, and I think we have a very real problem in
this Commission in that if we have meetings all the time and they know what it
is about *** and we are meeting rather rapidly here in the last few days, and
they can guess probably what it is about, certainly after the meeting with the
Texas people***.
Senator COOPER. *** In view of all the rumors and statements that have been made
not only here but abroad, I think to ask the President's brother, the dead
President, to do this, it wouldn't have any backing in it. It would have no
substance in his purpose but some crazy people would translate it from his
official postion to a personal position. It may sound farfetched but he would be
implying as a person that something was wrong. You can't overlook any
implications.
Mr. McCLOY. I think that would perhaps be an element in the thing, but it still
wouldn't divert me from asking this man who happens to be the Attorney General
whose sworn duty is to enforce justice, to ask him just what is within his
knowledge in regard to such a serious thing as this. It is [an] awkward affair.
But as you said the other day, truth is our only client *** I think we may have
to make this first step, that the Senator speaks about, but I don't think that
we could recognize that any door is closed to us, unless the President closes it
to us, and in the search for truth***.
Mr. RANKIN. I don't see how the country is ever going to be willing to accept it
if we don't satisfy them on this particular issue, not only with them but the
CIA and every other agency***.
Mr. DULLES. Since this has been so much out in the public, what harm would be in
talking to Hoover without waiving any right to make any investigation in the
public***. There is a terribly hard thing to disprove, you know. How do you
disprove a fellow who was not your agent? How do you disprove it?
Representative BOGGS. You could disprove it, couldn't you?
Mr. DULLES. No.
Representative BOGGS. I know, ask questions about something--
Mr. DULLES. I never knew how to disprove it.
Representative BOGGS. Did you have agents above whom you had no record
whatsoever?
Mr. DULLES. The record might not be on paper. But on paper we would know and you
could say this meant the agent and somebody else could say it meant another
agent.
Representative BOGGS. Let's take a specific case; that fellow Powers was one of
your men.
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Mr. DULLES. Oh, yes, he was not an agent. He was an employee.
Representative BOGGS. There was no problem in proving he was employed by the
CIA.
Mr. DULLES. No. We had a signed contract.
Representative BOGGS. Let's say Powers did not have a signed contract but was
recruited by someone in CIA. The man who recruited him would know, wouldn't he?
CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't tell it under oath?
Mr. DULLES. I wouldn't think he would tell it under oath, no. *** He ought not
tell it under oath. Maybe no tell it to his own Government but wouldn't tell it
any other way.
Mr. McCLOY. Wouldn't he tell it to his own chief?
Mr. DULLES. He might or might not. If he was a bad one then he wouldn't.
Representative BOGGS. What you do is you make out a problem if this be true,
make our problem utterly impossible because you say this rumor can't be
dissipated under any circumstances.
Mr. DULLES. I don't think it can unless you believe Mr. Hoover, and so forth and
so on, which probably most of the people will.
Mr. McCLOY. Allen, suppose somebody when you were head of the CIA came to you,
another Government agency and said specifically, "If you will tell us," suppose
the President of the United States comes to you and says, "Will you tell me, Mr.
Dulles?"
Mr. DULLES. I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes; I am
under his control. He is my boss. I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else,
unless the President authorized me to do it. We had that come up at times***.
Mr. RANKIN. If that is all that is necessary, I think we could get the President
to direct anybody working for the Government to answer this question....
Mr. DULLES. What I was getting at, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he
didn't have anything to do with this fellow.(155)
(134) Warren said he thought the problem had to be approached from both sides,
it would have to be checked out with Hoover and independently (156)
(135) Dulles said that he could not imagine Hoover hiring anyone as stupid as
Oswald. The following exchange then occurred:
Mr. McCLOY. I wouldn't put much confidence in the intelligence of all the agents
I have run into. I have run into some awfully stupid agents.
Mr. DULLES. Not this irresponsible.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, I can't say that I have run into a fellow comparable to Oswald
but I have run into some very limited mentalities both in the CIA and the FBI.
[Laughter.]
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CHAIRMAN. Under agents, the regular agents, I think that would be right, but
they and all other agencies do employ undercover men who are of terrible
character.
Mr. DULLES. Terribly bad characters.
Senator RUSSELL. Limited intelligence; even the city police departments do it.
CHAIRMAN. It takes almost that kind of a man to do a lot of this undercover
work.(157)
(136) As well as worrying about putting the Oswald informant allegation to rest,
the Commission worried about angering J. Edgar Hoover:
Mr. RANKIN. Would it be acceptable to go to Mr. Hoover and tell him about the
situation and that we would like to go ahead and find out what we could * * *.
Then if he reacts and says, "I want to show you that it couldn't be," or
something like that, beforehand, what about that kind of approach?
CHAIRMAN. I don't believe we should apologize or make it look that we are in any
way reticent about making any investigation that comes to the Commission. But on
the other hand, I don't want to be unfriendly or unfair to him***.
Mr. RANKIN. What I was fearful of was the mere process will cause him to think
that we are really investigating him.
CHAIRMAN. If you tell him we are going down there to do it, we are investigating
him aren't we?
Mr. RANKIN. I think it is inherent.
CHAIRMAN. If we are investigating him, we are investigating the rumor against
him, we are investigating him, that is true.(158).
(137) The reason the Commission had to worry about antagonizing Hoover was that
the Commission was almost totally dependent on the FBI for a large part of its
investigation. This became apparent later in the meeting when several members
expressed their concern over that dependence. It came up in the context of the
discussion of a problem related to the informant allegation and the way to deal
with the FBI. The problem was the strange circumstances that seemed to surround
FBI special agent James P. Hosty:
Mr. McCLOY. What have they done? * * * I would think the time is almost overdue
for us being as dependent as we are on FBI investigations, the time is almost
overdue for us to have a better perspective of the FBI investigation than we now
have * * * We are so dependent upon them for our facts that it might be a useful
thing to have [Allen Belmont, one of Hoover's assistants] before us, or maybe
just you talk to him, for example, to follow up on Hosty.
Mr. RANKIN. Part of our difficulty in regard to it is that they have no problem.
They have decided that it is Oswald who committed the assassination, they have
decided that no one else is involved, they have decided that no one else is
involved, they have decided * * *.
Senator RUSSELL. They have tried the case and reached a verdict on every aspect.
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Representative BOGGS. You have put your finger on it.(159)
(138) It was clear to the Commission at this point that they had two
alternatives in light of the FBI's preconceptions and the Commission's
dependence on the FBI. They could either, in Russell's words, "just accept the
FBI's findings and go and write the report * * * or else we can go and try to
run down some of these collateral rumors * * *."(160) There was general
agreement within the Commission that they had to go beyond the FBI's word on the
informant allegation. They finally voted to let Rankin approach Hoover in the
manner he thought best.(161)
(139) On the same days as the above described meeting, January 27, 1964, the
Warren Commission received a letter from Hoover. It said, in part:
Lee Harvey Oswald was never used by this Bureau in an informant capacity. He was
never paid any money for furnishing information and he most certainly never was
an informant of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the event you have any
further questions concerning the activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in this case, we would appreciate being contacted directly.(162)
(140) Rankin discussed the rumor with Hoover the next day, January 28, 1964.
Hoover assured him that all informants were known to FBI headquarters and that
"Oswald had never been an informant of the FBI."(163)
(141) On February 6, 1964, Hoover submitted an affidavit to the Commission that
stated that a search of FBI records showed that Oswald had never been an
informant.(164) On February 13, 1964, Hoover sent over 10 additional affidavits
from each FBI agent who had had contact with Oswald.(165) On February 27, 1964,
special agent Robert Gemberling submitted an affidavit that explained the
omission of special agent Hosty's name from the transcript of Oswald's
notebook.(166) Assistant Director Alan Belmont testified before the Commission
on May 6, 1964. J. Edgar Hoover on May 14, 1964.(167)
(142) Even though the Commission had decided that the informant allegation had
to be approached from both ends, there is little indication that they pressed
the investigation into the source of the allegations much beyond talking to the
newspaperman who first reported them.(168) According to testimony before this
committee, the Commission had the Internal Revenue Service do an audit of
Oswald's income on the assumption that had he been an informant, the IRS would
discover unaccounted income. (169) The Commission did not investigate Hoover or
the FBI, and managed to avoid the appearance of doing so. It ended up doing what
the members had agreed they could not do: Rely mainly on the FBI's denial of the
allegations.
(143) The question of whether Hoover and John McCone should testify before the
Commission was considered at a Commission meeting on April 30, 1964.(170)
Senator Cooper insisted that it was proper to call the heads of the agencies to
testify on the informant allegation. (171) It was decided to call them to
testify although some Commission members were still reluctant to get involved in
a confrontation with Hoover.(172) At this meeting, Rankin also expressed his
satisfaction
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with the CIA's and FBI's handling of the Mexico City investigation: "I think
that the CIA and FBI did a remarkably good job down there for us."(173)
Attitude of the Warren Commission staff
Predisposition regarding the Agencies
(144) The testimony of Warren Commission staff members before this committee
indicated that, before working on the Commission, they were in general favorably
disposed to the Federal investigative agencies. Some had had prior encounters
with either the FBI or the CIA. With two exceptions, they had been favorably
impressed with what they had seen.
(145) Wesley Liebeler testified that he had once been interviewed by an agent of
the CIA:
Q. Had you prior to going to work for the Warren Commission had any prior
experience with any of the Federal agencies, investigative agencies, FBI, CIA?
A. I was interviewed by a CIA agent once when I was younger.
Q. Did you form any impressions about them?
A. I was favorably impressed.(174)
Liebeler indicated that, other than this, he had had no other contacts with the
agencies prior to working for the Commission and that he had no predisposition
toward them.
(146) Arlen Specter testified that he had had no prior contact with the CIA and
no preformed opinion about the agencies:
I had had no prior contact with the Secret Service that I can recollect, or the
CIA. So I really had no predisposition. I had an open mind.(175)
(147) Specter had had experience with the FBI in his capacity as an assistant
district attorney in Philadelphia, prior to joining the Warren Commission staff
as a junior counsel:
With respect to their capabilities, speaking for myself, I had experience with
the FBI and had found them to be able investigative personnel in my prior
contacts.(176)
(148) W. David Slawson testified that he was, if anything, favorably disposed
toward the CIA:
* * * I don't think I had any predisposition other than the general public
awareness of these agencies. I suppose I had a little bit more than the average
person's knowledge about the CIA, very slightly. My recollection is that the CIA
when I was in college recruited people, I mean they came on, they sent down
people who would talk to students just like any other prospective employer. I
don't know if they still do that or not. I knew one or two people in the class
ahead of me who by all accounts went to work for the CIA and it was something I
briefly considered myself. I decided to go on to graduate school and physics and
I never explored the CIA thing. But they had seemed to hire high caliber people
out of my college. I was favorably disposed there(177)
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(149) Norman Redlich had a skeptical attitude toward the FBI when he joined the
Warren Commission staff as an assistant to J. Lee Rankin:
As a professor of constitutional law I regarded myself as a civil libertarian. I
had regarded the FBI and its activities during the 1950's in the cold war period
as being one which had been repressive of free speech. So I did not come to
Washington with the view that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was a model
that I should choose to follow. I had had no direct experience with it * * * I
had no particular feeling about the CIA. (178)
(150) Burt Griffin brought a very skeptical opinion of the abilities of the FBI
to the Warren Commission staff:
I had worked with the FBI for 2 years when I was an assistant U.S. attorney. I
didn't have a political view of them but I frankly didn't think they were very
competent. I felt then, and I still feel, that they have a great myth about
their ability but that they are not capable by their investigative means of ever
uncovering a serious and well planned conspiracy. They would stumble upon it. I
think their investigative means themselves may be self-defeating. I never found
them very creative, very imaginative.
My attitude toward them was that I thought they were honest. I didn't think in a
sticky situation that I would have great faith in them.(179)
(151) Griffin's skepticism did not extend to the CIA with whom he had had no
prior contact: "I guess I for one trusted them, I think."(180)
Attitude of the staff toward the investigation
(152) Whether it was because of, or in spite of, their predispositions toward
the Federal investigative agencies, the Warren Commission staff members who
testified before this committee believed they brought a healthy skepticism to
the investigation. Norman Redlich commented on the staff's orientation toward
the agencies:
* * * I would not characterize our position as being one of extreme belief or
extreme disbelief. I would call it one of healthy skepticism.(181)
(153) Arlen Specter testified that the staff had to take such an attitude
because some of the agencies' actions were subjects of the Warren commission's
investigation:
We were concerned about some of the agencies from the point of view that their
own activities were subjects of investigation. So that was always a matter of
concern.(182)
(154) W. David Slawson testified that, in spite of his predisposition toward the
Central Intelligence Agency, he maintained an objective attitude toward them: "I
understood immediately that part of my assignment would be to suspect everyone.
So included in that would be the CIA and FBI.(183)
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(155) Burt Griffin testified that Norman Redlich's political view of the FBI
gave Redlich a strong desire to prove them wrong:
I think that at that point my recollection of conversations, for example, with
Norman Redlich, were that he took a political view of the FBI. He saw them as a
conservative agency which was determined to pin this on someone who was of a
different political persuasion. I think he started out with a strong motivation
along that line, to prove that they were wrong.(184)
(156) Other testimony also indicates that the staff had a strong desire to find
the truth regardless of the consequences and to state that the Federal agencies
were wrong if the investigation showed that. Burt Griffin testified about the
desire to prove the FBI wrong:
I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects my feeling, and it was
certainly the feeling that I had of all of my colleagues, that we were
determined, if we could, to prove that the FBI was wrong, to find a conspiracy
if we possibly could.
I think we thought we would be national heroes in a sense if we could find
something that showed that there had been something sinister beyond what
appeared to have gone on.(185)
(157) W. David Slawson testified that the staff often speculated about the
possibility of finding a high-level conspiracy. He said that, if they found one,
they were determined to bring the truth out:
We would sometimes speculate as to what would happen if we got firm evidence
that pointed to some very high official. * * * Of course that would present a
kind of frightening prospect because if the President or anyone else that high
up was indeed involved they clearly were not going to allow someone like us to
bring out the truth if they could stop us.
The gist of it was that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to
try to bring it out and would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth
was. The only question in our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at
all credible how would we be able to protect it and bring it to proper
authorities.(186)
(158) Slawson testified that this speculative suspicion included people in the
investigative agencies or foreign governments. He indicated that the Warren
Commission staff was determined to get the truth out even if it would lead to an
international incident:
When I said higher-ups I would include the people high up in the organization,
the FBI and CIA too. Everybody was of course a possible suspect.(187)
* * * * * * *
I don't think that the American Government would have ever or would today stand
by and upon proven charges that their President had been killed at the order of
some other
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government, would just allow it to go by. They would either insist that the
people in that government be prosecuted or if they weren't I suppose we would
invade. So we thought we might be triggering a war with Cuba. But again that was
something that the chips would have to fall where they may.(188)
(159) At least one Warren Commission staff member had the impression that this
attitude, at least as it applied to the investigative agencies, was not shared
by the higher-level staff members or the Commission member. Burt Griffin
testified that:
* * * there was also a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such
a way as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the
Government. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done.
Second, that it was important to keep the confidence of the existing
investigative agencies, and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own
investigation, that it would generate a paranoia in the FBI and other
investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be politically
disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might be justified
but it might also be counterproductive.
I think that there was a fear that we might be undermining * * * my impression
is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than mine. (189)
Initial staff impressions of the Agencies
(160) The Warren Commission staff had its first contact with the FBI when it
received the summary and investigative reports prepared for the Commission. In
general, the initial impression of the staff was that the documents were not
good. Two of the staff members who testified before this committee indicated
that they got the impression that the FBI had already made up their mind about
the results of the investigation. Burt Griffin said:
Q. Is it fair to say from your perceptions that the FBI and agencies of the
Government at that period were convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone
assassin?
A. Right.(190)
(161) W. David Slawson had much the same impression:
The FBI had prepared a thick file which to their mind disposed of the case, it
seemed like. Although my own involvement was not nearly as much with the FBI as
it was with the CIA, I nevertheless read the FBI file which was a good way of
getting yourself introduced to the whole general case.
I think it appeared to me, as it did to many people on the staff to be a
competent document. But it also was self-serving, and you could not read that
and think that the FBI had ever made any mistakes or there was any serious
possibility that they had.
So, we knew that particularly with the FBI, but I just assumed it was the case
with anybody, it is human nature, that once having committed themselves on any
statement
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about what happened, they would be defensive about it and not want to admit that
they were wrong, and also that they all had a strong interest in not being
blamed for not having adequately protected the President.(191)
(162) Norman Redlich was not very impressed by the initial FBI documents:
I thought the FBI report was a grossly inadequate document. In fairness to the
Bureau they apparently decided to produce something very quickly, but based upon
what I feel I know and remember about the facts of the assassination, I think it
was a grossly inadequate document.(192)
Attitude of staff during the course of the investigation
(163) Generally, the attitudes that the staff members brought to the
investigation remained unchanged during the course of their work. Arlen Specter
testified that:
I thought they were good before they started. I thought they sent the very best
in the course of the investigation. I thought they had some very good men. I did
not deal with any of the note destroyers or allegations of that. I worked with
the technicians. * * * I suspected the ones we saw on the Commission were not
typical of the FBI, they were really good.(193)
(164) Burt Griffin's initial impression of the FBI also remained essentially the
same:
I felt that it-the FBI-is a big bureaucracy and most of the people I felt within
the FBI functioned like a clerk in any other big organization, and they try to
do their job and they try to not get in hot water with the boss and get egg over
their face, and sometimes they have a couple of bosses, we being one and
somebody else being another.(194)
(165) Griffin's trust of the CIA may have been altered somewhat by the delayed
response to his request for information on Jack Ruby.(195) He said "I was
skeptical but I won't go so far as to say I distrusted them."(196)
(166) Norman Redlich testified that he was generally satisfied with the work of
the Federal agencies:
Once the decision was made that the investigatory arms of the Federal Government
were going to be used by the Commission my overall judgment of the way that
those investigatory arms performed was extremely favorable.
I believe that they were completely responsive to the requests of the Commission
for investigative work.(197)
He also commented:
We came with not preconceived notion. * * * At the conclusion of the inquiry I
was of the opinion that we had had the full cooperation of the agencies of the
United States Government.(198)
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(167) This conclusion somewhat belied Redlich's initial political view of the
FBI. Realizing this, he explained:
I came with the feeling that maybe there were two FBI's. Maybe there is the FBI
that works at a professional law enforcement level; that was the group I dealt
with, that was the group for which I came away with a very healthy respect.
Maybe there was another FBI which dealt with political matters which I had
nothing to do with, and which undoubtedly accounted for my prior negative
feelings about their work.
Time after time as I worked with their experts I found they were fair, cautious,
and did not try to overstate the case. (199)
(168) Redlich's testimony indicated that there was at least one instance when he
was dissatisfied with the FBI's response to the Commission:
I was disturbed over that [the omission of FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty's
name from a transcription of the contents of Oswald's notebook provided to the
Commission by the FBI]. I immediately reported it to Mr. Rankin * * * We wrote
to the FBI a rather strong letter expressing our dismay about the fact that the
transcript was not complete and asking an explanation for it * * * On the same
day we sent the letter to the FBI there then came to us an explanation saying
that the reason they had not sent it was that they were sending us only the
material that would be addressed to leads and their own agency would not be a
lead * * * In any event the explanation still left me annoyed over the fact that
it had been left out and I remain annoyed to this day.
Q. Was it pursued further when you got a reply that they were only excepting
that they felt would be a lead?
A. I think the decision was made at the time that, while we were really not very
happy with the reply, we couldn't really disprove it. That was not, as I recall,
pursued beyond that point.
Q. Is it fair to say that the matter was then dropped?
A. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.(200)
(169) Other evidence indicated that the omission of Special Agent Hosty's name
from the transcript of oswald's notebook affected the whole staff. Rankin called
a staff meeting on February 11, 1964, to discuss the allegations that Oswald had
been an FBI informant and the Hosty incident. A memorandum for the record
prepared by Howard P. Willens on February 12, 1964, described the staff's
reaction to the Hosty problem:
Some members of the staff thought that the significance of this omission was not
particularly great and that no further action should be taken at this time. Most
of the members of the staff, however, thought that the omission of the Hosty
information was of considerable importance and could not be ignored by the
Commission. There was discussion as to
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the possibility of the adverse effect on the relationship with the FBI if this
matter were brought to its attention. The thought was expressed that pointing
this omission out to the FBI might in fact produce more accurate reports by the
FBI in the future. I suggested that the group consider the possibility of
addressing a letter to the FBI which would request an explanation from the
Bureau regarding this matter. The majority of the members of the staff present
at the meeting did agree with the proposal that something of this sort be done
in the near future.
At the end of the meeting Mr. Rankin suggested that the members of the staff
consider all the facts of this problem more fully.(201)
(170) Burt Griffin testified about this incident before this committee:
GRIFFIN. I recall the Hosty incident * * *
Q. What effect, if any, did that have on the relationship between the staff and
the Bureau?
A. I think it established in our minds that we had to be worried about them * *
* I think we never forgot the incident. We were always alert, we were concerned
about the problem * * * There was a staff meeting about it, as I recall. One of
the few staff meetings I have a general recollection of at this point seems to
me was one that Rankin called in which we were all brought in on this, and we
were all told about the problem and once it had been discovered there was a
discussion about whether our discovery should be revealed to the FBI and how
should we proceed with it.
Q. Would it be fair to characterize the incident then as perhaps producing a
more healthy skepticism on the part of the staff and less trust of the Bureau?
A. I think that is right * * *
Q. Would it be fair to say that the incident, far from adversely affecting the
quality of your investigation, may have heightened it?
A. No, I don't think that is true.
Q. If it made you more skeptical and more probing would it help the
investigation?
A. No, I don't think it did. The reason I say that is that I think it basically
set the standard for the kind of judgment that was going to be made about how we
were going to deal with these problems, and the decision made there was that
there was not going to be confrontation, they were to be given an opportunity to
explain it. So the decision was really, as I recall, to go back and give them an
opportunity to clean up their act rather than to carry on a secret investigation
that might be designed to lay a foundation for our further impeachment of
them.(202)
(171) J. Lee Rankin, the former general counsel to the Warren Commission who
headed the investigation, gave his perception of the Bureau's relationship with
the Commission during his testimony before the committee:
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Q. How would you characterize the Commission's relations with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation?:
A. Well, they were fairly good at first and then as we became more critical at
times and the Hosty incident came up and the question about Oswald and the
Director being required to swear personally about whether Oswald had any
connection with the FBI and our asking the Secret Service from time to time to
investigate things the FBI had already investigated and go back over their
tracks, it didn't warm up much at least on a friendly basis.
Q. Did it at any time become an adversary relationship?
A. Well, I went to see Mr. Hoover before we finally put out our report and I had
known him when I had been with the Department of Justice for 6 years and always
had cordial relations but he was pretty feisty when I saw him, any friendship we
had had in the past was not very apparent then.
Q. Did you think at that time that you were getting the full cooperation of the
Bureau?
A. Well, I thought so to this extent. I thought they would never lie about
anything and that if we had any difficulty it might be that they would not bore
in as hard as we would like to have them but I thought we could tell that and
insist on either following it up which we did a great many times by sending them
back to do it again and to do it more thoroughly, or putting the Secret Service
to do it, and they resented that so much that they were a little more careful
after that about trying to be more thorough and so forth. But to have them just
lie to us, I never anticipated that.
The things that have happened in the Bureau in the last few years have been
revealed in the press and so forth. I never thought the Bureau was capable of
that. When I was with the Department of Justice I never thought they were
capable of it and I didn't think agents would do such things. So I was rather
sanguine about that and I don't think the country believed the FBI would do such
things.(203)
(172) Recalling the climate of government in 1963 and 1964, Rankin went on to
state that he then firmly believed that any information that Director Hoover and
the FBI provided to the Commission was completely accurate and truthful, a
belief he no longer maintains. Rankin recalled:
It was a time then I am sure all the Commissioners and I certainly believed that
Mr. Hoover would not do that unless it was the truth and all of the things that
have come out in these later years about Mr. Hoover and the Bureau and various
personnel had not been made known to me or the public or the Commissioners so it
is quite different looking at it from this day than from then.(204)
(173) Recalling FBI Director Hoover's seemingly unchallengeable power in 1964,
and occasional FBI actions that irritated the Warren Commission, J.Lee Rankin
told the committee, "Who could protest against what Mr. Hoover did back in those
days?"(205)
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(174) Rankin told of his feelings upon discovering several years ago that FBI
personnel in Dallas had secretly destroyed a letter that Lee Oswald had sent to
FBI Agent James Hosty shortly before the assassination, a destruction of
evidence which occurred several hours after the accused assassin was shot to
death by Jack RUBY. Recalling the disclosure of this incident and its coverup by
FBI personnel, Rankin Stated:
I think there is considerable significance. In the first place, Hosty was doing
quite a bit of work on the inquiries that the Commission made and if we had
known that he had destroyed any kind of materials relating to the investigation
or his activities we would not have allowed him to do anything more that we knew
of in connection with work for the Commission. There is an implication from that
note and its destruction that there might have been more to it and that the
Bureau was unwilling to investigate whatever more there was and never would get
the information to us. Now that is just a guess. There is, of course, not
credible proof and so we really don't know how much more there was to the
incident and especially what could have been found out about it if it had been
examined closely upon the event.(206)
(175) Slawson's initial predisposition toward the CIA was reinforced by his
experiences on the Warren Commission staff:
Q. After working with the CIA your initial impression remains substantially the
same, you thought you could trust them and rely on them?
A. Yes. I came to know one man particularly well, Rayman Rocca, and I came to
like him and trust him both * * * My impression overall was very favorable of
him. I thought he was very intelligent and tried in every way to be honest and
helpful with me.(207)
Slawson testified that, if anything, rocca was overzealous in trying to be
helpful:
The only drawback I can think of--not really a drawback I suppose for someone in
CIA--is that he was a little overly suspicious. He obviously disliked Castro
immensely. He was very emotional on the subject.(208)
(176) On June 6, 1964, Slawson wrote a memo to Rankin regarding a telephone
conversation that he had had with Rocca. The memorandum relates that Rocca had
pointed out that a book had been published in England approximately 2 months
before the assassination of President Kennedy.(209) It contained the allegation
that rightwing groups in the United States were planning to kill President
Kennedy. The memorandum goes on to relate:
He--Rocca--drew to my attention the fact that the publishing time of this
particular book appears to have been almost exactly when Castro was supposed to
have made his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil * * * to the effect that
"Two can play at this game."(210)
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(177) When asked about this memorandum, Slawson testified that:
My only recollection at this time is that Rocca was drawing my attention to the
fact that Castro might well have been involved. Of course he had presumably
drawn my attention to this before but he was just doing what he did with me a
lot, trying to work with me to put two and two together.(211)
(178) Slawson also testified that Rocca had informed him of the CIA's
involvement with anti-castro Cuban exiles:
My best recollection at this time is that I did in several conversations with
Rocca discuss the CIA involvement in anti-Cuban activities. I was presumably
told that they had been involved of course in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I
remember discussing informally that involvement with a CIA operative in Mexico
City. Also their involvement with anti-Castro Cuban groups in the United
States.(212)
(179) Slawson said further that he considered it his job to suspect everyone,
including the CIA and FBI.(213) He also testified that he was very suspicious of
the anti-Castro Cuban exiles:
My theory was that perhaps, one, the anti-Castro Cubans we knew were very angry
with Kennedy because they felt they had been betrayed with the Bay of Pigs.
Oswald on the other hand was identified publicly with Castro, he was pro-Castro.
So, we felt that if somehow the anti-Castro Cubans could have got Oswald to do
it or done it themselves but framed Oswald, either way, somehow put the blame on
Oswald that they would achieve two objectives that they presumably wanted. One
was revenge on Kennedy and the second would be to trigger American public
opinion strongly against Castro and possibly cause an invasion of Cuba and
overthrow of Castro, and of course these people would be able to go back to
their homes in cuba and not have to live under the Castro government. As I say,
this made a lot of sense to me and I think it was a hypothesis held in mind for
quite a while to see if the facts would fit it. Ultimately they didn't.(214)
(180) When asked whether he had ever questioned the reliability of the
information he received from the CIA because of its involvement with the
anti-Castro Cubans, or rocca's bias against Castro, slawson responded:
No. In a sense everything I tried to take into consideration, so everything was
a cause for questioning. But in terms of coming to a conclusion in my own mind
about the reliability of the information supplied us, no, I concluded that
Rocca's strong anti-Castro feeling did not bias or did not prevent him from
being an honest investigator. I think he was and I am still convinced that he
was. On the other hand of course it affected his judgment.(215)
(181) When asked whether he had ever considered the possibility of CIA
involvement as part of his anti-castro cuban theory, Slawson responded:
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No. I don't think that I entertained very long the possibility that Rocca or
anybody else I had known in the CIA was involved in anyway in killing Kennedy *
* *. The possibility that the anti-Castro Cubans contained people who were
ruthless or desperate enough to kill Kennedy in order to serve their own end I
felt was a very real one. Apparently from all I knew they contained a lot of
desperate ruthless people. I did not have that feeling about the CIA. Now I
tried to keep an open mind so that any place I came upon evidence that would
point toward somebody I would investigate it and that included the CIA as a
possible nest of assassins.
My judgment of their character and so forth was far different I think from the
judgment I made of the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy groups in the United
States.(216)
(182) Slawson also testified before this committee that he was not aware of the
CIA attempts to kill Castro(217) that the CIA had plotted with underworld
figures to assassinate Castro from 1960 to 1963, with an official in the Cuban
Government to assassinate Castro.
Dependence on the agencies: staff views
(183) Slawson testified that the Warren Commission was "inescapably dependent
upon the CIA especially for some aspects of the investigation."(218) While this
bothered him somewhat, there was nothing that could be done about it:
There is really no way I can imagine and certainly there is no way at the time I
could imagine that anyone could carry on an investigation of foreign
intelligence operations other than through the CIA. That simply is the body of
expert opinion on that sort of thing and capability that exists in the United
States. So, if a major suspect is the CIA itself * * * an investigation like the
Warren commission would find it very, very difficult to ascertain that. That is
just inevitable. This I think occurred to me at the time, too, but there wasn't
much that could be done about it.(219)
(184) Slawson said that the staff tried to overcome this dependence as best it
could:
We would talk about how we might escape from the dependency * * * . One was
occasionally hiring an outside expert to give an independent evaluation or
assessment or something * * * . Second was cross-checking the papers passed back
and forth between jurisdictions. The third would be just keeping an eye and ear
out for any odd bits of information that would come in not through the agencies.
(220)
(185) Liebeler testified before this committee that he did not believe the
Warren Commission was dependent on the agencies:
I never had the feeling that we relied on the Government agencies for our
information. when we started with a bunch of FBI files, but we reviewed those so
that we could conduct
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our own investigation. We did take the testimony of many, many witnesses. We had
the reports of the examination of the physical evidence verified by outside
sources, we did not rely on the FBI. So as to the basic facts of what happened
in Dallas on that day not only did we not rely on the FBI work but the fact is
that the Commission came to assume somewhat different conclusions that the FBI
came to.
There was a preliminary FBI report that solved the problem as to what happened.
Our conclusions were somewhat different from that. I don't think we relied on
the FBI to the extent that people think we did.(221)
(186) Redlich testified that "The Commission used as its principal investigatory
arm the Federal Bureau of Investigation."(222)
(187) James Malley, who served as the FBI's liaison to the Warren Commission,
recalled that the amount of assistance being rendered to the Commission declined
during the latter stage of the investigation:
The majority of reports that were being sent to the Warren Commission, after
probably the middle of the summer, 1964, was rather innocuous reports of
miscellaneous allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. (223)
B. ATTITUDE OF THE FBI AND THE CIA TOWARD THE WARREN COMMISSION
General attitude
The FBI
(188) Once the Warren Commission was created,* J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of
the FBI, accepted his responsibility to respond to the Commission's requests for
information or investigations. Hoover designated Inspector James J. Malley as
liaison with the Commission. Hoover also informed Assistant Director Alan
Belmont that he would be personally responsible for every piece of paper that
went to the Warren Commission."(225) During the course of the Warren
Commission's existence, Belmont briefed Hoover daily on the various aspects of
the Commission's work.(226)
(190) The evidence indicates that Hoover viewed the Warren Commission more as an
adversary than a partner in a search for the facts of their assassination.
Hoover often expressed his belief that the Commission was "seeking to criticize
the FBI."(227) According to a former assistant director of the FBI, Hoover was
afraid that the Commission would discover gaps in the FBI's investigation:
Hoover did not want the Warren commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation
for fear that it would discover important and relevant facts that we in the FBI
had not discovered in our investigation, therefore, it would be greatly
embarrassing to him and damaging to his career and the FBI as a whole.(228)
___________________________________
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(191) The committee's investigation indicated that Hoover's fears were not
entirely unfounded. It had evidence suggesting that Hoover was receiving reports
on the Commission's activities from one of the Commission members.
* * * Our President (Gerald R. Ford) was one of our (FBI) members of the
Congressional stable when he was in Congress. It is to him and others we would
go when we want favors handled, and, of course, we were always willing to
reciprocate. All right, he became a member of the Warren Commission and he was
"our man" on the Warren Commission and it was to him that we looked to protect
our interest and keep us fully advised of any development that we would not
like, that mitigated against us, and he did. All this I know.(229)
(192) Hoover's fears evidently led him to attempt to limit the Warren
Commission's investigation:
(Hoover) did show marked interest in limiting the scope or circumventing the
scope of (The Warren Commission investigation) and taking action that might
result in neutralizing it.(230)
(194) According to Sullivan, Hoover's principal method in attempting to limit
the Warren Commission's investigation was leaking information to the press:
The main action * * * was to leak to the press the FBI investigation believing
that this would tend to satisfy everybody and perhaps the authorities would
conclude that an investigation of great depth and scope would not be
necessary.(231)
(195) Hoover also circumvented an independent investigation of a specific
allegation by the Warren Commission by another means:
* * * this then is how the FBI reacts to this allegation before the Commission
began investigating it. Hoover covered himself by starting an "investigation" of
the reports that Oswald had been an FBI informant, attempting to discredit the
sources, and he made it clear to the Commission that he would prefer, thank you,
to be approached directly in the unlikely event that any question remained.
(232)
(196) James Malley, the FBI official assigned by Director Hoover to serve as
liaison to the Warren Commission, told the committee that he was not aware of
any negative feelings Hoover had toward the Commission:
I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his office after I
returned from Dallas and what he told me that time. There was certainly no
criticism. I was told that the Warren Commission had been established. I was the
liaison representative, and he wanted full and complete cooperation with them
and no information whatsoever withheld from them. Give them everything.(233)
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(197) Malley described the FBI's relationship with the Warren Commission as:
Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just
strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you,
we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get
them from you. There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. (234)
(198) Malley further stated that he had:
No knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about when he says the Director
was opposed to the creation (of the Commission) and so on * * *. And I never
personally heard him object to the Warren Commission in any way, shape, or
form.(235)
(199) Malley further stated that he would not necessarily trust any statements
that former assistant FBI director William Sullivan made about the assassination
investigation and Director Hoover's role in it. (236) Speaking of Sullivan, the
man in charge of the FBI's investigation into the question of a possible
conspiracy, as well as Lee Oswald's background and association, Malley stated,
"I would not trust him."(237) Malley told the committee that he believed that
former Assistant Director Sullivan, who died in 1977, might lie about the
Bureau's work on the assassination investigation, portraying it in a false light
or negative fashion. (238) Malley suggested that Sullivan may have fabricated
various recollections about the assassination investigation and Hoover's
direction of it and further stated that he believed Sullivan was capable of
committing perjury about these matter.(239) Malley stated that he would "not
necessarily" believe any Sullivan statements made under oath.(240)
(200) Hoover's fear of criticism also lead, in at least one instance, to a
divergence between the Bureau's public statements, including those to the Warren
Commission, and the beliefs of their own officials:
The Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant
placing a stop on (Oswald's) passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence
that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign
government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels it was proper at that
time to take this "public" position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's
background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did
not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that
time.(241)
(201) Former Attorney General Katzenbach stated that FBI Director Hoover refused
to send a Bureau official to the first meeting of the Warren Commission, despite
Katzenbach's specific request that an official accompany him. Katzenbach
testified that this placed him in a position where he could not competently
brief the Commission on the continuing FBI investigation, since he was not
familiar with its course: He testified:
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This is the kind of thing you get from Belmont to Tolson, Hoover, knowing
Hoover's opposition to the Commission, not really wanting to have anything to do
with it and also thinking it fairly funny having me sitting over there and not
knowing what was going on.
The reason I wanted the Bureau there was I wanted somebody telling me what was
going on. I did not know.(242)
(202) Katzenbach recalled that Director Hoover and his senior aides were then
the only men in the Government who were truly familiar with the investigation of
the President's death:
Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. nobody in the Government
knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you
got from liaison people, from the director himself.
I did not know who they were interviewing or why they were interviewing, what
they uncovered.(243)
(203) Former Attorney General Katzenbach told the committee he believed the FBI
would have been deeply troubled if it had come across evidence about the
assassination that contradicted the Bureau's initial conclusions about Lee
Harvey Oswald being a lone assassin:
I would have thought they would have no particular problems in running down a
lot of alleys they had not run down if it did not develop any information that
was flatly contrary to their conclusions.(244)
The former Attorney General stated, however, that had the FBI come across
evidence that clearly contradicted its official conclusions about President
Kennedy's murder, he would not be completely sure what would have happened to
such evidence:
What would have happened if they came across that kind of information, God only
knows. What the reverberations of that talking about minor embarrassment--in
really uncovering something that would have changed some result they had
reported, God only knows.
I think people's heads would have rolled and they would have swallowed hard and
done it. I think my view at the time would have been that in a matter as
important as the assassination of a President, I think the Bureau would have
swallowed and taken it and found some graceful way out. Explaining why they had
come to the wrong conclusion would have been a fairly high-powered neutron bomb
in the Bureau, questioning any basic conclusion that they had come to.(245)
(204) Rankin similarly stated that he would be apprehensive about how Hoover and
the FBI would have reacted had they found concrete evidence that disproved their
earlier conclusions about the assassination:
* * * if they had found something like that, I am sure that if we had received
it, it would be only after Mr. Hoover had examined it carefully himself and
didn't dare withhold it
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from us. now that is looking from now rather than at the time that we didn't
think he would deliberately lie.(246)
The CIA
(205) At one level, it appears that the CIA's relationship with the Warren
Commission was exemplary. At another, that relationship was questionable. Dulles
suggested on december 11, 1963, that the CIA would be very useful to the
Commission in areas in which the Agency had expertise, such as Oswald's sojourn
in the Soviet Union.(247) The commission did use the CIA in this manner. Most of
the Commission's requests for information from the CIA dealt with the Soviet
union or Oswald's activities while he was outside the United states.(248)
(206) The CIA's initial investigation, which was completed in december 1963, was
conducted by an officer from the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.(249) When
the Warren Commission requested information after that, James Angleton, Chief of
the Counterintelligence staff, asked that his unit be given responsibility for
further research and investigation.(250) Richard Helms, Deputy Director of
Plans, granted Angleton's request.(251) Angleton designated one of his
subordinates, Raymond Rocca, the "point of record" for coordinating research for
the Commission.(252)
(207) Rocca and the three other CIA staff members who worked with him on this
task were experts in Soviet affairs.(253) The Church committee, which reviewed
this group's work, had concluded:
The CIA staff exhaustively analyzed the significance of Oswald's activities in
the Soviet Union, but there was no corresponding CIA analysis of the
significance of Oswald's contacts with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the
United States * * *. All of the evidence reviewed by this committee suggests
that these investigators conducted a thorough, professional investigation and
analysis of the information they had.(254)
(208) The evidence suggests that the internal structure of the CIA may have
prevented, or at least impaired, its ability to be of the utmost help to the
Warren Commission. The Commission staff's contact with the CIA was primarily
through Richard Helms. It was also in contact with Thomas Karamessines, Helms'
assistant, and with the "point of record" officer.
(209) In his appearance before the committee, Richard Helms stated that as a
general rule the CIA waited to receive a specific inquiry from the Warren
Commission before they would pass information on.(255) Helms recalled the
Agency's relationship with the Commission in this way:
Mr. HELMS. At the time that the Warren Commission was formed, the agency did
everything in its power to cooperate with the Warren Commission and with the
FBI, the FBI having the lead in the investigation. It was the agency's feeling
that since this tragedy had taken place in the United States, that the FBI and
the Department of Justice would obviously have the leading edge in conducting
the investigation, and
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that the agency would cooperate with them in every way it was possible, and the
same applied to the Warren Commission.(256)
(210) Helms, though the main contact with the Commission, apparently did not
inform it of the CIA plots to assassinate Castro because he did not think they
were relevant to the commission's work and he was not asked about them. (257)
There is also an indication that his testimony before the Commission was
misleading.(258)
(211) Generally, the evidence seems to indicate that the CIA was reluctant or
unable, due to internal structuring, to provide the Commission with certain
information. There are also indications that the Commission did not ask the
right questions. Further, most of the contact with the Agency, other than that
through Helms, was through the "point of record" officer who, although he was
aware of the CIA's involvement with anti-Castro Cubans, did not know about the
CIA's assassination plots against castro. At the same time, people within the
Agency who knew of the plots, such as members of the branch responsible for
Cuban affairs, the Special Affairs staff, knew of the plots but were never in
contact with the Warren Commission.(259)
(212) One example of the Warren Commission's not asking the right questions can
be found in Helm's testimony before the Church committee.(260) Another is the
fact that out of the 36 requests for information to the CIA on file at the
National Archives, only one, the Ruby request, concerned Cuba directly.(261)
(213) In summary, the CIA acted in an exemplary manner in dealing with the
Warren Commission regarding its narrow requests for information. In another
area, that of Cuban involvement and operations, the CIA's actions might well be
described as reluctant.
(214) In his testimony before the committee, Richard Helms stated that he
believed the CIA had done as much as possible to assist the Commission:(262)
I thought we made a major effort to be as cooperative and prompt and helpful as
possible. But in recent years I have been through enough to recognize that you
can't make a flat statement against anything, so I don't know. Maybe there were
some places where it wasn't as prompt as it should have been. but I am not in a
position to identify them.(263)
(215) Later in his testimony, Helms again noted that he had * * * learned in
recent years that one must never make a flat statement about anything, so there
may have been certain cases in which they did not get information promptly. But
I believe our effort was to give it to them as promptly as possible.(264)
Examples of attitudes and relationships
Introduction
(216) The evidence indicates that the Warren Commission was almost totally
dependent on the Federal investigative agencies for the facts and heir primary
analysis.(265) The evidence also indicated that the FBI viewed the Warren
Commission as an adversary and the CIA dealt with the Commission with
reservations. In instances where
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the agencies supplied the Warren Commission with information, followup
investigation was often requested. In at least one instance, this followup
investigation was not done to the satisfaction of the Commission staff. There
are indications in at least two instances there may have been unreasonable delay
on the part of the agencies in meeting the Warren Commission's requests. There
is also an indication that a senior CIA official may have given misleading
testimony.
(217)If the agencies did not supply the facts in the first instance, or if the
facts did not come to the Warren Commission's attention independently, then no
followup was possible. The evidence indicates that facts which may have been
relevant to, and would have substantially affected, the Warren Commission's
investigation were not provided by the agencies. Hence, the Warren Commission's
findings may have been formulated without all of the relevant information.
Inadequate followup--Odio-All incident
(218) As the Warren Commission was nearing the end of its investigation, there
were some areas which it believed had not been investigated to its satisfaction.
One of these was the testimony of Mr. Sylvia Odio. She had stated before the
Commission that a "Leon Oswald" had visited her on, or around, September 25,
1963, in Dallas. On August 28, 1964, Rankin wrote to Hoover requesting further
investigation into Odio's story. The letter said, in part:
It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegations
either be proved of disproved. *** In view of our time schedule we would
appreciate receiving a report as soon a possible.(266)
(219) On September 21, 1964, 3 days before the Warren report was delivered to
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Hoover sent Rankin a reply to the August 28, 1964,
letter. It reported that the FBI had located Loran Eugene Hall on September 16,
1964, at Johnsondale, Calif, and that Hall had said he visited Odio in September
1963, accompanied by a William Seymour and a Lawrence Howard. The letter went on
to say.
Hall stated that William Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald
and that Seymour speaks only a few words of Spanish. In connection with the
revelations of Hall, you will note that the name Loran Hall bears some phonetic
resemblance to the name Leon Oswald.(267)
The letter related that the FBI was continuing its investigation into this
matter and hoped to obtain a photograph of Hall to show Odio. Hoover promised to
report any other developments promptly.
(220) The Warren report, issued 3 days after it received the above-mentioned
letter, said:
On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in Johnsondale, Calif.
Hall had been identified as a participant in numerous anti-castro activities. He
told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in dallas, soliciting aid in
connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. Odio. He was
accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American from East Los Angeles, and
one William
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Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee
Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio testified one
of the men who visited her, did. While the FBI had not yet completed its
investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the
Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment
in September of 1963.(268)
(221) This committee found no evidence to indicate that the FBI continued its
investigation of this incident after the Warren report was issued. This incident
has remained controversial because of occurrences between September 16, when
Hall was first interviewed by the FBI, and September 21, when Hoover reported
the results to Rankin. on September 18, 1964, the FBI interviewed William
Seymour. He denied having ever visited Odio. On September 20, 1964, the FBI
interviewed Lawrence Howard, who also denied having ever visited Odio.
(222) On that day, a Sunday, Loran Hall was reinterviewed; he recanted his
original story. Hall had first been interviewed on September 16, 1964, by FBI
Special Agent Leon Brown. Brown was then stationed at the Bakerfield, Calif,
resident agency of the FBI. He received his work assignments, and reported to,
the Los Angeles FBI field office.(269) Brown testified before this committee
that he had no specific recollection of the interviews of Loran Hall.(270) He
also said that he had no specific memory of the events leading up to those
interviews.(271) He assumed they would have been a matter of routine assignment:
I am guessing and I have to suppose that this is the way it must have happened,
that I received a phone call from my Los Angeles office and probably from the
supervisor who handled the case, this particular case, in the Los Angeles office
at that time.(272)
Brown testified that he would have been given the background information for the
interview during this phone call.(273)
(223) The interview report shows that the report was dictated on Thursday
September 17, 1964. Brown testified that, even though he had no independent
recollection of these events, he assumed he had dictated the report on that date
and sent the dictabelt to the Los Angeles office for transcription. (274) The
report was typed on September 23, 1964. This would be in line with what Brown
testified were Bureau procedures: an interview report had to be typed within 5
working days after the date of the interview.(275)
(224) Brown reinterviewed Loran Hall on Sunday, September 2, 1964. He thought
the reason for the second interview was to get a picture of Hall. (276) He
testified that he had taken a picture of Hall on the 16th, but that it had not
turned out. (277) He did not recall any instructions he received to perform the
second interview, but he thought the reason was probably to obtain a
photograph.(278) Brown also testified that he had no independent recollection
that Hall told the two different stories at the two interviews:(297) He said:
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Had I not seen [the interview reports], I think that I would have been able to
tell you that I drove to Kernville [Hall's residence' one day back in 1964 and
interviewed somebody in connection with the assassination, and then again went
back the next day or two to get a picture, which failed to come out; and that
was it.(280)
(225) Brown's second interview of Loran Hall was on september 20, 1964. The
report shows that it was dictated on september 21, 1964. Brown testified that he
assumed that the dictabelt would have been sent to the Los Angeles office on
that day (281) This report was also typed September 23, 1964. Brown could not
explain why this report was expedited or why the first one was not typed until
the same day or the second one:
The only thing that comes to my mind is that they may have been trying to get
everything transcribed to complete an investigative report * * *. There may have
been some urgency to get the report, investigative report, put together and in
the mail.(282)
(226) This committee tried, but was unsuccessful, to determine the circumstances
leading up to the interviews of Loran Eugene Hall and the transmittal of the
results of those interviews to the Warren Commission by way of FBI headquarters
in Washington, D.C.
(227) Liebeler was the Warren Commission staff attorney responsible for the
investigation of Odio's allegations. He testified before this committee that
there was only one area of the Commission's investigation that he was not
satisfied with:
Q. The Sylvia Odio incident was never resolved to your satisfaction, was it?
A. No, not really.(283)
Unreasonable delays
(228) The Ruby information request. On February 24, 1964, Highboard and Griffin,
two Warren Commission staff lawyers, wrote a memorandum entitled "Jack
Ruby--Background, friends, and other Pertinent Information." This memorandum was
directed to Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency. A draft cover letter said, in part:
I would appreciate your forwarding to this Commission copies of all records in
your files which contain information about Jack Ruby or the persons mentioned in
part C of the enclosed memorandum.(284)
Some of the people included in part C of the memorandum were Eva Grant, Earl
Ruby, Ralph Paul, George Senator, Barney Baker, H.L. Hunt, Lamar Hunt, Louis J.
McWillie, and Barney Ross.
(229) The cover letter was not sent. The routing slip attached to the cover
letter explains;
This letter and the memorandum prepared by Messrs. Highboard and Griffin was not
sent. The Memorandum was delivered by hand to representative of CIA at a meeting
on March 12, 1964.(285)
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(230) The routing slip was dated March 14, 1964, and was initialed by Howard P.
Willens. Judge Griffin, in his testimony before this committee, said that he had
no idea why there was a 3-week delay in transmitting the memorandum to the
CIA.(286)
(231) A CIA internal memorandum for the record memorializes the March 12, 1964,
meeting between the CIA and Warren Commission staff. It records the transmittal
of the Highboard and Griffin memorandum on Ruby:
The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by
the CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a
roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed to Mr. Helms. He said he would
appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this
material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed
trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an
unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport.
Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this
story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of
assisting, [deleted].(287)
(232) On March 19, 1964, Rankin sent a letter, drafted by Willens, to Helms. It
reminded Helms of the memorandum on Ruby that had been handed to him on March
12, 1964. It went on to say:
At that time we requested that you review this memorandum and submit to the
Commission any information contained in your files regarding matters covered in
the memorandum, as well as any other analysis by your representatives which you
believed might be useful to the Commission.
As you know, this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would
appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to
comply with this request in the near future.(288)
(233) This committee's examination of the Warren Commission records in the
National Archives reveals no further written communication on the subject until
September 15, 1964. Then, 9 days before the Warren report was submitted to
President Johnson, the Commission received a memorandum on the Ruby request. It
was written by Helms' assistant, thomas H. Karamessines and referenced the May
19, 1964, letter from Rankin to Helms. Karamessines' memorandum said, in part:
This memorandum will confirm our earlier statement to the Commission to the
effect that an examination of Central Intelligence Agency files has produced no
information of Jack ruby or his activities. The Central Intelligence Agency has
no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were associated, or might have
been connected in any manner.
The records of this Agency were reviewed for information about the relatives,
friends, and associates of Ruby named in your summary of his background. Our
records do not reflect any information pertaining to these persons.(289)
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(234) There is some indication that the CIA notified the Warren Commission
orally of this prior to the time of the above-quoted memorandum. An early draft
of the Warren report chapter on conspiracy, which was written before September
1964, said: "The CIA has no information suggesting that Jack Ruby was involved
in any type of Cuban or other foreign conspiracy."(290)
Judge Griffin concluded from this that:
* * * we had received oral communications from the CIA telling us that they had
no information and that we ultimately insisted on their putting their oral
communications to us in writing. That, I believe, is why the CIA letter came so
late.(291)
(235) CIA item 250, dated March 5, 1964. On November 23, 1963, the CIA sent
three reports and supporting documents to the Secret Service. (292) The Warren
Commission first learned of these reports on January 8, 1964, a letter from
Rankin to McCone, Director of Central intelligence, requested copies of the CIA
materials in the possession of the Secret Service. A CIA internal memorandum
dated March 3, 1964, which dealt with this request, said, in part:
We have a problem here for your determination. [Staff officer] does not desire
to respond directly to paragraph 2 of that letter [of February 12, 1964] which
made levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service
since November 23 * * * Unless you feel otherwise [staff officer] would prefer
to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2.(293)
(236) On March 9, 1964, Willens reported a discussion with Helms about the
request for the Secret Service materials. (294) He reported that Helms had
indicated that the CIA had "certain unspecified problems" in complying with the
request. Helms maintained that some of the information in the Secret Service's
possession had already been made available to the Commission and that the rest
of it was irrelevant matters or things "that had not checked out." Helms said
that he would not be acceptable, and they would discuss it at their next
meeting.(295)
(237) Willens, Helms and other members of the CIA and Warren Commission staff
met on March 12, 1964. At this meeting, a deal was struck whereby a Warren
Commission staff member could review the CIA file on Oswald to insure that the
summaries provided to the Commission adequately reflected the contents of the
CIA file.(296) Such an inspection was performed by Warren Commission staff
member Samuel Stern on March 27, 1964. In a memorandum dated March 27, 1964, to
Rankin, Stern reported that "There was no item listed [in the CIA index] that we
have not been given either in full text or paraphrased."(297) Three days prior
to Stern's review of the CIA file on Oswald, the CIA had provided the Warren
Commission with copies of the documents provided to the Secret Service on
November 23, 1963. (298)
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Misleading testimony
(238) Richard Helms, the Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, testified before the
Warren Commission along with John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, on
May 14, 1964. Helms said that the CIA could find no indication that anyone in
the Agency even suggested a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald:
On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all our records searched to see if there had been
any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in
the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card
files and our personnel files and all our records.
Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those
officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see
if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with
this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the
Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the minds of any of the
individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.(299)
(239) There is a CIA internal memorandum dated November 25, 1963, that seems to
contradict Helm's testimony: CIA item 173A. The memorandum says, in part:
It makes little difference now, but [deleted] had at one time an [deleted]
interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as
[deleted] I had discussed--sometime in summer 1960--with [deleted], the laying
on of interview[s] through [deleted] or other suitable channels. * * *
I was phasing into my next cover assignment [deleted] at the time. Thus, I would
have left our country shortly after Oswald's arrival. I do not know what action
developed thereafter. * * *
It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually
accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in the Harvey story.(300)
Withheld information
(240) CIA item 298, dated May 12, 1964.--A CIA internal memorandum for a "staff
employee," dated May 12, 1964, deals with the Warren Commission's desire to take
testimony from the Deputy Director of Plans Richard Helms:
The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which
highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its
dealings with the Commission. For example, Rankin views as to how improvements
might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably
ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such
general questioning certainly
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necessitates that the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone) be
made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews. I raised with
[staff employee] the nature of the recent information which you are processing
which originated with the [deleted] source. I informed him that in your view
this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not
go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless he have first had
some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director if fully aware of its
implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning.
The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and make a decision as to the
question of timing.(301)
(241) The Sourwine/Tarabochia incident.--In June 1963, a group of private
citizens attempted a raid on Cuba. The purpose was, allegedly, to bring two
Soviet missile technicians who wanted to defect out of Cuba. They would have
then testified before the Senate Internal security Subcommittee that the Russian
missiles were still in Cuba. The operations failed.
(242) James Sourwine, counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, was
involved in financing the operation which had come to be know as the Bayo-Pawley
raid.
(243) The committee saw evidence that the CIA knew of Sourwine's involvement.
(244) Two Warren Commission internal memoranda indicate that Slawson was in
contact with Sourwine and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The
subcommittee informed Slawson that it had access to an informant in the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City.(302) Sourwine informed Slawson that the source was known
to Al Tarabochia, an anti-Castro Cuban associated with the subcommittee.
Sourwine refused to divulge the identity of the informant to Slawson or to put
him in direct contact.(303) He did agree to pass questions to their informant
and relay the answers to the Commission.(304)
(245) Slawson testified before this committee that the Commission did not use
the informant, even though it had considered using the person as an independent
check on the information about Mexico City that the Commission was receiving
from the CIA and FBI.(305)
Slawson testified:
Q. Whatever became of the possibility of using informants?
A. Nothing. * * * I talked to Mr. Sourwine * * * But he and Senator Eastland
were not willing to give us access to the claimed contact they had and nothing
came of the request that we have them for information from that. There was no
further communication.
Q. What was your final opinion about this incident?
A. My final opinion, and to my recollection, it was also J. Lee Rankin's, was
that Sourwine and Eastland were trying to use this alleged contact as a way of
finding out inside information about the Warren investigation which they could
use for their own political purposes.(306)
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(246) Slawson also testified that, although he did not have a specific
recollection of it, he would have probably discussed this with both the FBI and
CIA:
Q. What, if any, information did the CIA provide you concerning Tarabochia and
Sourwine?
A. I am sure it was to the effect that they didn't know anything about the
contacts. That was probably just the end of it.
Q. Do you recall whether or not the CIA provided you any information about
Sourwine or Tarabochia concerning raids in Cuba?
A. I understand the question as whether the CIA supplied me with any information
about raids in Cuba in connection with Sourwine and Tarabochia. My answer is
no.(307)
(247) Electronic surveillance of Marina Oswald.--The FBI tapped Marina Oswald's
telephone and bugged her living quarters from February 29, 1964, to March 12,
1964.(308) According to testimony before this committee, two reports were
written from these sources. FBI Special Agent Robert Gemberling, a supervisor in
the Dallas field office during this period, testified that he saw these reports,
but that they contained nothing pertinent to the investigation of the
assassination:
* * * the reports were written by another agent. I did have occasion to see
them. There was no information gleaned from either of these unusual sources that
had a bearing on the Assassination or a possible conspiracy and so forth.(309)
(248) Gemberling also testified that it was his understanding that this
information was not transmitted to the Warren Commission.(310) Gemberling's
understanding was borne out by the testimony of Warren Commission staff members
before this Committee. Nevertheless, the committee learned that the results of
the surveillance which was in fact requested by the Commission, were given to
the Commission and senior staff members.
(249) CIA Plots to Assassinate Castro: Agency contacts with the Commission who
knew of the CIA-Mafia plots.--On December 11, 1959, Dulles, then Director of
Central Intelligence, approved four recommended actions against Cuba that were
set forth in a memorandum submitted by J.C. King, chief of the Western
Hemisphere division. One of the recommendations called for the elimination of
Fidel Castro.(311)
(250) In September 1960, Richard Bissell, then Deputy Director of Plans for the
CIA ordered Sheffield Edwards, then Chief of the CIA's Office of Security, to
develop a plan to kill Castro.(312) Dulles was briefed about this plan, which
included the use of underworld figures, in September 1960 by Bissell and
Edwards.(313)
(251) On May 7, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was briefed on the
CIA-Mafia plots by Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Huston, the CIA general
counsel.(314) He was told the plots had been terminated.(315)
(252) On May 9, 1962, Attorney General Kennedy informed Hoover of the CIA-Mafia
plots.(316)
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(253) The evidence indicates that Richard Helms, the CIA Deputy Director for
Plans and main contact with the Warren Commission, knew of these plots, at least
as of May 14, 1962. On that date, he was briefed on the May 7, 1962, meeting
with Kennedy. (317) At this time, Helms decided not to brief the Director of
Central Intelligence, John McCone.(318)
(254) McCone learned of the plots on August 16, 1963, when he was briefed by
Helms. (319) McCone was led to believe that the plots had been terminated in May
1962.(320)
(255) Agency contacts with the Commission who knew of the AMLASH plot.--Evidence
developed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
indicates that the CIA was plotting with an official in Castro's government to
assassinate Castro in 1963. That official was code named AMLASH. The evidence
also indicates that the only person who knew of these plots and was in contact
with the Warren Commission was richard Helms.(321)
(256) Agency contacts with the Commission who did not know of the plots.--The
evidence developed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations indicates that Raymond Rocca, the CIA "point of record" officer, did
not know of the assassination plots.(322) The CIA desk officer who supervised
the initial CIA investigation into the assassination testified before the Senate
Select Committee that he did not know about these plots until they became public
knowledge in 1975.(323)
(257) Evidence that indicates that the Commission was not informed of the
plots.--The evidence indicates that the Warren Commission was never informed of
the CIA plots to assassinate Castro. It is, of course, now impossible to
determine why Dulles, Robert Kennedy and Hoover did not inform the Commission.
Helms testified before the Senate select committee that he did not do so because
he was not asked about them and because he did not consider them relevant to the
Commission's work.
Q. * * * you were charged with furnishing the Warren Commission information form
the CIA, information that you thought was relevant?
A. No sir, I was instructed to reply to inquiries from the Warren Commission for
information from the Agency. I was not asked to initiate any particular thing.
Q. * * * in other words if you weren't asked for it you didn't give it?
A. That's right, sir.(324)
(258) The testimony of the Warren Commission staff members before the Senate
Select Committee indicates that they never learned of the CIA plots to
assassinate Castro.(325) The testimony of members of the Warren Commission staff
before this committee also indicate they never learned of these plots.(326)
(259) Relevancy of the information about the plots to the Commission's
investigation.--The CIA's point of view was expressed by Richard Helms in
testimony before the Senate select committee that he did not believe the
information about the plots was relevant to the Warren Commission's
investigation.(327) The AMLASH case officer testified to the same effect.(328)
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(260) Other CIA officials disagreed with this in their testimony before the
Senate select committee. The disk officer who conducted the initial CIA
investigation of the assassination, and who did not know of the plots, thought
the plots would have been relevant to his inquiry:
Q. Did you know that on November 22, 1963, about the time Kennedy was
assassinated, a CIA case officer was passing a poison pen, offering a poison pen
to a high level cuban to use to assassinate Castro:
A. No, I did not.
Q. Would you have drawn a link in your mind between that and the Kennedy
assassination?
A. I certainly think that that would have been--become an absolutely vital
factor in analyzing the events surrounding the Kennedy assassination.(329)
(261) The chief of the counterintelligence branch of the CIA's Cuban task force,
who know of the plots but was not in contact with the Warren Commission, also
thought that the information would have been relevant to the Commission's
investigation: "I think it would have been logical for them to consider that
there could be a connection and to have explored it on their own."(330)
(262) The CIA analyst who acted as the "point of record" for the CIA research
for the Warren Commission, in a memo he prepared for the record in 1975,
expressed "concern about the Warren Commissions findings in light of this new
information."(331)
(263) Helms testified that he had never informed the Warren Commission of the
CIA-Mafia assassination conspiracies and did not then believe such information
was relevant.(332) He stated that he believed the significance of the Agency's
use of gangsters to try and assassinate President Castro has been considerably
exaggerated and, further, that he has difficulty in the semantics of discussing
assassination and other forms of violence.
Mr. HELMS. In retrospect, Mr. Dodd, I would have done a lot of thing very
differently. I would like to point out something since we are so deeply into
this. When one government is trying to upset another government and the
operation is successful, people get killed. I don't know whether they are
assassinated or whether they are killed in a coup. We had one recently in
Afghanistan. The head of the Afghanistan Government was killed. Was he
assassinated or killed in a coup? I don't know.
These semantics are all great. I want to say there is not a chief of state or
chief of government in the world today who is not aware of the fact that his
life is in jeopardy. He takes every possible protection to guard himself. The
relevance of one plot or another plot and its effect of the course of events I
would have a very hard time assessing, and I thing you would, too.
Suppose I had gone down and told them and said, yes; you know we tried to do
this. How would it have altered the outcome of the Warren Commission proceeding?
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Mr. DODD. Wasn't that really for the Warren Commission to determine?
Mr. HELMS. I think that is absolutely correct, but they did not have that chance
apparently.(333)
(264) Later in his testimony, Helms expressed considerable irritation over the
committee's questioning about his actions in withholding such information from
the Warren Commission. Helms finally remarked:
Mr. HELMS. I think it was a mistake, no doubt about it. I think we should have
shoved the whole thing over. I would have backed up a truck and taken all the
documents down and put them on the Warren Commission's desk.(334)
(265) With respect to the Warren Commission staff's point of view, those who
testified before this committee all thought the CIA plots to kill Castro would
have been relevant to the work. They disagreed on how it would have been
relevant, but all agreed they should have been informed.
(266) Slawson, the staff member who investigated the possibility of foreign
conspiracy, testified that he did not know of the plots. In a memorandum to
Rankin on September 6, 1964, Slawson wrote:
Throughout our investigation the CIA has been sending us memorandums. The CIA
made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission that it believed
was pertinent.(335)
(267) Slawson testified before this committee that the "it" in the above quote
referred to the CIA.(336) He also testified that he did not know of the plots
but believed that that knowledge would have been relevant to his investigation:
Q. * * * it was your impression as of September 6, 1964, near the end of the
investigation, that the CIA had made no attempt to withhold any information form
the Commission that the CIA believed was pertinent?
A. That is right.
Q. Did the CIA, or anyone, say, between the CIA and you, ever tell the Warren
Commission members about the CIA assassination plots on Castro?
A. No; not to my knowledge.
Q. Do you believe that would have been pertinent to your work?
A. Yes.(337)
(268) Slawson testified that he did not think to would have made him do anything
much differently than he had because he thought he had done everything he could
have. (338) But he also testified that knowledge of the plots would have made
him look harder at the possibility that Castro may have been involved.(339) He
also said that, had he know at the time the information had been withheld, he
might have been a little less likely to accept the CIA's determination of what
was pertinent.(340)
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(269) Arlen Specter testified that information of the plots should have been
made available to the Commission and that the determination as to its pertinency
should have been up to the Commission:
I think that if there had been information known to the Commission about a
possible assassination effort of Castro by the CIA, that the Commission would
have looked into it. I would have followed those facts to see if there was any
connection with the Kennedy assassination.(341)
(270) Redlich also thought the information would have affected the Commission's
investigation. If nothing else, it would have led the Commission to look more
closely into Oswald's Cuban connections:
I think that it would have affected it * * * How I am not completely sure * * *
Although I am cognizant of the fact that the Warren Commission at least to the
best of my recollection, did look into every Cuban connection that Oswald head,
it is possible that this additional fact might have led to further inquiry.(342)
(271) Speaking of the CIA-Mafia assassination conspiracies against Fidel Castro,
and other such information withheld from the Warren Commission, Rankin stated:
Certainly if we had had that it would have bulked larger, the conspiracy area,
the examination and the investigation and report, and we would have run out all
the various leads and probably it is very possible that we could have come down
with a good many signs of a lead down here to the underworld.(343)
(272) Former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach told the Committee that
he believed the CIA's and FBI's withholding of information regarding the
existence of the CIA-Mafia plots from the Warren Commission constituted a
serious failure to provide relevant evidence:
I think given that information, you would have pursued some lines of inquiry
probably harder than you might have otherwise pursued them.
I have no reason to believe one way or the other it would have changed the
result or turned it around or anything of that kind. I have no information on
that. It is simply I believe if I had been a member of the Warren Commission, I
would have believed that to be relevant information which would require
investigation.(344)
(273) Katzenbach further stated that he particularly faulted former CIA Director
Dulles for withholding knowledge of the Agency murder plots involving the
underworld from his fellow Warren Commission members:
Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the
Commission would insure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA
had. I am
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astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information
available to the other commissioners.(345)
(274) After reviewing the published findings of the Senate Intelligence
Committee regarding the CIA-Mafia assassination conspiracies of the early
1960's, Rankin testified that he believed the Agency is probably still
concealing information about the plots from the Congress:
My impression of the materials that I have been furnished by you with regard to
the report of the Senate committee in its investigation is that there is a
considerable amount being withheld and there may be a lot of false testimony in
some of the information furnished in connection with what they describe as the
eight assassination attempts.
To me as a lawyer in my experience in life for a good many years, I have the
impression that where they felt that you had some other information or the
Senate Committee had some other information like an Inspector General's report,
or other things that they could not avoid, you got something out of them, and
there is a vast amount that they either are not telling or they are telling
their own version of the way they want it to look, and I would not rely on any
of it. I don't mean that you have not gotten some material but I don't think you
have gotten all of it by any means.(346)
(275) Former Attorney General Katzenbach stated that he had been surprised to
learn that the FBI had also known of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots and had
also withheld the information from the Warren Commission. In discussing his view
of the Bureau's role in concealing such information, Katzenbach stated:
We were unaware then of any Mafia plots. I would not really have gone through my
head that that would have been a matter. It never would have occurred to me that
the FBI would cover up anything. If you ask me the question, if the FBI failed
to do something it should have done, would they have covered that up? My answer
to you is, even then, would have been yes, they probably would; not covering up
information that somebody else was guilty or something of this kind, but if the
bureau made any mistake or anything for which the public could criticize the
Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal the information from
anybody.(347)
(276) Wesley Liebeler did not think the information itself would have been
particularly pertinent, but he did agree that it would have had an affect on the
investigation:
I think that if I had known at the time that I would have been concerned to find
out more directly whether the CIA had any information that might provide the
Commission with leads on these other issues that we were looking at or issues
that we never turned up. In my mind the fact, if it is a fact, that the CIA was
trying to arrange the assassination of Mr. Castro at the time, the withholding
of that fact by itself I
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don't think is particularly significant to anything the Commission did.
What I am saying is the fact that the CIA was attempting, if it was, to
assassinate Castro, I don't understand what that has to do with Oswald or the
Warren Commission investigation or anything of that sort. I think that the
question of whether the CIA withheld evidence that would have provided leads to
the Commission that might have connected Oswald to presumably Cuban contacts
that we were not able to connect him with ourselves, that clearly would have
been significant. The fact that the CIA was apparently attempting to assassinate
Castro, might have provided a motive for them to withhold information if indeed
they did, but the fact that they were trying to assassinate Castro had nothing
to do with the issue.(348)
(277) Liebeler's doubts about the relevancy of the information itself were not
shared by Griffin, the staff member who worked on the investigation of Jack
Ruby. Judge Griffin testified that the Commission did not really investigate the
possibility that organized crime had been involved in the assassination because
there was no connection between organized crime and Oswald. Judge Griffin
thought that the information about the CIA plots would have led the Commission
to investigate more the Cuban/Mafia/CIA connections and, consequently, a
possible connection between Ruby, organized crime, anti-Castro groups and
Oswald:
Q. * * * you clearly raise questions about Ruby's possibly becoming involved in
purchasing Jeeps for Castro, which is a political activity on which the CIA
would have some information or they would be derelict in their duty?
A. Absolutely. * * *
Q. Would you have known the name Meyer Lansky in 1964?
A. Yes. That kind of information would not have significantly affected our
decision unless we knew of two things, at least unless we knew that the Mafia,
the underworld types, were being used by the CIA in connection with
international Cuban activities. If we had known that the CIA in anyway was
utilizing underworld people in connection with any kind of Cuban activity, that
might have said more for us--most particularly if we had, of course, known that
there was an effort on some part of the people in our Government to assassinate
Castro. * * *
Oswald was the person who assassinated the President. There was no showing that
Oswald had any connection with organized crime. Therefore, there was no reason
to think that, simply because Ruby was involved in organized crime, that that
would have been linked to the assassination of the President.
We needed to fill that in, in some way, but that is why the Cuban link is so
important. If we had known that the CIA wanted to assassinate Castro, then all
the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about this made much, much more
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sense. If we had further known that the CIA was involved with organized criminal
figures in an assassination attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a
completely different perspective on this thing.
But, because we did not have those links at this point, there was nothing to tie
the underworld in with Cuba and thus nothing to tie them in with Oswald, nothing
to tie them in with the assassination of the President.(349)
Submitted by:
G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief Counsel and Staff Director;
GARY T. CORNWELL,
Deputy Chief Counsel;
KENNETH D. KLEIN,
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel;
MICHAEL EWING,
DAN L. HARDWAY,
LESLIE H. WIZELMAN,
Researchers.
Attachment A
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(278) Attachment A: The Warren Commission
Attachment B
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(279) Attachment B: Monthly Progress of the Warren Commission Investigation
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Attachment B: cont.
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Attachment B: cont.
Attachment C
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(280) Attachment C: Days worked by Warren Commission Staff
Attachment D
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(281) Attachment D: Executive Session Testimony of Arlen Specter and Dean Norman
Redlich
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
--------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1977
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE OF ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10:25 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2237, Rayburn
House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Preyer, Stokes, Fauntroy, Devine, McKinney, and Sawyer.
Staff members present: G. Robert Blakey, Marion Wills, Vivian McPherson, Dorothy
Kuhn, Jacqueline Hess, Kenneth Klein, Elizabeth Berning, Gary Cornwell, James
Wolf, Jeffrey Facter, Jan Schlichtman, Michael Goldsmith, Mitchell Mars, Robert
Morrison, Larry Stickler, Clarence Day, and William Cross.
Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Elizabeth
Berning, the clerk of the committee, who will read for the record those members
who are officially designated to be on the subcommittee today pursuant to
committee rule 12.3.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Chairman, besides yourself and Mr. Sawyer, Mr. Mckinney is
substituting for Mr. Thone. Mr. Fauntroy is substituting for Mrs. Burke, and Mr.
Devine will be substituting for Mr. Dodd.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. I would like to entertain a motion at this time that
today's hearing and 1 subsequent day of hearing be held in executive session,
since on the basis of information obtained by the committee the committee
believes the evidence or testimony may tend to defame or degrade people and
consequently section 2(K) (5) of rule 11 of the rules of the House and committee
rule 3.3(5), require such hearings be in executive session.
Is there a motion to that effect?
Mr. SAWYER. I so move.
Mr. PREYER. You have heard the motion. The clerk will call the role.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Stokes.
[No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Devine.
[No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Preyer.
(79)
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Mr. PREYER. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Thone.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. Mrs. Burke.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Dodd.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. From Ford.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fithian.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Edgar.
[No response]
Ms. BERNING. There are four ayes.
Mr. PREYER. The motion is carried and at this time the committee will go into
executive session.
Mr. Specter, it is a pleasure to have you with us.
Mr. SPECTER. Nice to be here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. PREYER. On the record.
Under our procedures, Mr. Specter, I will ask that you stand and be sworn.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give the subcommittee in this
matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God.
Mr. SPECTER. I do.
Mr. PREYER. Will the clerk give Mr. Specter a copy of our rules?
Let the record show that Mr. specter has received a copy of the rules of the
committee.
House Resolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete
investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and
death of President John F. Kennedy including determining whether the existing
laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the
investigating jurisdiction and capability of agencies and Departments are
adequate in their provisions and enforcement, and whether there was full
disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and departments of the
U.S. Government and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of
an Agency or Department would have been of assistance in investigating the
assassination and why such information was not provided or checked by that
Agency or Department and to make recommendations to the House if the select
committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the
enactment of new legislation."
The Chair will recognize Mr. Klein at this time.
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STATEMENT OF ARLEN SPECTER
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, before the questioning begins, may I note for the
committee that in scheduling my appearance today I have a conflict to be in
Reading and was very hopeful of being out by 11 or at least by 11:30. I realize
that the time is not something that can be determined with absolute precision
but I did want to call your attention to a problem.
My appearance was scheduled last week on rather short notice and I do want to
cooperate and be available when the committee wanted me so I am here today but I
wanted to note that circumstance. I am advised by counsel that I will have an
opportunity to review my testimony for purposes of correcting some inaccuracy in
transcription and that I am not limited in any way form commenting on what I say
here today. I just want to be sure.
I have no had an opportunity to read the committee rules which are rather
voluminous which I have received.
Mr. PREYER. The chair can assure you, mr. Specter, that there won't be any
problem in that connection. You will be free to comment in any way you choose.
Mr. SPECTER. Thank you, sir. Mr. PREYER. We appreciate your problem. We will
certainly do the best we can to accommodate you.
Mr. SPECTER. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Klein.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Specter, what was your position prior to taking a position with the Warren
Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I was assistant district attorney in Philadelphia, Pa.
Mr. KLEIN. How many years of investigative and prosecutorial experience did you
have before working with the Warren commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I was assistant district attorney from October 1959 until January
of 1964 when I became assistant counsel to the Commission. I served in the U.S.
Air Force Office of Special Investigations form 1951-53. I practiced law in
Philadelphia from the fall of 1956 until October of 1959 which might have some
bearing on your question about investigative experience.
Mr. KLEIN. Prior to being hired by the Warren Commission what was said to you
about the goals of the Warren Commission and about what your function would be
as staff counsel?
Mr. SPECTER. The goals of the Warren commission, as I understood them, were to
find out the facts and the truth relating to as assassination of President
Kennedy. I was to function as one of the lawyers on that job.
Mr. KLEIN. After serving as staff counsel on the Warren Commission in your
opinion what were the real objectives of the Warren Commission investigation?
Mr. SPECTER. To find the truth about all the facts relating to the assassination
of President Kennedy?
Mr. KLEIN. I would like to suggest some other possible objectives and you can
comment on them. Was it as objective of the Warren Commission to allay public
fears?
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Mr. SPECTER. No, sir. At least not to the extent that they conflicted with the
facts.
Mr. KLEIN. Was it an objective of the Warren Commission to try to prevent an
international crisis?
Mr. SPECTER. no, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Was it an objective of the Warren Commission to allow a smooth
transition in national leadership?
Mr. SPECTER. No, sir. We were not unmindful of international concern about the
fats relating to the assassination of President Kennedy but none of the
considerations which you have just mentioned was in any way a consideration
which would influence the activities of the Commission or my activities as
assistant counsel for the Commission.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you saying that these factors could have been present but that
they would not have caused you to deviate from what you saw as your primary
objective, which was to find out what happened?
Mr SPECTER. That is correct, they would not cause us to deviate. When Chief
Justice Warren addressed the staff in an early session, as I recall, though this
goes back a long way, the Chief Justice commented about great international
concern about the facts of the assassination. So that was a matter in our minds
but we did not tailor our findings to accommodate any interest other than the
truth.
Mr. KLEIN. To the extent that they were consistent with finding the truth, then
they might have been part of the objectives of the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I don't really think they they were part of the objectives of the
Warren Commission. I believe that the Commission received its mandate from the
President to find the facts on the assassination and that was it, pure and
simple.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion were the operating procedures and organizational
structure of the Warren Commission conductive to achieving the objectives of the
Warren Commission as you have stated those objectives.
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I think they were within the context that the Commission came
together without having any prior organizational structure and not having any
independent investigative staff.
There was a concern for promptness in our determination but subject to the
general circumstances of the Commission's organization I would say that the
procedures were conducive to finding the truth.
Mr. KLEIN. And also the organizational structure, was that conducive to finding
the truth? by that I am not talking about the way it was divided up in different
categories but the categories themselves?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I think the categories were adequate to finding the truth. If
by organization structure you include the personnel available, I think that
everyone would have much preferred to have had a totally independent
investigative arm to carry out the investigative functions of the Commission but
I believe the Commission concluded early on, and I was not privy to any such
position from my position as assistant counsel, that it would be impractical to
organize an entire investigative staff from the start so that use was made of
existing Federal investigative facilities.
Mr. KLEIN. In the beginning of your last answer did you say there was some
agreement that if it would have been practical they should have had their own
investigators?
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Mr. SPECTER. No; there was no agreement that I know about. The most that I can
say on that subject would be that speaking from my own perspective that when the
lawyers would discuss the procedures from time to time, and that is why I
include this comment within the scope of your question on procedures, there
would be an observation from time to time how nice it would be if we had a
totally independent staff. The consequence of that kind of observation or wish
was that none was to be provided and the necessities to move forward with
promptness led the Commission to conclude and this is only my inference, that it
was going to function within existing Federal investigative agencies.
Mr. KLEIN. You had no input into that particular decision?
Mr. SPECTER. I did not.
Mr. KLEIN. looking at the type and mix of the personnel, were they conducive to
achieving the objectives?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I think the Commission recruited qualified people to carry on
the job with respect to those were designated as assistant counsel.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it true that some of the senior counsel, because of their busy
schedules and their prior commitments, were not able to fully participate in the
investigation?
Mr. SPECTER. I would prefer not to ascribe reasons but simply to say some of the
senior counsel did not participate as extensively as some of the junior counsel.
Mr. KLEIN. Did that in any way affect achieving the objectives?
Mr. SPECTER. I don't think that it is although it would have been helpful if my
senior counsel, Francis Adams, had had an opportunity to participate more
extensively. I respond with respect to Mr. Adams because that is the are a I
worked on and that is what I can comment about relatively and most directly.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion did the Warren Commission have any initial factual
assumptions regarding the following areas: First, the identity of the assassin?
Mr. SPECTER. I think we did not have any initial assumptions. We read the
newspapers like anyone else did before any of us became associated with the
Commission but our job was to find the assassin. So we did not have any
prejudgment on that question.
Mr. KLEIN. As to the reliability, trustworthiness, and competency of the
investigative agencies which assisted the Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. We were concerned about some of the agencies from the point of view
that their own activities were the subject of investigation. So that was always
a matter of concern.
With respect to their capabilities, speaking for myself I had had experience
with the FBI and had found them to be able investigative personnel in my prior
contacts. I had never had prior experience with the Secret Service as I
recollect it but I had no reason to doubt their competency, except the President
was assassinated.
Mr. KLEIN. At the initial phases of the investigation you said you were aware of
the agency's possible involvement. What are you referring to?
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Mr. SPECTER. The Secret Service had the responsibility to protect the President
and they did not protect the President. So their procedures were obviously a
subject of investigation. The FBI had certain responsibilities in the field of
Presidential protection so that their activities were subject to scrutiny by the
Commission.
Mr. KLEIN. With regard to any initial factual assumptions that the Warren
Commission might have had, were there any regarding possible repercussions from
the various conclusions that might have been reached?
Mr. SPECTER. No, sir. That is speaking of any knowledge that I had about the
situation.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion what effect, if any, did the organization and
procedures have on the end result?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that the organizations and procedures were reasonably
calculated to produce reasonably accurate results, given the scope of the
investigation, the general time frame that the Commission had established. I
might say at the outset that in response to that question that my view is that
the Commission's conclusions have withstood the test of time to this point. I
believe the single bullet conclusion is sound, I believe Oswald was the
assassin.
With respect to an issue as to whether there was a conspiracy, the most that the
Commission could do was to survey all the evidence and based on the absence of
any evidence shoeing a conspiracy to conclude that there was no evidence of a
conspiracy. It is obviously impossible to prove a negative the same way that a
positive is proved. I have been concerned about some of the disclosures with
respect to the allegation about the FBI destroying a note from Oswald. I have
been concerned about the issue of CIA involvement in assassination plots against
Castro, and I have said publicly in the past, and I repeat today that I think
those specific leads ought to be inquired into.
I was hopeful that the Senate committee that was in this field 2 years ago would
have done that. I would be hopeful that this committee would do that. I did not
have a direct role in the areas relating to the investigation on conspiracy but
I have no reason to believe that there was a conspiracy. My own personal
observation is that had there been a conspiracy that it would most probably have
come to light prior to today given the institutions of our American democracy
and the wide-ranging investigations which have been made in this field.
I think as long as there is any indication that official agencies of the
Government like the FBI destroyed evidence or that the CIA was involved, at
least allegedly involved in the assassination plot against Castro, had any
effect on the assassination of President Kennedy, I think those are matters that
ought to be inquired into, but my own personal thought is that it will not
result in the change in the findings of the Commission. To come back to your
question, my view is that the Commission did a good job and that the
Commission's work has withstood the test of time and a great seal of scrutiny
and an enormous number of questions and a prodigious number of debates.
I think the questioning is all very healthy in a democratic society and I don't
think it is likely to put an end to any questions today, tomorrow, or in the
future, considering the fact that the Lincoln assassination is still under
investigation, and I have responded to questions
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over the years since the first questions were raised with Mr. Epstein's book and
thereafter, and I am glad to respond to the questions and I think the
Commission's work was good work.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you experience any restrictions on your investigation or on the
writeup of your investigation due to the organization and work procedures that
were used by the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. While I do not think it was the organizational procedures
themselves which imposed any restrictions on my work, the Commission made
decisions as to what would abe done which was not always in accordance with my
own personal view as to what should be done, for example, the review of the
X-rays and photographs of the assassination of President Kennedy. I thought that
they should have been observed by the Commission and by me among other perhaps
having responsibility for that are an I said so at the time.
I did not recollect the memorandum which you have made available to me today
where I pressed to have that done. I have said that publicly before. There were
some other areas where if I had been making the final decision for the
Commission I would have pursued investigative matter somewhat differently.
Mr. KLEIN. What are the areas?
Mr. SPECTER. Well, the concerns that I had, I would have questioned President
Johnson and Mrs. Johnson before the Commission and I prepared a long list of
questions to that effect. You have made them available to me. I have not seen
them since I worked with the Commission. I would have questioned Mrs. Kennedy
much more extensively than the abbreviated questioning which took place of Mrs.
Kennedy. Those items I would have done differently. I do not think they would
have affected the conclusions of the Commission at all but I think in the
interests of a full record and comprehensive examination of key witnesses at the
scene that such inquiries would have been preferable to the abbreviated
questioning of Mrs. Kennedy or the statements submitted by President Johnson and
Mrs. Johnson.
Mr. KLEIN. In the case of the questions that were not submitted, why in your
opinion weren't they submitted? Why weren't they asked?
Mr. SPECTER. As to Mrs. Kennedy, I believe that Attorney General Robert Kennedy
was very protective of her evidence because of the fact that the questioning was
held, as I recollect it, in her apartment and only the Chief Justice was present
with Mr. Rankin and it was very brief.
With respect to why President Johnson wasn't questioned, I suppose it is because
he was the President and didn't want to be questioned.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever told why he wasn't questioned?
Mr. SPECTER. No. I thought he should have been questioned and I submitted a long
list of questions and I recommended that he be questioned. Since I was assistant
counsel and he was the President I thought that was enough.
Mr. KLEIN. You never got anything back explaining why the decision was made not
to question him?
Mr. SPECTER. I don't believe so.
Mr. KLEIN. What procedures existed, if any, to allow staff members to keep
abreast of work being done by other staff members?
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Mr. SPECTER. As I recollect it, some of the written reports were circulated so
that we could read the interim reports and the final reports of the members of
the staff. There was a very formal atmosphere on the staff so that there was
constant contact among all the lawyers both during the working day and those of
us who were around the evenings, we would customarily have diner together, the
virtual was a very extensive exchange albeit principally informal among members
of the staff as to what each was doing.
Mr. KLEIN. What procedure existed to assure that staff members would receive all
information relative to the areas they worked with respect both to internal
documents or information from sources outside the Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. As I recollect it, the information was funneled to the individuals
in the various areas through Mr. Rankin who served as the conduit in many
directions, from the outside to the Commission, from the outside to the lawyers,
from the lawyers to the Commission, from the Commission to the lawyers, so that
when information would come in which would bear, for example, on area one, which
was my area, I would customarily receive it from Mr. Rankin, perhaps through Mr.
Eisenberg who was his executive assistant, and perhaps Mr. Willins who did a
great deal of the liaison work.
Mr. KLEIN. Was this procedure successful in you opinion? Do you feel that you
received all the information that should have gotten to you?
Mr. SPECTER. I have no reason to think that it was unsuccessful in any respect.
Mr. KLEIN. As a Warren Commission staff counsel what was your particular area of
responsibility?
Mr. SPECTER. My area was area one which involved the activities of the President
from the time he left the White House until he returned after his death to the
White House, with a principal focus on examination of the medical evidence, the
trajectory of the shots as they related to medical evidence. I would say that is
a brief description to the area of responsibility for area one.
Mr. KLEIN. Were their any changes in your duties as the investigation proceeded?
Mr. SPECTER. I was asked to take on certain other responsibilities such as the
questioning of witnesses, Oswald's capability as a marksman, I was asked to be
the Commission representative at the polygraph examination of Jack Ruby as a
result of my having been present at part of his testimony in Dallas. Without
reviewing the voluminous record in detail I think that comprehends generally
what my assignments were.
Mr. KLEIN. What was the relationship of the staff counsel with the Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. Cordial, somewhat limited.
Mr. KLEIN. Was there any exchange of ideas, free exchange of ideas between staff
counsel and the Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes. The Commissioners would come to headquarters from time to
time. When they would there were occasional conversations, initiated principally
by the Commissioners but in some
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instances by staff counsel. There were exchanges before and after sessions.
There were exchanges on trips. I made a trip with Chief Justice Warren from
Washington to Dallas and back to Washington where there were quite a number of
exchanges.
President Ford, then Congressman Ford, was present on that trip. I recollect
exchanges with him on that particular occasion. In terms of the setting which
would enable you to talk there were exchanges.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion were the Commissioners well informed about the facts
of this case?
Mr. SPECTER. I think generally, yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Will you tell us approximately how long you worked for the Warren
Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I recollect that I started sometime in early January 1964 and I
worked through to early June when I submitted my report and I worked principally
a 5-day week, occasionally less if I had some other responsibilities. I had some
carryover cases as assistant district attorney. Then I helped out intermittently
on the areas I identified, Oswald's capability as a marksman, taking some
testimony and going to Dallas with the Ruby polygraph as I recollect in July
1964. I am sure there are records which list every day because we were paid on a
daily basis.
Mr. KLEIN. From January to July did you consider this a full-time job?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; subject to doing some other things but I considered it my
principal occupation, my principal responsibility.
Mr. KLEIN. In your areas of investigation which you have told us about, were you
able to reasonably explore and resolve all the viable questions?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that I was, and we were subject to the limitations that I
have already articulated for you about the X-rays and photographs and perhaps
the testimony from President and Mrs. Johnson and fuller testimony from Mrs.
Kennedy.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you have enough time to investigate the areas you were
responsible for?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that we did. The attitude with respect to time perhaps
should be viewed in November of 1977 as being somewhat different from 1964 to
the extent that the Commission was interested in a prompt conclusion of its
work. It did not seek to sacrifice completeness for promptness, but it was very
cognizant of the desirability of promptness. When the Commission started its
job, there was no conclusion date picked.
My recollection is that it was discussed in terms of perhaps as little as 3
months, perhaps as much as 6 months. As we moved along in the investigation,
there were comments or attitudes that we should be moving along, we should get
the investigation concluded, so that the scope of what we sought to do and the
time in which we sought to do it had as its backdrop an obvious attitude by the
Commission that it wanted to conclude the investigation at the earliest possible
date.
Mr. KLEIN. From whom in particular did these comments come, about moving along
and getting the investigation done?
Mr. SPECTER. It is not possible some 13 years later to identify specific
comments but that was an attitude from the Chief Justice Warren who
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was a fine administrator and an extraordinary person that I think did a superb
job on the Commission. I do not mean to suggest that his interest in expediting
the investigation in any way reflected an attitude on his part to have
shortcuts, but we worked to get with it and we worked hard to get it done.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you feel that you were able to do everything that you wanted to
do in the areas that you were investigating?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; subject to the limitations that I have already described to
you. There was a fair amount of independence exercised by some of us on the
staff that exhibited itself in perhaps small ways. In questioning some of the
witnesses in my area, I would ask questions which I recognized would be unlikely
to draw very specific answers but which I thought were important for the record,
questions such as:
To the best of your ability to recollect, what was the lapse of time within the
first shot and second shot; to the best of your recollection, what was the
elapse of time between the second shot and third shot? To the best of your
ability to recollect, what was the distance traveled from the first shot to the
second shot?
These questions, and I have not reviewed the transcript before coming here today
because the parameters you and I discussed was to be on procedure and not on
substance and there is not time to review the substantive work in the course of
a few days between the time you asked me to appear here and the time I am here,
but I make references to those portions of the questioning, as I recollect it,
and there was an overriding feeling that many of those questions could not
produce sufficiently specific answers to warrant the questions.
There was an attitude on my part, and I think on the part of other lawyers, we
were going to ask the questions for the record.
If some of the Commissioners thought we went too slow, so be it. I recall the
Chief Justice starting the questioning of Mrs. Connally after I questioned
Governor Connally, saying that the questioning would be brief. I proceeded with
the questioning in a way I thought was adequate, but I was mindful of the fact
that the Chief Justice who would have conducted the questioning differently if
he had been the questioner.
Mr. KLEIN. Were any political pressures applied to prevent you from thoroughly
considering all the issues in your area of responsibility?
Mr. SPECTER. No.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion, did you have adequate support with respect to
research and with respect to investigators in your area?
Mr. SPECTER. I think we did although I must say that as I watched CBS's seek
major analysis of our work and they talked about various scientific devices that
can be applied to the film, I watched those TV shows with the great and personal
attention to see if they had found some procedures and techniques that were not
present in 1964 or perhaps some procedure and techniques that were present in
1964 that I didn't know about or when we discussed the triangulation of
photographs which you and I talked about in my office during a brief interview
the week before last, I wondered if there were some techniques that might have
been applied that we didn't apply. But within the scope of what my knowledge was
at the time and what techniques were called to my attention, I believe that we
had adequate backup facilities.
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Mr. KLEIN. Were you told that you could have free rein as far s techniques
performed in your area of responsibility?
Mr. SPECTER. I don't believe anybody ever said, "You have free rein." But when a
suggestion would be made it was always dealt with as if we had free rein to make
whatever suggestion we chose. In the context of specific requests some tugs were
pulled. There was some reluctance to having onsite tests in Dallas in late May
1964. A number of us on the staff were very insistent upon that. It was not too
big a battle. We got the tests.
Mr. KLEIN. How did you come to the conclusion that a single bullet hit both
President Kennedy and Governor Connally?
Mr. SPECTER. Is that a procedural question or substantive question?
Mr. KLEIN. You don't have to go into specific facts but tell us how you came to
that conclusion.
Mr. SPECTER. That conclusion was reached because of the evidence which showed
that the bullet entered the back of the President's neck and did not strike any
solid subject in the President's body and exited from the front of his throat,
creasing his tie where a tear was found in his tie, and from the lineup of the
President's body and the position of Governor Connally and the position of the
limousine, that a bullet existing from the President's throat with the velocity
calculated would be ballistic evidence showing that the bullet found on the
stretcher, believed to be Connally's , and the large fragments in the front seat
of the limousine conclusively having come from the weapon identified as being
Oswald's, which have us our basis for calculating velocity, that such a bullet
would have had to have struck either someone else in the car or the car itself,
and the evidence shoed that the car itself was not struck, and Governor Connally
was seated immediately in front of President Kennedy, which led to the inference
that the bullet most probably struck Governor Canaille. The wounds on Governor
Canaille were consistent with the bullet which had a slight yaw on it and the
tests performed on the anesthetized goats were consistent with a bullet losing
substantial velocity in tumbling through Governor Connally's chest and
consistent with passing through Governor Connally's wrist backward and then,
velocity almost spent, lodging in Governor connally's left thigh. So the facts
that we found were all consistent with the single bullet conclusion.
But the most persuasive evidence was the alinement of the President, the
trajectory of the bullet and the necessity for the bullet to have hit either
someone or someone in the car in the absence of having struck the car.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today do you believe that President Kennedy and
Governor Connally were hit by one bullet?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. What experts ere consulted in determining this?
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Klein, that is definitely substantive.
Mr. KLEIN. I am not asking for names. I am asking what types of experts were
consulted?
Mr. SPECTER. Well, we consulted, we took testimony from doctors in Parkland
Hospital who worked on the President and Governor and autopsy surgeons and from
Colonel Finck who was an expert although
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not, as I recollect it, I am not sure as I say this, whether he was at the
autopsy or not, I believe he was but I am not sure, and from some experts at
Edgewood Arsenal.
I don't recall others but I have not reviewed the report with a view to being
able to recite the experts who were consulted.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall Commission exhibit 399 which has been called the
"pristine bullet"?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I do.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you fully satisfied that exhibit 399 is the bullet that went
through the President and the Governor?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I am, the President's neck and the Governor.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion in Commission exhibit 399 had been discovered on the
President's stretcher and not on Governor Connally's stretcher would the single
bullet theory, have any validity?
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. KLEIN, you are going far beyond procedure, far beyond what we
talked bout before.
Mr. KLEIN. I don't see this as calling for a particular---
Mr. SPECTER. It requires some recollection and some thought. You asked if the
bullet was found on the President's stretcher? The thoughts that are running
through my mind at the moment are what proximity Governor Connally had to the
President's stretcher so that the bullet which ended up in his thigh, whether or
not that could have been moved or ended up on the President's stretcher or what
the personnel at Parkland might have done with the bullet as it came from the
Governor's body or from his clothing, that is a question that would require a
good bit or more thought than I would care to give it on the spur of the moment.
That was not a question that you and I discussed.
Mr. KLEIN. That is right. That particular question we did not discuss.
Mr. SPECTER. I believe the evidence is very persuasive that the bullet did not
come from President Kennedy's stretcher. I say that only from recollection
because I believe that all of the linens were taken from President Kennedy's
stretcher after he died and the controversy as to which stretcher it came from,
I think it in no way came form the President's stretcher as I recollect the
evidence. It is a long time ago and it was involved.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion if the single bullet theory was not valid could there
still have been only one shooter.
Mr. Specter. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you agree that the alleged murder weapon, the Mannlicher-Carcano
rifle, has not been fired twice in less than 2.3 seconds?
Mr. SPECTER. My recollection is that the investigation showed that the shots he
fired were within 2.3 seconds so that three shots would be fired in 4.6 seconds.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think there was enough time from your viewing of the film and
other evidence you saw, enough time so that the Governor and the President could
have been hit by two bullets and that Oswald would have had enough time to fire
his rifle in that space of time?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; it is entirely possible that President Kennedy was struck in
the neck by a bullet which was fired before President
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Kennedy went behind the tree and that Governor Connally was struck by a bullet
while the President and the Governor were behind a sign, so that the single
bullet conclusion in my judgment is not all dispensable to the single assassin
theory. I don't think that is the way it happened.
I don't think the single bullet theory, that is to say I do not think that they
were struck by separate bullets with respect to the President's neck wounds and
the wounds on governor Connally but I think they could have been struck by
separate bullets, all fired by Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall that Mr. Darrell C. Tomlinson was the man who found the
bullet, exhibit 399 in Parkland Hospital?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall at what point in the development of the bullet theory
you first spoke to Mr. Tomlinson?
Mr. SPECTER. You mentioned his testimony yesterday, so I read the testimony on
the train. The first and only time I talked with Mr. Tomlinson is when I took
the deposition. I talked to him briefly before I took the deposition and when I
took the deposition.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall at what point in time, in relation to then the one
bullet theory was formulated, you decided that one bullet hit the President and
the Governor?
Mr. Specter. That is another question which you didn't discuss with me before
and that is a question which requires a fair amount of reconstruction.
Mr. KLEIN. I did mention this question to you yesterday.
Mr. SPECTER. You mentioned to me you were going to ask me about Tomlinson and
when I first talked to him but not about when the single bullet theory was
formulated.
The answer to the last question that you have asked as to when the single bullet
theory evolved required a very careful reconstruction of the time sequence,
principally starting with the interviews with Commander Humes and his testimony
and the evidence which evolved, the Gregory testimony and the Gregory Humes
report. That is not a question that can be answered on the spur of the moment.
That will require a very careful reconstruction of the time sequence where that
evidence was uncovered.
Mr KLEIN. Were you the Warren Commission's staff member most directly concerned
with the autopsy findings?
Mr. SPECTER. I think so. I think others doubtless read the reports and were
conversant with it but I say that I believe I was, based on the fact that I took
the testimony of Boswell and Humes.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified that you spoke to the autopsy doctors?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir, before I took their testimony.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you speak to any other forensic pathology experts?
Mr. SPECTER. On this case?
Mr. KLEIN. On this case.
MR. SPECTER. Prior to the time I did my work on the Warren Commission?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes; in relation to this.
Mr. SPECTER. There have been a lot of discussions about this case over the
course of the past 13 years. But to deal with the question as
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to whether I talked to any other forensic pathologist prior to coming to the
conclusions in writing my section of the draft report, I believe that I did not.
Mr. KLEIN. You also testified that you did not have an opportunity to review the
photographs and the X-rays pertaining to the President's wounds?
Mr. SPECTER. I certainly have.
Mr. KLEIN. Could you explain the reasons given to you as to why you could not
view those X-rays and photographs?
Mr. SPECTER. I do not know here again that anybody ever said what the reasons
were. I do know that I wanted to see them and there is a memorandum, which I
just looked at this morning, which I am very delighted to see in the files,
about my pressing to see it.
Reconstructing the reasons as best I can at this point, I believe it was, and I
have said this publicly before, an attitude on the part of the Kennedy family
that it might be possible that the photographs and X-rays would get into the
public domain and the photographs would defile the memory and image of President
Kennedy as a vibrant young leader and it would be ghoulish to show him in the
picture with half his head blown off. That was the reason why I was not
permitted to see them, as a speculation or a feel for the situation.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that these documents be marked as committee
exhibits.
Mr. PREYER. Did you want the one dated April 30th marked exhibit 1---
Mr. SPECTER. Are those the papers you gave me today?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection the two exhibits will be marked was exhibits 11
and 12 and entered into the record at this point.
[The following exhibits 11 and 12 were received in evidence.]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 11
[MEMORANDUM]
APRIL 30, 1964.
To: Mr. J. Lee Rankin.
From: Arlen Specter.
Subject: Autopsy photographs and X-rays of President John F. Kennedy.
In my opinion it is indispensable that we obtain the photographs and X-rays of
President Kennedy's autopsy for the following reasons:
1. The Commission should determine with certainty whether the shots came from
the rear.--Someone from the Commission should review the films to corroborate
the autopsy surgeons' testimony that the holes on the President's back and head
had the characteristics of points of entry. None of the doctors at Parkland
Hospital in Dallas observed the hole in the President's back or the small hole
in the lower portion of his head. With all of the outstanding controversy about
the direction of the shots, there must be independent viewings of the films to
verify testimony which has come only from Government doctors.
2. The Commission should determine with certainty whether the shots came from
above.--It isd essential for the Commission to know precisely the location of
the bullet wound on the President's back so that the angle may be calculated.
The artist's drawing prepared at Bethesda (Commission exhibit No. 385) shows a
slight angle of declination. It is hard, if not impossible, to explain such a
slight angle of decline unless the President was farther down Elm Street than we
have heretofore believed. Before coming to any conclusion on this, the angles
will have to be calculated at the scent; and for this, the exact point of entry
should be known.
3. The Commission should determine with certainty that there are no major
variations between the films and the artist's drawings.--Commission exhibits
Nos.
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385, 386 and 388 were made from the recollections of the autopsy surgeons as
told to the artist. Some day someone may compare the films with the artist's
drawings and find a significant error which might substantially affect the
essential testimony and the Commissions' conclusions. In any event, the
Commission should not rely on hazy recollections, especially in view of the
statement in the autopsy report (Commission exhibit No. 387) that:
"The complexity of these fractures and the fragments thus produced tax
satisfactory verbal description and are better appreciated in photographs and
roentgenograms which are prepared."
When Inspector Kelly talked to Attorney General Kennedy, he most probably did
not fully understand all the reasons for viewing the films. According to
Inspector Kelly, the Attorney general did not categroically decline to make them
available, but only wanted to be satisfied that they were really necessary. I
suggest that the Commission transmit to the Attorney General its reasons for
wanting the films and the assurance that they will be viewed only by the
absolute minimum number of people from the Commission for the sole purpose of
corroborating (or correcting) the artist's drawings, with the films not to
become a part of the Commission's records.
JFK EXHIBIT No. 12
[Memorandum]
MAY 12, 1964.
To: Mr. J. Lee Rankin.
From: Arlan Specter.
Subject: Examination of autopsy photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy.
When the autopsy photographs and X-rays are examined, we should be certain to
determine the following:
1. The photographs and X-rays confirm the precise location of the entrance wound
in the back of the head depicted in Commission exhibits 386 and 388.
2. The photographs and X-rays confirm the precise location of the wound of
entrance of the upper back of the President as depicted in Commission exhibits
385 and 386.
3. The photographs and X-rays confirm the precise area of the President's skull
which was disrupted by the bullet when it exited as depicted in Commission
Exhibit 388.
4. The characterisitcs of the wounds on the President's back and on the back of
his head should be examined closely in the photographs and X-rays to determine
for certain whether they are characteristic of entrance wounds under the
criteria advanced by Doctors Finck, Humes, Boswell, gregory, Shaw, Perry and
Carrico.
The films and X-rays should be viewed in conjunction with Commission exhibit 389
(a photograph of the frame of the Zapruder film immediately before the frame
showing the head wound) and Commission exhibit 390 (the frame of the Zapruder
film showing the head wound) to determine for certain whether the angle of
declination is accurately depicted in commission exhibit 388.
I suggest that we have a court reporter present so that we may examine Dr. Humes
after the X-rays and photographs are reviewed to put on the record:
1. Any changes in his testimony or theories required by a review of the X-rays
and films, and
2. Corroboration of the portions or all of his prior testimony which may be
confirmed by viewing the photographs and X-rays.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Specter, you have before you a copy of the memorandum dated April
30, 1964, to Mr. Rankin from Arlen Specter and the memorandum dated May 12,
1964, to Mr. Rankin from Arlen Specter.
Mr. SPECTER. I have two such memoranda you gave me shortly before I testified
today.
Mr. KLEIN. Have you had an opportunity to read those memoranda?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I did.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall writing them?
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Mr. SPECTER. Very vaguely. I have no doubt that I did write them. But in direct
response to your question do I remember writing these memoranda, very vaguely.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it fair to say that the memorandum of April 30 expresses your
opinion that in order for the Commission to determine with certainty that the
shots came from the rear, that the shots came from above, and that there are no
variations between the films and the artist's drawings that it would be
necessary to obtain the autopsy X-rays and photographs?
Mr. SPECTER. As you phrase the question permit me to read the memorandum please.
Your question was necessary, indispensable?
Mr. KLEIN. To the Commission in order to determine with certainty.
Mr. SPECTER. The thought running through my mind, why I wanted to read it, is
whether it was indispensable or only desirable. Let me pause a moment and reread
it.
I believe that it was necessary for the Commission to determine with certainty
the direction of the shots, which is what is said here on No. 1, that "The
Commission should determine with certainty whether the shots came from the rear"
and No. 2, "The Commission should determine with certainty whether the shots
came from above," and also 3, "The Commission should determine with certainty
there are no major variations between the films and the artist's drawings."
I believe that it was highly desirable for the X-rays and photographs to be
viewed to corroborate the testimony of the autopsy surgeons. I was overruled on
the request that I made to see them in drafting my own portion of the report.
My own feel for the situation at this moment, with what has been publicly
disclosed, that their have been independent viewings of the photos and X-rays,
is that they do corroborate the testimony of the autopsy surgeons. I did not
doubt the veracity of the autopsy surgeons when they testified because I believe
they are truthful men. I also felt that they would not be motivated to lie
because they didn't know whether the photos and X-rays were going to be viewed
that should have been done.
I do not think that the X-rays and films were indispensable for the Commission
to reach the conclusion because it had a final judgment to make on what evidence
it would hear.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you now disagree with part of this memorandum--
Mr. SPECTER. No, sir, I don't disagree with any part of the memo.
Mr. KLEIN. "--in my opinion it is indispensable that we obtain the photographs
and X-rays of President Kennedy's autopsy for the following reasons:" You say
now it wasn't indispensable?
Mr. SPECTER. Well, I think from my own personal point of view that the
investigation should not have been closed and the conclusion should not have
been reached and I did not want to come to final conclusions without seeing the
X-rays and photographs. So from my point of view, indispensable is not too
strong a word. As I reread this memo from 13-plus years ago, I was pushing the
Commission to let me see the photos and X-rays. But I cannot say that the
Commission was
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derelict in its duty in coming to a conclusion as to what it wanted to see other
than my own thoughts on the subject.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion as the staff member most directly concerned with the
autopsy findings were you able to adequately investigate this aspect of the case
without seeing those X-rays and photographs and having them evaluated by an
independent forensic pathology expert?
Mr. SPECTER. I can only repeat what I have already said to you on that subject.
I considered it something that I wanted to do. Having been overruled on an
opportunity to look at the photos and X-rays, I then functioned with the
evidence which I had.
Mr. KLEIN. I understand that, I understand you went along, the decision was made
and you accepted that, but in your opinion could you adequately investigate that
area without having the X-rays and photographs evaluated?
Mr. SPECTER. I think there was sufficient factual basis for me as an
investigator to reach a conclusion on the evidence which I had which is what I
did. I then came back to analyze some of the credibility of Boswell, Humes, and
finck, and I believe that they were honest and I concluded that their testimony
was a sufficient factual basis for the conclusions I wrote in my recommendation.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it fair to say that when you evaluated their credibility, you
considered whether they were telling the truth as opposed to whether they were
telling the truth as opposed to whether they could have made a technical error
which you would not be able to know, not having seen any of the autopsy
photographs?
Mr. SPECTER. I based it on their honesty and also on their ability to observe
and upon the records which they had an opportunity to make. All those factors in
my judgment justified my conclusion that their recounting of the facts was
correct.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that the doctors themselves had not seen the X-rays and
photographs at the time they spoke to you?
Mr. SPECTER. I believe that is in the record. I believe that they testified to
that effect, but I do not know that because I have not reviewed it.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the FBI report issued on December 9, 1963, and
the supplementary FBI report issued on January 13, 1964, both stated that the
first bullet that hit the President did not exit from his body?
Mr. SPECTER. You and I discussed that when we met the week before last, and I do
believe that the FBI report so stated but I have no firm recollection of that at
this time.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any recollection as to whether you were able to resolve
this discrepancy, considering that the FBI reports came out after the doctor's
autopsy report had been written? Do you have any recollection of that?
Mr. SPECTER. My recollection is that we investigated it and the conclusion we
came to was that the FBI report was written based upon the comments made in the
course of the autopsy before the autopsy surgeons knew there had been a bullet
hole in front of the President's neck, so their early speculation was that the
bullet penetrated the back of President Kennedy's neck, and they speculated, we
believe, that the bullet was forced out under pressure by external heart
massage. When
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they proceeded with the autopsy examination and found the path through the
President's neck and talked to Dr. Perry, saw the bullet hole in the throat,
that conditional speculation was rejected, but it found its way in the FBI
report.
But that is largely reconstruction, largely speculation, on my part, I say that
to this committee in an effort to shed what light I can on a possible
explanation of it.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall whether you were satisfied with the explanation?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I was satisfied that the bullet which entered the back of the
President's neck went all the way through and exited in front of his neck. It
was not forced out by external heart massage.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today, do you think it would be useful to form a
panel composed of the top forensic pathologists in this country and to allow
them to review the medical report and write a report telling of their findings?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I think this would be useful. There is enough public question
about the whole subject so that considering all the other matters which were
inquired into, that that would come very high on the list of priorities. I would
certainly not only have no objection but would welcome that kind of review.
Mr. KLEIN. What predispositions, if any, did you have toward the intelligence
agencies--I refer to the FBI, CIA, and the Secret Service--prior to working for
the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. As I testified earlier, my experience with the FBI had been that
they were competent investigators. I had had no prior contact with the Secret
Service that I can recollect, or the CIA. So I really had no predisposition. I
had an open mind.
Mr. KLEIN. As to the FIG with whom you did have some prior contacts, did your
opinion of them change during the course of the investigation?
Mr. SPECTER. I thought that the people who worked with the Commission from the
FBI were very able people. They sent us, I suspected, their very best. I
suspected the ones we saw on the Commission were not typical of the FBI, they
were really good. I am talking about the men on the investigation.
Mr. KLEIN. As to them your opinion didn't change?
Mr. SPECTER. I just stated the specifics. I thought they were good before they
started. I thought they sent the very best in the course of the investigation. I
thought they had some very good men. I did not deal with any of the note
destroyers or allegations of that, I worked with the technician.
Mr. KLEIN. Will you describe the attitude of the Warren Commission toward each
of the intelligence agencies; that is, how did the Warren Commission view them
and how in your opinion did these agencies view the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I have really no ideal how the agencies viewed the Warren
Commission. I can tell you that I thought the Secret Service men were a good
group and were trying to be helpful, the ones I questioned. I have already
testified about the FBI people, and my contacts with the investigative agencies
were limited to having technical assistance in those areas and questioning the
Secret Service people at the scene.
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I did not get involved in areas on foreign travel, foreign contacts, or CIA at
all.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the individual agencies you might have worked with, was
there any kind of feeling for how higher-ups of these agencies viewed the Warren
Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I really have no basis to testify about how those agencies viewed
the Warren Commission except from the contact I had with the specific agencies,
and they were courteous and very cooperative on matters where I dealt with them.
Mr. KLEIN. Was there a general attitude that the Warren Commission had toward
the intelligence agencies?
Mr. SPECTER. I really have no basis to testify on that.
Mr. KLEIN. No remarks, no memos, you might have seen that would reflect whether
there was some kind of attitude "We can trust these people," "We can't trust
these people," or anything like that?
Mr. SPECTER. I really was not privy to any such material during the course of my
work for the Warren Commission. The one thought which comes to my mind is on
Jack Ruby's polygraph examination. My suggestion was to have an independent
agency do the polygraph. It ended up with the FBI, a very able fellow. Most of
the time we figured the polygraph was never going to be taken. There were
objections from Ruby's lawyers. That is the only item that comes to my mind as
to the Commission's response to the other Federal agencies.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know if the intelligence agencies intentionally withheld any
information from the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. Nothing which came to my attention that information was withheld.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that FBI agent Hosty's name was not initially given to
the Warren Commission in the list of notebook entries, Oswald's notebook
entries?
Mr. SPECTER. I have a vague recollection about that but I had no responsibility
for that area and did not become involved in it.
Mr. KLEIN. You have no direct knowledge as a member of the Commission of any
international withholding of information form the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I have no direct knowledge and came into contact with no evidence
of any withholding of information by any Federal Agency from the Warren
Commission that I can recollect.
Mr. KLEIN. The only knowledge that you did have is from the newspapers? Is that
what you're saying?
Mr. SPECTER. That is all.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, did any of these intelligence agencies ever
intentionally delay providing the Warren Commission with any information?
Mr. SPECTER. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, did any intelligence agency ever intentionally
provide the Warren Commission with false or misleading information?
Mr. SPECTER. Not to my knowledge.
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Mr. KLEIN. do you recall what the procedures ere to obtain information from the
intelligence agencies?
Mr. SPECTER. As I recollect it, a request would be made by assistant counsel and
it would be funneled through Mr. Rankin He would make the request, he would get
the information back and disseminate it to assistant counsel.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware of any problems that were experienced in obtaining
information from intelligence agencies?
Mr. SPECTER. I do not recollect having any problem, myself. I would only have
the haziest thought in mind that some of the other lawyers may have made
requests which mr. Rankin or others may have raised some questions about but it
could not specify any such instance and could rally only testify about my own
activities. I recollect no instances where I asked for anything that I did not
get from any intelligence agencies. I again point out that the area I worked on
did not turn information from Federal agencies.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you testify to the fact that you read about CIA training troops
in Cuba and that wasn't given to the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. I did not testify about reading CIA training in cuba. I testified
there were press reports that CIA may have been involved in an attempt to
assassinate Castro.
Mr. KLEIN. Excuse me. You testified that you read press reports that the CIA may
have been involved in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Have you ever read
or heard that the CIA had been training troops to invade Cuba?
Mr. SPECTER. I don't recall whether I have ever heard about that. It might have
in the newspapers at some time. Certainly I have no recollection of having heard
about that prior to the time the Warren Commission work was concluded.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any knowledge or have you ever heard information to the
effect that an FBI agent in Dallas destroyed a note given to the FBI by Lee
Harvey Oswald a short time before the assassination?
Mr. SPECTER. Only what I read in the newspapers many months ago.
Mr. KLEIN. If that were true, in your opinion would knowledge of this
information have affected the Warren Commission investigation in a significant
way?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that the Warren Commission would have wanted to have known
all about that. To that extent it would have been significant.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it have affected the investigation in terms of assignments, in
terms of actual investigation that was done?
Mr. SPECTER. Speaking for myself, if I had known that an agent for the FBI had
destroyed a note of Oswald's I would have wanted to know every aspect of that
destruction, who did it, who authorized it, and those people would very
definitely be suspect in my mind and I would not give them any responsibility
for any investigation that I was part of. How far it went in the FBI I do not
know. I give my personal view. What the Commission would have done I can only
speculate
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about. I wouldn't do business with anybody who was a party to an incident of
that kind.
Mr. KLEIN. Certain avenues might have been opened if this information had been
turned over?
Mr. SPECTER. I can't answer that question more fully than I have.
Mr. KLEIN. Regarding the assertion that the CIA was involved in the attempt to
assassinate Castro, if that information had been given to the Warren Commission
would that have affected the investigation.
Mr. SPECTER. I started off volunteering as I did early on that the question
about the assassination attempt on castro and the FBI destruction of the note
are two questions which concerned me enormously as a citizen and events which
the Commission would have known about and questions which I hope this committee
will get to the bottom of.
Mr. KLEIN. What I am asking is not only looking at it from the point of view of
the reliability of the agencies for not giving that information but looking at
it from the point of view of the course of the investigation, would that have
been affected? Do you have any opinion as to whether the course of the
investigation would have been affected had this information been known?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that if there had been information known to the Commission
about a possible assassination effort on Castro by the CIA, that the Commission
would have looked into it. It would have followed those facts to see if there
was any connection with the Kennedy assassination.
I say that. That is an obvious sort of conclusion. Neither of those two matters
bears on the scope of the investigation which I was responsible for.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any opinion as to what motivated the intelligence
agencies to withhold information from the Warren Commission.
Mr. SPECTER. Only the rankest speculation, a private citizen's speculation.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion did the fact that prior to the information of the
Warren Commission the FBI had already issued a final report in which they
concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin affect the investigation
in any way?
Mr. SPECTER. Mr Klein, you are going far from procedure which is what I came
here to testify about. Let me try to deal with the question. I think that the
Commission set out to make an independent determination as to who the assassin
was. I cannot say that the identification of the news media of Oswald as the
assassin, the identification by the FBI, did not have some imprint, however
moderate, on my own thinking. I do know that the FBI report said that the first
bullet hit the President's neck, the second bullet hit the Governor, the third
bullet the President's back. I find the fact to the contrary.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion were the FBI agents you worked with, open to the
proposition that the FBI report could have been wrong when it concluded that
Oswald was the lone assassin?
Mr. SPECTER. I do not recall discussing the FBI report or having any interest in
what the FBI had to say.
Mr. KLEIN. In the investigation that they were performing for you, did you ever
have the feeling that in their minds the question was already resolved?
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Mr. SPECTER. I do not recollect being concerned with what was in their minds. I
was focusing on what I thought the facts showed. I do recall asking some of
their people questions relating to the probabilities of the one bullet theory
and some of their agents agreed with them. So to the extent the FBI agents
disagree with the early FBI report.
Mr. PREYER. I might ask one or two procedural questions Mr. Specter, for my own
understanding. As I understand it, the organization was set up so that there
were senior counsel. Were there four senior counsel?
Mr. SPECTER. There were six senior counsel, counting Mr. Rankin as one of the
senior counsel.
Mr. PREYER. Each one had a junior counsel working with him?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. You were junior counsel to Mr. Adams?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Adams is a very distinguished lawyer and obviously was a very
busy one. Is it really fair to say you ended up as the only counsel in my area.
Mr. PREYER. Did Mr. Adams come to do anything?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes. Mr. Adams was with the Commission on a number of occasions. We
did consult on some of the work of the Commission, but it was necessary for him
to become inactive at a fairly early stage, but he did some things.
Mr. PREYER. He was present at interviewing some of the witnesses, hearing
testimony?
Mr. SPECTER. I do not recollect his being present, interviewing witnesses. That
was something we didn't do a great deal of. The record will show, I believe, he
was present when the autopsy surgeons were questioned, but I have not reviewed
the record.
Mr. PREYER. He was in on the early stages but was not able to do much after the
first months, say?
Mr. SPECTER. I would say that he worked beyond the first month but precisely
when he discontinued his activities I am not sure. I think that would be
reflected on the Commission payroll because he was paid on a per diem basis. I
would be sure he would not have put in for per diem if he was not active.
Mr. PREYER. On the question of testimony of witnesses I understand that the
Commission and the staff, more accurately I should say the staff, took direct
testimony of 94 witnesses and interviewed some 300 witnesses or 400. When you
took the direct testimony of witnesses, were Commission members ever present or
was this all done by the staff?
Mr. SPECTER. There were two procedures. One was when the testimony was before
the Commission itself in which event at least one Commission member would have
had to be present. There was a second procedure which we denominated for
depositions where there was no Commissioner present, where verbatim testimony
under oath was taken. There were other procedures, for example, where we took
affidavits.
There were a number of way to acquire the evidence.
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Mr. PREYER. On the question of having enough time, I believe Mr. Rankin in May
instructed the lawyers to complete their summary of the case by June 1. I
believe you are the only one who had your work completed by that time?
Mr. SPECTER. I think that is right.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. I want to say I think the memos in the file reflect very
credibly on you and very favorably on your diligence and efforts to produce a
complete investigation.
Mr. SPECTER. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Stokes.
Mr. STOKES. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, at this time.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Specter, in response to questions from counsel as to what the objectives of
the Commission were as you recall, you gave rather categorical answers on your
view that the objective was not to allay public fears, was not to prevent an
international crisis, and was not to allow a smooth transition in national
leadership You then stated that there was concern for promptness in your
determination. What reasons were given for the promptness in your determination
and by whom?
Mr. SPECTER. I is hard to specify the people or Commissioners who were pushing
for a prompt conclusion, but that was an unmistakable aspect of the atmosphere
of the Commission's work. As I noted a few moments ago, Mr. Rankin set a date of
June 1 for completion of our draft reports. I do not recollect at this time that
there had been an earlier date or not. As I testified earlier, it was originally
thought that the investigation might terminate in as little as 3 months.
The Chief Justice was a very strong force on the Commission and was interested
in receiving periodic reports or documents showing the progress of the
Commission work. So that all of us knew that it was a goal to work with the
staff but at the same time to do a thorough job. No one ever said sacrifice
thoroughness for speed.
Mr. FAUNTROY. But promptness for promptness' sake, not for any other objective
or reason that you recall?
Mr. SPECTER. When I say promptness, I mean that the Commission had been given a
job by the President, it was an important job, but the most important aspect of
our job was to find the truth and do a thorough investigation. If there had been
any fact which had been uncovered which would have been inconsistent or which
had promoted an international incident, I can tell you categorically I would not
have stood by subvert any fact, and I don't think anybody else on the Commission
would have. The Chief Justice was a man of tremendous stature and tremendous
presence in the work of this Commission, as were Senator Russell, Senator Cooper
and Congressman Ford, Congressman Bogs, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Dulles. But the Chief
Justice was an overriding strong force and had a presence and a stature of
tremendous integrity.
That was what we were doing. The Chief Justice told a story, which has been in
the press. When the entire staff came together he told how
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President Johnson had finally persuaded him to take on the chairmanship of the
Commission and how he had first been approached by two of the other members of
the Justice Department and turned the matter down. The President said to the
Chief Justice--and I presume you gentlemen have had access to this, as I
recollect it, and it has been a long time ago--he said to Chief Justice Warren,
"Would you put on your country's uniform in time of national emergency if your
Commander in Chief asked you to do so?"
The Chief Justice said, "I would." President Johnson said, "Well, you Commander
in Chief is asking you to do so." The Chief Justice said, "OK; I will do it."
He had been unwilling to do it earlier for Judge Roberts in the Pearl Harbor
matter, but when President johnson told him that way, he said he would do it.
Chief Justice Warren had an international reputation. There were lots of rumors
that we were all concerned about whether Oswald had anything to do with the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee and whether Oswald's travels in Russia had anything to
do with it. But the people who were there, from the youngest lawyer all the way
up to the Chief Justice were dedicated to finding the truth. i can speak about
that unequivocally so far as I am concerned.
I have that view of everybody who worked on the Commission.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I share your respect for Chief Justice Warren, although I still
don['t get a feel for the desire for promptness in your determination. You don't
recall any reasons for that?
Mr. SPECTER. The best I can tell you is that they were periodic comments in the
media about when is the Commission going to finish its work? Everybody had
things they wanted to return to. We were a temporary agency. Mr. Russell wanted
to get on with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was very much current.
Everybody had other things they wanted to do. We had a Presidential mandate to
finish the report. When they gave me deadlines I really did not question too
much about it. I went to work to meet the deadline.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I was very much impressed with the memos which you sent to your
chief counsel and found the indispensable nature of the determination that you
felt the Commission should make very reasonable. I would like for you to review
with us again what reasons were given to you as a responsible person for this
area of the investigation for not having access to the X-rays and the pictures?
Are there any reasons beyond those which I heard you give in respect to the
sensitivity of the family?
Mr. SPECTER. That was the only reason which was ever alluded to for not seeing
X-rays and photographs.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The fear that you would not protect, you as the person responsible
for determination with respect to the validity of the---
Mr. SPECTER. I would not say so much me personally. I don't think anybody
thought I was going to take them to the Washington Post. But there was a feeling
that if they got into the hands of the Commission staff members that there would
be a material risk that they would get into the public domain. I do not
understand to this day what role Burke Marshall has on the photograph and X-rays
or what the status of them is at the present time.
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I was discussing with Mr. Klein, and I perhaps should not digress since I am so
anxious to go, what the status was with respect to your seeing them, or your
pathologist. It seems to me, and I have the greatest respect for the Kennedy
family, but the Kennedy family always have had too much authority over X-rays
and pictures as they relate to tangible pieces of evidence in this case. I feel
strongly about that to this minute as I did back in 1964.
Mr. FAUNTROY. finally, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to prolong this, but you also
experienced some frustrations apparently with respect to your desire to question
both Mrs. kennedy and President Johnson and while you indicated you have some
very specific questions you felt would have assisted you in the conduct of the
investigation, your failure to be able to ask those questions did not in your
judgment substantially affect the conclusions which you reached?
Mr. SPECTER. I think the conclusions would have been the same, but Mrs. Kennedy
was the closest person to the victim, President Kennedy. I thought she should
have been questioned. My view is that no witness is above the reach of the law
to provide evidence. Every man's testimony is available to the court or to a
proceeding here or in a court room or in any sort of judicial or congressional
determination.
I don't think Mrs. Kennedy was above that one iota, nor President Johnson. I
don't think President Johnson had anything to do with the assassination of
President Kennedy but I do not think that would have been an inappropriate
question to ask him notwithstanding the fact that he was the President.
I looked those over on the train this morning, whether he knew of any
conversation or any event that in any way bore of the assassination of president
Kennedy, I think those questions should all have been asked.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it you do have your notes of the questions that you would
have asked had you had the opportunity?
Mr. SPECTER. As a result of Mr. Klein's efforts, I have been furnished copies of
them. i did not retain any files of them when i left the Commission staff. I
always wondered what happened to the questions I suggested asking President
Johnson. I was glad to get a copy of them 10 days ago.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. When we were arguing on the floor of the House as to whether or
not this committee should be reestablished, Mrs. Boggs probably made the only
speech that carried the day when she said that Hale, in particular, and Jerry
Ford and a few others had a great deal of difficulty in drafting the final
language of the Commission report to state that from the evidence the all had
been shown or that had been put before them it was their conclusion. She alluded
to the fact that Hale had a great many doubts as to the adequacy of the
information that they were receiving.
Was it a pervasive sort of feeling on your part that you felt it was too fast
and not thorough enough?
Mr. SPECTER. No, sir, I did not think it was too fast or there was not enough
thoroughness. I thought that we functioned under a mandate of promptness but we
had an opportunity to do a reasonably
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thorough job. I don't think Mrs. Boggs participated as much in the work of the
Commission as some of the other Commissioners did but that is all a matter of
record because the record notes with precision when each one came. I never heard
any suggestion that Mrs. Boggs was in any way questioning any of the materials
that were being furnished to the committee.
Mr. McKINNEY. I don't think it was questioning that materials as much as it was
the adequacy of the information, the amount of information, the things they
didn't know. One thing that disturbed me is that, right after the assassination
the Attorney General wrote to the President and suggested very strongly that
everything be done to make sure that the conspiracy theory be ruled out and that
Lee Harvey Oswald was the only assassin. He also wrote on December 1963 to the
Warren Commission recommending that they immediately issue a press release
stating what the FBI conclusion of the case was, which was that there was no
international conspiracy and that Oswald was a loner.
How much of a handicap was that? Here you have the Attorney General of the
United States turning around and telling a Commission, which is supposed to
investigate a murder, this is who did it and they didn't do it? Did that disturb
you as an investigator?
Mr. SPECTER. I never knew the Attorney General did that. You are saying that
Attorney General Kennedy in 1963 in December told the Warren Commission to issue
some tentative finding?
Mr. McKINNEY. On December 9, 1963 he wrote each member of the Warren Commission
recommending that the Commission issue a press release stating the FBI report
clearly showed there was no international conspiracy and Oswald was a loner.
That did not get down to your level?
Mr. SPECTER. I was not on the Commission at that time. I did not join them until
january. I think it was inappropriate for the Attorney General to do that, if I
might state a citizen's opinion. I am happy to note that the Commission didn't
do it.
Mr. McKINNEY. I just wondered again how much of a pervasive force it was.
Mr. SPECTER. I don't know that anybody would have paid any attention to his
having said that. The things that bothered me were his protection of his
sister-in-law and whatever hand he had in keeping X-rays and photos from us.
What he ad to say or what he wanted to push to do, I never heard of any
involvement that Robert Kennedy had on trying to influence the Commission.
Mr. McKINNEY. you are back with Katzenbach?
Mr. SPECTER. Kennedy was Attorney General. He was Deputy Attorney general.
Mr. McKINNEY. Would you assume that the Deputy Attorney General would write a
letter to some of the most powerful men in the Nation without the Attorney
General knowing that?
Mr. SPECTER. Knowing Mr. Katzenbach I wouldn't doubt it.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. SPECTER. I don't think they would be influenced much by what Mr. Katzenbach
would say.
Mr. McKINNEY. I have to go back. I was younger than and was easily impressed.
Chief Justice Warren is one of my folk heroes. He was a
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very powerful individual. I find it very difficult to think that the Deputy
Attorney General would write a letter of that type to a Presidential Commission.
In fact I find it very difficult that the Attorney General would write one
without even the President knowing it. Because what you are doing is writing to
the Chief justice of the United States of America, the most powerful Senators
and most powerful Representatives and a Commission set up to find the facts and
you have the top legal entity in the United States of America writing a letter
saying this is what the conclusion is and this is who did it and this is who
didn't do it.
Mr. SPECTER. I had not known it was done. My own speculation would be that the
Chief justice would have been offended by it.
Mr McKINNEY. If I were President, I would have fired the Attorney General within
the next 10 minutes.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. I have one question. When you were asked a question about your
judgement or thinking as to why these investigative agencies may have withheld
information form the Warren Commission you said you only had the wildest type of
private citizen's speculation. I would like the advantage of what your
speculation is as a private citizen, if you have one.
Mr. SPECTER. I think the FBI in destroying the Oswald not, if it did so--I only
know it is an allegation--would have been offensive, and had it come to light
would have raised a question as to whether had they acted on it they could have
prevented the assassination. I have a grave concern as a private citizen about
what goes on with the CIA and what happens with plea bargaining with Mr. Helms
and what is going on in the CIA.
I have grave questions about the President of the United States engaging in plea
bargaining with Mr. Park. I have grave concerns as a private citizen about those
subjects and I think that considering the interest of national security that our
public welfare would be promoted by having some hard answers to those questions.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Do you have any further questions?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes, mr. Chairman. I have one more important area to go into and then
I will conclude.
Mr. Specter, to your knowledge did the Chief Justice and any of the
Commissioners or any of the Warren commission staff members have any knowledge
prior to the release of the Warren report that the CIA had anything to do with
attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?
Mr. SPECTER. I have no knowledge of anyone's knowledge about that.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge did the Chief Justice, any of the Commissioners, or
any of the Warren staff members receive information of any nature prior to the
release of the Warren Commission pertaining to the CIA involvement in attempts
to assassinate Fidel Castro.
Mr. SPECTER. Not to my knowledge but I am having a hard time distinguishing the
last question from the former question.
Mr. KLEIN. Simply if there were any documents that you have any knowledge of
that might have pertained in some way to CIA involvement in a attempt to
assassinate Castro Do you know of any?
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Mr. SPECTER. I don't know of any documents relating to what the CIA may have
done with respect to Fidel Castro. Nor do I have any knowledge, myself, of
anything about that or that anybody on the Commission knew anything about it. I
again hasten to add that my area was far removed in terms of what I had direct
contact with.
Mr. KLEIN. Again in that same area, to be specific, prior to the issuance of the
Warren report were you ever present with the Chief justice or any of the
Commissioners or any of the Warren Commission staff when the subject of an
intent to assassinate Fidel Castro was discussed?
Mr. SPECTER. No.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge did the Chief Justice, any of the Commissioners or
any of the Warren Commission staff members receive information of any nature
prior to the release of the Warren report pertaining to attempts to assassinate
Fidel Castro?
Mr. SPECTER. No to my knowledge.
Mr KLEIN. Did you ever receive any indications from Chief Justice Warren, any of
the Commissioners, any of the Warren Commission staff counsel or anyone else
that there were areas of intelligence agency activities which the Warren
Commission should avoid investigating?
Mr. SPECTER. Nothing of that sort were ever called to my attention.
Mr. KLEIN. I asked you whether you had ever received such indications. To your
knowledge did anyone else connected with the Warren Commission investigation
ever receive any indications from the Chief Justice, a Commissioner, a staff
member or anyone else, that they were to avoid areas of intelligence activity?
Mr. SPECTER. No one ever told me to avoid any such areas of intelligence
activities and I have no knowledge of any one telling anyone else to avoid any
such area.
Mr. KLEIN. At the time the Warren report was released were you satisfied with
the thoroughness of the investigation?
Mr. SPECTER. Subject to the limitations that I have testified about, yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Subject to the limitation?
Mr. SPECTER. Subject to the limitations I have testified about.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you satisfied, as you sit here today do you think it was
successful?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes.
Mr KLEIN. Other than what you have told us is there anything else you think
should have been done differently?
Mr. SPECTER. Not that I can think of. Focusing on the fact I first talked to you
a seek ago Thursday, I got a call from you last week to come here today to talk
about procedure. You called yesterday, you were going to ask me two specific
questions, so that my review of this matter is limited to a great many other
activities in the intervening several days.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it correct that I also told you that we would speak about the same
things we spoke about during our 2-hour interview in your office; is that
correct?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes. I think the scope of your questions has been substantially
broader. A lot of it has gone into the question of substance
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but I am glad to cooperate to the extent that I can, again saying that my
ability to respond is limited. We had some very bulky records which I had access
to and familiarity with a long time ago.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you then or do you now disagree with any of the major conclusions
reached by the Warren Commission?
Mr. SPECTER. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Will you describe was pressures, if any, existed to complete the
investigation before the election? Was that specifically ever mentioned, the
election?
Mr SPECTER. I think that there may have been some talk about it in the
newspapers or some question about whether the deadlines were going to be
extended beyond November but nobody ever said to me "We have to get this done
before the election." i had my report in early June and the election was not a
matter of concern to me. Nobody made it a matter to me, not that particular
election.
Mr. KLEIN. Were there any pressures not to criticize the FBI or the Secret
Service?
Mr. SPECTER. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today--
Mr. SPECTER. Not that I think about.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today, do you think there is a need to reinvestigate
the assassination of the President?
Mr. SPECTER. I think on the specific areas that I have discussed it would be
useful I have no objection to a total reinvestigation of the assassination
because I think it is a healthy thing in a democracy to investigate whenever
there is any public concern. I think that it is unlikely that a reinvestigation
would be fruitful except on the specific leads. I want to emphasize I have no
objection to having all the working over, including all of my work.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion why is the Warren Commission subject to so much
criticism?
Mr. SPECTER. Because it is the most fascinating subject in town, this town, any
town. Because the question of the murder of a President, with all the power of
the Presidency, is a question that is of overwhelming interest. The Lincoln
assassination survives until today, as I said earlier.
The aura of intrigue, what goes on behind closed doors, even like this executive
session, is of interest to people everywhere. So I think it is a natural thing.
And it is fascinating to have been a part of it. Aside from the volume of letter
I get all the way from high school student to media inquiries and the burden of
refreshing my recollection, I think it is fun, it is interesting to have been
part of it.
Mr. KLEIN. Other than what you have testified to, is there anything else you can
think of that the Select Committee on Assassinations can contribute to this
matter.
Mr. SPECTER. No. I would hope that the committee will go into two areas that are
of concern to me and beyond that the committee doesn't need my views or
suggestions as to what it should do. I would have only one other thing which
wasn't asked of me that is tangentially relevant that that is that it may be
that while I did not see the photographs and X-rays, others did. I was concerned
about the question after the Commission concluded and once wrote to the Chief
justice about that subject.
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Precisely when I couldn't tell you. I think he responded to me. We had some
meetings about it afterward. I think he may have seen the X-rays. I did not. Nor
would it have changed any testimony I have given about my interest in seeing the
photos and X-rays.
Your questions have been phrased in terms of what I did and what I knew and what
I saw and that is really all I can comment about.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions, mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question if I may.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. As an attorney you know that opinion evidence is admissible from an
expert. I think you are fully qualified as an expert, having been so deeply
involved in the Warren Commission investigation. For the purpose of the record I
would ask you your opinion, if you have an opinion, no. 1, whether or not there
may have been a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination and, No. 2, whether in
your opinion Lee Harvey Oswald was a sole operator?
Mr. SPECTER. In my opinion and judgment Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin,
the sold person to pull the trigger. I think the evidence is conclusive on his
having pulled the trigger. I think the single bullet conclusion is correct. In
my opinion I do not think that there was a conspiracy. I think that certain
materials were withheld from the Warren Commission that we talked about here
today.
My own best estimate of it is that they would not have been relevant to the
issue of conspiracy and I think that had there been a conspiracy, given the
milieu of life in America, that it would have come to light before this time. So
my opinion is that there was no conspiracy.
Mr. Devine. Thank you very much.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Mr. Specter, under our rules, rule 3.6 of the committee,
the witness is offered a chance to explain or amplify his testimony at this
stage for 5 minutes. You have in effect been given that several times. If there
is anything further you would like to say you are given the opportunity.
Mr. SPECTER. I only would like an opportunity to read the 1 hour 40 minutes of
testimony which I have given uninterrupted, as the record will show, to be sure
it is transcribed accurately and that I have no second thought about what I have
said, responding as best I could to the questions.
Mr. PREYER. Yes. We will be happy to grant you that privilege or right. If there
are areas in which you may not have anticipated being questioned and you would
like to amplify on it more, of course we would welcome any further testimony or
written statement.
Mr. SPECTER. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you very much. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock
today.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the meeting was recessed, to convene at 2 p.m. the
same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Staff members present: G. Robert Blakey, g. Cornwell, M. Wills, E. Berning, K.
Klein,, J. Hess, J. Facter, J. Schlichtmann, L. Wizelman, S. Brady, L. Matthews,
W. Cross, R. Morrison, and D. Miller.
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Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order. We will resume our hearings. Our
witness this afternoon is Dean Norman Redlich. We welcome you to the committee,
Dean Redlich. We appreciate your being here in this bad weather today. If you
will first be sworn.
So you solemnly swear that the testimony you now are about to give will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but their truth, so help you God.
Mr. REDLICH. I do.
TESTIMONY OF DEAN NORMAN REDLICH
Mr. PREYER. We appreciate your being here with us, Mr. Redlich. We will ask Mr.
Klein if he will begin the questioning.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Excuse me. In accordance with our results the committee will ask Ms.
Berning, our clerk, if she will deliver a copy of the rules of the committee to
Dean Redlich.
Mr KLEIN. Sir, what was your position prior to taking your job with the Warren
Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. I was a professor of law in the New York University School of Law.
Mr. KLEIN. What investigative and or prosecutional experience did you have prior
to taking that position with the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. I had no investigative experience and no prosecutorial experience.
Mr KLEIN. Prior to being hired by the Warren Commission what was said to you
about the goals of that Commission and about your function as a staff member?
Mr. REDLICH. Prior to the time I was hired?
Mr KLEIN. When whoever spoke to you about coming to work for the Warren
Commission.
Mr. REDLICH. When Mr. Rankin first spoke to you about coming to work for the
Warren Commission.
Mr REDLICH. When Mr. Rankin first spoke to me about working for the Commission
he indicated that he wanted me to assist him, to work in certain special areas,
and I believe he indicated that he wanted me to concentrate primarily on the
factual aspects of the assassination, itself.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion what were the real objectives of the Warren
Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. Perhaps I can best answer that by repeating what Mr. Rankin said
when he convened the staff of the Warren Commission for the very first meeting
of us a complete staff which, as I recall, occurred toward the middle or the end
of January 1964. He said, "Gentlemen, your only client is the truth." those were
his opening words of that talk. I think our objective was to find all of the
facts which we could relating to the assassination of president Kennedy and the
subsequent murder of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. Was it an objective of the Warren commission to allay public fears?
Mr. REDLICH. I never considered that as an objective. That was not put to me
other than in the context of the fact that there were a great many doubts about
what happened, there was great concern bout what happened, and of course to the
extent that we could find all of the truth about the assassination, we would be
allaying public fears. I
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always felt that that was a byproduct of the principal objective which was to
discover all the facts.
Mr KLEIN. Was it an objective of the Warren Commission to prevent international
crisis?
Mr. REDLICH. I don't believe so. I believe it was the objective of the Warren
Commission to learn all of the facts about the assassination, including any
questions with regard to possible conspiracy. If the learning of all the facts
resulted in the allaying of public fears and easing of international strains,
that, as I indicated, would be a byproduct of what our central mission was. Our
central mission was not to prevent a crisis or allay fears.
Mr. KLEIN. Was it an objective of the Warren commission to allow a smooth
transition in national leadership?
Mr. REDLICH. I don't recall that ever being mentioned as an objective.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion were the operating procedures and organizational
structure of the Warren Commission conducive to achieving the objectives of the
Commission as you saw them?
Mr. REDLICH. I think they were, yes.
Mr. KLEIN. How were they conducive to achieving the objectives of the
Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. We were all committed to the pursuit of all lines if inquiry. There
were no restrictions that I can ever recall placed upon me in terms of questions
which I could ask or lines of inquiry that I personally could pursue. The
Commission, as you know, was organized into certain areas of inquiry. I was not
part of any of those specific areas of inquiry. In each of those areas of
inquiry there was a senior counsel and a younger counsel. The commission used as
its principal investigatory arm the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to some
extent the Secret Service.
I believed then, and I believe now, that the method of inquiry that we conducted
was an objective one. We came with o preconceived notion. Our only objective was
to find all of the truth. At the conclusion of that inquiry I was of the opinion
that we had had the full cooperation of the agencies of the U.S. Government.
Mr KLEIN. You stated that the investigation was divided up into a number of
areas of investigation. Were the particular areas that were chosen conducive to
achieving the objective of solving this case and finding the truth?
Mr. REDLICH. I believe that they were. I believe that those seemed to be at the
time a natural way to divide the work. Obviously there might be some overlap.
One might possibly look at the subject by retrospect and conceive of different
ways or organization. I don't believe that there is any single one method of
organization that is the best one. That seemed to us at the time as a logical
division and I believe that it worked reasonably well.
Mr. KLEIN. Was the type and mix of the personnel hired conducive to achieving
the objective of the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. I think it was. I think the staff was an excellent one. I was proud
to be a part of it. I remain that was today.
Mr. KLEIN. Certain senior lawyers were not able to denote a good deal of time to
this investigation. Is that correct?
Mr. REDLICH. that is right.
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Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that affected the investigation?
Mr. REDLICH. Any time someone is not able to spend full time it had that effect.
It means that that work which might have been done during the course of that
full-time work gets picked up by others. In that sense even the fact that during
the first several months I was teaching at New York university School of Law and
was commuting back and forth, and it wasn't until May that my semester ended,
that fact of course would have an effect. I don't think on balance any of that
had a permanent harmful effect because I believe that that entire staff, taken
as a whole, managed to conduct what I consider to be a thorough inquiry.
obviously as anyone who has conducted an investigation knows, you always would
like to have everyone there all the time.
That was not possible during a substantial portion of the Warren investigation.
Mr KLEIN. Despite the fact that some of these personnel did not play the part in
the investigation that had been planned for them, do you think that the Warren
Commission had a sufficient number of experienced lawyers to conduct the
investigation?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes; I do.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the Warren Commission in your opinion have any initial factual
assumptions in the following areas: first, as to the identity of the assassin?
Mr. REDLICH. We had no preconceived belief that Lee Harvey Oswald was guilty We
started out, of course with a person, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had worked in the
Texas School Book Depository and had been killed by Jack Ruby, and with regard
to him there had already been considerable amount of investigation. But this was
not the case where one started and looked at the entire world and said let us
find out from the entire world population who is the assassin. Lee Harvey Oswald
was a suspect, a dead suspect but a suspect. I think that we had no prior
commitment at all to the concept that, one, he fired shots; two, that he fired
all the shots; or three, that there was any lack of or presence of a conspiracy.
Mr. KLEIN. Were there any initial assumptions regarding the existence of a
conspiracy, and as far as there were, what particular groups might have been
involved?
Mr. REDLICH. There were no preconceived notions, preconceived conclusions about
conspiracy, Early in the investigation several possibilities emerged as possible
sources of conspiracy. It was obvious that one had to look at the possibility of
a foreign conspiracy. Lee Harvey Oswald had been to the Soviet Union. He had
made an effort to go to Mexico He apparently had tried to go to Cuba. So, one
had to look at the possibility of a foreign conspiracy. One had to look at the
possibility of a domestic conspiracy.
There was a great deal of talk at the time about a conspiracy from the left, a
conspiracy form the right. But there was no preconception about whether there
was a conspiracy or if there were one, which one.
Mr. KLEIN. You referred to preconceived conclusions. I am more interested in
whether there were any assumptions that might not have reached the stage of
being a conclusion but which were regarded as prime areas for the Warren
Commission to follow in answering the question of whether there was a
conspiracy?
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Mr. REDLICH. I don't think those assumptions were any more specific than the
ones I just outlined. lee Harvey Oswald was a person who had been to the Soviet
union. one thing that one had to look at was the question of a conspiracy from
that source. He was a person who was making an effort to go to cuba and he had
been involved in the Fair play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans. So one had to
look at that possible source.
There was a great deal of talk in the press at that time about a rightwing
conspiracy, allegations about oil people, the so-called feeling of hate in
dallas. Then there was the fact that Oswald was killed in the basement of the
Dallas jail by Jack Ruby. So, one had to look at the question of whether Ruby
was somehow involved in this. I think all of that was at the threshold level of
inquiry.
We did not have any fixed assumptions about which of these was more likely or
not likely. I don't mean by my answer to limit the possible assumptions. There
may have been others that I have left out in my answer.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that the organization of the Warren Commission into five
investigative areas gave sufficient leeway for adequate investigation of all of
these possible areas of conspiracy, some of which you mentioned?
Mr. REDLICH. I believe that it did; yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the Warren Commission in your opinion have any initial factual
assumptions regarding the reliability, trustworthiness, and competency of the
investigative agencies which were working for you?
Mr. REDLICH. As nearly as I can tell, I and my colleagues came with a
professional lawyer's degree of skepticism. We made a decision early that in
regard to any expert testimony, fingerprints, handwriting, ballistics, a whole
separate set of experts were to be consulted. I think that we did not have any
preconceived notion of either believing everything to disbelieving everything. I
believe that we felt a responsibility to conduct our own inquiry which we were
conducting in the manner I have described to you.
But I would not characterize our position as being one of extreme belief or
extreme disbelief. I would call it one of healthy skepticism.
Mr. KLEIN. Dean Redlich, you were speaking about using different sets of
experts. To your knowledge, were any experts in the ballistics or autopsy field
or any field used other than experts employed by Federal agencies?
Mr. REDLICH. My recollection is that in ballistics I believe we used someone
from the government of Illinois, either handwriting or fingerprinting. I am not
sure it was not someone from the New York Police Department. I believe that in
all cases we used experts from other governments.
I am not going back 13 1/2 years on recollection. I think perhaps we may have
used the Post Office Department in connection with handwriting?
Mr. KLEIN. Were any initial factual assumptions that the Warren commission had
regarding the possible repercussions of the various conclusions that might have
been reached?
Mr. REDLICH. By repercussion, could you clarify that, please?
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Mr. KLEIN. If a particular conclusion was reached, for example that some foreign
government had a part in the assassination, then there would be certain
repercussions which might follow from that. Were there any assumptions that the
Warren commission had regarding that kind of repercussion?
Mr. REDLICH. I would have to say at any level of the Commission activity that I
am familiar with the answer is no. I think for the record I should indicate that
you have been using the term 'Warren Commission." I assume you are talking about
that which I knew as a staff member. I never was present at any meeting of the
Commission, itself. All relationships between the staff and the Commission
itself were through Mr. Rankin.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the organization procedures used have an effect on the end
result, in your opinion?
Mr. REDLICH. The procedures and the organization were an important part in
introducing the end result, which i\I thought was a professional and thorough
investigation of the assassination.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you feel any restriction on the investigation or writeup due to
the organization or procedural setup?
Mr. REDLICH. I recall no such restrictions.
Mr. KLEIN. What exactly were your responsibilities, sir?
Mr. REDLICH. I was probably the second staff person hired. When I came to the
Warren Commission, which was some time in mid-December, the only other staff
person who was there as I recall was Mr. Willens. Initially, Mr. Rankin wanted
me to work on special projects. One of the first things I did, for example, was
to draft a rule of procedures for the Commission. Then I was given an assignment
which tended to dominate the first 6 or 7 weeks of my work with the Commission.
The Commission made a decision that the first witness to be questioned would be
Marina Oswald.
I was given the assignment of helping to prepare Mr. Rankin for the examination
of Marina Oswald which was going to have to be very extensive. In the course of
that I started to read all of the investigatory reports that had come to us from
the FBI and the Secret Service with a view toward seeing how anything in those
reports could bear upon any questions that we might ask Marina Oswald. Since she
knew so much about Lee Harvey Oswald's background, not only in terms of what she
herself was witness to but what he may have told her about his background, and
since a great deal of that was in the investigatory reports, I had to go through
all of those investigatory reports with a view toward working with Mr. Rankin
and helping to prepare him for that questioning.
When that was done--I may be exaggerating the kind of compartmentalization of my
work but I will give it to you the best I can recall--when that was done I
tended to spend a great deal of my time working with those lawyers who were
working in the area of the investigation of the assassination, itself. That was
Arlen Specter, David Belin, and Joseph Ball. Because Mr. Rankin was anxious for
me to work with the lawyers in that area, see what approaches they were taking,
the witnesses they were questioning, I tended to concentrate, not exclusively
but I tended to concentrate, in those areas although the actual work of the
investigation in the sense of questioning witnesses
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was done primarily by Mr. Ball, Mr. Belin, Mr. Specter, Mr. Eisenberg.
Another assignment I had was that Mr. Rankin was most anxious for me to be
present at as many Commission hearings as possible so that there would be
someone working with him who had the opportunity to have as broad a range as
possible of the testimony that was at least being presented in formal hearings
before the Commission.
Then as the work of drafting took place as drafts were prepared which went to
mr. Rankin and then to the Commission, I was involved in the normal staff work
of reviewing drafts suggesting changes, editing work on the report. I stayed
with the Commission right up until the Friday that the report was submitted to
the President. I left at 1 a.m. that Friday to go teach a class at 9 a.m. in the
morning.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion, what was the relationship of the staff counsel to
the Warren commission?
Mr. REDLICH. That would vary from Commissioner to Commissioner. The staff
counsel were there and available at all times if any member of the Commission
wanted to ask questions. Some of them availed themselves of that. Former
President Ford was present at a great many hearings. He would talk to the staff
members before or after. The Chief Justice was an ever present person at the
Commission, and I can't emphasize that too much. His role was heroic in my
judgment. He was there at 8 a.m. We held hearings early in the morning so that
he could go back and preside over court. He would come back when the Court
recessed for the day. Those of us who were there had an opportunity to discuss
matters with the Chief Justice. However, in terms of informal relationship
between the staff and the Commission in the sense of the staff being present at
the Commission meetings in a formal way, that did not exist. I was not present
at any meeting of the Commission. I was not privy to an formal meetings of the
Commission. Mr. Rankin was the official line of communication between the
Commission and the staff.
We learned of Commission decisions particularly as they reworked various drafts
of chapters toward the end but we did no sit down with the Commission in a
formal way.
Mr. KLEIN. Was there ample opportunity for individual staff members to
communicate ideas to the Commissioners as a group or as individuals?
Mr. REDLICH. I think perhaps individual staff members may have had different
views on that. I felt from my point of view that any position I may have had was
being communicated through Mr. Rankin to the Commission in such manner as he saw
fit. I believe that perhaps some members of the staff would have preferred to
have had a more direct ongoing formal relationship with the Commission. We did
see the Commissioners as they would come and preside or be present at hearings,
but I think some members of the staff would have preferred a closer working
relationship.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion were the Commissioners well informed on the facts of
this case?
Mr. REDLICH. That was a very complex case. I think some of them were
tremendously well informed. The Chief Justice was extremely well informed. I
believe that former President Ford was extremely well informed. Mr. Dulles
attended a great many hearings.
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Senator Russell had very extensive Senate commitments, as you know. I believe
that on the broad areas on the Commission's inquiry the commission was informed.
They were obviously not as informed of some of the specific enormous factual
dates in connection with this assassination as was the staff. I have never known
a staff that thought that the group that it worked for was a well informed as
the staff was, and the Warren Commission was no exception.
Mr. KLEIN. How long did you work for the Warren Commission.
Mr. REDLICH. I came in mid-December, somewhere between December, somewhere
between the 19th and 20th of December, I believe, and I left about 1 a.m. on a
Friday, I am not sure whether it was September 22, somewhere in there, of the
Friday that the Commission went to the White House and presented the report to
the President. I then, as I recall, made one trip back to Washington where I had
an appointment to meet an archivist to go over the papers in my office. he
walked into the office and I said to the archivist, "I will make a simple deal
with you. If you can get it arranged you can have all of it." With that I turned
my back and left with the same fountain pen that I came with.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you consider it a full-time job during the time you worked with
the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. No. As I indicated earlier, from December until the end of January
I was working as full-time as one could possibly, as I recall. I did not have
classes at the time. That gave me an opportunity to get familiarized with the
investigation. then once classes began--it was a 14-week semester--I would
shuttle back and forth. I did work on weekends in New York but I was in this
pattern of shuttling back and forth. When classes ended, which was early in May,
i went back to spending the predominant portion of my time in Washington and
considered that certainly a full-time job up until the time I left.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions on the objectives of
organizational procedure.
Mr. PREYER. I might have a couple of questions I am sure the other members may
have a few questions also.
You mentioned that the Chief justice was ever present and that he was very
active and that you would hold meetings at 8 o'clock in the morning. Were these
staff meetings or Commission meetings?
Mr. REDLICH. Commission meetings, sir. As I recall the court convened at 10. I
believe that we started, I know that we had hearings prior to the time the court
convened and my best recollection is that they started at 8.
Mr. PREYER. How often would these meetings be held? let me put it this way. Were
these formal Commission meetings or meetings to hear the testimony of a witness?
Mr. REDLICH. They were meetings to hear the testimony of a witness.
Mr. PREYER. These were not full formal Commission executive sessions?
Mr. REDLICH. No, sir. If I conveyed that impression, that is wrong.
Mr. PREYER. I believe I have made a note that you said he was there every day. I
assume you mean every day that there was a meeting that he was likely to be
there, not that you met him.
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Mr. REDLICH. Certainly the impression I have, as I look back over that period
with the perspective of 13 years, if that the Chief Justice was a constant
presence. By every day I certainly did not include Saturdays and Sundays but I
think in terms of working days he was a constant presence at the Commission. I
would not say it was every single working day. I would just say he was a
constant presence.
Mr. PREYER. Would there usually be two Commission members to hear testimony of
witness? Did you have any rule about that?
Mr. REDLICH. Mr. Preyer, I don't recall the precise rule. There were generally
one or two other Commissioners present at the time testimony was taken. In
addition to the staff attorney who conducted the inquiry, in the beginning it
was Mr. Rankin and then it moved to other staff attorneys, and then I tried to
be present when I could.
Mr. PREYER. As Mr. Rankin's special assistant were you personally acquainted
with him before this?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir. I had met Mr. Rankin in the summer of 1961 when he had
left the Solicitor General's office. He had been Solicitor General under
President Eisenhower. He had left the Solicitor General's office in 1961 and had
come to New York City. In the summer of 1961 a workshop for professors of
constitutional law was held at New York University Law School and Mr. Rankin,
former Solicitor General, was invited to participate in that workshop. That is
where I met Mr. Rankin. I had previously met Chief Justice Warren on the
occasion of his coming to our law school.
Mr. PREYER. I was going to ask if you had known the Chief Justice. Did you know
President Johnson by any chance?
Mr. REDLICH. No; I had never met President Johnson. I never met him during the
entire investigation.
Mr. PREYER. You mentioned that you attended the first staff meeting and that Mr.
Rankin stressed very strongly the truth was the only client that you had, that
you should not form any conclusion before you heard the evidence. I believe that
meeting was on January 20, 1964. I understand that the Chief Justice attended
that meeting or came in a little later on in the meeting. Do you recall anything
that he may have said to the staff at that time?
Mr. REDLICH. As I recall, he used the "unturning of every stone" inference. He
said that he wanted to leave no stone unturned in pursuing this inquiry. While
those are the only specific words I recall, the tenor of his remarks was
completely supported by Mr. Rankin. I very vividly recall the phraseology of Mr.
Rankin.
Mr. PREYER. This was a period that I think you brought out in which there were
conspiracy theories floating around in the air. You mentioned the rightwing
conspiracy theory. Did he say anything about one objective being to preclude
further speculation or quenching rumors?
Mr. REDLICH. I cannot say for sure whether he specifically mentioned that. I
think that he indicated that we hoped that a full, complete, and thorough
investigation by bringing all the facts before the American people would have
the effect of putting to rest some of these fears and speculations many of which
were completely self-contradictory, and I know that I had hoped that this
national tragedy was one which hopefully would not poison the life of this
country if the facts were such as to indicate that there were no conspiracy.
But it was solely in the context that the great service we could perform would
be to bring out all the facts. If those facts were that of a
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a conspiracy and that conspiracy had international implications or domestic
implications, that would be the price of learning the truth. The aim was to
produce all the facts. That is my recollection of the Chief Justice's remarks.
May I add by the was of completeness, sir, it was either at that meeting or
perhaps some other meeting in which the Chief Justice related President
Johnson's urging him to take the chairmanship of the Commission. The Chief
Justice was very reluctant to do it. Then I remember another quotation, the
Chief Justice said he was confronted with a fact and not a theory and when
confronted with that fact he had to say yes. I believe he quoted the President
as saying "Your country requires you to put back on your uniform," and anyone
who knows Earl Warren knows that he was in intensely patriotic man.
He said he ended up accepting an assignment which he initially had been
disinclined to accept.
Mr. PREYER. thank you.
Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dean, without meaning to put words in your mouth do you think the Congress has
assigned this select committee a kind of dead end task in that I take it from
your remarks you feel that the Commission under which you served did a very
complete, thorough, and honest job and the conclusions they reached were
accurate and that will be the ultimate conclusion that this committee is going
to have to reach? Or do you have other thoughts?
Mr. REDLICH. I have thought a lot about that, sir. I think that while I may have
had reservations about the necessity of this committee, since I believe that the
facts remain in my judgment, at least on the basis of everything I know,
incontrovertible that Lee Harvey Oswald fired all the shots that killed
President Kennedy and wounded Governor Canaille, and since I have not learned of
anything as a private citizen that would cause me to question the Commission's
conclusion that there was no credible evidence in support of a conspiracy, I
would have had reservations about the necessity of this committee.
However, I think this committee has been formed and I would not regard its work
as a dead end cause, for whatever reason, doubts exist among the American people
concerning the facts of the assassination. I may have my own judgment as to how
those doubts arose but I think that is really irrelevant. The fact is that those
doubts are there. With those doubts there I think that perhaps this committee
has a useful, very useful, constructive role to play in terms of perhaps dealing
with those doubts. Now I do not want to convey the impression to you that I am
saying that you have only one conclusion that you can reach. Your conducting an
investigation under your responsibility. My opinion is that you will reach the
same conclusion that we reached. But if you do I do not think that that would
mean that this committee did not perform an enormously important public function
and I hope the committee would not feel that way.
Mr. DEVINE. To put it another way then, assuming but not deciding, assuming that
we did reach a conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin without a
conspiracy, the committee could indeed perform a useful service by perhaps
explaining away or coming to
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some conclusion on the rumors and unanswered questions that seem to exist in the
public mind?
Mr. REDLICH. I think that would be one very significant contribution. I think
also that facts have apparently come to the surface concerning the response of
different investigatory agencies to the Warren Commission, itself. I believe
that this committee is looking into that, and should. I think the question of
how the various agencies of the Government, including the Warren Commission,
itself, performed the very important job that it had is clearly within the
purview of this committee.
So that while I guess I would have preferred, as someone would spent 9 months of
his life working on this Commission, that we did not find ourselves engaged in
an activity which was perceived by the country to be a complete reinvestigation
of the assassination, putting that view aside, I think the committee has a very
important role to play for the reasons you have indicated.
Thank you very much.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Stokes.
Mr. STOKES. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dean, when you were serving on the staff of the Warren Commission did there art
any time come to your attention, directly or indirectly, that there had been
this alleged CIA involvement in an attempt to assassinate Castro?
Mr. REDLICH. I have no recollection of that, sir. To the best of my recollection
the answer to your request is no. I just do not recall any discussion about any
CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.
Mr. SAWYER. Was there any suggestion that the so-called anti-Castro wing of the
Cuban group here might have had any involvement in connection with the
assassination? Was that ever explored?
Mr. REDLICH. That part of the inquiry was really handled more by Mr. Jenner and
Liebeler. I do recall a great many discussions about Oswald's possible Cuban
connection. There were witnesses, as I recall, who claimed that Oswald was
linked to anti-Castro Cuba. There was also the possibility that Oswald could
have been linked to pro-Castro Cuba. While I was not involved in that aspect of
the investigation, I believe the Commission and its staff attempted to track
down everything that it could about Oswald's relationship with anybody that
related either to the pro-Castro side or the anti-Castro side.
But we did not, to the best of my recollection, look specifically at the
question of any link between a threat to assassinate or a plot to assassinate
Premier Castro and the assassination of President Kennedy.
Mr. SAWYER. Was there any investigation made or did any information come to your
attention with respect to Ruby's possible connection with organized crime?
Mr. REDLICH. I recall that there was some discussion about--I was no personally
involved in the Ruby investigation. There were a great many allegations about
Jack Ruby. He had a rather unusual background. Included among those, as I
recall, were some allegations linking him to organized crime. But I have not
clear recollection of the nature of that investigation.
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Mr. SAWYER. Was there information coming to the Commission about the alleged
combination of the CIA and some of the Mafia in connection with some of these
raids on Cuba?
Mr. REDLICH. I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. SAWYER. You have no recollection?
Mr. REDLICH. No; I do not. I am not saying it didn't happen.
Mr. SAWYER. The Commission as far as you know didn't get into that?
Mr. REDLICH. As far as I can recollect, no. But I was really not in that
particular area of the investigation in a direct way.
Mr. SAWYER. Did the Commission as far as you know get into the question of how
Officer Tippit identified Lee Harvey Oswald when he was allegedly killed by Lee
Harvey Oswald. Did you get into that at all?
Mr. REDLICH. No one really knows what happened when Officer Tippit drove up to
Lee Harvey Oswald on that street in dallas. We did look at the police report
that went out on the radio to see whether someone listening to those reports in
a police care would have had reason to pull over and stop a man looking like Lee
Harvey Oswald. The report goes into that in considerable detail. The
descriptions that went out on the police radio describing a man of Oswald's
build, although they were not incidentally at that time describing Oswald
themselves, the reports that went out on the radio were based upon eyewitness
description at the assassination. f Oswald himself was arrested not for the
assassination of President Kennedy, he was arrested because of the killing of
police officer Tippit and was found in the theater.
So we don't really know whether there was any identification of Oswald by Tippit
other than the fact that Tippit apparently moved up to Oswald in the car and
then Oswald shot him.
Mr. SAWYER. Did you have any information with respect to the alleged destruction
or concealment of information by the FBI that was your investigative arm, as I
understand?
Mr. REDLICH. The only incident of that kind that I can recall coming to my
attention related to an address book. In the course of sending us all of Lee
Harvey Oswald's possessions the FBI sent to us the address book which was found
either in Oswald's room or on his physical body at the time he was arrested, and
they also sent over a written transcript of everything that was in that address
book. Although I have not had prosecutorial experience, I am a lawyer and I sat
down and decided to go through the address book page by page and compare it with
the transcript of what was in it. In the course of doing that I found that there
had been left out of the transcript certain data, and here I cannot be
completely precise as to what was left out, but as I recall it was the name of
Agent Hosty and possibly his license number or possibly phone number. It had
something to do with Agent Hosty. That had been left out. Agent Hosty had been
an FBI agent who had some contact with Oswald after he had come back to Dallas.
I was disturbed over that. I immediately reported it to Mr. Rankin. i am sure
that Mr. Rankin immediately reported it to the Chief Justice because I believe
the three of us talked about it. We then waited several days, it may have been a
longer period but we waited to see
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whether the FBI would furnish this additional data, and it didn't come. Then we
wrote to the FBI a rather strong letter expressing our dismay about the fact
that the transcript was not complete and asking an explanation for it. I
believe, and I have no way of checking the specific dates, but my best
recollection is that on the same day we sent the letter to the FBI there then
came to us an explanation saying that the reason they had not sent it was that
they were sending us only the material that would be addressed to leads and
their own agent would not be a lead. I believe that would be the explanation
although I am not sure.
In any event the explanation still left me annoyed over the fact that it had
been left out and I remain annoyed to this day.
Mr. SAWYER. Was it pursued further when you got a reply that they were only
excerpting that that they felt would be a lead?
Mr. REDLICH. I think the decision was made at the time that, while we were
really not very happy with the reply, we couldn't really disprove it. That was
not, as I recall, pursued beyond that point.
Mr. SAWYER. Is it fair to say that the matter was then dropped?
Mr. REDLICH. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.
Mr. SAWYER. Can you tell me why the decision was made that the people primarily
concerned on the staff were not allowed to see the X-rays or the photos of the
autopsy and who made the decision?
Mr. REDLICH. To the best of my recollection, sir, that decision was made by the
Chief Justice, himself. I was not present at any meeting of the Commission, so I
don't know that it was brought up at any Commission meeting. I believe the Chief
Justice himself held that the publication of the autopsy film and the X-rays
would be a great disservice to Mrs. Kennedy, the Kennedy family.
Mr. SAWYER. I am not talking about publication. I am talking about a member of
the staff that had primary responsibility and, or the Chief Justice himself to
look at these, not the public.
Mr. REDLICH. I can only surmise but I think the Chief Justice believed, based on
all of the evidence that we had, including the testimony of the autopsy doctors,
all of the physical evidence I think the Chief Justice, rightly or wrongly,
concluded that he preferred for those firms not to be viewed.
Now I would say that I know, because I have been shown today a memorandum form
mr. Specter, Mr. Specter I know had strongly felt, that that was a wrong
decision. I think that there may have been another factor, sir, although I don't
recall discussing it with the Chief Justice. I think the Chief Justice really
wanted everything that was going to be viewed by the Commission to be part of
the record. I think the Chief Justice felt rather strongly that he did not want
the American people to say that a fact should be assumed as true just because
Chief Justice Warren or anyone else saw it.
I think that he did not want those films to be viewed and form a basis for the
conclusion of the Commission unless that could be part of the record. Now the
Chief Justice is not here so I am just giving you may best recollection.
Certainly, sir, by retrospect in light of all of the discussions about those
films it might have been a wiser course of
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action to have allowed those films to have been viewed. But those films are of
course there now. I think by retrospect it would have been the wiser course of
action to have permitted those films to be viewed.
I remember Mr. specter's memorandum, and i would say it is a persuasive
memorandum. I happen to agree that the films themselves, while they ere
important sources of evidence, I think that the evidence that the Commission did
have before it amply supported the conclusion. But by retrospect I think that
some arrangement should have been worked out for those films to be seen.
Mr. SAWYER. Perhaps the most controversial aspects of this or one of the most
controversial is the single bullet theory. Here was positive evidence or
potential positive evidence tending to go to that part of the inquiry that you
refused to look at it even in camera. That I don't understand. I don't
understand what was the nucleus of that decision.
Mr. REDLICH. I can only respond to that by saying that what appears to you in
retrospect, by the perspective of 1977, as being a crucial bit of evidence, did
not appear that crucial at that time. While I agree with Mr. Specter that the
film should have been viewed, I believe quite strongly that if one looks at all
of the evidence that was there at the time, and there was a great deal of that--
Mr. SAWYER. Why not look at all the evidence? That is what you are saying?
Mr. REDLICH. I think the reasons for that were the reasons that the Chief
Justice gave and I think they are linked. One was the question of publicity; and
secondly, it was his feeling that what the commission was going to look at
should be in the record. Now we may disagree with that. I am not saying that it
was necessarily the correct decision.
I don't think those films are crucial to the single-bullet theory.
Mr. SAWYER. The single-bullet theory is not a newly cropped up argument. That
was an argument that was raised within the staff. According to Mr. Specter,
there was some debate and philosophical argument on how this could happen. If
you have the evidence that can either make it or break it, let us say, to refuse
to look at it--you know, no one would try a jury case without introducing the
facts that are available. That is what I don't understand.
Mr. REDLICH. Mr. Sawyer, I don't believe those films would make or break the
single-bullet theory.
Mr. SAWYER. You don't know because you didn't look.
Mr. REDLICH. I think that the commission would have been criticized for not
looking at them, but I believe that looking at those films which would either
confirm or not confirm what the doctors themselves said, who conducted the
autopsy; I think we are forgetting the fact that we had the testimony of the
three doctors who conducted the autopsy and who had themselves seen the firm.
Now, the single-bullet theory was a very complex formulation. If you have heard
from Mr. Specter, you have heard it from a person who knows a great deal about
it. I am not disagreeing with you that the films were an important bit of
evidence. You have asked me why and I can only say to you, one, I did not make
the decision; and secondly, I am giving you my best recollection why the
decision was made.
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Mr. SAWYER. My recollection is that there is a dispute between the testimony of
the autopsy diagrams and the diagrams of the location of the bullet that entered
the President's neck or back and they seem to be disagreeing with their own
diagram made at the time, as I recollect.
Mr. REDLICH. There is no doubt about their testimony that the bullet entered the
President's back and another bullet entered the base of the head. They testified
in detail about the track of the bullet. The pictorial diagram which they
prepared I think was not consistent with their testimony.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to have taken so much time.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The question that I have may not bear directly on procedures and the structure
of the staff and the Commission to undertake the investigation. Inasmuch as we
are into investigation, I would simply like to ask if at any time you were able
to read a transcript or hear a tape recording of the interviews held with Mr.
Oswald after his arrest?
Mr REDLICH. I do not recall any tape recordings. We had as a witness before the
Commission the Dallas police officer who questioned Lee Harvey Oswald. I believe
that he did not use a tape recorder. That is my best recollection. He himself
did not. So, were had his report of the interview with Oswald. We then had the
FBI agents' and possibly Secret Service, I am not sure, reports of their
interviews with Oswald. We then had the agents who had interviewed Oswald and
they testified before the Commission.
I also believe that the Dallas police officer who questioned Oswald also was
interviewed by an FBI agent, and we had the results of that interview.
Mr. FAUNTROY. but you recall at no time a verified account of what Mr. Oswald in
fact said?
Mr. REDLICH. If you mean an actual transcript, sir--
Mr. FAUNTROY. A transcript of some sort.
Mr. REDLICH. I do not have any recollection of that.
Mr. FAUNTROY. You were comfortable with the procedural fact that your had FBI
agents and police officers who outlined to you what they recalled from their
interrogation of Mr. Oswald?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes. To the best of my recollection, everyone who questioned Oswald
was questioned by the Commission or the staff, as I recall.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEVINE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. In connection with what Mr. Sawyer brought up, on the Hosty omission
from the transcript, was that the only omission you found in your comparison
analysis of the notebook and the transcript?
Mr. REDLICH. That is my recollection, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. That is the only one/
Mr. REDLICH. Yes. I would have to actually look at the letter that we wrote to
the Bureau because that contains whatever else there was, but that is my
recollection now.
Mr. DEVINE. The only deletion so far as you know?
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Mr. REDLICH. As far as I can remember it. If the letter to the Bureau goes
beyond that, my recollection is faulty.
Mr. DEVINE. The Hosty thing stands out in your mind?
Mr. REDLICH. The Hosty thing clearly stands out in my mind. I am reluctant to
say categorically that is all there was. I was asked the question about what was
concealed at the time I was there. I have read in the papers about a letter that
was given to agent Hosty that was supposed to have been destroyed, but we knew
nothing about that at the time.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you.
Mr. Klein, we have covered your next area for you.
Mr. KLEIN. Yes; I think so, Mr. Chairman, but I will try to go around the area.
Mr. FAUNTROY. go right through them. Just go straight on through if you don't
mind.
Mr. KLEIN. Dean Redlich, in the areas in which you participated in the
investigation and you have told us what those areas were, do you believe that
you were reasonably able to explore and resolve all the viable issues?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you have enough time to fully investigate those areas?
Mr REDLICH. I believe we did.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you experience any political pressures applies in any of those
areas which prevented you from thoroughly considering all the issues?
Mr. REDLICH. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion in each of the areas that you participated in the
investigation, did you have adequate support with respect to research needs and
investigators?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes. Once the decision was made that the investigatory arms of the
Federal Government were going to be used by the Commission my overall judgment
of the way that those investigatory arms performed was extremely favorable.
I believe that they were completely responsive to the requests of the Commission
for investigative work.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it fair to say that in your opinion you had the time and the
support, the facilities, to complete the full investigation in each of the areas
in which you worked?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir. When I left on that Friday morning, I was satisfied in my
mind that we had done a complete and thorough job and that we were no under
political pressure and that if I felt that we had not done a thorough job I
would have been arguing vigorously to keep the investigation going. I did not so
argue. I thought that we had done what we had set out to do the preceding
December.
Mr. KLEIN. One area you testified you worked in was the facts of the
assassination. Can you tell us how the single-bullet theory evolved?
Mr. REDLICH. I can't recall any specific moment in which someone said that this
is the way it was. We were studying the film very carefully. By we I mean Mr.
Specter, Mr. Belin, Mr. Eisenberg, myself, Special Agent Shaneyfelt, who was a
photography expert for the
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Bureau. We were studying the films carefully to see the positions of President
Kennedy and Governor Canaille. We had the ballistic testimony which was that the
bullet that was found on the stretcher and the fragments that were found in the
care had been fired from the rifle on the sixth floor of the Texas School book
Depository to the exclusion of all other weapons. We had the autopsy document.
There was examination of clothing. There was no had evidence at all that any
bullet had come from any other source. Now a question that was troublesome was
that as one looked at Governor Canaille's position in the care and realizing the
time within which it took to fire bullets from the rifle, if Governor Connally
was hit at a certain frame, and I forget the number, but a certain frame based
upon his body position, and if president Kennedy was hit at a certain frame
based upon our observation of the film, and if those frames were so close
together that one person physically could not have squeezed off the two bullets,
we would had a situation where all of the known facts that we had--remember,
there were no facts that we had that the bullets had come from any place other
than the sixth floor window--we would have had a situation where the facts
simply would have presented an irreconcilable conflict.
New since Governor Connally was in front of President Kennedy one hypothesis
which started to emerge, and I repeat I can't tell you when it emerged, but one
hypothesis that started to emerge, and it would have been logical to have
emerged with Arlen Specter, one hypothesis was that the same bullet struck both
men.
Then the question became one of testing that hypothesis--that was done in
several ways--the question of whether one bullet could have gone through
President Kennedy's neck and emerged, going at such a speed as to have done the
damage that it did. There was testimony from witnesses answering that question
in the affirmative.
A critical question of course was whether the two men were so alined at the time
that President Kennedy was shot in the neck that the bullet could have hit
Governor Connally. that was one reason that the reenactment in Dallas was
staged. The care was placed at the point where, based on the films and what we
could see in the background, the car was at the time that we believed the
President had been hit with the first bullet. I was in the School Book
Depository at the time of reenactment.
Then we had a camera set up on the rifle, itself, through the sights to see
whether at that particular moment the two bodies were in alinement. They were in
alinement.
The single-bullet theory has somehow emerged in discussion as if it were
unrelated to all the other facts. The point I am simply making is the fact that
the bullet which went through President Kennedy's neck also was the same bullet
that entered Governor Connally's back was completely consistent with all of the
evidence that we had at that time.
Mr. KLEIN. You spoke about the time required to fire the alleged murder weapon
twice and you spoke about the point at which hit appears the President was hi
and the point at which hit appears the Governor was hi. With that in mind, in
your opinion, if the single-bullet theory is not valid, that is if there were
two separate bullets
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which hit the Governor and the President, could there still have been only on
shooter?
Mr. REDLICH. The only way I can answer that question is to say to you that if
the single-bullet theory is not valid we would had to have gone back and
reevaluated all our other facts. I am not prepared to say that that means that
there necessarily had to be two assassins. i can only say that all of the facts
that we have were consistent with the single-bullet theory. If that turned out
to be wrong, if somebody said that didn't happen that way, it was conclusive
that it didn't happen, I cannot tell you what the results of a complete
reevaluation of all the facts would have been.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you familiar with Commission exhibit No. 399, the so-called
"pristine bullet"? Do you recall that? Again we are speaking about the
single-bullet theory My question is are you completely satisfied as you sit here
that Commission exhibit No. 399 is the bullet that went through both Kennedy and
Canaille?
Mr. REDLICH. Assuming 399 is the bullet that was found on the stretcher at
Parkland Hospital, the answer is yes.
Mr. KLEIN. I believe that the conclusion of the Warren Commission was that 399
was found on a particular stretcher. Are you in a agreement with that
conclusion?
Mr. REDLICH. I am. I was simply being cautious, not having the report in front
of me and not knowing what 399 was.
Mr. KLEIN. If I tell you that 3999 was the bullet that the Warren Commission
concluded was found on Connally's stretcher, then you are completely satisfied
that that bullet went through both Kennedy and Connally?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. KLEIN. Based on your knowledge of the single-bullet theory, I will pose a
hypothetical. That is, if Commission exhibit No. 399 was not on Connally's
stretcher but if it were on Kennedy's stretcher, in your opinion would the
single-bullet theory have any validity? That is, if the Warren Commission was
incorrect when the concluded that exhibit 399 had been on Connally's stretcher?
Mr. REDLICH. I am trying to understand the point As you know from the testimony
of nurses, there was some question of where the bullet--as to the question of
the stretcher, I can only reiterate I am completely persuaded that a bullet went
through President Kennedy, the base of his neck, went through his body with a
downward trajectory, emerged at the base of his tie. Then proceeded with a
slight yaw and entered their right side of Governor Connally, hit his ribs, as I
recall, emerged through his belly, did the damage to his wrist and then was
lodged in his thigh and that one bullet did those things.
I am also convinced that a second bullet entered that back of President
Kennedy's head and blew out the right side of his head, killing him. now the
question of the bullet ending up on particular stretchers is something that I am
not quite sure I understand the thrust of. I can tell you what my conclusion is
as precisely as I just did. If somebody found that bullet on President Kennedy's
stretcher I would have to start to look to see where it came from, what
happened.
Obviously if that "pristine bullet' only went through President Kennedy, then it
would be at variance with the conclusion that I
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just described to you. But that is because I believe that the two men were
alined and based upon what that bullet had to go through, hit President
Kennedy's back, the absence of bone tissue, the fact that it was probably
emerging at almost the speed as when it entered, leads me to the conclusion that
it had nowhere else to go other than to hit Governor Connally.
Mr. KLEIN. Moving on, the second area that you testified you were involved in
was the investigation of Marina Oswald--is that correct?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that these two documents be
marked as exhibits.
Mr. PREYER. The documents will be marked as JFK exhibit No. 13. Without
objection it will be entered into the record at this time.
[JFK exhibition No. 13 was received; entered in the record, and follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 13
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Mr. KLEIN. [Handling this document, which is a memorandum dated February 28,
1964, to Dean Redlich.] Do you recognize that memorandum?
Mr. REDLICH. I do recall it; yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Have you had an opportunity to review that memorandum earlier today
in my office?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall writing that memorandum?
Mr. REDLICH. I believe I wrote that. I am not denying that I wrote it.
Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention to page 2 of the memorandum, the second
paragraph, the second sentence. I quote:
We cannot ignore, however, that Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the Secret
Service, the FBI, and this Commission on matters which are of vital concern to
the people of this country and the world.
Will you explain what you were referring to in that sentence please?
Mr. REDLICH. I have been thinking about that, Mr. Klein. This memorandum was
written in February 1964, shortly after Mr. Martin testified. As the committee
will notice, the purpose of this memorandum was to explain to the Commission why
I had pursued a line of inquiry with regard to Mr. Martin, a line of inquiry
which presented Mrs. Oswald in a less than favorable light. My explanation was
that we had an obligation to pursue all possible motives. One of the motives
could have been that Mrs. Oswald, through the kind of person that she was, drove
Lee Harvey Oswald to the assassination. I am not saying that was the motive. I
am saying that was a possibility. Therefore, I took the position in this
memorandum that Mrs. Oswald, that the nature of her character, the kind of
person that she was, was relevant to the scope of the inquiry.
In the course of that, I wrote this sentence.
Now I have tried to recollect any specific matter that i may have had in mind,
and I have to say that I do not recollect anything specific. It may have been,
and one would have to go back into the investigatory report, it may have been at
first she may not have told the truth in connection with the attempted killing
of General Walker. It may have been. I am really just surmising she may have
been asked if Oswald had ever engaged in violence, and she may have at first
said "No" and then brought out the fact about the General Walker shooting.
I can only recall that I prepared a lengthy memorandum, and I hope it is in the
files because if I had that I could answer your questions, that it was a lengthy
memorandum that I prepared which was the basis for her questioning. As I say, I
worked for about 5 or 6 weeks to develop a series of questions. Now I give to
Mr. Rankin a lengthy document which had a proposed series of questions, and to
each one of those questions I indicated the testimony that she had given at
various times, because she had been interviewed many times.
I indicated the testimony that she had given, the instances where it was in
conflict, and indicated the kind of questions that I thought should be asked
when she came before the Commission. This, of course,
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refers to the Secret Service and to the FBI. I believe that most of what I was
referring to in this sentence would have related to the answers that she would
have given to those agencies.
If you can find that document, i will be happy, if you called it to my
attention, to try to be specific on the answer. As of now I have no clear
recollection of any particular event other than the possibility of the Walker
one, and there was also the possibility that she may have original denied that
there was any other act of violence or any threat of violence whereas he had in
fact at one point told her that he was going to kill Mr. Nixon, which came out
later.
Mr. KLEIN. Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate many documents which
should be in the Archives. I do not have and have not read the document which
you are referring, but let me ask you this. As you sit here today, is it your
recollection of your investigation of Marina Oswald that this sentence is
basically correct, or was there any kind of change in your attitude toward her
credibility?
Mr. REDLICH. I would say that at the time I wrote this letter on February 28,
this statement is correct. I would not have written it if I did not think it was
correct. now I also say that at the time our investigation was over, I was
satisfied that whatever light she could throw on the assassination that was
relevant to our inquiry she had given us, and that there was no need to pursue
any further questioning of her. She was questioned again, I believe; I believe
in Dallas. It is possible that some of the areas might have been cleared up at
that point or cleared up in subsequent interviews that we may have asked the FBI
to conduct with her. So that this statement at the time I wrote it I must have
believed was correct, and if I could find that document, it would give you the
details of it.f
At the time we concluded our investigation, I did not feel that Marina Oswald
could have cast any additional light on the critical questions that were before
the Commission.
Can I just amend that answer slightly, Mr. Klein? Let me say that I felt that
any additional questioning of Marina Oswald was not going to cast additional
light. No one can really be sure whether someone possesses information. I think
the only thing I felt reasonably sure of, and still do, was that any further
questioning of her was not going to produce anything more than we knew.
Mr. KLEIN. I am just trying to understand your last statement. Is it your belief
that with proper time and investigative resources that Marina Oswald could shed
further light on the investigation?
Mr. REDLICH. I have no way of judging that. Fortunately, we live in a society
where there are limits on the extent to which one tries to pry information from
the mind of a human being. There may have been aspects about Mrs. Oswald's life,
of what she perceived to be of a personal nature, which she would not have
wanted to have discussed. Whether those could cast light on his motives one can
only speculate.
As you know, the Warren Commission reached the conclusion that there was no
evidence of a conspiracy. We tried to indicate several possible motives. Proving
negatives is always a very difficult thing to do. Whether Mrs. Oswald has
information in her mind that might be useful to this Commission I would doubt,
but I would not
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categorically say that any person does not have information in one's mind except
what I say about myself. I do not.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Will counsel yield, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I earlier indicated the fact that Mr. Oswald was dead dictated
what structures and procedures you had to follow, and that, while the absence of
any verbatim account of what he had to say did not disturb you unduly,
obviously, from your statement here, you did have some specific things in mind
which, of course, you obviously, after 13 years, can't recall specifically, and
counsel has advised us that we don't have access to the memorandum or writing
that might have refreshed your memory on those, I just wondered, inasmuch as
Mrs. Oswald is still available to us, if it would job your memory to think a
minute about what we might ask her, that you might have asked her had you had
the affirmative response to your memo?
Mr. REDLICH. The reason I find it difficult to answer that is that you must
understand that that sentence would have been completely consistent with Mrs.
Oswald's having told certain things to the FBI on one occasion, and then saying,
"I didn't tell you the truth that time, this is the truth." It would have been
consistent with her having told the FBI something on one occasion and then
coming before the Warren Commission, saying, "This is not the truth, that was
not." So, at the time I wrote this sentence it should not be interpreted as
meaning the I thought there were then a great many unanswered questions about
her.
I did think there were some because I did state later in the memorandum that "We
will be questioning Ruth and Michael Paine and possibly be reexamining Marina
Oswald." To my best recollection I did feel that we should reexamine Marina
Oswald and that happened I believe in July of the investigation. What I am not
sure of at this moment is whether after her testimony before the Commission
staff and whether after her subsequent questioning by agents of the FBI, if in
fact we asked them to do it and I am not sure about it, whether after all of
that, I still feel that I have doubts about what she told us. That is why I find
it hard to answer your question in the affirmative.
She is obviously a very important person in understanding Lee harvey Oswald and
possibly his motives. She was with him a great deal of the time. Her testimony
is very relevant as to whom he knew, whom he spoke to. I simply am unable to
tell you now whether I felt that we had anything less than the truth from her at
the time we finished in December 1964.
I must have felt that we did at the time I wrote this memorandum in February
1964.
Mr. FAUNTROY. But it is accurate to say that at the conclusion of the
Commission's work you were satisfied that your questions about the possible
motives for Oswald having their origin in the character of Marina Oswald, his
wife, were satisfied?
Mr. REDLICH. The Commission reached no conclusion on motive. my own personal
opinion is that I could not reach a conclusion on motives.
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I think it is possible that the personal, and this is my own persona; judgment
on this, sir, that the personal relationship between the two of them could have
been a factor. I am a lawyer and not a psychiatrist and I don't know whether
someone with psychiatric training would have a different view of this. The most
I would say is that that could have been a factor. But there could have been
other factors. It could have been a man who wanted to demonstrate that he was
really an important person, quite apart from his wife. He could have been a man
who had an intense dislike of authority.
He could have been a man who, based on his Marxist writings, had an intense
dislike of anything in the capitalistic system. I could have been any one of a
multiplicity of motives. I think that is something that people will speculate
about for along time to come.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Klein.
Mr. KLEIN. Dean Redlich, in the area of autopsy you have given extensive
testimony already; are you aware that the FBI report issued on December 9, 1963,
and the supplementary FBI report issued on January 13, 1964, both stated that
the first bullet to hit the President did not exit from his body? Are your aware
of that?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir, I do recall that.
Mr. KLEIN. During the course of the investigation were you able to account for
the discrepancy between the FBI report and the autopsy report, considering that
the autopsy report was written before the FBI report was written?
Mr. REDLICH. I believe that we satisfied ourselves that what happened was that
the FBI agents who were present at the autopsy were recalling their recollection
of what was being said and the doctors were examining various hypotheses during
the time of the autopsy, and that accounted for the FBI report saying one thing
and the doctors saying another.
I thought the FBI report was a grossly inadequate document. In fairness to the
Bureau they apparently decided to produce something very quickly, but based upon
what I feel I know and remember about the facts of the assassination, I think it
was a grossly inadequate document.
Mr. KLEIN. When you say it was a grossly inadequate document is that in all
respects or are you just talking about the autopsy?
Mr. REDLICH. I think the way it handled the autopsy, I believe--let me put it to
you this way, Mr. Klein. If all we had before us was the FBI report about the
assassination, the unanswered questions about the assassination would have been
legion and they would have come from very responsible sources, because the thing
that we were talking about earlier, the single-bullet theory, the explanation of
the totality of the facts of what happened, was simply not in the FBI report.
It took us a long time to work it up. I don't want to be critical in terms of
the time they had available to them but I think that this Government owed much
more to the American people than the FBI report that was presented to the
Commission, and we certainly did not use that as any type of basis for our
investigation.
Mr. DEVINE. If the gentleman will yield at that point, was not that FIB report a
preliminary report? Had i been a complete report there would have been no need
for an examination?
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Mr. REDLICH. What I was suggesting was that if that had been the final work,
that FBI report had been the final word, I think perhaps long before 1977 there
would have been a need for this committee, sir, because a great many questions
that I believe we answered were left unanswered by the Bureau's report. That may
have simply been a matter of--
Mr. DEVINE. Is it your understanding that was a final report from the FBI to a
preliminary report?
Mr. REDLICH. I am not sure of that. That was a report that I believe may have
been done for the President at the time and then given to us. Then I would have
to look at the report. I think you have raised a very good question. I would
have liked to look at the report again to see what they said about it. I would
say that report, just standing on its four corners, was in my opinion not an
adequate explanation of the assassination. In fairness to the Bureau, it may
well never have been intended to be a definitive report of the assassination and
if that is true, then my comments have to be judged in that light.
Mr. DEVINE. Then it was less than a month following the assassination, was it
not?
Mr. REDLICH. I think so.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Redlich, what present predispositions did you have toward the
intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, prior to working for the
Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. As a professor of constitutional law I regarded myself as a civil
libertarian. I had regarded the FBI and its activities during the 1950's in the
cold war period as being one which had been repressive of free speech. So I did
not come to Washington with the view that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was a model that I should choose to follow. I had had no direct experience with
it. I had felt that the Bureau had been part of what I perceived to be a most
unfortunate period in the history of civil liberties in the United States.
I had no particular feeling about the CIA or the Secret Service.
Mr. KLEIN. Will you describe the relationship of the Warren Commission to each
of the intelligence agencies. How in your opinion did the Warren Commission view
the agencies and how did the agencies view the Warren Commission? Mr. REDLICH. I
can say very little about the CIA because I had virtually no contact with it,
perhaps no contact with it. That was handled by Mr. William Coleman and David
Slawson, to some extent Willens. Now as far as the FBI is concerned, I thought
that we had a good relationship notwithstanding my extreme annoyance over the
Hosty matter. As I look at the totality of the work the did over this 9 or 10
month period there is nothing that we asked them to do that they didn't do and
do promptly.
While there were certain instances where I thought they made mistakes, that was
our problem to evaluate their work. But as far as cooperation was concerned,
while, as you know, the Bureau had fairly rigid rules about who wrote letters to
whom, and the letter that came from the Bureau was signed by Mr. Hoover, the
Bureau I found to be a very cooperative agency.
The Secret Service we did not ask to do that much. Whatever we asked them to do,
mainly in connection with some work in connection
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with the reconstruction of the assassination in Dallas, I found them to be
cooperative. I would say that notwithstanding my predisposition, which I already
mentioned to you, before I came to Washington, I left Washington with the
feeling which I incorporated in letters that I wrote to Mr. Hoover, with the
feeling of respect for the FBI.
I came with a feeling that maybe there were two FBI's. Maybe there is the FBI
that works as a professional law enforcement level; that was the group I dealt
with, that was the group for which I came away with a very healthy respect.
Maybe there was another FBI which dealt with political matters, which I had
nothing to do with, and which undoubtedly accounted for my prior negative
feelings about their work.
Time after time as I worked with their experts I found they were fair, cautious,
and did not try to overstate the case. They were not trying to convict Lee
Harvey Oswald ex post facto, they were a very professional organization.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified as to the Hosty notebook. Other than that to your
knowledge did any of the intelligence agencies ever intentionally withhold any
information from the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. To my knowledge as of September 1964 or my knowledge not?
Mr. KLEIN. As of September 1964.
Mr. REDLICH. As of September 1964 my best recollections that it was only the
Hosty matter.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today do you know of any such information?
Mr. REDLICH. As I sit here today I have read reports that Lee Harvey Oswald
delivered a letter to Agent Hosty in Dallas which Agent Hosty destroyed. I think
that is inexcusable. Now the question of what blame one attributes to the Bureau
depends one what Agent Hosty did. Whoever to turnout that people in high
positions of authority in the Bureau knew about that and didn't tell us, then I
would be very chagrined about that and it would certainly lead me to qualify my
statement that they had cooperated in every way.
If it was only Agent Hosty or some immediate superior I think that is a subject
of condemnation but I would not condemn the entire Bureau.
Now the other aspect that I have read in the press is that the CIA and the FBI
and Mr. Dulles are supposed to have known of a plot to assassinate Premier
Castro. I think that should have been brought to the attention of the
Commission.
Mr. KLEIN. The information that you just testified to relating to the note that
was not received and the attempt to assassinate Premier Castro, in your opinion
had this information been given to the Warren Commission would it have affected
the investigation?
Mr. REDLICH. Let us take them one at a time.
The note to Hosty. How it would have affected the investigation would have
depended--perhaps I don't understand your question. Do you man the existence of
the note or the fact that Hosty destroyed it?
Mr. KLEIN. I mean if you had known that the note existed would the investigation
have proceeded along different avenues than it ultimately went?
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Mr. REDLICH. That one I think would not have had too great affect on the inquiry
for this reason. As I recall, at some point in the investigation, perhaps in the
questioning of Ruth Paine, It was brought out that Lee Harvey Oswald had gone
down to the Dallas Police Department [sic] and had threatened to blow the
headquarters up or words to that effect. At least that is my recollection. To
the extent that the letter would have confirmed that fact it would have been
additional evidence.
But the relevant fact that Lee Harvey Oswald was capable of violence is
something that the Bureau, if my recollection is correct about the Ruth Paine
Testimony, would have known about, because she testified that Oswald had gone to
the FBI headquarters in Dallas and threatened to blow it up. So that that would
have only been relevant in evaluating the performance of the FBI in not turning
over Oswald's name to the Secret Service.
If I am right that the Bureau had that information, then I think the fact that
they would have had the information in the form of a letter would not have
materially affected the investigation.
Mr. KLEIN. On that point your answer is based on the testimony that you read in
the newspapers that was given by agent Hosty saying that the letter was a threat
by Oswald to blow up the FBI building. is it fair to say that your answer is
predicated on accepting agent Hosty's explanation of that was in the letter and
that the Warren Commission might have been able to further investigate the
letter and affirm whether or not that was in fact what the letter said? Was that
an avenue of investigation that might have been open to the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes; we would have had the letter. We would have been able to
compare the letter with what I recall was Mrs. Paine's testimony. That would
have been relevant to the question of Oswald's propensity to violence which
would have been relevant in terms of the FBI failure to report it to the Secret
Service because we had a lot of other evidence of Oswald's propensity to
violence at that time the investigation was made.
Mr. KLEIN. When you say that the letter that was destroyed--would not have
affected your investigation you are accepting Agent Hosty's 1976 testimony as to
what the letter said. I am saying that had you known at the time of the
investigation that a letter existed then do you think that that might have led
to an investigation and who knows what would have been found as to what the
letter actually said?
Mr. REDLICH. I am sorry, Mr. Klein, I did not understand your question. you are
quite right . Not having the letter we don't know what the letter said. If the
letter had said something different from what Agent Hosty said in 1977, then we
might have had a different investigation.
Mr. KLEIN. Further along that line, had you known the letter existed in 1964
when you investigated this case, then there would have been a lot of avenues
that you might have gone to, to try to find out what this relationship was.
Again, not necessarily accepting what Agent Hosty said the letter said.
Mr. REDLICH. That would depend entirely on what the letter said. I can only
speculate on that.
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Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, did any of the intelligence agencies ever
intentionally delay providing the Warren Commission with any information?
Mr. REDLICH. If they did it was not something that I recall.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge did any of intelligence agencies ever intentionally
provide the Warren Commission with false or misleading information?
Mr. REDLICH. Again I would say that as of September 1964 I would answer to my
knowledge no. If the alleged facts are true that there was a plot to assassinate
Premier Castro, and Mr. Hoover and Mr. McCone said that they had given us all
the information that was relevant to this assassination, then sitting here today
I would say that those statements were not accurate.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today do you have an opinion as to what might have
motivated the intelligence agencies to either withhold information or provide
false information?
Mr. REDLICH. You are asking a general question. The only information that I have
any knowledge about, which his what I learned through the press, relates to the
Hosty letter and the assassination plot in regard to Castro. I can only
speculate about that.
Mr. KLEIN. What would your speculation be?
Mr. REDLICH. Do you want my speculation?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes.
Mr. REDLICH. My speculation might be that the FBI could conceivably have
been--not the FBI but the Agent Hosty or someone in the Bureau might have felt
that a letter in their possession threatening to blow up the Dallas headquarters
of the Bureau would have been construed as, and put the Bureau on notice that
Lee Harvey Oswald was a person who was dangerous and therefore they should have
reported him to the Secret Service. In fact you will recall that the Warren
Commission did criticize the FBI in its report for not reporting Oswald to the
Secret Service.
Now I think that a possible reason is that they may have felt that this would
put the Bureau in a bad light. On the question of the assassination one can only
speculate that they may have had reasons that they perceived to be national
security in mind. They may have felt that if this were brought to the Commission
it might have led to certain areas of investigation which they perceived to be
matters of great national security. I can only guess about that and I really
have no knowledge.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion did the fact that prior to the formation of the
Warren Commission the FBI had issued its December 9 report and January 13 report
which concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, did that fact in
any way affect the investigation of the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. No .we did not accept that conclusion. We started with a completely
clean slate.
Mr. KLEIN. In your opinion while working for the Warren Commission, were the FBI
agents who worked for you adverse to, or were they open to, the proposition that
the Bureau might have been wrong when it concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was
the lone assassin.
Mr. REDLICH. I can't really analyze what was in the minds of the individual
agents. It is rare for people in or out of Government to be
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happy with the thought that something they worked on was wrong. I think that the
Bureau personnel was probably no exception to that. On the other hand I found
that in my working with them on questions of film analysis, I didn't have a
sense of working with a group of people who were resisting what the Commission
was done. I had a sense of a group of people who were trying to help us with
that we were doing.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it possible that the FBI, having already conducted its own
investigation and reached a conclusion, wanted to tailor the Warren Commission
investigation to conform to that conclusion?
Mr. REDLICH. I don't believe that is possible.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge was any consideration given to hiring independent
investigators?
Mr. REDLICH. I have clear recollection of that. Certainly during the time of the
investigation from time to time staff members talked to Mr. Rankin about what it
might have been like if we had had a completely independent staff. I think that
we reached the conclusion then, with which I still agree, that while using the
existing investigatory arms of the United states had certain disadvantages, that
on balance it was still the right decision to make. There were certain
tradeoffs.
We got the benefit of what I still believe to be a highly efficient,
cooperative, vast investigative apparatus which cooperated. The tradeoff was
that it could be said that we were using the very agencies of the United States
who might have some stake in a preordained result. I don't think there was any
happy, completely happy, solution to that dilemma.
I am satisfied that it was the right decision.
Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today, if you had to make that decision at this time
you would make the same decision? I am saying if this were 1963, knowing what
you know, would you make the same decision to use FBI agents as investigators?
Mr. REDLICH. I still think I would make the same decision. The only
qualification I would give to that would involve information that this committee
may know that I don't know and that is what one has learned about the extent to
which the FBI may have withheld information. Now based upon what I now know,
which is limited to the Hosty matter, I am not prepared to conclude that that
decision was erroneous.
Mr. KLEIN. Just one other question in this area which I had asked before but we
did not actually get to it. If the Warren Commission had known about the CIA
plot to assassinate Premier Castro would that have affected the investigation
and, if so, how?
Mr. REDLICH. I think it would have affected it, Mr. Klein. How I am not
completely sure. I think that an important fact like that might perhaps have led
to additional inquiry as to whether the Cuban Government might have known about
it, whether in some way the Cuban Government might have tried to retaliate.
Although I am cognizant of the fact that the Warren Commission, at least to the
best of my recollection, did look into every Cuban connection that Oswald had,
it is possible that this additional fact might have led to further inquiry. I
also think that it might have affected Oswald's motive or at least affected our
conclusion with regard to Oswald's motive quite apart from conspiracy. For
example if it could be shown that Oswald knew about
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the proposed plot to assassinate Castro, then the Commission could have
concluded that this was an additional motive that Oswald might have had. I would
doubt that the Commission would have concluded this was the sole motive, but
this could have been an additional motive. From my investigatory experience with
the Warren Commission, I think that we would have started an investigation.
Where that would have led I couldn't tell you.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I have only a few more questions which are of a
conclusory type, so I would now yield of anybody else has any questions in the
areas we have covered.
Mr. PREYER. I think Mr. Blakey has a few questions.
Mr. BLAKEY. Dean Redlich, I would like to see if I could pin down for the record
a couple of matters or at least one general matter that has been raised here by
a number of questions. I wonder if you will bear with me if I ask you a couple
of related questions.
Let me direct your attention to the period of time during which you worked on
the Warren Commission and ask you to your knowledge did the Chief Justice have
any information while he was serving with the Warren Commission concerning any
involvement of any of the U.S. intelligence agencies in alleged plots or
attempts against Cuba or to assassinate Fidel Castro?
Mr. REDLICH. To my knowledge, the Chief Justice had no such knowledge. I knew of
no such knowledge that the Chief Justice may have possessed.
Mr. BLAKEY. To your knowledge, did any other Commissioner have any such
information while he was serving on the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. To my direct knowledge, Mr. Blakey, no. I, of course, have read
about Mr. Dulles, but I have no direct knowledge.
Mr. BLAKEY. at the time you were serving on the Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. While I was serving I had no such knowledge.
Mr. BLAKEY. To your knowledge, did any staff members have any such information
while he was serving with the Warren Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. To my knowledge; no, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice
from which you could have or which you in fact did infer that he did have such
knowledge?
Mr. REDLICH. No, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any other
Commissioner from which you could have or you did infer that he had such
knowledge?
Mr. REDLICH. no, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect, was there any conduct on the part of the staff
members from which you could have or did infer that he had such knowledge?
Mr. REDLICH. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you see any document while you were serving on the Commission
from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice, any other
Commissioner, or any staff member had such knowledge?
Mr. REDLICH. I recall no such document.
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Mr. BLAKEY. Were you ever present at any discussions from which you could have
or did infer that the Chief Justice, any Commissioner, or any staff member had
such knowledge?
Mr. REDLICH. I recall no such conversation.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you ever instructed by anyone while you were serving on the
Warren Commission not to pursue any line of inquiry?
Mr. REDLICH. No; except I think that the Chief Justice was unhappy about the
questions I was asking Mr. Martin which led to that document which had nothing
to do with Cuba.
Mr. BLAKEY. Is that the only instance where either the Chief Justice or a
Commissioner or a staff member superior to you directed you or expressed
disapproval of a line of inquiry that you were pursuing?
Mr. REDLICH. To the best of my recollection; yes, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you ever instructed by anyone, the Chief Justice, a
Commissioner, or superior staff members or anyone else, not to pursue any line
of inquiry because the inquiry might endanger national security?
Mr. REDLICH. No, sir.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did anyone ever suggest to you while you were serving with the
Commission that such matters should not be explored?
Mr. REDLICH. No, sir, just to be completely on the record, and I know this is
irrelevant but I assume in answering all your questions we are making an
exception to my questioning of Mr. Martin. That related to some incident that
occurred between Marina Oswald and somebody in Moscow before she met lee Harvey
Oswald, which, as I recall, involved a diplomat, but it was a purely personal
encounter. That was really a matter of taste and a feeling that this might cause
embarrassment between the United States and that government relating to this
personal encounter. But it was a purely private matter and quite unrelated.
The only reason I was pursuing the line of inquiry was for the reason I stated;
namely, to find out what we could about Marina Oswald as a person.
Mr. BLAKEY. You have no knowledge that anyone associated with the Commission
knew or had reason to know of the assassination plot?
Mr. REDLICH. That is correct. That is my testimony.
Mr. BLAKEY. To your knowledge the existence of those assassination plots was
never used by any member associated or any person associated with the Commission
to limit your investigation in any way?
Mr. REDLICH. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Stokes.
Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dean Redlich, I am quite concerned about the memorandum that you wrote to Mr.
Rankin. It was obviously written to him as a result of some very strong feelings
you had regarding the matters contained in the memorandum. Is that true?
Mr. REDLICH. With regard to that memorandum I felt that it was important to
examine everything that we could about the kind of person Marina Oswald was. I
did feel strongly that we should do that. That is why I wrote the memorandum in
February of 1964, which was shortly after she testified.
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Mr. STOKES. Let me for a moment refer to this specific language in the
memorandum. You say, "This Commission has undertaken not only to determine who
fired the shots that killed President Kennedy but to study all evidence which
might lead to an explanation for why the crime was committed." Now, to the best
of your recollection when the final report was prepared, did you then feel that
the report that was prepared and issued as a Warren Commission report had
complied with that part of the mandate as you understood it?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir, I do, understanding my answer does not mean that I ever
felt in this memorandum that the mandate of the Commission report was to reach a
single conclusion with regard to plot.
I was always possible to reach an alternative conclusion once we had negatived
the evidence of conspiracy.
Mr. STOKES. As to that aspect of it in which you referred to studying all
evidence and that which had prompted you to write this memorandum, did you feel
that the final report then contained all evidence so that you could feel with
sureness that the report did reflect those concerns you had?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir.
Mr. STOKES. Has anything occurred or transpired in this interim period which
would now make you feel any differently?
Mr. REDLICH. I would like to answer that question with a little bit of
elaboration. There is nothing that I know of, sir, which leads to question the
Warren Commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald fired all the shot that
killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. Based upon anything I
have read, ad I am not privy to anything other than that, it is still my best
opinion that the conclusion of the Commission that there is no evidence Lee
Harvey Oswald conspired with any group, either foreign or domestic, in the
performance of those acts is still a valid conclusion. Based upon anything else
that I know I believe that the conclusion of the Warren Commission that it could
not ascribe a particular motive to the assassination is still one which I
support.
Mr. STOKES. Obviously, Marina Oswald was your area, you spent a great deal of
time preparing for her examination, and on this particular occasion it was your
concern about the Commission having full and complete and incisive data relative
to her so that they might come to a proper conclusion relative to her testimony.
I am concerned then about that part of your memorandum where you say, "We cannot
ignore, however, that Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the Secret Service,
the FBI and this Commission on matters that are of vital concern to the people
of this country." You told us earlier today that she testified before the
Commission on many occasions.
You refer in here to some further reexamination of her. Is that correct and I
did I quote you correctly?
Mr. REDLICH. She testified for I believe 4 or 5 days in february of 1964. Then
she was questioned again by a staff member, I believe Mr. Liebeler. She was
questioned both before February and after by FBI agents. This memorandum was
written basically at the conclusion of her Commission testimony in February.
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Mr. STOKES. did she ever reappear before the Commission for further
reexamination?
Mr. REDLICH. I don't believe that she did. I have no recollection of her
appearing before the Commission. I do recall that Mr. Liebeler, I think it was,
questioned her in Dallas. I believe that on other occasions we may have asked
the FBI to interview her on specific matter as further leads came to light.
Mr. STOKES. In terms of the Commission's final report how would you characterize
their reliance upon Marina Oswald's testimony? Would you say that they relied
upon it not at all or slightly or they relied upon it heavily?
Mr. REDLICH. I think on balance when all of the evidence is--the testimony of
Marina Oswald by itself was in my judgment not strongly submitted to the
Commission's basic conclusions, because with regard to all of the physical
evidence, the ownership of the rifle, the ownership of the revolver, that was
developed quite apart from Marina Oswald's testimony. Marina Oswald knew of no
contacts that Oswald might have had with other people.
She told us, for example, that the Fair Play For Cuba Committee was one person.
We have no evidence at all that it was anything other than one person.
Everything that one looked int, the event in New Orleans, confirms that. A great
deal of Marina Oswald's life with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas was confirmed by
Ruth hyde Paine with whom she lived. So that I think that on balance Marina
Oswald's testimony was less significant by the time we were through than might
have appeared at the time we started our investigation when she was of course a
very important factor.
Now once one gets into the question of negatives, it is always possible that
Oswald could have met someone and Marina might have known about it and Marina
did not tell us. That is possible. But their has been no other evidence of any
such contact.
I don't believe that the Commission really relied on Marina Oswald for its
conclusion or for its two basic conclusions, the identity of the assassin and
the nonexistence of evidence of a conspiracy. I do not believe that Marina
Oswald was the basis for those conclusions.
Mr. STOKES. But you did feel, and you did feel very strongly, that knowledge of
the real character of Marina Oswald was important to the Commission if they were
to be able to properly understand and to construe the motives that possibly lay
behind Lee Harvey Oswald's assassinating the President, did you not?
Mr. REDLICH. Yes, sir, and I still believe that.
Mr. STOKES. Let me ask you this. Knowing all that you know about Marina Oswald,
from all that you studied and prepared and from all the testimony that she have
all he agencies and to the Commission, would you believe her oath?
Mr. REDLICH. I would regard marina Oswald, based upon everything that I knew at
the time we were finished with our investigation, i would find her a credible
witness. Now whether I would believe everything she would testify about the
intimacies of her personal relationship with her husband, I don't know how to
answer that. I think that it is very hard for me to form my judgment about that,
ask a woman about the relationship with her husband of a purely personal nature.
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I think that any commission, and this committee also, that relied entirely on
the testimony of a person without corroborating testimony of other witnesses or
other facts is running the risk that that person might not have been a credible
witness. But I am not prepared to say on balance that Mrs. Oswald is not a
credible witness.
Mr. STOKES. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have one question that follows what our staff director and chief counsel asked
you. Do you have any knowledge that the Kennedy family requested the Chief
Justice not to go into the X-ray and photographic and other related medical
evidence, that that was the reason that was not pursued avidly by the staff and
by the Commission?
Mr. REDLICH. Mr. Devine, at this point it is hard for me to differentiate what
effect that might have had or a variety of things that one has read in the past
14 years. I also notice that there is reference to the Kennedy family in the
Specter memorandum which has been placed in the record. My impression, and I
cannot be more precise than that, my impression was that the Kennedy family was
concerned about the publicity, about a public display of the President's skull
in those pictures.
The chief Justice was very sensitive to that. He felt that that family had
undergone just tremendous trauma, and he was very sensitive to that, perhaps by
retrospect overly sensitive. but he was very sensitive to it. Now, I don't
believe that it would be fair to the Kennedys, at least on the basis of anything
I know of, to conclude that it was because of their directly saying to the Chief
Justice that we wanted it this way, that it was done this way. I have no
information of that kind.
I believed that the Chief Justice shouldered the responsibility for it. I think
one reason that he made the decision, perhaps a main reason, was his concern
about their sensitivity. I believe it would not be fair to the Kennedy family to
conclude that they were in any way directing him, telling him that this was the
course of action.
Mr. DEVINE. You have no personal knowledge that such a request was made by the
family to him, is hat correct?
Mr. REDLICH. I have no personal knowledge of it.
Mr. DEVINE. I want to thank you for your very candid testimony. It must be
strange for a dean of a law school to be in such a position. I notice also from
your biography we should wish you a happy birthday next Saturday.
Mr. REDLICH. Thank you very much. You must be good investigators.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. I just have one question. It seems more from your curiosity than the
search for relevant information, but in your memorandum you allude to the
actions of Marina Oswald in Washington. I am not aware of what that was. Can you
enlighten me at all?
Mr. SAWYER. I have the disability of not knowing that about which I am asking. I
am not aware of it. Maybe counsel will enlighten me.
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Mr. REDLICH. I would like the record to show that I am prepared to answer the
question.
[Counsel consults with Mr. Sawyer.]
Mr. SAWYER. I find out that it is nothing biologically unusual. I withdraw the
question.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. REDLICH. With regard to the transcript, do I understand that I will be given
an opportunity to look at my testimony to see whether, with all due respect to
the expert transcriber, he has recorded accurately what I have said?
Mr. PREYER. You may have that privilege.
May I ask you two unrelated questions, one following up Mr. Stokes. Have you
read Marina Oswald's new book or the book about her?
Mr. REDLICH. No. I have managed to go on to do a lot of interesting things in my
life since 1964 by avoiding those things.
Mr. PREYER. So you would not know whether it is consistent with what she might
have testified before you.
Were you or any member of the staff that you know of aware of the letter which
Deputy Attorney Katzenbach wrote to all the members of the Commission on
December 9, I believe it was, urging them to issue a press release to the effect
that Oswald was the lone assassin and showing that there was no international
conspiracy involved? Did you know anything about that?
Mr. REDLICH. this is the first I have heard about that.
Mr. PREYER. You did not send a copy of that letter to any member of the staff?
Mr. REDLICH. No. At that time I don't think there was a staff.
Mr. PREYER. I guess that is right, December 9.
Mr. REDLICH. I think Mr. Rankin was just appointed that day.
Mr. DEVINE. You were not on board that day?
Mr. REDLICH. I was not on board. I was called by Mr. Rankin a day or two after
his appointment was mentioned.
Mr. PREYER. On January 20, was Mr. Katzenbach present at that meeting?
Mr. REDLICH. no, sir.
Mr. PREYER. Think you.
Do you have a few conclusory questions?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes; it do, Mr. Chairman.
Dean Redlich, can you describe what pressures, if any, existed to complete this
investigation before the election?
Mr. REDLICH. We didn't want to be there forever. I think there were the normal
pressures to try to finish the job. But we did not sense any pressure in terms
of the elections other than I do recall discussions to the effect that if the
warren report was not done, the whole assassination could have become an
election issue. I do want to be firm on one point, as I come to the end of my
testimony, and I feel strongly that the committee should understand this.
It is my firm judgment that if at any time the members of the staff had come to
Mr. Rankin or the Chief Justice and said, "We regard this investigation as
incomplete. We need more time," I am firmly of the opinion that regardless of
the elections, regardless of any other factors we would have had more time. I
think the Chief justice was not interested in winding up this investigation
without all the facts being disclosed.
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I think that you will undoubtedly find as you complete your work that there
comes a point t which some of you reach the conclusion that you ought to get the
job done and publish a report. In that sense there is an internal pressure that
builds up to finish it.
It was not something that was imposed externally.
Mr. KLEIN. One final question why has the Warren Commission in your opinion
received so much criticism?
Mr. REDLICH. I think there are simply a great many people who cannot accept what
I believe to be the simple truth, that one rather insignificant person was able
to assassinate the President of the United States. I think there are others who
for reasons that are less pure have consciously tries to deceive. I think that
since there is a residue of public sentiment that finds it very hard to accept
the conclusion, that becomes a further feeling, for those who have found it in
their interest, to pursue the attacks on the Commission.
I do not mean to imply that all of the critics of the Commission have bad
motives. I think that the is in this country, fortunately, a healthy skepticism
about Government.
I believe that was certainly true during the Watergate period. The assassination
is a complex fact, as you will see when you investigate it. It was not an easy
thing to investigate. Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were two people with most
unusual backgrounds. They did a variety of things.
That they should meet in the basement of the Dallas police station and one shoot
the other is something that does strain the imagination.
I think it is very unfortunate that the Warren Commission has been subject to
the kinds of attack that it has. We did what we felt was a completely honest
professional and thorough task.
I have done a lot of things in my public service in my life. I regard my service
on the Warren Commission as an extremely important, perhaps the most important,
thing that I have done, because I believe I was instrumental in putting before
the American people all of the facts about the assassination of president
Kennedy.
That significant numbers of Americans don't believe it remains to me a source of
great disappointment. I hope that this committee can cure that.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you very much, dean Redlich. actually pursuant to our rules,
rule 3.6, we have to offer the witness 5 minutes for free-flying discussion or
any statement he wishes to make at the end of his testimony. If you wish to take
an additional 5 minutes we are delighted to offer it to you at this time.
Mr. REDLICH. I respectfully decline the offer.
Mr. PREYER. If you do wish to amplify your testimony or submit any further
statement or evidence after you read over your testimony the committee of course
will be happy to have you.
We appreciate very much your being down here. I hope you have better luck on the
metroliner going back to New York tonight.
Mr. REDLICH. Thank you, sir.
Mr. PREYER. The committee stands adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m.,
Wednesday, november 9, 1977.]
Attachment E
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(282) Attachment E: Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson and Wesley
Liebeler.
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1977
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2359, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer (chairman of the subcommittee)
president.
Present: Representatives Preyer, dodd, Devine, McKinney, and Fauntroy.
Staff members present: G. Cornwell, E. Berning, M. Wills, L. Wizelman, D.
Hardway, M. Mars, R. Genzman, B. Lawson, J. Facter, K. Klein, J. Hess, W. Cross,
and G. Robert Blakey.
Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Ms. Berning,
the clerk of the committee, to read for the record the names of those Members
who officially are designated to be on the subcommittee today pursuant to
committee rule 312.3.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Chairman, you and Mr. Dodd are regular Members of the
subcommittee. Mr. Stokes will be substituting for Mr. Sawyer. Mr. McKinney will
be substituting for Mr. Thone. Mr. Fauntroy will be substituting for Mrs. Burke.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you.
Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, i move that we go into executive session for today's
hearing and one subsequent day of hearing be hold in executive session since on
the basis of information obtained by the committee, the committee believes the
evidence or testimony may tend to defame or degrade people, and consequently
section 2(K) (5) of rule 11 of the Rules of the House and committee rule 3.3
(5), require such hearings be in executive session.
Mr. PREYER. You have heard the motion. i will ask the clerk to call the roll.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Dodd.
[No response.]
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Ms. BERNING. Mr. Stokes.
[No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Three ayes.
Mr. PREYER. The motion having carried, this hearing will be in executive session
for the remainder of the hearing.
Our first witness today is Mr. Slawson. I will ask Mr. Slawson if he will please
come forward to the witness table, if you will be sworn.
Mr. Slawson, did you solemnly swear the evidence you are about to give before
this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Slawson. We appreciate very much
your being here today.
I understand that a copy of the committee rules have been given to your prior to
your appearance here today.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. Before beginning the questioning the Chair will make a brief
statement concerning the subjects of the investigation.
House Resolution 222 mandates the committee "To conduct a full and complete
investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and
death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing
laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the
investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are
adequate in their provisions and whether there was full disclosure of evidence
and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and
whether any evidence or information not in possession of an agency or department
would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination, and why such
information was not provided or collected by that agency or department and to
make recommendations to the House if the select committee deems it appropriate
for amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation."
Mr. Cornwell, you may now begin your questioning of the witness.
TESTIMONY OF W. DAVID SLAWSON, ASSISTANT COUNSEL, THE WARREN COMMISSION
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Slawson, basically we would like to ask you questions today concerning your
knowledge and perceptions of the workings of the Warren Commission, questions
dealing with its organization, the state of mind of the Warren Commission staff
attorneys, the nature of any problems which the Warren Commission faced in
conducting its investigation and hopefully questions which will perhaps give us
an insight into what, if anything, we can contribute to the problems which were
faced by you and which have been debated over the years since then.
Simply as a matter of background will you first tell the committee prior to your
being hired at the Warren Commission what was your professional experience?
Mr. SLAWSON. I was an attorney in private practice in Denver, Colo. That really
was the sum of my professional experience at that point
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in 1964 when I received the telephone call. I graduated from law school in 1959.
I had been in practice that entire time.
Mr. CORNWELL. What had been the nature of your practice?
Mr. SLAWSON. General corporation and business law with an emphasis on antitrust
work.
Mr. CORNWELL. Who first contacted you with respect to possible employment at the
Warren commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. I have really forgotten. I think that it was Howard Willens but I
did not know him at the time. i was a stranger who telephoned me, to my
recollection.
Mr. CORNWELL. If you recall what was the nature of that first conversation?
Mr. SLAWSON. He introduced himself as a staff member of the recently formed
Warren Commission and said that I had ben recommended highly to him by Tom
Ehrlish, a classmate of mine at Harvard. At the time I think I remember he was a
special assistant to George Ball, subsequently went into law school teaching,
became a dean at Stanford. In any event he asked me if I would be interested in
coming back for 3 to 6 months, I think was the time estimate. I thought I was
interested but of course I would have to check it with my employers at the law
firm and call him back. I did check with them and they approved of my going. I
called him back.
As I recollect I was on my way in about 2 days.
Mr. CORNWELL. When did you first begin work at the Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. This was January. I don't remember the exact date.
Mr. CORNWELL. At the time you considered and ultimately did accept the offer for
employment at the Warren Commission what, if anything, did you know about the
nature of the investigation at the time?
Mr. SLAWSON. I think just about nothing. I can't remember whether the New York
Times published a front page article on the general organization that the Warren
Commission contemplated for its staff before i received the call or shortly
afterwards. In any event I do remember reading the New York Times article before
I got to Washington and thinking on the way which one of the five or six
sections I would want to be employed in. as I turned out the first day they
offered me was the one I thought I would be most interested in, so that was a
very happy coincidence.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was there anything in the New York Times article which you can new
recall other than a general description of the organization of the staff?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; not that I can recall.
Mr. CORNWELL. Then when you arrived on the job what discussions did you have at
that time and with whom concerning the scope of what would be your
responsibility?
Mr. SLAWSON. As I recollect, I showed up on the morning at the building that
they had set aside for the Warren Commission, reported to J. Lee Rankin, and of
course introduced myself to him. He just after a few brief words said that the
area of interest that they thought about for me was the foreign area and would I
be interested in that. That, as I said earlier, was the one I most wanted to get
into and of course I said yes, and there was no further discussion on that.
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I can't remember when I learned that my senior lawyer working with me would be
William Coleman. I would have been at that time or later. In any event I was
assigned to the office, introduced to the other staff members who were there and
began working.
Mr. CORNWELL. With respect to statements made to you concerning the fact that
you would be working in the foreign area what did they describe to you would be
the objective of your work?
Mr. SLAWSON. Two things. The possibility of foreign conspiracy, foreign
involvement. I have reread part of my old memos and I notice I used the words
"foreign involvement' because it was a broader term. I have forgotten whether
that was the way it was first given to me. And second, a simple narrative of
everything that Lee Harvey Oswald or anyone else connected with him, like
Marina, did while they were abroad.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there any statements made to you initially concerning the
fact that the staff was in any way restricted or confined to anything narrower
than the general assignment, that you were to investigate the possibility that
the assassination had been related to a foreign conspiracy?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; I don't think so.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was your understanding at this point in time either from
statements made to you during the hiring process or from any other source, if
there was any, concerning the reasons that the Warren Commission had been
formed?
Mr. SLAWSON. I can't remember any particular statements other than those I have
just related to you. of course, the whole country knew that it was to
investigate the assassination of the President and determine the facts as to
what happened and who was responsible so far as we could.
Mr. CORNWELL. To ask the question in reverse, would it be accurate to state that
you had been given no specific information and had no impressions concerning the
question of why it was that a special Presidential Commission was formed, as
possibly contrasted to other alternatives for investigating the same event?
Mr. SLAWSON. I had no special instructions or information on that.
Mr. CORNWELL. What, if anything, can you recall rom, say, the very early staff
meetings concerning the objectives of the investigation?
Mr. SLAWSON. The only thing that I can remember other than what I have already
told you which was that it was to be as deep and broad an investigation as we
felt necessary to ascertain the truth, there was some talk at the beginning
within the staff and I believe there were, I can't remember, outside
comments--they may have been from newspapers or something, I don't know--to the
effect that since Lee Harvey Oswald was obviously a prime suspect and since he
was dead and therefore would not be subject to forma trial procedures, that
perhaps we should appoint some portion of the staff, or perhaps even the
Commission itself, as a defense, in other words, run a mock adversary proceeding
at some point.
We talked about that possibility at some length and I think very seriously
considered it and ultimately decided not to follow it. I can't remember all the
reasons why. Part of it was practical, it just did not seem a feasible thing, in
effect to have the prosecution and the defense
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working together within the same building and using the same investigatory
agencies. It just did not seem to be something that would work very will.
Mr. CORNWELL. You mentioned in your answer just then that you had told us that
the objective was to state the truth. I believe perhaps in our informal
conversations you went into more detail on the subject matter than you have
given the committee. What can you recall specifically of such conversations?
Mr. SLAWSON. I think it is hard to remember 13 years ago what the timing of all
these things was but among the staff members themselves, like when I talked to
Jim Liebeler and Dave Belin and Bert Griffin particularly we would sometimes
speculate as to what would happen if we got firm evidence that pointed to some
very high official. It sounds perhaps silly in retrospect to say it but there
were even rumors at the time, of course, that President Johnson was involved. Of
course that would present a kind of frightening prospect because if the
President or anyone that high up was indeed involved that clearly were not going
to allow someone like us to bring out the truth if they could stop us.
The gist of it was that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to
bring it out and would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth was. The
only question in our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at all
credible how would we be able to protect it and bring it to the proper
authorities.
Mr. CORNWELL. Where did such conversations occur when you speculated about the
possible repercussions of findings that you might ultimately come across?
Mr. SLAWSON. Mostly at dinner at night. We should typically work late, again I
can't remember but I would say 9 or 9:30, and then break for dinner and go to
some restaurant nearby together and have drinks and sometimes we would kind of
relax at the end of the day there. That would be most of the time.
During the office hours, of course, that kind of speculating wasn't so common.
We were each busy with our separate tasks.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there conversations like that of the possible repercussions
from the nature of your investigation which went to matters other than the
possible uncovering of evidence that President Johnson could have been involved?
Were there other types of things you considered?
Mr. SLAWSON. When I said higher-ups I would include the people high up in the
organization, the FBI and CIA tool Everybody was of course a possible suspect.
If it had been say, a CIA conspiracy or some group within the CIA, then
everything I said about Johnson would apply to them too. Anybody who was
ruthless and determined enough to carry out the assassination of their President
obviously would not stop at killing somebody else to cover up their tracks.
Mr. CORNWELL. What about the question of whether there was any similar
speculation in the field of the possible repercussions in international
relations, particularly your field?
Mr. SLAWSON. Well, that reminds me that later on, I think this kind of thing
probably came up in the spring of 1964, March, April, around there, my end of
the investigation went into following up some possible
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leads. I have forgotten their nature but they were very speculative but we ere
following them up as best as we could about the anti-Castro Cubans. My interest
in that possibility I think was especially strong because it seemed to me on the
motivation side to make sense.
My theory was that perhaps, one, the anti-Castro Cubans we knew were very angry
with Kennedy because they felt they had been betrayed with the Bay of Pigs.
Oswald on the other hand was identified publicly with Castro, he was pro-Castro.
so, we felt that if somehow the anti-Castro Cubans could have got Oswald to do
it or done it themselves but framed Oswald, either way, somehow put the blame on
Oswald, that they would achieve two objectives that they presumably wanted. One
was revenge on Kennedy and the second would be to trigger American public
opinion strongly against Castro and possibly cause an invasion of Cuba and
overthrow of Castro, and of course these people would be able to go back to
their homes in Cuba and not have to live under the Castro government. As I say,
this made a lot of sense to me and I think it was a hypothesis held in mankind
for quite a while trying to see if the facts would fit it. Ultimately they
didn't.
Mr. CORNWELL. You focused on that area of inquiry and considered the possible
motives that would be connected with that group. Did you likewise consider the
possible international repercussions of investigations directed in that area?
Mr. SLAWSON. Sure. What you meant by that of course there would be an
international repercussion that the United States would invade Cuba bur if it
turned out that our investigation showed that Castro was involved, which of
course is another line of inquiry we followed through as thoroughly as we could,
this would I think probably have triggered at the very least the downfall of the
Cuban Government.
I don't think that the American Government would have ever or would today stand
by and upon proven charges that their President had been killed at the order of
some other government, would just allow it to go by. they would either insist
that the people in that government be prosecuted or if they weren't I suppose we
would invade. So we thought we might be triggering a war with Cuba. But again
that was something that the chips would have to fall where they may.
Mr. CORNWELL. You told us initially in our conversations that possible
repercussions of finding evidence of officials of the United States being
involved were discussed during conversations among various members of your staff
at your level including Redlich and Rankin.
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would that also include the international repercussions you have
just told us about?
Mr. SLAWSON. With Redlich, yes. With Rankin also yes but more briefly. Rankin,
you remember, was the boss of the whole operation. Consequently I had far fewer
informal discussions with him. He was my superior. Also he was married and had
his family here and whereas most of the rest of us, I wasn't married at the time
and those that were had left their families someplace else, so we spent alot
more time together at meals and stuff than with Redlich and Rankin.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Did you discuss it with any members outside the staff?
Mr. SLAWSON. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you discuss it with any members of the Warren Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. That I can't remember. The only one I might have would have been
Allen Dulles. Allen Dulles and I became fairly close, I think. He had aged quite
a bit by the time he was on the Warren Commission and was also sick. I have
forgotten, he had some kind of disease that made one of his legs and foot very
painful. So he was not effective sometimes, but when he was he was very smart
and I liked him very much. Because of my particular assignment, of course he
spent a lot of time with me. We talked informally quite a bit. That may have
included, probably did include, these kinds of conversations, but I really don't
remember specifically.
Mr. CORNWELL. Prior to going to work for the Warren Commission, did you have any
experience at all with Federal agencies, any of them?
Mr. SLAWSON. No. Well, if you don't count Army experience. I was in the Army
before I went to law school. I spent about a third of my time at a scientific
research center.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you from that or any other source have any initial impressions
about the Federal agencies, FBI, CIA, about what their predisposition might be
toward this case, about their competency or anything else you can tell us about?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; I don't think I had any predisposition other than the general
public awareness of these agencies. I suppose I had a little bit more than the
average person's knowledge about the CIA, very slightly. My recollection is that
the CIA when I was in college recruited people, I mean they came on, they sent
down people who would talk to students just like any other prospective employer.
I don't know if they still do that or not. I knew one or two people in the class
ahead of me who by all accounts went to work for the CIA, and it was something I
briefly considered myself.
I decided to go on to graduate school and physics, and I never explored the CIA
thing. But they had seemed to hire high-caliber people out of my college. I was
favorably disposed there. I understood immediately that part of may assignment
would be to suspect everyone. So included in that would be the CIA and FBI.
Mr. CORNWELL. As soon as you began your work, what facts did you uncover which
may have given you an indication of the extent to which the Warren Commission
could rely on the Federal agencies?
Mr. SLAWSON. As soon as you began your work, what facts did you uncover which
may have given you an indication of the extent to which the Warren Commission
could rely on the Federal agencies?
Mr. SLAWSON. In general, I think the impression was a good one, the extent to
which we could rely. I remember I was almost overwhelmed with the amount of
information that every agency was pouring into us. That seemed to me a good sign
that everyone was trying their best to give us all the information they could. I
also, though, quickly became aware that some agencies, presumably all of them,
were anxious not to appear in a bad light at all. Although I don't think that I
thought that any of them were actually withholding information from us, I did
think that some were trying to put the information they gave us in the best
possible light, shading things in their own favor. The State Department and the
Immigration and
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Naturalization Service, for example, had a whole host of every complicated,
legally complicated dealings with Oswald and Marina. It was my job to go back
through all that and see whether it had been done properly or whether there may
have been some evidence of something improper.
Maybe they let Oswald come back in the country when they shouldn't or something
like that. I think there was a lot of typical bureaucratic mixups. It is hard
for these people to explain it later; they were embarrassed. I don't think any
of it after reflection, I am sure none of it after reflection, showed
conspiratorial involvement, but I think it did show a lot of bureaucratic
mistakes.
Mr. CORNWELL. After working with the CIA, your impression remains substantially
the same; you thought you could trust them and rely on them?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. I came to know one man particularly will, Raymond Rocca, and I
came to like him and trust him both. The only drawback I can think of--not
really a drawback, I suppose, for someone in the CIA--is that I thought he was a
little overly suspicious. He obviously disliked Castro immensely. He was very
emotional on the subject. As I said, I would be surprised if a member of the CIA
specializing, as I think he had been in Cuban activities didn't feel that way.
My impression overall was very favorable of him. I thought he was very
intelligent and tried in every way to be honest and helpful with me.
Mr. CORNWELL. I assume you relatively quickly after beginning work realized the
basic findings, at least in the general sense, that the FBI had reached in a
relative short period of time after the assassination. Would you have recognized
the possibility then that there was perhaps an agency predisposition to attempt
to bolster those findings?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; with the FBI especially, I think. The FBI had prepared a thick
file which to their mind disposed of the case, it seemed like. Although my own
involvement was not nearly as much with the FBI as it was with the CIA, I
nevertheless read the FBI file, which was a good way of getting yourself
introduced to the whole general case.
I think it appeared to me, as it did to many people on the staff, to be a
competent document. But it was also self-serving, and you could not read that
and think that the FBI had ever made any mistakes or there was any serious
possibility that they had.
So, we knew that particularly with the FBI, but I just assumed it was the case
with anybody, it is human nature, that once having committed themselves on any
statement about what happened, they would be defensive about it and not want to
admit that they were wrong, and also that they all had a strong interest in not
being blamed for not having adequately protected the President. We spent a lot
of time--although this was not my particular area--in trying to ascertain
whether the Secret Service, the FBI, and CIA in particular but also the State
Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service, had done what they should
have to see that the President was protected against possible attack and, of
course, Oswald in particular.
Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to show you what has been marked for identification
as exhibit 22, if I might, Mr. Chairman.
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Do you recognize that document?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. have you had a chance to review it prior to coming here?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; although not very thoroughly. It turned out to be even longer
in detail than I remembered it.
Mr. CORNWELL. For identification, it is a document which initially had a stamped
"Top Secret" at the top, which has been crossed out. There is no date on it, and
it reads at the top "Introduction." You prepared the document?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; I should add that I did the first draft and Bill Coleman then
went over it with me. I don't remember what changes we made together, but we did
make some. Then it went into the Commission, presumably through channels, which
would be J. Lee Rankin.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that the memo included the kind of
problems you encountered in effecting an investigation of the foreign
conspiracy?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Might we introduce the document into the record and then ask the
witness some questions about it?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, exhibit 22 is admitted into the record.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 22 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 22
One of the basic purposes of the Commission's investigation of the assassination
of President Kennedy is to determine whether it was due in whole or in part to a
foreign conspiracy. The Investigation conducted by the section of the staff
responsible for the foreign aspect of the Commission's work leads to the
conclusion that there was no foreign involvement. Nevertheless, there is
evidence which points toward a possible conclusion of foreign involvement which
we think should be brought to the attention of the Commission for its
independent evaluation.
The foreign countries most suspected in the public's mind are the Soviet Union
and Cuba. The Chinese communists and even Madame Nhu's wing of Vietnam, however,
might also be suggested.1 Likewise, the possible involvement of expatriated
anti-Castro Cubans, whether resident in the United States or in one of the South
or Central American nations, is worth considering.
Firm evidence of a foreign conspiracy is obviously very hard to come by, since
there naturally is the greatest attempt by the country involved to prevent
discovery. Investigations that are dependent upon information voluntarily
furnished by the foreign government involved, such as have already been
undertaken with the Soviet Union and Cuba, are obviously not very helpful in
uncovering evidence of this type, because the foreign government will try to
furnish only that evidence which it believes to be nonincriminating.
Nevertheless, even this kind of evidence can be of some use in assessing whether
a foreign conspiracy existed. This is because, first, the furnishing of the
evidence, despite appearances, is not quite "voluntary." In a case of the
magnitude of this one, and in which the widely known facts already disclose
important links with the Soviet Union and Cuba, these governments are under
considerable pressure to render reasonable cooperation to the Government of the
United States. If they do not, they risk having public opinion swing strongly
against them and conclude
_________________________________
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 22 cont.
that they are afraid to cooperate because the evidence will indeed incriminate
them. Second, once these governments conclude that they will furnish some
evidence to the Commission, the difficulties of falsifying the evidence they
give are considerable. They must realize that the Commission already possesses a
great deal of data against which the new evidence will be tested, and that the
CIA has additional facilities for this purpose which will be placed at the
disposal of the Commission. Moreover, if even only a small part of the evidence
furnished is found to have been fabricated, the entire body of new evidence will
become suspect; and if this should happen, the adverse public opinion effects
previously mentioned would again come into play. For these reasons, we have
concluded that, on balance, it was worthwhile to ask the governments of the
U.S.S.R. and Cuba to furnish the Commission with whatever evidence they could.
(It should also be pointed out that there is another reason why the Governments
of Russia and Cuba have been asked to furnish evidence. The Commission is
primarily interested in ascertaining the truth, not just in "pinning the rap" on
someone, and therefore the two foreign governments mentioned must be regarded
not only as objects of investigation, but also as parties who have a right to be
heard. They therefore should be given basically the same opportunity to present
evidence as has been accorded to the hundreds of other individuals and
institutions which have come into contact with Lee Harvey Oswald in one way or
another.)
Obviously, despite the fact that voluntarily obtained evidence is not completely
useless even in judging whether a foreign conspiracy is involved, the most
valuable evidence for this purpose is that obtained through informers, ordinary
witnesses, electronic and mechanical spying devices and other means available to
American intelligence and investigatory agencies which are not dependent upon
the consent of the government being investigated. The bulk of this memorandum
will deal with this kind of evidence.
We think this separate memorandum for the Commission and the General Counsel
appropriate because the material covered in the final report to the public will
necessarily be somewhat more restricted. A good deal of the information
contained herein is Secret or Top Secret and therefore cannot be disclosed to
the American public at this time. In most instances this is not because of the
information itself but because of the necessity of protecting the method or
source for obtaining it. In other words, in the final report we can set forth
the facts, but we will not be able to demonstrate the reliability (or lack of
reliability) of these facts by showing their source. Moreover, in some cases
even the information itself must be withheld from the public. for example, the
fact that a Russian MVD employee may secretly have tried to warn Oswald not to
come to Russia, if disclosed, might result in the employee being severly
punished or even executed. Similarly, even disclosing the information gained
form certain wiretapping facilities would necessarily disclose the existence of
the facilities, where the nature of the information is such that we could not
have learned it except through these facilities.
I. Some General Considerations
A. "Foreign Involvement" defined
We have intentionally chosen the words, "foreign involvement," to describe the
problems with which we are concerned in this memorandum. The words were chosen
because they are extremely broad, covering everything from a comparatively
innocent arrangement for propaganda purposes, such as, for example, an agreement
whereby Oswald might have served the propaganda purposes of the Castro
Government in New Orleans and Dallas in exchange for that government paying his
printing expenses plus some small additional compensation, to the most serious
kind of conspiratioial connection, as would be the case if a foreign power had
ordered Lee Oswald to kill John F. Kennedy. By "foreign involvement," however,
we do mean something more concrete than simply emotional or ideological
influence. The Commission already possesses evidence, and indeed so does the
general public, that Oswald considered himself a Marxist and that he sympathized
wholeheartedly with the Castro regime: he openly spread pamphlets in its behalf
on the streets of New Orleans and he took its side in radio and television
debates. These facts have already been established, and they will be assumed,
rather than discussed, in this memorandum. The question to be treated here is
whether there was some reasonably close working relationship involving Oswald
and a foreign power or at least a group of men based in a foreign country.
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Mr. CORNWELL. First, when was the document written?
Mr. SLAWSON. I can't remember exactly but my guess would be early June but that
is just a guess.
Mr. CORNWELL. I might simply note that the document does have X's in it which
apparently occurred in connection with declassification of the document. Would
it be fair to state that as of June 1964 you had done a considerable amount of
work in the area of determining whether there was foreign conspiracy?
On page 1 of the memo you describe the fact that firm evidence of a foreign
conspiracy obviously very hard to come by, and go on to note that at least one
of the principal investigative avenues would be information acquired from the
various foreign countries that might be suspected of being involved and that
such information would obviously not be very helpful because a foreign
government will try to furnish only that evidence which it believes to be
nonincriminating, at least that was a substantial possibility. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct although I think that the emphasis in the
introduction you are quoting from was only explaining why
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that kind of evidence could not be relied upon as your primary evidence. We did
have other kinds of evidence. I was trying to explain at this point in the memo
that we would not be relying upon evidence furnished by the country itself
insofar as we could possibly avoid doing so.
Mr. CORNWELL. You go in that vein to note further on page 2 that one way to test
the accuracy of the information which would be provided by the foreign
government would be through the CIA and its facilities. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct. Incidentally that reminds me that in response to
an earlier question of yours, one way we had of checking the accuracy of
information American organizations like the CIA or the FBI was to check them
against each other. The jurisdictions of the various investigatory agencies at
the time would have fairly firm limits. For example, the CIA would do mostly
overseas things, the FBI would do mostly domestic criminal activities. The State
Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service had their respective
jurisdictions. So, when a person like Oswald or Marina would pass from one
jurisdiction to another, come from a foreign country or vice versa, the agencies
would pass information back and forth, notifications accompanied by documents.
In our getting the records of these in every case possible I would match them up
to make sure that the disclosure to the Warren Commission from a particular
agency included everything it should, judged by what the other agencies had
given us, having heard form that agency in times past.
Mr. McKINNEY. You spoke earlier of their defensiveness of the fact that they
might be accused of not having done a good job. Was there any particular
conversation or discussion on their defensiveness for not really having told the
Secret Service or for just sort of letting the most amazing thing to me. They
were tracking him and yet with the President coming into dallas, here is this
guy.
Mr. SLAWSON. There was no discussion of that, or rather no aspect of this
defensiveness that I could see in the documents that were passed prior to the
assassination.
They were all official bureaucratic type documents, very impersonal.
Mr. CORNWELL. There was no suggestion in any of those documents, say from the
CIA, when Oswald would come in from a foreign country, that the Secret Service
perhaps should watch this guy or the FBI watch him?
Mr. SLAWSON. I can't really remember that, Mr. McKinney, whether there was or
not. The usual notification would have no suggestion as to what the agency ought
to do at all. I would simply be that "Notification is hereby given that such and
such, Lee Harvey Oswald or somebody, had contacted the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City, et cetera, and presumably returned to the United States shortly
thereafter." Then it would be left up to the FBI to do what they would with
that.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much. Thank you, counsel.
Mr. CORNWELL. In your mind would there have been a particularly severe problem
with your area of international conspiracy because of the fact that there was
really only one agency, the CIA, that had any access to information which would
reveal that?
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Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. There is really no way I can imagine and certainly there was
no way at the time I could imagine that anyone could carry on an investigation
of foreign intelligence operations other than through the CIA. That simply is
the body of expert opinion on that sort of thing and capability that exists in
the United States. So, if a major suspect is the CIA itself in some kind of
foreign involvement, it might be, say, taken over or infiltrated by the Cuban or
Russian Government, an investigation like the Warren Commission would find it
very, very difficult to ascertain that. That is just inevitable.
This I think occurred to me at the time too but there wasn't much that could
beckon about it.
Let me add there I think there are two major defenses there: One, I think and I
still think that the likelihood of any large number of people in a major
Government organization trying to kill their own President is very small. I
think most people are loyal. The other is that anything that large would almost
certainly spill over someplace in the public view. We had all sorts of people of
course looking into this. I think the chances of its ever being successfully
hidden for a long time were infinitesimally small.
Mr. CORNWELL. Nevertheless it was still your impression, I gather from your memo
and your previous statements, that here were really only two primary sources of
possible information in your field of responsibility, and that is, what a
foreign government might supply, which obviously had its drawbacks and what the
CIA provided you.
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. Cornwell, remember, I did talk and hear about the questionableness of any
information supplied by a foreign government, about the possibility of its being
involved, burt we did have information from foreign governments that might lead
you to suspect either foreign governments were involved. there is no more reason
why that would by suspect than any information generally. For example, we had a
communication from the West German Government intelligence service, I remember,
which we investigated. As I recollect, if it had worked out, it would have
implicated the Soviet Union. There is no reason why we should suspect that.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may I have an exhibit marked for identification as
No. 23. It is a memorandum dated September 6, 1964. I show it to the witness and
ask you, mr. Slawson, if you recall that document?
Mr. SLAWSON. I read this last night when your staff supplied it to me. I in a
very general way recollect it, that is all.
Mr. CORNWELL. I deals generally with the question of the type of information
that had been supplied to the Warren Commission by the CIA. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we have this document entered into the record so that we may
ask questions concerning it?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection exhibit 23 is entered into the record.
[The document referred to, marked to, marked JFK exhibit No. 23 and received for
the record, follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 23
Mr. CORNWELL. The first two sentences in the memorandum read, "Throughout our
investigation the CIA has been sending us memoranda. The CIA made no attempt to
withhold any information form the Commission that it believed was pertinent."
Not meaning to be facetious but just for clarification, the "it" that is
referred to, in other words, "that it believes was pertinent," down that refer
to the CIA or to the Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. I suppose it meant the CIA. I am just trying to interpret my own
writing the same as you are but I think that is what I would have meant.
Mr. CORNWELL. The way it reads then in substance is that it was your impression
as of September 6, 1964, near the end of the investigation, that the CIA had
made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission that the CIA
believed was pertinent?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did the CIA or anyone, say, between the CIA and you ever tell the
Warren Commission members about the CIA assassination plots on Castro?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, not to my knowledge.
Mr. CORNWELL. do you believe that would have been pertinent to your work?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. What would you have done in respect your area if you had been
proved that information?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is hard to recollect at this point. It certainly would have
increased my suspicion of the possibility that the Cuban Government was
involved, for obvious reasons. I cannot, however, think of anything that I would
have done any differently. The reason for my conclusion is that I think I
followed up every lead as thoroughly as I could in any event. I already had
reasons of suspecting the Cuban Government as I had reasons for suspecting the
anti-Castro Cubans. So I would have been, I think, doing the same things I did
with perhaps a greater suspicion in my mind.
Nevertheless it was pertinent.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Would you have had with that information any cause to request
records which you did not otherwise seek?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, not that I can think of. That is a difficult question for me to
answer now because I can't remember in any kind of detail at all what my request
for records was what records I got.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you ever seek records concerning the general issue of
assassination plots?
Mr. SLAWSON. By the CIA?
Mr. CORNWELL. Against Castro or anyone?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I can't recollect that I did. Our requests for information form
the CIA were rarely specific. The request was made initially that they give us
all information in any way pertinent to the assassination investigation. Mr.
CORNWELL. Leaving to their discretion the decision as to what was pertinent?
Mr. SLAWSON. Well, I suppose inevitably, yes, because there are mountains of
information in the CIA and a request like that has to leave it to some extent to
their discretion as to what is pertinent. Anything that came out I would talk to
the CIA about it and if I had any specific requests those of course would be
forwarded.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that if you had received that
information you at least might have altered your willingness to rely upon their
judgments as to what was pertinent?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't know how to answer that. You see, I never received a "no"
from the CIA to any request for information. I mean a no in the sense of not a
willingness. Lots of times of course they would say "We don't know anything
about that" or "We can't find out for you." So I don't think my attitude would
have been any different. I would have had a different set of considerations in
mind. I probably almost certainly would have talked to them more thoroughly
about, well, did castro know the\at you were trying to kill him?
And when did he know? Things like that, trying to work out some possible link
between Lee Harvey Oswald and Cuba or anybody else who might have been
implicated in the killing.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we have a memorandum dated June 4, 1964 form Mr. Slawson to
Mr. Rankin marked for identification as exhibit No. 24, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. All right.
Mr. CORNWELL. You have had a chance to review that prior to coming here?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall that document?
Mr. SLAWSON. Again in a general way, yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Basically the document concerns a telephone conservation between
you and Mr. Rocca of the CIA and among other things discusses the general
subject matter of assassination plots of page 2, is that correct?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that document entered into the record, Mr. Chairman,
so that we may ask the witness specific questions?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection it is so ordered and will be entered into the
record.
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[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 24 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 24
JUNE 4, 1964.
To: J. Lee Rankin, Howard P. Willens, Norman Redlich.
From: W. David Slawson.
Subject: Telephone conference with Mr. Rocca of Central Intelligence Agency.
About a week or two ago I telephoned Mr. Rocca and drew his attention to
the fact that my examination of the documents furnished to us by the Russian
Government, excluding the medical documents, which had not arrived at that
time, showed that a high percentage of the signatures other than the Oswalds’
was said to be illegible by the State Department translators. I asked Mr. Rocca
that the CIA examination of these documents specifically take this observation
into account and comment on it. I said that my opinion, as a layman, was that
the high percentage of illegible signatures might have been intentional, in
order to prevent the CIA from checking back on actual persons and places when
it sought to authenticate these documents. However, I also wondered whether
the alleged illegibility was in some cases simply a reflection of the
translators’
reluctance to work too hard. Mr. Rocca said that he would bring this matter to
the attention of those who were analyzing the documents.
Commission document No. 1011, which is the CIA report on the Soviet docu-
ments, came to my desk today. It does not comment on the matter mentioned
above. I telephoned Mr. Rocca to ask him about this. His reply was that he had
interpreted my request as simply that the CIA translators do their best to read
and translate all signatures. I repeated that we were not so interested in that
as
we were in the general analysis of what if any significance could be attributed
to the higher percentage of illegible signatures. I told him that since talking
to him
the first time I had made a personal check and found that out of the 9
signatures
appearing on the non-medical documents 8 were illegible or at least stated to be
illegible by the translators. (Actually the percentage is even higher. Two of
the
documents which contained illegible signatures contain two illegible signatures
each, so the ratio is actually 10 to 1 rather than 8 to 1.)
Rocca said that he now fully understood my concern and would bring it to
the attention of the "higher ups." I told him that we would be happy to make a
formal request if this was desirable, and he said that perhaps it would be, but
he did not think so. He said that he would ask for a formal request from us
later if he or others at CIA thought it was necessary. He told me that the CIA
translators had commented that the illegibility of the signatures was the usual
think in Russian documents. He said that he got the impression from talking to
them that this is a recurring problem. Apparently the average Russian official
has so many documents to sign that his signature soon becomes a scrawl. How-
ever, Rocca did not purport to be an expert on this, and he agreed with me
that a more formal analysis is called for.
(I note here for the record that the following documents contain at least one
illegible signature each: 1A, 3A(1), 3A(2), 5A(3), 6A, 7A, 9A, and 1B, 3A(1)
and 4A(3) contain two illegible signatures each. The following documents con-
tain no signatures at all other than Marina’s or Lee Oswald’s: 2A, 4A, 5A, 2B,
3B, 4B. The single legible signature other than an Oswald signature is con-
tained on document 8A. The foregoing includes only the non-medical documents.
There are so many signatures in the medical documents that I have not tried
to itemize them, but it can be seen by a glance through them that they also
contain a high percentage of illegible ones.)
While on the telephone with Rocca he brought up the New York Times article
on conspiracy theories contained in the Times of June 1, 1964. he made
specific reference to the book by a London newspaper man by the name of Den-
nis Eisenberg mentioned in the Austrian newspapers. This book was published
about 2 months before the assassination and contained an assertion that the
right wing elements in America were at that time planning the assassination
of Kennedy. He said that the CIA has already put procedures in motion to
get the book and to obtain further information about the author. The New York
Times, as you are probably already aware, describes this as a "striking coinci-
dence." Rocca believes that this may be correct but, of course, cannot be sure.
He
drew to my attention the fact that the publishing time of this particular book
appears to have been almost exactly when Castro was supposed to have made
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171
JFK EXHIBIT No. 24 Continued
his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil (or to the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba,
I have forgotten at this point) to the effect that "Two can play at this game."
According to the Miami newspaper which published this allegation, Castro was
referring to the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent guerrilla activities
financed by the CIA which had resulted in the deaths of many Cuban citizens.
Rocca said that either he or Mr. [deleted] could report to us on the results of
the inquiry on Eisenberg, either formally or informally. He asked me whether we
wanted to make a formal request for such a report. I replied that I did not
think it was necessary in view of the fact that I now know that CIA was looking
into the matter and would give us a report. I told him that I would make a memo
of our conversation and might remind him of it at a later time if we had not yet
heard from him or [deleted].
Mr. CORNWELL. On page 2 the last paragraph reflects that while on the telephone
rocca brought up a New York Times article on conspiracy theories contained in
the Times of June 1, and made specific reference to a book by a dennis Eisenberg
published about 2 months before the assassination and containing an assertion
that the right wing element in America were at that time planning the
assassination of Kennedy.
The particular part of that paragraph I would like to ask you about is a couple
of sentences further down. There it reads that Mr. Rocca drew your attention to
the fact that the publishing time of this particular book appears to have been
almost exactly when Castro was supposed to have made his remark in the Cuban
Embassy in Brazil to the effect that, "two can play at this game." Would it be
fair to say that simply on the face of that, one possible inference was that
Rocca was deliberately suggesting to your that it was right wing plots to
assassinate him that had perhaps come to his attention and prompted his
statements about two being able to play at the game?
Mr. SLAWSON. I have no such remarks. My only recollection at this time is that
Rocca was drawing my attention to the fact that Castro might well have been
involved. Of course he had presumably drawn my attention to this before but he
was just doing what he did with me a lot, trying to work with me to put two and
two together.
Mr. CORNWELL. Specifically with respect to your notation that he draw attention
to the coincidence of the dates between this book and Castro's statement, would
it have been possible that he was attempting to mislead you and suggest that it
was right wing plots as opposed to CIA plots that had prompted castro's
statements?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't know. That suspicion I don't think occurred to me at the
time. It is hard for me to characterize that now.
Mr. CORNWELL. If you and Mr. Rocca had conversations such as this concerning
assassination plots, Castro's statements, can you tell us, based upon your
experience there at the time, any reason why the CIA would have withheld from
you information concerning their intimate knowledge and association with these
plots?
Mr. SLAWSON. Based on my experience at the time why the CIA might have withheld
information from me of their involvement in plots against Castro?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.
Mr. SLAWSON. If your question is directed toward my putting myself back in 1964,
my answer is that I had no inkling that the CIA was involved in those plots and
therefore that speculation never entered my mind. If your question is directed
toward my thinking now, the answer
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would be that, yes, they would have an interest in not disclosing it because
they were ashamed of it. They must have felt that it was not a proper thing for
them to have done. Otherwise, I don't see why they would not have disclosed it
to the members of the Warren Commission.
Of course it would have been highly secret but they disclosed other information
to us which they felt was also highly secret. For example, the Nosenko affair
was highly secret information. To a limited extent I was given information about
sources abroad by sources which were highly secret. I was permitted to follow
out that information insofar as I felt I needed to in order to assess the
credibility of information obtained. As I say, that was very secret stuff too.
I think the fact that they did not trust us would not have been a reason because
they did trust us with highly confidential information.
Mr. CORNWELL. The very last sentence of the memo reads, "According to the Miami
newspaper which published this allegation Castro was referring to the Bay of
Pigs invasion and subsequent guerrilla activity financed by the CIA which
resulted in the death of many Cuban citizens."
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you discuss in light of that report with Mr. Rocca whether or
not the CIA had been involved? Did you ask him for more information?
Mr. SLAWSON. My best recollection at this time is that I did in several
conversations with Rocca discuss the CIA involvement in anti-Cuban activities. I
was presumably told that they had been involved of course in the bay of Pigs
invasion. I remember discussing informally that the involvement with a CIA
operative in Mexico City. Also their involvement with anti-Castro Cuban groups
in the United States. I don't know how you exactly draw the line between that
and an attempt to kill Castro personally. Anyway I never in my own mind crossed
over that line and no one ever crossed over it voluntarily in talking to me.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there any other areas that, since termination of your work,
have now come to light which you would consider pertinent to the job you had and
yet apparently at the time the CIA did not consider pertinent or otherwise
withheld?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I don't think so, except this one.
Mr. McKINNEY. Could I ask a question about the way you were thinking? If you had
known then of the attempts by the CIA to encourage people to kill Castro and
probably their actual involvement would it not have been a legitimate thought
that that might have triggered the assassination of the President?
Mr. SLAWSON. Sure, that would have been the immediate suspicion.
Mr. McKINNEY. And probably the immediate suspicion of may of the other members,
not that the CIA did it but they had triggered it by their involvement. So it
would really have changed their thinking?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; I think I should have added that. that was involved in what I
did say, they were ashamed of it and particularly they might have been very
fearful that they would be blamed for the assassination of Kennedy even though
they of course had not ordered it but they had triggered it in the sense that
they instigated the Cuban Government to do it.
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173
Also, and I don't think I thought of this at the lime, but in retrospect an
agency that sanctions an attempt to kill somebody else's head of state is not
good position to be outraged when ours is killed.
Mr. MCKINNEY. I was going to go there but went there on your own.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall the information that the CIA provided you concerning
Kostikov, the man that, Oswald perhaps misdescribed in the Russian Embassy?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. An employee of the KGB in Mexico City?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did the possibility that Kostikov was a member of division 13,
among other things apparently at least including nation, ever came to your
attention?
Mr. SLAWSON. My recollection is that I was told that Kostikov was probably a
very, certainly a very high ranking official in the KGB and perhaps the highest
ranking such official in the Western Hemisphere. I don't remember whether he was
placed in any particular division which would include assassinations or not. But
my recollection is that his job would include that among other things. In other
words, he was high enough up that he might not even have been within a
particular division but had several divisions under his control insofar as they
operated in the Western Hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere being the northern
part of the Western Hemisphere including the Caribbean.
The CIA told me that Mexico City was a kind of spy headquarters so to speak for
lots of countries, like Istanbul used to be in detective thrillers, the spies
always met at Istanbul. Supposedly Mexico City was somewhat in truth like that
in the early 1960's and late 1950's.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was your understanding based on what the CIA told you at the
time concerning the nature of the contacts between Kostikov and Oswald?
Mr. SLAWSON. This was not a matter of the CIA telling me so much as it was a
prime objective of our joint investigation. Obviously this was a crucial thing.
I mean if we could be certain that we knew everything that went on between
Kostikov and Oswald we could have disposed one way or another of the Russian
involvement it seems to me, almost certainly. We had some highly reliable
sources of information about what was said. The CIA had some background
information on Kostikov, not a lot.
I mean they had what I just told you about him, and we had other bits of
circumstantial information as to who was probably in the Russian Embassy on or
about the same time as Oswald was. We tried to put it all together and I worked
with the CIA on that. We came up basically with the conclusions that are in this
report including parts of the report which are not here which I don't remember
either but there are obviously many, many pages that are out of this, which
presumably had things giving in more detail the background of my conclusions.
Mr. CORNWELL. As I understand, your best memory is that the CIA did not mention
division 13 in connection with Kostikov?
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174
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; that is my recollection. As I say I don't think it bears the
significance of any withholding of information because they certainly made clear
to me that Kostikov was a very important and that his importance was such that
it probably would include assassinations if any were being carried on through
the KGB in this part of the world and the CIA had taken great care m educating
me in the general technique of the KGB in carrying out foreign assassinations. I
spent a long time studying a file that the CIA gave me on a KGB foreign assassin
who had defected in Western Europe in the 1950's. I have forgotten his name but
the CIA had a big file on him which, as far as I know, I read everything they
gave me, trying to educate myself on what kind of patterns of conduct to look
for, how would the Russians carry on an assassination abroad, if they had done
so here.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention back to exhibit 22, one of the things
which you discuss in there as I understand it is the question of what type of
relationship Oswald may have had with a foreign government. In other words,
distinguishing between a relationship which might have involved the distribution
of propaganda, on the other hand an active role as an assassin for them, that
sort of thing. I take it from that that it would have been deemed relevant by
you if you had received the information, it would have been a relevant fact of
his control or work in division 13, in other words, his relationship to possible
assassination work by the Russian Government. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORWELL. I did not see this in the part of the memo, exhibit 22, but can you
tell me whether there exists any indication that Kostikov
had responsibility for assassinations?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; in my reviewing it last night I did not come across anything of
that nature either although I think that the parts the memo that are shown here
do include my statement that he was a KGB official, KGB employee.
Mr. CORNWELL. We may not have all of your memos but will you tell us, to the
best of your memory did the fact that Kostikov may
have worked with or had responsibility for assassinations appear anywhere in the
Warren Commission report?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't remember this either. I think the Warren Commission report
does reflect that Kostikov was a KGB employee and I think, but I am not sure at
this point, certainly not sure, that the Warren report also reflects the fact
that of course the KGB had cartied out assassinations elsewhere in the world. In
Western Europe I think we attributed one at least to them. So, to me that
presumably was. sufficient.
Mr. CORNWELL. If the possibility that Kostikov was associated with,
assassinations appears neither in your memos nor in the Warren Commission report
is your memory still the same that the CIA nevertheless gave you that
information?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; but I want to repeat myself for emphasis. My recollection or
impression of Kostikov was that he was more important than that. He was high
enough up so that he was the central director so to speak for KGB activities in
the Caribbean area which as I say was a very important area because it was a
kind of spy clearinghouse and presumably an assassination clearinghouse too.
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175
The principal objective of my work in Mexico was to find out what had gone on
between Oswald and this very important KGB operative. Obviously it was a
suspicious circumstance.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may we mark two memoranda, dated February 21 and
March 27, 1964, for identification as exhibits 25 and 26.
Mr. PREYER. Those documents may be marked for identification.
Mr. SLAWSON. I should add that as far as I was able to ascertain with the help
of the CIA the fact that Kostikoy was called down to see Oswald when Oswald
showed up at the Russian Embassy was probably not as significant as one might
think because apparently he would have been called down to see any
out-of-the-ordinary person, anyone that might have intelligence significance,
any secret significance to the Russians.
Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention to exhibits 25 and 26, you have
had a chance to review prior to coming here, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Basically both memos refer to a similar subject matter and that is
the possibility of obtaining some information concerning Oswald's contact in
Mexico City through a man named Al Tarabochia.
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we enter both of those exhibits in the record so that we may
ask the witness specific questions concerning them.
Mr. PREYER. Without objection exhibits 95 and 526 are admitted into the record.
[The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibits 25 and 26 and received for the
record, follow:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 25
[ Memorandum ]
FEBRUARY 21, 1964.
To: Howard Willens.
From: David Slawson.
Subject: The possibility of a new informant in Mexico City.
During the conference in your office on Thursday, February 20, we discussed [he
use of sources of information in Mexico City other than the CIA and the FBI. We
decided that rather than attempting piecemeal utilization of such other sources,
we would first gather information as to the existence of such other sources and
then try to use them in a coordinated manner, with full consultation among all
the agencies concerned.
I therefore am bringing to your attention the existence of a possible informant
for this purpose.
On pages 4-5 of Commission No. 351, which appears to be a portion of a
memorandum of a telephone call from Alan Schwartz of the State Department to
William McManus, of the Senate Internal Security Committee, it is stated that a
man named "AI Tarabochia" claims to have a good contact who has connections at
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Mr. Tarabochia wants to know if the contact
should inquire about Oswald's true purpose while at the Embassy there. The
context indicates that this Tarabochia is an anti-Castro Cuban. Otherwise, I
know nothing about him. If we want to explore the possibilities of using this
informant, we should probably contact Mr. William McManus and get more detail
from him.
I mentioned all this to you a few days ago, and you told me that you believed
our files contained a letter from Senator Eastland or his staff on the general
subject. The best efforts of Ruth Shirley have been unable to locate such a
letter.
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 26
[Memorandum]
MARCH 27, 1964.
To: J. Lee Rankin,
From: W. David Slawson.
Subject: Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; Possible Use of Their Mexican
Informant.
On Tuesday, March 17, 1964 I called Mr. J.G. Sourwine, counsel for the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee. I referred to a memorandum in a file which
William McManus, formerly with Mr. Sourwine's staff, had sent to the Commission
on January 28, 1964, in which there was a reference to an "Al Tarabochia," a man
known to the subcommittee who, in turn, claims to know someone who has access to
confidential information about the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. I told Mr.
Sourwine that the Commission would like to utilize this informant and that for
this purpose we would like either to be told his name or given other means by
which we could make contact with him. Mr. Sourwine asked me why we wanted to use
the informant, This question struck me as strange, since the reasons must have
been obvious, but my reply was that we of course had. knowledge that Oswald had
been in Mexico not too long ago before the assassination and that he had made
contacts with the Cuban Embassy, so we naturally wanted to find out as much as
possible about these contacts. Mr. Sourwine said he would take the matter up
with Senator Eastland.
That afternoon Mr. Sourwine called back and asked that I send him copies of the
memorandum from Mr. McManus, since he could not find this memorandum in his
files. He said he would like the memorandum if possible by the following morning
because he was having a conference with Senator Eastland around noon time and
could then present the whole problem to him for an early solution. I therefore
sent Mr. Sourwine a letter dated March 18, enclosing a copy of the memorandum in
question, and had it hand delivered to him on the morning of March 18.
I heard nothing further from Mr. Sourwine and therefore I telephoned his office
on Thursday morning, March 26. He was not there. He returned my call that
afternoon and the conversation went roughly as follows:
He apologized for the delay, saying that he had been unable to reach Senator
Eastland about this matter because the Senator had been so busy and sometimes,
out of town. However, he had just seen Senator Eastland and their decision was
that although they wanted to cooperate in every way with the Commission, they
did not feel that they could disclose their informant to us. He said that they
would be happy to give us a letter to this effect, signed by the Senator. Mr.
Sourwine added that they would be happy to convey to the informant any specific
questions we had and convey back his answers to those questions. Mr. Sourwine
also added that Mr. Tarabochia's reluctance to disclose the identity of his
informant was "understandable." I agreed and said words to the effect, "Am I to
understand then, that it is Mr. Tarabochia's reluctance to disclose the identity
of the informant which is the basis for Senator Eastland's refusal to do so?"
Mr. Sourwine replied, "No; the decision is the
Senator's, not Mr. Tarabochia's."
I said that I was not authorized to give a decision at the present time, that
the decision on something of this importance would have to be made by Mr. Rankin
or the Commission itself. I added that it was my opinion that if we did decide
to forward questions through Mr. Sourwine that they would be of the most general
nature, rather than specific. Mr. Sourwine replied that general questions might
be hard to handle. I asked Mr. Sourwine whether his informant could handle a
question such as, "Give us all the information you have on what the Cuban
Embassy knows about Oswald, his visits to the Embassy, and anything else which
might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy." Mr Sourwine's reply was
that although such a question was very broad, it probably could be handled. He
then repeated his willingness to give us a signed letter from Senator Eastland.
We closed off the conversation by my saying that he should do nothing whatever
on this matter until hearing further from me or Mr. Rakin. Mr. Sourwine agreed.
In view of the subcommittee's reluctance to give us direct access to their
informant, I recommend that we convey to Mr. Sourwine the very general kind of
questions that I mentioned during the telephone conversation and hope that we
get as much information as possible from the informant. Forwarding specific
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questions to the informant would carry the strong disadvantage of disclosing the
informant and to everyone who worked with him, the particular problems that were
worrying us and the particular areas in which we felt we were deficient in our
knowledge.
Mr. CORNWELL. First, would it be accurate to state that the sub-
stance of the two memos is that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
contacted the Warren Commission with respect to offering information through an
informant?
Mr. SLAWSON. I cannot remember whether they contacted us or whether I came upon
the reference in a memorandum--well, it says here in exhibit 25, page 1, "A memo
of a telephone call from Abba Schwartz to William McManus." You see, I had
copies of every Government agency's memorandum and correspondence of every kind
that had anything to do with the assassination. So, the State Department
presumably would have sent us a copy of this. So, in going through that I may
have noticed the statement and, of course, then wanted to get in touch with this
contact, myself.
I don't remember how it first came to our attention.
Mr. CORNWELL. Whatever became of the possibility of using this informant?
Mr. SLAWSON. Nothing. The contacts to the best of my recollection were made as
stated in these two memorandums. I talked to Mr. Sourwine. I think but I am not
sure that I followed up a telephone call with a personal conference with him in
his office. But he and Senator Eastland were not willing to give us access to
the claimed contact they had, and nothing came of the request that we gave them
for information from that.
There was no further communication.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was your final opinion about this incident?
Mr. SLAWSON. My final opinion and to my recollection, it was also J. Lee
Rankin's, was that Sourwine and Eastland were trying to use this alleged contact
as a way of finding out inside information about the Warren investigation which
they could use for their own political purposes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you discuss the Tarabochia and Sourwine contacts with Rocca or
anyone else in the CIA?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't remember the occasion of doing so, but I certainly must
have. I would probably have discussed this with both the CIA and the FBI.
Mr. CORNWELL. What, if any, information did the CIA provide you concerning
Tarabochia and Sourwine?
Mr. SLAWSON. I am sure it was to the effect that they didn't know anything about
the contacts. That was probably just the end of it. Their standard procedure
would be not to make any comment on a Congressman or his motive. They would have
said, "We don't how anything about this Tarabochia" and that would have been the
end of it.
Mr. CORWELL. In the course of consideration of raids and that sort of thing in
Cuba, did the subject matter of one raid, which I guess is popularly known as
the Bavo-Pawley raid, come to your attention?
Mr. SLAWSON. That name does not mean anything to me; no. It does not mean
anything to me now.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall whether or not the CIA provided you any information
about Tarabochia or Sourwine concerning raids in Cuba?
Mr. SLAWSON. I understood the question as whether the CIA supplied me with any
information about raids in Cuba in connection with Sourwine and Tarabochia. My
answer is no.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention again to exhibit 22, on page 3 you
discuss not only the problem that we asked you questions about earlier, and to
what extent you could conduct an effective investigation, but on the bottom of
page 3 you note that there are also problem with the fact that a good deal of
the information cannot be disclosed to the American public and you note that
there are two reasons for that. One, that much of what CIA might provide could
come from particularly sensitive methods or sources which would be impossible to
disclose; and second, that in fact in some cases the information itself could
not even be disclosed, and you cite as an example on page 4 the fact that a
Russian MVD employee may secretly have tried to warn Oswald not to Come to
Russia, if disclosed, might result in employes being severely punished or
executed. Will you provide to the Committee any examples where those types of
considerations ultimately restricted your ability to tell the American public
why reached certain findings or to provide it in the information you acquired?
Mr. SLAWSON. I can recollect several situations like that, but to this day some
of them, so far as I know, are still sensitive. There was a highly placed
source, a source highly placed in a particular foreign government, from which we
got information indicating noninvolvement of that government. The information
was in the nature of the surprise expressed by members of that government and
apparently genuine shock at the news of Kennedy's assassination which would of
course tend to show they were not involved. But even to state what that
government was and any information in great detail would lead to possible
identification of the course because there were only apparently so many people
present when these things were observed.
So that would be one such situation. Other ones were, while other one I have in
mind was similar, we were not able to use other information which again tended
to exonerate the government involve because the information was spoken by
certain foreign officials time and place where, if they knew we had it, they
could tell pretty well how we got it. Then the comment I made right here in the
memo on page 4 or someplace further on, about the Russian MVD employee there the
reasons would be to avoid retaliation against an individual they might have
harmed him and still might. One thing that has bothered me about the public
disclosure of some of this information in that these people are presumably still
alive in Russia.
Mr. CORNWELL. At least there were a number of examples where these kinds of
concerns did result in exactly what you predicted, other words, failure to
disclose the information to support your conclusion?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
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Mr. CORNWELL. What about the Nosenko example? What were the reasons for
ultimately not disclosing the information that Nosenko had provided?
Mr. SLAWSON. There were two basic ones. One, I never did understand thoroughly;
but to get to the first one we did not disclose it because it seemed so very
self-serving by the Russians, that to even appear to rely upon it in our
conclusion that was basically exonerating the Russian involvement in the
assassination we thought would be bad because we in fact were not relying upon
it. As I said in the memo, the coincidence was too much, the first major
defector in many years should come across after the assassination and have
information that tended to show that the Russians were not at all involved. I am
still suspicious of it. I still think that Nosenko was probably a plant, which
does not go to say it was not true, but it means that you can't rely upon it.
The second reason was that the CIA told me and told Bill Coleman, it is my
recollection, and other people on the Commission staff, that their procedures to
test the authenticity of Nosenko would be compromised if the Russians were to
how what Nosenko told us. They said that authenticating and evaluating Nosenko
was of extreme importance to them.
He was the most important potential source of information they had obtained in
years about the Russians. So, we didn't want to hurt their investigation.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification a memorandum dated July 17, 1964,
as exhibit 28, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. We will mark that for identification.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall that memo, Mr. Slawson?
Mr. SLAWSON. I recall it from reading the file last night. Except in very
central way I assume it is the one I wrote. I don't recall any details.
Mr. CORNWELL. I am sorry that I don't have a copy of it here but
apparently there was a memo dated July 15, shortly before this one, from you to
Mr. Rankin, explaining a list of your proposed references to what would be
quoted as "A confidential Soviet Union source, the reliability of which has not
been established." In the foreign conspiracy, in the Russian section of the
report, in detailing about five areas which you had planned to discuss and
following that memo I take it was the July memo 2 days later, would it be fair
to state that at the point in time when this memo was written the Warren
Commission was going through the process of determining whether or not they
could disclose the information that Nosenko had provided?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes, that would be my recollection.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we have this exhibit admitted as part of the record, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection the exhibit is entered into the record.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit 28 and received for the record,
follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 28
[Memorandum]
JULY 17, 1964.
To: William T. COLEMAN.
From: W. David Slawson.
Attached is Howard Willens' re-draft of our Foreign Conspiracy draft. I have not
had time to read it in detail yet, but with a few exceptions he seems to have
accepted our arguments and our plan of organization. There are three major
exceptions: First, all references to the "secret Soviet Union source" have been
omitted. I attended a conference with the CIA on this and now agree that we
should not question this source. Willens can fill you in on the reasons why.
Indeed, the argument based upon Oswald's being permitted to marry Marina has
been omitted because the CIA claims it has information of many cases in which
spies were married to nonspies. Third, the argument based upon Oswald's general
character and his way of life in the United States has been omitted here and
will be reinserted at a point where it will apply to not only the foreign
conspiracy, but also the [deleted] conspiracy and a tie-in with Ruby.
In case I do not get to talk to you on the telephone before I leave, I have read
your Mexican draft. It is very good. If you get a chance, speak to Willens and
see whether he wants a xerox copy now or whether he wants to wait for
footnoting. I made a very few changes while I was reading it, but have not
attempted as yet a real editing job. I am in full agreement with the substance
and the conflicting evidence. These, so far as I am concerned, require change.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to the memo, would it be fair to state
that in the third sentence in the first paragraph we have a record of the fact
that a decision as of July 17 had been made that all references to the secret
Soviet Union source have been omitted, which then coincides with Mr. Willen's
redraft of your foreign conspiracy draft? In other words is this the point in
time when the Warren Commission made the decision not to---
Mr. SLAWSON. I am not sure. There were several levels, of course. This would be
a reflection at this point, July 17, that Howard Willens, who of course is not
the Commission itself, had made this decision tentatively that we were to take
out references to a secret Soviet Union source. This was my reforming Coleman of
it but this, like all decisions of importance, presumably would have gone up. In
other words, Willens would have sent in his redraft of the foreign conspiracy
portion of the report which I had written with his explanation of any changes.
This would have to go to Lee Rankin and Lee Rankin would have made any comments
or whatever that he might have had and that in turn might have gone to the full
Warren Commission for decision.
Mr. CORNWELL. Then the answer is, ultimately, the initial decision, which at
this point had been made by Mr. Willens, was finally adopted by the Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Now in addition to the problems we have already, discussed
concerning the sheer difficulty of conducting an investigation in the foreign
conspiracy field and the problems with writing a final report which could
describe fully the results of your investigation, were there any other obstacles
in connection with your assignment? For instance, start with the question of
time. Was there enough time to adequately conduct the investigation?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes, there was, although at times I was afraid that wouldn't be.
There was time pressure on all of us. I think that all members of the staff were
bothered and somewhat resented the fact that we were being pushed to work at
such a rapid pace but we
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resisted any attempts to make us finish before we felt we were ready to be
finished. When the report came out neither I, and I don't think anybody else,
felt that there was anything significant that we had not been able to do in the
time.
Mr. CORNWELL. When we discussed the same subject matters informally as I recall
you made statements to the general effect that everyone had too much to do.
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CONWELL. Would you explain the sense in which you made the statement?
Mr. SLAWSON. Well, I have since learned I think that this is the nature of any
kind of special program. You probably feel overworked yourself in this. But the
amount of paper that we had to go through to do our job well was tremendous. I
spent I think about the first month simply absorbing information. I don't think
I issued a single significant request the first month I was back there. I had so
many documents to get through and try to understand and try to put them
together. They continued pouring in from the ongoing investigation after that.
There weren't that many of us. So we had more than enough to do I would say.
Mr. CORNWELL. One reason I ask the question, if I could direct your attention
again to exhibit 22, at page 7 you discuss the possibility of the Soviet Union
having assassins abroad to carry out work for them. Near the bottom of the main
paragraph on that page you note that once you accept this fact, the possibility
that their network, if it exists, included Lee Harvey Oswald, must be fully
explored, indicating that at least at that point you felt additional
investigation was warranted. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not necessarily. My recollection is that I was stating here--well,
the memo tends to confirm my recollection that I was here speaking of what on
page 6 I call the "overall relevance of political motive" and giving the
background to the readers of this memorandum which was the members of the
Commission that when I said that must be fully explored I meant that I was going
to explore them as fully as I could in this memo and that they as members of the
Warren Commission should fully explore them in their own minds in order to come
to a conclusion.
In addition, I would have meant that insofar as that exploration on my side was
not complete, I was going to continue pursuing it. We did have portions of that
kind of exploration which went up almost to the last minute before publication.
Mr. CORNWELL. At least the investigation had not anywhere near been completed at
this point, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not quite, no. I would say a great deal of it had been done. This
was written in early June I think. I suppose some thing like two-thirds or
three-fourths of this investigation had been completed by that time.
Mr. CORNWELL. The initial employment arrangement that you described contemplated
3 to 6 months, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Is it also true that you understood Earl Warren wanted a final
draft of everything by June?
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Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. At one point I remember he was expecting us to be completed by
the following Monday, whatever date that would be, some time in June or May. Lee
Rankin was on his way home for the weekend and turned to Howard Willens and
said, "you had better tell the chief it won't be done next Monday."
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you know what his reaction was?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, except he didn't like it. His main motivation in wanting the
work done, and which he repeated several times to different members of the
staff, was that he wanted the truth known and stated to the public before the
Presidential election of 1964 because he didn't want the assassination in any
way to affect the elections. I am not sure at all how he thought it would but he
didn't want any possibility of it.
That was his principal reason for having it all finished.
Mr. CORNWELL. Whom did you get this information from?
Mr. SLAWSON. About Warren?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. SLAWSON. From my recollection right from the Chief Justice himself. He did
not deal with us on an individual basis frequently but enough so that everybody
I think who had a significant role on the staff had conferences with Earl
Warren.
Mr. CORNWELL. Again with respect to the same memorandum, exhibit 22, the very
last page of it concludes that, "The facts that we already know are certainly
sufficient to warrant additional investigation," again in the same context, is
that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. Let me back up and see what this was in connection with. This
is the anti-Castro Cuban movement I am commenting on, yes. We had done a good
deal of investigation by this time but on that one we were still going forward
insofar as we could.
Mr. CORNWELL. So, the investigation in fact as you suggested was not complete by
June and in fact it continued throughout the summer, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Sylvia Odio, one of the more publicized issues in the last 15
years, was interviewed in July after you wrote this memo. Isn't that accurate?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. In fact, as I recall, you had some information about the
investigation in your field, even going up to within 36 hours the publication
date of the report, isn't that accurate?
Mr. SLAWSON. Thirty-six or 72 or something. It was a matter of fractions of a
day. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. Will you tell the committee what that incident related to?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is another one that I cannot get into detail but
we had--well, to go back to the beginning, as I said earlier, a major part of
our investigation into the Mexico trip by Oswald was as to what transpired
between him and Kostikov at the Russian Embassy and what transpired between him
and the people he spoke to in the Cuban Embassy, I can't pronounce the name,
Asque or somebody the Cuban Embassy that he apparently spoke to and also Sylvia.
Turado de Duran.
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This information we had and were able to obtain by further investigation led us
to the conclusion that if Oswald had done only what he apparently had done at
the Cuban Embassy, which was to apply for an intransit visa to Cuba so that he
could visit Cuba in transit to the Soviet Union, that certain kinds of documents
would have been made out that would have borne certain people's signatures
including Oswald's.
We did not have those documents. We thought if we could get them or copies of
them and if we could authenticate them that would be good evidence that in fact
Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy was indeed innocent as far as the
assassination is concerned. It did concern these other things. So, some time in
the spring of 1964 we put through a request to the Swiss Government which had
diplomatic relations with Cuba for all the Cuban documents relating to Oswald
although I don't think we named anyone in particular.
Eventually copies did come back but they did not get back to us until fairly
late in the summer. My recollection is that the reason was that there was a lot
of friction between Castro and us at that time. I think they turned off the
water at Guantanamo Naval Base or something like that and they were not in the
mood to cooperate.
Nevertheless, they finally got them through the Swiss. When they came in,
although they appeared to be authentic I would like to have had some additional
information as to whether certain peoples' signatures were really their
signatures. I told this to the CIA, probably to Rocca, I can't remember who
exactly. He said, "Well, we may be able to get that for you. We will try." They
did finally get it within a fraction of a day or so before publication deadline.
I was able to say in the Warren report then that this particular bit of
information had been reasonably well authenticated but without saying how it
was.
Mr. CORNWELL. This particular routine was very important to you, was it not?
Mr. SLAWSON. The working out of what Oswald had done in Mexico and trying to
authenticate as far as we could?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. In fact when you first were telling me earlier when you first
focused on that issue there were conversations concerning whether or not you
would be permitted to go forward with the investigation in that area, isn't that
true?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. The request to the Castro government, request to the Cuban
Government through the Swiss went up through channels to Earl Warren and his
first response was no. The reason he gave was that he did not want to rely upon
any information from a government which was itself one of the principal
suspects.
The CIA and I nevertheless came to the conclusion that any information that we
could get we ought to get. We would worry about trying to authenticate it after
we got it. As I told you, I simply disobeyed orders and went ahead and made the
request through the State Department--it had to come from Dean Rusk, I remember
we got his signature--to the Swiss Government and we got the information. Then
of course I had to tell the Chief Justice that we got it and I pretended
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that I had misunderstood his previous statement. I think that is the only time I
disobeyed orders.
Mr. CORNWELL. It was not only his first impression, it was his only impression
that you should not have pursued this particular information?
Mr. SLAWSON. Once we got the information he was angry and said something to the
effect "I thought I told you we didn't want it." I said,
"I am sorry, I didn't understand it that way. But he accepted the fact that we
had it. I would never have thought he wouldn't. He did not make any attempt to
suppress it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state then that this particular transaction
was a matter that you felt strongly enough about to in fact, disobey Earl
Warren's orders and pursued and finally the information came in within hours
before the final publication on September 28 the report.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there any other areas like this where maybe, you just didn't
make the deadline, you wanted to very badly to investigate, and you were not
able to get within hours of the final publication?
Mr. SLAWSON. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. With respect to the question of whether or not the investigation
was adequate, would you tell us what the composition of the staff was, the
Warren Commission staff, and whether or not there were enough lawyers whether or
not they all produced?
Mr. SLAWSON. As I said before, I felt overworked and I think many of the staff
members felt the same way. I think that the main problem was one of the great
underestimations of the size of the task at the time. As I said, we were told,
we were telephoned and asked to come in, it would be 3 to 6 months. It is my
recollection they said it would be only 3 to 6 months on the outside and of
course we ended up taking about 8.
There was a reluctance, once we were there, to admit--again this is a matter of
once you have made a decision you don't like to admit you were wrong but people
did not like to admit that we probably needed more help and more time.
The following incidents will illustrate this. When we first got there it turned
out the secretarial help we had was mostly incompetent. Also
we had one fewer typewriter for our own use than there were staff members. That
struck a lot of people as silly. In any event I made a complaint. We eventually
got enough typewriters.
Several of us complained about the secretarial help. I was in Lee Rankin's
office talking to him at the time. He had previously put through a call to
McGeorge Bundy at the White House and Bundy's call back came while I was there.
Bundy said "What do you want." Lee Rankin told him about the secretaries. Bundy
said, "Just hold." Apparently picked up another phone and called the Defense
Department and he got back on the line, "I just told the Defense Department to
have--I have forgotten the number--but 20 of the best secretaries over there
tomorrow morning," and they did. From that point on we had good secretaries. But
it took, you know, pressure that high up to get us the resources we needed.
There were things all along the line we had to complain we want more of this or
we want something done here and there.
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Mr. CORNWELL. With respect to the investigation of the basic number of people
who did the investigation for the Warren Commission, was there anybody besides
lawyers there to do the work. Did you have any investigative staff?
Mr. SLAWSON. We had special people assigned from CIA, FBI, and Secret Service
who were with us more or less full time, especially the Secret Service who were
investigators. I think that time of the areas of investigation such as that
headed by Dave Belin, which was the immediate circumstances of the shooting in
Dallas employed private investigators at various points to crosscheck and give
an independent evaluation.
In other words, people who were not themselves FBI agents.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did Dave Belin employ those people?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not with his own money but he chose them. He and Bill Ball worked
together had chosen them. In my area we did not because of the difficulties, as
I told you earlier. There is no place in the world you can go and buy a spy
investigator.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there any problems with the selection of senior lawyers?
Mr. SLAWSON. I am not quite sure of the thrust of your question. I of course was
not privy to the selection of staff counsel. I was one of those who was
selected.
Mr. CORNWELL. I mean who did not do the work?
Mr. SLAWSON. A few did not. The majority of them did and I think contributed
very valuably, they did not, with a couple of exceptions, spend as much time as
the younger men did, especially as the investigation wore on. Some of them I
understand were hired with the promise that only a few weeks work would be
required of them. Of course that turned out not to be the case.
Bill Coleman, who was the one I worked most closely with, I have forgotten the
exact amount but it was in the week was all that he was
told he had to contribute. He ended up contributing much, much more than that.
Even then in the middle part of the investigation he was coming down only 1 day
a week. But then toward the end he came down again and stayed for a long period
of the. Of course in the beginning he stayed permanent time.
Mr. McKINNEY. May I ask a question here. As the investigation went on, at the
dinners among senior counsel or anyone else did you ever discuss or feel
uncomfortable about your tremendous dependence on existing governmental
agencies? You were really sort of processing papers, did that bother you?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes, it did. We would talk about how we might escape from the
dependency. Apart from the things that I have already mentioned in three
different categories, one was occasionally hiring an outside expert to give an
independent evaluation or assessment something. I was not able to do it in my
particular area but Dave Berlin, for example, did do it.
Second was cross-checking the papers passing back and forth between the
jurisdictions.
The third would be just keeping an eye and ear out for any odd bit of
information that would come m not through the agencies.
Mr. McKINNEY. The CIA had been somewhat discredited by the time this
investigation started by a sort of bumbling with the Bay of
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Pigs. It seems to me there was a large question of their intelligence gathering
capability after that particular diasaster. We also had the Cuban missile crisis
and so forth. There was a very strong cry in Washington that perhaps our
intelligence gathering forces were not as good as they should be.
I wonder if this disturbed you any?
Mr. SLAWSON. My recollection is that it did not. I did not view the Bay of Pigs
as reflecting so badly upon the CIA's intelligence gathering operations as it
did upon their judgment as to what kind of operation might be successful.
Mr. McKINNEY. That is a fine line you are drawing.
Mr. SLAWSON. It is. I will admit it is. To illustrate what I mean, not to tell
you that I am right, I think there is no question but that had President Kennedy
been willing to back up an invasion of Cuba, then
of course we were much stronger than Cuba, we could have toppled the Cuban
Government. The bad judgment came in thinking that the United States would be
willing to go that far overtly.
Mr. McKINNEY. One last question. We have since learned that an organization
which I find hard to pin down, called Army Intelligence, had its muddy little
fingers in a great many things from inside, actually spying on American citizens
within the continental borders of this country as well as being involved in
covert and overt activities outside. Has Army Intelligence ever been contacted
by the Warren Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. My recollection would be yes because we contacted every armed
service and that would include specifically their intelligence operations.
Mr. McKINNEY. Did they ever admit to any Cuban activities that you know of?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not that I remember, no. My recollection of the Army
Intelligence--I think it was called Army Security Agency in those days--was that
we got information from them about Oswald's record and activities in the Marine
Corps.
I take that back, it could not have been Army Security. It could have been Navy
Security. In any event it was an Armed Forces security.
Mr. McKINNEY. But not on the subject matter of Cuba?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not to my recollection, no.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have a couple of additional areas but would the committee like
to ask questions on what we have been over so far?
Mr. PREYER. I might ask one or two questions.
Incidentally, Mr. Slawson, I see among your qualifications that you are a summa
cum laude from Amherst, magna cure laude from. Harvard Law School, which should
impress a Yale man like Mr. Kinney here.
You mentioned that you spent a considerable amount of time with Mr. Dulles and
that you worked with him. Of course he was one member of the Commission that had
more expertise in this area.
What was the nature of your meetings with him? Did you have any of these
informal late evening sessions after dinner and a few drinks and talk about the
state of the world as you mentioned you had with the other lawyers?
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Mr. SLAWSON. No. The discussions were some of them informal but they all
occurred right in my office at the Warren Coramission building and during the
afternoon or morning. He, as I mentioned, was somewhat a sick person at the
time. I don't recollect his ever being there past 6 or 7 o'clock in the evering,
something like that. He would become too tired generally to stay on any longer.
Mr. PREYER. Do you happen to know whether he was able to attend most of the
Warren Commission meetings or not? Did his illness prevent him from being active
on the Commission?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I think his illness did not prevent him. In fact, I think the
record will show that he probably had the best attendance record of anyone. We
had a rule that testimony that was to be presented to the Commission, as opposed
to testimony just to a staff member, could only be given if at least one
Commission member was present. Of course there had to be someone there. I think
more of those sessions that member was Allen Dulles than anybody else.
Mr. PREYER. Did you talk over with him your theory or the hypothetical example
of the anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the assassination?
Mr. SLAWSON. Presumably I did, yes. I don't remember the exact conversations but
that would have been the kind of things I talked over with him.
Mr. PREYER. Did he ever at any time during those conversations mention anything
about the assassination plots on Castro that the CIA was undertaking?
Mr. SLAWSON. No.
Mr. PREYER. He had been a Director of the CIA of course. Do you know when he was
last Director of the CIA?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I don't. I believe he was the immediate past Director at the
time but I am not even sure of that.
Mr. PREYER. Perhaps you are going to get into this area, Mr. Cornwell. I want to
get the witness' view about the possibility of Oswald being an FBI informant.
Are you planning to go into that?
Mr. CORNWELL. You can go right ahead if you would like.
Mr. PREYER. Since you dealt with Oswald's actions in Russia I would just like to
get your views on the possibility of his being an FBI informant. He did seem to
be able, he and his wife, to move back and forth in Russia with a minimum of
bureaucratic delay in getting passports and that sort of thing. I wondered if
you looked into that or had any suspicions in that area or came to any
conclusions in that area?
Mr. SLAWSON. I did look into the possibility that his moving into Russia,
getting a passport to travel abroad and his coming back out of Russia with
Marina when he decided to come back to the United States, had been suspiciously
quick or anything else suspicious about how they were handled and ultimately
concluded that they were not suspicious, that the obtaining of the passport in
particular to go abroad was well within the normal time for obtaining a passport
from the place he obtained it which I think was New Orleans. All these places
are foggy in my mind now.
In any event, we got the statement of procedures from the particular Passport
office concerned and also from Washington passport office. We followed up the
timing. We did not just accept the State Department's
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word but we got a list of how long it had taken other people, just a random
selection of citizens, about the same time for the same passport application,
places to get their passports, and compared them, and his obtaining his, as I
said, was just routine in terms of time.
Coming back, it was more difficult to assess whether there was anything
improperly quick or otherwise improper about Oswald's return because there you
are not dealing with a routine thing. Of course it is not routine for someone to
defect and then come back from the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, my recollection was that there had been something like 20 people
that that had happened to, a surprising number at the time.
Insofar as I could, I studied all those other cases to make comparisons. The
conclusion there was that there was nothing odd about the Oswald case. As I say,
that is a soft conclusion because they were all unique cases in a sense. You
could not make any statistical study out of the 20.
Mr. PREYER. I have just one other question. Do you know at this time whether or
not Raymond Rocca knew of the assassination plot against Castro at the time you
were dealing with him?
Mr. SLAWSON. I certainly did not know at the time because I did not know there
were such plots. Even to this day I don't know whether he did know. I either
read or had someone tell me, and I can't remember which, in the last couple of
years that in their opinion, Rocca did not know it, that the CIA had
deliberately chosen people to work with the Warren Commission staff who were not
aware of these plots in order that they could pick people who could be sincerely
ignorant of it.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREVER. Any further questions, Mr. McKinney?
Mr. McKINNEY. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Cornwell, how much longer do you think you will need to question
the witness? The question is whether we should recess for lunch at this time or
try to finish?
Mr. CORNWELL. I would say at least 30 minutes, perhaps a little longer.
Mr. PREYER. Perhaps we had better break for lunch and resume at o'clock. Will
that be all right, Mr. Slawson?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; that will be OK. I have plane reservations at 5:30.
Mr. CORNWELL. Which airport?
Mr. SLAWSON. Dulles.
Mr. PREYER. I don't anticipate there will be any problem making that plane.
Mr. CORNWELL. Not for Mr. Slawson. There are two witnesses from California today
,both of whom are trying to catch that same plane. For Mr. Slawson at least
there is no problem.
Mr. PREYER. We will recess until 1:30 today.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed until 1:30 p.m.]
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AFTERNOON SESSION
Staff members present: G. Robert Blakey, G. Cornwell, W. Wizelman, D. Hardman,
R. Genzman, E. Berning, M. Wills, W. Cross, J. Facter, J. Wolf, K. Klein, and L.
Matthews.
Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Cornwell.
TESTIMONY OF W. DAVID SLAWSON RESUMED
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Slawson, we have discussed up to this point many of the papers that you
wrote while you were a Warren Commission staff attorney and the problems that
you faced which in large part are reflected on the face of these memoranda.
What happened to the fruits of your investigation and particularly the fruits as
they were reflected in such memoranda at the time that the final Warren
Commission report was written?
Mr. SLAWSON. To the best of my knowledge, I never destroyed anything and they
were left either in my desk or in files at the Warren Commission building and
were subsequently put in some kind of security classification and sent off to
the Archives.
Mr. CORNWELL. What I really had in mind, although I appreciate the answer, was
what transition occurred in putting the results of your investigation into a
final report, the public report?
Mr. SLAWSON. My recollection of that, and the memos that I have refreshed my
recollection on tend to confirm this, is that Bill Coleman and I handed in our
reports to Howard Willens, not reports but our drafts for inclusion in the
Warren report to Howard Willens, and Howard redrafted to some extent, made
comments and would send us back a copy. We would either approve or state our
objections. Then when we reached agreement, it would go from Howard to J. Lee
Rankin and from him, usually with very little further change, to the Commission
itself.
But this whole process took considerably more than a month toward the end and
the Commission might frequently send things back for redrafting or shortening or
more elaboration and so on. Of course it was their job to put the whole report
together in a meaningful and clear fashion.
In other words, we might see something again or it might come down and somebody
else would be given the task of putting it together with two or three other
staff members' input.
Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to ask you some questions about what type of changes,
if any, were made in the rewrite processes. Perhaps, again because there has
been some period of time, we might proceed to do that by looking at your papers
and, if you would, let us begin looking at exhibit 22 which is basically a large
document.
For purposes of comparison, I will hand you a copy of the Warren Commission
report so that we will know what page we are talking to. It is the official
version as opposed to the McGraw-Hill publication. I believe the only changes
are in page numbering between those two versions. As a reference we will refer
to that one and those pages in the official report.
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With respect to pages 1 and 2 of your memo, page 1 is the concept that: "Firm
evidence of foreign conspiracy is obviously very hard to come by", the kind of
concepts you discussed earlier. The concept page 2 that one method which you
could use was the CIA but in essence there weren't really too many additional
sources for comparison of what you got from foreign governments other than the
CIA.
I would like to ask you to compare those concepts with what appears in the
Warren Commission report at page 243, which would be 225 in the McGraw-Hill
publication. Near the top of that page we of course do find the statement in the
first full--I am looking at the McGrawHill version, it is at the top of my page
statement that "The Commission faced substantial difficulties in determininng
whether anyone conspired with or assisted the person who committed the
assassination."
However, on the following page the concept is somewhat different or at least I
ask you whether or not it is.
Mr. SLAWSON. Which part?
Mr. CORNWELL. Pages 244 and 245 of the official version.
Mr. SLAWSON. At the very bottom of 244 "In considering the question of foreign
involvement"?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir. The language:
In considering the question of foreign involvement, the Commission has received
valuable assistance from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Federal agencies with
special competence in the field of foreign investigation.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Taking those passages, would it be fair to state that the nature
of the difficulties that you faced in the foreign investigative field were
substantially minimized by comparison in the Warren Commission report from the
way you described them in your internal memos?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; I don't think they were minimized. I think the right words
would be just simply "not discussed." The report, as read it, is giving a kind
of "thank you" to these various agencies their help and then just saying we are
not going to disclose anything that is from a confidential source of
information, but aside from that, the Commission will disclose everything that
it relied upon, and I think that needs to be emphasized, that Earl Warren in
particular tried to be scrupulously honest that way.
He would not in his own mind and in the deliberations of the Commission that I
heard about, rely on anything that he felt he could not disclose to the public,
for example, the Nosenko stuff.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to page 374 which is page 350 in the
McGraw-Hill version, the concluding paragraph reads:
Based upon the investigation reviewed in this chapter, the Commission concluded
that there is no credible evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was part of a
conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Examination of the facts of the
assassination itself revealed no indication that Oswald was aided in the
planning or execution of his scheme. Review of Oswald's life and activities
since 1959, although productive in illuminating the character of Lee Harvey
Oswald (which is discussed in the next chapter), did not produce any meaningful
evidence of a conspiracy. The Commission discovered no evidence that the Soviet
Union or Cuba were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Nor did
the Commission's investigation of Jack Ruby produce any grounds for believing
that Ruby's killing of Oswald was part of the conspiracy.
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Would you agree with that?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL, It states the conclusion with considerably less doubt than the
view that you expressed in your memos.
Mr. SLAWSON. There is an emphasis gained in the official report by repetition.
This goes on and on essentially saying everything in thefirst sentence and then
repeating it in detail thereafter and that makes it sound more positive than it
would otherwise literally be.
No; I think I agree that this is accurate in that I, too, concluded that there
was no credible evidence. In other words, there is lots of evidence we count as
evidence, as we had to in the processes of investigation, everything that came
in that if true would point toward a conspiracy. But our investigation in no
case has led to the conclusion that that evidence was accurate. So, I think the
flat statement there was no credible evidence is absolutely accurate.
Mr. CORNWELL. The first statement then in your view, "no credible evidence" is
accurate. What about the remaining repetitious concepts, "no indication"?
Mr. SLAWSON. Literally of course that is not true. There was some indication. I
would read that as implicit in the word "credible," there is no credible
indication.
Mr. CORNWELL. The next concept, "no evidence," in the concept of that, "nor any
grounds, in the final statement, "no evidence" again. As repeated the sentence
would be a slight overstatement?
Mr. SLAWSON. I would put it differently. If you interpret the word "evidence" as
meaning something that points toward the involvement of these people, if you
conclude that the thing is true, then of course these statements are flatly
wrong. It all has to go back to the credibility of the weight of the evidence.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to page 98 of the large document, exhibit
22, I would like you to compare the language at the top:
Unfortunately, however, although the means of investigation at our disposal in
Mexico have in our opinion been stretched to the utmost, there still remain gaps
in our knowledge of what Oswald did while he was there.
The paragraph concludes:
The final answer to the meaning of the Mexico trip therefore will probably never
be given.
I would like you to compare that language, if you would, to the report at page
305, which is page 282 in the McGraw-Hill version.
Mr. SLAWSON. 305 in my version?
Mr. CORNWELL. 305. Particularly the language that---
The investigation of the Commission has produced considerable testimonial and
documentary evidence establishing the precise time of Oswald's Journey, his
means of transportation, the hotel at which he stayed in Mexico, and a
restaurant at which he often ate. All known persons whom Oswald may have met
while in Mexico, including passengers on the buses he rode, and the employees
and guests of the hotel where he stayed, were interviewed. No credible witness
has been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person while in Mexico
City.
There is perhaps no flat statement that there were no gaps, as you indicated in
your memo and your knowledge of that trip, but there is no statement--
Mr. SLAWSON. There I would have to say, I would not have written the report that
way, frankly. I think it would have been better to make
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frank recognition that we could not account for every hour of Oswald's time by
any means in Mexico.
Mr. CORNWELL. On the same subject, if I could, I would like you to compare your
perhaps more candid statement that "the final answer to the meaning of the
Mexican trip will probably never be given", with the language in the final
Warren Commission report which appeared on page 299 of the official version and
279 of the McGraw-Hill version, or 278 and 9 which reflects:
The Commission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's
purpose and activities on his Journey, with specific reference to reports that
Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments. As a result of its
investigation, the Commission believes it has been able to reconstruct and
explain most of Oswald's actions during this time.
That again at least in tone is different from your concept of the evidence in
that field, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; in tone. I don't feel as strongly about this one as did the
one before. The statement in the report "as a result of this investigation, the
Commission believes that it has been able to reconstruct and explain most of
Oswald's actions during the time," if you mean "most" in terms of most of the
time that is wrong. If you mean most in terms of probable actions, I think we
did. Although that is somewhat question begging because you never know what is
significant unless you know what it is.
Mr. CORNWELL. With respect to page 83 of your original memo, there you discuss
the meaning of Oswald's letter to the Russian Embassy. Your characterization of
it near the bottom of page 83 is that "the letter undoubtedly constitutes a
disturbing bit of evidence and will probably never be fully explained." Then you
conclude by stating that "We think that the letter constitutes no more than a
desperate, somewhat illiterate and deranged attempt to facilitate his family's
return to the Soviet Russia."
I would like you to compare that with page 287 of the McGraw-Hill reprint or
page 310 of the official version, particularly the last half of the paragraph
concerning what Marina Oswald could add to that problem, which concludes by
stating." * * * it becomes apparent that Oswald was intentionally beclouding the
true state of affairs in order to make his trip to Mexico sound as mysterious
and important as possible."
In other words, the language "It becomes apparent," or let me ask you, would
that be different from your concept that the import of this letter probably
never will be fully explained?
Mr. SLAWSON. Again, I would not have chosen the word "apparent." I would have
nut in there "probable." I think that is in effect my conclusion but I wouldn't
have stated it that strongly.
I think some place in my memo I make a statement to that effect. I think I used
the word "obfuscate." Anyway it is the same thing.
Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to ask you to look at the concept at the bottom of
page 3 and top of page 4 of your main memo, exhibit 22, and also perhaps in the
same light, the memo of yours which we have had admitted as exhibit 28 which
discusses in the first instance generally the problems with reporting everything
you had learned in the final report and in the second instance. exhibit 28, if
you could look at that, a particular application of that principle.
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Mr. SLAWSON. You mean references to the secret Soviet Union source having been
omitted?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir. If you would, compare the problem which you have
discussed facing, and the need in some instances to withhold information because
the very information could perhaps give away sources and methods, with the
language on page 945 of the official version of the Warren Commission report
which appears at page 226 of the McGraw-Hill reprint. Does it not state there
that "the Commission has concluded in this report all information furnished by
these agencies which the Commission relied on in coming to its conclusions or
which tended to contradict those conclusions." Then in fact clarifying that in
the next sentence by stating, "Confidential sources of information as contrasted
with the information, itself, have in relatively few instances been withheld.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; it conflicts in a way, but I think what the writer in the
official report is trying to say is although in some instances there was
information as opposed to just sources of information, but actual substantial
information which was not disclosed, the Commission was able to come to its
conclusions without relying upon that. My recollection is that Earl Warren tried
very hard to do that.
There were very few things that couldn't be disclosed of a substantive nature.
Nosenko's statement, the only one I can think of offhand and the "information
from a highly placed source in a foreign government" that I referred to this
morning in my testimony, for example, tended to support the conclusions, not to
contradict them, the conclusions in the report. Therefore the Commission in the
report is being truthful when it says that it has concluded all information
furnished by those agencies which the Commission relied upon to make its
conclusions or which tended to contradict those conclusions.
In other words, it did not have to include the information from highly placed
source in the foreign government, for example, because it did not contradict the
conclusions here.
Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention to page 98 of exhibit 22, between
98 and 102, you discuss information concerning the testimony by Mr. Pedro
Guiterrez Valencia which in pertinent part concerns the possible payment of sums
of money to Oswald in Mexico City which he says he observed. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would you compare your discussion of Mr. Guiterrez Valencia's
observations as set forth in that memo with page 659 of the official version or
page 588 of the McGraw-Hill reprint, particularly that page the discussion of
what is labeled "Speculation"--"Oswald came back from Mexico City with $5,000"
and the following statement, "Commission finding"--"No evidence has ever been
supplied or obtained to support this allegation."
Would not the testimony of Guiterrez Valencia support that allegation?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes, it would. Again the Commission report has to be read as
meaning no evidence that they believe. Otherwise it is not true.
Mr. CORNWELL. Of course as you may recall back in volume 24 of the official
version, there as a reprint of Mr. Guiterrez Valencia's testimony
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but it would appear on the face of what we have been able to determine from the
main volume that this testimony does not exist.
Mr. SLAWSON. This should not have been written the way it was. But I could have
been as much at fault as anybody in putting these things together. I didn't
write this part of the report. On the other hand, I am sure it was shown to me,
so I would say I am probably as much at fault as anyone.
Mr. CORNWELL. Again, with respect to exhibit 22 at pages 6 and 7 you discuss the
possibility that Oswald might have been an agent for the Cuban or Soviet
Government, and particularly on pag 6 you state "his circumstances and character
do fit the criteria for an 'agitator,' propagandizer, or even assassin, for the
Cuban Government. It follows therefore that bits of evidence pointing toward his
being an agent for one of the latter purposes must be taken seriously."
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Is that an acknowledgement that there were both circumstances and
character traits, and bits of evidence which pointed toward those possibilities?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes, sure. Those presumably were those that I came to discuss later
in the same memo.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would that then be a somewhat different picture than is painted at
page 374 of the official version or 350 of the McGrawHill reprint which states
that "there is no credible evidence that Oswald was part of a conspiracy * * *
no indication that he was aided * * * no meaningful evidence of conspiracy * * *
no evidence that the Soviet Union or Cuba were involved in the assassination"?
Mr. SLAWSON. I can only repeat what I said before, that page 374 is the
Commission's conclusion as to what the credible evidence was. Whereas the stuff
on page 6 of my memo is a statement of evidence at the point where we had not
yet made up our mind what the credible evidence was.
As I said earlier this was somewhere between two-thirds and three quarters of
our investigation had been done but the remainder remained to be done.
Let me put it another way. I would say the Commission report is like a jury
verdict whereas the memo you are reading from is like an investigator's brief or
report or even a prosecutor's report although not quite. I certainly was not
giving only the evidence in favor of a conspiracy. but I had a more deliberative
adoption of suspicion in the memo. I think it was proper at that point.
Mr. CORNWELL. The memo does indicate you do have evidence indicating those
concepts?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Where the Commission report said there was no evidence indicating
those concepts; is that right?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to exhibit 93, which is the memorandum
that relates to the footnote supplied by the CIA. In the last two sentences in
the first paragraph you note:
Generally speaking we will publish all information on which the Commission
relied in coming to its conclusions and all the information which tends to
counteract those conclusions. Sources of information will frequently be
withheld, but the information supplied by those sources will in almost all cases
be published.
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Would it be fair to state that your concepts of the fact that you could only
make those statements in terms of "generally speaking" and "in almost all cases"
do not appear in the Commission report when they describe the fact that all
information furnished is published?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right. It is not the same. I was quite aware at the time I
wrote this memo presumably that I was speaking only in generalitics and
probabilities. But I think that probably was my recognition that the decision
was not mine to make.
Mr. CORNWELL. In fact, your preliminary view of this was in fact implemented,
was it not? and what really happened in the end was just as you predicted, that
all information was perhaps generally set forth and maybe even in all cases but
not universally?
Mr. SLAWSON. It is hard to know because at the sessions at which the Commission
made their final decision, staff members were not present. Those were executive
sessions. So we on the staff--I never did find out exactly what the Commission
relied on. All I knew is that we gave them all the information we had plus our
own evaluation of the evidence and evaluation of what conclusions should be
drawn from it.
Finally we read the report like any member of the public did. I forget the exact
time I left Washington. I left 24 hours sooner than most staff members did
because I broke down and got the flu at the last minute from exhaustion. My law
firm also wanted me to get home.
In any event there was a week or week and a half as I remember between the time
I left Washington and the time the final report was published. I did not get a
copy until the public did.
Mr. CORNWELL. At least the examples you gave us today of the areas in which you
decided the information could not be published, it was in fact not published?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. The report is rather voluminous; is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. It was prepared under, I take it, rather severe pressure in the
final moments of your work?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Apart from the kind of thing we have just been
comparing which I suppose we might describe as a change, at least a change in
tone from your view of the strength of the evidence and the severity of problems
to the way the report reads, were there other problems in the preparation of the
final report concerning the question of its accuracy?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, not that I can recollect.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let me show you one document and see if it will perhaps refresh
your memory.
May we mark, Mr. Chairman, a memo dated, September 22, 1964 from Mr. Slawson to
Mr Willens, subject "Pending Matters" for identification as exhibit 30?
Mr. PREYER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state, Mr. Slawson, that the memo was prepared
September 22, approximately 6 days prior to the Publication of the Warren
Commission report, and dealt with the kinds of publication problems you were
facing at that time?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
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Mr. CORNWELL. May we have exhibit 30 admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, so
that we may ask the witness specific questions on it?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, exhibit 30 is admitted into evidence.
[The above referred to document, exhibit 30, was admitted into,
evidence.]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 30
SEPTEMBER 22, 1964.
To: Howard Willens.
From: W. David Slawson.
Subject: Pending matters.
1. Additional or substitute authority from FBI. Reference is made to footnote
563, page 307 of chapter VI. The FBI was simply unable to get to us in time a
comprehensive list of the Hotel del Comercio guests who have been located and
questioned. Consequently, in addition to the authority already cited, I have
inserted a phantom CE number which can be filled in with something. I believe I
have fudged the text sufficiently so that almost anything can be fitted in. (CE
3074)
2. The cite checkers tell me that CE 2123 and in particular, attachment 5
thereto, does not have a translation with it. This was translated but before
leaving I was unable to locate the translation. It is not particularly important
for substantive purposes but obviously the translation should be located.
3. CIA oral clearance has been given for the references to Oswald's staying at
the hotels in Helsinki, CE 2676 (portions thereof) which is footnote 479 of
appendix 13. This should be coming through soon.
4. Just before he left Bert Jenner said he cleared with Stu Pollak that we
should check with State Department as to whether they had any information George
de Mohrenschildt's walling trip in Central America in 1960. I asked Dick Frank
for this information. The local State Department files contain nothing. He has
cabled consulates in Central America to look in their files and will report when
he gets their reports.
5. The material which Dean Rusk promised to send over in his testimony has not
yet been formally made an exhibit as was agreed during the course of his
testimony. This material is contained primarily in CD 1462, CD 1462-A, and CD
1462-B, and somewhat in CD 1135. Sally Hennigan has these documents and is
familiar with the material.
6. Mrs. Henningan has tried to catch as many FBI documents as possible that have
security classification and that I have made into exhibits. She has made a
running list.
7. When I leave I will take with me all my personal materials I will of course
take nothing that has anything dealing with Commission business. I think it
would be a good idea to leave all by materials approximately where they are,
throwing nothing away until enough time has elapsed that you are sure I will not
have to be called back for anything. After that, of course, it is up to you what
you do with all my stuff. I imagine it will be thrown away. In my own filing
system I have made no distinction between classified and unclassified material
so the only thing to do with my previous drafts in the black notebooks, for
example, if the Commission wants to keep this sort of material, would be to put
it in a classified file.
W.D.S.
Mr. CORNWELL. The very first paragraph reads:
Additional or substitute authority from FBI. References made to footnote 563,
page 307 of chapter VI, the FBI was simply unable to get to us in time a
comprehensive list of the Hotel del Comercio guests who have been located and
questioned. Consequently in addition to the authority already cited, I have
inserted a phantom CE number which can be filled in with something. I believe I
have fudged the text sufficiently so that almost anything can be fitted in.
What was the phantom CE number?
Mr. SLAWSON. A phantom CE number was a number that had not yet been taken by
anything, so that when the presumed report came in they could give us that
number and then have the FBI report cluded in the final volume, assuming it came
in in time.
This was apparently done by me because I had to leave before it could come in.
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Mr. CORNWELL. There have been public criticisms of the Warren Commission which
concern the general subject matter of the accuracy of footnotes and the
suggestion that the text did not always coincide with the footnotes. Does your
experience, being there at the time this process was being undertaken, indicate
that those criticisms were correct, and if so, to what extent?
Mr. SLAWSON. I took, and I think everyone else did, as much care as we could.
But the time pressure was severe. With the mass of material that we have I am
sure that errors of numbering, and perhaps what footnote A should have had,
footnote B did, and vice versa, occurred. I don't think that the kind of
crosschecking that normally goes into a good professional publication, for
example, ever went into this.
Mr. CORNWELL. What is your impression as to why there were the kinds of changes
in tone in the statements? Why did those occur?
Mr. SLAWSON. I think because Earl Warren was adamant almost that the Commission
would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth and then they would
state it as much without qualification as they could. He wanted to lay at rest
doubts. He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his
philosophy as a Judge.
The Brown v. Board of Education decision you remember was unanimous. I think he
was at great pains to make sure it was.
At one point in the report it didn't have anything to do with foreign conspiracy
so I only was tangentially involved in it--but the question of whether two shots
out of the probable three that were fired hit Kennedy, the question was whether
or not the first shot came before the first two or between these two or
afterward. A great deal of time was spent on that, getting a unanimous opinion
from all the Commissioners, I remember that one in particular, and all because
Earl Warren felt it was best that they make up their mind as to what they
thought the truth was and then try to settle it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Apart from, I guess what you basically are describing as a
personality trait of Earl Warren and what you have previously told us concerning
his desire not to have the question of the assassination become an issue in the
national election and therefore keying his time schedule to accomplish that, was
there any other motive that you perceived being in existence at the time coming
perhaps from Earl Warren, or even from a higher level which would have caused
the kind of changes in tones that
we are viewing here, particularly with respect to your area of expertise, the
foreign area?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; I think that was it. You characterized it as a personality
trait of Earl Warren. It was. I think it was almost a very consciously adopted
philosophy of his. His idea was that the principal function of the Warren
Commission was to allay doubt, if possible. You know, possible in the sense of
being honest. lie thought that it was. I suppose he did not think that an
official document like this ought to read at all tentatively, it should not be a
source of public speculation if he could possibly avoid it.
On the other hand, he always assumed that we would publish the background
information on which we drew our conclusions so that if anybody wanted to check
our conclusions they could. Of course people have.
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Mr. CORNWELL. If I could ask you to look at exhibit 27. Mr. Chairman, may we
have marked for identification exhibit 27 which is a document reading at the top
"February 1964" and is a memorandum from Mr. Slawson to Mr. Willens styled
"Letter to the Russian Government".
Mr. PREYER. We will mark that for identification.
Mr. CORNWELL. You have previously reviewed that memo overnight is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that that memo concerns the subject
matter of how to seek, and what extent information should be sought, from the
Russian Government?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that document admitted as part of the record, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection the exhibit is admitted in the record.
[The above referred to document, JFK exhibit No. 27, was received in the
record.]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 27
[Memorandum]
To: Mr. Howard P. Willens. FEBRUARY 1964.
From: Mr. W. David Slawson.
Subject: Letter to the Russian Government.
BACKGROUND
Lee Oswald spent almost three years in Russia. Almost our sole sources of
information on these years are his own writings and correspondence and Marina's
testimony. We are therefore preparing a letter to be sent to the Russian
Government asking for additional information.
On 21 January 1964 the CIA sent us a draft of such a letter. The State
Department has commented that in its opinion the CIA draft would probably have
serious adverse diplomatic effects. The State Department feels that the CIA
draft carries an inference that we suspect that Oswald might have been an agent
for the Soviet Government and that we are asking the Russian Government to
document our suspicions. The State Department feels that the Russians will not
answer a letter of this kind at least not truthfully, and that it will also do
positive harm in that they will take offense at our sending it to them. The
State Department proposes instead that we send a very short and simple request
for whatever information the Russians may have.
RECOMMENDATIONS
My inclination at the present time is that the State Department's recommended
approach is probably preferable to the CIA's. However, I would modify the State
Department approach slightly by following the general request with a few-very
few--specific questions. These questions would be restricted to areas that were
both important to us and not such as to give material offense to the Russians. I
think that including a few specific questions might even be beneficial in that,
if we were careful in the choice of and drafting of these questions, we might
successfully convey to the Russian Government the impression that at the present
time at least we were inclined to regard Oswald as neurotically and personally
motivated in killing the President rather than being motivated by anything
connected with the Russian Government. In other words, properly chosen and
drafted specific questions might serve to allay suspicion rather than arouse it.
With the foregoing general criteria in mind, I would propose including specific
questions such as the following:
We would like to have:
1. Copies of all documents and records in connection with any hospitalizations
and other medical examinations and treatments of Lee Harvey Oswald and of Mrs.
Marina Oswald during her adult life, including:
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(1) His treatment in October 1959 in Moscow when, according to his own diary, he
Was found unconscious in his hotel room by Intourist Grade Rima Shirokova after
an attempted suicide.
(2) Any examinations or treatments made of Marina Oswald on or about October
1961 when, according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, Marina Oswald was treated for
nervous exhaustion.
2. The results of any physical examinations, psychological tests or
psychological examinations made at any time on Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina
Oswald.
3. Copies of all communications to and from Lee Harvey Oswald with any organ or
commission of the Russian Government in relation to his entering Russia and
seeking permission to reside there and in relation to his seeking Russian
citizenship during late 1959 and thereafter.
4. Copies of all correspondence to and from Lee Harvey Oswald with any organ or
commission of the Russian Government in reference to Oswald's efforts to leave
Russia and return to the United States.
5. Copies of all correspondence to and from Marina Oswald in reference to her
attempts to leave Russia and accompany her husband to the United States.
6. Copies of the file on Lee Harvey Oswald kept by the Soviet Consulate in
Mexico City.
7. Copies of any records showing drunkenness, violence, disorderly conduct or
other abnormal behavior on the part of Oswald, whether or not criminal.
You will note that I have not asked in the foregoing questions (except for "No.
6 and No. 7) for co. pies of internal memoranda minutes, etc., as does the CIA
draft.
The following questions might be asked, but I am inclined to think that they are
not important enough to warrant probably offending the Soviet Government by
including them:
1. In the file furnished to the United States Government by the Soviet
Government covering the correspondence between the Russian Embassy in
Washington, D.C., and Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. there is a letter
dated July 9, 1952 from N. Reznichenko, Chief of the Consular Section, to Marina
Oswald and a letter dated August 15, 1962 to N. Raznichenko from Marina Oswald.
Both letters refer to a "Form Card No. 118," and the letter dated August 15,
1962 states that the Form Card has been filled out and is enclosed. If possible,
we request that a copy of this Form Card be furnished to us at this time.
2. A description of Oswald's job in the Minsk Radio and Television factory, plus
copies of all employment records, union records and other job-related activities
of Lee Harvey Oswald.
3. A statement as to why Lee Harvey Oswald was not granted Russian citizenship
status by the Russian Government. Or, if Oswald was offered such citizenship and
he refused, copies of all correspondence to and from Oswald on this subject.
The CIA draft includes certain inquiries on Oswald's ownership of weapons the
Soviet Union. The CIA draft does not go on to ask about his membership in the
Minsk gun club, which would seem logically to follow in this context. David
Belin has told me that he no longer regards the issue of Oswald's marksmanship
as of primary importance and that therefore, although he would welcome whatever
additional evidence we might obtain from the Russian Government as to Oswald's
skill with firearms, he does not feel that this is a high-priority item. In my
opinion, the only other reason we might want to ask questions in regard to
Oswald's firearms and/or hunting activities in the Soviet Union is to find out
whether the gun club and these activities were some sort of cover-up for
sabotage or espionage training. Certainly, if such was the case, the Russians
will not admit it nor will they furnish us any evidence from which we can
document such a conclusion on our part. Consequently, because trying to get
information as to a "cover-up" is hopeless and because the marksmanship angle is
not crucial, I recommend that we not question the Russian Government on the
subject of Oswald's firearms and/or hunting activities in Russia.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let, me ask you, in connection with the preparation of this
document, do you recall a roughly contemporaneous meeting between yourself and
Mr. Dulles concerning the subject matter?
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Mr. SLAWSON. No, I don't. That doesn't mean I don't recollect it. That means I
recollect there was not one.
Mr. CORNWELL. The subject matter, I suppose, in the memo concerns a balancing of
your desire, and apparently the CIA's desire, to request specific information
from the Russian Government, with the State Department's apprehension about the
possibility of antagonizing them. Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. No. I would state the balance slightly differently. The attempt on
my part and the CIA's, I think, was simply to obtain information in a way that
would be most likely to get true information and complete information. The State
Department, I think, was also concerned with that, but in addition concerned
with not giving great offense to the Russians. As I say on page 1 of the
document, No. 27, "The State Department feels that the Russians will not answer
a letter of this kind at least not truthfully, and it will also do positive harm
in that they will take offense at our sending it to them."
I apparently read the State Department's response as saying, "You people are not
going to help yourselves by this kind of letter as well as do some harm by
creating a minor international incident."
Let me direct your attention to the very last page, page 5. That page seems to
concern a very specific request which the CIA had suggested and that was with
respect to Oswald's ownership of weapons in the Soviet Union.
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. The request was dropped, is that accurate?
Mr. SLAWSON. My only recollection is what I read here but certainly that is what
I seem to be saying in this memo.
Mr. CORNWELL. It was dropped in part because, I gather. David Belin had told you
that he, no longer regarded the issue of Oswald's marksmanship as of prime
importance, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. This memo was prepared in February 1964?
Mr. SLAWSON. That is correct. I know it was fairly early on and that is what it
says, February 1964. So presumably that is right.
Mr. CORNWELL. You conclude based upon that information from
Mr. Belin that consequently, I recommend that we not question the Russian
Government on the subject of Oswald's firearms and/or hunting activities in
Russia". Is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. I think so, yes. That seems to come through here.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did David Belin speak to you or Mr. Dulles about the problems in
this area?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't know. I would guess that probably what happened here is
that Dave Belin did not speak to Dulles directly, but Belin and I probably
spoke, or Belin and Coleman or Joe Ball. who was also working with Dave Belin,
and it was on the basis of those, conversations that this memo was written.
Mr. CORNWELL. I am sorry, I don't have it to show you, but our research reflects
that there was another memo in the files reflecting the fact that you had a
conversation with Mr. Dulles on or about January 31, shortly prior to the
preparation of this memo concerning the subject, matter of the memo. But you
don't recall the conversation?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't recall the conversation. Presumably of course there was
one.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Did Mr. Belin ever change his view as to the relevance or
necessity of obtaining this type of information?
Mr. SLAWSON. Not to my recollection, no. There is possibly a misunderstanding
between us on this point. My recollection of what I meant when I said Dave Belin
is telling me he no longer regards the issue of Oswald's marksmanship as of
primary importance is not whether Oswald's good or bad marksmanship is not
important but he had apparently found other evidence indicating that Oswald
could have become a sufficiently good marksman by what happened in this country
or what had happened in the Marine Corps before he went to Russia, so that it
was no longer of primary importance whether or not he had gun training in
Russia.
Mr. CORNWELL. In other words, your understanding was that he was willing to
forego any inferences that could be derived from getting Oswald's handling of
guns in Russia?
Mr. SLAWSON. For his purposos, which is Oswald's marksmanship, yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. It is your memory that he never changed that view?
Mr. SLAWSON. I have no memory on it one way or another.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you ever secure the information about the Minsk Gun Club?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't remember. We of course did get a reply from Russia with
quite a few documents in it. My recollection now is that they were mostly
medical documents. We had a lot of stuff from the Botkinskaya Hospital and
various communications between Oswald from Minsk and the Russian Government and
the American--no, just the Russian Government in Moscow in connection with his
seeking permission to leave and taking Marina with him and that was about all.
My recollection is that there would have been nothing on this Minsk stuff, the
gun club stuff.
Mr. CORNWELL. In the McGraw-Hill edition on page 180 there is a section styled
"Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines". One of the sentences under that
reads, "While in Russia Oswald obtained a hunting license, joined a hunting club
and went hunting about six times, times, as discussed more fully in Chapter VI."
On page 182 in the conclusion part of that chapter, there is a sentence that
reads, "Oswald's Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience,
and his established familiarity with this particular weapon show he possessed
ample capability to commit the assassination."
At pages 251 and 252 there are statements that "Oswald's membership in the
hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special
interest to the Commission." It appears I assume from that that the Commission
did draw inferences from the Minsk Gun Club routine in connection with the
question of Oswald's marksmanship. Would that be correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I don't think so. There was certainly nothing in his being in a
gun club in Russia that would detract from his marksmanship. As I recollect it,
Dave Belin felt that you didn't need to posit any special training by Oswald in
Russia in order to account for the fact that he was probably a good enough
marksman to have hit Kennedy from the position, et cetera.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall Mr, Liebeler earlier raising the issue near the
publication date that in fact the Minsk Gun Club data in-dicated use of shotguns
and not rifles at all?
Mr. SLAWSON. No, I don't recollect that. Now that you mentioned it that would
seem to me probably, even at the time. I have hunted, myself, a little. I have
always used a shotgun. I never have gone after deer. My recollection of the sort
of hunting that he probably did in Russia was for birds.
Mr. CORNWELL. What inference do you think is appropriate to draw from this chain
of events? The fact that the possible inference from the Minsk Gun Club event
could relate to the issue of marksmanship, the fact that the information was not
sought because of international relations considerations, and the fact that
nevertheless the Warren Commission makes statements on the subject matter and
draws the inference which was initially contemplated?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't draw the chain of conclusions I think you are there. The
first two parts of what you read me from the McGraw-Hill edition of the report I
think were from the rumor section, weren't they?
Mr. CORNWELL. Let me hand you the McGraw-Hill volume and leg you look at the
same pages. I read from page 180.
Mr. SLAWSON. Right, OK. While in Russia Oswald went hunting six times and
discussed chapter 6.
Mr. CORNWELL. The next page I read from was 182.
Mr. SLAWSON. "OK Oswald's marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle
experience and his established familiarity with this particular weapon show that
he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination."
The first one I read obviously does refer to his hunting in Russia 182 doesn't.
Mr. CORNWELL. And the final one I read from was 251-252.
Mr. SLAWSON. Once he was accepted as a resident alien in the Soviet Union,
Oswald was given considerable, benefits:' excuse me, "Oswald's membership in the
hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special
interest to the Commission."
I don't know, what can I say? They did at one point, the first, of three things
I read, include his experience, his presumed experience as
a hunter in Russia, as something that would help to explain his being an
adequate marksman to kill the President, yes. I mean I don't think that that is
being inconsistent even if you assume that the Commission at the time they wrote
that had in mind my statements back in this memo which is, of course, a lot to
assume.
This memo to Howard Willens about the letter to the Russian Government was a
procedural matter to which the Commission members had access and probably saw
but I doubt that they saw it when the final time came to write the report.
Mr. CORNWELL. One inference which might be drawn for purposes of discussion from
the chain of events is that tile Warren Commission would, if necessary, have
opted for the alternative of writing up its preconceived or initially conceived
inference, which in this case would be David Belin's conclusions on the
marksmanship issue, rather than take a chance on disrupting delicate foreign
relations.
What I want to ask you is, is that a proper inference, as to something that you
experienced more widely than this one instance or is it example of an abnormal
situation as that time?
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Mr. SLAWSON. Let free try to reconstruct what I assume to be the Commission's
thinking process going, into that.
We had pretty good evidence that Oswald had been a member of a hunting club at
some time in Russia. The best evidence we had was simply Marina's statement he
was. I think we had a statement from other people testifying before the
Commission that when he came back at some point or other he might have mentioned
to them he was in a gun club in Russia.
There wasn't really much doubt about that. Therefore, it seems to me it is
perfectly fair to mention that when someone says, was this man good enough
marksman, among other things you could mention is that he enjoyed hunting, he
was familiar with guns. Even if it was only a shotgun, nevertheless there is
some correlation, I assume, between how good you were with a shotgun and with a
rifle on a moving target.
Now what we presumably would have gotten, what we hope we would get from the
Russians on the gun club or hunting club was more than that. This is why finally
we decided there is no way to get it. What we were most suspicious about or the
worst possibility that might have happened was that this was some kind of
coverup for training of assassins. I think that is why the State Department
thought the Russians would take offense at it. If that is so, you can be certain
the Russians would not have come back with a document of "Yes, here is the
method of training assassins here." So' it would have been an exercise in
futility to ask the Russians to come across with that kind of information.
Mr. CORNWELL. So, the short answer I guess is that you don't draw the inference
that I suggest might be possible because you felt it was an explainable chain of
events based upon what evidence was necessary, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes. For marksmanship purposes I think it was perfectly proper and
honest for the Warren report to refer to the Minsk Gun Club. But at the
beginning of the investigation I was interested in it not primarily for that
reason but for the reason that it might have been a coverup for something more
sinister.
Mr. CORNWELL. Are there any other examples where the possibility of wanting to
avoid sensitive areas of international relations, diplomatic relationships,
prevented you from securing the kind of evidence that you would have liked or
that you felt was necessary?
Mr. SLAWSON. There was one other area that may have involved that among other
things. Sylvia Turada de Duran, who was the clerk at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City, was taken into custody by the Mexican police very soon after the
assassination and questioned, my recollection is, for about 3 days. All this
happened before the Warren Commission was formed. We got a report from the
Russian police and that report is in this memo, No. 22.
We would have liked to questioned her further. When I say we, members of the
staff, Coleman and myself and Howard Willens thought it would be a good idea
too. But when I talked to the CIA about it and later when we went down to Mexico
City I remember talking to officials. I believe we even talked to the Mexican
officials at the time, one of them being Echevarria who later became President.
He was Minister of Security when we went down there. The upshot of
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all those conversations was that she had suffered a nervous breakdown, possibly
because of the arrest and questioning, and that she was in hiding and only her
husband knew where she was and he would not let her speak to anyone in
connection with this.
Nevertheless, the CIA told me that they might be able to persuade her husband to
permit us to question her, even including possibly flying her back to
Washington. But it would be very difficult---well, Earl Warren decided not to
follow up on that if she was not willing to come willingly. He did not want to
apply pressure on her. Insofar as I understood his reasons for that, they were
partly feeling that we ought not to put pressure on her, the American Government
did not want to involve itself further at that point.
But primarily he just felt he did not want to put severe pressure on an
individual and I think he was ashamed that already interrogation had caused her
to have a nervous breakdown. He did not want to get involved in anything
remotely like torture.
Mr. CORNWELL. I am sorry I don't have a copy of it to show you. We have ordered
it but not yet received it. But it has been reported to us by our research staff
that in the L.B.J. Library in Austin there is a memo prepared by, or reflecting
a conversation between, Mr. Hoover and the White House, Walter Jenkins. The
conversation reflects that Hoover made the following statement: "The thing I am
most concerned about, and Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so that
they can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin," the conversation
occurring November 24, 1963, 2 days after the assassination. Furthermore, Mr.
Hoover also stated: "Mr. Katzenbach thinks the President might appoint a
Presidential Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I
counterted with the suggestion that we make an investigative report to the
Attorney General with pictures, laboratory work, et cetera. And then the
Attorney General can make the report to the President and the President can
decide whether to make it public."
The final sentence in the memo reads, the final statement by Mr. Hoover:"I felt
that, in other words, the investigation by the FBI was better because there are
several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations if we followed the
Presidential Commission route."
First, let me ask you, would this concern, that apparently was discussed between
the head of the FBI and the White House 2 days after the assassination, of
convincing the public that "Oswald is the real assassin" and "avoiding
complicating our foreign relations," would that, was that concept known to you
at the time?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; not other than as it is reflected in memos like this number 27.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would that type of concern at those levels have been consistent
with the obstacles you encountered in attempting to secure various types of
evidence in the foreign conspiracy field?
Mr. SLAWSON. No; I suppose it would not be. There is an obvious conflict. You
are following evidence wherever it leads logically. Occasionally you are going
to ruffle people and that obviously includes foreign heads of state and
diplomats and so on.
Mr. CORNWELL. I am not sure I phrased the question or you understood the way I
meant it, but that concern, would it have been
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consistent with the obstacles you encountered, of Earl Warren's desire not to
have Duran come back, not to go to the Swiss to get information from the Cubans;
the other examples we discussed?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes; that may have played a larger role in the consideration than I
thought at the time.
Mr. CORNWELL. Finally, let me ask you, do you know specifically what was meant
by the words "several aspects," in other words, the concept, "I felt this was
better because there are several aspects [in other words] of potential
investigation which would complicate our foreign relations- Specifically what
areas were they concerned about?
Mr. SLAWSON. That was Hoover speaking, is that right?
I can only guess of course but presumably Hoover had information even at that
early date that Oswald had been down to Mexico and spoken to the Cuban and
Russian Embassies. Of course he knew that Oswald had been a defector to Russia
and would return. I assume therefore that he was thinking of the Cuban and
Russian Governments but probably in particular the Cuban Government. Obviously
Cuba would have known about Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities. We have FBI
reports on that. So I would guess we had in mind especially Cuba but also.
Russia. He thought that probably this evidence indicated some possible
involvement with those countries and that it would be bad public relations, bad
international diplomatic relations, to arouse suspicion.
Mr. CORNWELL. To what extent, if any, do you believe it would have been possible
if the CIA, and of course from the memo we can assume the FBI, were aware of
these considerations--to what extent could they have tailored their report to
you to be sure that even though the Presidential Commission was formed, that you
did not "tip whatever boat" it was that they were worried about?
Mr. SLAWSON. Well, if the two agencies worked together on that, their ability
would have been considerable. If they worked separately they still would have
had some ability to do that. I testified this morning we were inescapably
dependent upon the CIA especially for some aspects of the investigation. Looking
back though, remember the CIA was on my side in getting that authenticating
information from Russia. They wanted me to do it. My recollection is that I did
not discuss with them the fact that Earl Warren had told me not to, but the CIA
was also willing to help us persuade Mrs. Duran's husband to get her to come
back. They were on the side, in other words of going ahead in spite of ruffling
international relations.
Mr. CORNWELL. You testified earlier that you and Mr. Rocca had had conversations
concerning CIA's involvement with anti-Castro groups, is that correct?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. I believe you told us that your understanding of his personality
was that he was very much opposed to Castro?
Mr. SLAWSON. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. What inference do you draw or did you draw if you compared those
facts with your considerations of the anti-Castro Cuban motive matter that you
also told us about? In other words, you considered as part of your investigation
that the anti-Castro Cubans would have had a motive for the assassination? You
told us that Mr.
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Rocca admitted the CIA's close connection with the anti-Castro Cubans. You told
us that Mr. Rocca himself had personally the same type of feeling the
anti-Castro Cubans would have.
Mr. SLAWSON. Against Castro, right.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did that cause you to question the rehability of the information
you were receiving from the CIA?
Mr. SLAWSON. No. In a sense everything I tried to take into consideration, so
everything was a cause for questioning. But in terms of coming to a conclusion
in my own mind about the rehability of the information supplied us, no, I
concluded that Rocca's strong anti-Castro feeling did not bias or did not
prevent him from being an honest investigator.
I think he was and I am still convinced that he was. On the other hand of course
it affected his judgement. I think he would probably to this day think that
maybe there is a substantial possibility at least that Castro had something to
do with it.
Mr. CORNWELL. But you did not draw the inference that because of similiarity of
motives that the CIA may have been wittingly or otherwise involved in the type
of activity you hypnotized, the anti-Castro setup of Oswald, and therefore would
be tailoring the information that he was providing to you on those subject
matters?
Mr. SLAWSON. No. I don't think that I entertained very long the possibility that
Rocca or anybody else I had known in the CIA was involved in any way in killing
Kennedy.
Mr. CORNWELL. Perhaps I overphrased the question. I did not mean Rocca, as much
as information coming from CIA on the subject matter which was funneled to you.
Mr. SLAWSON. I guess I am having trouble getting the crux of your question
because the possibility that the anti-Castro Cubans contained people who were
ruthless or desperate enough to kill Kennedy in order to serve their own end I
felt was a very real one. Apparently from all I knew they contained a lot of
desperate ruthless people. I did not have that feeling about the CIA. Now I
tried to keep an open mind so that any place I came upon evidence that would
point toward somebody I would investigate it and that included the CIA as a
possible nest of assassins.
My judgment of their character and so on was far different, I think, from the
judgment I made of the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy groups in the United States.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have one final question. Do you have any knowledge of the use of
any electronic surveillance after the assassination in order to acquire
information concerning what caused it in the first instance?
Mr. SLAWSON. Wait. Use of electronic surveillance after the assassination in
order to---
Mr. CORNWELL. Secure evidence of the manner in which the assassination may have
been planned and carried out.
Mr. SLAWSON. Here or abroad?
Mr. CORNWELL Here.
Mr. SLAWSON. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. What about abroad? I take it by your answer you do not feel free
to discuss that?
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Mr. SLAWSON. No; I don't. That is one of those areas that I was cautioned very
strongly not to disclose and I have not been released from it.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have no further questions.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Are there any questions from the panel? Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKINNEY. I have one brief question. It interests me as to how we got from
what you did and what everyone else did to what you have sitting in front of
you. Who dictated or put it together or typed it or what?
Mr. SLAWSON. It was obviously a group project but the principal authors I think
were Howard Willens, Norman Redlich and Al Goldberg, all of them staff members.
That is my recollection.
Mr. McKINNEY. If I were working with you and you and I were working with Coleman
and we do our affidavit and we sent it off somewhere and you are back in Denver
at that point, you don't even see the final result.
Mr. SLAWSON. That is right.
Mr. McKINNEY. From what I know of the Commission they met sporadically as a full
group. From having tried to wade through what counsel has given us on these
reports and the Warren Commission report itself, what I have taken as a very
objective document historically from my point of view, has suddenly become a
very. subjective document. Someone took Dave Slawson's stuff and rewrote it and
said here it is. Is that a fair judgment on my part?
Mr. SLAWSON. I don't know how to assess how subjective. In matters of tone it
obviously is. I still think an attempt was made to keep it objectively accurate.
Yet, I did cut loose at a certain point and I have done all I can and I just
hope that everything comes out the way it should, and come back to private life.
Mr. McKINNEY. Let me ask you a personal question. You practice law in Colorado
and pick up and read this thing. You spent 16-hour days and were living from a
hotel in Washington, I assume, and working for a greater cause. Did you read
this with a sense of disappointment, satisfaction, questioning, or just what the
hell can you expect?
Mr. SLAWSON. Generally one of satisfaction. First, it may sound odd to say so
but to this day I have never read it from cover to cover.
Mr. McKINNEY. Fine. I don't think anyone really has. Some of our researchers
here I think cut it up in sections.
Mr. SLAWSON. I read parts of it in the beginning. Then I turned parts which were
my own particular expertise to see what happened to them. My recollection is
that my first reaction was a sense of disappointment, I think mostly
egotistical, they were shorter than they should have been. I thought my sections
were more important. I did not see anything inaccurate in them. Mr. Cornwell
pointed out this one thing about the $5,000, for example. That slipped by me
until you pointed it out a few minutes ago. That is a minor inaccuracy but it is
an inaccuracy. I just did not see it at the time. So my answer is generally I
was quite satisfied.
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Mr. McKINNEY. I think it is a general historical opinion among 200 million
Americans that this is something that was very objectively, done by a group of
our most distinguished leaders. That is why I ask the question about what they
had done to your work.
Mr. SLAWSON. This was a somewhat new experience to me too. I had been on a
student law review and seen my work edited by someone else and not come out
exactly the way I put it in but I never had been on thing approaching this with
the number of people involved and the emotional and personal pressures that
everyone felt. At first I was surprised at how little control all of us on the
staff had over what was finally going in. Then I quickly realized this is the
way it had to be, what we would expect, and to my knowledge nothing was
falsified, but the general shape and tone of the document was going to be
something, that others did.
Mr. McKINNEY. One last personal opinion since you have been kind. One of the
reasons that I argued for this committee being established was that I felt that
the Warren Commission was under extremely undue pressure No. 1, one of the most
popular leaders assassinated. Because assassinations are extremely politically
motivated Europe, historically they have been aimed at starting something doing
something. There was good historical information that the Europeans were
concerned we might be becoming a bit of a banana republic, all of those
pressures plus the election and everything else. Do you feel we have a better
chance of getting at the truth now than did under pressure?
Mr. SLAWSON. No. To be truthful, I think the historical moment. has passed. For
good or bad history is not going ,to get much more than we have right there.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Slawson, we certainly appreciate your being here today and your
very straightforward testimony. We will excuse you at this time. I hope you have
ample time to avoid the rush hour traffic to, Dulles and will make your flight
without any problem. Thank you again.
Mr. SLAWSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have been of help.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Liebeler. if you are ready to proceed we will swear you at this
time. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will he the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?
Mr. LIEBELER. I do.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Mr. Liebe]er. I understand that the committee rules have
been given to you and a copy of those are before you.
Mr. LIEBELER. That is correct, yes.
Mr. PREYER. At this time I will make a brief statement concerning the subject of
the investigation.
House resolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete
investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and
death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether existing laws
of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the
investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are
adequate in
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their provisions and enforcement, and whether there was full disclosure of
evidence and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government,
and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or
department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination, and
why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department,
and to make recommendation to the House if the select committee deems
appropriate for amendment of existing legislation or enactment of new
legislation." Mr. Cornwell is recognized to begin the questioning of the witness
at this time.
TESTIMONY OF WESLEY LIEBELER, ASSISTANT COUNSEL, WARREN COMMISSION
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Leibeler, basically what we want to
do is ask you some questions about the manner in which the Warren Commission's
investigation was conducted, the state of mind you and your fellow staff
attorneys may have had in pursuing your work and the nature of any problems
which you encountered in the process.
Before I do that, as a matter of background will you tell the committee what
your professional experience was prior to joining the Warren Commission?
Mr. LIEBELER. I graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1957 and
went immediately thereafter to the New York firm of Kater, Ledger & Milburn
where I worked primarily in corporate litigation until the time I joined the
staff of the Warren Commission.
Mr. CORNWELL. Who first contacted you with respect to employment as staff
counsel for the Warren Commission?
Mr. LIEBELER. You mean from the Commission?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that it was either Mr. Rankin or Howard
Willens. I am not sure which I think it was Willens who called me first.
Mr. CORNWELL. Had anyone contacted you prior to that?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Who was that?
Mr. LIEBELER. Kenneth Damm of the University of Chicago law firm.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was the nature of the discussion with him?
Mr. LIEBELER. He told me I might expect a call from either Mr. Willens or Mr.
Rankin and told me that Mr. Willens had called his colleague Mr. Oakes asking
for a recommendation for someone for Commission staff and that Mr. Oakes and Mr.
Damm, both of whom were classmates of mine, decided they should recommend that
Mr. Willens contact me. I did receive a call from Mr. Rankin as they suggested I
might.
Mr. CORNWELL. Will you describe for us in whatever sense you now recall it the
nature of your first conversation with either Mr. Willens or Mr. Rankin, whoever
it was that called you.
Mr. LIEBELER. I was simply asked if I would be interested in working on the
staff of the Warren Commission. I said I would be. Mr. Rankin
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or Mr. Willens asked me if I would come to Washington the next day or the day
after and talk to. them about it, and I agreed to do that and I did that.
Mr. CORNWELL. Upon arriving in Washington, whom did you speak to there?
Mr. LIEBELER. Mr. Willens and Mr. Rankin.
Mr. CORNWELL. What Conversation occurred at that time?
Mr. LIEBELER. After talking with me and meeting me and observing me, Mr. Rankin
asked me if I would be willing to join the Commission staff. I told him I would
think about it and let him know in a few days. I did that, and I agreed
subsequently to join the start.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were you told anything at that time about the purposes of the
investigation?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't recall.
Mr. CORNWELL. Either through those conversations or through some other public or
other source of information, what was your understanding as to the reason that a
Presidential Commission had been formed as opposed to perhaps some other manner
of dealing with the fact of the assassination?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't have any recollection of my thoughts on that at that time
except that my general notion was at that time and throughout the time I worked
with the Commission that we were to ascertain the facts surrounding the
assassination to the extent that was: possible and to report on them to the
American people in the form of report of some kind.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall any conversations on that subject matter with any
particular persons in the very early stages of your work?
Mr. LIEBELER. No; not specifically on that subject.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you recall any staff meetings at which the subject matter of
the Commission's objectives were set forth and provided to you?
Mr. LIEBELER. I do not. I am under the impression there had been a staff meeting
when that question was discussed but that occurred, as I recall, prior to the
time I came to Washington.
Mr. CORNWELL. When approximately did you begin work?
Mr. LIEBELER. Some time near the end of January 1964.
Mr. CORNWELL. Had you prior to going to work for the Warren Commission had any
experience with any of the Federal agencies: investigative agencies, FBI, CIA?
Mr. LIEBELER. I was interviewed by a CIA agent once when I was much younger.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you form any impressions about them?
Mr. LIEBELER. I was impressed with them.
Mr. CORNWELL. Apart from that?
Mr. LIEBELER. No; no contact.
Mr. CORNWELL. When you first went with the Warren Commission to begin work, what
was the nature of the assignment that was given to you as far as subject matter?
Mr. LIEBELER. I was assigned to work in the area of possible motivation that Lee
Oswald might have had for having been involved in the assassination, and there
was an outline of the work assignment that existed at the time that I came to
work which I recall discussing with Mr. Willens at the time I received that
assignment.
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Mr. CORNWELL. To what extent if any did your assignment involve questions of
conspiracy or possible conspiracy?
Mr. LIEBELER. Well, it did involve both that question and the question of
possible psychological condition of Oswald. My basic responsibility and that of
Mr. Jenner, who was working also in this area, was to derermine to the extent we
could anyone with whom Oswald had contact in any way in the United States prior
to the time of the assassination. That did involve, of course, the question of
whether or not he, had been involved with anyone in a possible conspiracy to
assassinate the President.
The question of conspiracy which involved persons out of the country was outside
of our area.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was there anyone else besides you and Mr. Jenner who were assigned
responsibility with respect to investigating possible involvement of persons in
a conspiracy within the United States?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think that the whole Ruby issue would be involved in that also.
Mr. Griffin and Mr. Hubert were assigned to that area, the Ruby area. Of course,
the question came up during their work as to whether there had been any prior
contact between Oswald and Ruby or contact with either of them, between them
either directly or indirectly. Mr. Slawson was also involved to some extent in
this question of domestic conspiracy because the domestic contacts and at least
the Cuban and possible Mexican contacts ran into each other in the sense that we
were trying to run down the possible contacts that had been alleged between
Oswald and the Cuban groups, both in New Orleans and in Dallas, and that related
at some point in time to Oswald's trip to Mexico which Mr. Slawson was primarily
responsible for because Slawson was involved to some extent but not primarily.
Other than that, I don't recall anybody was specifically assigned to that
question.
Mr. CORNWELL. What contribution did Mr. Jenner make with respect to the
investigation of Oswald's background and His conspiratorial relationships?
Mr. LIEBELER. The record will show that Mr. Jenner conducted testimony before
the Commission, itself. He took a large number of depositions in Dallas and New
Orleans. And subsequently my recollection is that he worked on a draft of some
material that related to the Oswald involvement with the so-called Russian
community in Dallas. My impression was that he worked primarily on this in the
drafting process.
Mr. CORNWELL. When did you leave the Warren Commission?
Mr. LIEBELER. After the work was finished, some time I believe in October 1964.
Mr. CORNWELL. When did Mr. Jenner leave?
Mr. LIEBELER. He stayed until the end also I believe, close to the end.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you consider your assignment there a full-time job?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes. sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. How many hours a week did you work?
Mr. LIEBELER. The pay records will show what I charged the Government for. Mr.
Rankin sometimes didn't believe there were that,
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many hours worked. There were in fact many more. It was a 7-day-a-week job for
large periods of time.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was that also true with respect to Jenner.
Mr. LIEBELER. In the latter part of the work of the Commission Mr. Jenner put in
a lot of hours working on Commission matters. During the early stage of the
investigation his participation was somewhat less.
Mr. CORNWELL. During what period of time was it somewhat less?
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that when I started to work the first thing I
had to do was read a very large number of basically FBI reports and trying to
organize the material within my general area in such a way that I could decide
what additional evidence had to be developed and whose depositions had to be
taken. It was difficult for Mr. Jenner and I to work out a general relationship
on that, question at the time. Since I was a so-called junior staff member at
that time, Mr. Jenner was not, I was quite unsure when I started as to how to
handle the problem. I finally just decided to do my own thing and basically went
ahead and did most of that original work, myself. Mr. Jenner and I never
actually worked very closely together. He worked on projects and I worked on
projects.
Mr. CORNWELL. I don't think you actually ever answered the last question which
was when was it that the changeover occurred between Mr. Jenner's part-time
activity and his full-time.
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that during the early part of the Commission's
work that Mr. Jenner was concerned, I believe he was interested in becoming
president of the American Bar Association and believe he spent some time on that
issue. I suppose that the record will show when the Bar Association convention
was held which is usually in the summer sometime. His interest rose sharply
after the convention and he participated to a greater extent in the work of the
Commission.
Mr. DODD. I presume he was not elected then?
Mr. LIEBELER. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may we mark for identification a memorandum dated
August 27, 1964 from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Willens and Mr. Redlich as exhibit 31?
Mr. PREYER. Exhibit 31 will be marked for identification.
Mr. CORNWELL. I show you that exhibit and ask you if you have had a chance to
review that prior to coming here?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes. I have. .
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that memorandum deals generally with the
subject matter of the adequacy of the work in the field of conspiracy as of
August 27, 1964?
Mr. LIEBELER. This memo was written following a particular conference between
Mr. Willens and Mr. Redlich and myself in which some very specific questions
were discussed. It talks in general terms about the conspiracy question. It was
motivated or it was a function of really a couple of particular issues that had
arisen at that time.
Mr. CORNWELL. Conspiracy and what else?
Mr. LIEBELER. Well, they were parts of the conspiracy question in the sense that
they involved the way the FBI and the staff had handled the fact of at that time
a large number of unidentified palm prints
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and fingerprints on the cartons found in the School Book Depository.
Mr. CORNWELL. With that statement, Mr. Chairman, may we admit exhibit 31 in
evidence and may I ask specific questions?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, exhibit 31 is admitted into the record.
[The. document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 31 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 31
[Memorandum ]
AUGUST 27, 1964.
To: Howard P. Willens. Norman Redlich.
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
Subject: Conspiracy.
It has not been my practice to write memoranda for the record. I am constrained,
however, by remarks made to me by both of you within the last two days
concerning my responsibilities in respect of the investigation of a possible
conspiracy, to state the following:
1. Both of you have recently made statements. in response to my criticism of the
present state of affairs concerning conspiracy which indicate your belief that I
am somehow responsible for same.
2. Those remarks are apparently based on the proposition that the question of a
domestic conspiracy at least (ex-Ruby) was to be handled by those responsible
for the so-called area III outlined in the "Tentative Outline of the Work of the
president's Commission." While that has also been my general understanding for
some time, examination of that outline indicates that the responsibility for the
question of conspiracy is fragmented into several areas.
3. As I advised you both this morning, however, I personally cannot be held
responsible for the present condition of the work on conspiracy Both of you, Mr.
Jenner and I conferred in my office sometime late in June at which time it was
agreed by all of us I would assume responsibility for the section on personal
motive (Chapter 7) and that Mr. Jenner would devote himself to certain questions
relating to the possible existence of a domestic conspiracy. I understand he has
been working on that since our conference.
4. By the middle of July it was thought that Chapter 7 was in such condition
that I could work on other things. I was sent to New Orleans and Dallas to take
depositions which, together with preparation and editing, took more than two
weeks of my time. Since then I have been revising Chapter 7 and working on
footnotes for it. I also wrote the section in Chapter 4 relating to the Irving
Sports story and footnoted it.
5. I am more than willing. if able, to accept my full share of responsibility
for the work of this staff. I cannot, however, leave myself in the position
implied by the above-described oral statements made by both of you which I hope
you both will admit, upon reflection, are false and unfair.
6. You have asked me what I think should be done at the present time in
reference to our work on conspiracy. I gave you some of those suggestions orally
this morning. After conference with Mr. Griffin. Mr. Slawson and I spoke with
Mr. Rankin about that subject this afternoon. Mr. Rankin has asked me to set up
a conference with representatives of the FBI to discuss the fingerprints on the
cartons and the palmprint problems. I will cover both subjects in memoranda to
Mr. Rankin tomorrow. My comments on Marina Oswald will follow.
WESLEY J. LIEBELER.
Mr. CORNWELL. Paragraph 1 of the memo states that, "Both of you have recently
made statements, in response to my criticism of the present state of affairs
concerning conspiracy which indicate your belief that I am somehow responsible
for same ;" In paragraph 3, "As I advised you both this morning, however, I
personally cannot be held responsible for the present condition of the work on
conspiracy."
What was the problem with the state of the work and the present condition of the
work on conspiracy? What it was as of August 27, 1964?
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Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection of that is that no one, no one person, had taken
the responsibility of drafting a chapter of the report or a portion of the
report dealing with that question separately from the ways in which it was more
tangentially treated in the other work in the report. Part of the reason for
that was that I had spent a fair amount of time, as this memo indicates,
drafting what eventually became chapter 7 of the report which; while it looked
at the question of the contacts that Oswald had had in the United States and his
part in the assassination, it was really more of a psychological profile of
Oswald rather than the kind of work it became clear that we did have to do which
became chapter 6 of the report and which as I recall at that time was lagging
behind the other work.
It was not in the same condition of development as the other work was. Chapter 7
was done and it had been done for some time. What eventually became chapter 6
was not that far along. I don't recall what condition it was in but I know it
was not as far advanced as the other work of the staff. May I add that that
question, if it becomes really pertinent, could be dealt with to some extent by
looking through the files and finding the draft and noting the development. of
what became chapter 6.
Mr. CORNWELL. In a couple of places in the memo you phrase your criticism of the
present state of affairs in terms of the work on conspiracy, both in paragraph 3
and again in paragraph 6. Does that reference refer only to the work in drafting
the conspiracy chapter, or in fact were you dissatisfied on that. date with the
general work in unscrambling the facts and determining whether there had been a
conspiracy?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think the basic thrust of the memo was addressed to the problem
of pulling the material together in a draft more suitable for inclusion in the
report. There were, however, at that time still some open questions that had not
been satisfactorily dealt with in my mind. There was some question at that point
in time as to whether or not we were going to be able to get additional
investigations conducted that would satisfy myself as to the problems that
existed in my mind at that time. As I say, that, question was the question that
was discussed at this meeting and that is what led to this, if I may
characterize it, somewhat intemperate memo.
Mr. CORNWELL. Can you now recall any of the specifics of the types of
investigative work found lacking as of August 27?
Mr. LIEBELER. The two specific questions that were discussed in the meeting with
Mr. Willens and Mr. Redlich I believe, if I have the sequence straight in my
mind, were the questions I referred to before, about the existence of
unidentified fingerprints and palm prints on the boxes in the window in the
School Book Depository and the question of the treatment of the palm print that
had allegedly been lifted from the underside of the rifle barrel and identified
as Oswald's. I have no independent recollection of the sequence of events but I
know that it was about that time that this meeting occurred. By looking at some
of the other memoranda I can refresh my recollection that it was almost exactly
at that time, I believe it was that meeting I referred to in my memo of August
27.
During the course of the conversation I had argued to Mr. Redlich that the
record could not be left in the condition it was in. There
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had been no serious attempt to identify these other prints, as to the prints on
the carton, and there was a serious question as to the chain of evidence as
regards the palm print on the rifle barrel which I thought should be resolved.
Mr. Redlich did not want to conduct any investigation into those matters. That
led to a vigorous exchange between us. Mr. Rankin was later informed of that
exchange and he, after discussing the matter with me, agreed to bring the FBI
people back and discuss with them the continuance of the investigation, and it
was done.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, memorandum dated
September 4 from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Rankin
Mr. PREYER. That may be marked for identification.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Liebeler, have you had a chance to review that document prior
to coming here today?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, I have.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that that document relates generally to
the subject matter of an attached first draft of a proposed conspiracy chapter
and also certain recommendations concerning Marina Oswald?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes. It appears that I attached to this memo a first draft of a
proposed section for the conspiracy chapter dealing with certain specific
questions.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we at this time admit that document in evidence, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Without objection it is admitted into evidence.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit. No. 32 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 32
[ Memorandum ]
SEPTEMBER 4, 1964.
To: Mr. Rankin.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
I attach a first draft of a proposed section for the Conspiracy Chapter dealing
with the testimony of Sylvia Odio, Evaristo Rodriguez. Dean Andrews and with the
fact that one of the persons who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature in New
Orleans on August 16, 1963 has never been identified. Perhaps this draft can
serve as a guide in questioning Marina Oswald, which I understand that you and
Senators Cooper and Russell plan to do this coming weekend. While I have
recommended that Marina Oswald be deposed at length concerning certain conflicts
which have appeared in her testimony and other matters of interest to various
members of the staff, in the absence of such an examination I recommend that
Marina Oswald be questioned about the following:
1. All the circumstances surrounding her departure from New Orleans on September
23, 1963 with Mrs. Ruth Paine. As I have previously advised you, I spoke with
Marina Oswald on the telephone on August 26, 1963 concerning, in part, that
subject. Marina Oswald told me then that her husband had told her that he
planned to leave New Orleans on the day immediately following the departure of
Marina and Mrs. Paine. Oswald also told her, Marina said, that she should expect
to receive an unemployment compensation check at Mrs. Paine's address. He said
that cheek would be sent from Texas to his post office box in New Orleans and
forwarded from there to Mrs. Paine's address. That would indicate that Oswald
did not intend to remain in New Orleans until he received the cheek himself. It
would also indicate that he had sufficient funds to go to Mexico City without
waiting for the cheek.
All of this, of course, relates to Oswald's activities between September 23.
1963 and the time he crossed the border into Mexico sometime in the afternoon of
September 26, 1963. I have previously discussed with you the apparent pattern of
his movements in New Orleans which is indicated by the fact that he apparently
traveled a total of approximately six miles through the city of New Orleans to
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cash his unemployment compensation check when he could have done so by traveling
only ten blocks. The details of that situation are set forth in the attached
draft. Marina Oswald should be questioned about all aspects of that situation.
2. In connection with the above Marina Oswald should be asked questions,
designed to elicit any information or suspicions that she might have concerning
the possibility that Oswald was in Dallas in late September, 1963 after he left
New Orleans and before he went to Mexico. This subject, of course, involves the
possibility that he may have made the acquaintance of some Mexicans or Cubans in
New Orleans prior to the time Marina Oswald left that city. In that connection
it should be noted that Sylvia Odio testified that the men that came to her
apartment said they had just come from New Orleans and that they were on a trip.
3. Odio's testimony relates to some extent to that of Evaristo Rodriguez in that
both persons described the unidentified person accompanying the person thought
to be Oswald as having a bald spot on the forepart of his hairline. Rodriguez
testified that Oswald [was] in the Habana Bar in New Orleans sometime during
August 1963, near the time Oswald was involved with his fracas with Bringuier,
i.e., August 9, 1963. Marina Oswald should be questioned closely as to how her
husband used his time during that period. For example, he was kept in jail for
the night of August 9-10, 1963. Was Marina surprised when he did not come home
or did she know where he was? Did he stay out late on other occasions? Did she
see any indications that he was associating with other people? Did she see any
evidence that he was drinking at all during this period?
I think Marina Oswald should be told upon her deposition that we have evidence
that Oswald was associating with Cubans and Mexican type individuals and that
she should be pressed vigorously on these points.
4. Marina Oswald should be questioned concerning the unidentified individual who
helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature on August 16, 1963. Oswald may have
told her, for example, that he had paid one or more individuals to help him.
distribute that literature. Marina may also have seen pictures of these other
people helping him.
5. In connection with the testimony given by Dean Andrews. Marina should be
questioned closely as to whether or not Oswald even consulted an attorney in New
Orleans. She should be questioned what he told her about what he was doing to
obtain a reconsideration of his undesirable discharge. She should be questioned
what, if any, conversations they had about her becoming an American citizen. She
should also be asked whether Oswald ever expressed any concerns over his own
citizenship status. You might even ask her if she has ever heard of Clay
Bertrand.
6. In short, I would like to have you question Marina Oswald, in detail,
concerning any knowledge that she might have of any Cuban or Mexican contacts.
that Oswald may have had in the United States prior to the time he left for
Mexico City. In that connection Marina should be asked what she knows about
Oswald's apparent attempt to infiltrate Bringuier's organization in New Orleans.
She has already testified that a Cuban came to their apartment in August of 1963
seeking information about Oswald's FPCC activities. My recollection is that
Oswald was suspicious of that person and thought him to be either an anti-Castro
individual or a representative of some intelligence agency. Oswald may have told
Marina about his contacts with Bringuier in connection with the visit of the
above mentioned Cuban.
She should also be questioned about any contacts of that sort that Oswald may
have had after his return from Mexico City as well as any conversations she
might have had with Oswald concerning a possible renewal of his FPCC activities.
In connection with the possibility that Marina may be familiar with the person
who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature on August 1963. I attach Pizzo
Exhibits 453A and 453B. The unidentified individual is marked with an inked
arrow in Pizzo Exhibit 453A. He is located in the center of the picture and
appears to have some leaflets in his hand. That individual is marked with an
inked numeral 3 in Pizzo Exhibit 453B in which he appears in the far left hand
corner of the picture. These photographs should be shown to Marina Oswald to see
if she can identify any of the individuals depicted therein.
Mr. CORNWELL. Does the first sentence of that memo which reads:
I attach a first draft of a proposed section for the conspiracy chapter dealing
with the testimony of Sylvia Odio, Evaristo Rodriguez, Dean Andrews and
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with the fact that one of the persons who helped Oswald distribute FPCC
literature in New Orleans on August 16, 1963 has never been identified.
Does that indicate that it was your draft of the chapter which was attached?
Mr. LIEBELER.. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. That means that you ended up writing the conspiracy chapter which
was at issue m the earlier memo now exhibit 31, that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. No; it means that I prepared the first draft dealing with the
questions that I described in that first sentence.
Mr. CORNWELL. The conspiracy work then that was at issue in exhibit 31 was
broader than that or different than that?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes; it was a broader issue than that but it included the problems
that I discussed in the first sentence of exhibit 32. The discussion related to
the question of drafting the entire chapter. I refer to the fact that on
September 4 I produced a draft of part of the section, it was agreed that I
should go ahead and draft some of that chapter, which I did.
Mr. CORNWELL. Why was it at this relatively late date--the report was finally
published on September 28, is that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't remember.
Mr. CORNWELL. At any rate, Why was it at this late date you were ultimately
given the assignment to write the chapter when it was not an issue in your field
of responsibility.
Mr. LIEBELER. I think there are two reasons for that. One, I had finished the
chapter that became chapter 7 and that I was the person in the best position to
draft this section of the conspiracy report because I had taken the testimony of
the people who were involved in these questions listed in the first sentence of
exhibit. 30 and, of course, before taking that testimony had prepared myself to
do so and was more familiar with that area. than probably anyone else on the
staff.
Mr. CORNWELL. By this time at least, however, Mr. Jenner was free from his
campaign and was able to work on drafting the conspiracy chapter too, is that
correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes; that is true.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, one page out of a
book marked "Inquest," as exhibit 33.
I show you what has been marked as exhibit 33, being a photocopy of one page of
the book "Inquest." That publication purports to quote you in connection with
the work of the Warren Commission. I might state that that particular segment of
the book relates to the Commission members work as opposed to staff work. It
states, "Wesley Liebeler, when asked what the Commission did re lied in one word
'nothing.'" Let me ask you two questions.
Does the book quote you accurately and if so what was the meaning of the
statement?
Mr. LIEBELER. I have no recollection making the statement to Mr. Epstein but I
don't deny that I made it.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was the nature of the Warren Commission's work as you
perceived it and viewed it during your tenure as staff counsel?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think Mr. Willen's characterization on this same page is a more
accurate characterization. What I had intended to
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convey to Mr. Epstein was the idea that in terms of developing the
investigation, the direction in particular of the investigation, and in drafting
the report, the Commissioners themselves were not directly involved, and they
were not.
Mr. CORNWELL. So, your general view then would be that similar to what is
reported in the document Mr. Willens said and that is that the Commissioners
were not in touch with the investigation all times?
Mr. LIEBELER. As further explained in my previous testimony, yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, with respect to that last exhibit. I think the
testimony perhaps speaks better than the exhibit, so I will not offer it,
myself, into evidence.
I would ask that we mark exhibit 34 for identification, which is an August 28,
1964 memorandum from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Rankin.
Mr. PREYER. It may be so marked.
Mr. CORNWELL. Have you had a chance to review exhibit 34 prior to coming here,
Mr. Liebeler?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Is it accurate to state that that is a memorandum written in
connection with issues which were pending in August of 1964 concerning the palm
print about which you have previously testified?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we admit exhibit 34 in the record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, exhibit 34 is entered into the record.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 34 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 34
[Memorandum]
AUGUST 28, 1964.
To: J. Lee Rankin.
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
Messrs. Griffin and Slawson and I raise questions covering the palmprint which
Lt. Day of the Dallas Police Department testified he lifted from the underside
of the barrel of the K-1 rifle on November 22, 1963. That story is set forth on
pages 7-10 of the proposed final draft of Chapter IV of the Report, copies of
which are attached.
We suggest that additional investigation be conducted to determine with greater
certainty that the palmprint was actually lifted from the rifle as Lt. Day has
testified. The only evidence we presently have on that print is the testimony of
Lt. Day himself. He has stated that although he lifted the palmprint on November
22, 1963, he did not provide a copy of the lift to the FBI until November 26,
1963 (9 R 260-61). He also testified that after the lift he "could still see
traces of the print under the barrel and was going to try to use photography to
bring off or bring out a better print." Mr. Latona of the FBI testified with
respect to the lift of the palmprint, that "evidently the lifting had been so
complete that there was nothing left to show any marking on the gun itself as to
the existence of such--even an attempt on the part of anyone else to process the
rifle" (Id. at 24).
Additional problems are raised by the fact that:
(1) Mr. Latona testified that the poor finish of the K-1 rifle made it absorbent
and not conducive to getting a good print;
(2) None of the other prints on the rifle could be identified because they were
of such poor quality;
(3) The other prints on the rifle were protected by cellophane while the area
where the palmprint had been lifted was not, even through Lt. Day testified that
after the lift the "[palm] print on gun was their best bet, still remained on
there," when he was asked why he had not released the lift to the FBI on
November 22, 1963.
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We should review the above circumstances at our conference with Agent Latona and
Inspector Malley. The configuration of the palmprint should be reviewed to
determine, if possible, whether or not it was removed from a cylindrical
surface. The possibility that the palmprint or evidence of the lift was
destroyed while the rifle was in transit should be reviewed with them. The exact
condition of the rifle at the time it was turned over to the FBI Dallas office
should be ascertained. Agent Latona should be asked if he can think of any
explanation for the apparent conflict in the above testimony.
We should also:
(1) Determine whether or not Lt, Day had assistance when he worked with the
prints on the rifle. If he did, we should obtain statements from those who
assisted him.
(2) Lt. Day should be asked why he preserved the fingerprints on the rifle,
which were sufficiently Clear to make positive identification, and yet did not
preserve the palmprint, which was clear enough for that purpose.
(3) Lt. Day should also be asked why he removed only the palmprint and should be
requestioned covering his recollection that he saw the palmprint still on the
rifle after he made the lift.
(4) Lt. Day should be asked if he took any photographs of the palmprint on the
rifle after the lift. He may have done so, since he did photograph the less
valuable fingerprints, and the palmprint on the rifle, according to his
testimony, was still the best bet for identification. It is also significant
that Lt. Day stated that he was going to attempt to get a better print through
use of photography.
Mr. CORNWELL. This was a memorandum. is it correct, Mr. Liebeler, that you wrote
in connection with the consideration by staff particularly Mr. Rankin, of
whether additional investigation should be conducted on the palm print about
which you previously provided some information?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Why was a memo like this written? What was the purpose of it?
Mr. LIEBELER. The purpose was to outline the kind of investigation that Mr.
Griffin and Mr. Slawson and I thought should be conducted into this question.
Mr. Rankin requested us to indicate to him, since we had pressed for an
additional investigation, the kind of investigation that we thought should be
conducted.
Mr. CORNWELL. So this. was in response to a specific request from Mr. Rankin for
this memo?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes. Mr. Rankin requested this memo but he requested the memo only
after Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson and I had raised this question about the
condition of the record as regards the palm print.
Mr. CORNWELL. That had become a rather heated subject matter, is that correct,
at that point ?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, it certainly had.
Mr. CORNWELL. Were there generally problems of this nature encountered by the
staff concerning matters which they felt required investigation and Mr. Rankin
and Mr. Redlich did not?
Mr. LIEBELER. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. This is a very unusual event in your experience, is that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that it was only these two items that this
question ever came to a head on.
Mr. CORNWELL. The rest of the time such matters would be handled orally, is that
correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. For the most part it wasn't a question. For the most part the
individual staff members were free to take the deposition of
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anyone they wanted to take, subject to Mr. Rankin's approval, which was never
withheld and there was never any question raised about it or to ask the FBI or
other agencies to conduct additional investigation and that would be done by
drafting a letter for Mr. Rankin's signature and forwarding it to Mr. Willens
who would then presumably advise Mr. Rankin on the question.
I do not recall any case in which any previous recommendations that I had made
in the form of requests to the FBI or other agencies were ever questioned or
resisted and in fact since both in this case and in the palm print case I did
eventually prevail on this issue I am able to state there is not a single case
that any of my recommendations as to investigation were denied, that I can
recall.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was that, to your understanding and within your ability to observe
the workings of the Warren Commission, true with respect to other staff counsel?
Mr. LIEBELER. As a general proposition, yes. The only issue in which the
question came up in another context, as I recall it, was when Griffin and Hubert
were trying to establish how Ruby got in the basement of the police station, and
there was also another issue involved with Griffin in which I believe he was
advised to move on to other questions, only because, as I understand it, of the
fact that there were other questions that had to be dealt with and it did not
seem likely that these issues could be clearly resolved.
Mr. CORNWELL. In other words, your testimony as I understand it is basically
that there was no atmosphere of restriction upon the investigation as the people
who were actually doing the work saw it, in other words, people at your level
were across the board given relatively free rein to follow the investigation
where it led them in an attempt to secure the necessary evidence?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, memorandum dated
September 2, 1964, from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Willens as exhibit 35.
Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point? Are we getting copies of
these or should we have them?
Mr. CORNWELL. You should have copies of all of these.
Have you had a chance to review that memorandum prior to coming here?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that the subject matter of that
memorandum is the discovery of property remaining in the possession of Marina
Oswald as of August 26, 1964?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we admit that. exhibit as part of the record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibit is admitted into the record.
[The document. referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 35 and received for the
record, follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 35
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 2, 1964.
To: Mr. Willens.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
Re: Relevant property remaining in possession of Marina Oswald as of August 26,
1964.
I forward a proposed letter to the FBI along lines which I suggested in a
conference with you and Mr. Redlich on August 27, 1964 and generally in accord
with conversations between Inspector MaHey, Mr. Rankin, Mr. Griffin and myself
held on August 28, 1964.
I have previously expressed my opinion that it reflects adversely in the
thoroughness of this investigation that Marina Oswald still had in her
possession on August 26, 1964, material pertinent to our work, the existence of
which material was not known to the FBI, this Commission, or any other
investigative agency.
As indicated in the report of Special Agent Heitman dated August 27, 1964, at
Dallas, Tex., Marina Oswald discovered the materials mentioned in that report on
or about August 17 or 18, 1964. They had been in a small brown suitcase that had
been in her possession at Ruth Paine's residence. Marina Oswald told Agent
Heitman that she remembered that she had the materials in question when I asked
her in a telephone conversation on August 26, 1964, about Oswald's plans
following her departure for Irving, Tex., with Ruth Paine on September 23, 1963.
The proposed letter seems indicated under the circumstances.
Mr. CORNWELL. The first sentence in the second paragraph reads:
I have previously expressed my opinion that it reflects adversely in the
thoroughness of this investigation that Marina Oswald still had in her
possession on August 26, 1964, material pertinent to our work, the existence of
which material was not known to the FBI, this Commission, or any other
investigative agency.
What type of material was that, or was at issue there?
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that there was a map of Mexico City on which
had been made marks and notations of various kinds, a stub of a bus ticket
covering transportation, I believe from Mexico City to Dallas, Tex., and a
television guide in Spanish relating to the broadcast of television stations in
Mexico City during the period of time, as I recall, that Oswald was in Mexico
City.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that this material then would have had
an obvious relevance to many of the issues that the Warren Commission was in the
process of considering?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think so.
Mr. CORNWELL. It was not obtained by you, the FBI apparently or the Warren
Commission until approximately 30 days prior to the date the Warren Commission's
report became public?
Mr. LIEBELER. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was this in your view, based on your knowledge of what transpired
at the time and your ability to reflect back on those events, typical or
atypical of the FBI's investigation of this matter? I am talking about the
assassination.
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't think it was typical of the FBI's work as a general
proposition. It certainly was not typical of the work that the FBI did in
response to the request that we made that they conduct their own investigation.
I have no direct knowledge of the quality of the Bureau's work prior to the time
that the Commission began to operate although that is reflected to a
considerable extent of course in the reports that we did receive from the
Bureau.
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Obviously those reports cannot reflect sins of omission on the part of the
Bureau.
Mr. CORNWELL. What explanation did you receive in connection with this
discovery?
Mr. LIEBELER. From the FBI?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIEBELER. I did not ask the FBI for an explanation and they never offered me
one.
Mr. CORNWELL. The reason I ask the question is I suppose there might be some
chance that the evidence had been fabricated and did not even exist in November
1963. Is that corret? Did you even ask to see if they had checked this location
earlier and found nothing?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't recall making that request. I have a problem here to some
extent because this memorandum says that I am forward ing a proposed letter to
the FBI and I don't have that letter in front of me and I don't know what I
said, I have no recollection of what it said. My recollection of my position at
this time was that, I believe I had the feeling at that time that this whole
question of the property inventory, if any, and the question of the way the
Bureau handle the obtaining and forwarding of this property to the Commission
should be looked at but it is not a strong recollection and I would like to see
the letter if we have it.
Mr. CORNWELL. I apologize for the fact that we don't have it here today.
Mr. LIEBELER. If I may say, if this information or piece of paper had been in
the possession of the Commission or the FBI prior to the time that they were
obtained, it would have made the investigation into Oswald's trip to Mexico a
great deal easier. But I don't believe there was anything in this information
which was inconsistent with the conclusions that had been reached on that issue
independent of the papers.
Mr. CORNWELL. I did not mean to suggest necessarily that the FBI had fabricated
the evidence. I meant to ask you whether or not the possibility had occurred to
you that Marina Oswald had fabricated the evidence and decided to give it to
the, FBI at this late date?
Mr. LIEBELER. My recollection is that these papers had notes on them that were
written in Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting. I am not certain of that but I think
that is the case and that would handle that question.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was there, in your view, enough time to adequately complete the
investigation in your field of responsibility?
Mr. LIEBELER. I would have to answer yes to that question with one exception
that I can think of. I did not have any other investigation or line of
investigation that I wanted to pursue and I don't know that anyone else on the
staff did either by the time we finished drafting our report except for the fact
that the FBI was still trying to either corroborate or discredit, to determine
the truth or falsity of some testimony that had been given by Sylvia Odio to the
effect that Oswald had been in her apartment in Dallas some time in either
September or October 1963.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was Sylvia Odio's testimony initially within your field of
responsibility?
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Mr. LIEBELER. It is hard to answer that question. Her FBI reports were there and
we all knew about them and they were the subject of continued discussion between
Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson and myself because they related to work that all
three of us were doing. It was really never decided who would take the primary
responsibility for developing that problem until it finally fell on me because I
happened to be in Dallas to take other testimony and so the three of us agreed
that I would take her testimony.
Mr. CORNWELL. Essentially because you were there?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, and the fact that it was a question that was within this
whole general area and one that I was familiar with and I had discussed with
these other two gentlemen.
Mr. CORNWELL. The Sylvia Odio incident was never resolved to your satisfaction,
was it?
Mr. LIEBELER. No, not really.
Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention again to exhibit 32, the memo written on
September 4, which we have previously admitted into evidence, would it be fair
to state that as of that late date there were still in your mind a long list of
areas about which more information was needed for Marina Oswald?
Mr. LIEBELER. My recommendation in this letter was that she be asked about these
questions, yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. In fact the staff has been rather concerned with what they thought
was the superficial questioning of her from the very beginning, as far back as
February, is that not true?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, that is true.
Mr. CORNWELL. In addition to the pressures I guess we would say complete the
investigation and get the report out in the matters that at least you felt
required further attention even in September 1964, was there any problem with
the rewrite processes, the processes of preparing the final report as of that
date?
Mr. LIEBELER. I certainly thought so for a number of reasons.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may I mark for identification exhibit 36, a
memorandum dated September 6, 1964, by Mr. Liebeler reading "Memorandum
Regarding Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report."
Mr. PREYER. The exhibit may be marked for identification.
Mr. CORNWELL. Have you had a chance to review that document prior to coming
here?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would that in part at least, reflect your concern with the rewrite
processes?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we admit that document into the record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection the exhibit is admitted into the record.
[The document referred to marked JFK exhibit No. 36 and received for the record,
follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 36
[Memorandum re Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report]
SEPTEMBER 6, 1964
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
I set forth below comments on the galley proofs of chapter IV of the report, a
copy of which I obtained from Mr. Redlich on September 4, 1964. Other comments
and suggestions are set forth in the margin of the galley itself.
PURCHASE OF THE RIFLE BY OSWALD
1. On galley page 30, query if the name "Hidell" was stamped on the membership
application blanks of the New Orleans branch, FPCC.
2. The text near the top of page 30 gives the impression that the name Hidell
was stamped on all of the New Orleans Chapter's printed literature. It was not.
Oswald stamped his own name on some of it.
OSWALD'S PALMPRINT ON THE RIFLE BARREL
1. Query if the palmprint provides additional evidence of ownership of the rifle
as is stated. The most it does is show that Oswald had possession of the rifle
at some time. It does not show that he owned it.
2. Second paragraph states that Lt. Day determined the wood, SR wooden stock was
too rough to take prints "from visual examination." Day does not say that in his
testimony. While it is a minor point, he just said that he noted it was too
rough. For all I know he may have reached that conclusion by feeling the stock.
3. It may be noted here that the conclusion for the section on rifle ownership,
that appears on galley page 32, states that the presence of the palmprint on the
rifle shows that Oswald "had disassembled it." That conclusion is not warranted
from the existence of the palmprint on the rifle. The conclusion that Oswald
handled the rifle while it was disassembled is justified.
4. The palmprint section must be changed to reflect the latest findings of the
FBI that the palmprint had to have been lifted from the barrel because of the
marks that appear on the lift that correspond to those on the rifle barrel
itself.
FIBERS ON THE RIFLE
1. I think this section is written a little too strongly considering the record.
For example, there is no footnote after the statement that the Commission found
no credible evidence that Oswald used the rifle between September 23 and the
assassination. Furthermore, even if he did not "use" it, he might very well have
handled it at some time during that period. Also, Stombaugh was not able to
estimate the period of time within which the fibers were placed on the rifle,
but much of the language in the section is designed to bring one to the
conclusion that they were put there on the day of the assassination, even though
that is not said.
2. In the last sentence of the section, it is not the Commission's conclusion
that provides proof, it is the fact that the fibers most probably came from
Oswald's shirt. Also, does that show that he "owned" the rifle, or just that he
or someone that wore the shirt had handled the rifle at some time?
PHOTOGRAPH OF OSWALD WITH RIFLE
1. It is interesting to note that the conclusion to the ownership section, on
page 32, states that "a photograph taken in the yard of Oswald's apartment
showed him holding this rifle." That statement appears in the conclusion in
spite of the fact that Shaneyfelt specifically testified that he could not make
a positive identification of the rifle that Oswald was holding in the picture,
and in spite of the fact that the Commission was not able to conclude, in the
discussion of this subject on page 31, that Oswald was holding the assassination
weapon in the picture.
RIFLE AMONG OSWALD'S POSSESSIONS
1. I do not believe there is any real authority for the proposition that Oswald
sighted through the telescopic sight on the porch in New Orleans. Marina Oswald
first said she did not know what he did with the rifle out on the porch, and
then
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was led into a statement which might be thought to support the instant
proposition. It is not very convincing.
2. On the top of page 32. it is stated that Ruth and Michael Paine "both noticed
the rolled-up blanket in the garage throughout the time that Marina Oswald was
living in their home. I am sure the record will not support that statement, a
rather important one, too. I recall that there was a period of time before the
assassination that neither of them saw the blanket. I have always had the
opinion that there was a gap in the proof as to the rifle being continuously in
the garage, one that probably could not be filled. It cannot be filled by
ignoring it. The conclusion is even worse when it states that "the rifle was
kept among Oswald's possessions from the time of its purchase until the day of
the assassination." I do not think the record provides any real evidence to
support that broad statement. The fact is that not one person alive today ever
saw that rifle in the paine garage in such a way that it could be identified as
that rifle.
THE CURTAIN ROD STORY
1. The report states that Frazier was surprised when Oswald asked for a ride on
November 21, 1963. I am not able to find anything in the record to support that
statement.
2. The last paragraph of this section is misleading when it attempts to show the
falsity of the curtain rod story by stating that Oswald's room at 1026 North
Beckley had curtains, and does not take account of the fact that Frazier
specifically testified that Oswald said he wanted the curtain rods to put in an
apartment. This takes on added significance when we remember that Oswald was
talking about renting an apartment so that his family could live in Dallas with
him. That aspect of the problem should be specifically treated if we are going
to mention the fact that his roominghouse had curtains.
THE LONG AND BULKY PACKAGE
1. The last sentence states: "Frazier could easily have been mistaken when he
stated that Oswald held the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand, or when he
said that the upper end was tucked under the armpit." On the very next page of
the galleys, in the discussion of the prints that appeared on the paper bag, it
is stated that the palmprint was "found on the closed end of the bag. It was
from Oswald's right hand in which he carried the long package as he walked from
Frazier's car to the building."
I am advised that the palmprint is right on the end of the bag, just where it
would be if Oswald had carried it cupped in his hand. If we say in the
discussion of prints that that print was put on the bag when he carried it to
the TSBD (which we don't quite do) and if the print is where it would be if he
carried it cupped in his hand, then we must face up on the preceding page and
admit that Frazier was right when he said that that is the way Oswald carried
it. If the print story is right and the implication left there as to when the
print was put on the bag is valid, Frazier could not have been mistaken when he
said Oswald carried the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE LINKING RIFLE AND OSWALD TO PAPER BAG
1. The section on fibers in the bag is very thin. The most that can be said is
that there was a possibility that the fibers came from the blanket. The FBI
expert would not even state that such was probable.
CONCLUSION
1. I am at a loss to know why the fact that Oswald apparently failed to turn out
Ruth Paine's garage light is mentioned in the conclusion.
PALMPRINTS AND FINGERPRINTS ON CARTONS AND PAPER
1. The problem of all the unidentified prints has already been discussed. The
FBI has been requested to conduct additional investigation to attempt to
identify those prints. The results of that investigation must be incorporated in
the report.
2. This section emphasized the freshness of one palmprint on one carton. That
palmprint was the only one of 28 prints that could be developed by powder as
opposed to a chemical process. As a result it was held to have been placed on
the carton recently, within from 1 to 3 days prior to the time it was developed.
"The
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inference may be drawn from the present language of this section that all of the
other prints, which could be developed only through a chemical process because
the cartons had already absorbed them, must have been older than the palmprint.
Thus, it could be argued that Oswald's other prints had to have been placed on
the cartons at least a day before they were developed and perhaps as much as 3
days before. While there may be some reason within the realm of fingerprint
technology why that is not so, it does not appear in the report.
Under those circumstances, the presence of Oswald's other prints, which must be
treated pari passu with the prints of others on the cartons, seems to have very
little significance indeed. This relates to the prints on one of the Rolling
Readers cartons near the window, the existence of which is emphasized by stating
that they "take on added significance" because of the work being done on the
sixth floor. The report also states that the Commission placed "great weight on
the fingerprint and palmprint identifications." I don't think we should say that
in any event. We certainly should not until we deal with the problem of the
apparent age of Oswald's other prints and the presence of all those unidentified
prints.
3. The report states that it is "significant that none of the prints on the
cartons could be identified as the prints of a warehouse employee." It also
states that those employees "like Oswald, might have handled the
cartons"--presumably in the ordinary course of business. It is significant. But
not necessarily to the point that the report tries to make. The fact that only
Oswald's prints appeared on the cartons could show that he was the sole
warehouse employee that handled them--in the ordinary course of business. The
fact that Oswald was the only employee whose prints appeared on the cartons does
not help to convince me that he moved them in connection with the assassination.
It shows the opposite just as well.
4. It is also difficult to tell just what happened to all of the cartons or who
developed what prints. While it appears that all four cartons were forwarded to
the FBI, some confusion is created by the later statement that the right
palmprint on the box on the floor next to the three near the window was also
sent to the FBI. Why was that necessary if the carton had already been sent? The
use of the passive voice in the second sentence of the second full paragraph on
page 35 of the galleys leaves open the question of who developed the prints
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF ASSASSIN
1. There is a duplication of a long quote from Brennan's testimony that also
appears at page 15 of the galleys, the first page of chapter 3. It does not seem
to be needed in both places. If left the way it is, the form as to omitted
material should be standardized.
2. Following that quote it says that Brennan's description "most probably" led
to the radio alert sent out to police in which the assassin was described. Can't
this be more definite? One of the questions that has been raised is the speed
with which the assassin was described, the implication being that Oswald had
been picked out as a patsy before the event. The Dallas police must know what
led to the radio alert and the description. If they do we should be able to find
out. If they do not know, the circumstances of their not knowing should be
discussed briefly.
3. On page 36 it says that at 1:29 p.m. the police radio reported that the
description of the suspect in the Tippit shooting was similar to the description
which had been given by Brennan in connection with the assassination. On page 46
it is stated that it was unlikely that any officer said anything like "Kill the
President, will you?" The reason given is that the officers did not know "that
Oswald was a suspect in the killing of the President." But they very likely had
heard the police radio note that the description of the two were similar and
they may have drawn their own conclusions. The statement on page 46 should be
taken out or qualified.
4. There should be a picture of the inside of the Texas School Book Depository
sixth floor showing the low window sills and a reference to that picture in
connection with the discussion of Brennan's testimony that he saw the man
standing.
5. Query if we need such a long paragraph on Euins testimony merely to conclude
that it is inconclusive as to the identity of the man in the window.
6. In the last sentence of the second to the last paragraph in the section it
says that Altgens picture was taken about 2 seconds "after the shot which
entered the back of the President's neck." We should say after that shot was
fired or heard or something. The sentence is not a good one as it now stands.
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1. I do not think the description of the Baker-Oswald sequence is sufficiently
clear. I am confused as to how many entrance doors there are to the vestibule,
even though after a close reading there appear to be only two, the one
connecting to the second floor landing and the one connecting to the lunch room.
It is also not clear whether Baker saw Oswald through the window in the
vestibule/landing door, or whether that door was still open as is implied by
Baker's testimony. Mention of the window previously, however, implies Baker saw
Oswald through the window. It does not seem likely that Oswald would still have
been visible through the window if the door had already closed, although that
depends on how fast the door closes, which is something I would like to know.
What kind of a stairway is it that someone coming up can see nothing at the top
of the lanking? Truly may in fact have seen Oswald if the latter had just come
down the stairs from the third floor as Truly was coming up from the second.
I think additional effort should be made with the writing and a picture of the
view coming up to the second floor and a diagram or other pictures of the
lanking and vestibule area would be a good idea.
2. The first sentence in the third from the last paragraph on galley page 38
leaves a false inference concerning Oswald's presence on the sixth floor. It
should be rewritten along the following lines: "The fact that Oswald could not
have come down in the elevators, the only other possible means of descent, is
shown by thier movements after the time Baker and Truly tried to use them to go
up in the building."
3. In the same paragraph, the statement that both elevators occupy the same
shaft is not clear. It would be better to say: "both elevators, which operate
adjacently in the same shaft,"
4. Last paragraph on page 38 (galley), the testimony of the employees as set
forth in that paragraph is also consistent with Oswald having been in Ethiopia
at the time of the assassination, or with his having used the elevators to get
down from the sixth floor. Since those employees did not see either Oswald or
Dougherty, their testimony says nothing on the point under discussion. The whole
paragraph should be cut.
5. The next two paragraphs, the first two on galley page 39, are a complete
mystery to me. When I left the bottom of page 38 I was looking for additional
testimony showing that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. After
two paragraphs of excellent analysis I am convinced that Victoria Adams either
came down the stairs before or after Oswald did and it is clear that that is so
because we know that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. I do not
understand, however, how the fact that Victoria Adams came down the stairs
before or after Oswald did shows that Oswald came down the stairs. If the idea
is to show that Adams was not on the stairway when Oswald was I am not convinced
by the analysis or speculation in these two paragraphs. Furthermore, if that is
the idea it is not clearly set forth. How about a first sentence like: "Victoria
Adams testified that she came down the stairway, within about 1 minute after the
shots, from the fourth floor to the first floor where she encountered two
depository employees--Bill Shelley and Billy Lovelady. If Miss Adams was on the
stairway at that time, the question is raised as to why she did not see Oswald
.... "
6. In the conclusion: I do not see how the commission can possibly state that
"fingerprint and palmprint evidence establishes that Oswald arranged the cartons
in the window." That evidence establishes that at some time Oswald handled one
of the three cartons in the window, as suggested above, probably prior to the
assassination by at least 1-3 days. That evidence establishes with equal
validity that perhaps about 20 other persons "arranged the cartons in the
window."
OSWALD'S MOVEMENTS AFTER LEAVING DEPOSITORY BUILDING
1. The description of Oswald's bus ride sequence is very confusing and wholly
unable to stand by itself without a map. Even if we include a map, which I
assume we will, the text should be clear enough to stand by itself. The basic
problem is that there is no indication of the relationship of various
intersections to each other. It should be simple enough to set forth the
relationships between St. Paul and Elm, Field and Elm, and Poydras and Lamar.
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2. There also seems to be a mistake in description of direction. I don't see how
Oswald could walk west on Elm and board a bus that was heading back in the
direction of the depository and which was also travel west. Somebody had to have
gone east (Oswald.)
3. The second to the last full paragraph on galley page 40 is not very clear as
to what all those buses actually do and what they are supposed to do. I have set
forth suggested clarifying changes in the margin of the galley.
4. On galley page 41 the terms "lineup" and "showup" are used interchangeably.
It should be one or the other throughout. I have always thought it was lineup.
5. There are direct quotes in the first paragraph on galley page 42 for which
there are no footnotes. It is my understanding that there are to be footnotes
for each direct quote and that there is to be uniformity on this point
throughout the report.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SHOOTING
1. References here to what the Dallas police radio ordered Tippit to do should
be qualified to indicate that a transcript of a recording of the radio
communications indicates the material being set forth. This should be done at
least until we have cleared up the problems with the transcript and recordings,
if we have not already done so.
2. There are no footnotes at all in the last paragraph of this section.
EYEWITNESSES
1. There is more confusion between lineups and showups at the top of galley page
43.
2. As to any attempt to explain Mrs. Markham's description (so-called) of Oswald
as having bushy hair by showing the world a picture of Oswald "taken at the time
of his arrest." I suggest that even the slowest of readers would imagine that
their hair might be in an uncombed state--which is the suggested explanation of
the bushy condition--after they had fought with a dozen policemen in an attempt
to resist arrest. In fact Pizzo exhibit 453-C, the evidence for this
proposition, shows Oswald with cuts and bruises on his face. I don't think Mrs.
Markham's testimony needs much comment and neither does her statement to Lane.
Any attempt such as is presently in the report will merely play into Lane's
hands and make the Commission look naive.
3. Query statement that Markham's identification was mostly from his face. I
think she was all over the lot on that one.
MURDER WEAPON
1. Why don't we take a sentence or two and explain why the bullets fired from
the revolver were smaller than the barrel? There is no way to tell from this
report now and an obvious question is raised as to why.
2. There is an unclear sentence in the middle of the third paragraph of this
heading which states: "Also, the bullets were mutilated." Which ones?
3. The paragraph dealing with the number of shots fired and the manufacture of
the cases and the slugs seems to me to be an exercise in pedantry, and possibly
subject to error. Is it not possible that a Winchester-Western slug could have
been fired from a Remington-Peters case? Even if not, why leave ourselves open
to question when it does not really matter how many shots were fired, as between
four or five.
4. The last paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes, either in or out.
OWNERSHIP OF THE REVOLVER
1. The first sentence refers to "this type of revolver." I think it would be
better to say "the type of revolver that was used to kill Patrolman Tippit."
OSWALD'S JACKET
1. The second paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes.
2. There are inconsistencies in the description of Commission exhibit 162. The
same problem occurred above, when an exhibit was described sometimes as
"exhibit---" and at others as "Commission exhibit ---." A little thing, but why
not do it right,
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3. This conclusion to this heading reaches the crushing result that "Oswald
disposed of his jacket as he fled from the scene of the Tippit killing." I
submit that that is really not the conclusion we worked toward. Why not : "Those
facts strongly support the finding that it was Lee Harvey Oswald who killed
Patrolman Tippit and then fled through the parking lot adjoining Jefferson
Boulevard, disposing of his jacket as he did so."
OSWALD'S ARREST
At first I was surprised to learn that Johnny Calvin Brewer knew that a
patrolman had been shot when Oswald walked by his place of business, less than
eight blocks from the point of the Tippit killing which Oswald apparently left
as fast as he could.
2. Then I was surprised to learn that the police radio did not send out
information about the suspect being in the Texas Theater until 1:45 about 30
minutes after the police first learned of the Tippit killing from Benavides over
Tippit's radio. What were Oswald and Brewer doing during this 30 minutes? Oswald
was strangely inactive during this period, considering all that he had done the
45 minutes following the assassination.
3. While I know that I will be thought mad to suggest that some editing be done
on this chapter, consider the following sentence that appears on galley page 46:
"As Oswald, handcuffed, was led from the theatre, he was, according to McDonald,
'cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality.'" There are only 5 commas
in that sentence. How about: "McDonald testified that Oswald was 'cursing a
little bit and hollering police brutality' as he was led handcuffed from the
theatre."
Here compare the note above concerning page 36 that the police radio had noted
the similarity of the descriptions between the man wanted for the assassination
and the man wanted for the Tippit killing, by the time Oswald was arrested at
the theater. It could be, therefore, that some of the officers suspected that
the man they were arresting was wanted in connection with the assassination.
STATEMENTS OF OSWALD DURING DETENTION
1. There are entirely too many subheadings under this general heading. None are
really necessary. We reach the sublime when we have one whole heading for one
short, four sentence paragraph. They should all be cut out and the whole
discussion comprehended under the above general title.
2. In the paragraph on denial of rifle ownership appears the statement "small
bore .22 rifle." That is redundant, since I presume we do not mean to
distinguish from large bore .22 rifles. It should probably just read: ".22
caliber rifle."
3. The second to last sentence in that paragraph needs a footnote.
SHOOTING OF MAJ. GEN. EDWIN A. WALKER
1. There is no footnote after the sentence concerning the 15-year-old boy who
saw two men leave the area.
Same after the statement that a friend of Walker gave information to the police
about' the two men snooping around. Also that statement is not correct. Walker
gave the information to the police.
3. No footnote after statement re results of private investigation.
4. No footnote after statement that the note was in the "Book of Useful Advice."
5. The second full paragraph on page 48 assumes a lot of knowledge about
Oswald's movements and about the Paines that the reader had not gotten anywhere
yet, except in the first chapter narrative. A few extra words as suggested in
the margin of the galley might improve things considerably. Furthermore, the
first sentence needs a footnote, as does the entire next paragraph, which has
not one footnote to its name.
6. In the paragraph on photographs, a footnote is needed after the first
sentence. The second sentence must be changed because at present it implies that
Oswald told Marina about the notebook or rather showed it to her when he
returned the night after the attack. She stated in her testimony in July that
she did not see what was in the notebook until 3 days after the attack and there
is nothing in her early testimony that I know about to support the PropoSition
now in the report.
7. Statement that Oswald apparently destroyed the notebook should be changed in
order to reflect fact that he did destroy it, and at the suggestion of his wife.
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8. Second to last sentence in photographs section must be changed to indicate
that Oswald did not bury his rifle in some bushes, but rather that he may have
hidden it there.
9. Query usage of "ballistics" in first paragraph of "Firearms Identification"
section. Same as to last paragraph thereof.
10. Under "Corroboration by Marina Oswald" we learn for the first time about a
postponement of the attempt to kill Walker. There is no mention of from when,
what the circumstances of the postponement were, what happened to the rifle in
the meantime, et cetera. It should be set forth, since there is no mention of it
above, as I recall.
OSWALD'S RIFLE CAPABILITY
1. The purpose of this section is to determine Oswald's ability to fire a rifle.
The third word at the top of page 50 of the galleys, which is apparently meant
to describe Oswald, is "marksman." A marksman is one skilled at shooting at
mark; one who shoots well. Not only do we beg the question a little, but the
sentence is inexact in that the shot, which it describes, would be the same for
marksman as it would for one who was not a marksman. How about: the assassin's
shots from the easternmost window of the south side of the Texas School Book
Depository were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade virtually
straight away from the assassin, at a range of 177 to 266 feet."
2. The last sentence in the first paragraph on galley page 50 should indicate
that the slope of Elm Street is downward.
3. The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the
effect of a telescopic sight. Several experts conclude that the shots were easy.
There is, however, no consideration given here to the time allowed for the
shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy or hard unless
he knows something about how long the firer has to shoot, that is, how much time
allotted for the shots.
4. On nature of the shots--Frazier testified that one would have no difficulty
in hitting a target with a telescopic sight, since all you have to do is put the
crosshairs on the target. On page 51 of the galleys, however, he testified that
shots fired by FBI agents with the assassination weapon were "a few inches high
and to the right of the target * * * because of a defect in the scope."
Apparently no one knows when that defect appeared, or if it was in the scope at
the time of the assassination. If it was, and in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary one may assume that it was, putting the crosshairs on the target
would clearly have resulted in a miss, or it very likely would, in any event. I
have raised this question before. There is a great deal of testimony in the
record that a telescopic sight is a sensitive proposition. You can't leave a
rifle and scope laying around in a garage underfoot for almost 3 months, just
having brought it back from New Orleans in the back of a station wagon, and
expect to hit anything with it, unless you take the trouble to fire it and sight
the scope in. This would have been a problem that should have been dealt with in
any event, and now that it turns out that there actually was a defect in the
scope, it is perfectly clear that the question must be considered. The present
draft leaves the Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent
that it leaves testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy
out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply
dishonest.
5. Why do we have a statement concerning the fact that Oswald's Marine records
show that he was familiar with the Browning automatic rifle, .45-caliber pistol
and 12-gage riot gun? That is completely irrelevant to the question of his
abilility to fire a rifle, unless there is evidence that the same skills are
involved. It is, furthermore, prejudicial to some extent.
6. Under the heading "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines" we have a
statement concerning his hunting activities in Russia. It says that he joined a
hunting club, obtained a license and went hunting about six times. It does not
say what kind of a weapon he used. While I am not completely familiar with the
record on this point, I do know for a fact that there is some indication that he
used a shotgun. Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun
under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the
reader of the fact?
7. The statements concerning Oswald's practice with the assassination weapon are
misleading. They tend to give the impression that he did more practicing than
the record suggests that he did. My recollection is that there is only one
specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this
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area, because the Commission is going to have its work in this area examined
aery closely.
8. On the top of galley page 51 we have that statement about Oswald sighting the
telescopic sight at night on the porch in New Orleans. I think the support for
that proposition is thin indeed. Marina Oswald first testified that she did not
know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly led into the only
answer that gives any support to this proposition.
9. I think the level of reaching that is going on in this whole discussion of
rifle capability is merely shown by the fact that under the heading of rifle
practice outside the Marine Corps appears the damning statement that "Oswald
showed an interest in rifles by discussing that subject with others (in fact
only one person as I remember it) and reading gun magazines."
10. I do not think the record will support the statement that Oswald did not
leave his Beckley Avenue roominghouse on one of the weekends that he was
supposedly seen at the Sports Drome Rifle Range.
11. There is a misstatement in the third paragraph under rapid fire tests when
it says "Four of the firers missed the second shot." The preceding paragraph
states that there were only three firers.
12. There are no footnotes whatsoever in the fifth paragraph under rapid fire
tests and some rather important statements are made which require some support
from someplace.
13. A minor point as to the next paragraph--bullets are better said to strike
rather than land.
14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15
different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert riflemen of the
FBI and other places. According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a
total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2
seconds. Assuming that time is calculated commencing with the firing of the
first shot, that means the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots
was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not
counting the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I
recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse between
shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired
by Frazier of the FBI.
The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with
two hits in from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above.
only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including the three
just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The conclusion at its
most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster than the Commission experts
fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster than
the experts did in 10 of their 15 tries. If we are going to set forth material
such as this, I think we should set forth some information on how much training
and how much shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
have something on which to base their judgments concerning the relative
abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the Commission and the
ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some point in the
text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot
used throughout chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle capability shows that
expert riflemen could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of
the experts managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI
experts, were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever be
expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my recollection
of the response of one of the experts to a question by Mr. McCloy asking for a
comparison of an NRA master marksman to a Marine Corps sharpshooter.
16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth material in the
record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good shot and that he was not
interested in his rifle while in the Marine Corps. It does not set forth
material indicating that a telescopic sight must be tested and sighted in after
a period of nonuse before it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is
emphasized by the fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in
the scene which caused the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the
above the present section takes only part of the material in the record to show
that Oswald was a good shot and that he was interested in rifles. I submit that
the testimony Delgado that Oswald was not interested in his rifle while in the
Marines is at
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least as probative as Alba's testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read
rifle--and hunting--magazines.
To put it bluntly that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect
the integrity and credibility of the entire report.
17. It seems to me that the most honest and the most sensible thing to do the
present state of the record on Oswald's rifle capability would be to write a
very short section indicating that there is testimony on both sides of several
issues. The Commission could then conclude that the best evidence that Oswald
could fire his rifle as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he
did so. It may have been pure luck. It probably was to a very great extent. But
it happened. He would have had to have been lucky to hit as he did if he had
only 4.8 seconds to fire the shots. Why don't we admit instead of reaching and
using only part of the record to support the propositions presently set forth in
the galleys. Those conclusions will never be accepted by critical persons
anyway.
GENERAL COMMENT
1. The above was written without having the footnotes to the chapter, a
considerable disadvantage when one would like to check the accuracy and
precision of statements made in the text.
2. The placement of footnotes is not consistent within the chapter, nor with the
general rule that there are to be footnotes after all direct quotes. Many times
there are no footnotes where it appears to me that there should be.
3. Form as to omitted material should be checked. The form of citations to the
appendix is not consistent with chapter 3 or internally.
4. I for not to mention that some question might be raised when the public
discovers that there was only one person who saw Oswald kill him. All the rest
only saw subsequent events. Mrs. Markham is nicely buried there, but I predict
not for long.
Mr. CORNWELL. Who prepared chapter IV initially? Who first drafted that?
Mr. LIEBELER. Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you at the time work closely enough with Mr. Ball and Mr.
Belin where you would have both become familiar with the facts within their area
and also the quality of their work?
Mr. LIEBELER. That question has two parts. I was certainly familiar with the
facts of their area because I had read most or all of the same FBI reports that
they had read in outlining their area of investigation in my own efforts to
prepare my own investigation.
I think I can say I had been able to form a judgment as to certain kinds of
their work. But I was not in a position to judge the quality of their written
work because I had never looked at it closely or examined it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Based on that last answer you would not be able to tell us whether
or not their rough draft of this chapter in and of itself was a competent
professional polished piece of work?
Mr. LEIBELER. No, I would not. I don't recall that I even ever read it.
Mr. CORNWELL. What basically, however, was the nature of the problems that you
found with the galley proofs, the rewrite of chapter IV?
Mr. LIEBELER. Well, my memo September 6 speaks to that question. It involves
problems ranging from matters of form and location, of footnotes to the problem
that I thought was important at the time and that was that I thought that the
text of that chapter was written in the sense that it made statements that could
not really be supported by the nature of the underlying evidence.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let us simply very briefly go through that memo. I would like to
ask you if you believe today your criticisms were
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accurate? For instance on page 3 you very cryptically note near the bottom that
a gap in the proof cannot be filled by ignoring it with respect to certain
portions of the galley proof. On page 21----
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you want to take these one by one or do you want to lump them?
Mr. CORNWELL. We can simply look at them in bulk if you would like, whichever
way you prefer.
Mr. LIEBELER. The reference on page 3 as to the question of whether or not it
could be definitively established that the rifle that Oswald had ordered and
received and was used to assassinate the President had actually been in the
Paine garage the entire period of time after the Oswald return from New Orleans
until the time of the assassination. I took the position that that could not be
directly proved and I think that that position was correct. I still think that
it is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. On page 21 you note at the top: "The present draft leaves the
Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves
testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy out of the
discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest?"
Was that your view of the report in its galley proof form
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, that was my view of the galley proofs as they existed at that
time on tiffs issue of the Oswald capability as a rifleman and the accuracy of
the rifle.
Mr. CORNWELL. Also on page 21, bottom of paragraph 6, did you conclude that it
was misleading to place information concerning the shotgun, possible use of the
shotgun, under the heading of "Rifle practice" and then not advise the readers
of the true facts of the distinction
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, I did.
Mr. CORNWELL. You note on page 93 near the bottom of the page that there was
insufficient material provided on which the readers could base their judgment.
Was that also a criticism that you felt was justified with respect to that final
report?
Mr. LIEBELER. On that specific issue, yes, from the speed and the way the rifle
could be fired.
Mr. CORNWELL. In paragraph 16, on page 24, at the very bottom, did you feel that
the process of selecting what facts and information to rely upon seriously
affected the integrity and credibility of the entire report?
Mr. LIEBELER. I used the words that it could do that. I believed that then as to
the galleys, and I think that was a problem that we had in writing it and
difficulties we had about that. The problem became apparent to me when I went
through my own chapter after I had drafted it and wrote the footnotes for it.
After I drafted my chapter, it had been rewritten and gone through several
drafts, other people had changed it and things had been changed around over a
period of time. It is absolutely impossible for a process like that to occur
without ending up with sentences and statements in the report that simply you
cannot find support for in the footnotes, in the testimony and the underlying
evidence. It was an extremely painful process to go through all that evidence
and try to conform as closely as possible the statements in the text to the
actual evidence that was in the record.
That was part of the problem. I think also part of the problem was, as I said
before, a tendency, at least in the galleys of chapter IV, to
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try to downplay or not give equal emphasis to contrary evidence just simply
admit and state openly that there is a conflict in the mony and the evidence
about this question, but after reviewing the evidence the Commission could
conclude whatever the Commission conclude. I thought that would have been a
better way to do it.
Mr. CORWELL. What was done with all of your comments, the work product that you
obviously spent a good deal of time preparing here
which we have now marked as exhibit 36?
Mr. LIEBELER. I typed this memo, myself, so it was not distributed throughout
the Commission files in the ordinary form, with different colored copies going
to different places. My recollection is that I put a copy of it on Mr. Redlich's
desk when I came back from Vermont that weekend and gave Mr. Willens a copy and
I believe gave Mr. Rankin a copy. There was really no response to it for a
considerable period of time. Then after the chapter had come back in page proof
I reviewed it again. Mr. Redlich had already returned to New York. I was
dissatisfied with the condition of the chapter even at that point. I went into
Mr. Rankings office and told Mr. Rankin that I thought there were problems. So
Mr. Rankin said, I believe, get the memo and the proofs and the page proofs, and
we sat down, the two of us, and started going through the chapter. Mr. Willens
came in and observed what was going on and, it is my surmise, as a result of
subsequent events he went out and called Mr. Redlich in New York and in the time
it took Mr. Redlich to get from N.Y.U. to the airport and down to Washington,
Mr. Redlich appeared in Mr. Rankin's office.
Mr. CORNWELL. It was Mr. Redlich's rewrite you were critizing, is that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes. So, Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin and Mr. Willens and I then
spent the rest of that day and long into the night going over this memorandum
and the page proofs and my recollection is that we considered and discussed all
the issues that were raised here, and probably more as well.
Mr. CORNWELL. Apart from considering what action was taken.
Mr. LIEBELER. The record will show that. I don't recall. My general
recollection, my general impression was that my performance against Mr. Redlich
was like UCLA's football team usually is against USC. But it really was not
quite that bad. I won some and some of the changes were made. And some were not.
There is a difference between the page proofs and final report and galley
proofs, there is no question about that.
Mr. CORNWELL. There is some difference?
Mr. LIEBELER. Some difference, yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, as exhibits 37, 38,
39, 40, and 41, memos respectively dated September 14,
from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Willens, concerning chapter Vl; memo dated September
15, Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Willens concerning suggestions set forth in a letter
from David A. Rothstein: memo of September 15, from Liebeler to Willens
regarding a letter from Dr. Rome; a memo of September regarding chapter VI, and
a memo dated September 16 regarding chapter VI.
Mr. PREYER. All of these exhibits are marked for identification only.
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Mr. CORNWELL. Have you had a chance to review each of those exhibits prior to
coming here today?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that each of those exhibits relates also
to your findings with respect to errors and overstatements, incorrect
statements, which existed in the galley proofs and that you discovered during
the rewrite process?
Mr. LEIBELER. No.
Mr. CORNWELL. Or suggested additions to the report?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, I think that is correct. but of course they will speak for
themselves. But that is a generally correct characterization of them.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we then submit each of those exhibits into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Without objection the exhibits are admitted into the record.
[The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibits No. 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 and
received for the record, follow:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 37
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 14, 1964.
To: Mr. Willens.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
The following are some general comments on that portion of chapter VI dealing
with conspiracy beginning with "investigation of Other Activities" on galley
237.
1. We have not conducted sufficient investigation to state that there is no
evidence that FPCC and ACLU were aware that they were authorized to receive mail
at P.O. Box 6225, or that mail was ever addressed to them there.
2. Same as to statement re three post office boxes being used for surreptitious
receipts of messages. I would delete the whole idea.
3. The sentence re investigation of aliases preceding footnote 714 in the
galleys is much too broad.
4. Query statement at top of page 238 that Oswald "commonly" used Hidell as name
of others--he also used that name to get the rifle and revolver.
5. What investigation has been conducted "with regard to persons using the name
of 'Lee.'" I think the statement following note 727 is too broad.
6. The sentence relating to chapter VII at the close of the discussion of
aliases should read "Oswald's creation of false names and fictitious
personalties is also treated in the discussion of possible motives set forth in
chapter VII."
7. Ownership of second rifle:
a. We cannot say that all of Oswald's transactions in connection with firearms
were undertaken under an assumed name, only his known transactions.
b. I think the degree of doubt about the authenticity of the repair tag is
overstated.
c. First sentence in first full paragraph on page 259 is too strong and should
be changed along the lines indicated in my copy of the galley.
d. The third sentence should also be qualified. The underlying report is not
that strong.
e. The last sentence in that paragraph is not supported by the TV films we got
from CBS. It should be deleted.
f. The second full paragraph has only one footnote. Furthermore, the last
statement is incorrect. Whitworth and Hunter do not now say Oswald drove down
the street and only Mrs. Whitworth said so before.
g. The statement that neither Mrs. Hunter nor Mrs. Whitworth could identify a
picture of Lee Harvey Oswald is not so. Mrs. Whitworth did do so at 11 H 272. My
draft stated that they could not "identify Lee Harvey Oswald standing with a
small group of other different looking people."
8. Rifle practise:
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a. Query if all the witnesses agree that the barrel had been shortened. (See
note 775.)
b. Do we have evidence on the question of whether or not Oswald's rifle spouts
fire. ( See note 777. )
c. What is our authority for the nonexistence of the Cedar Hills gunshop. (See
note 781. )
d. At note 794 Oswald could have been at Paine's and still have gone to the
rifle range. Add: "and did not leave there to go to the rifle range."
9. Automobile demonstration: I think it is Stemmons Freeway, not "Expressway."
10. Alleged activities with Cuban underground organizations:
a. The title is inappropriate because Andrews and Pena do not talk about
underground activities.
b. The title and the introduction are inappropriate because they strongly
suggest that Oswald was an anti-Castro. The implication runs through Odio's
testimony that he was an infiltrator. It would be better to start with a neutral
sentence like: "The Commission has also considered testimony of certain persons
that claim to have seen Oswald in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban
or Mexican background."
c. What is the authority for the statement that Mrs. Odio claims that both of
her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime?
To go back for a moment to the second rifle section: In the third full paragraph
it states, "On November 24, Ryder and Greener discussed at length the
possibility" that Oswald had been there, but "Ryder did not mention the tag to
his employer." I know of no evidence that Ryder and Greener talked on the 24th.
If they did not, the next sentence must be changed or cut.
The next sentence is a good example of what happens in the "rewrite" process. It
says incorrectly, that on November 25 Ryder told the FBI that Greener did not
remember the tag, although he had not called the tag to Greener's attention. The
original sentence said, correctly, that Greener "did not remember the
transaction represented by the repairtag..."
The next sentence says the FBI was directed to Ryder by anonymous phone calls.
Not so. They were directed to the Irving Sports Shop and would very likely have
talked to Greener, but he could not be found by the agent on November 25, 1963,
when he went to the shop.
Back to Odio:
d. Check correct name of JURE.
e. The paragraph on bus transportation starting "There is no firm evidence"
should be completely rewritten. I do not think there is "convincing evidence"
that Oswald was on the buses as stated. One sentence says he was apparently one
of four passengers bound for a point beyond Texas. The next suggests that he
bought a ticket in Houston for Laredo, which is in Texas. The McFarland
testimony is given too much weight. I don't think Mexican immigration records
show the time of day he crossed the border. Slawson told me he got the time of
crossing from the scheduled arrival of the bus. Now we are using it to show that
since he crossed at that time he had to be on the bus.
f. Since we have no direct evidence that Oswald boarded bus 5133 in Houston, the
first sentence of the next paragraph ("Hence, the only time...,) should be
changed. That also obviates the necessity that he had to go from New Orleans to
Dallas and thence too Houston.
There really is almost no evidence at all that he left Houston on that bus-- and
there is really no reason why we should suggest there is. The point can be made
without saying that and to seem to rely on really weak evidence is to invite
trouble.
g. Again---later in the same paragraph--more reliance on the McFarlands. Their
affidavit is very weak--we should not fight it.
h. Then the single ticket from Houston to Laredo again--which probably could not
have been Oswald if he were one of the four heading for points Laredo.
i. Also the assumption that the Twiford call was a local call. Why
speculate--make the arguments--he probably would not have called at all if he
were not in Houston or going to be in Houston.
j. The conclusion that the evidence is persuasive that Oswald was not Dallas on
September 25 is too strong.
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k. The story of Father McGhann (sp.?) is overemphasized. We should state that
Odio never told anyone else that Eugenio had been one of the men with Oswald.
How can we conclude that McGhann would not have become confused when he was
apparently in a rest home of some sort and we have never seen or spoken to him?
1. Since we have never taken testimony from Odio's other two friends on which
people could base judgement as to their veracity, we should not rely too heavily
on their statements, about which they have never been cross-examined.
m. The first two full paragraphs on galley 242 should come out. The
"inconsistencies", if any, are minor. Furthermore, Sylvia's testimony is
actually misrepresented when it is stated that she and her sister felt Oswald
"looked familiar" when they saw his picture after the assassination. Sylvia
testified that she was sure it was Oswald.
The paragraph about the psychiatrist is quite unfair. It states that Odio "came
forward" with her story, whereas she did not come forward at all and was quite
reluctant to get involved at all. Her story came to the attention of the FBI
through a third person. The hearsay statements of "friends," concerning their
personal opinion of a witness are thin stuff indeed. The whole paragraph is poor
and should come out.
The Odio analyses should be based primarily on the apparent likelihood that LHO
was elsewhere. These are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will
look bad if it turns out that she is. There is no need to look foolish by
grasping at straws to avoid admitting that there is a problem.
11. Oswald not U.S. agent:
a. Did CIA. note his FPCC activities in New Orleans?
b. Why mention fact that LHO's name was not given to Secret Service--leave --to
chapter VIII.
c. Should not say Mrs. O. did not give any basis for her belief LHO was a U.S.
agent--better to say any reasonable or credible basis. We should also add that
the Commission has thoroughly considered all of her statements; that she was not
foreclosed from giving any evidence she had and the Commission concluded that
there was no real basis for her position.
d. Why do we mention the Ruby deal here--how does that relate to LHO's being a
U.S. agent?
e. Have we really seen the full CIA file on Oswald? Do we need a footnote to the
last sentence in the first full paragraph on galley 243?
f. Who is going to attest that they have reviewed the complete Bureau files
dealing with the Oswald investigation?
12. Oswald's finances:
a. The second paragraph is a little expansive. It certainly needs more than one
footnote in any event.
b. Last sentence in fourth paragraph is ungrammatical.
c. Please let's take out "cheap and shabbily furnished" and other stuff of that
sort! See galley and my previous comments on the draft for my suggestions.
d. I think we should cut the description of Oswald's wardrobe to the statement
that it was also very modest.
e. The first full paragraph on galley 244 should be rewritten and shortened. I
think the discussion of finances is too long and detailed. It is also too
apparently precise to be readily believable.
f. To be somewhat facetious: If we are going to explain the other assistant in
the FPCC distribution as a hired hand, we had better provide for him in the
third full paragraph on 244.
g. We fall back into the first name treatment for Marina Oswald again.
h. Where do we get the hotel expenses of $1.28 per day on the Mexican trip?
i. If Oswald did not cash his unemployment check at Hutch's Market, why do we
mention it? I think it was cashed at an A&P store.
j. The whole discussion of Huchison's testimony should be limited to one
paragraph in the rumors section.
k. Why do we fail to mention the Cuban or Mexican that one of the Western Union
employees said was with the man Hambian thought was Oswald?
l. We should be more specific about the "other cities" in which WU has searched
their records.
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 38
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 15, 1964.
To: Mr. Willens.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
Pursuant to suggestions set forth in a letter dated September 13, 1964, from Dr.
David A. Rothstein of the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, I suggest the
following following additions to chapter VII.
1. The second sentence in the second full paragraph on galley 67 should be
omitted and the following should be substituted:
"Irving Sokolow, a Youth House psychologist, reported that:
"The Human Figure Drawings are empty, poor characterizations of persons
approximately the same age as the subject. They reflect a considerable amount of
impoverishment in the social and emotional areas. He appears to be a somewhat
insecure youngster exhibiting much inclination for warm and satisfying
relationships to others. There is some indication that he may relate to men more
easily than to women in view of the more mature conceptualization. He appears
slightly withdrawn and in view of the lack of detail within the drawings this,
may assume a more significant characteristic. He exhibits some difficulty in
relationship to the maternal figure suggesting more anxiety in this area than in
any other."
The footnote remains the same except for the deletion of an indication that the
quote appears at page 1. Since CE 1339 is a short document no page numbers need
be indicated. The third sentence of the paragraph under discussion should then
commence a new paragraph which otherwise would remain the same.
2. On galley 71 a new paragraph should be inserted immediately following the
first full quoted paragraph at the top of that galley. Since the material that
Dr. Rothstein recommends that we add continues right on from the present
paragraph at the top of galley 71, no indication of omitted material is
necessary. The material to be added is as follows:
"This should answer your question, and also give you a glimpse of my way of
thinking.
"So you speak of advantages. Do you think that is why I am here? For personal,
material advantage? Happiness is not based on oneself, it does not consist of a
small home, of taking and getting. Happiness is taking part in the struggle,
where there is no borderline between one's own personal world, and the world in
general. I never believed I would find more material advantages at this stage of
development in the Soviet Union than I might of had in the U.S."
The asterisks should then be left in as they are in the galley because there is
omitted material following the above quote and the quote starting "I have been a
pro-Communist .... "'the footnote remains the same.
3. Dr. Rothstein thinks we should indicate the approximate date of Marina's
"liberation" by de Mohrenschildt. That could be done very simply by adding the
words "sometime in early November 1963" following the word "apartment" in the
sentence following footnote 250 in galley 74.
4. Dr. Rothstein thinks it is an overstatement to say that Oswald had never been
able to obtain from his wife that respect. etc. He suggests, and I agree, that
the second sentence in the paragraph following footnote 410 read: "Oswald had
difficulty in obtaining from his wife .... "
5. The doctor thinks that the fourth sentence in the paragraph following
foot-note 477 is too strongly worded. The sentence should be changed to read:
"He had not been able to establish lasting, meaningful relations...." While Dr.
Rothstein has also made other worthwhile suggestions, I do not think they can be
included at this point without seriously disrupting the present state of our
galleys on chapter VII. I think the ones set forth above should be included
however since they are worthwhile changes and can be readily made without
disrupting the galley.
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 39
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 15, 1964.
To: Howard 5. Willens.
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
Subject: Letter of Dr. Howard P. Rome, dated September 13, 1964.
Dr. Rome has sent a 12-page analysis of Oswald's reading disability which I
recommend be included in the report as a Commission exhibit.
I also recommend that reference to the disability be set forth in the text by
inserting the following as a new paragraph following the second full paragraph
on galley 68:
"This misspelling of names, apparently on a phonetic basis, is cited by a
psychiatrist consulted by the Commission as an example of a reading-spelling
disability from which Oswald appeared to suffer. Other evidence of the existence
of such a disability is provided by the many other misspellings that appear in
Oswald's writings, portions of which are quoted below. The psychiatrist has
suggested the existence of this disability also stated his opinion that the
frustration which may have resulted from it gave an added impetus to his
(Oswald's) need to prove to the world that he was an unrecognized 'great man.'"
If the above is agreeable, it can be added by shifting only two footnote
numbers.
JFK EXHIBIT No. 40
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 15, 1964.
To: Howard P. Willens.
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
Subject: Chapter VI.
I set forth below my comments on the first part of chapter VI:
1. I do not think we should speak of "Proving a negative conclusion" as we now
do in the second full paragraph on galley 189 since that might be thought to
imply a prejudgment of the issue. It would be better, I think, to speak of the
difficulties in developing evidence of any well executed conspiracy.
2. The last sentence in the third paragraph says that all of Oswald's known
writings or other possessions which might have been used for code or other
espionage purposes have been examined either by the FBI or the National Security
Agency of both. The sentence does not indicate the purpose for which those
writings were examined by those agencies. Even though it may be clearer by
implication that they were examined to discover any code messages that might be
in them, if that is the case I think it should be so stated.
3. The last sentence in the fifth paragraph of galley 189 says that the
Commission has also considered whether any connections existed between Oswald
and "those groups which, shortly before the assassination, were responsible for
the propagation of hostile criticism of President Kennedy." I would assume that
reference to right-wing group is intended, but that is not entirely clear since
there were certain other groups that propagated hostile criticism of President
Kennedy both shortly before the assassination and at other times. The Militant,
the Journal of the Socialist Workers Party. was extremely critical of the
Kennedy administration. I think that if right wing groups are intended by the
sentence, that should be specifically stated and there should be no inference
that other groups such as the Socialist Workers Party did not propagate hostile
criticism President Kennedy. While that inference is, I am sure, not intended,
it might be drawn from present sentence.
4. The next paragraph, relating to the Ruby discussion, should indicate that the
Commission has considered the possibility that Jack Ruby was part of a
conspiracy to kill Lee Harvey Oswald. That is not mentioned in the present
paragraph and is or at least should be a part of the discussion on Ruby.
5. It is a minor point, but we always refer to the window from which the shots
were fired as the southeast corner window or a window in the southeast corner of
the building. It would appear it would be more precise to say that the window
the eastern most window on the south side of the building or at least indicate
that clearly at the beginning and state that the window will thereafter be
referred to simply as the southeast corner window.
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6. Another small point and perhaps one simply of taste, the stringing together
long clauses separated by semi-colons does not seem to be good writing
technique. Periods are generally preferable since they make the sentences
shorter and actually make the material easier to read and follow.
7. The second paragraph under the heading "Selection of Motorcade Route refers
to Dealy Plaza without any explanation of what it is. This has probably been
done above. A short clause, however, describing it as the park area between.
Ella and Commerce Street immediately east of the triple underpass might be a
good idea.
8. The second sentence in the third paragraph under the heading "Oswald's.
Presence in the Depository Building" is ungrammatical.
9. Another detail, but the word "company" following "Depository" in the fifth
paragraph of this section is abbreviated "Co." It should be spelled out, I
think, as should Texas and other such words as that.
10. The last paragraph in this section indicates that the Trade Mart was
selected as the luncheon site on November 14, 1963. The newspapers did not
indicate a final selection until November 16, 1963, if my recollection is
correct. While these two things are not necessarily inconsistent we should be
sure that the Trade Mart was actually first selected as the luncheon site on
November 14.
11. In the last paragraph of the section entitled "Bringing Rifle into Building"
it is stated that "neither women saw the paper bag or paper tape out of which
the bag might have been constructed" it would be better to state, I think: "both
women testified that they did not see the paper bag .... "
12. Under the caption "Accomplices at the Scene of the Assassination", I am
still not able to understand, as set forth in paragraph 4, why the Commission
considered probative in considering whether Oswald moved the cartons to the
window, the fact that none of the warehouse employees who might have customarily
handled the cartons left prints which could be identified. It may in fact be
probative in considering that question, but if I am not yet able to understand
why, after considering the question at some length, I have reason to believe
that the public will have similar difficulties in understanding the reasons why.
If it is in fact probative, it should be a relatively simple matter to set forth
briefly the reasons why it is.
13. Query whether the prints were identified as those of an FBI "Agent".
Inspector Malley told me that they were the prints of a clerk in a Dallas office
who wrapped the boxes to be forwarded to Washington for fingerprint
identification.
14. The next paragraph still bears the marks of a discussion that was
appropriate before the fingerprints had been identified as those of an FBI agent
or clerk and a member of a Dallas Police Department. I do not think the
sentences set forth at footnotes 45-47 are really appropriate or necessary any
longer, since the great bulk of the fingerprints have in fact been identified.
The rest of that paragraph should also be rewritten to reflect more clearly the
fact that most of the prints have been identified.
15. The discussion starting at the bottom of galley 191 and continuing through
to the end of the section of accomplices at the scene is highly repetitive of
material set forth in chapter IV. It would seem to me that the rather extensive
treatment in chapter V could be substantially reduced by references back to
chapter IV. Actually this makes about the third time that some of this stuff has
been set forth. First to support the proposition that the shots came from the
eastern most window, on the south side of the TSBD. Second, to deal with the
identification and now the question of conspiracy. It should be shortened in
chapter VI considerably. If the Rowland material is new, of course it should be
retained.
16. Under the section captioned "Oswald's Escape," in the discussion of the
testimony of Earlene Roberts concerning the police car, it is stated that "the
Commission has established that there was no police vehicle in the area of 1026
North Beckley at about 1 p.m. on November 22." I do not think that statement is
supported by the evidence we have and even if it appears to be so supported it
is entirely too broad and leaves open too much possibility of error. It would be
much better to say that investigation has produced no other evidence that there
was any police car in the area of 1026 North Beckley, etc.
17. The last sentence on the section of Oswald's Escape is too broad when it
states that investigation has produced no evidence that Oswald had pre-arranged
plans for a means to leave Dallas after the assassination or that any other
person was to provide him assistance. There is no footnote. I do not think we
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can make those broad statements concerning investigations that have been made
without supporting them in detail.
18. The statement in this section "Background of Lee Harvey Oswald"' that study
of the period from his birth ,"in 1939 to his military service from 1956 to
1959, has revealed no evidence which even plausibly suggests that Oswald was
associated with any type of sinister or subversive organization during that
period, is too broad and is inaccurate. There is testimony that Oswald wanted to
join the Communist Party during the period that he lived in New Orleans from
1954 to 1956. That evidence does plausibly suggest that he might have been
associated with a sinister or subversive organization.
There is also evidence that he wrote to the Socialist Party and while this may
not be so strong a suggestion as the fact that he wanted to join the Communist
party, it is worthy of note.
There is also testimony by Delgado, one of his Marine Corps associates, that he
was greatly interested in Cuba, discussed going to Cuba and in fact contacted
the Cuban consulate m Los Angeles during the time he was stationed at Santa Ana
The period covered by the above statement includes the time that Oswald was in
Japan during which he might have contacted members of some communist
organization there. If that ever happened, it would be highly unlikely that we
would have any evidence about it. De Mohrenschildt said that Oswald had told him
that he had met some communists in Japan and that they got him excited and
interested and that is one of the reasons he went to the Soviet Union.
19. While it is probably of little consequence, I do not think it is necessary
for the Commission to justify its investigation into the possible existence of a
conspiracy involving the Soviet Union by stating that it does not suggest that
the rulers of the Soviet Union believed that their political interest would be
advanced by the assassination of President Kennedy. The facts in that regard
speak for themselves.
20. At the top of galley 195 I do not understand the point about investigation
concerning the possibility that Oswald was sent to Minsk unusually soon after he
arrived. The statement appears without any warning and immediately raises the
question whether or not he was sent to Minsk sooner than might be expected on
the basis of information about other defectors. Perhaps the thought would be
better expressed only in terms of investigation concerning the possibility that
he was expected in the Soviet Union or had developed an undercover relationship
without specific reference to the possibility that he had been accepted or sent
to Minsk unusually soon.
21. The last sentence in the third full paragraph on galley 195, which states
that the CIA has (which is, incidentally spelled out and is not abbreviated as
is done in other places) contributed data on the normal practices and procedures
of Soviet authorities in handling American defectors, would seem to require a
footnote. That would be so if the CIA material is set forth in the record. If it
is not, that fact should probably be indicated.
22. The sentence following footnote 151 is slightly ungrammatical in that the
word "nor" following the first clause, should be "or." Furthermore, the last two
sentences of that paragraph could be omitted and a sentence along the following
lines substituted: "Oswald's arrogant and secretive character does not seem
inconsistent with a suicide or reigned suicide attempt or with his failure to
mention it to others."
23. The sentence which runs from the bottom of galley 195 and ends at the top of
196, dealing with the allegation that those who spoke with Oswald speculated
that he may have received some instructions from the Soviet authorities, appears
to need a footnote. In that connection, query whether there is any authority for
the proposition set forth at footnote 169 that Oswald had read "communist
literature without guidance while in the Marine Corps and before that time."
24. Reference is made in galley 196 to a 2 1/2 month period that Oswald had to
wait for disposition of his application after he arrived in the Soviet Union.
The beginning of the section at the top of page 195 says the period was "almost
3 months."
25. Back to footnote 110; the material set forth at footnote 209 indicates that
Oswald used 2200 rubles to pay his hotel bill whereas the material at 110 says
that he apparently did not pay his hotel bill at all after November 30, 1959.
The statement at 110 means that he did not pay his hotel bill by himself, but
that it was paid for out of funds provided to him by the Russian Government.
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26. The material at footnote 225 should reflect the latest testimony of Marina
Oswald concerning her knowledge of Oswald's job. It should probably also say
that Marina Oswald has testified that Oswald told her he operated a lathe, etc.
As the statement now reads it might appear that she had first hand knowledge of
what he was actually doing, which in fact she did not.
27. In the sentence following footnote 245 seems to bega a question that should
be discussed in this chapter. The sentence says that it seems unlikely that
Soviet authorities would have permitted Oswald to marry and oviet authorities
would have permitted Oswald to marry and take his wife to the United States if
they were contemplating using him "alone as an agent." One of the questions at
hand is whether they did contemplate using him as an agent, either alone or
together with Marina Oswald. The sentence as it presently stands, without any
discussion of the possibility that Marina Oswald was an agent, seems to be
circular.
29. At footnote 257 it says that Oswald unexpectedly appeared in Moscow on July
8, 1961. The following sentence states that Marina Oswald flew to Moscow "also
without Soviet sanction." There has been no indication that Oswald's trip to
Moscow was without Soviet sanction. Since it was, I believe, that should be
indicated. If it was not, the "also" should be taken out in connection with
Marina's statement. The first sentence in the next paragraph, of course,
indicates that Oswald's travel was apparently without permission, but that
should probably be indicated in the preceding paragraph at some point.
30. I think the information set forth in the several extensive quotes from the
CIA and State Department could be summarized in a much shorter form thus cutting
the length of the chapter.
31. The sentence at footnote 270 uses Marina Oswald's first name only, something
we have generally decided not to do and have not done in other places.
32. In the sentence following footnote 279, I believe the MVD colonel's name is
misspelled. It should be Aksenov--A-k-s-e-n-o-v, or at least it was so spelled
in Marina Oswald's latest testimony before the Commission.
33. At footnote 286 note should be taken of Mrs. Oswald's latest testimony. My
recollection is that she testified that she was not aware of any interviews that
Oswald had prior to his departure from the Soviet Union.
34. The last sentence on galley 199 which speaks of the Commission's awareness
of "both interviews" and states that the way in which American authorities
learned about those conferences affords additional evidence that they carried no
subversive significance raises the question in my mind of how many other
conferences Oswald and his wife may have had of which the Commission has no
knowledge. That is a question that can never be satisfactorily dealt with. It is
certainly raised, however, by the sentence just referred to which perhaps should
be rewritten to avoid raising that question. Perhaps the Commission should face
the proposition that it cannot really determine what the Oswalds did in the
Soviet Union. Then, in the absence of any other evidence of a conspiracy
involving the U.S.S.R. or Marina Oswald, the Commission has concluded that there
were no such conferences and if there were they were not related in any way to
the greatly subsequent event of the assassination.
35. The fourth sentence following the quote on top of galley 200 is very unclear
and should be rewritten. Furthermore, the footnote with respect to that quote
(No. 288) seems to be in the wrong place.
36. In the section on the Russian-speaking community, a little rewriting could
be done. In addition the second sentence in the second paragraph which says that
Oswald spent a "reasonably pleasant period during his grammar school years in
Ft. Worth" should be changed simply to indicate that he went to gram-mar school
in that city. It is questionable that there is authority to support the
proposition that his stay there was "reasonably pleasant."
37. I do not understand the material set forth following the first sentence of
the second paragraph, particularly the statement that there is no evidence that
he had been in touch with any of his former "acquaintances" when he was in the
Soviet Union. All that material could be stricken and the first sentence of the
second paragraph could become the first sentence of the third paragraph. Another
sentence could be added following that first sentence to indicate that Oswald's
brother and mother lived in the Ft. Worth area. We could then go directly to the
statement that upon his arrival Oswald did not know any memrbers of the
Russian-speaking community.
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38. I do not believe it would be correct to state that it is not surprising that
Oswald initiated contacts with the Russian group "in search of persons with whom
his non-English speaking wife could converse." We have already seen in chapter
VII that Oswald was not concerned about his wife's contacts with others. He
apparently did not wish her to have them. He resented her Russian-speaking
friends. There was testimony that he prevented her from learning English so that
he could continue to practice his own Russian. The most likely reason for
Oswald's contact with the Russian-speaking community was his desire to speak
Russian himself. I do not think the statement here which seems to evidence a
touching concern for his wife is consistent with the picture that has been
painted of Oswald in chapter VII.
39. My recollection of the events by which Paul Gregory came to be tutored in
Russia by Marina Oswald is different from that which is implied by the third
paragraph. They were not consecutive. I believe that Gregory was out of town for
some time during that summer and did not begin the Russian lessons until
sometime after he returned in the fall of the year. The inference to be drawn,
from the present structure of the sentence is that they begin almost at once,
perhaps within a week after the conversation between Max Clark and Oswald. I'm
perhaps within a week after the conversation between Max Clark and Oswald. I'm
quite sure that that is not correct. That inference is supported by the next
sentence which starts "sometime later in August" which clearly indicates that
the Russian tutoring lessons occurred sometime in early August, which I do not
believe to be the case.
40. I think we could do without the detailed descriptions of Bouhe and Meller,
and simply say that the Oswalds went to a dinner party where they met George
Bouhe and Mr. and Mrs. Meller, other members of the Russian community.
41. The sentence at footnote 324 is somewhat misleading in that it implies that
Oswald was looking for work in Dallas all during the time that Marina Oswald
stayed with Elena Hall. That is not correct, since Oswald began work at
Jaggers-Chiles-Storall almost immediately after he moved to Dallas in about the
middle of October whereas it appears that Marina Oswald stayed with Elena Hall
until late October or early November, as it says in the next sentence.
42. Query if it can be stated that "a quarrel" led to the November separation of
the Oswalds, in view of George De Mohrenschildt's testimony about how he went
and took Marina away. It would be simpler to state that the Oswalds were
separated again in early November, 1962 during which time Marina Oswald spent
approximately 2 weeks with Anna Meller and Mrs. Ford.
43. I would not be prepared to state that the severing of the relationship
between the Oswalds and members of the Russian-speaking community was caused
primarily "by personal animosity engendered by Oswald." I think it can be just
as clearly said that the animosity was "engendered" by George Bouhe and other
people who tried to take Marina Oswald away from her husband and who thrust
their "help" on Oswald when he had clearly indicated that he did' not want it.
This subject is actually more appropriate for treatment in chapter VII where it
has in fact been treated. It would be sufficient to say that relationships
between the Oswalds and other members of the Russian-speaking community were
terminated for personal reasons and let it go at that.
44. At the bottom of the paragraph that ends with footnote 327, Marina Oswald is
referred to by her first name and Mrs. Ford's first name is incorrectly used, it
is not "Kairina" but it is Katherine or "Kstya." Also the stars should be taken
out of footnote 327 in accordance with policy not to use them in material quoted
in the text itself. The next paragraph that ends with footnote 327 may be
reduced to one sentence which would state that far all practical purposes there
was no further contact between the Oswalds and the Russian community following
Oswald's departure for New Orleans in the spring of 1963. The material that is
now set forth is repetitive of material in chapter VII and greatly repetitive of
material in the appendix. It is not necessary for the support of the conclusions
of the conspiracy chapter.
45. The last full paragraph on galley 227 now starts to repeat materials that
have been set forth in the first paragraph of that section. It has already been
stated that Oswald came to Fort Worth on his return from Russia for reasons that
had nothing to do with the presence of the Russian community in that city and
there is no reason is repeat it now. Additionally, Marina Oswald is again
retorted to by her first name as she is also at footnote 337.
46. The whole section of the Russian-speaking community could be tightened very
much and should be severely edited and rewritten. The accuracy and precision of
the statements set forth should also be improved considerably.
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47. Marina Oswald is again referred to by her first name only at footnote 341
and at several other places throughout the discussion that follows.
48. Query whether we have evidence to support the proposition that "particularly
Marina" visited the de Mohrenschildts. I am not aware of the fact that Marina
Oswald visited them on any great number of occasions without her husband being
present.
49. After reading the remaining section on de Mohrenschildt I am constrained to
remark that it really is essential that this material be substantially shortened
and cleared up in every sense. It is very bad as it now stands and there is
really no reason for all this to be in the text.
50. The first sentence in the second full paragraph states that the opening of
the closet door "inadvertently" exposed Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. Point
1: There is no footnote at the end of the sentence. Point 2: I do not know what
evidence there is that the exposure of the rifle was inadvertent. Point 3: I do
not know what evidence there is that that which was exposed, inadvertently or
otherwise, was Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
51. The two paragraphs dealing with the rifle episode do not indicate the
conflict in the testimony as to when the remark was made. My recollection is
that someone testified that de Mohrenschildt made the remark as soon as he
walked in the door. That does not appear in the discussion presently in the
galley.
52. The paragraph which includes footnotes 391 and 392 is unnecessary. It is
personally offensive to de Mohrenschildt. I do not think it is at all necessary
to establishing the fact that de Mohrenschildt was not involved with the
assassination, to describe him as "immature" and an "admirer of the opposite
"eccentric" or anything else.
I think the discussion of de Mohrenschildt and also of Paine should be rewritten
and substantially shortened if not altogether deleted from chapter VI. I am
unable to understand why such extensive time and space is devoted to de
Mohrenschildt and Paine when Marina Oswald herself the most obvious place to
look for possible co-conspirator, is not discussed at all.
53. I'm not setting forth comments on the Paine material in the hope that will
be substantially rewritten or deleted from chapter VI. I cannot resist; however,
noting the paragraph which includes footnotes 431-433. I am particularly struck
by the sentence that "Oswald obtained a room in Dallas, where he found
employment, but spent weekends with his family at the Paine home." I will always
have visions of Oswald and the other TSBD employees packing their books in that
long, narrow room at 1926 North Beckley. More seriously, however, the last
sentence of the paragraph includes the statement "by the time the agents again
came to Mrs. Paine's home." That clearly implies that there was more than one
agent present at both interviews. My recollection is that Hasty was by himself
on one of the occasions.
54. So far I have not found anything in chapter VI concerning William Kirk
Coleman's story of two men who drove out of the area behind Walter's house
immediately after the shot was fired at the general.
55. I have given all of my galleys to Stuart Pollack together with copies of
this and other memoranda which I have given to you on chapter VI.
JFK EXHIBIT No. 41
[Memorandum]
To: Howard P. Willens. SEPTEMBER 16, 1964.
From: Wesley J. Liebeler.
Subject: Chapter VI.
The following comments relate to the discussion of Oswald's political activities
upon his return to the United States which starts at about the middle of galley
230.
1. In the first paragraph of the discussion of the Communist Party, ,et cetera,
the T on the word "the" in The Worker should be capitalized.
2. The term "as a matter of course" at footnote 505 implies the existence of
evidence beyond that which exists in the record. In order to support that we
would have to have evidence as to what the ordinary course of action would
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be on the part of the Communist Party in response to a letter such as that sent
Oswald. Since we do not have that evidence I do not see how we can say that
their response was "as a matter of course".
3. The same point might be made about the statement in the next paragraph that
the organization was not especially responsive. In order to state that we would
have to know how responsive they generally were in other situations. Since we do
not, I do not see how we can make the statement.
In the sentence following footnote 510 it would be better to say that Johnson
testified that he did not receive the letter until after the assassination,
instead of making the flat statement, since the only evidence we have on that
question is Johnson's testimony. This same point was raised in a discussion
concerning chapter VII with Mr. Rankin and Mr. Redlich and it was agreed by all
that the qualified statement would be preferable.
5. The next sentence says that Oswald wrote the Communist Party and the Hall
Davis Defense Committee enclosing samples of his photographic work. He did write
the Hall Davis Defense Committee but I believe the other letter enclosing
samples of his photographic work was to The Worker and not to the Communist
Party, although my recollection is not precise on that point.
6. The first sentence in the last paragraph on galley 230 should be qualified by
stating "Johnson testified that the files of the Communist Party * * *" Once
again Johnson's testimony is the only evidence we have and the qualified
statement would be preferable.
7. The sentence preceding the sentence covered by footnote 518 should have
footnote. In any event the nature of the evidence indicating that the files of
the Young Socialist Alliance contain no reference to Oswald should be indicated.
If it is somebody's testimony we should state that so-and-so testified that the
files contained no such reference.
8. The Militant should have an initial capital T on the article in its name.
9. The sentence following footnote 523 says that the Commission has questioned
persons who knew Oswald during every phase of his adult life and that one of
them gave any indication that Oswald maintained a surreptitious relationship
with any organization. There is no footnote in support of that sentence and the
next sentence goes on to an entirely different subject. Obviously a footnote is
needed.
10. The last sentence in the discussion of Communist Party, et cetera,
activities says that there is no reason to believe that any material has been
withheld by any of the organizations under discussion. I would omit that last
clause ending the last sentence as follows: "The material that has been
disclosed is in all cases consistent with other data in the possession of the
Commission." There is no reason for the Commission to go on and make a statement
that could very well arouse political controversy, especially when it does not
contribute in any material way to the discussion.
11. The first sentence in the discussion on Fair Play for Cuba Committee
indicates that Oswald "purportedly" acted on behalf of the FPCC. I do not know
that qualification should be stated. He obviously acted on behalf of FPCC in the
sense that he was encouraged by the national organization in many of the
activities in which he engaged.
12. The sentence preceding footnote 527 should be omitted since it simply does
not seem to fit here.
13. The sentence preceding 529 is incorrect since Oswald did not ask the
national organization for the circulars as described nor did he distribute them
on at least three occasions. He had his "Hands off Cuba" materials printed in
New Orleans at his own expense.
14. I would say that the FPCC chapter in New Orleans appeared to have been
entirely fictitious.
15. The sentence following footnote 533 states when the national office learned
of Oswald's unauthorized activities, it terminated its correspondence with him."
Technically they terminated correspondence with him with their last letter, at
which time they did not know of his "unauthorized activities." In any event the
sentence implies a causal connection between the two events which cannot under
any circumstances be justified by the testimony presently in the record. The
most that can be said is that V.T. Lee later testified that he was disappointed
with Oswald, even though there is really no reason I see why he should have been
at that time and that Lee did not write any letters after a certain date. I know
of no way in which a causal connection may be established between
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those propositions. In any event a footnote for the sentence or the thoughts
expressed differently is necessary.
16. The reference to chapter VII in parentheses following footnote 534 should be
moved up to the preceding sentence which should read "in fact these letters
which are discussed in greater detail in chapter VII, contained * * *."
17. At the very bottom of galley 231 a footnote is needed for a reference to Mr.
Steele's testimony that he never saw Oswald before and never saw him again after
the distribution of FPCC leaflets on August 16, 1963.
18. I would add language at the top of galley 932 to indicate that a search had
been made for the individual who helped Oswald and Steele distribute literature
but that he has not yet been found. A parenthetical expression preceding the
word "but" at the top of that page as follows would be appropriate: "in spite an
extensive search for him,".
19. While the discussion of groups hostile to President Kennedy is generally,
well written, it is too long and contains material that has not the slightest
conceivable relevance to the possible existence of a conspiracy to assassinate
the President or to any other possible issue in this investigation. In addition,
I suggest that the quote from Oswald's undated letter of November 1963 to the
Communist Party be omitted, as it is set forth in chapter VII. If it is left in
the two quotes should be made identical in form, which they are not now.
20. Some footnotes are needed in the second paragraph following the quote.
Mr. CORNWELL. Again, Mr. Liebeler, what we have now admitted into the record is
a rather voluminous quantity of additional comments concerning the galley proofs
and the nature of the final report. What, if anything, was done with your
comments in all of these memos?
Mr. LIEBELER. I am not able to answer that question from my own recollection. I
have not gone through all of the memos to see which of the suggestions were
adopted and which were not. But I have done that with respect to two of them.
Exhibit 39 and exhibit 38, I find that for the most part the recommendations
made in these memos are reflected in the final report.
Mr. CORNWELL. Which two memos again were those?
Mr. LIEBELER. Exhibits 38 and 39.
Mr. CORNWELL. Again did the implementation of your suggestions in those cases
require lengthy discussions or were they inaccurate based on the memorandum
itself?
Mr. LIEBELER. Since I don't have any recollection of them I assume they were
adopted without any difficulty. I don't have any recollection that there was any
difficulty with any of these suggestions
Mr. CORNWELL. You implied earlier by your analogy, to UCLA and USC that you lost
more of those suggestions than were adopted, that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. I only said that about that conference in Mr. Rankin's office with
Mr. Redlich and Mr. Willens on chapter IV.
Mr. CORNWELL. Does that analogy apply to the rest of the memos?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't think so. I have not had time to go through these other
memos and see whether the changes were reflected in the report or not. I have no
recollection whether they were or not, but that can easily be done if somebody
wants to do it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let me ask you this. What if any motive was there: for the general
tone of the galley proofs that you found repeated fault, with in these memos?
Why was it written the way it was? Was it simply inadvertence. Was it pressure
in an attempt to get the report together under a too restrictive deadline, or
was there some other reason, the kinds of problems you found?
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Mr. LIEBELER. I think there are different reasons in different cases. I have the
impression from looking at these memos that the problem that I am addressing
here in chapter VI and chapter VII are a little different than the problems I
addressed in exhibit 36 which related to chapter IV. It appears to me that the
kinds of problems raised in exhibits 37 through 41, I, believe are more of the
kinds of problems that will just come up on reviewing a draft or a set of
galleys that will just creep into the work for the most part, whereas chapter IV
was a little different question. I did say I thought there was overwriting to a
great extent.
Mr. CORNWELL. The overwriting concept, of overstating the degree proof, was one
of the problems discussed with respect to chapter IV, is that correct?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let us look at the September 14 memo which I believe is exhibit
37. On page 9 do you not state that:
We cannot say that all of Oswald's transactions in connection with firearms were
undertaken under an assumed name, only his known transactions.
b. I think the degree of doubt about the authenticity of the repair tag is
overstated.
d. The third sentence should also be qualified. The underlying report is not
that strong.
e. The last sentence in that paragraph is not supported by the TV films we got
from CBS.
On the next page 3, under item 10, b., "The title and the introduction are
inappropriate because they strongly suggest that Oswald was an anti-Castro."
On page 4 under "Odio," item e., "The paragraph on bus transportation starting
'There is no firm evidence' should be completely rewritten. I do not think there
is 'convincing evidence.'"
On page 5, "The McFarland item is given too much weight."
Down there further, under paragraph f., "The point can be made without saying
that and to seem to rely on really weak evidence is to invite trouble."
Item J. "The conclusion that the evidence is persuasive that Oswald was not in
Dallas on September 95 is too strong."
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes; all these things are here, that is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. The same kind of comments in chapter VI then that we found in
chapter IV?
Mr. LIEBELER. There are some of them in here. This memo has many of them in
here. My impression as I said before is I still have that impression that there
was not the severe problem in these other chapters that there was in chapter IV.
Obviously, that problem I thought was there in all of them, and I raised these
questions about it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you receive any impression that the reason for writing the
report, as you found it, overly strong, and of course in context that means I
guess that the sole assassin in theory was stronger, the lack of a conspiracy
may have been overstated? In that sense was it prompted by any consideration of
the national or possible international repercussions of this report?
Mr. LIEBELER. I have no way of knowing that or answering that question. I think
that the kind of thing that we observe here as much as anything else reflects a
basic difference in judgment between some
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the other people on the staff who drafted these portions of the report about
which I am commenting and myself. In some cases l think that the memos indicate
that simply mistakes were made and that they should be corrected and I assumed
that they were. I am almost certain that they were.
But that could be probed by looking at the report. I don't think there is any
"explanation" for it other than the difference in attitude and approach between
different people.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we mark for identification as exhibit 42, Mr. Chairman, a memo
dated September 16 from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Rankin, subject matter: "Quote from
New Orleans Times-Picayune September 19, 1963 concerning Fidel Castro's speech."
Mr. PREYER. That may be marked for identification only.
Mr. CORNWELL. Have you had a chance to review that memo prior to coming here?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that that is one additional memo
concerning the same general subject matter of what should and should not be
included in the final report?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. May we admit that document into the record?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, it is admitted into the record.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 42 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 42
[Memorandum]
SEPTEMBER 16, 1964.
To: Mr. Rankin.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
Re: Quote from New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 19, 1963, concerning
Fidel Castro's speech.
We previously discussed the possible inclusion in chapter VII of the quote from
the New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 19, 1963, concerning Fidel Castro to
the effect that U.S. leaders would not be safe themselves if U.S. promoted
attack on Cuba continued. You and Mr. Redrich took the position that we could
not include the quote unless there was some evidence that Oswald had actually
read that particular newspaper. I stated that the material was relevant and the
possibility that Oswald had read it, should be discussed. I was not, however, at
that time able to indicate any other situation in which materials had been
discussed on the possibility that Oswald had read it, in the absence of any
specific proof that he had.
I now note, however, in reviewing the galleys of chapter Vl that an extensive
discussion of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for
Treason" handbill are included. The following statement appears in connection:
"There is no evidence that he [Oswald] became aware of either the 'Welcome Mr.
Kennedy' advertisement or the 'Wanted for Treason' handbill, though neither
possibility can be precluded."
Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious
political overtones. The discussion set forth in chapter Vl concerning the
"Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have
similar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout
this investigation is that the groups on both ends of the political spectrum
must treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general, even though
have disagreed at times on specific applications of it.
It appears clear to me, however, that if we are precluded from including the
quote from the New Orleans newspaper concerning Castro's speech on the grounds
that we have no evidence that Oswald actually read it, even though we do know
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he read a great deal, the same must be true of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy"
advertisement and the "Wanted four Treason" handbill. The discussion in chapteer
Vl actually admits that the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement in the November
22, 1963, Dallas Morning News probably did not come to Oswald's attention. Under
those circumstances, it would seem to me that fairness indicates either the
deletion of the discussion of the advertisement and the handbill that is now set
forth in chapter VI or the inclusion of the Castro statement in chapter VII.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state, Mr. Liebeler, that on the first page of
that document you outline to Mr. Rankin two different types of newspaper or
articles, one of which would reflect a possible threat against the President by
Mr. Castro, and another set of articles which would indicate possible threats by
rightwing groups in the United States?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would it be fair to state that on page 2 you go on to state that:
Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious
political overtones. The discussion set forth in chapter VI concerning the
"Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have
similar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout
this investigation is that the groups on both sides of the political spectrum
must be treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general although
we have disagreed at times on the specific application of it.
In other words, would it be fair to state that in substance you found an example
where the report was to allow the inclusion of evidence if it reflected a
possible right wing conspiracy, but it would be. more sensitive to the problem
if you included evidence concerning possible Castro conspiracy?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes; I think that is a correct statement, and I am prepared to
offer, if you wish it, an explanation as to why that sort of thing occurred.
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LIEBELER. I have the very definite impression that the Chief Justice was
extremely sensitive about some of the things people in Texas and in Dallas
particularly had said about him. There was considerable discussion about putting
anything in the report or conducting any kind of investigation into the
newspaper ads that had been taken in Dallas prior to the time that President
Kennedy went to Dallas and about some handbills that had been distributed down
there.
I took the position that there was no conceivable relevance between that
activity and President Kennedy's assassination. As this memo reflects, one of
the legal formulations of that issue became a part of the question of whether
there was any evidence to suggest that Oswald had ever seen these newspaper
stories or knew about the handbill, and if he had not, of course, there would
not be any foundation at all for saying anything about it. This memo is an
attempt to quite frankly either get the rightwing stuff out or put the Castro
stuff in but not put the rightwing stuff in and keep the Castro stuff out.
In fact, this particular article from the Tirnes-Picayune I do not believe was
discussed in the report, but I may be wrong about that. I have not been able to
find any reference to it. There is a considerable discussion, however, on pages
414 and 415 of the report about
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the possibility that Oswald was motivated by sympathy for the Castro regime and
other Communist materials that he read and was familiar with, so that that
question was discussed in the report even though the specific article was not.
The other material about these rightwing people was also included in the report.
Both of them went in although not the specific Castro thing as near as I can
tell. The reference to the New Orleans article was not included in the report.
Mr. CORNWELL. I wonder if part of your last answer inferred a particularly close
relationship between Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin on the one hand and Chief
Justice Earl Warren on the other. In other words, you seem to be suggest that
Earl Warren's feeling about the rightwing attitude in Texas may have had an
effect upon the decision or at least the preliminary decision to include the
rightwing articles and omit the Castro articles.
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't have the impression that it had anything to do with
omitting the Castro article. I have the rather clear impression that the Chief
Justice requested that the investigation into the rightwing activities be
conducted. I know that for a fact because they asked me to do it. I didn't do
it. I wouldn't do it.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you believe based on your experiences there that this type of
selection process, and the process by which many of the points of evidence were
overstated, was the result of Rankin's and Redlich's views of what Earl Warren
wanted? Did this last exhibit represent a typical occurrence or an isolated
occurrence?
Mr. LIEBELER. It wasn't the only time the question came up. That is certainly
true. It seems to me there are two questions here though. This business of
overwriting, as I characterized it, I don't have any reason to believe that that
had any relationship to the Chief Justice's views on any of the issues. I didn't
have any reason to believe that. I have no knowledge that would lead me to
believe that. Mr. Redlich and I have quite profoundly different views of the
world on political questions, and that led to disagreements over this matter on
several occasions.
Mr. CORNWELL. I am sorry I don't have it here to show you, but I would like to
read for you what our research department says is the contents of a memorandum
they have reviewed in the L.B.J. Library in Austin. Tex. The memo purports to
reflect J. Edgar Hoover's statements to White House aide Walter Jenkins on
November 24, 1963. It states Mr. Hoover's apparent thinking.
The thing I am most concerned about and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having
something issued so that we can convince the public that Oswald is the real
assassin. Mr. Katzenbach thinks that the President might appoint a presidential
Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I countered
with the suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney General
with pictures, laboratory work, et cetera, and the Attorney General can make the
report to the President and the President can decide whether to make it public.
I felt this was better because there are several aspects which would complicate
our foreign relations if we followed the Presidential Commission route.
Were you aware of any belief at the level of the FBI, the head of the FBI, the
Justice Department, the White House, perhaps Earl Warren, during the operation
of the Warren Commission that the public needed to be convinced that Oswald was
the real assassin and
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that there were sensitive areas that had to be avoided in connection with
foreign relations?
Mr. LIEBELER. No. I did not get that impression. I don't think anybody on the
staff of the Commission thought it was their job to convince anybody that Oswald
was the assassin. I think they felt their job was to find out who was the
assassin. For better or worse we came to the conclusion, which I felt was
correct, that Oswald was the assassin and that is what the report said. I don't
have the feeling that there was ever any constraint placed on any investigation
that I was involved in or anyone else that I know of on the Commission staff,
either for reasons of the kind to which you now allude or for any other reason
that didn't make sense in the context of the development of the work of the
Commission.
I want to put that exception in because there were persons who felt that Griffin
was spending too much time trying to find out how Jack Ruby got in the basement
and things like that. On this other issue there was no such thing involved.
Mr. CORNWELL. In other words, your answer, as I understood it, is that you
observed no restrictions upon your investigation or that of your fellow staff
attorneys which you then or now would construe as being the product of this type
of attitude?
Mr. LIEBELER. That is correct.
Mr. CORNWELL. Let me ask you, however, whether or not in your view it would have
been possible for the facts to have been supplied to the Warren Commission by
the investigative agencies in a manner to accomplish this type of constraint?
Could they have tailored what they provided you in your view to accomplish that?
Mr. LIEBELER. In my view that could have been done by the Central Intelligence
Agency. I do not believe that could have been done by the FBI.
Mr. CORNWELL. On what basis do you make the distinction?
Mr. LIEBELER. The FBI provided us with a piece of information and interview, the
FBI reports. Those witnesses, those persons who were interviewed by the FBI were
available to us. We took their depositions ourselves. The work the FBI did on
the physical evidence, the ballistics work, the fingerprint work, the fair and
fibers work, that sort of thing, in many, if not in all cases, were checked by
independent criminal laboratories. We did not rely solely on the statement of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in that regard.
I do not believe because of those considerations that the Bureau could have
essentially done that. It is true that apparently there were things that some
people in the Bureau knew that they did not tell us but don't think that any of
those things had anything to do with the basic facts of the assassination.
As to the CIA, however, it is much more difficult. It was much more difficult
for us to verify statements received from them. So, I think as result of those
factors it might have been possible in the case of the CIA. I want to emphasize,
however, that I do not believe that was the case. But I think it might have been
possible. I think the basic problem, the basic area where it could have been a
possibility is that if the-- we were faced with a number of leads that led to
various kinds of Cuban individuals and Cuban groups that Oswald was claimed to
have
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associated with or been seen with. The Odio thing and a series of contacts in
New Orleans, several in New Orleans.
In those cases it was very difficult or impossible to follow them down in the
sense you could say absolutely with a high degree of certainty that there was
nothing to them. It is possible I suppose that the CIA may have had information
in its files reflecting its own activity and concerns with Cuba that, if
provided to us, might have helped us keep up with some of these other things
that we were pursuing on our own and with the help of the FBI. As I say, I have
no reason to believe that is the case.
Mr. CORNWELL. Would that attitude, which would appear on the face of that one
memorandum which I just read, have been consistent with what you observed to
have happened during the rewrite process?
Mr. LIEBELER. Are we referring to exhibit 42?
Mr. CORNWELL. No. I am referring to the memorandum I read you a moment ago
concerning what appears to have been Mr. Hoover's feeling that they needed to
convince the American public that Oswald was the assassin and to avoid several
aspects which might complicate foreign relations. Was that consistent with what
was happening in the rewrite process?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't know. Once you conclude on the basis of the evidence we
had that Oswald was the assassin, for example, taking that issue first, then
obviously it is in the interest of the Commission, and I presume everyone else,
to express that conclusion in a straightforward and convincing way. Now the
question, I think, that perhaps Mr. Redlich and I differed on from time to time
was what was the most convincing way? Do you write the thing in a conclusionary
sense or do you say: Well, here are the problems. And after looking at all this
evidence and taking account of the conflicting evidence and differences, the
Commission has concluded that this is the result.
If you were just going to publish the report ired get rid of all the other
evidence obviously you can state it in any kind of conclusionary fashion you
want. But If you know that people are going to be looking at this work for years
and years to come, as it has turned out they are, then it seemed to me the most
convincing way to do it was to lay everything right out there and say, "Here are
the problems, you don't have to look for them, the Commission looked at them and
after considering them this is the conclusion we came to."
Mr. CORNWELL. One final exhibit, Mr. Chairman. May I have marked for
identification a document or a memorandum dated April 15, 1964, from Mr.
Goldberg to Mr. Rankin as exhibit 43?
Mr. PREYER. It may be marked as exhibit 43 for identification purposes.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you have a chance to review that document prior to coming
here?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. CORNWELL. Is it fair to say that the subject of that memo concerns a
possible request from all the members of the staff for a historical memorandum
outlining the nature of their work, the major problems they encountered, and
soliciting their evaluation of the work of the Commission from various
standpoints?
Mr. LIEBELER. That is what it says.
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Mr. CORNWELL. May we admit that for the record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, it is admitted into evidence.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 43 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 43
APRIL 15, 1964.
Memorandum for: Mr. J. Lee Rankin.
From: Mr. Alfred Goldberg.
Subject: Historical memoranda by staff members.
Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, I suggest that the members of the
Commission staff be asked to prepare, prior to their departure from here, an
account of their experiences with the Commission. Attached is a suggested draft
of a memorandum to the staff.
April 15, 1964.
Memorandum to: All members of the staff.
From: J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel.
Subject: Historical memoranda by staff members.
It is more than likely that this Commission will be the subject of future
historical, legal, and political studies. We have an opportunity, and also an
obligation, to help create as complete a record as possible of the work of the
Commission. At some time, shortly before your departure from here, will you
please prepare an account of your contribution to the work of the Commission. It
would be helpful if you would also analyze and evaluate the work of the staff
and the Commission in general. Please be as specific and comprehensive as
possible. You may find the check list below of some assistance in preparing your
memoranda.
1. How did you become associated with the Commission?
2. How were your functions and area of activity decided?
3. What actions did you take to carry out your assignment?
4. What were the major problems you encountered in carrying out your assignment?
5. What is your evaluation of the work of the Commission from the following
standpoints?
a. Organization;
b. Administration;
c. Planning of work;
d. Policies;
e. Investigative support;
f. Hearings and depositions;
g. Organization and preparation of reports;
h. Validity of findings.
Mr. CORNWELL. Prior to the time that I showed you that document in anticipation
of your testimony here had you seen it?
Mr. LIEBELER. Not to my recollection.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was it to your knowledge, circulated among the staff and were
those requests ever made?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't believe so. I don't believe they were ever made.
Mr. CORNWELL. Did you ever write any memorandum of that nature, in other words,
a memorandum giving your views on those subject matters?
Mr. LIEBELER. Not directly.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you have any information which could give us an insight into
why that memorandum was never distributed among the staff, if it was not?
Mr. LIEBELER. Well, I think if I had been in Mr. Rankin's position I would
probably not have sent it out either.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have no further questions.
Mr. PREYER. Are there questions by members? Mr. Fauntroy.
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Mr. FAUNTROY. Not at this time.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. No questions.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. I have just two questions really. You stated in regard to the rifle,
the palm print, and I think on the boxes as well you had a bit of disagreement
over whether or not those prints ought to be--was it verified or checked out? I
wasn't sure what you meant. They had actually been run already once. There was
some question of the absorption because of the wood. Had there already been a
test on them?
Mr. LIEBELER. If I may, I will explain exactly what happened in both of those
cases, it won't take very long.
I think particularly the point on the rifle barrel may be worthwhile. The Dallas
Police Department had gotten to the rifle. Very shortly thereafter they sent it
to the FBI for fingerprint analysis. The FBI reported there were no prints on
the rifle. Four days later the Dallas Police Department forwarded to the FBI a
lift of a palm print that they said had been taken from the underside of the
rifle barrel. When they were asked, as they were, why they had waited 4 days to
send this lift to the FBI or had not told the FBI that they had made this lift
from the rifle, their reply was that even though the print had been lifted, that
that lift had not removed the latent print from the underside of the rifle
barrel and it was still there.
Well, the problem was that the FBI never found it there. It occurred to us that
it was possible that in fact the palm print never came from the rifle. We only
had the say-so of the Dallas Police Department to that effect and we weren't
satisfied with that. We wanted the FBI to establish, if they could, whether that
palm print in fact came from that rifle or not. At the time this question was
raised no attempt whatever had been made to deal with that problem. Now after
the discussion that Mr. Willens and Redlich and I had that was referred to in
the testimony Mr. Rankin invited to his office the chief FBI fingerprint expert,
Inspector Mally of the FBI, who was liaison with the Commission and I think Mr.
Slawson and Mr. Griffin and Mr. Willens and Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin met with
them. I suggested to Mr. Latona, their fingerprint expert, that there might be
some distortion in the lift because it had been taken from a cylindrical
surface, sort of a Mercator projection is here, put your hand on a light bulb
and take the lift and lay it flat, it might distort the lift from what it might
have been on the surface.
Latona went back and looked at the lift. He found that there were indications in
the lift itself of pits and scores and marks and rust spots that had been on the
surface from which the print had been lifted, and happily they conformed
precisely to a portion of the underside of the rifle barrel and the FBI so
reported to us. As far as I was concerned that conclusively established the
proposition that, that that had come from that rifle.
Mr. DODD. To your knowledge why would not the FBI have been able to detect it?
Mr. LIEBELER. I have no explanation of that.
Mr. DODD. There have been all sorts of allegations about the numbers of various
weapons kicking around. I don't know, this has been one of
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the pieces of evidence they have used to corroborate the critics that allege---
Mr. LIEBELER. Not any more. There is nothing you can say about it. It clearly
came from that rifle.
Mr. DODD. Why did Mr. Rankin object so strongly to going through that fairly
simple process to make that determination? Did he ever give an explanation why?
Mr. LIEBELER. It wasn't clear that it was going to be that simple when we
started out. That was an idea that sort of occurred to us as we went along. Our
first approach was to think of how we could question the Dallas Police
Department about what happened, why they had not forwarded the print with the
rifle. This being late in the day, whenever it was, late August or September,
Mr. Rankin was not terribly enthusiastic about having a couple of Commission
lawyers go down to Dallas and start questioning the Dallas Police Department
quite frankly cause it would have raised all kinds of questions at that time as
to what in the hell was going on, what are we doing going down and taking
depositions from the Dallas Police Department months after the report was
supposed to be out?
I had some sympathy with that view and halfway thought we would have pushed
that, we would have done that had it not been for the Bureu's ability to deal
with that problem in another way and much more effective way.
Now on the cartons the problem there was that Oswald's prints had been
identified on those cartons, they were cartons containing books that were in the
corner of the window from which the shot had been fired and there were, I don't
know, 20 or 25 or 28 other prints on the cartons that had never been identified.
No serious attempt in my mind had ever been made to identify them. I first was
troubled by the fact that at one point the draft of the report said that the
Commission great weight on the fact that Oswald's prints were on those cartons.
I had some difficulty with that proposition in view of the fact that we had not
identified these other prints and really had not made any attempt to do so.
Mr. DODD. What eventually happened to that?
Mr. LIEBELER. What eventually happened was at that same conference--I was given
the gift of tongues or something. As I walked out of the conference I heard
someone say to Inspector Mally, "By the way, Inspector Mally, you might consider
the possibility that those prints were put on those boxes by FBI agents." I
looked around the room to see who had the temerity to suggest that and I found I
said it myself. Unconsciously, I didn't realize I was saying that. Inspector
Mally did consider that possibility and it turned out to be correct.
Mr. DODD. All those prints did come from the FBI people?
Mr. LIEBELER. They came from an FBI clerk in the Dallas office and from a
detective in the Dallas Police Department except for one print that was never
identified.
Mr. DODD. Also the palm prints on the gun that was FBI?
Mr. LIEBELER. That was Oswald's, yes.
Mr. DODD. I did want to ask you why you thought Gerald Ford was the best
Commission member but I thought that was irrelevant.
Mr. McKINNEY. It is irrelevant now.
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Mr. PREYER. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Just a question I have asked everybody appearing before the
committee. It concerns the lack of communication between the CIA and the FBI
over Oswald, the fact Oswald was a known defector from the United States. The
CIA's debacle of the Bay of Pigs which we discussed with Mr. Slawson, none of
our agencies at that particular time were in very good repute. There was a
question as to our intelligence gathering ability after the Bay of Pigs and
after the Cuban missile crisis and one thing or another.
The FBI had problems. Do you feel as a junior counsel on this a little nervous
about the fact that you had to depend, for all your information to essentially
come from governmental agencies that had somewhat clearly goofed at least as far
as keeping each other apprised of what Lee Harvey Oswald was at?
Mr. LIEBELER. I never had the feeling that we relied on Government agencies for
our information. When we started we started with a bunch of FBI files, but we
reviewed those so that we could conduct our own investigation. We did take the
testimony of many, many witnesses. We had the reports of the examination of the
physical evidence verified by outside sources, we did not rely on the FBI. So as
to the basic facts of what happened in Dallas on that day not only did we not
rely on the FBI work but the fact is that the Commission came to assume somewhat
different conclusions than the FBI came to.
There was a preliminary FBI report that solved the problem as to what happened.
Our conclusions were somewhat different from that. I don't think we relied on
the FBI to the extent that people think we did.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you feel there was not enough time?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, to write the report. What we had planned to do originally-Mr.
Rankin spoke to me about this in June or July--was that after the report was
drafted, put into the condition it was eventually released in, he wanted two or
three people and I was quite flattered by the fact that he asked me to be one of
them to stay on and rewrite the whole report and polish it up. We simply never
had time to do that. I was unhappy about that.
In terms of the investigation with the one exception that I mentioned I did not
think that time was a particular problem.
Mr. PREYER. I have a couple of questions. One of the most troubling incidents is
the Sylvia Odio incident where apparently there was so much unanimous agreement
that she is a credible witness. Yet, some of her testimony seems rather
improbable, measured against some of the other known facts. Do you have any
suggestion, calling on your gift of tongues, that would give us any thoughts on
how we might corroborate her testimony or challenge it? I assume one thing, if
we could find out whether Oswald
was in Dallas on that date it would be an important fact. But do you have any
thoughts on how, if you had the time now and an opportunity--you mentioned you
did not think you had gotten at the bottom of that--what would you do now to try
to get to the bottom of it . What could we do?
Mr. LIEBELER. The first thing I would do is review the FBI on that question that
I understand came into existence subsequent to the publication of the report and
then I think I would want to find out, if I knew how to do it, whether the CIA
has any information or had any information
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about any of the people who were involved in that sequence of events. I don't
believe that the committee will be able to eliminate the possibility that Oswald
was in Dallas at that time any better than we did. We tried to do that. We had
his location pinpointed rather well.
The FBI conducted an extensive investigation quite late in the game to see if
they could produce any additional information about his whereabouts in New
Orleans before he went to Mexico, unsuccessfully. While it would have involved
travel by automobile or by airplane I think he could have been in Dallas at that
time. I personally do not believe he was but he could have been.
Mr. PREYER. Did you ever talk to Ms. Odio personally?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir, I took her testimony.
Mr. PREYER. What is your impression of her credibility after you subjected her
to questioning?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think she believes that Oswald was there. I do not think she
would lie about something like that. But I also have the impression both from my
own observations of the woman and from some knowledge of her background obtained
from the FBI, that I would not regard her as a reliable witness on this
question. I will be happy to discuss that at greater length. The staff I am sure
will follow up on that matter.
She was having certain psychologist and other problems at the time. I just don't
think she accurately reported on what happened.
Mr. PREYER. I might ask one other question in another area. I understand that
several of the Warren Commission members had a long day session with a number of
psychiatrists and psychologists dealing in your area of what were the motives of
Oswald and there has been some criticism that the Warren Commission report
treated that day's findings in a somewhat selective manner. Do you have any
comment about that? Were you at that all-day meeting?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, I was. My understanding and recollection of that was that
that session was sort of a working session and a transcript was made of it and
it was not published in the underlying hearings. I think it is available in the
archives. I have seen a copy of it since then. I know it is available somewhere.
I think that some people st the time thought we were getting a little too far
into this business of trying to psychoanalyze a man who none of us had even
seen. In the 13 years that have passed since that time I think that too now. I
did not think it then but I do now.
Mr. PREYER. There was more question of the weight of the evidence to why you
didn't come down very hard on that.
Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. Unlike some people we are not able to observe
Members of the United States Senate st a distance and characterize the nature of
their psychology.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I have two questions, Mr. Chairman. That is that there has
recently been published a book called "The Making of an Assassin" by Ms.
McMillan, referring to a 13-year-long writing of an account of the man through
interviews with his wife Marina. I have not had an opportunity to read it, only
reviews of the book. It suggests motives that may have emerged from that rather
exclusive interviewing of Mrs. Oswald. Are you familiar st all with that work?
Mr. LIEBELER. No; I haven't seen it. I have not read the reviews of it or
anything.
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Mr. FAUNTROY. My second question is, is it not your testimony that the
reservations that you had about the character of the Commission report, the
language, the writing, additional questions that have been raised since, new
information has come to light since, all these things notwithstanding, you feel
that the Warren Commission was accurate beyond question?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think that the Commission's conclusion as to the identity of the
assassin and as to the facts that occurred in Dallas on that day, that is to say
there was only one person killing the President and it was Oswald and he used
that rifle and so on, are correct beyond any doubt, beyond any plausible doubt.
It is not possible to reach the conclusion that Oswald did not have contacts
with other people, the knowledge of which would be relevant to this matter,
about which the Commission did not learn, and the Commission of course never
stated that there was no conspiracy. It only stated that it had not been able to
develop evidence that suggested the existence of a conspiracy.
I debated this issue with Mark Lane at UCLA and many other critics. I don't have
any reason to doubt the basic conclusions in the report including the conspiracy
question, and even this business of the FBI supposedly destroying a note that
Oswald left at the office and that sort of thing does not cause me to have any
questions about that. To me it is perfectly clear what was going on in the
Bureau at that time.
It was clear to most of us st the time.
Mr. FAUNTROY. So that your view is that he acting alone killed Kennedy?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKINNEY. Was it ever discussed by you or by others that there was a
possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald could have been a CIA agent or informant or
FBI informant?
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes, sir.
Mr. McKINNEY. Did you think it would have been possible for the CIA and the FBI
to keep this information sway from the Commission?
Mr. LIEBELER. No.
Mr. McKINNEY. Why?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think that that is the kind of issue on which it is quite
conceivable that the only persons who would have knowledge of it if that were
true would be Oswald who is dead and a very few, presumably as many as only one,
but very few people within these organizations and I think that it is quite
conceivable that if they wanted to withhold that information they could do so
and we would not have any direct way of finding out. One of the ways that the
Commission did approach that question was to examine Oswald's financial history
and do a financial audit of it which hopefully would have, if there had been
unaccounted revenues that he had spent, that would have lent credibility to the
proposition that he had been in the employ of these agencies on the assumption
that he was not doing it for nothing. The Internal Revenue Service people that
worked for the Commission were able to account for all of the expenditures out
of the income that he received or was known to have received during this period
of time.
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Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional question
Mr. PREYER. Yes.
Mr. CORNWELL. What is your view with respect to the question of whether or not
the withholding by the CIA from the Commission of information concerning the
assassination plots did or did not substantially affect the factfinding process?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't understand the question.
Mr. CORNWELL. Do you think it was significant? Would there have been things that
the Commission would have done had it possessed that information?
Mr. LIEBELER. What information?
Mr. CORNWELL. About the CIA assassination plots against Castro.
Mr. LIEBELER. Fidel Castro?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.
Mr. LIEBELER. I think that if I had known that at the time that would have been
concerned to find out more directly whether the had any information that might
provide the Commission with leads on these other issues that we were looking at
or issues that we never turned up. In my mind the fact, if it is a fact, and I
don't have direct knowledge of that but I take it to be a fact, that the CIA was
trying to arrange the assassination of Mr. Castro at the time, the withholding
of that fact by itself I don't think is particularly significant to anything
that the Commission did.
What I am saying is the fact that the CIA was attempting, if it was, to
assassinate Castro, I don't understand what that has to do with Oswald or the
Warren Commission investigation or anything of that sort. I think that the
question of whether the CIA withheld evidence that would have provided leads to
the Commission that might have connected Oswald to presumably Cuban contacts
that we were not able to connect him with ourselves, that clearly would have
been significant. The fact that the CIA was apparently attempting to assassinate
Castro, might have provided a motive for them to withhold information if indeed
they did, but the fact they were trying to assassinate Castro had nothing to do
with the issue.
It seems to me that relates to the motivation of the CIA in a separate matter.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question? Throughout the course
of your testimony you indicated there were some leads that you would like to
have pursued had you had more time and that there were still some questions,
albeit minor, apparently in your mind about those leads. I wonder if you could
identify for me any outstanding question that you now have that you would like
to have pursued although that pursuit would have led you, as you have conduded,
to the same conclusion which the Commission reached, that Oswald, acting alone,
without conspirators, killed Mr. Kennedy?
Mr. LIEBELER. I think the only question that would satisfy that description is
the one that the chairman has a]ready referred to and that is the Odio incident,
at least from the standpoint of what the Commission staff would have done.
Because on these other questions we did all we could think of to do, to try to
connect these allegations up to Oswald, and were not able to.
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So in terms of the feeling that I had at the time that we didn't have time
enough to follow these leads up that would only have been true with respect to
the Odio incident. Now as far as what this committee might do or would want to
do, I wouldn't think that would be confined simple to the Odio thing. I think if
you obtain materials that we did not get, for example, if that could occur, that
it could be that material in the files could relate to others than Ms. Odio.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER Thank you. We appreciate very much your testimony. You were just
about the last man off the beach here, weren't you Were there three of you left
that mostly did the final writing?
Mr. LIEBELER. I don't know. There were more than that. Mr. Griffin and Mr.
Slawson but Redlich was there almost to the very end and did an enormous amount
of work on the report.
Mr. PREYER. The senior members began to drop off before the end?
Mr. LIEBELER. Many of them did. Mr. Jenner stayed on until the end. Mr. Ball did
a large amount of work. Mr. Hubert also. I understand the fact that many of
those senior members had advised Mr. Rankin that they really couldn't work full
time when they were asked to come to the Commission.
Mr. Adams was the most prominent amongst those.
Mr. PREYER. Your testimony has been very helpful. We appreciate very much your
being here with us.
Mr. LIEBELER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Pursuant to our rules the witness is offered 5 minutes at the
conclusion of the questioning to make any statement that he cares to make about
the case or to amplify any of his remarks in any way. The Chair would like to
offer you your 5 minutes.
Mr. LIEBELER. Unfortunately I am going to accept part of that time.
My testimony and I am sure the testimony of other staff members and the files of
the Commission obviously show the existence of very strongly held views on
various issues and vigorous. exchanges on those views. As I tried to indicate,
however, all of the investigation that I wanted conducted was conducted. Much of
the disagreement was about how the report should be written and, as I have said,
my views on that issue prevailed sometimes and sometimes they did not and that
is exactly what one would expect in that kind of situation.
As to the basic facts of the assassination relating to questions of the
President's wounds, source of the shots and identity of the assassin, the
physical evidence alone shows without doubt that Oswald was the assassin and
that he fired from the sixth floor the school book depository. The Commission
pursued to the extent that it could all plausible leads suggesting the
involvement of persons other than Oswald and it could not establish any facts
that would seriously suggest the existence of a conspiracy to assassinate the
President.
The staff was highly motivated and competent with no inclination or motive not
to pursue the issues to the truth. The work of the staff of the Commission was
not perfect.
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When Compared to the criticisms that have been made of our work or corn. pared
to the product of other human institutions and not to some ideal of perfection,
we might ask ourselves, or you might ask yourselves whether you would have been
likely to have done better at the time and when thought of in that way and when
compared to those standards I think the Commission's work will pass muster very
well.
As I have said, I have never doubted the nature of the conclusions of the report
and I do not doubt them now. In spite of what has happened since the publication
of the report I think that eventually it will stand the test of time. Thank you
very much.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. We appreciate your comments and testimony.
The committee will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m. on
Wednesday, November 16, 1977.]
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Blank Page
Attachment F
Page 263
(283) Attachment F: Executive session testimony of Judge Burt W. Griffin and
Howard P. Willens.
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1977
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 2359, Rayburn
House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman Of the Select Committee on
Assassinations) presiding.
Present: Representative Stokes, Fauntroy, Dodd, and McKinney. Professional staff
members present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel; J. Facter, J. Wolf, K. Klein,
E. Berning, L. Wizelman, D. Hardaway, M. Mars, R. Genzman, A. Hausman, R.
Morrison, D. Kuhn, and J. Hess.
Chairman STOKES. The meeting will come to order.
At this time the Chair will recognize Ms. Elizabeth Berning, clerk of the
committee, to read for the record those members officially designated to be on
the subcommittee today pursuant to committee rule 12.13
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Preyer and Mr. Dodd are regular members. Mr. Stokes will be
substituting for Mr. Sawyer. Mr. McKinney will be substituting for Mr. Thone.
Mr. Fauntroy will be substituting for lirs. Burke.
Chairman STOKES. At this time I will recognize Mr. Fauntroy as chairman of the
subcommittee in the absence of the designated chairman, Mr. Preyer.
Prior to recognizing Mr. Fauntroy for that purpose, we should have a motion that
the subcommittee go into executive session for today's hearing and one
subsequent day of hearing since, on the basis of information obtained by the
committee, the committee believes the evidence or testimony may tend to either
defame or degrade people, and consequently section 2(k) (5) of rule 11 of the
rules of the House and committee rule 3.3(5) require such hearings to be in
executive session.
Mr. McKINNEY. I so move.
Chairman STOKES. It has been properly moved that the committee go into executive
session. The clerk will call the roll.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Stokes.
Chairman STOKES. Aye.
(263)
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Ms. BERNING. Mr. Sawyer. [No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Dodd.
[no response.]
Ms. BERNING. Three "ayes," Mr. Chaiman.
Chairman STOKES. Then at this time the subcommittee is officially in executive
session and members of the public are asked to remove themselves.
The Chair at this time will recognize Mr. Fauntroy for the purpose of acting as
subcommittee chairman.
Mr. FAUNTROY [presiding]. The Chair welcomes as our first witness today Mr. Burt
W. griffin. Mr. Griffin, if you will stand we will swear you at this time.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Judge GRIFFIN. I do.
TESTIMONY OF BURT W. GRIFFIN
Mr. FAUNTROY. I understand, Mr. Griffin, that the committee rules have been
given to you prior to your appearance today.
Judge GRIFFIN. That is correct.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Let me begin by saying that the House Resolution
222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete investigation and
study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President
John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United
States concerning the protection of the President and the investigatory
jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their
provisions and enforcement, and whether there was full disclosure of evidence
and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and
whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or
department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination, and
why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or
department... and to make recommendations to the House... if the select
committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the
enactment of new legislation."
To begin our questioning the Chair will yield now to our Chief Counsel, Mr.
Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Judge Griffin, I would like to extend my thanks to you for coming
today and also the thanks of the staff. It is a pleasure to see you again. We
appreciate your taking time from your very busy trial schedule to come here and
share with us your thoughts and observations.
We would also like to thank you on the record for taking time to talk with Ms.
Jacqueline Hess and myself on November 4 in Cleveland.
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The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Stokes, whom I am sure you know quite
well, also asked me to express to you his regrets. He apparently came a little
earlier and had to leave because of a previous commitment.
Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be appropriate at this point to insert in the
record and also for the benefit of the committee some of the background and
biography material on Judge Griffin.
Judge, I wonder if you would let me read several things for you and indicate
whether they are correct. You were born in Cleveland in 1932, received your B.A.
degree with honors from Amherst College in 1954, your L.L.B. degree from Yale
Law School in 1959 where you were the co-editor of the Law Journal.
In 1959 and 1960 you were a law clerk to Judge George T. Washington of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and from 1960 through 1962 you
were Assistant U.S. Attorney in the northern district of Ohio.
You joined the law firm in Cleveland of McDonald, Hopkins Hardy.
Is that all correct?
Judge GRIFFIN. That is correct.
Mr. BLAKEY. Then in 1964 you were Assistant Counsel to the Warren Commission. Is
that correct?
Judge GRIFFIN. That is correct.
Mr. BLAKEY. After your term of duty with the Warren Commission ended you
returned to be associated with the firm of McDonald, Hopkins & Hardy.
Subsequently you served as the director of the Legal Aid Society in Cleveland
and of the Office of Economic Opportunity legal service program, and finally, on
January 3, 1975, you were appointed judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the
County of Cuyahoga, Cleveland, Ohio.
Judge GRIFFIN. That is correct, except that I was elected.
Mr. BLAKEY. Turning then to your assignment with the Warren Commission in 1964,
would you tell the committee how you were hired?
Judge GRIFFIN. I was first contacted by a man named David Filvaroff, a staff
member of the Justice Department. I believe he worked, but I am not certain, in
the Deputy Attorney General's office. He is a man I had known when I was
practicing law in Cleveland, Ohio. He had been contacted by others in Washington
to suggest names of people who might be appropriate to serve as counsel to the
Commission. He contacted me and asked me if I would be interested in serving. I
told him that I would be.
He suggested I send a resume to J. Lee Rankin with some kind of cover indicating
that I talked with Mr. Vilaroff. I did that. My recollection is at that point I
received a telegram back from Mr. Rankin.
I may have had a brief telephone conversation with him, but I can't be sure
about that. My contacts were primarily with Mr. Filvaroff.
Mr. BLAKEY. What were you told about the goals of the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. I was told that our goal was to attempt to determine what the
facts were behind the assassination of president Kennedy.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any conversations with Chief Justice Warren?
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Judge GRIFFIN. Prior to being hired 9.
Mr. BLAKEY. Yes.
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Rankin?
Judge GRIFFIN. Prior to being hired?
Mr. BLAKEY. Yes.
Judge GRIFFIN. I can't recall whether I had a brief telephone conversation with
him or not. If so, it wasn't a matter of any substance.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Willens?
Judge GRIFFIN. I never met Mr. Willens until I actually joined the staff.
Mr. BLAKEY. After you came on the staff, what were you told about the goals of
the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. I should correct this. I have no recollection of conversation
with Mr. Willens. It is possible I did but I certainly don't remember at this
point.
Mr. BLAKEY. After you came with the Commission what were you told about the goal
of the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. Essentially what I have just said. I was assigned a particular
area to investigate.
Mr. BLAKEY. Who specifically talked with you? Do you recall any conversations
with the Chief Justice?
Judge GRIFFIN. Not at the outset. I have really no distinct recollection of the
particular individual I talked with. I have a general recollection at the time I
arrived I simply met Rankin, and having had the bulk of my conversations with
Howard Willens. I really can't be at all accurate about that.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did the Chief Justice actually express to you or the other members
of the staff as far as you know what he wanted the Commission to do?
Judge GRIFFIN. We had a staff meeting at some point relatively early in our
work. It wasn't in the sense of a formal opening session at which the Chief
Justice appeared and said, "Here is your mission." My recollection is that we
appeared and we, the staff members, began working at different times, and we
were given instructions through Howard Willens and perhaps directly from Lee
Rankin, I don't recall. We were into our work by the time we first met the Chief
Justice. But we did at one point, it is my recollection, have a staff meeting at
which the Chief Justice made an appearance. My most vivid recollection is
occasions when I had lunch with the Chief Justice which was simply more of a
social-working basis.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did he express at that time to you the hopes of the Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't recall these discussions as being much beyond the normal
kind of chit-chat that would take place at lunch.
Mr. BLAKEY. When did you go to work here in Washington?
Judge GRIFFIN. When did I first begin? Your records would be more accurate than
my recollection. We discussed this in Cleveland. I was under the impression that
I began the 8th of December. That date sticks in my mind. Your record seems to
indicate it was the latter part of January when I actually began working. I
would defer to the
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Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I might note that the material prepared by the staff
does indicate that Judge Griffin worked, based on the pay records, from February
1, 1964 through September 26, 1964, and that he worked 225 days out of a
possible 308 which makes him, next to Mr. Rankin, probably the hardest working
single attorney. The averge attorney, worked only 159 days. The chart on which
those figures are based will be introduced in the record this afternoon.
Judge Griffin, I wonder if you would give us some idea of the scope of your
assignment.
Judge GRIFFIN. I was assigned with Leon Hubert, who recently died, to
investigate what I think we called at that point area 5, which had to do with
Jack Ruby and the means and method and motivation for the killing of Lee Oswald,
and the question of whether Jack Ruby was involved in any kind of conspiracy to
assassinate the President.
Mr. Hubert had the title of Senior Counsel, and I had the title of Junior
Counsel. I think the committee is probably familiar with the
organization format that was used.
Mr. BLAKEY. Can you give us some indication of how the Commission was organized?
Judge GRIFFIN. Well, on a staff basis Lee Rankin was the General Counsel of the
Commission. Howard Willens was his Chief Administrative Assistsnt. There were 12
of us who were divided up in six areas. We had two lawyer teams consisting of
what was conceived of as being a senior lawyer and a junior lawyer.
I might mention the one thing I do remember at the outset was a little bit about
what was anticipated would be the length of time that we would serve. It was
indicated to all of us that we would serve from 3 to 5 months. It was also
indicated at the outset that the hope was that the report would be completed
prior to the Democratic National Convention, and that was a target, it was my
understanding, that essentially had been indicated by the White House, that it
was the President's feeling. Obviously, I had no conversations with the
President on this.
As time went on other staff people came on, but initially it was orgsnized in
this format I just outlined. Various people came on, including Norman Redlick,
and it may be true that Norman Redlick was already at work when I arrived,
functioning in a kind of special capacity in which he was not responsible for
any exclusive area but was involved in helping out on various aspects,
particularly the Oswald investigation. He really played no role of any substance
that I can recall in the Ruby end.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I might indicate for the record that the pay idea
indicates that Mr. Hubert worked 115 days out of a possible 308.
What was your relationship with Mr. Hubert?
Judge GRIFFIN. Mr. Hubert and I had a very good relationship. The reason for the
difference in the amount of time Mr. Hubert worked and the amount of time I
worked had to do with three things: one was that he was given the expectation
that he would not have to give up more than 5 months out of his private
practice. I believe at the time he had both a private practice and he was on the
faculty of Tulane Law School.
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There also developed a personal situation that it became important for many
family reasons for him to go back early. A third reason was, however, that
Hubert was disenchanted with some of the things that were going on in that he
didn't feel he was getting the kind of support that he wanted to get, and he
expressed to me a certain amount of demoralization over what he felt was
unresponsiveness that existed between himself and particularly Mr. Rankin.
Of course the fourth factor was that Hubert basically felt that when he left
that we had gone as far as we could go. He stayed through the period when the
investigation was completed but the writing portion and the drawing together
portion was really left in my hands after he left.
Mr. BLAKEY. You have given us some indication of what our responsibilities were.
I wonder if you could outline in general terms what the responsibilities of the
areas were.
Judge GRIFFIN. You want me to enumerate just the labels that were put on those
areas as I recall them?
Mr. BLAKEY. Yes.
Judge GRIFFIN. My recollection is not going to be as good as the written record.
My recollection is that Arlen Specter and Frank Adams were to be responsible for
the rather narrow question of the shots that were fired at the President. But I
think it was actually beled in a different way, that Joe Ball and Dave Bellin
were responsible for tracing Oswald's conduct in the period immediately
surrounding the assassination, athough I am not sure whether their work was
separated from Specter's in such a way that Specter took the few hours leading
up to the assassination and Belin and Ball took the period from the point of the
assassination until Oswald was shot.
Jim Lebeler and Albert Jenner had responsibility for trying to determine what
Oswald's motive was which involved them heavily in developing a live history of
Oswald. Dave Slawson and Mr. Coleman were responsible for the question of
whether or not Oswald was involved in a conspiracy, I believe the limited
question of whether they were involved in a foreign conspiracy.
It may be that Belin and Ball were concerned with whether he was concerned in a
domestic conspirscy. Again my recollection is not good on this.
Mr. Stern, Sam Stern, was responsible for the question of Presidential
protection. I don't recall whether he had a senior lawyer working with him. My
recollection is that he did not, he was the only one that did not.
Mr. BLAKEY. What was the relationship or interrelationship among the various
areas? Were there staff meetings, interchange of memos?
Judge GRIFFIN. We had very few staff meetings of a formal nature. We did have
two or three, maybe four or five. The bulk of the communication was on a
person-to-person ad hoc basis. There were some memos, I believe, passed back and
forth. Again, I think the records would be more accurate on that than my memory.
Mr. BLAKEY. What was your relationship with Mr. Willens and Mr. Rankin and the
Commission? Did you have direct access, for example, to Mr. Rankin?
Judge GRIFFIN. I suppose that it would not be fair to say that we did not have
direct access to Rankin. I cannot say at any point when we
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tried to see Rankin that we couldn't see him. I don't recall any situation where
we were formally required to go through someone else to get there. There was no
doorkeeper in a certain sense.
All of those communications that were in writing that went to Rankin went
through Howard Willens but as a practical matter, and I am not sure entirely
what the reasons are, Hubert and I did not have a lot of communication with
Rankin. We really communicated with him personally very infrequently. We had a
certain amount of communication at the beginning. I do remember at the outset
Hubert and I had a meeting with Rankin in which we discussed the work of the
mission that we had, but Iwould say that by the first of April we had relatively
little communication with Rankin. That is, we might not speak to Rankin maybe
more than once every 2 weeks.
Mr. Rankin is a formal person. Hubert and I did not feel comfortable in our
relationship with him. I point this out because I think our relationship with
Rankin was different than some of the other staff members. I think a number of
them would genuinely say, and I would believe from what I saw, that they
certainly had much better communication than we did. Whether they would regard
it as satisfactory I don't know.
Mr. BLAKEY. What was your relationship to the Commission itself?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't recall other than sitting in on the taking of testimony
once in which Norman Redlick was involved. We never had any direct contact or
formal appearance before the Commission.
Mr. BLAKEY. Looking back, would you say that the organizational structure of the
Commission was effective to achieve its goals?
Judge GRIFFIN. Are you asking me a question about structure or are you asking me
a question about operation?
Mr. BLAKEY. I would say how it actually operated.
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Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms
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Judge GRIFFIN. As far as I was concerned, I did not feel that it operated in a
way I felt comfortable.
Mr. BLAKEY. How would you have done it differently?
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me first of all preface it. Hubert and I began to feel after
a couple of months that perhaps there was not a great deal of interest in what
we were doing, that they looked upon the Ruby activity, based upon information
that they saw as being largely peripheral to the questions that they were most
concerned with.
We did have a disagreement, pretty clear disagreement, on how to go about
conducting the investigation, and I think that again was other reason why
perhaps I would say the operation was not as effective as I would have liked to
have seen it.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions in the of his assignment
and the organization. I do have some other questions but I thought it might be
useful, if the committee wants to ask anything at this point, to yield.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you.
Mr. Dodd, do you have a question?
Mr. DODD. I want to be careful I don't get into something you are going to go
into.
Mr. BLAKEY. Basically his assignment and the organization.
Mr. DODD. There has always been some debate as to exactly what the purpose of
the Warren Commission was, what was in the minds of the Chief Justice, the
President, in regard to the various memos that went back and forth.
You stated earlier that you cannot recall having any meetings ahead of time with
any people.
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes.
Mr. DODD. What was your feeling, to the best of your recollection, as to what
the purpose of the Warren Commission was?
Judge GRIFFIN. I felt then, and I still feel, despite a lot of misgivings that I
had, that the purpose was a genuine purpose, to find out the truth behind the
assassination. I do think, however, that there were major political
considerations that dictated how this work was conducted. The time frame that
was set initially for the work was a political consideration. This investigation
was carried on during a period when everyone was vividly aware of the results of
the 1950"s when Senator McCarthy held a prominent position. There was a great
deal of concern that we not conduct an investigation that would have overtones
of what people called McCarthyism. So that a lot of the decisions that were made
in terms of how we proceeded I think were made against that kind of background.
Mr. DODD. That was your impression from speaking to the various people who were
in charge?
Judge GRIFFIN. I have no question about that.
Mr. DODD. I notice the Chief Justice's opening remarks to the Commission
referred to their job as not one of collecting evidence but one evaluating
evidence. That is a vast distinction in terms of a Commission that is
investigating an assassination.
Judge GRIFFIN. I think that as a staff member we saw our role as collecting
evidence, that is, that wherever there appeared to be gaps in
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information that had been provided to us by the investigative agencies we had an
obligation to try to get beyond those gaps. And where there were contradictions,
then to find further evidence that would resolve those contradictions.
However, we did not have an investigative staff. We had lawyers who were taking
testimony and functioning as lawyers, but we did not have people on our own who
were out conducting initial interviews with witnesses. That was done, and I
think both Mr. Rankin and Mr. Willens could speak much more authoritatively on
this than I can, but it was my understanding that that was done because there
was also a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such a way as to
destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the Government.
There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done.
Second, that it was important to keep the confidence of the existing
investigative agencies, and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own
investigation that it would generate a paranoia in the FBI and the other
investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be politically
disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might not be
justified but it might also be counterproductive.
I think there was a fear that we might be undermining. Again, I think you should
talk to Willens and Rankin about this. My impression is that there was genuine
discussion of this at a higher level than mine.
I am trying to get a flavor for the atmosphere of the Commission as you walked
in on February 2 in term of presumptions and perceptions.
Judge GRIFFIN. I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects, my
feeling, and it was certainly the feeling that I had of all of my colleagues
that we were determined, if we could, to prove that the FBI was wrong, to find a
conspiracy if we possibly could.
I think we thought we would be national heroes in a sense if we could find
something that showed that there had been something sinister beyond what
appeared to have gone on. I think that everyone that worked on the staff level
that I was working at, and I think Howard Willens, with whom I had enough
communication, I think, to be able to pass a judgment on him, and the only
reason I did not mention others is I did not have the communication.
Mr. DODD. Was that junior counsel concept because of your being the younger guys
there? Did you sense there was a different attitude at the top? I appreciate
your candor. I can get a sense of what you are saying. Did you believe that that
feeling you had about going out to maybe uncover something far more sinister was
in contradiction to what the senior counsel and the members of the Commission
themselves felt?
Judge GRIFFIN. No; first of all, as far as the senior counsel, Hubert Ball,
Jenner, I don't think there was any difference in perspective. I think that
designation that was originally set forth vanished very quickly as working
relationships developed among people, and it turned out who was doing the work,
senior and junior did not mcan a tiring. In fact, they abolished the label. It
does not show up in the report in the final listing of people, and they
recognized that.
I think that a number of us, I have no doubt the people I had close
communication with, who were essentially Belin, Slawson, to some
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extent Lebeler, Norman Redlich for a substantial period of time, were determined
to prove that the FBI was wrong, and determined to root out---
Mr. DODD. Wrong in what way
By the way, if I am getting into something you will be inquiring into I will
hold up.
Mr. BLAKEY. You are going into it very well. Don't let me stop you.
Mr. DODD. Is it fair to say from your perceptions that the FBI and agencies of
Government at that period of time were convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald was a
lone assassin?
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. DODD. That was clearly coming from the FBI and the agencies?
Judge GRIFFIN. I think at that point my recollection of conversations, for
example, with Norman Redlich were that he took a political view of the FBI. He
ssw them as a conservative agency which was determined to pin this on someone
who was of a different political Dersuasion. I think he started out with a
strong motivation along that line to prove that they were wrong.
I had worked with the FBI for 2 years when I was an assistant U.S. attorney. I
didn't have a political view of them but I frankly didn't think they were very
competent. I felt then, and I still feel, that they have a great myth about
their ability but that they are not capable by their investigative means of ever
uncovering a serious and well-planned conspiracy. They would only stumble upon
it. I think their investigative means themselves may be self-defeating. I never
found them very creative, very imaginative.
My attitude toward them was that I thought they were honest. I didn't think in a
sticky situation that I would have great faith in them.
Mr. DODD. I don't want to editorialize, but you have these feelings: Redlich is
suspicious of them for political reasons; you are suspicious of them because of
their inability to cope with a situation of this magnitude.
Judge GRIFFIN. Rankin did not trust the FBI, either.
Mr. DODD. Yet you are sitting here and you are evaluating, all you are really
doing is evaluating the evidence that they are handing you, with all of your
suspicions.
Judge GRIFFIN. We did have other agencies. We had a countercheck on them. We
were getting to a certain extent parallel investigations from the Secret
Service. We were also getting information back from the Dallas Police
Department. A lot of people who were being interrogated by the FBI were being
interrogated by other agencies, even the Post Office Department. So that in a
lot of things there were ways of having checks.
I think in terms of the scientific information there was a definite effort not
to rely on the FBI. As I recall, the Commission did utilize in the ballistics--I
don't want to be held to what fields, but it may be in the fingerprint and
ballistic areas that they did rely and deliberately went to find people
independent of the Federal Government. I think there were some experts from
Illinois, as I recall, involved.
Mr. DODD. I am trying to develop the relationship between what is listed as
junior counsel and senior counsel in terms of perceptions as you go into this.
Again I realize you did not have time to contact them
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on a day-to-day basis to draw concrete conclusions, but you may have. I may
prejudice your response by my questions.
In terms of the Commission members themselves, the Chief Justice, President Ford
and so forth, how did you relate their perceptions in starting out as opposed to
what you told me the reactions were from Redlich, Rankin, yourself, and others?
Judge GRIFFIN. I had almost a total lack of contact with the Commission members.
I have some thoughts in retrospect now about some of the perceptions, total
conjecture but based on other things that have happened, but at the time I did
feel that Senator Russell was genuinely concerned about conducting an
investigation.
Mr. DODD. Concerned about what?
Judge GRIFFIN. Genuinely wanted to conduct an investigation. Senator Russell
genuinely wanted to conduct an investigation as distinguished from simply an
evaluation. I may be overstating that, and I say this because he hired a woman
named Alfredda Scobey after a couple of months of Commission work to come in and
actually do a countercheck on the staff.
It would be difficult for me to reconstruct exactly what was happening that
motivated him to do that, but after a while there became within the staff some
differences of opinion and some feeling that we were not going far enough. I do
recall that at the time Scobey came on, there was expressed through her
communications with others that Russell really wanted to make sure that there
weren't going to be any stones unturned.
Mr. DODD. I am just talking about that initial period as you come into this
position and your feeling and perceptions about what the Commission members
actually felt, the Katzenbach memo.
Judge GRIFFIN. I am not familiar with the Katzenbach memo.
Mr. DODD. The memo that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach sent to Lyndon
Johnson on November 26, or so I think it was, some 4 or 5 days after the
assassination, saying he thinks it is important that there be an investigation
to determine that in fact Lee Harvey Oswald was--the clear implication of the
memo was to set aside the uneasy feelings that everyone had and let us establish
once and for all that Lee Harvey Oswald did this thing.
Mr. McKINNEY. He also sent a similar letter to each Commission member at a later
date.
Mr. DODD. You have from the Justice Department a clear perception that the
President seemed to agree with it.
Judge GRIFFIN. Maybe I can in part answer it in this way, in addition to saying
I have no idea what was in their minds, but I think it is important to say that
if they had a point of view about this difference from the one I expressed that
was a staff point of view, it was never communicated to the staff. We had no
knowledge that we were being restrained in any way from conducting the kind of
investigation that we wanted to conduct.
If the investigation began to be limited in the method in which we proceeded
beyond the start limitations that we had--that is, the areas we went into and
how far we went--I think it may have reflected the point of view that I did hear
attributed to the Chief Justice, that in his 20 years as district attorney in
Alameda County. he never had seen
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a criminal homicide investigation that was as thorough as this; and if we had
not found anything that would show any more than already seemed to be the
conclusions, there was not anything there to be found.
I recall as pressures began to be put on to move away from investigation and
into drafting the report, it was really based on this concept, that what we had
going here was a classical investigation into murder, and we had gone far beyond
what anybody who had ever had any experience would do, and we had not found
anything.
Mr. DODD. I have taken more time than I should have.
I thank the chairman.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKinney. You have covered most of my ground anyway.
Judge, I was interested and was going to follow through on the Commission item.
No. 1, I would agree with you on Senator Russell because he expressed his
outrage several times at the lack of communication between Federal agencies.
It seems to me that we have two fators here. I just want to get your
interpretation on whether I am correct or not. In reading the transcript of the
Commission's meetings, time, let's get it over with, Katzenbach letters, we have
to put the Nation to rest, so on and so forth, your statement that this has been
the most complete investigation, let us get it over with, we have to get the
report out, then we have all of you coming in.
It seems to me that there is a great disparity between the Commission and the
junior staff, but you did not actually feel that?
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me say it was never communicated to us that it was the
Commission that wanted to curtail things. There were two communications that
were made as to where this pressure was coming from. The most prominent one was
the White House, that there was a general, unspecified reference to the fact
that the White House wanted this report out before the convention. That was said
to us many, many times. I think the convention was in June.
Second, just by way of human interest, color, perhaps, another date began to be
set because the Chief Justice had a trip scheduled to go to Europe, and the hope
was that it could be completed before he went on his trip to Europe.
Mr. McKINNEY. I may have to leave before you finish because I have a trip to
Boston.
Judge GRIFFIN. Mr. McKinney, it is difficult for the general public to
understand that these human factors play a major role in a lot of these
decisions.
Mr. McKINNEY. Let me ask you a question I have asked each witness on the
subject. When you arrived here, the CIA was not what you would call in the best
of repute; it had fallen apart on the Bay of Pigs, it had fallen apart on the
Cuban missile crisis, it had fallen apart on the Berlin Wall. The FBI was going
through its personality problems in severe fashion at that time. When you got
here, did you become appalled with the amount of work you had to do in the time
you were given, and the fact that you were really going to review Agency
material?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes. I don't know whether I would say appalled, but we were very
concerned about it, very anxious about it.
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Mr. Mc KINNEY. For instance, I am appalled that we have to do what we are
supposed to do in 2 years. My question is probability or possibility after the
slow start we had.
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me answer that, however, from the standpoint of what Hubert
and I were doing. I don't know how the others felt. I think Arlen Specter, for
example, may have felt comfortable with the time period. But Hubert and I, we
had a completely, we had a scope of investigation that was as great as all the
other people put together because we were investigating a different murder. We
had two people who were investigating a conspiracy from one man's point of view,
and we had a security question, how did he get into the basement, and so forth.
Hubert and I particularly felt that way. It may not have been valid for
everybody else.
Mr. McKINNEY. I think Mr. Dodd has covered most of my material so I have no
further questions.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Counsel may continue.
Mr. BLAKEY. I would like to continue with the relationship between the Warren
Commission and both the CIA and FBI.
Mr. Griffin, you have given us some indication of what the relationship between
the Commission and the Bureau was, and an indication of what the attitude was
between the Commission staff and the Bureau. What did you perceive the attitude
to be between the FBI and the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. I didn't have any real factual basis for making any judgements
about it. My perception just grew out of my past experiences. I felt that it is
a big bureaucracy and most of the people I felt within the FBI functioned like a
clerk in any other big organization, and they try to do their job and they try
to not get in hot water with the boss and get egg over their face, and sometimes
they have a couple of bosses, we being one and somebody else being another.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any day-to-day contacts with field agents?
Judge GRIFFIN. Very limited. Day to day, I did not. I think, in fact I know that
Norman Redlich worked closely with a couple of agents, but I did not.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any day-to-day contact with seat of government
agencies?
Judge GRIFFIN. What do you mean by seat of government?
Mr. BLAKEY. Here in Washington, as opposed to field agents Dallas or New
Orleans.
Judge GRIFFIN. Did I personally?
Mr. BLAKEY. Yes.
Judge GRIFFIN. Everything basically went out from us by way of written
memorandum.
Mr. BLAKEY. I would like to outline for you an incident that occurred that may
be illustrative of the relationship between the Warren Commission and the
Bureau, and ask you if you recall it and then comment on it.
Robert B. Gimberling, who was a special agent of the FBI, acted as coordinator
of the FBI's investigation in Dallas. Gimberling's report dated December 23,
1963, which was submitted to the
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Warren Commission on January 13, 1964 and labeled as CD205, contained a
transcription of Oswald's address book but omitted the name, address, telephone
number, and car license number of Special Agent James B. Hosty. This is
Gimberling's report dated February 11, 1964 submitted to the Warren Commission
on February 24, 1964 and labeled CD385, which, however, contained the remaining
contents of the address book including the Hosty entry.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. Gimberling submitted the Commission an affidavit dated February 25,
1964, explaining the original omission. Special Agent John T. Hosty, who
reviewed the similar transcript submitted a similar affidavit. Both affidavits
explained that the omission reflected Gimberling's instructions to the effect
that Kesler was to extract all names and telephone numbers the identity of which
were unknown to her with any other lead information.
On this basis Special Agent Hosty's name was said to have been excluded because
it was neither upknown nor lead information.
Do you recall that incident?
Judge GRIFFIN. I recall the Hosty incident. I don't recall that memorandum.
Mr. BLAKEY. What effect, if any, did that incident have on the relationship
between the staff and the Bureau?
Judge GRIFFIN. I think it established in our minds that we always had to be
worried about them.
Mr. BLAKEY. Do you think it led to any increased or decreased, or about the
same, skepticism toward the investigation.
Judge GRIFFIN. I think it increased. I think we never forgot that incident. We
were always alert, we were concerned about the problem.
Mr. BLAKEY. Was it discussed at the time among the staff attorneys?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes, it was. There was a staff meeting about it, as I recall. One
of the few staff meetings I have a general recollection of at this point seems
to me was one that Rankin cal]ed in which we were all brought in on this, and we
were all told about the problem and once it had been discovered there was a
discussion about whether our discovery should be revealed to the FBI and how
should we proceed with it.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would it be fair to characterize the incident then as perhaps
producing a more healthy skepticism on the part of the staff and less trust of
the Bureau?
Judge GRIFFIN. I think that is right.
Are you trying to contrast it to my earlier statement?
Mr. BLAKEY. Not necessarily. Would it be fair to say. that the incident far from
adversely affecting the quality of your investigation may have heightened it.
Judge GRIFFIN. No, I don't think that is true.
Mr. BLAKEY. If it made you more skeptical and more probing would it help the
investigation?
Judge GRIFFIN. No, I don't think it did. The reason I say that is that I think
it basically set the standard for the kind of judgement that was going to be
made about how we were going to deal with these problems, and the decision made
there was that there was not going to be confrontation, they were going to be
given an opportunity to explain
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it. So the decision was really, as I recall, to go back and give them
opportunity to clean up their act other than to carry on a secret investigation
that might be designed to lay a foundation for our further impeachment of them.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me outline for you another incident and ask you to comment on
it.
Sometime approximately 9 weeks before the assassination it is said that Lee
Harvey Oswald left a note at the Dallas office of the FBI for Agent James B.
Hosty. The receptionist who took the note has testified that its contents were
as follow: "Let this be a warning I will blow up the FBI and the Dallas Police
Department if you do not stop bothering my wife."
Agent Hosty acknowledges, or has acknowledged, in testimony receiving the note
on the same day. He remembers it, however, as saying, "If you have anything you
want to learn about me come talk to me directly. If you don't cease bothering my
wife I will take appropriate action and report this to proper authorities."
Hosty put the note in his workbox and that on the evening of November 24, 1963,
he was instructed by his superior, Gordon Shanklin, who was the SAC in Dallas,
to destroy the note and the memorandum he wrote discussing the note and his
contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. Hosty destroyed both of them.
When Hosty testified before the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964, at that time
he made no mention of the note or its destruction because, he said he had been
instructed by the FBI, the seat of government personnel, not to volunteer any
information.
Were you aware of that incident in 1964?
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Had you known of it in 1964 do you think it would have made any
difference in how you conducted the investigation?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know. I don't know how committed those who made policy
were to the idea of avoiding confrontation.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me ask you one further matter in this regard.
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me say this: I think that the dynamics of Commission, if
there had been a second incident involving Hosty, the dynamics of the staff
would have brought tremendous pressure out of the staff not to give Hosty a
second chance and the Bureau a second chance on this. I don't know how it would
have been resolved.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Griffin, you have indicated that you had general jurisdiction
over Oswald's death and therefore Jack Ruby.
Judge GRIFFIN. Don't put it that way. It makes me sound like a conspirator.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you aware that the Bureau had administratively designated Ruby
as a PCI--by PCI I mean a potential criminal informant--during the period March
to October 1959?
Judge GRIFFIN. We were aware, it is my recollection at this point, and documents
would be more accurate than my recollection--my recollection is that we were
aware that Ruby had been contacted by the FBI and it had been hoped that he
could provide them with information, that there were as many as six or seven
contacts with him that produced any information.
I can't say I had any familiarity with the label PCI.
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Mr. BLAKEY. If you had known that administrative designation had been placed on
Ruby would it have made any difference on how you handled your investigation of
him and his activities?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know whether we would have then looked upon this as
some--I don't know whether that would have given heightened importance to it or
not. I don't know that labeling might have made a difference. It might or might
not have.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me turn now and ask you some questions about the relationship
between the Warren Commission and the CIA. How would you characterize the
general relationship between the Commission and the Agency? How would you
characterize it?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know that I am in a position to say that. The only direct
contact I ever remember with the CIA was at a meeting. It is my recollection
that Helms and another person who was designated as the liaison person were at a
meeting with us. They were introduced and the discussion took place about what
the formal relationship ought to be or the nature of the relationship, how we
communicated with the CIA.
After that I never spoke, to my recollection, with anyone from the CIA.
Mr. BLAKEY. You indicated what the attitude of the staff was toward the FBI.
Would you characterize for us what the attitude of the staff was toward the CIA?
Judge GRIFFIN. You know, this is a very impressionistic thing I am going to say.
If anybody on the staff has a different view their view is more accurate than
mine, but my impression is that I for one trusted them. I guess I for one
trusted them, I think.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have much contact with agency personnel other than this one
meeting where you met with Mr. Helms and Mr. LaRocca?
Judge GRIFFIN. After their failure to respond to us in the inquiry that Hubert
and I directed toward them, and after they finally did respond with basically an
answer that they didn't have any information that we didn't have already, I was
skeptical but I won't go so far as to say I distrusted them.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have the Clerk mark four specific
items, a note of March 14, 1964 with the initials HPW on it; a memo of February
24, 1964, Hubert and Griffin to Helms, re Ruby background; three, a letter from
Rankin of May 19, 1964 to Helms, re Ruby, and a memo from Mr. Karamessines of
September 15, 1964 to Mr. Rankin, re Ruby, as JFK exhibit No. Will the Clerk
show the exhibit to the witness?
Mr. Griffin, are you familiar with these materials?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes, I am.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can incorporate the material in the
record at this point so I can ask some questions of the witness.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection it is so ordered.
[The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 62 and received for the
record, follow:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 62
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[Memorandum]
FEBRUARY 24, 1964.
To: Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
From: Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin, Staff Members, President's Commission
on the assassination of President Kennedy.
Subject: Jack Ruby--Background, Friends and other pertinent Information.
A. BACKGROUND ON JACK RUBY
Jack Ruby was born on about March 25, 1911, in the United States, the fifth of
eight living children of Joseph and Fannie Rubenstein. Three other children are:
Hyman Rubenstein, born December 1911, in Poland; Ann Rubenstein Volport, born
June 1904, Poland; Marion, a.k.a. Marlan, Rubenstein Carroll, born june 1906, in
United States; Eva Rubenstein (Magid) Grant, born in United States, 1909; Sam
Rubenstein) Ruby, born December 1912 in United States; Earl (Rubenstein) Ruby,
born April 1916 in the United States; and Eileen Rubenstein Keminsky, born July
1917 in United States. Jack and his brothers, Sam and Earl, were known by the
name Rubenstein until that name was legally changed by each of them in
approximately 1947 or 1948.
Ruby's father, Joseph, was born in Sokolov, Sedlits Province, Poland on February
2, 1871. He served in the Russian Army Artillery from 1893 to 1898. He married
Fannie (Turrell) Rutkowski in 1901. Fannie was born in 1875, one of seven
children of a reportedly prosperous Polish physician.
At least two of Fannie's sisters together with her parents remained in Poland.
One brother reportedly came to the United States. Joseph also had at least one
brother who came to the United States. We have no evidence as to any other
family members of either Joseph or Fannie who remained in Europe. Nor have we
any information concerning family ties maintained with relatives or friends in
Europe.
Jack Ruby spent his early life in Chicago, quitting school at approximately
sixteen, and beginning to work thereafter as a ticket scalper and peddler of
cheap merchandise. In 1933, he traveled to Los Angeles and remained there and in
San Francisco until sometime in 1937. His sister, Eva, accompanied him to San
Francisco and lived with him for most of the time that he was there. Both worked
as sellers of subscriptions for daily newspapers in San Francisco. Jack also had
employment selling a horse race "tip sheet" and linoleum. Jack was known both by
his Chicago and West coast friends as "Sparky" Rubenstein.
Jack Ruby returned to Chicago sometime in 1937 and was employed for undetermined
periods of time by the Stanley Oliver Co. and the Spartan Co. we have no further
information concerning those companies. He also continued to engage in ticket
scalping, the sale of cheap merchandise, and the sale of punch boards. The punch
board operation involved traveling throughout New England and the Eastern
Seaboard including Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
Sometime between 1937 and mid-1940, Ruby was employed as an organizer and in
other undisclosed capacities for the Waste and Material Handlers Federal Union
in Chicago. Paul Dorman later became head of this union. At the time of Ruby's
association with the union, the President was jack Martin, another principal
figure was an attorney, Leon Cooke. Cooke was shot by Martin in an argument in
December 1939, and died as a result thereof in January 1940. Shortly thereafter,
Ruby left the union.
Jack Ruby served in the United States Army Air Force from May 1943 to February
1946. He was stationed the entire time in the United States, obtained the rank
of Private First Class, and has Army Serial Number 36666107.
After leaving military service, he was employed for approximately one year with
Earl Products Co., a Chicago based business jointly owned with his brothers,
earl and Sam Ruby. His brothers became dissatisfied with him because he
allegedly was not devoting full time to that business. As a result, they bought
out his interest in 1947. We do not have precise information as to what Jack
Ruby was doing while he was also employed with Earl Products; however, he is
rumored to have frequented and been employed at various Chicago area night clubs
in the capacity of a bouncer or other minor functionary.
In early 1947, he went to Dallas, Texas, to manage the Singaport Supper Club, a
business in which his sister, Eva Grant, was engaged. He returned to Chicago
sometime in the late summer or early fall of 1947. At about this same time, he
became the subject of a narcotics investigation along with his brother, Hyman,
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and Paul Roland Jones Both Hyman and Jack disclaimed any knowledge of Jones'
activity in narcotics and were not prosecuted. Jones was prosecuted and
convicted by federal authorities.
Sometime in late 1947, after having been interrogated by Narcotics Agents Ruby
returned to Dallas and established permanent residence. He continued to operate
the Singapore Supper Club with Eva until sometime in 1948 when she moved to
California and alone lot an undisclosed period thereafter. At some undisclosed
point, Ruby changed the name of the Singapore Supper Club to the Silver Spur. He
no longer operates that club. He eventually purchased the Vegas Club and
operated it with Eva after early 1959. In 1960, he purchased the Sovereign Club,
changed the name to the Carousel Club, and continued to operage it and the Vegas
Club until his arrest on November 24, 1963. Both the Vegas Club and the Carousel
Club have been put under management other than the Ruby family since Ruby's
arrest.
Ruby is considered to be a highly emotional person. He speaks with a lisp, has
been described as soft spoken, is generally well mannered and well dressed, but
is given to sudden and extreme displays of temper and violence. He is known to
have brutally beaten at least 25 different persons either as a result of a
personal encounter or because they were causing disturbances in his club. The
normal pattern is for Ruby to attack his victims without warning, and few of the
beatings of which we have knowledge seem to be the result of prolonged
arguments. After many of these assaults, Ruby is known to have apologized to the
victim.
Ruby is known to have a strong affection for dogs and a great pride in physical
fitness. He has owned as many as seven dogs at one time, and one person has
stated that he cared more for his dogs then he cared for people. At various
times during his life, he is known to have worked out regularly at the YMCA or
other gymnasiums, and he is reported to have owned and kept in his apartment a
set of barbells during recent years. He neither smokes, nor drinks, and curses
rarely.
He is said to have effeminate mannerisms and is alleged by some to be
homosexual. However, there is no direct evidence of any homosexual behavior.
Although he has never been married, he is known to have dated and at one time
was known as a "ladies man." In recent years, some of the women toward whom he
has shown interest have indicated that he had perverted attitudes toward sex.
One male witness describes an occasion when he masturbated one of his dogs and
apparently derived great pleasure from it.
Ruby's friends and close associates are detailed more fully in a subsequent
section. To generalize, it can be said that, while living in Dallas, Ruby has
very carefully cultivated friendships with police officers and other public
officials. At the same time, he was, peripherally, if not directly connected
with members of the underworld. The narcotics episode mentioned above concerning
Paul Roland. Jones is representative. Ruby is also rumored to have been the
tip-off man between the Dallas police and the Dallas underworld, especially in
regard to enforcement of the local liquor laws. Ruby is said to have been given
advance notice of prospective police raids on his own club and other clubs.
However, it must be emphasized that such allegations are in the rumor category.
Ruby apparently did not permit prostitution to be carried on in his clubs;
nonetheless, his associations with stripteasers and cheap entertainers brought
him into constant contact with people of questionable reputation. Ruby operated
his business on a cash basis, keeping no record whatsoever--a strong indication
that Ruby himself was involved in illicit operations of some sort.
When it suited his own purposes, he did not hesitate to call on underworld
characters for assistance. For example, shortly prior to the assassination of
President Kennedy, Ruby was involved in a dispute with the American Guild of
Variety Artists (AGVA) concerning the use of amateur stripteasers in Dallas.
Ruby claimed that AGVA was permitting his competitor to pursue amateurs but
denying him that privilege. When he was unable to Ruby called Barney Baker, a
Chicago hoodlum who was reputedly a muscle man for Jimmy Hoffa and had been
released from prison in June 1963, to ask Baker to give him assistance in his
dispute with AGVA. For the same purpose, Ruby also called Frank Goldstein, a San
Francisco gambler, who was a friend of his sister, Eva Grant.
Ruby is not known to have been politically active. He is reported to have been a
Democrat and an admirer of President Kennedy and President Roosevelt, however,
the evidence on this is not sufficiently reliable to warrant a firm conclusion.
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Prior to World War II, he was a member of a vigilante group which physically
interfered with meetings of the German-American Bund in an area of Chicago known
as White City. Ruby's group was known as the Dave Miller gang, but we have no
evidence to indicate whether this group was simply made up of aggressive young
men who were looking for trouble and were from the Jewish neighborhood in which
Ruby lived or whether it was an organized group with a strong political basis.
He is not known to have engaged in any political activities in Dallas. At the
time of his arrest, Ruby was found in possession of various radio scripts issued
by H.L. Hunt, a prominent American right wing extremist. There is insufficient
evidence as to how these radio scripts came into Ruby's possession, their
content and Ruby's reaction to them to be able to pass judgment on the
relationship of ruby to any right wing groups.
In about 1959, Ruby became interested in the possibility of selling war
materials to Cubans and in the possibility of opening a gambling casino in
Havana. He was in contact at that time with a friend, Lewis J. McWillie.
Insufficient evidence is available on that episode to evaluate Ruby's connection
with any Cuban (anti-Castro or pro-Castro) groups. Ruby is also rumored to have
met in Dallas with an American Army Colonel (LNU) and some Cubans concerning the
sale of arms. A Government informant in Chicago connected with the sale of arms
to anti-Castro Cubans has reported that such Cubans were behind the Kennedy
assassination and was financed by Jewish interests.
Religiously, Ruby is Jewish. He was not a regular attender at the Synagogue,
although he did attend the services on high holidays. We have no information as
to whether or not Ruby observed any particular Jewish customs in his home or was
active in Jewish lay organizations. Nonetheless, it is established that Ruby was
very sensitive to anti-Semitism and to his position in Dallas as a Jew.
On balance it may be said that Ruby's primary interest in life was making money.
He does not seem to have had any great scruples concerning the manner in which
he might do so; however, he has usually been careful to avoid prosecution by law
enforcement authorities. This care did not necessarily involve avoiding
violations of the law although there is no evidence that he did commit any
flagrant legal violations. His primary technique in avoiding prosecution was the
maintenance of friendship with police officers, public officials, and other
influential persons in the Dallas community. Ruby appears to be the kind of
person who could be persuaded by another person whom he respected (either
because of that person's friendship, influence, power, prestige or wealth) to
become involved in any activity which was not obviously contrary to the interest
of the United States. No one who knows Ruby has indicated that he was
politically sophisticated, and some have commented that he was devoid of
political ideas to the point of naivete. It is possible that Ruby could have
been utilized by a politically motivated group either upon the promise of money
or because of the influential character of the individual approaching Ruby. If
he is a deviate, blackmail is also possible.
B. THE FOLLOWING GROUPS AND PLACES WERE SIGNIFICANT IN LOOKING FOR TIES
BETWEEN RUBY AND OTHERS WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
1. The Teamsters Union. Ruby's old union, the Waste Handlers in Chicago, is now
a part of the Teamsters. Ruby had a contact with Barney Baker, reputed to be
close to Hoffa. Ruby also frequented the Cabana Motel in Dallas, alleged to have
been built with Teamster money.
2. The Las Vegas gambling community. Ruby was particularly close to Lewis J.
McWillie of Las Vegas.
3. Persons involved in the promotion of fad items. Ruby himself was attempting
to sell an item known as a "twist board." in the fall of 1963 and has often-been
involved in the sale of gimmick-type items.
4. Persons connected with cheap nightclub entertainment.
5. The Dallas Police Department.
6. The Dallas news media, with particular emphasis on entertainment columnists
and persons employed at radio station KLIF.
7. The following geographical areas:
a. Chicago
b. Denver
c. Milwaukee
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d. Minneapolis
e. New York
f. Los Angeles
g. San Francisco
h. New Orleans
i. Gulf Coast areas (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida)
8. Places frequented by Ruby in Dallas:
a. Adelphus Hotel
b. Cabana Motel
c. Egyptian Lounge
d. Sol's Turf Bar.
e. Bull Pen Drive-in.
f. Vegas Club.
g. Carousel Club.
C. THE FOLLOWING PERSONS SEEM, AT THIS WRITING, TO BE THE MOST PROMISING SOURCES
OF CONTACT BETWEEN RUBY AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED GROUPS INTERESTED IN SECURING
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
1. Family members
a. Eva Grant, born and reared in Chicago, 1909 to 1933. Lived in San Francisco
1933 to 1937 and 1948 to 1959. Known to be in Chicago August 1937 and January
1938. Lived in Dallas approximately 1942 to 1948 and 1959 to present. Married
about 1930 to Hyman Magid, divorced about 1932. One son, Ronald Dennis Magid,
born 1931. Married Frank Grant, aka Frank Granovsky, in San Francisco, 1936.
Lived with him about six months, divorced about 1940. Friendships with Frank
Goldstein, San Francisco gambler and Paul Roland Jones, convicted in Dallas
about 1948 for narcotics violations. While living in Dallas, engaged in export
and import of raw material and managed night clubs.
b. Earl Ruby, born, Chicago, about April 1916, lived in Chicago until 1961. U.S.
Navy 1942 to 1944. Sold punch boards on East Coast with brother Jack in early
1940's. Owner and manager of Earl Products, 1944 to 1961. Nervous breakdown
1961. Moved to Detroit and opened Cobo Cleaners in 1961. Telephone records show
telegram of undisclosed nature to Havana, Cuba, April 1, 1962, telephone call to
Ansan Tool Manufacturing Company, 4750 North Ronald, Chicago, Illinois, owned by
Anrei and Mario Umberto, and to Dominico Scorta, 102 West Grant, Chicago,
Illinois. Also calls to Welsh Candy Company. Nature of telephone calls in all
cases unknown, no further investigation of the call as yet has been initiated.
c. Anna Volpert, sister of Jack Ruby, born June 1904 in Poland. Remained in
Chicago until early 1930's. Sometime after 1937 but before 1939 moved to
Youngstown. Ohio. Resided in Youngstown, with husband until 1959. Husband was
engaged in a company known as National Home Improvement Company.
2. Close friends
a. Andrew Armstrong, Ruby's Man Friday at the Carousel Club. Resident of Dallas,
background unknown, Negro.
b. Ralph Paul. Resident of Arlington, Texas, born New York City. About 55 years
old, came to Dallas about 1948. Owns Bull Pen Drive-in Restaurant in Fort Worth.
Co-owner with Ruby of the Carousel Club.
c. George Senator, reommate of Jack Ruby. Background unknown.
3. Other associates and employees
a. Barney Baker, Chicago hoodlum. Reported muscle man for Jimmy Hoffa. Requested
by Ruby in mid-November of 1963 to assist him in dispute with AGVA.
b. Karen Bennett Carlin, employed by Ruby as strip-teaser under name of Little
Lyn. Borrowed $5 from Ruby on Saturday night, November 23, telephoned Ruby
Sunday morning, November 24, and says she requested him to send her $25. Mrs.
Marguerite Oswald (mother of Lee Oswald ) believes that she knew a Carol Bennett
when she (Mrs. Oswald) was employed as a waitress in Dallas. Mrs. Oswald claims
that Carol Bennett was the daughter of a Dallas hoodlum who was murdered in a
gangland slaying. No information as to whether or not Karen Bennett Carlin and
Carol Bennett are the same person or are related.
c. Bruce Carlin, husband of Karen Bennett Carlin.
d. Curtis Laverne Graford, aka Larry Craford. About 22 years old, itinerant
laborer. Worked for Ruby at the Carousel Club from about October 31, 1963 to
November 23, 1963. Became close confidant of Ruby. Fled Dallas area Saturday,
November 23. Located in rural part of Michigan, November 28.
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e. Robert Cravens, age unknown. Resident of Los Angeles. Friend of Ruby's. Came
to Dallas about October 1, 1963, to operate a show at the Dallas State Fair
called How Hollywood Makes Movies. Called Ruby in November 1963 with respect to
the sale of some lumber. No other information concerning Cravens.
f. Leopold Ramon Duces, life was threatened by a person suggesting that the same
group that would kill Duces had been responsible for getting rid of Kennedy,
Name "Leopoldo" had been mentioned by others who claim that Ruby was associated
with an anti Castro group in the procurement of arms. Name "Leopoldo also
mentioned by a woman in Dallas who claims she was introduced to a a "Leon
Oswald," description fitting Lee Harvey Oswald, in October 1963 by anti-Castro
Cuban leaders.
g. FranK Goldstein, age unknown. San Francisco gambler. Friend of Eva Grant.
Requested by Ruby in November 1963 to assist him in his difficulties with AGVA.
h. Sam Gordon, west coast resident Friend of Ruby from childhood in Chicago.
Reportedly purchased sixty-first home run ball from Mickey Mantle. General
background and connections unknown.
i. Alex Gruber, resident of Los Angeles. Friend of Ruby. Visited him in Dallas
in November 1963. Received telephone call from Ruby on Friday after the
assassination of President Kennedy.
j. Thomas Hill, name found in Ruby's notebook. Official of John Birch Society.
Resides in Massachusetts.
k. H. L. Hunt and Lamar Hunt, may be same person. Name Lamar Hunt found in
notebook of Ruby. Ruby visited his office on November 21. Hunt denies knowing
Ruby. Ruby gives innocent explanation. Ruby found with literature of H.L. Hunt
after shooting Oswald.
l. Lewis J. McWillie, operates Las Vegas gambling casino. Formerly employed
gambling casino in Havana. Ruby visited him in Havana. Ruby also purchased a gun
for McWillie and had it mailed to McWillie in Las Vegas. Ruby and McWiLlie give
innocent explanations of their relationship.
m. Barney Ross, former professional prize fighter. Former narcotics addict. Long
time friend of Ruby from Chicago days. Ruby visited him at least once a year and
telephones him two or three times a year.
n. Amesi and Mario Umberto, owners of Ansen Tool Manufacturing Company Chicago.
In telephone communication with Earl Ruby.
o. Billy Joe Willis, musician employed by Ruby at Carousel Club. Lives in
Irving, Texas, across the street from Mrs. Ruth Paine (Friend at whose home
Marina Oswald resided).
MAY 15, 1964.
Mr. RICHARD HELMS,
Deputy Director for Plans,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. HELMS: At a meeting on March 12, 1964, between representatives of your
Agency and this Commission, a memorandum prepared by members of the Commission
staff was handed to you which related to the background of Jack L. Ruby and
alleged associates and/or activities in Cuba. At that time we requested that you
review this memorandum and submit to the Commission any information contained in
your files regarding the matters covered in the memorandum, as well as any other
analysis by your representatives which you believed might be useful to the
Commission.
As you know, this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would
appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to
imply with this request in the near future.
Sincerely,
J. LEE RANKIN,
General Counsel.
Memorandum for: Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel, President's Commission on
the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby (aka Jack Rubenstein) and his
Associates.
1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 19 May 1964, requesting that this
Agency furnish any information in its files relative to Jack Ruby, his
activities and his associates.
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2. This memorandum will confirm our earlier statement to the Commission to the
effect that an examination of Central Intelligence Agency files has produced no
information on Jack Ruby or his activities. The Central Intelligence Agency has
no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald ever knew each other, were
associated, or might have been connected in any manner.
3. The records of this Agency were reviewed for information about the relatives,
friends and associates of Ruby named in your summary of his background. Our
records do not reflect any information pertaining to these persons.
THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES,
Acting Deputy Director For Plans.
Mr. BLAKEY. Judge Griffin, let me direct your attention to the date on the
memorandum prepared by yourself and/or Hubert, February 24, 1964, and the date
and the routing slip that has Mr. Willens' initials, March 12, 1964.
Do you know why there was a 16-day delay in Mr. Willens' communicating this
material to the CIA?
Judge GRIFFIN. No, I don't.
Mr. BLAKEY. Was it usual or unusual for him to do something by direct
communication as opposed to mail? The note ,of course, indicates that the
proposed letter which accompanied the memorandum was not sent, rather that it
was physically handed to the representative.
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know what their procedure was or, indeed, whether they
used couriers rather than mail. I really don't know how things went out.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me direct your attention as well to the fourth item, the memo of
Mr. Karamessines of September 15, 1964 to Mr. Rankin. I take it this is the
answer to the oral request of Mr. Willens of March 12, 1964.
Do you know why it took from March to September, some 7 months, to answer the
questions raised in your memorandum of November 24?
Judge GRIFFIN. I can only speculate.
Were you ever told why it took that long?
Judge GRIFFIN. Never.
Mr. BLAKEY. Was this kind of delay typical in getting a response from a
Government agency?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't believe we ever had a delay of this magnitude about
anything else.
Mr. BLAKEY. Could it have been that kind of delay that would have been a factor
contributing to your inability to make the deadlines that were being set for you
by the Chief Justice and others in your investigation of Jack Ruby?
Judge GRIFFIN. No. You are really asking me the question that goes back to some
other memos that aren't in the record at this point, and what happened to the
investigations that Hubert and I had suggested be conducted, and why they
weren't conducted.
Mr. BLAKEY. We will get to some of that later on. I am wondering now about the
relationship between the Agency and your own concerns.
Judge GRIFFIN. The reason it took us so long to do the job was that it was a
tremendous amount of work. That was the starting point. The other question about
why we weren't allowed--I won't say we weren't allowed--why we got the reaction
we did get with respect to certain of our suggested investigations, whatever
underlies the delay
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in this memorandum may underlie--may, I am not certain--may underlie some of
that.
I suspect that within the whole vast apparatus of investigation that was going
on it went far beyond the Commission, but even within the commission different
considerations may have affected different people who made decisions. What
affected Howard Willens might be very different from what affected Lee Rankin or
what affected the Chief Justice.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn from the relationship between the
Warren Commission and the Bureau and Agency and ask some specific questions
about the character of the investigation itself.
Judge, you previously testified in response to questions by Congressman Dodd and
Congressman McKinney that you were under certain political pressures, and I
don't mean political pressure in a pejorative sense, a desire to allay public
fears, perhaps to work at a smooth transition in national leadership.
Certainly this would be in the context of the political conventions. Let me ask
you some specific questions in regard to a perhaps less attractive motivation,
for limiting your investigation. I hope you will bear with me if I ask you a
series of questions which may sound like strike force attorney asking hard
questions of a witness.
To your knowledge did the Chief Justice have any information while he was
serving with the Warren Commission concerning any volvement of U.S. intelligence
agencies in plots against Cuba or to assassinate Fidel Castro?
Judge GRIFFIN. I have no direct knowledge on that.
Mr. BLAKEY. That he had knowledge.
Judge GRIFFIN. I have no direct information.
Mr. BLAKEY. Do you have any indirect information?
Judge GRIFFIN. Nothing that would be information. I only have my speculations.
Mr. BLAKEY. To your knowledge, did any other commissioner have such information
while he was serving with the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. I have no knowledge that anybody would have. All I have is
speculations.
Mr. BLAKEY. The point of time that I am directing your attention to is while you
were serving on the Warren Commission.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. To your knowledge did any staff member have any such information
while he was serving with the Warren Commission?
Judge GRIFFIN. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice
from which you could or did infer that he had such information?
Judge GRIFFIN. Tell me again what information you are asking me about.
Mr. BLAKEY. This goes to whether the Chief Justice or other people in leadership
capacity were aware of any involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies in plots
against Cuba or to assassinate Fidel Castro.
The question now is whether in retrospect there was any conduct on the part of
the Chief Justice from which you could have or did infer that he had such
information.
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288
Judge GRIFFIN. The only statement that he made in retrospect from which my
inference--there are two statements from which one could make any kind of
inference about what he knew about national security problems. One was his
statement to us that we did not handle this in a responsible way, and I think my
characterization has to be against the background of the fear of McCarthyism;
that we didn't handle what we found in a responsible way, we could trigger a
thermonuclear war.
I remember that phraseology thermonuclear war, being used. I don't know whether
I heard the Chief Justice say that directly or was told it by Mr. Rankin he had
said that.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did he ever explain to you or did anyone else explain to you what he
meant by "handle in a responsible way"?
Judge GRIFFIN. I am certain this all came up in the context of protecting
confidences, not leaking things to the press and maintaining the internal
security of our own investigation. That is the area in which you have to review
that.
The other thing was the statement that I was quoted in the press as making, that
there might be materials that the Commission had which couldn't be revealed for
some extended period of time. I don't remember whether it was 50 years or what
the period of time was. Frankly, that statement also surprised me, even at the
time, because there was nothing that I saw in my judgment that couldn't have
been revealed the minute we concluded our report, with one exception, which I
always understood, which had to do with the autopsy photographs, had nothing to
do with national security but had to do with personal factors surrounding the
Kennedy family. But I never saw any investigative information that in my view
justified any secrecy whatsoever.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any other
Commissioner, that is, other than Chief Justice Warren, from which you could
have or did infer that that Commissioner had such information?
Judge GRIFFIN. Not at the time.
Mr. BLAKEY. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any staff member
from which you could have or did infer that he had such information or she had
such information?
Judge GRIFFIN. ,No, not at the time, nor is there any conduct that I can think
of that would fall in that category.
Mr. BLAKEY. While you served with the Commission did you see any document from
which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice or any other
Commissioner or any staff member had such information?
Judge GRIFFIN. Never.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you ever present during a discussion from which you could have
or did infer that the Chief Justice or any other Commissioner, or any staff
member, had such information?
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you ever instructed by anyone, including the Chief Justice or
any other Commissioner or any staff member, while you were serving on the Warren
Commission, not to pursue any area of inquiry?
Judge GRIFFIN. I was never instructed not to pursue an area of inquiry. Some of
the ways we went about opening up areas of inquiry,
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since we had limited. resources and were under time pressures, required
permission, permission to subpena witnesses to travel, and we needed to clear
all requests for information to an agency through the administrative hierarchy
of the Commission.
I don't recall, I can't at this point remember if any specific inquiry that we
ever sent to an agency was blocked within the Commission. But there were areas
of investigation and methods of investigation we wanted to pursue that were
turned down.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be
explored as opposed to instructing you not to do it?
Judge GRIFFIN. In a substantive sense, no, that was never done. It all had to do
with the method of investigation.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me turn now from the general question of political pressure and
talk to you a little bit about the time pressures that you were under at that
time.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have the clerk mark the memo of Hubert and
Griffin, dated May 14, 1964, re the adequacy of the Ruby investigation, as JFK
exhibit No. 63.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would the clerk show the memo to the witness.
Judge GRIFFIN. I have a copy of it.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can have that memo incorporated in the
record at this point in order that I can ask some questions based on it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 63 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 63
[Memorandum]
MAY 14, 1964.
To: J. Lee Rankin.
From: Leon D. Hubert, Jr. Butt W. Griffin.
Subject: Adequacy of Ruby Investigation.
1. Past Recommendations.--In memoranda data February 19, February February 27,
and March 11, we made various suggestions for extending the investigation
initiated by the FBI in connection with the Oswald homicide. Shortly after March
11, 1964, we began preparation for the nearly 60 depositions taken in Dallas
during the period March 21-April 2; after we returned from Dallas we took the
deposition of C. L Crafard (two days) and George Senator (two days) worked on
editing the depositions taken in Dallas and prepared for another series of 30
other depositions taken in Dallas during the period April 13-17. On our return
from Dallas we continued the editing of the Dallas depositions, prepared the
Dallas deposition exhibits for publication, and began working on a draft of the
report in Area V. As a consequence of all of this activity during the period
March 11-May 13, we did not press for the conferences and discussions referred
to in the attached memoranda. The following represents our view at this time
with respect to appropriate further investigation.
2. General Statement of Areas Not Adequately Investigated.--In reporting on the
murder of Lee Oswald by Jack Ruby we must answer or at least advert to these
questions:
(a) Why did Ruby kill Oswald;
(b) Was Ruby associated with the assassin of President Kennedy;
(c) Did Ruby have any confederates in the murder of Oswald?
It is our belief that although the evidence gathered so far does not show a
conspiratorial link between Ruby and Oswald or between Ruby and others,
nevertheless evidence should be secured, if possible, to affirmatively exclude
that:
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(a) Ruby was indirectly linked through others to Oswald;
(b) Ruby killed Oswald, because of fear; or
(c) Ruby killed Oswald at the suggestion of others.
3. Summary of Evidence Suggesting Further investigation.--The following facts
suggest the necessity of further investigation:
a. Ruby had time to engage in substantial-activities in addition to the
management of his Clubs. Ruby's night club business usually occupied no more
than five hours of a normal working day which began at about 10:00 a.m. and
ended at 2:00 a.m. It was his practice to spend an average of only one hour a
day at his Clubs between 10:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. Our depositions were confined
primarily to persons familiar with Ruby's Club activities. The FBI has
thoroughly investigated Ruby's night club operations but does not seem to have
pinned down his other business or social activities. The basic materials do make
reference to such other activities (see p. 27 of our report of February 18), but
these are casual and collateral and were not explored to determine whether they
involved any underlying sinister purposes. Nor were they probed in such a manner
as to permit a determination as to how much of Ruby's time they occupied.
b. Ruby has always been a person who looked for money-making "sidelines." In the
two months prior to november 22, Ruby supposedly spent considerable time
promoting an exercise device known as a "twist board." the "twist board" was
purportedly manufactured by Plastellite Engineering, a Fort Worth manufacturer
of oil field equipment which has poor credit references and was the subject of
an FBI investigation in 1952. We know of no sales of this item by Ruby; nor do
we know if any "twist boards" were manufactured for sale. The posibility remains
that the "twist board" was a front for some other illegal enterprise.
c. Ruby has long been close to persons pursuing illegal activities. Although
Ruby had no known ideological or political interests (see p. 35 of our report of
february 18), there is much evidence that he was interested in Cuban matters. In
early 1959, Ruby inquired concerning the smuggling of persons out of Cuba. He
has admitted that, at that time, he negotiated for the sale of jeeps ot Castro.
In September 1959, Ruby visited Havana at the invitation of Las Vegas racketeer,
Louis J.
McWillie, who paid Ruby's expenses for the trip and who was later expelled from
Cuba by Castro. McWillie is described by Ralph Paul, Ruby's business partner, as
one of Ruby's closest friends. Ruby mailed a gun to McWillie in early 1963. In
1961, it is reported that Ruby attended three meetings in Dallas in connection
with the sale of arms to Cubans and the smuggling out of refugees. The informant
identifies an Ed Brunner as Ruby's associate in this endeavor. Shortly after his
arrest on November 24, Ruby named Fred Brenner as one of his expected attorneys.
Brunner did not represent Ruby, however. Insufficient investigation has been
conducted to confirm or deny the report about meetings in 1961. When Henry Wade
announced to the Press on November 22, 1963 that Oswald was a member of the Free
Cuba Committee, Ruby corrected Wade by stating "Not the Free Cuba Committee; the
Fair Play for Cuba Committee. There is a difference." The Free Cuba Committee is
an existing anti-Castro organization. Earl Ruby, brother of Jack Ruby, sent an
unexplained telegram to Havana in April 1962. We believe that a reasonable
possibility exists that Ruby has maintained a close interest in Cuban affairs to
the extent necessary to participate in gun sales or smugggling.
d. Bits of evidence link Ruby to others who may have been interested in Cuban
affairs. When Ruby's car was seized on November 24, it contained various
right-wing radio scripts issued by H.L. Hunt and a copy of the Wall Street
Journal bearing the mailing address of a man who has not yet been identified. In
May 1963, Earl Ruby, operator of a dry cleaning business, is known to have
telephoned the Welch Candy Company (owned by the founder of John Birch Society).
The purpose of the call is unknown. Jack Ruby's personal notebook contained the
Massachusetts telephone number and address of Thomas Hill, former Dallas
resident, working at the Boston headquarters of the John Birch Society. Although
it is most likely that all of those bits of circumstantial evidence have
innocent explanations, none has yet been explained.
e. Although Ruby did not witness the motorcade through Dallas, he may have had a
prior interest in the President's visit. A November 20 edition of the Fort Worth
Telegram showing the President's proposed route through Fort Worth, and the
November 20 edition of the Fort Worth Telegram showing the President's proposed
route through Fort Worth, and the November 20 edition of the Dallas Morning News
showing the President's route through Dallas, were found in Ruby's car on
November 24.
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f. On November 16 Jack Ruby met at the Carousel Club with Bertha Cheek, sister
of Mrs. Earlene Roberts, manager of Lee Oswald's rooming house. Mrs. Cheek said
that she and Ruby discussed her lending Ruby money to open a new night club.
Ruby was not questioned about this matter. On November 20, 1963, a woman who may
be identical to Earlene Roberts, was reported to be in San Antonio at the time
of President Kennedy's visit, The possible identification of Mrs. Roberts in San
Antonio has not been checked out. In addition, the link formed by Mrs. Roberts
between Oswald and Ruby is buttressed in some measure by the fact that one of
Ruby's strippers dated a tenant of the Beckley Street rooming house during the
tenancy of Lee Oswald. We have previously suggested the theory that Ruby and
Mrs. Cheek could have been involved in Cuban arms sales of which Oswald gained
knowledge through his efforts to infiltrate the anti-Castro Cubans. Our doubts
concerning the real interest of Mrs. Cheek in Jack Ruby stem from the fact that
one of her four husbands was a convicted felon and one of her friends was a
police officer who married one of Ruby's strip-tease dancers. We have suggested
that Ruby might have killed Oswald out of fear that Oswald might implicate Ruby
and his friends falsely or not in effort to save his own life. We think that
neither Oswald's Cuban interests in Dallas nor-Ruby's Cuban activities have been
adequately explored.
g. Ruby made or attempted to make contacts on November 22 and 23 with persons,
known and unknown, who could have been co-conspirators. Ruby was visited in
Dallas from November 21 to November 24, 1963 by Lawrence Meyers of Chicago.
Meyers had visited Ruby two weeks previously. Ruby also made a long distance
call shortly after the President's death to Alex Gruber in Los Angeles. Gruber
had visited Ruby about the same time as Meyers in early November. Both Gruber
and Meyers give innocent explanations. Meyers claims he was in Dallas enjoying
life with a "dumb but accommodating broad." Gruber claims Ruby called to say he
would not mail a dog that day, as he had promised to do. Finally between 11:35
p.m. and 12 midnight, Saturday, November 23, Ruby made a series of brief long
distance phone calls culminating with a call to entertainer Breck Wall at a
friend's house in Galveston. Wall claims Ruby called to compliment him for
calling off his (Wall's) act at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas. Background checks
have not been made on these persons.
h. In short, we believe that the possibility exists, based on evidence already
available, that Ruby was involved in illegal dealings with Cuban elements who
might have had contact with Oswald. The existence of such dealings can only be
surmised since the present investigation has not focused on that area.
i. We suggest that these matters cannot be left "hanging in the air." They must
either be explored further or a firm decision must be made not to do so
supported by stated reasons for the decision. As a general matter, we think the
investigation deficient in these respects:
(1) Substantial time-segments in Ruby's daily routine from September 26 to
November 22 have not been accounted for.
(2) About 46 persons who saw Ruby from November 22 to November 24 have not been
questioned by staff members, although there are FBI reports of interviews with
all these people.
(3) Persons who have been interviewed because of known associations with Ruby
generally have not been investigated themselves so that their truthfulness can
be evaluated. The FBI reports specifically do not attempt evaluation. The
exception has been that where the FBI has been given incriminating evidence
against Ruby, it has made further investigation to determine whether others
might also be implicated with Ruby. In every case where there was some evidence
implicating others, those other persons were interviewed and denied the
incriminating allegations. Further investigation has not been undertaken to
resolve the conflicts.
(4) Much of our knowledge of Ruby comes from his friends Andrew Armstrong, Ralph
Paul, George Senator, and Larry Crafard. Investigations have not been undertaken
to corroborate their claims-
4. Specific Investigative Recommendations.
a. We should obtain photos of all property found on Ruby's person, in his car,
or at his home or clubs, now in possession of the Dallas District Attorney. We
already have photos of Ruby's address books, but no other items have been
Photographed or delivered to the Commission. These items include the H. L Hunt
literature and newspapers mentioned in paragraphs 3d and 3e.
b. We should conduct staff interviews or take depositions with respect to Ruby's
Cuban activities of the following persons:
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i. Robert Ray McKeown.--Ruby contacted McKeown in 1959 in connection with the
sale of jeeps to Cuba. The objective of an interview or deposition of McKeown
would be to obtain information on possible contacts Ruby would have made after
1959 if his interest in armament sales continued.
ii. Nancy Perrin.--Perrin claims she met with Ruby three times in 1961
concerning refugee smuggling and arms sales. She says she can identify the house
in Dallas where meetings took place. Perrin now lives in Boston. Ruby admits he
was once interested in the sale of jeeps, at least, to Cuba.
c. We should obtain reports from the CIA concerning Ruby's associations. the CIA
has been requested to provide a report based on a memorandum delivered to them
March 12, 1964 covering Ruby's background including his possible Cuban
activities, but a reply has not been received as yet.
d. We should obtain reports from the FBI based on requested investigation of
allegations suggesting that Earlene Roberts was in San Antonio on November 21.
e. The Commission should take the testimony of the following persons the reasons
stated:
i. Hyman Rubenstein, Eva Grant, Earl Ruby.
All are siblings of Jack Ruby. Hyman is the oldest child and presumably will be
the best witness as to family history. He talked to Jack on November 22,
reportedly visited Jack the week before the assassination, and participated in
Ruby's twist board venture. Eva lived with Jack for 3 years in California prior
to World War II, induced Jack to come to Dallas in 1947, and managed the Vegas
Club for Jack in Dallas from 1959 to 1963. Earl was a travelling salesman with
Jack from 1943.-1943, a business partner 1946-1947, and made phone calls before
November 22, 1963 and afterwards which require explanations.
ii. Henry Wade.--This person can testify to the development of the testimony by
Sgt. Dean and Det. Archer against Ruby and of seeing Ruby on November 22 in the
Police Department building.
iii. Jack Ruby.
f. We should take the depositions of the following persons for the reasons
stated:
i. Tom Howard.--This person is one of Ruby's original attorneys, and is reported
to have been in the police basement a few minutes before Oswald was shot and to
have inquired if Oswald had been moved. He filed a writ of habeas corpus for
Ruby about one hour after the shooting of Oswald. He could explain these
activities and possibly tell us about the Ruby trial. We should have these
explanations.
ii. FBI Agent Hall.--This person interviewed Ruby for 2 1/2 hours on November 24
beginning at approximately 12 noon. His report is contradictory to Sgt. Dean's
trial testimony. He also interviewed Ruby on December 21, 1963.
iii. Seth Kantor.--This person was interviewed twice by the FBI and persists in
his claim that he saw Ruby at Parkland Hospital shortly before or after the
President's death was announced- Ruby denies that he was ever at Parkland
Hospital. We must decide who is telling the truth, for there would be
considerable significance if it were concluded that Ruby is lying. Should we
make an evaluation without seeing Kantor ourselves?
iv. Bill DeMar.--This person claims to have seen Oswald at the Carousel Club
prior to November 22, and this rumor perhaps more than any other has been given
wide circulation. Should we evaluate De Mar's credibility solely on the basis of
FBI reports?
g. The FBI should re-interview the following persons for the purposes stated:
i. Alex Gruber.--To obtain personal history to establish original meeting and
subsequent contacts with Ruby; to obtain details of visit to Dallas in November
1965, including where he stayed, how long, who saw him, etc. The FBI should also
check its own files on Gruber.
ii. Lawrence Meyers. (Same as Gruber.)
iii. Ken Dowe.--(KLIF reporter). To ascertain how he happened to first contact
Ruby on November 22 or 23; (Ruby provided information to KLIF concerning the
location of Chief Curry), and whether KLIF gave any inducements to Ruby to work
for it on the weekend of November 22-24.
iv. Rabbi Silverman.---To establish when Silverman saw Ruby at the Synagogue and
obtain names of other persons who may have seen Ruby at the Synagogue on
November 22 and 23. Silverman states that he saw Ruby at the 8 p.m. service on
November 22 and at the 9 a.m. service on November 23; but
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both of these services lasted at least two hours and we do not know whether Ruby
was present for the entire services. Silverman (and others) could "place" Ruby,
or fail to do so, during crucial hours.
v. Mickey Ryan.--(Same as Gruber plus employment in Dallas.)
vi. Breck Wall.--This person was an entertainer at the Adolphus Hotel, Dallas,
at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ruby called him in Galveston
at 11:47 p.m. Saturday, November 23, 1963. He also visited Ruby at the County
jail. A background check should be conducted as to this person.
vii. Andrew Armstrong, Bruce Carlin, Karen Bennett Carlin, Curtis LaVerne
Crafard, Ralph Paul, George Senator.
These six persons were deposed at length because of their friendship with Ruby,
familiarity with Ruby's personal and business life, and contacts with Ruby on
November 22, 23, and 24. In general, each has presumed to have had no knowledge
of Ruby's activities during those three days.
Andrew Armstrong was very active in the operation of the Carousel and worked
closely with Ruby for 18 months. His deposition covers Ruby's activities and
emotional state generally and particularly several hours on November 22 and 23.
A background check should be conducted as to this person and selected parts of
his testimony should be checked out to test his veracity.
Karen and Bruce Carlin were the recipients of a $25 money order bought by Ruby
approximately 5 minutes before Ruby shot Oswald. Marguerite Oswald testified
that she believed she knew Karen Carlin. Background checks should be conducted
on the Carlins.
Crafard fled Dallas unexpectedly on Saturday morning November 23. Although we
tend to believe his explanation, we believe a background check on him plus
verification of some of his activities on November 23 are warranted.
Paul is Ruby's business partner. A background check should be conducted as to
him and his telephone calls during November should be checked out. George
Senator, Ruby's roommate, alleged by Crafard to be a homosexual, claims not to
have seen Ruby except at their apartment Sunday morning and for a few hours
early Saturday morning. Senator's background and own admitted activities on
November 22, 23, and 24 should be verified.
5. Other areas of Ruby Investigation which are not complete.
a. Various rumors link Ruby and Oswald which do not appear to be true; however,
the materials we have are not sufficient to discredit them satisfactorily. Such
rumors include:
i. Communist associations of Ruby;
ii. Oswald's use of a Cadlilac believed to belong to Ruby;
iii. After the depositions of Nancy Parrin, Robert McKeown, and Sylvia Odio have
been taken, further investigation may be necessary with respect to Ruby's Cuban
associations.
b. Ruby's notebooks contain numerous names, addresses, and telephone numbers.
Many of these persons have either not been located or deny knowing Ruby. We
believe further investigation is appropriate in some instances; however, we have
not yet evaluated the reports now on hand.
c. We have no expert evidence as to Ruby's mental condition; however, we will
obtain transcripts of the psychiatric testimony at the Ruby trial.
6. Other Investigative Suggestions.--We have suggested in earlier memoranda that
two sources of evidentiary material have been virtually ignored:
a. Radio, TV and Movie Recordings. Two Dallas radio stations tape recorded every
minute of air time on November 22, 23, and 24. We have obtained these radio
tapes for all except a portion of November 24, and the tapes include a number of
interviews with key witnesses in the Oswald area. In addition, the tapes shed
considerable light on the manner in which Dallas public officials and federal
agents conducted the investigations and performed in public view. We believe
that similar video tapes and movie films should be obtained from NBC, CBS, IBC,
UPI, and Movietone News, and relevant portions should be reviewed by staff
members. Wherever witnesses appear on these films who have been considered by
the Commission in preparing its report, a copy of such witnesses' appearance
should be made a part of the Commission records by introducing them in evidence.
If one person were directed to superintend and organize this effort, we believe
it could be done without unreasonable expenditures of Commission time and in
money.
b. Hotel and motel registrations, airline passenger manifests, and Emigration
and Immigration records.
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Copies of Dallas hotel and motel registrations and airline manifests to and from
Dallas should be obtained for the period September 26 to December 1, 1963.
Similarly, Emigration and Immigration records should be obtained for the period
October 1, 1963 to January 1, 1964. We believe that these records may provide a
useful tool as new evidence develops after the Commission staff at the present
time. But, for example is is likely that in the future, persons will come
forward who will claim to have been in Dallas during the critical period and who
will claim to have important information. These records may serve to confirm or
refute their claims.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Griffin, do you recall the circumstances that led you and Mr.
Hubert to prepare this memorandum?
Judge GRIFFIN. In a general sense I do; yes. I don't remember the specific
catalytic event but I remember where we were.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you asked sometime in May to finish your work by June 1?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't remember the date but we were given a deadline which we
felt we couldn't meet, whatever that date was.
Mr. BLAKEY. Was this memorandum prepared in response to a request?
Judge GRIFFIN. At the same time as that kind of pressure was coming, whether it
was specifically in direct response to a request I don't know, but for practical
purposes that is right.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder, Judge Griffin, if I could direct your attention to page 2
of the memorandum and ask you to focus on paragraph 3a. In general terms you
indicate that there was a need for further investigation and you observe that
the FBI has thoroughly investigated Mr. Ruby's night club operations but does
not seem to have pinned down his other business or social activity. Is that
correct?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes.
Mr. BLAKEY. In the period of time after this memorandum was written that is
between May and July and August when the investigation wound down, did the
Bureau subsequently pin down these other activities?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't think they did. The question in part is whether they did
any more as a result. What was Mr. Rankin's response to this memo? I don't know
whether we got a written response to this or not. I don't have any recollection
of really pursuing this. I have a general recollection of a conversation, I
don't remember who it was with, in which we were not told we could not do any of
these things but we were told not to go off the deep end, and so forth, and we
were in a sense given a light to go ahead but they still made clear to us that
we had these deadlines. So I don't know what we did to follow that up.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me direct your attention now to page 9 of the memorandum, to
paragraph c, which then continues over on page 3 and also paragraph f, on page
3, which continues over on page 4.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. In which you generalIy indicate that Mr. Ruby had been close to
persons pursuing various legal activities. You note, for example, in September
1959, Mr. Ruby visited Havana at the invitation of a man named Louis J.
McWillie, whom you characterized as a Las Vegas racketeer. You also indicate
that Mr. Ralph Paul had indicated that Ruby considered Mr. McWillie one of his
closest friends.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
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Mr. BLAKEY. You comment:
In addition we believe that a reasonable possibility exists that Ruby has
maintained a close interest in Cuban affairs to the extent necessary to
participate in gun sales or smuggling.
Now reading over page 4, paragraph f:
We think that neither Oswald's Cuban interests in Dallas nor Ruby's Cuban
activities have been adequately explored.
This of course was written as of May 14. In the period of time after May 14 in
your judgment did the Bureau subsequently adequately explore these Cuban
matters?
Judge GRIFFIN. In fairness to the Bureau I don't think they had much of a
request to explore them. There were some requests made to them for
investigation. We did not pursue these matters in a manner I felt at the time,
or ever have felt, was satisfactory.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me direct your attention now to page 3 of the memorandum,
specifically paragraph d, in which you generally indicate that there is some
possible connection between Ruby and various rightwing groups. Particularly you
mention H. L. Hunt, and raise the possibility of some connection between Mr.
Ruby and the John Birch Society.
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes.
Mr. BLAKEY. In your judgment in the period of time following May did the Bureau
adequately explore these possible rightwing connections?
Judge GRIFFIN. Again, I have to answer that in terms of what we requested them
to do. At this point I don't recall what we requested with respect to H. L.
Hunt. With respect to Earl Ruby, Hubert and I explored Earl Ruby's connection
with Ruby to a very limited extent but we never requested any followup.
We took his deposition on May 14, 1964, and asked him some questions about the
Welch Candy Co. We did push a request for information on Thomas Hill. My
recollection on that is that the Bureau did everything we asked them to do.
Whether they could have done more about it and didn't, that I don't know.
Mr. BLAKEY. I call your attention to page 4, specifically paragraph g, and note
that you indicate that Mr. Ruby had a visit from one lawrence Meyers from
Chicago, you comment on the relationship between Mr. Meyers and Mr. Alex Gruber
of Los Angeles and conclude: "Background checks have not been made on these
persons."
Subsequently did the Bureau do background checks to your knowledge of Mr. Meyers
and Mr. Gruber?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know. Again I am not certain whether were requested that.
I will say that I don't know whether there was anything put in writing, any
written response to this memo. Your records I think would reveal that. It is
quite possible that based on your conversations with those who received this
memo that Hubert and I decided that we had to make--in fact, I know we did
this--after we had talked about this we decided we had to make some choices
about where we could go, because we had a lot of resistance to these things. We
felt that we couldn't expose ourselves to too many dead ends things that looked
like wild goose chases.
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I am fairly coriclent that although we may never have been told not to do
certain things, that we made the decision probably ourselves that we should go
for the things that we thought might have the best chance of a payoff and avoid
any further hassle with others in the Commission over our view on how to conduct
the investigation.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me last direct your attention to page 4 and specifically to
paragraph h, and quoting from the record:
In short, we believe that the possibility exists, based on evidence already
available, that Ruby was involved in illegal dealings with Cuban elements who I
might have had contact with Oswald. The existence of such dealings can only be
surmised since the present investigation has not focused in that area?
In your judgment did the investigation in succeeding months adequately focus on
that area?
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Judge Griffin, I wonder if I could direct your attention to the
final report of the Commission, a copy of which is on the desk in front of you,
to your right, and ask you to look at page 365 in the official report, and page
340 in the New York Times edition.
Looking now at page 365, the Commission discusses at page 365 in the official
report and page 340 of the New York Times report, Ruby's background and
associates and it says:
In addition to examining in detail Jack Ruby's activities from November 21 to
November 24, and his possible acquaintanceship with Lee Harvey Oswald, the
Commission has considered whether or not Ruby had ties with individuals or
groups that might have obviated the need for any direct contact near the time of
the assassination. Study of Jack Ruby's background, which is set out more fully
in appendix XVI, leads to the final conclusion that he had no such ties.
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me understand what that first sentence is there. "The
Commission has considered whether or not Ruby had ties with individuals or
groups that might have obviated the need for any direct contact near the time of
the assassination."
Ties to some intermediate group that might have wanted to assassinate the
President?
Mr. BLAKEY. In the context of your memorandum of May were you raising the
question whether Ruby had illegal dealings with Cuban elements who might have
had contact with Oswald? Do you believe that the succeeding months of
investigation from May through September adequately explored those dealings so
that this conclusion "leads to the final conclusion that he had no such ties,"
could have been
Judge GRIFFIN. If this phrase individual or groups that might have obviated the
need," if that is read to mean any Cuban groups or any people interested in
dealing with Cuba, I would say no, I would not agree with that last sentence
that you read.
I must say I don't know what the first sentence means.
Mr. McKINNEY. Does that not simply mean that there could have been contact
between Ruby and Oswald without physical contact?
Judge GRIFFIN. I know it means that. The question is whether someone had in mind
some group that we knew had contact with Oswald. If that is meant to say that we
could reach a conclusion that someone that we knew had direct contact with
Oswald also had direct contact with Ruby, then this sentence about the firm
conclusion is probably
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correct, that we could conclude that based upon someone that we know at that
time that had a direct contact, we could say yes, he didn't have any direct
contact we knew about, but how about the people we don't know about?
Mr. BLAKEY. I would like to know your feeling in May that there might be a
relationship between Oswald and Ruby through Cuban elements, and your suggestion
in May that that possible connection should be adequately explored.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. I am raising the question that I understand that you thought it was
not adequately explored.
If it was not, I am wondering how the Commission could have concluded on page
365 in the official report and on page 340 in the New York Times report that
there were no such ties.
Judge GRIFFIN. Because I think that this report throughout was really written
from a very narrow perspective when general terms were used and they really
meant someone we already knew a group we already knew had contact with Oswald.
The question was could we find that Ruby had contact with any of those specific
individuals or groups, groups not meaning every Cuban in the country but a
specific known group that Oswald had made contact with.
Mr. BLAKEY. In the context of that answer, let me direct your attention to page
370 of the official report and the New York Times report on page 346. Reading
now from page 340 of the official report and page 348 of the New York Times
report, there is an indication of information on a relationship between Ruby and
Louis J. McWillie, who you mentioned in your memorandum of May 5; and then in
the next designated paragraph, paragraph designated "Possible Underworld
Connections," let me direct your attention to the two concluding sentences:
Ruby has disclaimed that he was associated with organized crime activities, and
law enforcement agencies have confirmed that denial.
Judge GRIFFIN. I suppose that statement on its face is true, that Ruby has said
that he didn't have organized criminal activity and law enforcement agencies
have said yes; he is not associated with organized criminal activities.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The law enforcement agencies said that?
Judge GRIFFIN. That is right. I think that is a true statement.
Mr. BLAKEY. On page 801 of the official report and page 707 of the New York
Times edition, I quote now from the last paragraph, headed "Underworld Ties."
This is from the appendix generally dealing with Mr. Ruby's background:
Based on its evaluation of the record, however, the Commission believes that the
evidence does not establish a significant link between Ruby and organized crime.
Both State and Federal officials have indicated that Ruby was not affiliated
with organized criminal activities, and numerous persons have reported that Ruby
was not connected with such activity.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right. I think the key words are "significant link" and that
question was: Where did Ruby stand in the organized criminal hierarchy? Was he a
big fish, little fish, or was he on the
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periphery? It is not an attempt to say that he did not have lots of friends and
associates and couldn't perhaps get things done and that they might not call
upon him.
Mr. DODD. Counsel, that is clearly what it says. I don't know how you can
possibly reach any other conclusion from that statement that he was not
associated or affiliated. To say that that statement indicates he was not
significantly involved, I think, is not a fair appraisal of it.
Judge GRIFFIN. The question is what you mean by "significant."
Mr. BLAKEY. Do you think a normal person, an average American lay reader to whom
this report was directed, in reading that, would have led to believe that Ruby
was not associated in any way with organized crime?
Judge GRIFFIN. Let me say this: If anybody who reads the whole appendix there,
which lays out all what his associations were--if you just read the last
sentence, if you don't read all the other associations that are laid out but if
you read one or two pages we have on this and you look at the footnotes, you
will see it is actually one page, guess-it goes in his past history, so this
entire appendix covers a good many pages of laying out what his specific
associations were going all the way back to the 1930's and early 1940's in
Chicago.
I don't think anybody who could read this and have all of this information that
is in here would have any doubt that there were lots and lots of associations
that he had with underworld types and one could fairly characterize him in a
kind of way as a fringe person the underworld.
Unfortunately, for various reasons, this report is loaded with code words such
as "the Commission found no evidence" and this one significant link." It is an
attempt by the Commission to say to the lie that:"Yes; the average person would
read this and, if you read it the newspapers, you would think there is a lot of
stuff here, but we are exercising a professional evaluation and we don't think
this is significant."
Mr. BLAKEY. In your professional judgment, did you explore the relationship
between Ruby and McWillie, and possible connections with organized crime
figures?
Judge GRIFFIN. If we were conducting an investigation that really was a
no-time-limit, no-stops investigation into whether there could have been a
conspiracy to assassinate the President that involved underworld, and if we had
had one bit of information at that point that was significant that would show
that the underworld might had a motive or might have been connected with someone
else who a motive to assassinate the President, my answer would be that this was
not adequate.
But at the point that we stopped this investigation, we didn't know anything
about the so-called Mafia connections with the CIA, we knew nothing about the
assassination attempts in the Caribbean. The thing we could see in the
underworld types were that they were to make some money selling guns to Cuba,
and that did not seem to justify the next conclusion, that they therefore wanted
to the President.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you know in 1964 that it was at least alleged that McWillie was
manager of the Tropicana Casino?
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Judge GRIFFIN. I think that is all in the record.
Mr. DODD. Did you say earlier you were familiar with this memorandum from the
Central Intelligence Agency dated, I think, September 17, 1964, in which the CIA
states emphatically that they have no information on Jack Ruby or his
activities?
Judge GRIFFIN. Including Louis McWillie, for example. His name was in a memo
that they were responding to. Louis McWillie's name was given to them by us
along with a lot of other people. Understand that we got that memo 8 or 9 days
before the report was published. That report was already in galley proof, and
the galleys--probably the page proofs--were being read at the time this report
came back from the CIA.
Mr. DODD. In your memo of May 14, 2 or 3 months before that, clearly raise
questions about Ruby's possibly becoming involved in purchasing jeeps for
Castro, which is a political activity on which the CIA would have some
information or they would be derelict in their duty?
Judge GRIFFIN. Absolutely.
Mr. BLAKEY. Were you also aware after May 1960 he took a job at the casino that
was allegedly owned by Meyer Lansky?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know whether we knew that.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would you have known the name Meyer Lansky in 1964?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes. That kind of information would not have significantly
affected our decision unless we knew two things, at least unless we knew that
the Mafia, the underworld types, were being used by the CIA in connection with
international Cuban activities. If we had known that the CIA in any way was
utilizing underworld people in connection with any kind of Cuban activity, that
might have said more for us--most particularly if we had, of course, known there
was an effort on some part of the people in our Government to assassinate
Castro.
Mr. BLAKEY. You know it?
Judge GRIFFIN. We did not know it.
Mr. BLAKEY. You knew that Ruby had some connection with the underworld?
Judge GRIFFIN. That is all we knew.
Mr. BLAKEY. You knew he was trying to sell jeeps to Castro?
Judge GRIFFIN. In 1959--incidentally, we had rumors on that which we could never
confirm from anyone.
Mr. BLAKEY. You were suspicious enough?
Judge GRIFFIN. We were suspicious.
Mr. BLAKEY. You knew the guy had underworld connections, you knew he had
political activities in a foreign country?
Judge GRIFFIN. We took the depositions of all of the people who gave us that
information. We requested further information from the CIA. We got their
September 15 memo. We got nothing to start with from them. We were being told to
write the report. We got no further information.
I can't tell you in any kind of detail what we requested of the FBI. I feel
fairly certain that we were making requests to the FBI up to the point that we
got nothing back. At that point we had nothing link it in with.
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Mr. BLAKEY. Would any of these other names be familiar with you: Jake Lansky?
Would that name mean anything to you?
Judge GRIFFIN. Sure.
Mr. BLAKEY. Gerald Catens, Would that name mean anything to you in 1963?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes; that would not have told us anything that we did not already
believe about Lansky anyhow.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would the name David Cellini mean anything to you?
Judge GRIFFIN. No; it would not mean anything to us.
Mr. BLAKEY. Eddie Levinson, who was alleged to own the Riveria Casino?
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKER. Does the name Trafficante mean anything to you?
Judge GRIFFIN. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Raoul Gonzales or Benny Fernandez?
Judge GRIFFIN. I think the answer would have to be no; it did not mean anything
to us.
Mr. BLAKEY. The reason I raise this with you, Judge Griffin, to move off the
question of a possible CIA or Mafia connection as a motive: Were you aware in
the 1960's the Department of Justice, under Robert Kennedy, had what some people
say was a vigorous organized crime drive?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would the death of the President have possible undermined Robert
Kennedy's political support in the Government.
Judge GRIFFIN. You are asking me to speculate now on that? Or did we think about
that question? I don't think we thought about it, didn't think about it.
Mr. BLAKEY. As a matter of fact, did Robert Kennedy remain in the Department of
Justice after the President's assassination, under President Johnson?
Judge GRIFFIN. He was elected Senator from New York.
Mr. BLAKEY. In point of fact, he left the Department of Justice, did he not?
Judge GRIFFIN. I will say categorically that by Hubert and me that possibility
was not seriously explored. I think what you are saying is the possibility that
someone associated with the underworld would have wanted to assassinate the
President; isn't that right?
Mr. BLAKEY. To undermine the organized crime program.
Judge GRIFFIN. You see, the difficulty with making that leap was that--I am
satisfied everyone who investigates this will have the same conclusion--that
Oswald was the person who assassinated the President. There was no showing that
Oswald had any connection with organized crime. Therefore, there was no reason
to think that simply because Ruby was involved in organized crime, that that
would have been linked to the assassination of the President.
We needed to fill that in, in some way, but that is why the Cuban link is so
important. If we had known that the CIA wanted to assassinate Castro, then all
of the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about, this made much, much more
sense. If we had further known that the CIA was involved with organized criminal
figures in an assassination attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a
completely different perspective on this thing.
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But, because we did not have those links at this point, there was nothing to tie
the underworld in with Cuba and thus nothing to tie them in with Oswald, nothing
to tie them in with the assassination of the President.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me direct your attention back to what has been marked as JFK
exhibit No. 63, your memorandum of May 14. Beginning on page 5 and following,
there are the names of a number of people that you suggest either should be
interviewed by the staff or from whom depositions should be taken or that the
Bureau should reinterview in the field.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. I don't find McWillie among those people. Is there any reason why he
was omitted that you can recall now?
Judge GRIFFIN. It may be that we had pursued this is a request mostly for
background information on these people. We identified McWillie very early as a
somebody who might be a key link. It may be that at the time we wrote this memo,
we had gotten everything we felt we could get out of the FBI, that we could not
make a productive request to the FBI, so that we were now focusing on other
people in an effort to see if they somehow linked back in. I think that is
probably why McWillie was left out.
Mr. BLAKEY. If you knew then what you know today about the relationship between
McWillie and such figures as Meyer and Jake Lansky and Trafficante and other
organized crime figures who apparently were heavily involved in Cuban gambling
and the fact that those Cuban gambling syndicates had a relationship with the
CIA in an effort to overthrow Premier Castro, do you think you would have more
vigorously pursued McWillie?
Judge GRIFFIN. It is not simply McWillie.
Mr. BLAKEY. And all organized crime, the Cuban connection?
Judge GRIFFIN. I frankly think that if anybody on the staff level that I dealt
with had had this information, the memos that Hubert and I were
generating--which I expressed my unhappiness about the response to---I don't
think they would have been handled in that way.
Now, whether above the staff level that I was dealing with, other people had
information which produced a much higher-up decision not to go forward in this
area, I don't how.
I have said to Mr. Blakey in our private conversation in Cleveland that it
frankly is not conceivable to me that Allen Dulles did not know about everything
we are talking about here. I personally would not believe it if he came here and
denied it to my face. I a]so don't believe the President didn't know about this.
Now, how much was then communicated on to the Chief Justice how specific the
communications might have been, my own speculation, like any other citizen's,
reflecting my own involvement in this, is that I think the Chief Justice had to
be told something pretty convincing in order to get him to take this job.
I don't know how much detail they would have given him but he must have
genuinely believed that there was a national security question involved here,
not simply a McCarthyism kind of question.
From my own perspective at this point, I have a stron belief, without any more
information than I have a]ready expressed, that at least
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Allen Dulles, if not one or two or her people somewhere in the Commission
hierarchy had some information about the importance of the Cuban problem that
wasn't communicated to us.
Mr. DODD. Given that fact, would it not be fair, then, to assume--given the fact
you had a group of energetic, young attorneys who were anxious to uncover this
thing and, by your own statement earlier, to prove the FBI wrong--that you would
have to conclude that soma of the key staff people then would also have to be
privy to that information?
Judge GRIFFIN. No; I don't know where the "key" goes.
Mr. DODD. What happened to this memo of yours? This is a damn good memo, May 14.
Hell, these are exactly the kind of questions we are wrestling with. Had someone
asked those questions, talked to people who are no longer with us at this point,
we would not be sitting here possibly today. You had 2 to 3 weeks, less than
that, before the Commission folded its tent?
Judge GRIFFIN. No; this was in May and the report came out in September.
Mr. DODD. Your last hearings were held in June?
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. DODD. June 3 was the date. You had May 14 to June 3, less than 3 weeks?
Mr. FAUNTROY. They responded in September.
Judge GRIFFIN. You see, in order to understand their response, have to take into
account what they were learning outside of the Oswald area--
Mr. DODD. You have touched on some pretty sensitive points in this memo by fluke
or otherwise. I think you scared some people.
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't think they were by fluke. I am trying to be totally
straightforward with you because I have strong feelings about this in terms of
the possibilities that we had in this area. I didn't write this memo for flimsy
reasons.
Mr. DODD. I know that.
Judge GRIFFIN. Nothing that has happened since I wrote this memo substantially
changes my view about this. So I obviously feel that somewhere along the line
somebody pulled the rug out from under us. But I am not willing to jump to the
conclusion that it knowingly took place within the staff. Some of this relates
to the field.
You see people on a day-to-day basis. It is hard for me to believe that Howard
Willens and Dave Slawson and the other people whom I worked with on this thing
knew anything significant that I didn't know. I am strongly inclined to believe
at that level they didn't know any more than I did.
Mr. DODD. What happened to this memo? You asked the question. On page 4 you say:
"We think neither Oswald's Cuban interests Dallas nor Ruby's Cuban activities
have been adequately explored." I can see people at the CIA just flipping out,
knowing now what they knew then.
Judge GRIFFIN. CIA never saw this memo, but they saw another one.
Mr. DODD. How do you know they didn't see it?
Judge GRIFFIN. That is true; they may have.
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Mr. DODD. What I am getting at is that these are some pretty good questions and,
knowing what we know now, I can see where this could have caused some serious
what happened to the memo? What happened to the response?
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't know whether we got a written response back. I can only
answer that in a kind of general way. I am trying to recall 13 years ago. I made
some notes on my memo, my copy of this, as to what I recall happening. In some
cases we went ahead and took testimony. In other cases my notes reflect--at some
point I will be happy to share my notes on all of these; these are my personal
recollections I made on this--that I think we did what I indicated to Mr.
McKinney we did.
We were told, in response to this memo, basically that we still had to start to
write, that we had certain deadlines to meet, but we knew they kept getting put
back, given the list of people that we wanted to depose and we could do it. "If
you want to get some other stuff out to the FBI, okay, but remember they are
getting pretty sick of this investigation at the FBI." It was this kind of
quality of dialog that was taking place over this memo.
I believe that what happened was that, against that context of things, Hubert
and I went back and we looked at this memo and we decided: What do we have in
here that we could get something on in a reasonable period of time and let us
try to get that, let us put our energies in that direction because we know we
have to start producing copy for them at some point; we have to start writing.
We made decisions based on that kind of thing.
Mr. DODD. I can see that.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could turn to a slightly different area
and inquire of Judge Griffin whether there were pressures other than time, for
example, resource pressures. I wonder if, in that context, I could ask the clerk
to mark a Hubert-Griffin memo of April 4, 1964:, to Howard Willens as JFK
exhibit No. 64.
I wonder if the clerk will show it to the witness. Are you familiar with that?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes, I am.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I can have that document placed in the
record so that we can ask some questions of the witness based on it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 64 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 64
[ Memorandum ]
APRIL 4, 1964.
To: Mr. Howard Willens.
From: Leon D. Hubert and Burr W. Griffin.
1. You will recall that after the staff meeting on Friday, we stayed on with Mr.
Rankin to discuss the matter of giving us assistance in area V. Three subareas
are involved:
a. A checkout of names, telephone numbers, addresses, et cetera found in Ruby's
Papers. (See area "E")
b. A checkout of all rumors relative to possible associations between Ruby and
Oswald; and between Ruby and the gangster element. (See area "F")
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c. An analysis of telephone calls by Jack, Eva, and Earl Ruby and by Paul.
2. Mr. Rankin told us to get Mr. Lenbrandt (Chief Justice Warren's guard) to do
this work. Because of the press of time and because we did not really put our
minds to it at the moment, we failed to say to Mr. Rankin that each subarea will
require a man working full time for a month. There is no possibility that this
work can be properly done so as to be useful in writing a report even if it had
a deadline date of June 15.
3. In connection with the above and for the other reasons stated below, we do,
not think the Ruby aspect of the case should be included in the Commission's
report.
a. To do an acceptable job on Ruby, it would be necessary to make public
statements concerning his character, his background, the possibility that he was
lying about his entry into the basement, his motivation and state of mind, et
cetera.
Ruby's conviction is refused and our report is in any way hostile to Ruby, the
Commission could be justly criticized for issuing a report which impaired his
right to a fair trial. On the other hand, if the report gave support to Ruby's
already stated version, the prosecution would be justified in criticizing us.
e. Aside from this, is it proper for a Commission of the high rank and prestige
of this Commission to comment extensively about a person whose case is on appeal
and will surely get to the U.S. Supreme Court?
2. We think that the Commission's report could very properly state that
conclusions relative to any aspect of Ruby or his activities are considered
improper because of his pending appeal and that a report will be made later.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me direct your attention to paragraph 2 and note that you are
referring in that paragraph to a previous request for assistance in checking the
names and telephone numbers and addresses found in Ruby's papers and your
comment that--
* * * because of the press of time and because we did not really put our minds
to it at the moment, we failed to say to Mr. Rankin that each subarea will
require a man working full time for a month. There is no possibility that this
work can be properly done so as to be useful in writing a report even if it had
a deadline date of June 15.
I think that that was written in the context of April, where you were speaking
of a May deadline. Is that an accurate reflection of your feeling at that time
that you were on the staff?
Judge GRIFFIN. This is more than that. It was also a statement that this fellow
Lenbrandt, who was the guard for the Chief Justice, did not strike us as the
kind of person we needed for this job. Not only numbers; we didn't want somebody
who had a regular job guarding the Chief Justice and part time would go out and
gather information for us.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me ask you, then, a general point. As you know, the conclusion
of the Warren Commission was that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of the
President. Are you satisfied with that conclusion?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes, I am. There is no doubt about that.
Mr. BLAKEY. The central conclusion from many people's point of view was that
there was no evidence found of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. Are
you satisfied with that conclusion?
Judge GRIFFIN. I am satisfied that that statement is true.
Mr. BLAKEY. Are you satisfied with the investigation that led to that
conclusion?
Judge GRIFFIN. I am not.
Mr. BLAKEY. What would you have done differently in the are pursuing the
conspiracy allegation or the conspiracy possibility And, in the context of
asking you that question, I wonder, Mr. Chairman,
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if I could ask the clerk to mark a memo dated February 24, 1964, from Hubert and
Griffin to Willens in connection with the suggested collection of phone data as
JFK exhibit No. 65 and I wonder if the clerk will show it to the witness.
Are you familiar with that memo?
Judge GRIFFIN. Yes, I am.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that memorandum be incorporated in
the record at this point in order that I can ask some questions about it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 65 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 65
[Memorandum]
FEBRUARY 24, 1964
Mr. Howard P. Willens.
From: Mr. Leon D. Hubert and Mr. Butt W. Griffin.
Subject: Further Telephone Records to be Obtained for the Commission.
In furtherance of your conversation with Mr. Griffin on February 20 and our
Joint memorandum of February 19, the following steps are suggested to be taken
as soon as possible for obtaining and preserving telephone records which may be
pertinent to the work of this commission.
Some of the suggestions may impose burdens upon private parties which are not
justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so, they should be rejected
and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future critics
that such efforts were carefully considered.
Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 seek telephone numbers of phones "reasonably available"
to Ruby plus records of calls placed from phones under Ruby's direct control.
Paragraph 4 seeks telephone numbers of all phones reasonably available to
certain persons.
Paragraph 5 seeks only phones listed to or under the control of certain people.
Paragraphs 6 to 10 are designed to lay a basis for further investigation.
1. The FBI should immediately obtain the telephone numbers, names of subscriber,
location and type of service of all phones reasonably available to Jack Ruby.
"Reasonably available" should include, but not be limited to, subscriber and pay
telephones at the All Right Parking Garage, Adolphus Hotel, the Egyptian Lounge,
Phil's Delicatessen, Cabana Motel, Sol's Turf Bar, Dallas City Hall and Jail,
Dallas Morning News, Radio Station KLIF, together with any pay phones within
reasonable walking distance of said places or any other places which Ruby
frequented. Numbers and information concerning phones "reasonably available" to
Ruby in Dallas may be obtained by personal contact with subscribers or the
telephone company. Information as to phones available outside Dallas should not
involve contact with nonresidents of Dallas.
2. The FBI should immediately obtain with respect to Jack Ruby, for the period
August 1 to November 25, 1963, copies of all original telephone company records
bearing upon the dates, time, length of call, calling number, billing number,
person calling and number called with respect to all telephone calls (including
local calls) utilizing any telephone listed to Jack Ruby or any of his Clubs,
including pay phones on or near the premises. If the telephone company has no
records which would provide information concerning local calls, the FBI should
so state.
It is unnecessary at this point to obtain call records from all phones
"reasonably available to Ruby" since analysis of calls from such phones would be
impossible without further information. However, we contemplate that if we
establish a list of suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald, it would
be valuable to check telephones "available" to Ruby against calls to the
"intermediaries." In addition, it may be valuable to examine records of
telephones listed to or used regularly by suspected intermediaries" for calls to
phones "available" to Ruby.
3. With respect to all records requested in paragraph 2, the FBI should indicate
in its report what telephone company personnel were questioned, the questions
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asked and the answers received, in all investigations which were conducted, so
that it may be determined that the records obtained are complete and accurate.
We believe that the method of searching for records must be detailed since
telephone information forwarded so far has been spotty and inaccurate.
4. To the extent not already provided, the FBI should be requested to obtain for
the Commission a list of all telephones (but not call records) reasonably
available to the following persons since March 1, 1963:
Andrew Armstrong, 3821 Dickson Circle, Apartment C, Dallas, Tex.
Karen Bennett Carlin, aka Karen Bennett Karlin, aka "Little Lynn," 3609
Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Tex.
Bruce Carlin, aka Brue Karlin, 3809 Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Tex. Marion (aka
Marian) Rubenstein Carroll, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Ill. Eileen Rubenstein
Kaminsky, 6724 N. Ta. Iman, Chicago, Ill.
Lewis J. McWillie, Las Vegas, Nev.
Hyman Rubenstein, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Ill.
Sam (Rubenstein) Ruby, 11616 Jamestown Road, Dallas, Tex.
Earl (Rubenstein) Ruby, 29925 Woodland Drive, Southfield, Mich.
Eva Rubenstein (Magid) Grant, 3929 Rollins, Dallas, Tex.
Ralph Paul, Arlington, Tex. c/o Bert Bowman, Copeland Road, Arlington Road,
Arlington, Tex. (home); Podnuh's Restaurant, Arlington, Tex. (access); John W.
Jackson, 1602 Browning, Arlington, Tex. (access); Bull Pen Drive-in, 1936 East
Abram, Arlington, Tex. ( business ).
Anna Rubenstein Volpert, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Ill.
The date March 1 is chosen because it establishes a safe margin for inquiry
prior to Oswald's trip to New Orleans. With respect to each of the above
persons, the FBI should provide numbers, to the extent possible, not only of
home telephones but nearby pay phones, telephones of any businesses in which the
individual is employed, telephones of business partners or other similar close
business associates, telephones of friends and relatives visited frequently, and
telephones at restaurants and other businesses which the individual is known to
frequent, For each telephone the FBI should indicate the type of service (pay
phone, subscriber phone, limited service telephone), name of subscriber,
location of phone, and reason for concluding the phone was accessible to the
individual under investigation. This information should be obtained primarily by
examining records which will not involve personal contact with persons outside
of the telephone companies and without communicating the names of suspects to
persons outside the FBI. We realize that such a means of investigation will not
provide a complete answer to questions, but we believe other modes of inquiry
would be unwise at this time. As to each individual under investigation, the FBI
report should indicate what sources were checked and what other information as
to possibly accessible phones might be available by direct contact with
individuals.
5. The FBI should obtain from a telephone company records check the personal,
family and business phones of the following persons during the period March 1,
1963 to present:
Barney Baker, 5900 Sheridan Road. Chicago. Ill. (home); Chicago Loop Auto
Refinishing Co., Inc., 3216 South Shields Ave., Chicago, Ill. (business).
Curtis LaVerne Crafard, aka Larry Crafard (including phones available to him on
his "flight from Dallas to Michigan").
Sam Gordon, 755 Crescent Drive. Palm Springs, Calif.
Alex Gruber, 5222 W. Olympic, Los Angeles, Calif. (WE. 5-1082).
Frank Goldstein, 640 Teresita Boulevard, San Francisco, Calif. (JU 7-7674) ( S U
1-7343).
Lawrence Meyers. 3950 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. (home); Ero Mfg. Co.
714 West Monroe, Chicago, Ill. (business).
Roy William Pike, aka Mickey Ryan, 2344 Connecticut Lane, Apt. C, Dallas, Tex.
Anesi Umberto, Chicago. Ill.
Mario Umberto, Chicago, Ill.
Abe Weinstein. 11028 Westmore Circle, Dallas. Tex.
6. The FBI should confer with the appropriate officials of telephone companies
in Chicago, Dallas, Detroit. New York. San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New
Orleans to determine what means, if any, are available for obtaining information
as to incoming long distance telephone calls to any particular number if the
name of the caller is unknown. It is conceivable, for example, that connecting
or trunkline telephone carriers may have automatic recording devices which
record the
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calling exchange and the dialed number with respect to calls which they
transmit. Or, it may be that most telephone companies in large cities are now so
fully automated that such information is contained on their IBM cards and these
IBM cards could be run through a computer or other device for every telephone
subscriber in the area so that such information could be derived mechanically
without undue expense or personal effort. Information as to city or telephone
company from which a long distance call originated could conceivably be
meaningful in light of other data which we have.
7. The FBI should confer with telephone company officials of each company
serving Jack Ruby and the persons listed in paragraph four and five to ascertain
if that company has any means of providing information, concerning local calls
to or from the phones of those persons. Even if no records are maintained by
such companies in the ordinary course of business, it may be that certain
electronic, mechanical or other entries are routinely made either by telephone
transmitting equipment or in connection with business records ordinarily
maintained by the telephone company so that by careful examination of such data
information concerning local telephone activity on a particular telephone could
be obtained. To whatever extent information can be obtained concerning local
telephone activity, the Agent should report to the Commission the nature of the
information which can be obtained and the means by which it would be obtained.
This data should be secured without mentioning particular names or telephone
numbers.
8. The FBI should obtain a list of all telephone companies and the chief
executive officer serving the following areas:
Texas; Nevada; Los Angeles, Calif.; San Francisco, Calif.; Chicago, Ill.;
Detroit, Mich.; and adjacent suburbs in the Detroit metropolitan area, including
Southfield, Mich.; Boston, Mass., and adjacent suburbs, including Belmont,
Mass.; New York metropolitan area, including suburban Long Island, Connecticut
and New Jersey; Miami, Fla.; Washington, D.C. and adjacent suburbs; New Orleans,
9. Mr. Rankin should address a letter to the chief executive of each of the
telephone companies mentioned in Datagraph eight requesting that such companies
not destroy until June 1, 1964 any records they may have with respect to
telephone service of all subscribers. The letter should request that the source
of this policy not be disclosed.
Retention of records on a blanket basis would preserve security as to the
thinking of the Commission and will afford the maximum assurance that telephone
records will be preserved with respect to persons not yet suspect. We realize
that blanket retention may be so burdensome or expensive as to make our request
seem unreasonable. If there is any suggestion along these lines, a conference to
work out a reasonable system should be suggested.
10. As soon as possible after the Ruby trial and after consultation with the
Commission, the FBI should obtain copies of original telephone records uncovered
as a result of the investigations requested in paragraphs four and five. These
records should be analyzed to determine possible links to Ruby or Oswald.
Thereafter, if deemed advisable, records of phones "reasonably available" to
Ruby would be analyzed for possible calls to phones reasonably available to
suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald.
Mr. BLAKEY. Judge Griffin, as I look over this memorandum, basically what it
suggests is that the Commission obtained telephone toll records of a number of
phones to which Mr. Ruby had access and a number of people, including, for
example, Barney Baker of Chicago, Lawrence Meyers of Chicago, with an effort., I
take it, to see if there had been commnunication between these people.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. BLAKEY. I notice, for example, on page 2 of the memo we have Lewis J.
McWillie of Las Vegas, Nev. You comment in the second paragraph of the memo that
"Some of the suggestions may impose burdens upon private parties which are not
justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so, they should be rejected
and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future critics
that such efforts were carefully considered."
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Mr. FAUNTROY. Will counsel yield for a moment? I am looking exhibit No. 65 and
its length. I wonder what your recommendations would be with respect to a break.
Mr. BLAKEY. I think I have only about three or four questions and I would
suspect we can conclude in the next 10 minutes.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Fine.
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't have a pressing engagement; I can stay if there is any
desire for that.
Mr. BLAKEY. There is a necessity for a lunch break. We have witness due at 2,
Judge Griffin. If you will bear with us I think we can finish it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Proceed.
Mr. BLAKEY. Do you recall what happened as a result of this memorandum?
Judge GRIFFIN. I generally recall. I made some notes on my copy. In the numbered
paragraphs that follow from here with paragraph 1 which relates to simply
obtaining telephone numbers and locations of telephones without the actual
underlying calls that were made from it, a request was made for what with
respect to Jack Ruby. I can tell you the extent to which we got returns on it.
We got some of that information.
I also think, with respect to paragraph 2, we did get that. That was the
original telephone company records for telephones that were listed to Jack Ruby
or any of his clubs. We got that.
With respect to the request in paragraph 3, whether the FBI reported to us in
the fashion that we requested I don't know or even if we made a followthrough on
that request.
With respect to paragraph 4, my recollection is that much of that, that
information on the specific telephones of the individuals named there, telephone
listings to their names, I believe that was given to us.
We were suggesting here going beyond simply their names and getting numbers
reasonably available, which required some thought and investigation. I don't
believe that was done but I am not certain.
In paragraph 5, 212 am not certain in paragraph 5 whether we got those telephone
company records.
In paragraph 6, I think this is the one requesting a freeze on telephone company
records. I will have to read that again. My notes reflect, as I read it prior to
coming here, that I concluded that that was not done, paragraph 6.
In paragraph 7, I don't recall--I do remember internal conversations with other
staff members about whether that kind of thing was feasible--in other words,
getting information on local calls as opposed to long-distance calls that might
somehow be utilized by us. I know we never directly had a conversation with
telephone company people: to find out whether there was anything that we might
use that could trigger some information for us. With respect to No. 8, it is my
recollection that that was not done, but I am not entirely positive on that.
With respect to No. 9, I would definitely state that that was not done; Although
the records could prove me wrong, I am virtually certain no request to freeze
records was made to telephone companies.
No. 10, my recollection is that it probably wasn't done but I am not certain
about that.
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Mr. BLAKEY. You testified that you were not satisfied with the adequacy of the
investigation of conspiracy. Would your failure to follow through this telephone
toll call records request be an example of an area where you were not satisfied
with the conduct of the investigation.
Judge GRIFFIN. That is right.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions. I would like to express
my gratitude to Judge Griffin for coming and spending so much of his time with
us, taking precious time away from his trial calendar, and my own personal
thanks. I appreciate it, Judge. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I would like to add to your thanks that of myself and that of the
committee for your kindness in giving us so much time, Mr. Griffin.
Are there any concluding questions, Mr. Dodd?
Mr. DODD. I really have found your testimony most interesting, Judge. I hope by
some of my questions you did not glean anything more than my really trying to
determine exactly the frame of mind in which you dealt with it at that
particular time. I am sympathetic to outside influence, schedules, all kinds of
things that came to bear on it at that time.
Judge GRIFFIN. May I also say to you, Mr. Dodd, and the committee, that I do not
feel any sense of purpose in trying to defend what we did for the sake of
defending it. To defend it against inaccuracies, yes. For approximately 2 years
now I have been trying to conunumcate with various people in the Congress about
my personal feelings which have gone back almost 2 years, that an investigation
of the sort that your committee is conducting should be conducted.
I simply want to say to the committee that I am happy to cooperate and assist
the committee in any way they think I can be useful.
Mr. DODD. I appreciate that. I am sure we will probably be in more contact with
you than you care to hear from us on some of the information we have.
I have one question in my own mind and my ignorance is really responsible for
the question. What was Ruby's motivation that came out of the trial for killing
Oswald? I had heard he had great affection for the President and so forth. Was
that carried through in the trial?
Judge GRIFFIN. That was his defense. Are you also asking me to comment on what I
think his motive was?
Mr. DODD. You got to know this fellow pretty well after poring backover his
life. I wondered if you had turned up any kind of evidence that he had a deep
affection for Kennedy.
Judge GRIFFIN. I don't think his motivation had anything to do with that.
Strangely enough, I do think it was tied in with his feelings about
anti-Semitism.
Mr. DODD. Would you explain that?
Judge GRIFFIN. I only say this based on the assumption that we don't link him
into some kind of a conspiracy. That is an open question as far as I am
concerned. But based on the evidence that we have, that, I think, seems to be
the most reliable; at the time that the President was assassinsted, he was
already very much upset about the fact that someone had placed a black-bordered
advertisement in the Dallas
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Morning News suggesting that the President was a traitor and it was signed by a
man whose name-was listed as Bernard Weissman.
As we trace Ruby's activities from that point when he was in the Dallas Morning
News office and learned that the President had been shot and the reactions of
people there and following this on through, it did seem to me that there was a
very consistent pattern that showed that Ruby was emotionally involved in the
possibility that the assassination of the President was an attempt to discredit
the Jews, that this ad which had a Jewish name on it was somehow linked in
Ruby's mind to a group, unknown group, that might have wanted to assassinate the
President and pin it on the Jews.
He tried to search for Weissman. He found there was no Weissman listed in the
Dallas phone book. He checked with his rabbi and found that there was no
Weissman in the small Jewish community by this name in Dallas.
He virtually did not sleep. He was on a drug, which was really a reducing pill
but has a narcotic effect, called Preludin. Put this together with Ruby's
personality end his penchant to be in the limelight and all these other things;
Ruby was in a frame of mind by Sunday morning that in some way, as he said to an
arresting officer immediately after the arrest, "I want to show the world a Jew
had guts."
Now, that does not preclude that someone might not have utilized him in that
frame of mind but to me that explains what happened to him.
I have left out a lot of details on this but I feel that was the basic thread,
behind his emotional state at this time.
Mr. DODD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FAUNTROY. You have made reference, in response to questions from counsel, on
instructions which were given you that the staff has to conduct the
investigation in a responsible way and that the consequences of irresponsible
investigating might be that a thermonuclear war might be precipitated.
Judge GRIFFIN. Right.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Do you recall what your reaction to that formulation was?
Judge GRIFFIN. My reaction basically was that if unsubstantiated or only
suspicious but not really solid evidence were developed that this was motivated
by a foreign government, whether it be the Russians or Cubans or anybody else,
that then political forces would be set afoot in the United States, much as
heard in Spanish-American War, that could have forced the country into some kind
of retaliatory attack upon someone.
I did not understand this as a statement that we should not find then formation
or that we should conceal the information if we found it. I always understood
it, in the context that we should try to get what we could possibly find out. If
it led to these kinds of consequences, then we had to be very careful about how
it was handled within the Commission.
That was the reason that the Commission was structured the way it was, with
important members from both Houses of Congress. The hope was that if this kind
of information which could trigger a demagog such as we were concerned with, the
kind of McCarthyism
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of the 1950's, that it could be handled in a responsible way within the
political process. That is what I always felt it to mean. I still feel it was
intended to mean that.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Griffin, pursuant to our rules, at the conclusion of the
questioning, we offer the witness 5 minutes to explain or amplify his testimony.
That offer is made to you at this time.
Judge GRIFFIN. I would like to decline the offer. I would like to have the
privilege to reflect on what has happened here and perhaps send you something in
writing in lieu of any kind of oral statement to you.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I would be very happy to accede to that request.
Judge GRIFFIN. I again want to compliment the committee for conducting this
investigation. I have read your rules. I feel that if these rules are adhered
to, that this will be a responsible investigation. Conceivably you could be in
the same situation that we were in and you will have to wrestle with the same
problems. I wish you good luck if you do.
Mr. DODD. We might find ourselves on that side of the table 10 years from now.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you for that wish and for that compliment. The committee
will recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
[The subcommittee reconvened at 2:40 p.m., Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy presiding.]
Professional staff members present: Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, E. Berning,
M Wills, R. Genzman, M. Mars, D. Hardway, L. Wizelman, J. Hess, K. Klein, W.
Cross, J. Wolf, and A. Purdy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The committee will come to order.
Pursuant to our meeting of this morning, the executive session will continue.
At this time I will swear our witness.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
Mr. WILLENS. I do.
TESTIMONY OF HOWARD P. WILLENS
Mr. FAUNTROY. Will the witness state his name and address for the record,
please.
Mr. WILLENS. Howard P. Willens, W-i-l-l-e-n-s, 4242 Mathewson Drive NW.,
Washington, D.C. 20011.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you. We are very pleased to have you before the committee. I
do understand that you have the committee rules provided you, and you had them
prior to your appearance today.
Mr. WILLENS. Yes, I have, Congressman.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The Chair would like to state for the record and for the witness
that House Resolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete
investigation and study the circumstances surrounding the assassination of John
F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States
concerning protection of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction
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and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and
enforcement, and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information
among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and whether any evidence
or information not in the possession of an agency or department would have been
of assistance investigating the assassination and why such information was not
provided or collected by that agency or department--and to make recommendations
to the House--if the select committee deems it approprimate for the amendment of
existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation."
The questioning of the witness may now proceed.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WILLENS, I would like to thank you on behalf of myself and the staff for
taking time from your very busy practice to come and share with the committee
your thoughts and observations about the work of the Warren Commission, and also
to thank you for taking time on October 31 to sit and talk with me in your
office for several hours about these issues.
Please be assured that the committee appreciates your time, which is obviously
not chargeable to a client except perhaps the public interest.
Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be appropriate at this time to put some
biographical data of the witness in the record.
I wonder, Mr. Willens, if I could read some of it and you could indicate whether
it substantially is accurate. You were born in 1931;
you received a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Michigan, an LL.B.
from the Yale Law School in 1956.
After a short tour in the Army, you became associated with Kirkland, Ellis,
Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters in Washington, D.C., until 1961, when you went with
the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice as second assistant to
the Assistant Attorney General.
Following your service with the Warren Commission, you have served as Executive
Director of the President's Commission on Crime in Washington, D.C., and I
understand that you are now a member of the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
Washington, D.C. Is that substantially correct?
Mr. WILLENS. Yes, Mr. Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens. I wonder if you would indicate to the committee how you
came to be associated with the Warren Commission?
Mr. WILLENS. On December 17, 1963, the Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, Mr. Katzenbach, inquired of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Criminal Division, Herbert J.Miller, Jr., whether I would be available to
assist the Chief Justice and Mr. Rankin with respect to their Commission
responsibility.
Mr. Miller reported that request to me and, after some discussion, we reached
the only conclusion that seemed appropriate under the circumstances, which is
that I would be available to assist in any way that the Chief Justice and Mr.
Rankin desired.
Accordingly, I called Mr. Rankin and had an appointment with him on December 17
and, following that, a short meeting with the Chief Justice. After those
conversations, it was decided that I would assist the Commission as liaison with
the Department of Justice and in doing
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the other work that was necessary to begin the Commission's work; and on
approximately December 20, 1963, I began to work, on a fulltime basis, to assist
Mr. Rankin with the work of the Warren Commission. I remained in that capacity
until late September 1964, when the report was completed.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, what were you told by those who asked you to come with
the Commission what the goals of the Commission would be?
Mr. WILLENS. It was made very clear to me, in personal conversations with both,
Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice, that they saw the Commission's responsibility
as being solely to obtain all the facts that were relevant to the assassination
of President Kennedy and to report those facts fully to the President and to the
people of the United States.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you have any discussions with Mr. Katzenbach over what the
Commission ought to do?
Mr. WILLENS. I talked with Mr. Katzenbach at the outset of this assignment and I
had occasional conversations with him during the course of my duties with the
Warren Commission. Mr. Katzenbach gave me no instructions except to perform to
the best of my ability and to help the Commission to do the best possible job
that it could.
There were, at the time the Commission was formed; as you know from the record,
some differing views as to how to handle the report of the FBI investigation
that had been produced in early December and was going to be transmitted to the
Commission. This was one of the many issues that developed in December 1963; I
was aware that Mr. Katzenbach had views as to whether the Warren Commission
should or should not issue a press release summarizing the conclusions reached
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to the assassination.
This is an issue which had been discussed within the Department of Justice to my
knowledge before I went with the Warren Commission and was an issue that was
addressed in the earl? days by the Commission itself.
Mr. BLAKEY. What did Mr. Katzenbach want done?
Mr. WILLENS. I believe it was the view of Mr. Katzenbach at the time that it
would be in the public interest to make some sort of public statement
summarizing the conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is hard
to recapture 14 years later the sense of bewilderment, and trauma that prevailed
at the time; but there was a very substantial feeling held by very responsible
people that there was an important public interest that could be served by
making public at the earliest possible date some of the conclusions that had
resulted from the investigation conducted to that point by the FBI.
The Commission, as you know from the public record reached a contrary conclusion
and decided that its mission and the public interest did not warrant a premature
press release with respect to the conclusions of the FBI.
The Commission decided that. it should conduct its own investigation, that it
should review the underlying materials and that it should not make any public
statement, regarding its findings until it was satisfied as to what the facts
did disclose.
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Mr. Willens, let me shift our discussion somewhat from your assignment and the
goals of the Commission to the organization of the Commission itself. To your
knowledge, was the organizational chart of the Commission ever prepared by the
Commission?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not recall any organizational chart being prepared of the kind
you have made available to me.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be possible to have the clerk
mark as JFK exhibit No. 66 an organizational chart prepared by the staff.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder if the clerk could show JFK exhibit No. 66 to the witness.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can incorporate that chart into record at this
point in order that I may ask the witness some questions about it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 66 and for the record,
follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 66
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Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, I have in the past shown you a copy of this chart. I
wonder if now you would look at it and indicate whether, in your judgment, it
accurately reflects the organization of the Warren Commission.
Mr. WILLENS. There are several errors on this chart, none of which perhaps
amounts to matters of substance. If it would be of assistance, will point out
some of those errors.
Mr. BLAKEY. It will be of help.
Mr. WILLENS. First I think it is incorrect to have Messrs. Ely, Laulicht, and
Pollak listed as junior counsel. They were employed by the Commission for
limited periods of time and did have specialized assignments, some of which fell
into the areas indicated.
Nonetheless, the title of "junior counsel" was reserved to those on the line
above their names and they should properly be included under the category of
"Others" assisting the Commission.
Second, the description of Arthur K. Marmor as a historian from the Air Force is
incorrect. Mr. Marmor, as the report makes clear, was on loan from the State
Department. It was Mr. Goldberg who was a historian from the Air Force and that
characterization should be properly assigned to him.
The third name on this list, as on others, is misspelled. It must be Mosk. There
are references in the materials to Overholser which would make clear what his
anticipated function was to be. He was at that time associated with St.
Elizabeths Hospital.
Mr. Shaffer, who was a former associate of mine, would probably take issue with
the characterization of his duties as clerical and administrative.
Mr. BLAKEY. Where would you place him in the general organization chart?
Mr. WILLENS. Mr. Shaffer belongs where you put him; as a matter of fact, he did
assist me with a wide variety of investigative and supervisory responsibilities.
Mr. Barson, who is described as a CPA, is from the IRS and was an agent from the
Philadelphia office of the Internal Revenue Service who was made available to us
on a loan basis in order to conduct the project of a reconciliation of Oswald's
expenditures and income.
Under the column entitled "Liaisons," this is the first occasion I have ever
heard of a Mr. Davis, but that is not to say that he didn't do the job that is
mentioned here. The liaison with the State Department was the Legal Adviser's
Office, as indicated further on the list.
The name of Yrmlisky is most certainly a misspelling and is probably incorrect.
It may be a reference to Mr. Yrmalisky. Our principal liaison with the
Department of Defense was Mr. Nederlander.
With respect to the CIA, I think it is more accurate to describe Richard Helms
as the liaison with the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca and Mr. Karamessines served
as his deputies and assistants in that capacity. With respect to the Justice
Department, show that Mr. Katzenbach designated Herbert J. Miller, Jr., to serve
as liaison with the Commission and there is correspondence to that effect.
Apart from those comments, Mr. Blakey, I think that the chart is essentially
correct.
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I should point out that technically Mr. Redlich, Mr. Goldberg, and myself did
not exercise any line responsibility over other members of the staff. We were
each serving as an assistant to Mr. Rankin and fulfilled those missions that Mr.
Rankin assigned us. From an organizational chart standpoint, therefore, the
three of us should be indicated as coming out sideways from Mr. Rankin so as to
make clear that we did not have and do not claim to have had a supervisory
responsibility over other members of the staff.
Mr. BLAKEY. The basic division of the work of the Warren Commission in the five
substantive areas, and subsequently a sixth I take it, was as a result of a
memorandum that you wrote. Is that correct?
Mr. WILLENS. One of the assignments I undertook in my first few weeks with the
Commission was to make a recommendation to Mr. Rankin as to how the work of the
Commission might be organized. I did write a memorandum in either late December
or early January that proposed an organization very close to that reflected on
this chart. That was reviewed by Mr. Rankin and presented subsequently to the
Commission and did serve, with some amendment, as the organization through which
the Commission staff performed its duties.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder if you could share with us at this time your rationale in
dividing the basic work of the Commission into five areas as designated on this
chart.
Mr. WILLENS. I keep thinking of six areas, as is reflected on the chart. I
believe the rationale is readily stated. In order to begin and undertake a
project of this dimension, there has to be some arbitrary allocation of
responsibilities. There is no way to do it that eliminates overlap or possible
confusion but this was an effort to try to organize the work in such a way that
assignments would be reasonably clear overlaps could be readily identified and
coordination would be accomplished among the various members of the staff.
It did seem to me and others who reviewed this chart that the various areas here
did lend themselves to separate treatment, at least at the outset, when our
principal task was to marshal the investigative materials that were made
available to the Commission, try to identify those areas that needed additional
investigation and to outline those questions that had to be addressed by the
staff and the members of the Commission.
Area No. 1 with respect to the basic facts of the assassination seemed to carve
out an analytical and descriptive area that related to the trip to Texas, the
planning for that trip, the security precautions involved on that trip, the
facts of the assassination in Dallas, and the subsequent treatment of the
President at the hospital.
With respect to the identity of the assassin, it seemed that one of the
principal undertakings of the Commission; of course, was to identify the
assassin or assassins and to examine all the evidence that bore on that issue.
It did seem to be an acceptable issue that would require separate staff
attention.
Area No. 3 was to deal with Lee Harvey Oswald's background. There has been some
question raised as to how the Commission could assign staff members to
investigate Lee Harvey Oswald's background at a time when it had not yet decided
who the assassin or assassins were and whether Lee Harvey Oswald was one of the
assassins.
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I find that a fairly naive criticism of the work. We were not operating on a
blank tablet. We did have in front of us not only a summary report of the FBI
but very extensive evidence, including physical evidence indicating that Lee
Harvey Oswald was, at the very least, a prime suspect in the matter. We did feel
that some initial investigation into his background and into possible
relationships of interest and relevance to the Commission's work was warranted.
The fourth area as reflected on this chart deals with the possible conspiracy.
This was, of course, the second principal question that the Commission had to
wrestle with just as your committee may have to wrestle with it.
Originally this area was defined more precisely as involving the foreign
affiliations or possible involvement of foreign countries in the assassination.
It was that area that Mr. Coleman and Mr. Slawson were primarily responsible
for.
As we proceeded into the investigation toward the writing of the report we
included in this area those findings that related to the possibility of domestic
conspiracy involving Oswald, domestic conspiracy involving Ruby as well as the
possibility involving foreign conspiracy.
Area No. 5 was to deal with the detention and death of Lee Harvey Oswald. That
again seemed, at the outset, to be on the whole, a separate area that warranted
immediate and thorough attention by staff members with that as a prime
responsibility.
We did feel, in terms of the sixth area, of course, that the Presidential
protection area was perhaps one of the Commission's most important undertakings
because it was perhaps the only area where the Commission could make some
contribution to the future so as to prevent future assassinations.
As the chart indicated, Mr. Stern was assigned to that area. It was contemplated
that Mr. Rankin himself would serve the function of senior counsel in that area.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder if you could comment, Mr. Willens on the process of
communication between these areas as they were broken up. How did it facilitate
the sharing of information and ideas.
Mr. WILLENS. I mentioned that one of my responsibilities in the early weeks was
to assist in organizing the work of the Commission. Another responsibility was
to assist Mr. Rankin in the staffing of the Commission. A third responsibility
bears directly on your question, Mr. Blakey. It was my responsibility to review
the materials that had been received from the investigative agencies,
particularly the and the CIA, and to request all further information that would
be relevant to the Commission's inquiry from those two agencies plus a dozen or
more other Federal agencies that might have some information of relevance to the
investigation.
One way of dealing with the separate areas within which the lawyers were dealing
was to make certain that all the materials that came in the office were reviewed
in one central place and that any materials that bore even remotely or
potentially on an area within the Commission's work were sent to that area.
It was frequently the case that materials in our possession were sent to three
or four areas so that each of the groups of lawyers could look at the same
material from that group's own perspective and decide
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whether it had any relevance in the part of the investigation for which those
lawyers were responsible.
I continued that function throughout the Commission and always erred on the side
of multiple duplication so as to make certain that the members of the staff in a
particular area did get the papers which I thought they needed.
Another way of coordinating among the staff was by the circulation of summary
memoranda, which happened on a regular basis throughout the Commission's work.
One of the early work products that was requested of the members of the staff
was a summary memorandum that attempted to assess the investigative materials in
their area, to identify investigative leads that should be pursued, to identify
any policy or other issues that should be addressed by Mr. Rankin or the
commission and to make proposals for it he taking of testimony by the Commission
or staff.
As those memoranda were produced in February and subsequently, they were
circulated and available to the members of the staff so that the investigation
could, in each area, take advantage of what the other lawyers had discovered and
were proposing to do.
A third way of coordinating among the staff was perhaps more informal and
related primarily to the ease with which the members of the staff could get
together to discuss a problem in which more than one area had a particular
interest. There was rarely a day that went by that we did not have lawyers from
more than one area sitting down with respect to an investigative request, a list
of proposed witnesses, or a proposed line of questioning, to decide what should
be pursued in order to further the area's interest that each lawyer or lawyer
group might have.
This was subsequently formalized, of course, when we did have witnesses
appearing before the Commission when the members of the staff would be canvassed
for their suggestions as to what questions should be addressed to the particular
witness.
So those are several of the ways we developed to try to coordinate our work and
to make as certain as we could that nothing of importance be swept between the
cracks.
Mr. BLAKEY. What was the relationship between the junior and senior staffs?
Mr. WILLENS. The relationship was one of professional collegiality. The
designations of senior and junior may seem overly formal and hierarchial. In
most areas there quickly developed a close personal relationship between the
senior counsel and junior counsel and they worked together as a team. That was
obviously more successful in some areas than in others as you would anticipate.
Mr. BLAKEY. What was the relationship between the staff and the Commission?
Mr. WILLENS. By this time you have probably heard a fair amount on that subject
and I am sure you have had your own personal experience here on tiffs committee
that can serve as a benchmark.
No staff ever feels that the commission or committee for which it works is as
knowledgeable as the staff. At the same time members of the Commission staff I
think were sufficiently sophisticated and experienced to realize that the
members of the Commission had multiple
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responsibilities and were men of considerable experience in public life and
could bring to the work of the Commission a perspective that some of the members
of the staff might not share.
The principal liaison between the Commission and the staff was through Mr.
Rankin. Mr. Rankin was the General Counsel of the staff and was the person to
whom the Commission looked with respect to the work of the staff. He was the
principal staff member who attended all the sessions of the Commission although
there were other members of the staff who did participate in the taking of the
testimony before the Commission on a fairly regular basis.
Apart from those occasional meetings with the Chief Justice most of the staff's
dealings with the members of the Commission occurred on a sporadic and limited
basis. There were several members of the Commission, for example, Mr. McCloy and
Mr. Dulles, who took a very active interest in the work of the Commission and
frequently did have the opportunity to meet with individual members of the staff
to discuss a particular problem or area in which the Commission member was
interested. Otherwise the interaction was primarily through Mr. Rankin and by
the flow of paper between the staff and the Commission.
The flow of paper is best demonstrated by the records that I am sure you have
reviewed and I think will demonstrate the effort of the staff to keep the
Commission fully informed of the progress of the investigation as it was being
handled by the staff.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did Chief Justice Warren come around the office and discuss the
investigation with the staff?
Mr. WILLENS. That happened on occasion, yes. The Chief Justice, thought was
carrying an enormous burden with respect to full participation in the work of
the Court at the same time that he was serving as Chairman of the Commission.
Some members of the staff, including myself, did have occasional meetings with
the Chief Justice and he did participate in some meetings with other agencies
that were of particular interest to him and of importance to the Commission. I
do not want to mislead you and suggest that he was constantly available for
consultation by the staff because he certainly was not. He did deal on a very
regular basis though, to my knowledge, with Mr. Rankin and Mr. Rankin was very
conscientious in making certain that members of the staff knew precisely what
the Chief Justice did want to have done.
Mr. BLAKEY. You have indicated that. Mr. Dulles was around the staff offices on
some occasions?
Mr. WILLENS. Yes.
Mr. BLAKEY. Would you share with us what he indicated he thought the Commission
ought to do in those conversations?
Mr. WILLENS. I don't remember any general conversations with Mr. Dulles that are
responsive to that question. Mr. Dulles did have a particular interest in the
possibility of a foreign involvement in the matter and was available for
consultation with me or with other members of the staff who had some
responsibility for pursuing the allegations and materials on that issue. As the
record will reflect he did participate in some of the meetings and the Central
Intelligence Agency in connection with that Agency's assistance to the
Commission.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did he have any particular area of foreign involvement in which he
showed particular interest ?
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Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did he ever express any concern about posible Soviet involvement?
Mr. WILLENS. The question of Soviet involvement was, of course, one that was
squarely before the Warren Commission. Certainly the fact that the assassin of
President Kennedy was someone who had expatriated or tried to expatriate himself
in the Soviet Union and spent several years there could only be a matter of the
greatest suspicion and require the Commission's best attention. It is an area
that is very difficult to investigate. Mr. Dulles and the other members of the
Commission's work to Oswald's Soviet residence and his marriage to a citizen of
the Soviet Union and they were very interested in all facets of the
investigation bearing on this and exploring it as fully as possible.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did he ever express any concern about possible Cuban involvement?
Mr. WILLENS. There also was a similar interest in exploring that, articularly
with the Mexico trip coming so shortly before the assassination. There were from
the beginning of the Commission's investigation allegations before the
Commission and staff that Oswald had been motivated in one way or another in the
assassination by his dealings with respect to Cuba. Our record will indicate
that several investigative leads were pursued with respect to Oswald's
relationships with pro-Castro groups and anti-Castro groups and various theories
were advanced as to what his motivation might have been. One of these theories
was that he was prompted by the desire to retaliate against the United States
for its attempted invasion of Castro's Cuba in 1961.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me shift the focus of our concern, Mr. Willens, from the
organization of the Warren Commission to the question of staff selection,
itself. Did you participate in the selection of the other members of the staff?
Mr. WILLENS. I participated in the selection of several members of the staff to
the extent that Mr. Rankin asked me to canvass the available applicants, to
develop other applications for positions with the Commission and to make him a
series of recommendations on the subject. I did do that during late December or
early January.
Mr. BLAKEY. What criteria were employed in the selection of staff members?
Mr. WILLENS. It is particularly with respect to the senior staff that I have
fairly limited knowledge. Some of the members of the senior staff were selected
before I became associated with the Commission. I know that there was an
interest to have among the senior staff men of considerable legal experience,
some record of public service and demonstrated independence of judgment. The
Commission was interested in having as senior counsel men who, although they
might not be able to work on a full-time basis, nevertheless would bring to the
work of the Commission a seniority, a wisdom and a demonstrated experience that
would help to advise the Commission with respect to its mission and provide
support in gaining public respect for the product of the Warren Commission.
I think that in many respects the senior been unfairly criticized over the years
for not devoting themselves
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full time to the work of the Commission. If I could just make two points on that
issue I will make the following:
First, several of the senior counsel did work very hard, specifically Messrs.
Ball, Jenner, and Hubert. I know y. ou have some work records with respect to
those. I want to state with respect to those three men that they did at various
times during the work of the Commission work every bit as hard as the younger
members of the staff.
Second, and perhaps more importantly is the fact that none of the senior counsel
had been asked in my view to work on a full-time basis with the Commission. Each
of them did have many responsibilities and I think in those cases with which I
am familiar they made that fact known to Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice. So it
is I think somewhat unfair in retrospect to state that they should be falted for
doing only what they were asked to do, namely make available as much time as
they could to the work of the Commission. That may have been a mistake but it is
not a mistake that I think can be fairly assigned to the senior lawyers
themselves.
Mr. BLAKEY. What criteria were used in the selection of the junior counsel?
Mr. WILLENS. In respect to the junior counsel we were concerned with some
diversity of experience in practice and in the criminal field in particular. We
were interested in lawyers of some considerable intellectual attainment as could
be measured by their academic achievements and by their early years in practice.
We were also interested in some diversity of views and some geographical
representation.
It seems clear from the hindsight of 14 years that we erred seriously in not
having several women among the staff.
I think with those criteria in mind that we did find a group of lawyers who had
the characteristics that I emphasized, independence of mind, some considerable
experience, including some with extensive trial experience, diversity of views,
and some modicum of geographical diversity.
Mr. BLAKEY. What accounts for the heavy predominance of Yale backgrounds? As a
teacher at Cornell, I am compelled by my academic associations to ask that
question.
Mr. DODD. As a Congressman from Connecticut, I may object to the question.
Mr. WILLENS. I am glad to find some support from members of the committee before
I invoke any privileges on that point. They always told us when I was at law
school that Yale produced more law professors than any other single law school.
In this case several of the people to whom I turned for recommendations and to
see whether they would be themselves available for work with the Commission were
people I knew through the Yale Law School affiliation. I did turn in some
instances to people who graduated from Harvard. At least in one case I recall he
reciprocated by recommending someone from the Yale Law School.
I do concede that there is here a predominance of lawyers from Yale and Harvard
in the hope that that won't be held against the Commission.
Mr. BLAKEY. At least not by those on the committee associated with Yale.
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You raised, Mr. Willens, the question of the time devoted to the work the
Commission by the staff. I think it might be appropriate at this time to ask the
Chairman if he will have the clerk mark as JFK exhibit No. 67 a chart prepared
by the staff based on the pay record of the Commission. Mr. Chairman, would you
ask the clerk to mark that as JFK exhibit No. 67?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, that may be done.
Mr. BLAKEY. I will ask that the clerk also show the chart to the witness.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would not be appropriate at this time to
incorporate the chart in the record in order that I may ask the witness some
questions with reference to the chart.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, JFK exhibit. ,No. 67 and received for the record,
follows:]
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JFK EXHIBIT No. 67
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Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder, Mr. Willens, if you will indicate whether that chart in at
least general outline reflects your own memory of the relative balance of work
by the various lawyers who were on it on a per diem basis? I would not expect
you, after some 13 years, to remember the number of days.
Mr. WILLENS. I find it difficult to relate these figures to my recollection of
the performance of individual lawyers in terms of the amount of time they spent.
It has been my experience, in private practice at least, that lawyers differ
widely in their assessment of how much time they spend on matters and how
valuable their time is. I think in the very roughest terms this gives a fair
picture of the days spent during the period by members of the staff. I think
that with reference to my earlier comment you should note that several of the
senior counsel felt that their primary responsibility was to work in the
investigative stages of the Commission's work. In their view the particular
contribution they could make would be in the review of investigative materials,
the decisionmaking process with respect to additional lines of investigation,
the taking of te.stimony, either before the Commission or by deposition, and the
presentation of the results of their investigative work in a first draft report
to be reviewed within the Commission staff.
With that view in mind I think you will understand why some of the senior
counsel put in substantially more time in the period from February through June
30 than in the following months of July, August, and September, when the
principal work being done within the Commission staff was to write the report
and to conduct those additional investigations that seemed to be required and
were prompted by the ongoing process of depositions and testimony before the
Commission.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be appropriate to note for the record
at this point the chart covers the pay periods from February 1 through September
26, that it indicates a range of days devoted to Commission work from 308 by Mr.
Rankin to 16 by Mr. Adams. It indicates that the average time devoted to the
Commission was approximately 159 days and that of the senior counsel, only Mr.
Jenner exceeded that average.
I think we ought also to note, in fairness to Mr. Willens, himself that the
chart omits him and no one should construe that as an indication that he did not
work for the Commission.
I am correct, am I not, Mr. Willens, in indicating that your salary during this
time was paid by the Department of Justice and it probably true that you put in
at least as much time as Mr. Rankin on the work of the Commission?
Mr. WILLENS. It is true that I was on the payroll of the Department of Justice
st the time. During this period from December 20, 1963, to about September 22,
1964, I worked almost exclusively on the work of the Warren Commission. There
were a few weeks when I had to send the majority of my time at the Department of
Justice because the other deputy to the Assistant Attorney General was on
military leave. With that principal exception and some occasional trips back to
the Department, mine was nearly a full-time job. It may be that I would have
worked on this measure somewhat less than Mr. Rankin hut it was in my view a
full-time job.
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Mr. BLAKEY. You have indicated, Mr. Willens, that the original understanding
among the senior counsel was that they would devote their time to the Commission
approximately 3 to 6 months during the investigatory stage. Do you think their
absence during the period of time during which the evidence was ultimately
evaluated and reduced to the Commission report was an absence that was missed?
Mr. WILLENS. Let me declare I don't know what was the original understanding
that each of the lawyers had with Mr. Rankin or the Chief Justice. It is my
impression that they probably thought the duty would not be more than 6 months
but they undoubtedly said they would give as much time as they could to the
undertaking.
With respect to the emphasis on the investigative stage, it is my recollection
that most of the senior counsel felt that was the area where they could make the
most substantial contribution.
During the rewriting process, hot, ever, we did go back to the senior counsel
with the revised drafts that related to the portions of the investigation with
which they had the most familiarity. We did request their continuing comments on
drafts of the report where they had interrogated the witness, or in which we
knew they had a particular interest. That did precipitate as you would expect,
during the months of August and September some considerable debate among all the
members of the staff and presumably within the Commission as to how best to deal
with the investigative materials and what kind of support existed for the
various findings that were being tentatively proposed for the Commission's
consideration.
I think, Mr. Blakey, they were available to be called upon in the latter stages
of the Commission's work and the fact they were not there on a full-time basis
did not serve to handicap the Commission's completion of its work.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, 1 would like to turn at this time to raise with the
witness some questions about pressures under which they obviously labored.
Mr. Willens, you indicated that the general goals, as stated to you by those who
were ultimately responsible for the Warren Commission, was to find the truth. I
wonder if you will indicate for the record whether there were also any
additional political pressures on the Commission, and I don't use the word
political in a pejorative sense. For example, were you told or was the
impression conveyed to you that one role that the Commission might play would be
to allay public fears or to make possible a smooth transition of national
leadership or to allay international concerns or even indeed to so conduct the
investigation that it might not have about it the character of a witch hunt? I
suppose the answer would be either some of the above, none of the above, or one
of the above?
Mr. WILLENS. I understand the thrust of the question. Mr. Blakey although I
would object in a deposition to its being multiple or compound.
There undoubtedly were concerns that the Chief Justice and members of the
Commission had with respect to the undertaking that, the President had asked
them to assume. It is hard to recapture today the sense of public turmoil that
existed at the time with respect to the assassination and the concerns that were
being expressed as to what
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impact the assassination might have on the foreign relations of the United
States. At no time did anyone tell me that the work of the Commission was to be
less than complete because of some need to allay rumors or to make a transition
more expeditious.
I was after all an employee of the Department of Justice.
I was personally responsible to the Deputy Attorney General and to the Attorney
General of the United States. No one could seriously maintain that the
Department of Justice headed by Attorney General Kennedy had any interest in
this investigation other than the most thorough and honest canvassing of all the
available facts.
Now having said that, it is certainly true that the Commission did not feel it
had an endless period of time within which to complete its work. It was not a
leisurely undertaking. We did not have a charter that permitted us or encouraged
us to proceed at a leisurely pace. We were under an obligation to complete the
work as quickly as we conscientiously could. There were certainly disputes
within the staff and among the Commission as to how rapidly the work could be
completed. As those differences developed, however, the staff repeatedly
expressed its views strongly to Mr. Rankin and to the members of the Commission
that the investigation could not be completed on any anticipated timetable and
we repeatedly emphasized that when there was additional work to be done that
additional time had to be afforded.
In every instance where the staff made clear that additional time was required
the Commission acquiesed in that conclusion and agreed that the final product
should be, only that kind of report that was satisfactory to the members of the
staff and to the members of the Commission.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me ask you some specific questions in order that the record
might be clear, Mr. Willens.
Did Attorney General Kennedy ever express to you directly or indirectly any
desire on his part that the investigation come out in any particular fashion?
Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach ever express to you directly
or indirectly his desire that the investigation come out in any particular
fashion?
Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did the Chief Justice ever express such a desire to you.
Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did Mr. Dulles ever express such a desire to you?
Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. Did you ever learn directly or indirectly that President Johnson or
any member of the White House staff desired that the investigation come out in
any particular fashion?
Mr. WILLENS. No.
Mr. BLAKEY. You indicated that there was some concern or some thought expressed
about allaying people's fears or smooth transitions or international
considerations. Did the staff itself ever discuss these concerns?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not recall any discussions among the staff that focused on
those particular concerns. The staff, as you have gathered from your interviews
and testimony, was composed of a number of
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fairly articulate and forceful individuals. They were of the definite view that
they had one assignment with respect to the Commission and that was to conduct a
full investigation and report those findings that could be supported by the
facts. There were obviously in the investigation of foreign possibilities
discussions about the impact that a particular mode of investigation might have
on a foreign government if it were discovered.
There was considerable attention given to the communications that were to be
addressed to foreign governments. But I think that is to be expected and doesn't
relate to any limitation on the staff that flowed from a concern about adverse
impact on foreign relations.
Mr. BLAKEY. More particularly, was there ever any pressure put on the Commission
to your knowledge or the Commission staff to have the Commission's conclusions
agree with those that have already been reached by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation?
Mr. WILLENS. No; there was no pressure emanating from the Commission or any
other source on the staff to encourage the staff to reach conclusions that were
identical or comparable to those of the FBI.
Mr. BLAKEY. Was there any pressure on the Commission or staff from outside the
Commission or outside the staff to have the Commission reach a result consistent
with that already reached by the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
Mr. WILLENS. I am not aware of any.
Mr. BLAKEY. We have already discussed in the record the letter of Attorney
General Katzenbach sent on December 9, 1963, to the Warren Commission asking the
Commission to issue a press release stating that the FBI report clearly show
that there was no international conspiracy and that Oswald was a loner. How
would you construe that letter?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not have the letter in front of me.
Mr. BLAKEY. I am talking about the general impact of that letter. Would it be
fair to characterize that as pressure on the Commission or the Commission staff
by releasing the FBI report at that early point in time, at least implicitly
indicating agreement with its conclusions?
Mr. WILLENS. First of all, there was no Commission staff at the time that the
letter was written. As I indicated earlier, the Commission concluded not to
publish any press statement affirming the findings of the FBI. The Commission
was of the view that it had a separate responsibility under the President's
order to conduct its own investigation and make its own findings. Many of the
members of the Commission were skeptical regarding the FBI investigation and
wanted to review the raw materials and conduct additional investigation before
they reached any conclusions that could be publicly stated with any degree of
confidence by the members of the Commission themselves.
The Commission did include as you know, four Members of Congress and they were
particularly sensitive to the public concern that was precipitated by the
investigation and by the assassination of President Kennedy and they undoubtedly
were under pressure from their constituents to make the findings public. But in
each case they decided that the work of the Commission required more extensive
work and consideration than the FBI had been able to give the matter in
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what after all had been a very limited period within which the Bureau could
investigate the assassination.
What I have said is not to fault the Bureau for their initial product the
Commission report does take exception to some major issues. The FBI report was
prepared under enormous strain and was done so at the direction of the President
and in my view in order to make certain that some of the facts with respect to
this could be developed rapidly so that the President and the other leaders of
the Government could decide what actions were appropriate.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, you have, as have some of the other witnesses appearing
before the committee, mentioned the general problem of time and perhaps tune as
a pressure. Let me st this point review with you some of the key dates in the
time between November and September from the assassination to the release of the
report. After have done that I would like to ask you some general questions on
that.
The President was, of course, assassinated on the and of November, 1963.
President Johnson created a Commission on November 29. The Commission's first
meeting occurred on December 5. On December 5, the FBI submitted its four-volume
summary report, just 17 days after the assassination. On December 16, Mr. Rankin
was sworn in as General Counsel. On December 20, the FBI report from which the
summary report was composed began arriving at the Commission offices. On January
10, the Commission's organization was completed. On January 13, the
supplementary report was received by the Warren Commission. On January 20, the
first staff meeting occurred.
February 3 marks the beginning of the hearings conducted by the Commission,
March 14 the date of the Ruby trial. In March the beginning of field
investigation by the Commission. The month of April is a month in which
approximately half of the depositions were taken. In May Mr. Rankin informed the
Commission staff members that they should have their investigation completed by
June 1. On June 1 only Mr. Specter had finished his draft. On June 17 the Warren
Commission announced that its hearings were completed.
On June 27, the Commission announced that its report would not be released until
after the Republican National Convention on July 13. In July most of the senior
lawyers left. Primarily Mr. Liebeler, Mr. Griffin, and Mr. Slawson remained. In
August the report was written in part but the deadlines were extended to
September and of course on September 24, the first galley proofs arrived. On
September 24, the report was submitted to the President. On September 28, it was
released.
A summary of these dates would indicate that the actual FBI investigation, at
least initially, extended from November 22 to December 9, a period of 17 days.
There were approximately 5 months between the organization of the Commission and
the completion of some drafts, approximately 2 to 4 months were spent in writing
and rewriting the Commission's report and approximately 3 1/2 months were spent
by the Commission engaging in field investigations.
In retrospect do you believe that that time schedule as generally outlined was
adequate to do the work?
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Mr. WILLENS. I think the time was sufficient to do the work of the Warren
Commission. I cannot deny that the work could have gone on for another month or
two or six. The question of how much time was one that had to be reassessed from
month to month as we pursued the investigation and looked at those remaining
lines of investigation that could be explored. There inevitably are going to be
loose ends of one kind or another that are going to be left. undone at the end
of any major criminal investigation. I think that the way you have described the
timing, based on the records of the Commission, is substantially accurate.
The only question I would raise for your consideration is whether it is accurate
to describe the FBI investigation as limited to the early portion, to the 17-day
period you are talking about, and whether you have fairly taken into
consideration the fact that as soon as the Commission staff began work in
mid-January or thereabouts there begin to result a series of investigative
requests to the FBI, CIA, and other investigative agencies which built on the
investigation already conducted and was a very important component of the
overall investigation.
I would also point out that the investigative work did continue through July and
August and in some respects into September. You will find in the records of the
Commission a substantial volume of important investigative requests that were
sent to the FBI and other agencies during those months as it became clear from
the testimony of witnesses or from other investigative reports that some leads
should be further explored before any Commission findings were arrived at.
Those may be only caveats, Mr. Blakey, and are not directly responsive to your
question but I do think it is important to recognize that essentially the
Commission had from mid-January to mid-September to do its work and it is
certainly true that during that 8 month period most of the investigation was
done during the first 5 months of that period and most of the writing was done
during the last 3 months of that period.
Obviously there was some writing and assembly of investigative materials during
the early months. One of the principal assignments given the lawyers was to
absorb what they had assigned to them in their area and to propose a factual
narrative or analysis that would inform the members of the Commission what was
known and what was unknown. There was a constant stream of summary memorandums
that were produced by the staff and then the taking of depositions was a very
major and important part of the Commission's factfinding and it was
concentrated, as you say in the months from mid-March through May or
thereabouts, with some significant number of depositions taken I believe in June
and July.
Nonetheless the record is clear as to what time was available and the record is
awfully clear what was done. It is up to you to assess whether what was done was
fairly and efficiently done in light of the time available.
Mr. BLAKEY. MY. Chairman, that concludes my questions in the area of Mr.
Willens' assignment, the organization of the Warren Commission, the selection of
the staff, the staff's general performance,
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and possible pressures under which it operated. I have some additional questions
in the area of procedures, the methods of investigation, relationship of the
agency, and the writing of the report. But it might be appropriate now for the
committee to ask questions at least in those first areas, if it so desires.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Willens, I have become very impressed with the fact that the members of the
Commission staff and otherwise were working in a relatively short time frame. I
don't think I was fully aware of the fact that this really took only a few
months from the very beginning until the first drafts were done, a little less
than a year for the entire job. I guess I was under the impression it was a
longer period of time. I don't know why. Chief Justice Warren started the
investigation at the first meeting and I could quote him but I will just
paraphrase his remarks, mentioned specifically that he perceived his job as
Chairman of the Commission and the job of the Commission as one to evaluate
evidence rather than conduct an investigation. Now it may just be semantic here
but I thought it was rather significant at the outset that he seemed to make the
distinction that the Commission was not to serve as an investigative body but
really as an evaluator of accumulated evidence. I wonder if you might comment on
that in terms of, one, did we see sort of evolutionary process that the
Commission went through from that being the original ideas and then as the work
developed it became more an investigative agency, not an agency but an
investigative body, rather, or did it in fact maintain its original framework of
an evaluator of evidence.
Mr. WILLENS. I think that is an interesting question, Congressman Dodd.
I think that there was no question that many members of the Commission and
certainly all of the staff knew that there was a very substantial amount of
investigative work to be done, that this was indeed an investigative Commission,
with a Presidential charter that had a most important set of crimes to
investigate and report. There was at the same time some reticence among some
members of the Commission because of the fact that the Commission was an unusual
kind of factfinding agency and was not a court with the responsibility for
finding facts through the adversary processes. I think there certainly was some
concern as to what kind of factfinding agency the Commission should be. I
believe though that any reservation on that score was set aside as soon as it
became clear to the members of the Commission as to the scope of the
investigation that was necessary in order to resolve the many unanswered
questions that were raised by the investigative materials that were turned over
to the Commission.
I think the members of the Commission and the staff also became increasingly
aware as the public rumor mill began to operate, of the sensitivity of their
mission and the need to deal with these various rumors and allegstions in the
public domain, and that in order to do so effectively it was necessary to check
out those various allegations to see whether they had any factual foundation or
whether they lacked any factual foundation.
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If there was any reservation, in short, to begin with, I think it was cured in
the early months of the Commission's work and that the Commission members and
staff like recognized that they were inevitably conducting a mammoth
investigation, using the Federal agencies and using their independent staff in
order to find out all the facts that were relevant to the assassination of
President Kennedy and the murder of Oswald.
Mr. DODD. Within the 4 days after the assassination, and I don't recall your
response to Mr. Blakey's question with regard to your awareness of the
Katzenbach memo regarding the directive so to speak of the Commission, that is,
to lay to rest the growing concern, both nationally and internationally, with
the ramifications of the assassination, and to establish that once and for all
that Lee Harvey Oswald was acting alone, you maintained your employee-employer
relationship with the Justice Department throughout the entire investigation, is
that correct?
Mr. WILLENS. Yes.
Mr. DODD. Your salary and everything came from the Justice Department? You never
were paid at all by the Coramission itself as a salaried employee of the
Commission?
Mr. WILLENS. That is correct.
Mr. DODD. Were you consciously aware at all, either as a result of direct or
indirect communication from Mr. Katzenbach, that he had this feeling or was that
a misstatement of his thinking with regard to the Commission's duties at the
outset?
Mr. WILLENS. Before I became officially associated with the Commission I was
aware of the fact of an FBI report and the issue whether or not some public
statement should be made on the subject. As I recall there were some who felt
that the entire FBI report should be made public. There were others who thought
it should not be. but that some form of summary should be made public.
There was a third group who felt nothing should be made public until the
Commission had been created and had undertaken its job. I sympathize with those
who felt at the time that some public statement would have been a useful gesture
if it could have allayed public concern and unrest. I think that was a
well-motivated, understandable desire. If the national interest could have been
furthered in such a way, I am sure most people considering the issue would have
come out that way. In fact, they did not because they concluded no simple public
statement could really resolve the uncertainties until all the facts had been
developed, and everyone accepted the fact that the FBI could not possibly be
asked to develop all the facts regarding the assassination within a week or even
3 weeks or a month.
Mr. DODD. I am not clear as to when you were assigned the liaison
responsibilities. Do you recall the date of that?
Mr. WILLENS. I did go over to the Connnission on December 17, 1963. In the
period between the assassination and December 17 I have some knowledge, very
limited, regarding the FBI investigation and the issues that were being
discussed within the executive branch regarding the appointment of the
Commission and the making of a public statement with respect to the
assassination.
Mr. DODD. The reason I ask that, I don't have any reason to believe you
necessarily were aware of this or not, maybe you were, on November
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21, 1963, and again on December 2, 1963, Mr. McCone---that was when Lyndon
Johnson was President discussed with him various questions surrounding Cuba. He
met again on the second with Mr. Bundy. Mr. McCone met with both L.B.J. and
Bundy and discussed Cuba again. In light of the fact that we now know that prior
to 1963 the Central intelligence Agency, with certain members of organized crime
along with the apparent knowledge of the President, were involved in an effort
to assassinate or to do away with Mr. Castro, in some way bring about a change
in that government down there, do you think it possible that the Attorney
General, then Attorney General Robert Kennedy, being knowledgeable, assuming he
was knowledgeable of those particular circumstances, would be somewhat reluctant
to have the kind of full-blown investigation that could possibly surface certain
pieces of evidence at that time that would have shed a poor light on his
brother's administration and that therefore there might very well have been a
degree of reluctance to have the kind of fullblown investigation that was
contemplated and sought after by some?
His brother in fact was dead. Nothing that the Commission could do would bring
him back. There was a lot of personal hurt there, and why open up Fandora's box,
particularly when you are dealing with someone who is parading around as having
connections with a Free Cuba or Fair Play for Cuba Committee or a lot of the
issues that would surface as a result of that kind of full-blown investigation
when there were some rather strong ties to Cuba?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not believe that is possible. I know from my conversations
with the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General that no effort was
ever made to influence me with respect to the scope or the thoroughness of the
investigation. I was told nothing about what to do but to do my best work to
assist the Commission in completing its investigative assignment and reporting
its findings in a coherent and persuasive report.
Mr. DODD. You mentioned before that there were no political pressures in
response to Mr. Blakey's question, to terminate the Commission's work. Yet a
note I have someplace indicates that at a meeting that you had with the Chief
Justice in June of 1964, at the time you informed him it was going to take a
little longer than originally had been expected, the Chief Justice apparently
lost his temper a little bit or became annoyed. I guess--I don't know what the
proper description is of that meeting, but he became quite upset with the fact
that you were not going to get the work done as planned. The Chief Justice had
earlier stated:
Other than obviously wanting to get the job done, which is obviously something
we are all interested in, I certainly would like to see this job done, but my
primary concern is that it be done right.
I am curious as to whether or not the Chief Justice expressed at that time or
prior to or thereafter, that while he would like to see it done he wanted the
kind of thorough and complete job that should be done, given the significance of
the event. I am concerned why there seemed to be this tremendous concern with
the time element when you consider it was an assassination of a President.
Mr. WILLENS. I understand that question, Congressman. I think that one
explanation that I have for this and in retrospect is that none of us,
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including the Commission or staff had any real comprehension at the beginning of
the Commission's assignment as to exactly how long it would take.
Mr. DODD. Although the Chief Justice did set June 1 as the date from the very
first meeting?
Mr. WILLENS. I think that is probably right. Yet I am sure he would concede it
was an absolutely arbitrary date. It did not bear any necessary relationship to
the scope of the mission or the number of people on board or the obstinancy of
the investigative agencies whatever that might develop during the course of
those 5 months that he thought it would take. I must say I probably thought at
the outset when I went over to the Commission that although I did not know how
long it would take I probably thought it would take 6 months. I knew it would
take some time to get organized. I knew it would take some time to conduct
investigations. I knew it would take substantial time to write a report.
I think in my own mind I underestimated the time it took to do all of those
things. I think what came home to the Chief Justice and to other members of the
Commission beginning in late May and June was that the job really was more
complicated and more controversial than any of us had assumed. I think the Chief
Justice was very discouraged by that report to him in June of 1963 that the
deadlines he had hoped could be met were not any longer realistic ones because
of the need to conduct additional investigation and because of the difficulty in
putting together draft sections of the report that were coherent, and defensible
and ready to be reviewed by the members of the Commission.
To some extent the Chief Justice undoubtedly felt like every chairman does of a
commission or committee, that is, he felt that he was a prisoner of the staff or
limited by the staff's willingness or ability to complete a particular
assignment on the schedule that the Chairman had set. Staffs uniformly tried to
do that. Then, when they were unable to do that, their obligation was to come
forward and say why they were unable to meet the timetable and propose a
different timetable.
I want to be certain that you do understand that as the deadline was constantly
put off there were of course events during that year of a political nature that
would undoubtedly bbe in the minds of the media and other persons who were
concerned about when our report would come out. There were certainly times when
it was discussed whether the report should come out after or before the
Republican Convention. There was certainly concern about whether the report
would come out in advance of the 1964 election.
Mr. DODD. I have heard everyone say that. I have tried to imagine. I am certain
that at the time the President must have been extremely anxious as the
investigation was proceeding that he be kept abreast of what was turning up.
Having a somewhat passing familiarity with Johnson he never let anything happen
that he did not keep apprised of it at all times. He must have been terribly
nosey about what the Commission was coming up with. I say that with all due
respect to the President of the United States. He had that reputation. Assuming
nothing startling was coming up the original FBI report-seemed to be holding
true as far as the investigation, why was it so important that it be done before
a political convention or fall election if there was nothing startling in the
report other than what we already assumed was true anyway?
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Mr. WILLENS. In part the concern was a media concern. There were numerous
conversations with media representatives who were apprehensive about being
scooped by the report being published at a time when they or their facilities
were being allocated to covering some other major political event. That
obviously was not a decisive concern but it was something that was brought to
the attention of the Commission and various other officials as the Commission's
report seemed to be working toward its conclusion. The concern about the
election may be difficult to understand now. At the time there were ugly rumors
and apprehensions regarding the work of the Commission end the nature of the
conspiracy that may have occurred to have caused the assassination of President
Kennedy.
It was feared, perhaps without justification, that the report might become a
campaign issue if it had not been published in edvidence of the election.
Mr. DODD. If that was the issue why not wait until after the campaign?
Mr. WILLENS. That is right. The other concern was that if it were postponed
until after the election it would be assumed it had been repressed so as to
avoid disclosures that might affect the candidacy of the President. Now having
said all that, it was clear to me in September as we were in the final stages of
this, that if the staff had concluded that the report should not be published it
could have been free to recommend the Commission, and the history of the
relations with the staff of the Commission is that the staff certainly did make
its views known to Mr. Rankin and through him to the Commission.
That was not done because although them were differences among the staff with
respect to specific outstanding matters I think it was the consensus of the
staff that the work had been completed and we prepared to produce the report.
Mr. DODD. l wondered if there was any serious doubt between the people over the
timeliness of the report, given some of the outstanding questions that lingered
in some peoples minds anyway on the Commission.
Mr WILLENS. I think the record will reflect a certain increase in the pace of
memo writing as August and September approached and it was a very constructive
and positive process because those memoranda detailing problems with the
chapters and with the nature of the investigation forced everyone on the staff
and the members of the Commission to pause in their deliberations and decide
whether or not in fact the investigation was sufficiently completed to justify
making findings and including them in a proposed report.
I have no quarrel in abstract or with the benefit of hindsight with the concerns
that were expressed by members of the staff regarding the adequacy of the
investigation or the sufficiency of the draft sections of the report. It was not
a majority view still that the publication of the report should be deferred
because of the outstanding matters. In every case the outstanding matter was
resolved before the report was finally completed and published.
Mr. DODD. I have over extended my time. Let me just ask one other question here.
Again reviewing the synopsis of the various meetings that the Commission had, at
one of the first meetings, if not the first
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formal meeting, you had been on board 3 or 4 days about this time, around
December 20, the Chief Justice began a meeting by emphasizing that rumors should
be quenched or squelched. He was talking about rumors. I am curious if you can
recall what the rumors were? Is there something other than rumors about what the
committee was doing or not doing? Was that really what it was about?
Mr. WILLENS. I think the reference there was intended to refer to the various
allegations in the foreign press and in some segments of the domestic press
regarding foreign or domestic conspiracy, either of left-wing nature, right-wing
nature, any variety you could identify. I think it is to those rumors that the
Chief Justice was referring in a way that suggested that these were matters of
great public moment that had to be investigated by the Commission and resolved
hopefully as speedily as possible.
Mr. DODD. I would think though, and again I will editorialize a bit and ask you
to comment on it, if I were a young attorney and sitting there at a meeting with
the Chief Justice of the United States who is sitting here, and he then
announces that we want to squelch any of these rumors that are going around
about conspiracies involving other people, I wouldn't necessarily want to
suggest that we ought to go seeking out conspiracies, but certainly there was
some evidence there that deserved looking into beyond a homicide investigation,
particularly when you are talking about the assassination of a President of the
United States. I wonder if you, although still a young man, 14 years ago even a
young man, can state what was the reaction of a group of young attorneys who
were looking at the Chief Justice who said he wants to squelch these rumors.
Was there not a tendency to express the desire you wanted to examine thoroughly
some things you might find important to proceed on? What was the reaction of a
group of young people in a room like that with the Chief Justice saying
something like that?
Mr. WILLENS. First of all none of the members of the staff including me were at
that meeting. That is not to evade your question because that statement has been
made publicly on more than one occasion. The staff was not influenced by any
desire of a single member of the Commission to squelch rumors at the cost of
conducting a full and honest investigation. As young as we were, we were given a
very substantial public responsibility and no person, member of the Commission
or not, was going to stand in the way of any of us completing our
responsibility. That was certainly the way I felt about it and I had a
particularly personal sense of involvement in this investigation. It was also
the view that was shared by my colleagues. You have now seen sufficient of them
to know that they are a talented, aggressive and independent group of lawyers.
Fourteen years ago they were, shall we say, perhaps less wise and even more
aggressive and articulate and ambitious that they are today when they have all
been mellowed by the years. They were drawn from private life.
They had no motivation in this except to do the best job possible. They knew, as
this committee investigation demonstrates, that their work was going to be
scrutinized in detail for decades to come. With all due respect to the Chief
Justice, if we differed with him regarding the attitude to be taken with respect
to the investigation we pursued our
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own views of what to be done and it was in that vein that the stuff did its
work.
Mr. DODD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appologize taking so much time.
Mr. FAUNTROY. It is quite all right. I am anxious to get into the other matters.
We do want to proceed to that. I just have one related question.
Mr. Willens, is it your testimony that at no time prior to December 17, 1963, or
subsequent to the initial call to you, were you aware of a sentiment which had
been expressed to Walter Jenkins as early as 2 days after the assassination, a
sentiment that had been conveyed by Mr. Katzenbach to Mr. Bill Moyers 4 days
after the assassination, that there was a need to convince the public that
Oswald was the real assassin and that he acted alone? At no time were you aware
of that feeling on the part of Mr. Katzenbach?
Mr. WILLENS. No; that is not my testimony, Congressman. I was aware that there
was such a feeling held by some people in the department including Mr.
Katzenbach. I was aware that how to deal with the matter and whether to appoint
a Commission and whether to make public statement were issues that were being
much debated within the executive branch. I was not a party to any of the
meetings in which any of these issues were discussed. I was, however, one of the
few people who was aware of the issues being discussed and the fact of the FBI
investigation and of the probability that a Commission would be appointed.
Mr. FAUNTROY. That sentiment was not expressed to you in the conversations
subsequent to the 17th and prior to your going on board
Mr. WILLENS. I think that once a decision had been made to handle the public's
need via a Presidential Commission, that the attitude changed significantly as
to the pressure or urgency of quelling public rumors or convincing the public
that Lee Harvey Oswald was a sole assassin. It may be that after the FBI report
was produced and examined by responsible authorities that they concluded that no
quick public statement could serve the needs of the country in ascertaining the
facts and eliminating uncertainty which was not warranted by those facts.
So once a decision was made I believe to appoint a Presidential Commission I
think there was a concession by most-of the people involved that public
elaboration of this should be deferred until the Commission completed its work.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Counsel, will you proceed now?
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, let me direct your attention to the general issue of
procedures and methods of investigation conducted by the Commission. As I am
sure you are aware, the simple question in any investigation is not so much what
you do as what you don't do. In this context I would ask that the Chairman
direct the clerk to mark as JFK exhibit No. 68 a memorandum of February 27,
1964, from Mr. Hubert to Mr. Rankin. And ask that it be shown to the witness.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The clerk is so directed.
Mr. BLAKEY. Are you familiar with that memorandum, Mr. Willens?
Mr. WILLENS. Yes; a copy of tiffs memorandum was made available to me in advance
of the hearing.
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Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the memorandum be incorporated in the
record at this point so that I may ask Mr. Willens some questions based on it.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 68 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 68
[Memorandum]
FEBRUARY 27, 1964.
To: Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel.
From: Leon D. Hubert, Jr.
1. I have given some thought as you know (see my memos of February 19 relative
to particular problems) to what policy should be developed as to future
investigations by the Commission; but this memo concerns broader aspects of the
same problem. I wish to pass them on to you not for the record, but so that this
memo may be used as a point of departure for discussion. Let me say further,
that if this general problem has already been considered by the Commission,
please simply disregard this memo.
2. As I see the whole picture to date, these has been an intensive investigation
starting November 22 but diminishing in intensity as time has passed. I think
this diminution has occurred because the normal and usual techniques have been
nearly exhausted. This investigation has produced a great mass of material which
has proved useful for deductive and inductive reasoning.
3. However, the fact is that so far, the Ruby materials on hand are not
sufficient either to exclude the possibility of a conspiracy or to warrant a
conclusion that there was none.
4. In regard to the investigation to date, as what I choose to call the "first
effort," I now pose the following problems:
a. Is there to be a "second effort," aside from the taking of testimony by the
Commission? I think there should be.
b. If so, then a decision should be made as to the degree of intensity of that
effort, and a policy arrived at, at least in the nature of establishing a set of
norms, as to how far it should go. I realize that to some extent each aspect of
the "Second effort" will be sui generis; but norms would help.
5. I suggest that in arriving at the norms consideration should be given to
whether most of the people of this country (say 75 percent) living and yet to be
born, will accept a cessation of investigation at any given point (discussed
below), and also whether other investigators of this or another generation will
accept cessation at the same point. I believe they will, if it is demonstrated
that continuation of investigation was not justified because the possible result
was too remote and tenuous to warrant the expenditure of the required time and
funds. I have in mind as an example one of the matters I have submitted to you
to wit: Suppose 500,000 people left the country after .November 22; they are
remotely suspect because presumably a culprit would want to get out of the
United States. Now, if we were reasonably certain of finding the President's
assassin or a conspirator, the notion and particular critics would readily
accept the work, time and money involved in sifting through this vast material;
and moreover would be critical of the fact that the work was not done; and this
irrespective of the cost. However, if the chances of finding anything of value
were extremely remote, I think there would be acception of cessation of this
particular line of investigation effort.
6. I suggest that the problem of deciding when to stop in any area or simple
episode depends upon the rules of diminishing returns: but where lies the line
of demarcation creates a real problem. I suggest that each advisor in his own
area can make Iris judgment and pass it to you for acception, rejection or
modification. But then you must pass it to the Commission because the problems
are so grave that only they should make the decisions; and as indicated above, a
set of norms would be helpful, since most decisions for cessation will fall into
one of three or four norms and could be disposed of by stating that cessation
was decided upon by application of the conditions of a stated normOther
cessations, not falling within a norm, would have to be dealt with specifically.
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339
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, the memorandum of Mr. Hubert to Mr. Rankin generally
raises the question of character of the investigation and the general issue of
when not to conduct investigations. I note that it generally describes the
picture of the investigation as indicating it was rather intensive in the period
of time immediately following November 22. I am referring to paragraph 2. But
that it diminished in intensity its time passed. Mr. Hubert ascribed that
diminishing intensity primarily to the exhaustion of the normal and usual
techniques of investigation.
He then commented in paragraph 3 that the Ruby materials on hand were not
sufficient either to exclude the possibility of a conspiracy or to warrant a
conclusion that there was none. He raised then the general issue in paragraphs 5
and 6 about the question really of diminishing returns. How much expenditure of
time and effort should the Commission make in pursuing allegations of one kind
or another.
I will ask you in the context of that memorandum whether you were aware in
February of discussions like this about how far you should go and what the
general position of Mr. Rankin and the Commission was in response to memorarda
of this character?
Mr. WILLENS. Yes; I can respond to that question in a general way. It was of
concern to all the members of the staff to have some sense of what kind of
investigative effort was contemplated by the Commission. There was an
uncertainty, as reflected in Mr. Hubert's memorandum, as to exactly what kind of
investigation the staff was authorized to request. In other areas there was no
uncertainty and the lawyers there produced investigative requests as quickly as
they had mastered the materials and came forward with some coherent requests to
address to the FBI and the CIA or one of the other agencies.
This memorandum has to be looked at particularly in the context of its date. It
was shortly after the date of this memorandum, which is February 27, 1964, that
the Commission authorized an extensive program of depositions by the staff. The
significance of that fact is sometimes overlooked. It was the fact of
depositions by the staff and the permission to conduct investigation following
up on deposition testimony that constituted essentially the second effort that
is described here by Mr. Hubert. I don't think it is fair to say that the
investigation had diminished at the time that Mr. Hubert wrote this memorandum.
The initial assignment of the staff though, as I said earlier, once they arrived
on duty, was to master the materials in their area and to propose a second
effort of investigation consisting of specific requests of investigative
agencies, consisting of identifying those witnesses which should be called
before the Commission or deposed by members of the staff and identifying any
further issues in their area that they thought required the attention of the
Commission. As of late February 1964 these memoranda were coming in from members
of the staff and being reviewed by Mr. Rankin. Professor Redlich and myself, and
decisions at that point were being made about an overall program of
investigation which was responsive to the staff analyses that could be presented
for approval to the Commission.
The records of the Commission will reflect that in early March the Commission
did receive a memorandum over Mr. Rankin's signature outlining a proposed course
of investigation which was adopted without reservation by the members of the
Commission.
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Mr. BLAKEY. In light of your answer, Mr. Willens, I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if the
clerk could be requested to mark as JFK Exhibit No. 69 a memo of March 25, 1964,
of Mr. Willens to Mr. Rankin, responding I think in part to the general subject
raised by Messrs. Hubert and Griffin.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The clerk is so instructed.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder if the clerk could also be instructed to show the
memorandum now marked JFK Exhibit No. 69 to the witness.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The clerk is so instructed.
Mr. BLAKEY. Are you familiar with this memorandum, Mr. Willens.
Mr. WILLENS. Yes, I am.
Mr. BLAKEY. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you would direct that that be
incorporated in the record in order that I might ask some questions of the
witness based on this document?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to, marked as JFK Exhibit No. 69 and received for the
record, follows:]
JFK EXHIBIT No. 69
[Memorandum]
MARCH 25, 1964.
For Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel.
From: Howard J. Willens.
The attached is one of the specific investigative requests proposed by Messrs.
Hubert and Griffin which requires, in my view, further consideration. I am
opposed to sending out this request, without further documentation, for the
following reasons:
1. I think that we should develop this type of information only if we have some
specific allegation regarding travel or contacts by an identified person at a
particular time and place which appears possibly relevant to our inquiry. If
sufficient information has not been developed in the course of the extensive
investigation already conducted to meet this requirement, then I think the
probabilities of the additional inquiry yielding information of value are too
slight to justify the extensive inquiry proposed. As Messrs. Hubert and Griffin
have recognized in their several prior memoranda, this is a problem of balancing
considerations. One consideration which looms increasingly large in my opinion
is the tentative target date for the completion of this investigation. This is
not to state that any meaningful allegation should not be investigated because
of time factors. I do feel, however, that the attached does not appear to be
based on a meaningful allegation and therefore our limited time and effort
should not be expended by projects, such as this, which do not promise to yield
very much.
2. If Messrs. Hubert and Griffin were to demonstrate that the materials
currently in their possession raise an allegation meeting the above criteria,
then think the way to check the allegation out is to ask the FBI to review the
relevant files in the Department of State. Only after this is done should we
request original documents from State, in my opinion, unless there is a special
reason why the original document is necessary.
Mr. BLAKEY. As I read JFK exhibit No. 69, Mr. Willens, the general issue being
raised is not so much the technique of investigation, for example, depositions,
as we saw reflected in a previous memorandum, but rather the nature of
allegations that should be pursued. I am not so much concerned with the specific
allegation reflected on the memorandum that were attached to this memorandum but
rather the general issue of what kinds of allegations should be followed up. I
take it by reading paragraph 1 that what you were suggesting to Mr. Rankin was
that on the whole allegations that were not m some way supported, to be
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341
called meaningful allegations, should probably not be followed out and I will
quote now the second to the last sentence in paragraph 1.
One consideration which looms increasingly large in any opinion is the tentative
target date for the completion of this investigation. This is not to state that
any meaningful allegation should not be investigated because of time factors. I
do feel, however, that the attached does not appear to be based on a meaningful
allegation and, therefore, our limited time and effort should not be expended by
projects such as this, which do not promise to yield very much.
I wonder if you could comment on this, Mr. Willens? Did the Commission accept
this recommendation that there should be some distinction between meaningful and
nonmeaningful allegations and if so what criteria were employed in determining
the difference between meaningful allegations and I take it unmeaningful
allegations?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not know whether this issue was ever presented to the
Commission in the terms that the memorandum defines the question. I believe my
memorandum, JFK exhibit No. 69, is in essential agreement with Mr. Hubert's
memorandum of February 27, JFK exhibit No. 68, to the extent that it indicates
that there is a balancing process which must be undergone in deciding which
investigative request to send out to the agencies and which allegations should
be pursued.
Hubert was one of the members of the staff who did address this issue in general
terms. I do not remember the specific investigative request that JFK exhibit No.
69 was addressed to but I do believe, and continue to believe, that there are
limitations on investigative resources available either to the Warren Commission
or presently to this committee and that judgment has to be exercised as to how
best to use those investigative resources. My effort in this memorandum was to
suggest that any allegation should be checked out if you could tie an allegation
to a particular person or a particular time and place. My concern at the time
was with overly general and vague investigative requests that would deny us
access to investigative resources for other more specific lines of investigation
and would promise to produce very little of value.
On any specific investigative request I am sure there could have been
conflicting views. My general reaction is that I approved almost all
investigative requests coming from the staff without any question whatsoever. My
recollection is, however, that there were numerous occasions when I raised the
question with a staff member as to the utility of the particular request, the
particular objective that he had in mind, and the extent to which there might be
other ways of obtaining the necessary information.
Usually we were able to resolve those differences of view without any
difficulty. If we were not able to do so they were presented to Mr. Rankin for
his final decision as to whether the investigative request would or would not go
out. I think it is fair to say that the records will reflect many more
investigative requests coming from Messrs. Hubert and Griffin which prompted
debate than there had been from other areas and that prompts, I am sure, some of
the rhetoric in this memo and other memoranda that you have undoubtedly seen or
will see suggesting that we ought to sit down and try to work this out.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have the clerk directed to show
the witness what has already been marked and admitted into the record, JFK
exhibit No. 65.
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Mr. FAUNTROY. The clerk is so directed.
Mr. BLAKEY. It is a memorandum of February 24, 1964, from Messrs. Hubert and
Griffin to Mr. Willens. Do you recall this memorandum, Mr. Willens?
Mr. WILLENS. I did not recall it until a copy was recently made available to me.
I am now familiar with it.
Mr. BLAKEY. We have had testimony in the record that as a result of this
memorandum some of the suggestions for developing telephone numbers and phone
call records were followed and that others were not. Generally the broader scope
of the request, for example, as represented in paragraph No. 9 that there be a
general freezing of phone call records was not implemented and that an effort
was not made to ascertain all of the reasonably available phone and phone call
records to some of the parties identified in the record. I wonder if you could
share with the committee, if you recall, your reasons or Mr. Rankin's reasons
for not pursuing the telephone call records suggested here by Mr. Hubert and Mr.
Griffin?
Mr. WILLENS. I do not have any specific recollection or discussions regarding
this memorandum. My recollection does coincide, however, with the testimony that
you have summarized. My recollection is that the broad-based request here was
not implemented by a letter to the FBI but that throughout the remaining months
of the investigation some of the specific inquiries suggested here with respect
to telephone calls and telephone records were made and reports produced
regarding those requests. I think that the reason the broader requests were not
taken is anticipated very neatly by Mr. Hubert's and Mr. Griffin's second
paragraph which I quote, "Some of the suggestions made impose burdens on private
parties which are not justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so,
they should be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to
assure future critics that such efforts were carefully considered."
I believe that the broad requests were not accepted by Mr. Rankin or by me for
this very concern. I do not know whether the records show any written statement
of our reasons as Mr. Hubert and Mr. Griffin suggest would be appropriate. I
agree with that suggestion and I think my custom was to make notes with regard
to the disposition of some of the matters in dispute such as this one but I do
not have a recollection of so doing in this precise case. I am confident that I
would not have made a decision of this kind without consulting with Mr. Rankin
and discussing the matter fully with him. It was a]so his practice that if I
made my recommendation to him that was contrary to the views expressed by other
members of the staff that he would typically have them in to discuss the matter
with them so that he could make a final disposition of the matter, having heard
all points of view.
That was his practice. I do not know whether it was followed in this precise
case but I suspect that it would have been.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Willens, there are obviously only a limited number of ways in
which conspiracy allegations can be pursued. There was not available to the
Commission sophisticated electronic surveillance techniques that would deal with
the formation of the conspiracy. It is doubtful that physical records would be
in existence or that the
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Commission had access to search warrant authority to seize them. Basically all
you could do was to engage in field interrogation and depositions. I wonder why
you would have foregone the opportunity to examine long distance call records in
pursuit of the conspiracy allegation? Had you done so and you had developed a
pattern of preassassination communications between some of the individuals
identified subsequently by Messrs. Griffin and Hubert, who were associated with
Mr. Ruby and perhaps even with Mr. Oswald, it might have been possible to pursue
these associations and precipitate Commission interogation based on those calls?
Would it be a fair characterization that by failing to do this you lost, and
probably permanently, the ability to pursue, however, tenuous, some of the
associations?
Mr. WILLENS. I would not accept that characterization. If your investigation
discover that it did have those consequences then I think that is an important
conclusion for you to report. The Commission did have the subpena power, it
could have subpenaed records if it had elected to do so. It had close liaison
with the Texas law enforcement officials and undoubtedly they had some authority
to pursue these matters if they wanted to or if we suggested to them that might
be useful.
There was a very extensive investigation into the Ruby area involving his
relationships with many of the people identified in this memorandum. I think it
is shortsighted to look at this memorandum alone without looking at all the
subsequent investigative requests in the Ruby area and make a judgment on the
basis of that kind of inquiry as to whether the Ruby investigation was adequate.
In that connection, I think you should look at the exchange of memoranda, which
you have not supplied me, of June 1, 1964, whereby I requested Mr. Hubert and
Mr. Griffin to inform me of any outstanding investigative requests for any
additional investigations they wanted to have made in order to satisfy
themselves of the adequacy of the Ruby investigation.
They responded in a memorandum of the same date reporting they were satisfied
with the adequacy of the investigation and there would be presented to me within
the next few days all the investigative requests that would be required in order
to assist them in the preparation of their report. Those memoranda do reflect a
clear and on the record communication between us with respect to the adequacy of
the investigation and the proper disposition of their investigative requests.
In subsequent months they did submit additional investigative requests and those
were almost without exception honored.
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be appropriate that the staff be
directed at this point to obtain those memoranda and that the Clerk be directed
to incorporate them in the record at this point. [For copies of these memoranda,
see IV JFK Hearings at 559-60.]
Mr. FAUNTROY. The staff is so directed.
If Counsel will yield, I would like to raise one question with Counsel. Do we
have documentation dealing with the rejection and the reasons for rejection of
the specific requests noted in document exhibit No. 65?
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Mr. BLAKEY. Not to my knowledge. I will make an effort to see to it as our
investigation continues, that if that document is developed that it be made
available to the committee.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Without objection.
Mr. DODD. Along that same line of questioning, we saw the May memo I think from
Mr. Griffin to Mr. Hubert as well in which they outlined a rather detailed
request for certain information. I am curious, you are looking at 7 or 8 days
later, the June 1 memo that you are talking about that I have not seen yet,
there must have been something that ensued between May 24 and June 1. It is a
rather detailed, long memo requesting a bit of leeway in terms of investigating
further allegations surrounding Jack Ruby. I would be curious as to what
transpired between May 24 and June 1. Do you recall at all? Are you familiar
with the May 24 memo?
Mr. BLAKEY. May 14
Mr. WILLENS. I think I have seen that memorandum although it is not one of those
in front of me at the moment. Yes, it was about that time, Congressman Dodd,
that we were trying to make certain that we were completing the investigative
stage of the matter and proceeding to the preparation of the report. It so
happens, with all due respect to my colleagues, that the lawyers in this
particular area were somewhat slower in producing an acceptable draft section of
the report than was true of their associates in other areas.
That prompted some concern and discussion by Mr. Rankin and me and Professor
Redlich with them. It became clear that a lot of these investigative requests
were, shall we say, detracting from their effort to understand, assimilate and
analyze what, in fact, was already available to the Commission. So, the
memorandum from me to them of June 1, 1964, was designed to make certain on the
record that we had before us all investigative requests that they thought at
that time were necessary to provide them with the necessary material on the
basis of which they could write their assigned portions of the report.
Now there were differences of view from time to time between me and all members
of the staff. There were many differences of view among the members of the staff
and I often was in a position of trying to moderate those disputes and
accommodate the different interests the members of the staff. It was my
responsibility to help the Commission complete its investigation and complete
the writing of the report and to do so consistently with the standards that I
set fer the staff.
So there were many discussions with Mr. Hubert and Mr. Griffin individually and
together and many of them were participated in by Mr. Shaffer or by Mr. Redlich
or by Mr. Rankin. I believe when it was all said and done they did a superior
job is pressing with the investigation and producing their sections of the final
report.
On or about June 1, however, there was a point at which we were trying to assess
where we were in light of the fact--coincidentally June 1 was the anticipated
publication date of the report based on earlier hopes---and we were trying to
assess where we were in terms of our investigation, how long it would take to
complete the report, so that Mr. Rankin would have some informed basis on which
to advise the members of the Commission as to the progress of the Commission's
work. I believe it is that process that precipitated the memorandum
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of June 1 and it had a very healthy effect because it did elicit from Mr. Hubert
and Mr. Griffin a barrage of limited, sound investigative requests that went out
without dispute.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Willens, this memorandum of May 14 is a source of great
concern to us, dealing with the adequacy of the Ruby investigation. You are
saying to us that the memorandum of June 1 will satisfy us, as it did you, that
the concerns raised here and not responded to in terms of investigative
direction, were adequately dealt with?
Mr. WILLENS. That is right, Congressman. By May 14 we had received a series of
memoranda outlining proposed investigative requests in the Ruby area. Many of
them were the subject of some differences of view although in almost each
instance some investigation did go forward in response to the request from Mr.
Hubert and Mr. Griffin. Having received the May 14 memorandum, and I believe by
that time a preliminary draft prepared by Mr. Hubert and Mr. Griffin with
respect to their assigned portion of the report, we were concerned as to the
extent to which the investigation was completed in their area and the extent to
which their report could be reviewed and submitted to the members of the
Commission.
It was at that time that I felt it would be useful to confront the problem
straight out and to elicit from them all investigative requests which in their
judgment were necessary to insure that the investigation was an adequate one.
There is a responsive memorandum to the effect that if their investigative
requests were sent forward they would consider the investigation to be a
sufficient one.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Counsel.
Mr. BLAKEY. Public Law 8-202 which came from Joint Resolution 137 of the 88th
Congress, sighted by the President on September 13, 1963, in subparagraph (B)
authorized the Commission to issue subpenas and in subparagraph (E) provided
immunity for those who testified before the Commission if they claimed the
privilege and were compelled to testify. The start has been unable to find any
indication that any witness testifying before the Commission felt it necessary
to claim the privilege of self incrimination and consequently be granted
immunity. Should we draw from that the inference that it was the policy decision
made not to call any witness before the Commission whose testimony could only be
secured on grant of immunity?
Mr. WILLENS. No, I don't think you can draw that conclusion. I have a
recollection of one or two witnesses who advised the Commission or the staff
that they might invoke their constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.
I do not recall their names or whether in fact they were subsequently deposed
and elected not to claim the privilege. I have a recollection that one of the
people I am thinking of was associated with one of the rightwing groups but I am
not sure that is the case. I am sure the record will reflect what happened.
I agree with your recollection that no witness did in fact invoke the fifth as I
recall and there were no instances where immunity was granted. There were on at
least one or two occasions discussions of that possibility within the staff, I
believe. I do not recall any discussion of a general policy not to utilize the
authority available to the Commission under the statute.
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Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions in the area of the
general relationship between the Commission and the agencies, both the FBI and
the CIA, and also having to do with the writing of the final report. In view of
the late hour and the indulgence of the witness now to what amounts to almost 3
hours of questioning, I wonder if it might not be appropriate to adjourn now and
ask him to return at a later point in time when perhaps all of us can be
refreshed, and while we might impose on him again, nevertheless at least let him
be fresh when we are doing it?
Mr. FAUNTROY. I have no objection to that.
Mr. DODD. After 3 days, l am ready.
Mr. BLAKEY. I would like at this time to extend again my appreciation to Mr.
Willens for taking time from his very busy practice to share with us his
thoughts and observations on the work of the Commission and say to him that I
personally look forward to the opportunity to talk to him again about these very
important matters.
Mr. WILLENS. I am available at your convenience, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you. With that we will adjourn this session and reconvene at
the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the
Chair.]
Attachment G
Page 347
(284) Attachment G: Executive Session Deposition of J. Lee Rankin
EXECUTIVE SESSION DEPOSITION
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1978
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, called for examination by counsel for the
committee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on
Assassinations, House Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets SW., Washington, D.C.,
beginning at 10:50. a.m., before Annabelle Short, a notary public in and for the
District of Columbia, when were present: Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel;
Kenneth Klein, assistant deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, counsel; and
Michael Ewing, counsel.
Mr. KLEIN. The time is 10:59. on August 17, 1978. We are present in the House
Select Committee on Assassinations offices.
My name is Kenneth Klein and I am the assistant deputy chief counsel for the
committee and I have been authorized by the committee to take sworn depositions
under oath pursuant to House Resolution 222 and committee rule 4.
Would you please state your name, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. My name is J. Lee Rankin.
Mr. KLEIN. Miss Short, are you authorized in the District of Columbia to swear a
witness and to take a deposition?
Miss SHORT. Yes; I am a notary public in the District of Columbia.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you please swear the witness.
Whereupon, J. Lee Rankin was called for examination by counsel for the committee
and, having been first duly sworn by the notary public, was examined and
testified as follows:
BY MR. KLEIN:
Q. Mr. Rankin, is it correct that you are here voluntarily and not subject to
subpena?
A. That is correct.
Q. Have you been advised that you have the right to have a lawyer present at
this time?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you been given pursuant to our rules, a copy of Committee Rules and
House Resolutions 222, 433, and 760?
A. Yes.
(347)
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Q. Have you had an opportunity to look through the rules?
A. I have glanced through them. I have not read them in detail.
Q. And you are aware that if you want to read them, you can.
A. Yes. You gave me a copy and if I need to consult them at any time, I will.
Q. In particular have you had an opportunity to read rule 4?
A. Yes.
Q. I will state at this time that pursuant to our rules at the completion of
this deposition the stenographer will type up a transcript the deposition. The
original copy will be sent to you, you will be asked to read through it and make
any corrections and send the original back to us. If you desire a copy, it will
then be sent to you to keep for your records.
A. I do desire a copy.
Q. That will be done.
Sir, what was your position with the Warren Commission?
A. I was the General Counsel.
Q. Could you tell us how it came about that you were appointed to this position?
A. Yes. I was asked by Chief Justice Earl Warren by telephone whether I would
undertake the position and I told him I would have to let him know. He said that
he would like very much for me to do it that it would take only about 3 months
at the outside and I would have a staff to help me, could select the staff. I
responded, I think the same day, that I was willing to undertake the work or the
position. However, I said probably some of the other Commissioners would not
want me and therefore he better ask them and find out whether they were
interested in my doing the work. He said they have already done that and they
were unanimous in wanting me and to get down as soon as I could and get sworn in
and get started.
Q. Was there any talk at that time about the goals of the Commission?
A. No.
Q. Did there come a time when you did speak to Chief Justice Warren about the
goals?
A. No. The first day that I had not all the staff but a considerable part of it
together I had a meeting with the staff and told them that their only client was
truth and that is what they were here for was to search for the truth and to
have it as completely as possible and there were no other considerations. That
was my own decision as to what our responsibility was and our duty under the
Executive order of the President and 212 never had anybody on the Commission or
otherwise that indicated we had any other responsibility or duty.
Q. Did you ever specifically discuss goals with the Chief Justice?
A. Not as such. I discussed with him the fact that we were going to try to
examine every witness that we could secure that could give light in regard to
the assassination and that we would make every inquiry about who actually
committed it, whether there were any associates or assistants, whether there was
any conspiracy, all of the various activity in connection with it that we could
obtain information about and to make a written report as completely as possible
to the President and the American people about whatever we learned.
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Q. Who made the determinations as to the size and composition of the staff?
A. I made the decision as to the various areas of interest that had to be
considered and I then presented that proposal informally to the Chief Justice
and the members of the Commission. I don't think there was any formal action
approving but there was informal approval or consensus and we proceeded on that
basis.
Q. To clarlify what you just said, at the time you made this proposal of the
areas that you felt were necessary to investigate, had you at that time resolved
the composition and size of the staff or did that come subsequent?
A. That came subsequently in that we didn't know at that point the size of the
stenographical staff that we would require because that would depend upon the
amount of material that had to be typed and filed and photocopies and all of
that type of work. It was generally thought by me that there should be probably
a senior attorney and younger attorney for each of the respective areas and I
had that in mind at that time. I never had any indication from the Chief Justice
or any member of the Commission that we were to be limited on funds. I was to
exercise reasonable judgment and that we would receive the necessary support
from whatever parts of the Government that support was required by approval or
otherwise and that we were to be financed out of the President's funds since we
were a commission appointed by Executive order and all I had to do was properly
account for and see that none of the funds were spent for any improper or
illegal purpose.
There was a question at one time raised with the Commission about the problems
of whether we should try to get an independent investigative staff and I
examined the various possibilities that way and the availabilities in the
country and the time that it would take to try to secure such a staff and be
able to have any knowledge of its competency and ability and then get it working
on the job. It appeared to me, and I so advised the Commission, that it would be
a long time before we got any such staff put together that could handle all the
problems that were involved with the size of the investigation that we would be
engaged in and we had so many facilities from the Government that the President
had insured the Commission that it would cooperate fully with the Coramission
and that it seemed prudent to try to use the intelligence facilities that the
Government had at hand.
Q. As we understand it there were five basic areas of investigation.
I think they were the basic facts of the assassination, the identity of the
assassin, the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, the conspiracy investigation, and
the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. Is that a correct statement?
A. That is my recollection of it, yes.
Q. When you say that you made a presentation to the Commission pertaining to the
areas of the investigation, are these the areas that you presented to them at
that time?
A. Yes, that is as I recall it.
Q. Then if I understand you, with the five areas determined you made the
judgment that for each area there should be two staff counsel,
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a senior and a junior, and then went about picking the counsel to fit
these areas.
A. Yes.
Q. How did you go about determining the different areas that you
ultimately chose?
A. Well, they just seemed obvious.
Q. Well, I meant did you have any help doing it, for example? Did you read FBI
reports or was it just obvious, like you say?
A. Well, we had at that point the FBI's report about the assassination which as
I recall had been leaked or available to the press and we had that. We didn't
have the detailed materials of the FBI yet and so it seemed like that was a
reasonable analysis of the problem.
Q. As you recollect, once the staff was actually chosen there were no the
original five major topic areas, that they remained the same.
A. I think so.
Q. Who picked the staff members?
A. I did.
Q. Did you have a criteria that you used to pick them?
A. Well in the senior men I tried to get lawyers of very considerable experience
in various fields and some distribution geographically so that the country would
feel that various parts of the country were represented. In the younger men I
tried to get those who had indicated a considerable skill and ability in their
law school and other educational opportunities and men who had the reputation of
being industrious.
Q. In retrospect was it a good staff for the work that you had before you?
A. I found it to be generally a very good staff. I think probably the younger
members were of more assistance to me than some of the older members.
Mr. KLEIN. Let me state for the record the deputy chief counsel, Gary Cornwell,
has entered the room and is now sitting with us.
Mr. CORNWELL. Hello.
The WITNESS. Hello.
The one factor that I did not examine with regard to the staff as much as I
would from my having had this experience was their ability
to write and most of them had demonstrated a considerable ability to write in
Law Review or other legal materials by their record but my experience taught me
that some people are fluent in writing and others while they are skilled at it
have great difficulty in getting started and finishing and getting the job
completed. I don't know just how I would have tried to have anticipated that
problem and worked it out but it became a serious difficulty for me in my work
as General Counsel. Looking back on it I would have much preferred that I had
not only the skills that I did in the staff but the additional one that as soon
as we had completed the investigation they would go right to work and write a
fine piece in which they described their activities and the results.
By Mr. KLEIN:
Q. If I might show you this chart, it is entitled "Day's Work by the Warren
Commission Staff, 1964." Maybe you could take a look at that.
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Q. It was a long time ago but basically does it appear to be an accurate chart?
A. I would not have any knowledge of that. I never tried to develop such a
chart. I know that relatively it points out that some were more available and
more active than others.
Q. That was what I was going to ask you about. It appears from the information
that the committee has gathered that a number of the senior attorneys ultimately
took a lesser role in the investigation than might have been originally planned
for them. Would you have a comment on that and the problems that arose?
A. Well, that is true. The senior attorneys were all hired with the
understanding that they would be able to get away from time to time and take
care of their practice, otherwise I could not secure them at all, and I think
that was somewhat the problem of Mr. Ball. Mr. Jenner I think was quite
available and worked rather steadily. Mr. Hubert I think I became somewhat
disenchanted toward the end. Mr. Adams I think was interested in being on the
staff at first but never expected to put any work in on it---didn't.
Q. I think also Mr. Coleman was not present a great deal of the time.
A. Mr. Coleman we had problems with because he was a very active Black man who
had gone with a principal firm in Philadelphia and had too many clients and in
order to keep our commitment we said that he could keep his practice going so he
would not have it destroyed, while he was working with the Commission. He had
many activities he had to return to Philadelphia which was handy so they called
him back repeatedly because he was in demand by his firm to help. He never
indicated any lack of interest or purpose to try to help where he could.
Q. To what extent did the absence of a number of the senior counsel affect the
investigation?
A. I don't think it materially affected the investigation as far as its
thoroughness is concerned. It threw an unreasonable burden upon some younger men
in the various areas where senior men were supposed to have carried some of that
burden and those younger men did take on that responsibility and were competent
enough to carry it out.
Q. Do you think that the results or the method of investigation would have been
significantly different in any manner had either these senior attorneys or other
senior attorneys had a more active role in it? Might it have gone into other
areas using other techniques of investigation had senior attorneys been present
to a greater extent?
A. I think my thoughts about that would be entirely speculative. I didn't see
any adverse effect due to the fact that the younger men were so industrious and
they seemed to be quite thorough in their work.
Q. We discussed the five areas which the investigation was divided into and you
have told us how you determined the areas. What, if any, pre-dispositions did
you have after reading the FBI report when you were about to embark on this
investigation?
A. Well, I proceeded in the start of the investigation with the assumption that
the FBI report was merely what they thought about
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the situation and it didn't have any effect on what we did and I never was
caused to believe by any member of the Commission that we were to support it in
any way or to assume that it was either adequate or complete or correct.
Q. Upon beginning your investigation, what were your thoughts about Lee Harvey
Oswald and his role in this case?
A. I think I assumed that he must have been involved some way and that is all.
Q. Did you have any thoughts relative to a possible conspiracy?
A. I thought the most obvious possible conspiracy was either the Soviet in some
way or eastern European countries involved with the Soviet or possibly Cuba. I
also thought there could be a possibility of some kind of conspiracy within the
country. The most obvious seemed to be in the right wing in the country in light
of the President's more liberal attitude and so forth in his conduct of the
Government, but those were merely the obvious possibilities and we constantly
searched to see if we could find any sign regardless of who the leader might be
involved.
Q. Looking back are you satisfied with the investigation into the possible
conspiracies which you have mentioned?
A. Well, I am somewhat disturbed by what the Senate committee discovered about
the fact that they say in their report as I read it that there were at least
eight different activities of some kind. directed toward the assassination of
Castro in which the CIA was involved, their use of underworld people in
connection with it, and that that information was all available in the
Government and never disclosed to us that Castro had said that if the Kennedys
could engage in this kind of activities why others could, too, and the FBI
apparently from the information you have given me of the reports of the
committee had information to a considerable degree about these activities of the
CIA and didn't disclose them to us. It is very difficult to do anything
thoroughly with the people that are supposed to be cooperating with you and part
of the same government that you are involved in and should have their loyalty to
their country withholding information from you in the process.
Q. I want to go into this area with you in much more detail a little bit later
but would it be fair to say that due to the circumstances which you have just
discussed that your staff was not able to adequately investigate the conspiracy
aspect of this case?
A. Well, I can't say that because if we had had that information and if we had
done as thoroughly as I think we did in other areas that we knew about, we might
have run out of all the leads and found nothing there except what has been
apparently revealed to date to the Congress in their various committees showing
that there are all kinds of lines but nothing that really proves any kind of a
conspiracy existed. At least that is the way I read such materials I have seen
and read in the papers. What I am saying is that I cannot say that if we had had
all the information and had the opportunity that we should have had with a
complete disclosure to investigate thoroughly everything, every lead, that we
would have found a conspiracy and have been able to lay it out because I have
not found anybody to date that has produced any credible evidence that there was
such a conspiracy.
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Q. Basically I am not asking if you think that you would have found the
conspiracy, just whether if you found one or not you would have been able to
more adequately investigate the whole conspiracy aspect had you had the
information that you have mentioned.
A. Well, we certainly would have gone in the investigation that we made if we
had that information to every possible source that seemed reasonable or a remote
possibility as to any conspiratorial activity and we would certainly have
examined the whole range of our own Government's activity in assassinations.
Q. Looking back is it possible to adequately investigate the conspiraracy aspect
of this case without this type of information which you did not have at the
time?
A. Well, my problem with that is that I think your question assumes that there
was some kind of conspiracy at the end---
Q. No, it is not meant to make that assumption. Regardless of whether at the end
you would have found the conspiracy or not, can you say that it has been
adequately investigated without the kind of information that you did not have at
your disposal?
A. Well, we certainly could not investigate the things that were withheld from
us unless we just happened on to it in some way and apparently that was quite
skillfully withheld from many people in the Government and the press and
everybody else for a long period of years.
Q. As I say, we will get back to that area in a little while.
Would you describe for us the communication that existed between Chief Justice
Warren and yourself?
A. Well, I think that it was every day; practically every day. When the Court
was in session he would come over afterward or before and then he would have a
short period of time with me. I never dealt with him on the basis that he could
run the Commission by himself. I didn't conceive that my responsibility and he
didn't either in all my dealings with him. If there was a problem, often times
he would deal with the housekeeping aspects of the Commission and in broad terms
tell me to go ahead on certain matters or if they were small or if they were of
any importance he would take them up with the rest of the Commission. He never
gave me any instructions that were just his own.
Q. How knowledgeable was he with respect to the day-to-day operations of the
investigation?
A. Quite knowledgeable in that he asked me and I tried to report to him. He
would go around to various members of the staff and ask them how they were
getting along and so forth. He didn't try, that I know of, to inquire about how
their work was progressing in such way as to sort of look like he was checking
up on what I told him or anything like that but I tried to give him a daily
progress report of how things were moving and what was immediately ahead of us,
what hearings we should be involved in, how soon and all of that kind of
business.
Q. As to the substantive decisions with regard to the actual running of the
investigation, did you make most of those?
A. No, the substantive decisions were all made by the Commission. I would
recommend. I didn't have authority to execute on my own.
Q. What communication existed between the Commissioners and yourself?
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A. Well, sometimes the different Commissioners would ask me about certain
testimony in a hearing, they wondered what this meant or that meant individually
or they would make their own comments what they thought of it. Generally we had
a meeting and the Commission was told informally about how things were
progressing and if they had any doubts any one of them would say so and
generally they didn't. They didn't complain about anything and wanted to go
ahead and get done.
Q. How often did you meet with them, approximately?
A. I don't know. I think that is all of record, but I would have no idea.
Q. In your opinion were the Commissioners as a group knowledgeable about the
facts in this case?
A. Yes, they were. It has always been my opinion that in light of the
responsibilities they each had and the work that they were involved in in the
Government that they devoted much more thought and time to it than I ever
expected they could, and that is not revealed as much by the record as by the
fact of what happened because there were quite a few times that Senator Russell
was not able to attend the hearings, and he was so disturbed about that at one
time that he spoke io the Chief Justice and said maybe he should resign because
he was not able to perform his responsibility as he wanted to in accordance with
his concept of his obligations. The Chief Justice was disturbed about that and
spoke to me and asked me to see him, and particularly with the idea that if
Senator Russell resigned it might appear that there was disharmony in the
Commission and that he felt things were not being done properly, and therefore
that was the reason for his resignation and even though he would say otherwise
and try to make it as clear as possible, it still would be read into it by the
press and commentators and so forth.
So, I went to see him. I had always had a relationship with him personally, so
that he was completely frank with me. I went to his office and he told me about
the disturbance with the work he had, the Armed Services Committee and civil
rights and other things that he wes active with in the Congress and the Senate,
that he was attending the Commission hearings as much as he wished he could,
that he had difficulty reading the transcript because he had to read all these
other things every night and he hardly had enough time during the nights to get
this done.
I asked him whether there was anything about the way the Commission was being
run or anything that I was doing that was not satisfactory and he assured me
that he was entirely satisfied. in fact was pleased with what he saw, but he was
not participating enough. I told him about the problem that if he should leave
the Commission how it might be misunderstood by the country and by people
regardless of what he said, and he said: "Well, I recognize that. I don't want
to do it, but I have this problem."
I said, "Well, what if we supplied you a lawyer who would attend the hearings
just like you would and would read the transcript and try to make the digest for
you and keep you fully informed?
He said, "Well then I will stay on if you do that"
I said, "Well we will undertake to do that. So we did.
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Now that is an example. I think that they showed a familiarity with the record
of the hearings and the progress of investigation that I was impressed with.
When you consider what else they were doing it is just the most remarkable
thing. I often wonder why we would have a committee of personalities that were
so involved that they had before they were appointed to the Commission anything.
They had more than enough to do in all of their assignments but I recognized
that the President was very wise selecting someone that represented the various
constituencies that they did and shown competence in government and knowledge
over a long term of years. I just felt he was in the dilemma of picking someone
without those qualifications who had more time and, it has been my experience in
life, that some of the busiest perform the best.
Q. Were you totally satisfied with the performance of the Commission?
A. Yes. I had no problem in that regard at all.
Q. You have told us that you would present recommendations to the Commissioners
and then they would make the decisions. Were there instances where they rejected
your recommendations?
A. I don't recall any. I think that the only time we had a serious problem in
that regard was whether we should accept the assurances of the FBI about whether
Lee Harvey Oswald had been involved with the FBI as an agent that was concealed
by a number or some other method in their system and I think--well. I was
disturbed by it myself and so I may have caused some of the difficulty because
it presented serious problems to me and I related it to them and tried to
analyze it for them and they recognized those problems and then tried to
consider the alternatives and I think everybody finally concluded that J. Edgar
Hoover would not swear to a lie.
Q. In that case, did Choy overrule your recommendation or was there a
recommendation by you in that area or in that instance?
A. I thought that that was the best we could do, was to get that. The
Commissioners had some problems about my temerity in insisting that
J. Edgar Hoover come and swear to it. They thought that was almost less majeste
to treat Mr. Hoover that way, but I told them I thought the record would be
seriously incomplete without it and I didn't care whether he was angry with me
or the whole Commission because of it and that we should do it.
Q. Speaking of specific members of the Commission over the years a number of
them have--some publicly, some privately--made statements expressing a degree of
doubts to whether there might have been a conspiracy in this case. Specifically,
I speak of Senator Russell who made a public statement to that effect, and I
think that it has also been stated that Representative Boggs expressed some
doubts. Do you have any recollections of conversations you had with them or
statements they have ever made to you about their doubts with respect to a
conspicary in this case?
A. Well, the only doubts that any of them expressed that I recall were at the
time of the draft of the report about conspiracy, and I think that we tried to
be very careful to make the report clear that we had found no evidence of a
conspiracy. We did not ever c]aim that we had proved a negative so that a
conspiracy could not have occurred
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that we could not find any evidence on. When the Commissioners examined that
carefully, I think my impression was that they were all willing to accept that,
that that is something they would agree to and would not dissent from or want
any minority report and they so voted. They were unanimous on that.
Now whether or not from the other side they were assured that there was never
going to be discovered that there was a conspiracy, I think that is all they
were ever talking about and that is all they have ever expressed to me, that,
well, you have not proved that there was no conspiracy and we didn't claim that
they did.
Q. Do you have any comment to make on the statements that President Johnson is
quoted to have made after leaving the Presidency to the effect that he beieved
there was some kind of a conspiracy?
A. I would like to see the quotation. I don't beleve he ever said that. I don't
think he ever said that he thought there was a conspiracy. He may have said that
he was not satisfied that there was not a conspiracy. Do you have the quotation
on that?
Q. Perhaps if we take a break we can provide for you some notes we have from the
reporter Howard K. Smith who provided us notes of an interview that he had with
President Johnson in which I believe the President stated that he felt there was
a conspiracy. When we take a break, we will try and provide that for you.
A. Was this from a telecast or some notes that he had that he gave on
television?
Q. As I understand it, it is notes of an interview but it never appeared in any
televised program.
A. I would not have much confidence in it then. If he was not willing to put it
on the air, I would not believe it.
Q. Dealing with the Commissioners. I have showed you prior to taking this
deposition these two documents for the record. One is dated December 12, 1963,
to Mr. Mohr from Mr. DeLoach, subject: "Assassination of the President." The
second is dated December 17, 1963, again from Mr. Mohr to Mr. DeLoach, and that
states, subject: "Lee Harvey Oswald Internal Security."---the letter "R," and
then it says under that "The Presidential Commission."
You have had an opportunity to look through those documents?
A. I have.
Q. The memos indicate that Congressman Gerald Ford who was a Warren Commissioner
on at least two occasions went to speak with Mr. DeLoach and provided him with
information as to what was happening during internal Warren Commission meetings,
what opinions were being expressed by different Commissioners, general
information such as that, and Mr. DeLoach indicates that these meetings were
meetings between himself and Mr. Ford, and were to be kept in the strictest
confidence.
At the time that you were serving on the Warren Commission staff, did you have
any knowledge that Mr. Ford was meeting with Mr. DeLoach?
A. No; I had no knowledge of such meetings and I had no knowledge that they
occurred now. I don't accept those memorandums as the truth. I would like to
know what the former President of the United States says about the matter before
I would believe him,
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particularly in light of what has happened in the Bureau in recent years, and I
would like to see the memos associated with that and around it that may have
been withheld.
Q. Let me ask you this. You have had an opportunity to look at these memos, and
I will let you read them now if you like. The information attributed to Mr. Ford
describing Commission activities, to your recollection is the information
correct?
I have no personal knowledge of Warren Olney's being considered as General
Counsel for the Commission. I heard about it afterward, but that was what
somebody told me. And I don't know anything about this meeting when he says that
it purports to say that if former president Ford objected to Dulles and Boggs. I
don't know anything about that. I never heard about it until I read this memo so
I don't know what the facts are.
I don't think this memo of the 17th is accurate. I don't understand it the way
it reads because it is my impression now that there was not a question of
preliminary release. The FBI report had already been leaked at that point and so
it does not seem to me the Commission ever had the question of whether it was
going to release the report. Can you refresh my memory? Had it not been leaked
before the 17th of December?
Q. I am informed that it had been leaked prior to that.
A. I am sorry to interject that way, but I can't answer your question very well.
That was my impression. So the Commission didn't have the problem of whether
they would release it, it was already out, and it is a question of whether they
would repudiate it or say that that was a valid report, they would rely on, and
it certainly made it plain that they did not rely on it.
Q. Let me ask you this. Accepting your statement that you have no knowledge of
such meeting and do not accept these memos as being accurate, if there were any
meetings between any member of either the Warren Commission staff or any of the
Commissioners themselves in which that person provided information to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to internal Commission matters, would
you consider that significant with regard to the conduct of the Commission's
investigation?
A. My problem would be what kinds of leaks were there--you certainly understand,
I am sure, and Congress would certainly understand--but I could not tell any
member of the Commission that they could not talk to whoever they pleased about
the work of the Commission. They were free agents, they were powerful men in the
Government, and my task was not to tell them, "I am telling you what the
Commission is going to do and don't you ever tell anybody," and so forth. I just
didn't conceive that I had any such right. On the other hand, if there was
information being furnished to the FBI that might alert them to ways of trying
to defeat the investigation, I would certainly be shocked and angry, and try to
do something about it.
Q. That is what I am referring to, that--as you have already stated in your
statement--the Commission was engaged in making certain decisions which affected
the FBI. For example, what to do about the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was
an FBI informant and what to do about the fact that Agent Hosty's name was not
in the list of
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names provided to you from the Oswald notebook, considering that the Commission
was engaged in making decisions regarding the FBI. Would your opinion be that
the FBI was being simultaneously formed of what the Commission was saying, the
decision making process, what the different opinions were of different members
of the Commission with respect to these questions pertaining to the FBI? Would
that be a problem with regard to the integrity of the Warren Commission
investigation?
A. Well, I think you are asking me to assume an awful lot that I am not sure
ever happened. You see, these memorandums don't show anything like that as I
read them. They are very preliminary from on December 12 and 17. Where are all
the other memorandums that show the other information that they got or did they
get any other I am assuming you are not withholding anything from me so if they
didn't get any more than this, this is not much of a leak. Do you follow me?
Q. Yes.
A. If they did get more, they are not telling us. On the other hand, try to
respond to your question, if what we were doing was leaked in such a way that
whenever we got something that might help the Commission with its investigation
but might reflect adversely on the FBI that was communicated to them so they
could try to do something to prevent us from getting it or hinder us in some
way, then I would have brought it to the Commission's attention and the
President himself if I had to. I would not have hesitated but I certainly would
not assume that from this memorandum.
Q. OK. I should state for the record that we do not at this time have any other
memorandums which we have not provided to you in this area. We are showing you
what we have.
A. I assumed that and I don't in any way reflect on you about it but the mere
fact that you got these two and no more would either presumably be the FBI does
not have any beyond that which is December 17 or that possibly they are lying
about it and I don't say they are, of course.
Q. Another Commissioner was Allen Dulles who had been the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency prior to serving with the Commission. What effect,
if any, did Mr. Dulles' prior service with the Central Intelligence Agency have
on his ability to serve as a neutral member of the Warren Commission?
A. Well, we assumed at that time that he would be a substantial asset to the
Commission, that if there was any tendency of the not to cooperate fully or help
the Commission in the investigation that he would see that that did not continue
and help us to get everything available. It would appear now assuming, and I
don't know this, that Allen Dulles knew these things about the activities of the
CIA and with regard to assassinations that have been revealed by the Senate
committee that he helped to withhold the information or at least did not
disclose it, assuming he knew it, so as to assist us in our investigation?
Q. Looking back now on the various actions and statements by Mr. Dulles when he
was serving as a member of the Commission, do you recall him either pushing the
investigation in any directions or frying to restrict it from going into any
areas?
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A. My impression, looking back on it, is that he never at any time indicated any
reticence about investigating or searching for evidence as to conspiracy, either
domestically or foreign, that he was completely cooperative in considering any
material that we had and trying to follow it down and search out for the truth
on it.
Q. Was much use made of his prior Central Intelligence Agency experience in
determining what areas the investigation should go into and what techniques it
should utilize?
A. Not very much. We didn't want, or I didn't--l can't speak for the Commission
but I didn't want to be controlled by any member of the Commission as to the
areas we would go into. I felt that our duty was to be exhaustive in regard to
every possibility and didn't want to ask for any assistance that might be
something that I had to climb over later in the nature of suggestions that might
be opposing and so I didn't ask that type of suggestions from any Commissioner,
urging all the time that we investigate every place and never meeting any
objections to proceeding.
Q. According to Senate testimony Dulles personally authorized the Castro
assassination plots in the fall of 1960. With that in mind do you think that his
presence on the Commission and the fact that whenever informed the Commission or
the staff of his knowledge of this type of CIA activity--- do you think that
there were other areas that he in any way could have affected by his lack of
candor of the staff?
A. Well, in the first place I would not believe that Mr. Dulles did authorize
such action from anything that I have seen or that I have heard. My impression
of the materials that I have been furnished by you with regard to the report of
the Senate committee in its investigation is that there is a considerable amount
being withheld and there may be a lot of false testimony in some of the
information furnished in connection with what they describe as the eight
assassination attempts.
To me as a lawyer in my experience in life for a good many years have the
impression that where they felt that you had some other information or the
Senate committee had some other information like an Inspector General's report,
or other things that they could not avoid, you got something out of them and
there is a vast amount that they either are not telling or they are telling
their own version of the way they want it to look and I would not rely on any of
it. I don't mean that you have not gotten some material but I don't think you
have gotten all of it by any means.
Q. Could you clarify your last statement to us as far as who would be
manipulating the data to which you are referring?
A. I don't mean that this committee or the Senate committee are manipulating
anything. You are trying to get, I assume, the truth, just like I was in my
investigation but the witnesses, it appears to me from reading and having read
hundreds maybe thousands of records in my professional life, were not frank and
open about their disclosures and they have problems that you can readily
recognize about Personal liability for some of the things they were engaged in
and all of those things so that they have all kinds of possible motivation
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to not tell you the whole story and it seems to me it is replete with
possibilities of that kind.
Q. So you are suggesting that testimony to the effect that Allen Dulles was
personally responsible for the Castro assassination attempts does not convince
you that that was actually the fact?
A. That is true. Now just think. Allen Dulles is dead; he cannot say a word
about it, poor fellow. The fellow that did anything about it has to have
somebody to unload it on so he passes it up to the dead man. How convincing or
credible is that? That is the kind of record you run into all the time.
Look at Mr. Hoover. Everything that happened Mr. Hoover did. Anything now that
anybody living can point to, that is criticized. Maybe Mr. Hoover did do it, but
it is certainly an easy way out. Why should I believe that? In the experience of
life I think any jury would have difficulty with it. It could happen but when is
the memorandum, where is the paper?
You have got testimony of people who have every interest to point the finger at
somebody else instead of taking responsibility themselves I note that they
didn't say the president approved it. Why didn't they? Well, that would be going
pretty far but there is not any kind of paper to substantiate any of that stuff.
Q. Moving to another area would you tell us what you felt were the pressures
that were on the Commission, the Commission staff, in 1964?
A. Well, let me try to do it first with regard to the Commission. The Commission
had a general responsibility to the people to try to find the answers with
regard to who the assassin was; what Ruby had to do with it and whether there
was a conspiracy. It also had an obligation to do it as promptly as possible
because the entire country was disturbed by this and it had its impact in
foreign capitals throughout the world, too. A large part of the people, the
world, were greatly disturbed by President Kennedy's death and the disturbance
continued from there. Many people were unhappy about it and the fact that this
man with so many aspirations for the country, for the world, had had his life
terminated and I think the Commissioners felt a heavy responsibility in that
regard. The staff were involved in doing the work and I felt that they were
dedicated. I never found any of them, any single one, that indicated that he was
looking for something other than the truth and I was exerting pressure on them
all the time to get along with their work and not do any loafing or neglect
their responsibilities.
My experience in working with people and lawyers, too, is that they are not
always motivated to go to work 8 or 10 hours a day and do it every day without
some prodding. Days are different and how they feel about it and so forth. I had
to keep after them and I did and I always checked constantly about whether they
were getting the preliminary investigation, whether they had read the FBI
reports, Secret Service or other intelligence agencies and what they had done
about personal interviews, whether they were prepared to have a hearing and how
soon if they were not presently and I exert the pressure about that.
There was talk about trying to get the report out. I was told, as I told you,
that it would only take 3 months for my job in the first place
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and then we were going to try to get it out in 6 months and that seemed
obviously impossible soon after. I got there and then we were under the time
pressure to try to get it done within a year as a reasonable time. A great deal
of pressure came from the press and the public who wanted to get an answer to
some of these questions.
I felt that we were spending a considerable amount of money but one ever raised
that question except myself. On the other side of that question I told the Chief
Justice and then the Commission that I thought all of our appendixes should be
printed, all of the basic material we had and I asked the Printing Office what
it cost and they said something around $1 million or thereabouts. When I told
the Chief Justice that he was very much shocked. He said, "My, we can't spend
money like that."
I said: "Well, I think the report without it is not going to have the validity
that it will have if it is supported and people can check out what we did."
He said:"Well, that is up to the Congress. I don't know whether they will
approve anything like that or spend the money. You better go talk to the other
members of the Commission."
So I went first to Senator Russell and told him what I recommended strongly and
why. He said, "I agree with you." He said, "How much is it going to cost?" I
told him about $1 million and he said:"Go right ahead, don't worry about it. We
will get the money for you."
I said, "Well, what about my talking to Congressman Boggs and Congressman Ford
and Senator Cooper?"
"Don't worry about it. I wall talk to them. We will get the money. You go ahead
and do it."
I went back to the Chief Justice and we all agreed that is what we would do.
So I did exert considerable pressure about not dillydallying when we had gotten
down to a place where we had exhausted our various leads and getting started to
write. Like I told you before, some seemed to hang back about ever getting
started writing and they had good minds, their investigation was good, they saw
their materials but just write it out. Even to make a draft seemed to be hard
for some of them to do and finally we had to do the writing for some areas for
their materials and put it together and then rewrite it and so forth and have
them read it and make any suggestions or changes and corrections and so forth.
I feel that we probably could go on for 20 years with such an investigation and
keep on trying different leads but you know that is not practical in the
Government and I could not recommend anything like that. It seemed like we
should get to a place where we did the best we could with the leads we had and
the information we had and then report to the people and let them have a
judgment about what we did.
Q. At the time did you feel that you had adequate time to investigate the ease?
A. Yes: I did. I felt that we had done everything reasonable from the
information that we had obtained. The only area I was bothered about was the
conspiracy and then I was always fighting with that idea of trying to prove the
negative. I knew better. I knew that you
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can't. It was always possible and it is possible in the next 100 years that
somebody will come out and actually be able to show that there was some
conspiritorial action but that seems to me to be a question of proof. You have
to present the evidence that is credible and I don't think there has been any so
far.
Q. Looking back today with 20-20 hindsight, was the time devoted to the
investigation adequate?
A. Well, I think so. Certainly it would not have been adequate if we had gotten
this information that you have about the CIA's activity and FBI's knowledge of
it and so forth. I am sure there would have been quite a serious upheaval in the
Commission and the Government and everything if they had known that that
information was withheld and I am confident the President would have been active
in that area if he had known that.
Were there any political pressures applied to either the staff or to the
Commission?
Nobody was ever selected on the basis of political activity or background. I
didn't even know what party they belonged to or didn't belong to. Nobody ever
indicated ny political interest from the President on down. If you mean by
political whether there was an active interest in trying to get a report to the
people, there was that by all the Commissioners.
Q. What about a political pressure with respect to finishing the report by a
certain date prior to the election, prior to the convention?
A. Well, in my opinion--you are talking about November?
Q. Yes.
A. There was never any chance. Now maybe other people saw it differently but as
soon as I saw the size of the job, we could not meet that kind of a deadline.
Q. I mean November of 1964.
A. Yes. As I said, I was told it would only take 3 or 4 months when I came down
and as soon as I saw the size of the problems and the job and started outlining
the areas I knew that was unreasonable and I always thought if we could get it
done within about a year, by the end of 1964, that we would have accomplished a
great deal but I never had that as a target date. I think everybody on the
Commission wanted it done as fast as it could be done properly. They all had
more than enough to do without this.
Did the Chief Justice give you a date and say this is the date I want that
report finished by?
A. Well, he gave me a number of times, that we certainly ought to be able to get
this out in a couple of months now and then he gave me another couple months and
we went on that way. I would just tell him it is impossible, we have got too
much yet to do. We had to go through or I would not have had anything to do with
it, I would have resigned. We had to go through and run out our leads and
complete our various areas and feel that we had done all have reasonably could.
Q. We have, as I am sure you know, taken testimony from other members of the
staff.
A. I have not seen any of it.
Q. A number of them had testified to the effect that the Chief Justice had made
it clear to the staff that he wanted the report finished
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before the November election. Do you recall any admonitions from the Chief
Justice that it must be finished by that time?
A. Nothing like that. I think he did say that it would be better for the country
if they didn't have this problem about what our report was going to be before
the convention so that that would not be something that would be brought up and
be made a political issue or anything like that. I never thought there was any
prospect of that. I never indicated to them that they had to meet any such
deadline or anything like that, it was impossible. If you look at the progress
of our work at that point you know that we just weren't far enough along for
anybody to believe that could happen. I think it was just something to use as a
prod to push us along and try to make us get our work done.
Q. Let me refresh your recollection. The report was finished before the election
in fact. The election was in November of 1961 and the report was finished in
September of 1964. It was finished before the election but after the political
conventions.
A. I know it was after the conventions. When were they, in July?
Q. Yes. I am just wondering if you are mixing up the conventions with the
election.
A. September 24. When was the election? The election was November 4?
Mr. EWING. Yes.
BY MR. KLEIN:
Q. So in fact the report was completed before the election.
A. Yes.
Q. Now refreshing your recollection on that, do you recall whether there was
pressure to finish the report before the election which is in fact what
happened?
A. I don't remember if it was the election that was involved. I have strong
recollection that we were constantly exorted to get along with our work and get
it done. I don't remember talk about anything about the election being involved
but I do remember about the conventions that it would come up and be an issue
and controversy and one party against the other and so forth. At least it could
be talked about and so we ought to try to get it out before that and that was
impossible, and I told the Chief Justice. I don't think there was any pressure
because of that and I don't remember the discussion of the election as a date to
me with the staff but I know that I had to urge a number of them to start
writing and not just let it drift from day to day because we just could not have
that.
Q. With respect to pressure, was there any discussion between either yourself
and the Chief Justice or yourself and the Commissioners or yourself and the
staff members about the possible repercussions should your investigation
determine that there was a conspiracy involving some foreign country such as
Cuba or the Soviet Union?
A. Well, I think we had some discussions on this in the staff--I don't remember
the Commissioners--in which it was speculated about if we find a conspiracy with
the Soviet Union involved or Cuba and so forth, what is going to happen or
somebody in the Government. We said that is not our problem, we will find it and
tell the story no matter what happens, and they all agreed that was our job. We
could all
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speculate on what a mess it might make in foreign affairs or domestic.
Q. The knowledge of the grave repercussions, which could result---if, for
example, the Soviet Union were determined to have been involved--did that
knowledge affect the investigation in any manner at all?
A. I didn't observe that it did in any way. It seemed to me that maybe it is
because quite a number of our people were young but they were eager to get the
information and get it out and didn't care who it hurt or helped. Maybe that is
youth and a lack of recognition of all the hazards but I think they also
recognized that any withholding would be very damaging to any of the staff or
the Commission forever with the public; their reputations would be destroyed.
Q. Were there ever any discussions with the Chief Justice about possible
repercussions should the Soviet Union be involved?
A. No. I never had anything from him except find out what the truth was.
Mr. KLEIN. Maybe we should break for lunch now.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. KLEIN. Back on the record.
By Mr. KLEIN:
Q. Was the course of the investigation in any way affected by the feeling that
it was important to allay public fears and a smooth transition of government and
the possible thought that finding a single assassin who acted alone would
facilitate this?
A. Not to my knowledge in any respect, either by the commissioners or myself or
by the staff.
You have got so many things in there that I don't know what you are trying to
get at but you just got too many things in there, I can't separate them out.
Q. I will make it simpler.
Would you say that---
A. Allay public fears, of course there was an interest in the Commission
particularly and the staff, too, that the public learn the facts, whatever they
were, and the mere fact that they didn't have anyone to look to to get the whole
story seemed important with regard to the public being disturbed about the
situation. I assume that is why the President appointed a commission.
Q. Did you ever have an opportunity to speak with Robert Kennedy relevant to the
investigation?
A. No. My only contact with Robert Kennedy was when he made arrangements to have
the testimony of Mrs. John Kennedy and he went with us to take that testimony
and I think that appears in the record.
Q. Did you ever speak with President Johnson?
A. Yes, but I never discussed the assassination with him.
Q. Or the investigation?
A. I told him that we were going to come up there and deliver the report and
made the arrangements in that regard and that is all. He never tried to directly
or indirectly interfere or say anything that I knew of about the Commission's
activities.
Q. Showing you this document, which consists of a first page which is a
memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Evans, subject: Assassination of President
Kennedy, and the second and third pages are a
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memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, and the date on both
documents is November 25, 1963, have you had an opportunity to read the
Katzenbach memo?
A. Yes but I never saw that before. Mr. Ewing I guess gave me a copy to look at,
or you did today, I don't know.
Q. At the time, you were general counsel for the Warren Commission you had no
knowledge that Mr. Katzenback had written this memo on November 25, 1963?
A. I don't recall it at all.
Q. In this memo Mr. Katzenbach indicates that he believes that "the public must
be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin, that he not have confederates who are
still, at large, and that the evidence was such that he would have been
convicted at trial." The memo, as I said, is dated November 25, 1963.
Were you ever aware of any pressures either on yourself or on the commissioners
from the Department of Justice to put out a report this early saying that Lee
Harvey Oswald was the assassin?
A. No, there was not any such pressure. I know there was not. I don't recall
ever having a communication with Mr. Katzenbach or anybody from the Department
that they ever had such ideas.
Do you think that now upon learning of Mr. Katzenbach's beliefs in this
memorandum dated November 25, 1963, that this belief which the Deputy Attorney
General had in any way could have affected your investigation?
A. Well, I am sure it didn't and if anybody had given me that kind of a memo and
told me that was my job, I would never have taken it. I had gotten it after I
started, I would have resigned.
Q. You touched earlier on the subject of a decision not to hire independent
investigators and to rely on the existing Federal agencies.
A. Yes.
Q. Again using 20-20 hindsight, was that a good decision?
A. Well, I think it was a good decision without this element of dishonesty as
far as withholding information, evidence by CIA action and FBI, and so forth, as
they knew CIA action. Even with that I think the problem of trying to establish
an independent investigative staff is overwhelming and when you consider the
man-hours of the intelligence community of the Government that we used, I don't
know where they would be available in the country and I am sure that you would
not have the competency of the best men that the Bureau had when I knew it in
the Department of Justice and the assistance of the Secret Service and the Army
and all the various intelligence agencies. If you try to put that together, I
doubt whether you could find it in all the peace forces of the country and I
don't mean to denigrate them at all but when you take the number of people that
were used on this investigation and the man-hours and all it would take a
tremendous staff just in personnel let alone knowledge and ability of
investigations. Then we used, as is obvious I think from our report, various
members of the intelligence community from different agencies to check up on
each other and they resented that but I think it helped us.
Q. Were you aware whether there was any communication between the different
intelligence agencies which might have somewhat limited the effectiveness of
using one to check the other?
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A. No, I was not aware of anything like that. I did know that at times there
was--l heard that there was criticism by either generally the Secret Service
against the FBI for making them look bad about some investigation that was not
as complete as they had done but not anything that would be of the character of
trying to compare notes in advance or anything like that. I felt that there was
a deep resentment by the Secret Service against the FBI for making them look bad
and by the FBI against the Secret Service for vice versa.
Q. Was there ever any consideration to using the Federal agencies by hiring some
investigators of your own, sort of a combination, make use of the Federal
manpower but also have some independent investigators?
A. Well, I gave some thought to that and I finally concluded that would lose
more than I would gain, that the whole intelligence community in the Government
would feel that the Commission was indicating a lack of confidence in them and
that from then on I would not have any cooperation from them, they would
universally be against the Commission and try to trip us up.
Q. How would you characterize the Commission's relations with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation?
A. Well, they were fairly good at first and then as we became more critical at
times and the Hosty incident came up and the question about Oswald and the
Director being required to swear personally about whether Oswald had any
connection with the FBI and our asking the Secret Service from time to time to
investigate things the had already investigated and go back over their tracks,
it didn't warmup much at least on a friendly basis.
Q. Did it at any time become an adversary relationship?
A. Well, I went to see Mr. Hoover before we finally put out our report and I had
known him when I had been with the Department of Justice for 6 years and always
had cordial relations but he was pretty feisty when I saw him; any friendship we
had had in the past was not very apparent then.
Q. Did you think at that time that you were getting the full cooperation of the
Bureau?
A. Well, I thought so to this extent. I thought they would never lie about
anything and that if we had any difficulty it might be that they would not bore
in as hard as we would like to have them but I thought we could tell that and
insist on either following it up which we did a great many times by sending them
back to do it again and to do it more thoroughly or putting the Secret Service
to do it and they resented that so much that they were a little more careful
after that about trying to be more thorough, and so forth. But to have them just
lie to us, I never anticipated that.
The things that have happened in the Bureau in the last few years have been
revealed in the press, and so forth. I never thought the Bureau was capable of
that. When I was with the Department of Justice I never thought they were
capable of it and I didn't think agents would be such things. So I was rather
sanguine about that and I don't think the country believed the FBI would do such
things.
Q. Were their responses to your staff's requests timely?
A. Yes, I think they were remarkably good. I really felt ashamed at times with
that of the demands we put on them. It was beyond any
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reasonable requirements or rights that we had and we asked them to work very
long hours at times because we were trying to get something done when we thought
it was more available and might not be later, things of that type. I think they
could have said, "Look, we have been doing a tremendous amount for you and there
ought to be an end to this some time," but I never received that kind of
treatment even to last.
Let us recess for lunch.
[Whereupon at 1 p.m., a recess was taken until 1:20 p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. KLEIN. We have just completed a short break for lunch and we will now
continue with questions to Mr. Rankin.
[Whereupon, J. Lee Rankin having previously been sworn by the notary public,
resumed the stand and testified further as follows:]
Q. You are aware of the fact that approximately 17 days after the assassination
the FBI had a report with their finding that the Harvey Oswald was the assassin
and that he acted alone, is that correct?
A. I am not sure about the time. I know it was shortly afterward.
Q. Considering that FBI was the primary investigative arm of the Warren
Commission, what, if any, effect did it have on your investigation that they had
already reached a conclusion as to who the assassin was?
A. Well, the principal effect it had on our people in the Warren Commission,
including the Commissioners was what they had already taken their position and
that we had to be careful about anything that they gave us.
Do you think it affected the incentive of the people working on this case to
properly investigate the areas which you had designated to be investigated?
A. Yes. I think that they all felt that we ought to just take them their report
and go on home but we didn't and we just kept piling it on them information that
we wanted from every place we had a lead.
Q. Do you think that this feeling had affected your investigation in any way?
A. Because we made them go back and do it where we thought was inadequate at all
and we made it plain to them that we would only accept a good workmanlike job.
It may have affected our investigation in that they did not do original work to
try to find out the intomarion that they would, if it was an open matter and
they were just working on it in that manner, don't know about that, I never saw
any sign of it but it is possible.
Q. For example, did you ever have the feeling that if you gave them a particular
assignment they would go as far as they had to go to fulfill your request that
they might not but that they might not if it were not for the fact that they had
already reached their conclusion?
A. I don't think so because I think everybody who worked on the investigation
from the Bureau realized that his job and his future
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depended upon the FBI's not being criticized because of the way he did his work
and I think they were so sensitive to that that it protected us in having them
to do a good job because if they slipped and we would point the finger at them
and Hoover would be on their back and discipline accordingly.
Q. On the other hand, if by following the leads you wanted them to investigate,
they did it with great enthusiasm and found information which led to a
conclusion different from the FBI report might that not also have led to great
embarrassment for the Bureau?
A. Yes, that is true, and if they had found something like that, I am sure that
if we had received it it would be only after Mr. Hoover had examined it
carefully himself and didn't dare withhold it from now that is looking from now
rather that at the time he didn't think he would deliberately lie.
Q. Were there ever any pressures from the Bureau to investigate certain areas or
not to investigate certain areas?
A. No. Whenever we got critical about anything that happened the Bureau's
investigation, it was obvious they didn't like it. It was distasteful job but we
put it back to them in such a way that they were on the spot and I never saw any
sign that they ducked out.
Q. Did you ever get any indications from the Bureau that a particular area
should be left alone or you should go easy in that area due to national security
ramifications?
A. The only thing that I got that impression at all about what this business
about whether or not Oswald had a number as an agent and the Bureau had a system
that I think is public now that some accents were identified by numbers or some
other system rather then their names and they expressed a fear that covers would
be taken off of good many of their agents if we went down the list and checked
every number out to see whether Oswald could be identified and in that process
we had to go through taking each number and finding out what really had that
assigned end then our whole start would know every covered agent that they had,
as you see. That did disturb them and that is why we finally were willing to
take J. Edgar Hoover's statement about that situation. I thought and the
Commission thought that they had a pretty serious point for us to brush aside
that we reveal all the covered agents that they had that are identified by
numbers to our whole staff and then expect it to not get out so as to destroy
some of it.
Q. You are referring to the fact that Hoover had some of his accents, I believe
about eight of them, sign affidavits saving that Oswald was not any kind of an
informant. Is that what you are testifying to?
A. Yes; and also what Oswald was not an agent.
Q. Yes. In retrospect---
A. You see, we could identify the fact that Oswald was not there on any of their
lists, that was easy, and so forth, hut when you got into these special numbers
then you had to go back and find out who is covered by that number so as to
conceal his identity and then you would have all of the special agents that were
so covered identified and revealed.
Q. Once again, looking upon that decision with 20-20 knowing what you know
today, do you think it was adequate to allow Hoover to present the Commission
with these affidavits rather than having some kind of independent investigation?
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A. Well, I think we still, even if we had the problem today, have the dilemma
that I have seen in the Government a number of times where, and I see it is
involved right now in various areas about the CIA and the FBI and intelligence
community whether you want to have a disclosure that is going to destroy any
usefulness as far as protecting the national security is concerned and weigh
that against what you might get out of it.
Q. Granted that it is a difficult problem, my question still would be looking
back on it would you have resolved it in the same manner knowing what you know
now?
A. I think I would have accepted it because I think the Commission would have
made me because I think fix the Government the tendency has been not to make
that revelation when it is thought that it might seriously damage the national
security.
Q. You are also aware from the materials that we have given you of the letter
allegedly written by Lee Harvey Oswald to FBI Agent Hosty which was subsequently
destroyed by Agent Hosty. Am correct that you are aware of this?
A. I am aware that there was such a letter and it was destroyed. I am not aware
of its contents because it seems conflicting in your memo as to what the
contents were, Apparently the receptionist thought she saw a precise contents
and Hosty and possibly others claim that they were different. What she saw
seemed to me was much more practical material than the recital of the others and
I am aware of what you showed me about that.
Q. What is the significance of the fact that the FBI did not inform the Warren
Commission of the letter or of its destruction?
A. I think there is considerable significance. In the first place, Hosty was
doing quite a bit of work on the inquiries that the Commission made and if we
had known that he had destroyed any of materials relating to the investigation
or his activities we would not have allowed him to do anything more that we knew
of in connection with work for the Commission. There is an implication from that
note and its destruction that there might have been more to it and that the
Bureau was unwilling to investigate whatever more there was and never would get
the information to us. Now that is just a guess. There is, of course, no
credible proof and so we really don't know how much: there was to the incident
and especially what could have been found out about it if it had been examined
closely upon the event.
Q. You are disturbed about the omission of information pertaining to this
letter?
A. Of course.
Q. A second incident relating to the FBI was the omission of Hosty's name from a
list which was provided to the Warren Commission of names appearing in Oswald's
notebook and I believe you were aware when you were serving on the Commission of
this commission, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. What are your thoughts relative to that incident?
A. Well, we were very much disturbed about it at the time and it was only Mr.
Hoover's assurances about it that sort of made us accept it and that was an
entirely different climate. It was a time when I am
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sure all the Commissioners and I certainly believed that Mr. Hoover would not do
that unless it was the truth and all of the things that have come out in these
later years about Mr. Hoover and the Bureau and various personnel had not been
made known to me or the public or the Commissioners so it is quite different
looking at it from this day than from then.
Q. The omission becomes much more significant in light of other fats which have
become known to you?
A. Well it raises more questions. It does not prove anything. There is no
affirmative proof in it. You just wonder whether there are other reasons than
mere fact that it was not there.
Q. On a broader scale, the knowledge that you now have that has come out about
information omitted that was not provided you by the FBI, does this general fact
that this type of thing was going on and at the time you never saw it on the
broad scale to which it existed, does that bother you today as to how it
affected the investigation?
A. Well, it does in certain areas. It does in regard to the CIA assassination
activities and the fact that that was known to the FBI and that they concealed
it. Those I think are much more serious than any of these others because that
was an get of concealment and it raises the question of whether there are others
and whether the Bureau would make a good, thorough investigation of ordinary
matters but when it got into something that would involve considerations that
appear to be present in those withholdings they are governed by entirely
different standards. Even then we don't have anything out of it that shows that
there was a conspiracy and I assume that where our staff is checking out all the
possible leads on that, then if you had something that was concrete evidence you
would have been out with it long before this or somebody would and so it just
raises doubts about the way our Government has been conducted and the fact that,
it seems to be more important to people that they protect their particular
agency or Bureau than their own country. It does not prove that there was ever a
conspiracy. By that I mean conspiracy to kill president Kennedy. There may have
been a conspiracy as far as the Commission was concerned and what they were
going to do to it, and it has worked.
Q. Was the possibility ever considered that the Mafia might have been involved
in some manner in the Kennedy assassination?
A. Yes, I think that we examined that to a considerable extent regard to Ruby
because he had some background and I don't know; whether I can distinguish
between the underworld and the Mafia, whether it was--I think the Mafia is
limited to certain groups of the underground and not the whole underworld but
certainly he had some background with underworld connections and we tried to
follow out in the leads we had. It didn't seem to reveal anything as far as
conspiracy was concerned and except for his ability to kill Oswald, Ruby didn't
demonstrate any characteristics that you would consider particularly skilled or
the type of person that the Mafia would elect to be one of their men or
assistants or anything like that. So all of those things raised doubts about
that.
We also, or I realize and I think everybody did, the problem of trying to prove
anything with regard to activities in the Mafia and the
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that people don't live very long after they testify when they are connected with
the Mafia in any way.
Q. Were you made aware that the Bureau had extensive electronic surveillance,
wiretaps, on most major organized crime figures from 1959 to 1965?
A. I was not aware of that at all until maybe 2 or 3 years ago and then I heard
inquires about whether or not there were such wiretaps during the time I was in
the Department of Justice, it came to my attention. I had been assured by Mr.
Hoover and I had been in the resence of Attorney General Brownell when he
assured Mr. Brownell that there were no domestic wiretaps, the only ones were
foreign wiretaps within the Presidential power which were very limited and only
done upon the approval of the President or the Attorney General, excuse me. And
then I learned that it was a fact that the Department had departed from that
practice and gone ahead and put wiretaps on various personnel that they felt
were involved in organized crime and knew or I was confident that was after I
left the Government. That is how it came to my attention.
Q. The conversation you had with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Brownell, when did that take
place?
A. Well, I think it was 1956 or 1957, somewhere in there.
Q. And you said you learned later that they did have domestic wiretaps. When was
that that you learned that?
A. That was in 1971 or 1972.
Q. And in 1963 had you inquired whether they had any domestic wiretaps at that
time?
A. No, I had not. I thought it was illegal and I assumed that they were not
doing illegal acts.
Q. Let me make clear that the wiretaps that I am referring to were unlawful.
A. I always thought that they were and as a lawyer in my experience the
constitutional law and so forth and I just assumed that the Bureau didn't do
those things.
Q. Considering that they did exist and considering the nature of your
investigation which was not courtroom trial. had you been informed that the
Bureau had this electronic surveillance of organized crime figures, would you
have requested conversations recorded in 1963, possibly early 1963, of certain
figures?
A. Well. I don't know. That is highly speculative. I will tell you my problem
With that would be that I would have on the Commission the Chief Justice of the
United States in all of these other Government officials who would be involved
in using material that was in my opinion highly illegal, violation of people's
constitutional rights and whether I should put them in that kind of a position
knowingly would be a serious question. I don't think that their duties as
Commissioners would require that they step up and violate the Constitution. I
have not ever thought that a man in public office had a duty or a right to
violate the law in order to carry out his official position.
Q. My question actually would not involve them violating the law, it would
merely violate reading or listening to tapes which were taken in violation of
the law.
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A. They would be using the product and how could these men in public life
justify knowing that that was going on, asking for it and using it?
Q. On the other hand--
A. They stood against that all the way through in their whole life, they are
opposed to that type of thing.
Q. On the other hand, it might be that there were conversations relating
directly to the subject which you were investigating and which might very well
since no one knew what was in these types might very well have led to a solution
to many of the unanswered questions.
A. Yes; I think that is just like saying it would have been a good thing not to
have Castro around and, therefore, you should proceed to assassinate him
regardless of what was you are breaking.
Q. Turning to the Central Intelligence Agency, do you recall who the people were
st the Agency with whom you had direct contact in your investigation?
A. I don't.
Q. Do you recall speaking to Richard Helms at any time?
A. I know he testified. I am sure he testified.
Q. Do you know if this involvement was more than just testifying?
A. Well, I have, it seems to me, a recollection that he was an important figure
in our liaison with the CIA and either we were directed by Mr. McCone or someone
else but I think Mr. McCone to deal with him and he would have other people in
the CIA that we could then talk to and work with and so forth.
Q. How would you characterize the Commission's relationship with the CIA?
A. Well, it seemed to be very precise and regular, something like you are
dealing with another country. Like Ambassadors deal with each other.
Q. Was it an adversary relationship in any way?
A. Not in appearance. It is obvious they were now but from what you have learned
they were I think smooth about it. They were polished diplomats.
Q. That would be in as distinguished from your relations with the Bureau which
eventually did become strained, is that correct?
A. Yes, there were times when relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
could be characterized as kind of surly and we were partners of convenience
rather than enjoyment.
Q. And although the CIA might have been doing much the same witholding they
managed to do it in a friendly manner?
A. Yes; but I really don't think that the Bureau was withholding generally, and
to me what the CIA withheld is of major importance because of the nature of the
information and the size of it and the whole picture and their intimacy with it,
and the Bureau's withholding was of somebody else's activities and not as to
anything of that seriousness, I think, as far as I have been able to find so far
with regard to their own activities.
Q. When you referred to the CIA's withholding, you are referring to the fact
that there were plots to assassinate Fidel Castro?
A. Yes; according to the committee's report.
Q. And you as General Counsel of the Warren Commission were never told of any
such plots?
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A. That is correct; I never was.
Q. And to your knowledge was the Chief Justice ever informed of such plots?
A. Well, some of the material that I was given indicated that after the
Commission had made its report and I had left and all that, the Chief Justice
did receive some information from Drew Pearson and he promptly reported to the
President, I guess, and the President directed that the FBI investigate it, and
they reluctantly did without any thorougliness, without even giving background
material to the agents or the people that did the investigation, according to
this material that you gave me.
Q. But to the best of your knowledge during the course of the investigation, the
Chief Justice had no information pertaining to the assassination plots?
A. He never imparted any to me and I am confident that he never withheld
anything from me, so I am sure he would not have, and his reaction when he did
learn of it according to your memo is of reporting it promptly to the President
is characteristic of him.
Q. You have touched on this withholding by the CIA a number of times today. It
was in your opinion a very significant withholding?
A. Yes; I think so, and I think it was selfish, in their own interests in
accordance with the information I have which, of course, is not to my knowledge
just what you supplied me from your materials.
You are referring in this case to the materials from the Church committee?
A. That is right. And I think that the only construction you could put on it was
that if the country had been informed that they were engaged in this type of
assassination plots, that it was very possible that they had caused a reaction
from Cuba or from someone interested in Castro or connected with him that caused
the assassination of President Kennedy, or that they might have even been
engaged themselves in a plot against the President and that that was more
dangerous than withholding, and it is very possible the FBI had the some kind of
thinking that would be so damaging to the intelligence community and everything
that they did and wanted to do, that they didn't dare reveal it.
Q. Is there any question but that your investigation would have followed new
revenues had you been informed of what these plots were?
A. No; we certainly would have followed every lead down. I don't want to claim
that we would have found something you did find or that we could have broken
behind the underworld shield of keeping the other problems that are involved in
that, but least we ought to have had the opportunity to try.
Q. Had you known about these plots, might your investigation have focused more
on the Agency itself than it ultimately did?
A. Well, I don't know whether I could do better than the Congress has in trying
to find out what happens in the CIA.
Q. I am not really asking if you would have been successful but would not have
been directed more toward the Agency than it was?
A. I think that we would have been alerted to the type of thing that they were
capable of and would have tried to find out as much as we could from them but
probably also use all other possibilities to check
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them because I think the Commission would have come to the conclusion they could
not rely much on anything they did if they found out that they were involved in
the assassination plots against the heaxls of countries.
Q. Would their relationship with the underworld also have had effect on your
investigation?
A. I am sure that we would have had some effect that would be substantial from
learning about that relationship. It would cause us
to try to exhaust any possibilities there and also to follow up more on the
assumption with Ruby that there might have been some of their connections; that
is, the CIA's connections with the underworld that were involved there and the
fact that they were involved it seems to me would also compromise almost any of
their activities as far as we were concerned because it is easy to see how the
CIA could get itself in the position of being blackmailed with regard to law
enforcement or its activities by reason of that connection and obligations to
it.
Q. In determining whether there was any connection between Oswald who was known
to have certain Cuban affiliations and Ruby who was known to have some type of
underworld associations, might it have changed the course of your investigation
at least to focus, to that the CIA with their assassination plots was dealing
with the underworld and thereby connecting Cuba with the underworld, the two
areas in which Ruby and Oswald each had connections?
A. Well, I think we would have followed up on that and tried to ascertain the
extent of such connection, if any. I still see a difficulty in trying to connect
Oswald up with Ruby through the Cuban and underworld picture because it seems to
me it looked like it could be a possibility from this, but it does not look like
you ever get them connection, and Oswald is so foreign from most of Ruby's
world, including as far as we could determine that he never visited the place or
places that Ruby had, that it is very possible that we would have found this
came out to an empty picture, but at least we would have the opportunity to find
out.
Let me suggest a concrete, example. I have shown you this memo of February 24,
1964, to Mr. Willens from Mr. Hubert and Mr. Griffin and it concerns some
recommendations made by Mr. Griffin and Hubert with respect to freezing certain
telephone records.
A. Yes.
Q. New I will show it to you once more.
A. I am familiar with it. I think you ought to describe it a little more though,
how far ranging it is.
Q. It is certainly--well, there are a number of questions; I think there is
altogether 10 paragraphs, 10 sections. Ultimately some of these suggestions were
accepted and some were rejected as far as freezing the records.
A. Yes.
Q. Might---
A. But some of them are so involved so much and such large expense to all of the
telephone companies and everybody else that would have to do it that it just
seemed unreasonable to try to spend all that money without more justification
for it.
Q. Which is the point I am getting to which is that the object of this: memo was
to see if some connection could be established between Ruby
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and Oswald through their respective associates. Had you had some knowledge of
the CIA Mafia plots which at least offered a tentative possibility that the
Cuban area and the Mafia area might have some connection--
A. This was not just through their various associates. This was through the
telephone calls of the various associates.
Q. I understand.
A. Which is more limited. It also involves a more remote prospect, too.
Q. I understand. My basic question is might some of these recommendations which
were rejected have been looked at more carefully possibly even accepted if
knowledge of the CIA Mafia assassination plots were known to you?
A. Can you refresh my memory as to which ones were rejected?
Q. There were some specific associates or names that were rejected although at
this time I can't say which ones and I know the general recommendation that all
phone call records from a number of cities, Texas, Nevada, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, is all together 11 cities, that those would all be frozen might this
request have been looked at a different light? If more information were known
about the CIA's assassination plots.
A. Well, it might have made a difference. The one about freezing records--that
was 11 cities or some such number--is such a shotgun approach to the problem
that generally I didn't approve of that kind of activity because that can
involve unlimited expense and unlimited time and no assurance of any return
whatsoever. I tried to--l think we had had a followup on the more identifiable
and one step could be indicated as being prior associates and having some
information and knowing something about them. So I think that it could have had
an effect in that while we would not, I don't believe, approve anything so
general as that I would have I think been favorable to trying to go specifically
into what particular associates might be there that would have any prospect of
connection with Ruby or with this problem, or underworld and then go on to a
particular locality and forth based on more specific information.
Q. To your recollection did the CIA ever indicate to you, to the Chief Justice,
or to the Commission in general that you should not pursue a line of
investigation because of national security reasons?
A. They never did to me and they never did to any member of the Commission that
I know of.
Q. Did you ever have a feeling that the CIA was trying to encourage you to go in
a particular direction in your investigation?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall being informed by the CIA that they had information from a
Soviet defector relating to Lee Harvey Oswald in Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. I should inform you that our committee has top secret clearance and has been
provided with all materials relating to this defector that you would not be
revealing to us any information that we are not supposed to be receiving.
Do you remember the name of the defector?
A. No; I don't.
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Q. Does the name Nosenko---
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what you were told with respect to Nosenko?
A. No. I do feel that We heard there was a defector from the Soviet that could
give us some information about Oswald, we were very elated. It is ray
recollection now that it didn't pan out and we became very disappointed.
Q. Do you recall why it didn't pan out?
A. No. You would have to refresh my memory about that.
Q. Before I do that, let me ask you one question. Do you recall the substance of
what he had to say?
A. No; I am quite sure there was nothing about a conspiracy. Whether he was
supposed to have been an agent or something, I am not sure.
Q. Do you recall whether there was any discussion with the CIA representatives
as to whether Nosenko was a legitimate defector? As opposed to being a
dispatched KGB agent?
A. Well, it seems to me ray recollection that they were quite suspicious that he
might be dispatched to carry certain information to cause us to believe that
something probably didn't have any truth to it.
Q. Do you recollect any of these discussions?
A. No, but I think that is about the substance of it.
Q. Was there any consideration given to whether members of the staff or your
Commission should interview Nosenko?
A. I don't recall any. I don't know whether he was able to speak English or not.
I don't really recall that.
Q. I think that our records will reflect that at that time he did speak English
and had been interviewed in English by the Agency. Can you give us any reasons
as to why your people might not have wanted to interview him?
A. Well, I don't recall whether they wanted to or not. My own reaction is that
at that time we did not have doubts about the CIA and we had no one that
purported to have still in trying to determine who was a plant and who was not a
plant and, therefore, that we would be in kind of discipline act that we had no
experience with and we would be lost as far as any skills concerned in the
field.
Q. To your knowledge was any information gained from Nosenko incorporated into
the final report of the Coramission?
A. I don't recall any. See, when we discussed with the CIA people about the
problem of whether someone was being planted or a genuine defector and so forth
they purported to give us, maybe it was not valid but we accepted it at the time
detailed discussion of how you had know about things within the Soviet and
various matters that you could ask about during the periods of time and
activities and who was engaged in there and that whole background of vast amount
of material that would disclose whether somebody---what he really knew and what
he didn't know and what he failed to know that would reveal what his connections
were and whether he actually had the connection and experience in that whole
Soviet setup that would verify his story or would promptly show that some of it
was fixed that this was special knowledge and that we would be just children
trying to make inquiries and could be easily fooled.
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Q. Was any consideration given to the fact that although the CIA certainly would
be the experts on all information pertaining to Nosenko's background in the KGB
and his manner of defection but that members of your staff might very well have
superior knowledge as to Oswald and be able to make a more educated judgment on
the question of whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald?
A. No; I don't think that is true that our people would be superior in that
regard. We didn't have enough information about Oswald at any time to be
informed in depth. He had certain things that we had gotten this period in the
Soviet, in this country and in the Marines but all of that was either not very
unusual or information that some of could have been planted on us by Oswald and
some of it with regard to his life before he went to the Soviet. You know, for
instance, incompetency in regard to language and communication and all of that,
his difficulty to explain as compared with some of his accomplishments and it
also puzzled us and I don't think that in the time that we studied we could
have--I think we have been very conceited to think that we were so experienced
that we would know more about him than someone who had spent time with him or
knew him from his activities I just don't think we would have sufficient skill
to compare what they might know within what happened in the Soviet and what we
knew. In fact, I think all of us felt we didn't know enough about what happened
within the Soviet and what was truth and what was manufactured for us and
whether he went to the Embassy for ulterior purposes or valid purposes, and all
of that kind of a problem, and we frankly told the people in the CIA we knew of
no way to break down behind that kind of a society and they didn't seem to be
able to either. They didn't have any information to give us as to how they could
get more accurate information about what Oswald did while he was there.
Q. Was it your belief that the CIA had any kind of expertise as far as Oswald
was concerned?
A. I always had the impression that they knew quite a bit about the history and
that they appeared to know about as much as we did about
his life. They knew a lot of his background material about how he grew up, and
his another"s problems and his problems and his Marine history and all that kind
of business, what we knew about in the Soviet.
Q. If I were to tell you that the person from the Agency who questioned Nosenko
about Oswald personally knew nothing about Oswald other than what he read in the
newspapers, would that greatly surprise you.
A. It would. Just as much as I, would this memo about the agents going to a
lawyer to ask about the conspiracy and not having any background testimony. If
you told me that the FBI had operated that way back at this time I would say it
can't be, they just don't do that, but it does reveal a lot though that they
would do anything like that purporting to think to be helping us and--that is
just ordinary homework.
Q. Were you under any impression as to whether the Agency was specifically
trying to check out any of the information given to them by Nosenko about
Oswald?
A. I got the impression that they were doing that and were going to do it
carefully.
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Q. I am distinguishing checking out information that Nosenko gave about Oswald
as opposes to checking out other types of leads provided by Nosenko.
A. Yes.
Q. Were you of the impression that---
A. I don't want to give the impression, however, that is they concluded that
whenever they, did conclude, as I recall, they did that he was not a valid
defector, that they would do much more than just try not to reveal that they
discovered him or found him out and go away but I don't think you can do very
much after that to try to learn anything from him.
Q. Would you be surprised to learn that on April 4 the Agency began what they
called hostile heterrogations of Nosenko and that the first time they questioned
him in depth about Oswald was not until July. When did they conclude that he was
not a valid defector.
Well, my point is that Nosenko came over in the begnnning of February of 1964,
he was questioned from February until April 4, and at that time he was not
confined, he was not in prison in any manner. Beginning on April 4, hostile
interrogations began although it is difficult to say at what point somebody did
not believe he was a legitimate conspirator. At that point he was confined, he
was imprisoned begining April 4 and up to that time he had not been questioned
in depth about Oswald.
Would that surprise you?
A. Well, it would not surprise me that they would not ask him about Oswald
before they had verified whether they thought he was a valid defector. We were
certainly interested in that and didn't care about a lot of fabrications
furnished us that had been planted---why they waited until July I don't know and
I could not tell without seeing more of what happened in that interval.
Q. What was the relationship of the State Department to the Commission?
A. Well, we thought it was friendly.
Q. Do you have any reason now to think it was otherwise?
A. Well, no; I don't. I always felt that by the nature of the things nothing
that anybody ever told me that the State Department would not be pleased if we
found that the Soviet was involved in the conspiracy to kill the President of
the United States or that Castro from Cuba was involved in any such conspiracy.
It just seemed to me that that would pretty much blow up foreign affairs and all
their former concepts and conclusions, and so forth, but that was just ray own
thinking, but I didn't think that had anything to do with what we were doing.
Q. With respect to that, was there put on your Commission or your staff by the
State Department to investigate certain areas?
A. No; there never was. Not to my knowledge, I never heard of any such thing.
Q. Do you recall the Commission making a request to the Soviet Government for
information about Oswald and his stay in Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. The materials received were documents of a public nature as opposed to, for
example, part of a KGB file, their own reports, their own
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surveillance. My question is, did the Department of State have any influence in
the type of documents you requested or type of documents you ultimately
received?
A. Not that I know of. I don't know that they just requested any certain
documents. On the other hand, I would not have been surprised that they didn't
have anything from the KGB if they asked for it and I would not be surprised
that they didn't ask for it knowing that they would not get it any more than I
would expect that we would give them anything from the CIA or the FBI that we
had.
Q. Do you know if the Department of State had any role in determining what type
of documents we should request?
A. don't think so. I think we asked them to ask for whatever they would give us
and we wanted as much as possible and I think we made that clear to them but I
do not know--we would not get any more than they wanted us to have.
Q. It is my belief that the request that was sent to the Soviet Government
specifically asked for documents that were of a public nature as opposed to
saying give us any files which you might have or your Government might have on
the surveillance. Do you recall any discussion on what should be requested?
A. I don't recall any discussion at this time.
Q. Do you recall the Commission taking up the question of whether the X-rays and
photographs taken at the President's autopsy should be seen by the Commission?
A. Yes; I remember that.
Q. And do you recall that the decision was made that the Commission staff would
not be allowed to see the X-rays and photographs?
A. Yes; I remember that.
Q. Could you give us your recollections of why that decision was made?
A. Well, basically there was I think it came from the Chief Justice who had
received the communication. He related from Robert Kennedy that the family would
either I don't know how it was expressed, either hope or urge or something
stronger than that, that the X-rays would not become a part of the official
record of the Commission so that they would have to be published which was our
public position at the time, anything we had published, and, therefore, the
American people and everybody else would remember the President as having all
these pictures and the terrible things that he had suffered from the
assassination.
Q. At the time did you agree with that decision that the staff should not even
be allowed to see the X-rays and photographs?
A. Yes; because they had the testimony of the doctors.
Q. With 20-20 hindsight knowing as you do the great controversy which has arisen
over what those X-rays and photographs show, was it a good decision not to allow
the staff to view them?
A. I think so. I think they had all the basic information that was involved. If
we had it in the record we would have printed them and think condemnation for
that would have been a great furor, too.
Q. Could not some kind of a compromise have been made where one possibility
might be to crop them in some manner, another might be to make a special
exemption where the staff at least has an
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opportunity to see them to question the doctors about them and not put them in
the record? Was that considered?
A. Well, I never considered any cropping and I never changed evidence in my
life.
Q. I don't mean cropping in terms of altering, I mean simply instead of showing
a picture of the President's head so that it would be recognized as being the
President it be cut in such a manner that you might see the wounds but not see,
say, the face or some distinguished feature of the hair but not in any way to
alter the evidence. I am not suggesting that.
A. Well, I never thought of that. I don't think it would work because everything
we took out would be the parts that people would say we were concealing and that
would be worse I think than what happened, what we did do. There was not
anything about the examination of the doctors that could have been added to in
my opinion by seeing the X-rays and nobody has come out with anything since
people have seen them in my opinion that reveals any new knowledge or any
failure to ask questions or anything that does not confirm what we had before.
Q. Let me suggest something to you.
A. Yes.
Q. By questioning the doctors since they were the only ones who had seen the
wounds you were restricted questioning with three doctors involved in the
autopsy, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. If these doctors had made some type of error, maybe not with regard to how
many bullet wounds but possibly the location, it would appear that there would
be no way that your Commission could have learned of it if the doctors had made
an error in that without looking at the photos and X-rays.
A. Well, I think that may be a possibility but it seems to me it is very remote.
The men that did the examination on the President of the United States were most
able men that were in that locality in that field and their knowledge was more
complete than anybody else's and as far as I know there has not been any
withholding there and everyone that has looked at them since has confirmed what
they said about it so it seems to me the net effect is that both the family and
the public have been spared kind of an exhibition.
Q. If I were to suggest to you that the men who performed the autopsy were far
from being as you testified the most competent that could have been obtained,
why in fact rather inexperienced in performing autopsies, might that affect your
answer?
A. Well, I think you would have to prove that before I would---
Q. Connected with the investigation itself your Commission had by law the right
to call a witness and if the witness invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination your Commission had the power to grant immunity, is
that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Am I also correct that no witness asked for immunity and it was never,
therefore, granted?
A. That is right.
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Q. Was there ever a policy decision that no witness would be called who would
request immunity?
A. No. We didn't have that problem. We would have to make that decision if any
witness had claimed or indicated that unless he was granted immunity he would
not testify but we never had the question raised.
Q. Do you recall members of the Commission going to Texas to speak to Jack Ruby?
A. Just one.
Q. Who was that?
A. The Chief Justice.
Q. And are you aware that Ruby in Texas requested that he be brought to
Washington?
A. Yes; I think that is true.
Q. Have you ever discussed with the Chief Justice why this request was not
honored?
A. I had forgotten about that. You will have to refresh my memory. Do we have
any record about that?
Did he continue to ask after or when we were down there, do you remember?
Q. This is a transcript of Jack Ruby speaking with the Chief Justice when the
Chief Justice and other members of the Commission---
A. One other member, Mr. Ford.
Q. Were you also present?
A. And myself.
Q. When the three of you went to Texas.
A. Yes.
Q. And that is the transcript that you are referring to that refreshed your
recollection?
A. Yes. He asked if we could not come back to Washington and the Chief responded
to him as the transcript says, he says we had no power to take him to Washington
and we had no way to take care of prisoners. I don't get the impression that he
went much further than that that is, Ruby. He seemed to recognize that that was
an answer and that he was not going back to Washington.
Q. Let me read to you just one statement by Ruby and I think he makes this point
a few times.
I may not live tomorrow to give any further testimony. The reason why I add
this, to this, since you assure me that I have been speaking sense by then, I
might be speaking sense by following what I have said, and the only thing I want
to get out to the public, and I can't say it here, is with authenticity, with
sincerity of the truth of everything and why my act was committed, but it can't
be said here.
It can be said, it's got to be said among people of the highest authority that
would give me the benefit of doubt. And following that, immediately give me the
lie detector test after I do make the statement.
That is from page 169 of the transcript.
Ruby seems to be indicating that he has something he wants to tell the
Commission but can't say it in Dallas. Do you have any recollection of that
conversation and why even though his statement was somewhat cryptic the
Commission would not have jumped at an opportunity to see if he did in fact have
anything to add?
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A. I remember the conversation now that you brought the transcript to my
attention. And I think that the Chief Justice and former President Ford and
myself all felt that he didn't have anything more to say, that he just wanted to
come back to Washington on the trip and they presented all kinds of problems for
us to get him back there and have protection as a prisoner and have jurisdiction
over him and take the jurisdiction away from the authorities down in Dallas and
it just seemed like it was one of those idle statements that he was making.
Q. Considering the report itself, how was it determined which witnesses to rely
on when the Commission came to its final conclusions?
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. The Commission presented conclusions in its final report.
A. Yes.
Q. In arriving at those conclusions it accepted certain testimony as being
credible and rejected other testimony. My question is, what criteria was used in
determining which testimony should be accepted and which rejected?
A. Well, each time, as I recall, the Commissioners would have a action as to a
witness from the transcript or from observing him or both when they did observe
and they quite readily arrived at the conclusion as to those that they could put
any credence in and those they could not. I don't remember any time that there
was any disagreement on that about any witness.
Q. In many instances the Commission reached firm conclusions with regard to the
testimony. The Commission has been criticized by certain critics as being a
brief for the Government position. Was there ever any kind of discussion as to
whether the Commission should come out with firm, definite conclusions as
opposed to portraying different possibilities, in other words, not rejecting
certsin testimony sort of possibly ending up with a more ambiguous report but
one that would have included testimony that was in some cases conflicting?
A. Oh, there was not any question but what the Commission treated with
conflicting testimony and it examined it, commented on it, and said why it
didn't accept some. There was discussion about conclusions and when there was
doubts a discussion was an agreement that the doubt should be revealed and I
think that is apparent in the report. I think if there had been any real
differences in judgment of the witnesses and their credibility and those that
were worthy of belief and the Commission between the staff and the Commission
would certainly come out in some way before or in the preparation of the report
or beforehand but there was not.
The only thing that the Commission didn't do was to speculate that so and so was
telling the truth, and we don't believe he was, why it might have turned out
this way. We didn't do that kind of thing but don't think anybody thought that,
is what we should do.
Q. Was there any kind of pressure on the Commission to come out with definite
conclusions, maybe not what the conclusions ought to be but there should be
definite conclusions regarding the facts of the assassination?
A. Not at all.
Q. For example, the Commission developed what has come to be referred to as the
single bullet theory. Would it have been acceptable
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for the Commission not to have reached a definite conclusion as far as how many
bullets there were and what individual bullets hit what person or was there some
kind of pressure that you have to decide how many bullets there were and what
each bullet did?
A. Only the fact. Facts don't leave you anything else as a conclusion. It forces
it.
Q. Recently polls have shown that a majority of the American people don't accept
the conclusion of the Warren Commission that Lee Harvey Oswald was the single
lone assassin of the President. Why do you feel that 14 years after the
Commission's report such doubts continue to exist?
A. Well, people don't have much confidence in government today anyway in any
level, you know, and that is the first problem. Then the attacks on the report
are probably 50 or 100 to 1 and there is no one going out and saying the report
is perfect, is right and so forth and every time someone makes an attack on it
that attack stands by itself and is not exposed to any cross-examination or
public report of the weaknesses in the claims and someone can say over in France
that he has got the conspirator, he will tell it to the President alone, and
that gets all kinds of publicity over in this country and nobody says how
foolish can you be, all those things. So how can you expect any other result?
People are entitled to their doubts and most of them have not read the report.
If you take a census of those that read the report and what their opinion is, it
might be more interesting than to have people that have never even looked at it
or cared. I think when you get through and you make your report you will find
that the public will be asking the question, what did you do for all this money?
And I don't think that will be any fairer than the other response.
Q. To your knowledge what percentage of all files relating to the President's
assassination were turned over to the Commission by the FBI? What percentage of
the FBI's files relating to the assassination did they turn over to you?
A. I have no knowledge.
Q. Were you under the impression you had 100 percent?
A. You mean today or then?
Q. Today.
A. I don't know that we thought we had 100 percent but I think we thought we had
100 percent of anything that could make any contribution.
Q. Well, you were making requests to them and I assume you were keeping track of
what your requests were and making sure you were getting answers.
A. That is right.
Q. Did you have any type of understanding as to whether you would be provided
with other files which didn't involve requests that you made but which did
involve the assassination in any way?
A. Yes. I had a direct understanding with J. Edgar Hoover that we would have
full cooperation. They supplied every assistance they could give to the
investigation.
Q. Well, let me phrase it another way. Was it your understanding that while the
Warren Commission was carrying on its investigation the Bureau was free to have
their own investigation?
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A. Yes. Very clearly, and if anybody came to them in any place in the country
and give them any information, and there were cases where they did in any office
about the assassination, they were free to take it and get the information and
when have it for their purposes and our purposes, too.
Q. The second part of that answer is what I am interested in and that is if some
information were given to the FBI and they investigated it, of course, if it
came out positive, then I expect that you would have expected to receive that
information; is that correct?
A. Well, no; I think that contributing to the investigation would be more than
just positive. We had innumerable inquiries that were never positive and they
just turned out to be duds but we wanted to know about them just the same.
Sometimes we had to know somebody was supposed to know all about a conspiracy
and know that it was nothing as well as anything else.
Q. I think you have jumped one step ahead of me. As the first point you would
expect to receive all information of any lead which turned out positive.
A. Yes.
Q. And as the second point which is what I was going to get to next, did you
have an understanding that of they received a lead, which they worked on and
even if it didn't come out positive but they spent considerable amount of time
on it that you would still receive information about that lead and about the
work they had done?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have the same understanding with reward to the CIA?
A. Well, I thought we did. We, of course, didn't expect them to have any
domestic information and didn't anticipate they would have any volume like the
FBI because this is a domestic event, but wherever there was anything that would
bear on it in any way, positive or otherwise, we expect them to reveal it and
call it to our attention.
Q. This might be a difficult question or one that you don't want to answer, but
did any of the Commissioners appear to you to be significantly more informed
than the others or significantly less informed than the others?
A. Well, I think there were some gradations of the extent of their information,
but as I said before I really was surprised that all of them knew as much as
they did about it and tried to become informed affirmatively, tried, as I
observed, to become informed as much as possible, and I don't know whether you
knew Senator Cooper or not but he was not too articulate sometimes in the
Commission and so forth, but it was surprising how he would come up with
comments from time to time about the hearing he attended or some transcript that
he had read and so forth, and I found that was true with practically all of them
from time to time so that even though some of them didn't attend and I didn't
try to have them punch a clock or anything about when they came or whether they
would attend hearings and why they didn't attend a hearing, oftentimes I knew
they were on the floor, both Congressman Boggs and Congressman Ford, and I also
knew that the Senators were on the floor at various times just because of
reading the papers and so forth, and could not attend. Mr. Dulles
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was generally there; Mr. McCloy generally came. I think for a public body they
did remarkably well.
Q. What were the circumstances of Senior Counsel Leon Hubert, his disenchantment
with the Commission?
A. Well, it came to my attention that he and Mr. Griffin had some differences
and I was much impressed with Mr. Griffin's work and his thoroughness; sometimes
he was irritating to Hubert about it because he was so thorough and he didn't
want to pass any little detail, and I could understand both of their attitudes
but I recognized how important it was to have that thoroughness, particularly
when you were trying to develop facts and find out what they were in an
investigatory manner rather than work with them after they are developed, and
later it seemed to me Mr. Hubert wanted to be rather free to have any kind of
depositions or hearings wherever and whenever he wanted to, and we just weren't
that freewheeling. We had to make some plans and find out whether it was going
to contribute or why they thought it would contribute to the investigation so it
would have some justification for it. All those things seem to bother him.
Q. What was your reaction to the apparent leaking of that early FBI report?
A. Who could protest against what Mr. Hoover did back in those days?
Q. Did you have the feeling that it was an attempt to preempt the Commission?
A. I always thought it was an attempt, but I felt it never was going to
accomplish it because I was not going to get it.
Q. You talked a few times about money and how yourself and the Chief Justice
kept an eye on it. Do you recall or did you ever know what the total cost was of
the Warren Commission investigation?
A. No; I didn't. I don't think that figure is--I tried to work out a scheme of
getting a copyright on it for the Government and I got along pretty well with my
Commission on the idea for a while but then I had to present to the Congressmen
and Senators the problems that had developed early about the copyright laws and
the Government having copyright and the holding of information in the Government
by reason of it and that probably was not as a precedent, it was not a good
idea, but I anticipate that we would have sales of the report that could run
into several millions of dollars and get our money back, but I finally had to
give that up. I assume that it could have cost somewhere between $1 million and
$2 million. Did you see any figures on it?
Q. I have been informed by a member of our staff close to $2 million.
A. I think a large part of that was the publication cost because of the fact
that we had 20 or 21 volumes of appendixes as well as the report itself, and I
don't think the Government ever charged its cost for the publication.
Q. Looking again back with 20-20 hindsight, what mistakes did the Commission
make?
A. Well, it is clear that it made a mistake by believing that the FBI would not
conceal from it. It also made a mistake by believing that the CIA would not
withhold information from it. Those were obvious and they could have been
material, I don't know, it depends on how you think how material they are, but
certainly we would have done much more if we had had that information.
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I think if I had it to do today, I would not have had those X-rays published;
and if I had a choice between concealing or not showing part of the X-ray and
not showing any, I would have chosen not showing any because I think the moment
we started withholding anything whatsoever except secret or top secret
materials, that we would have no credibility. I think the report, the work that
was done, and the form of it and the quality language is comparable to the best,
and I think that 15 years is a pretty good period for it to stand up without any
serious retraction from it.
Q. Might it have been a mistake not to let Ruby come back to Washington?
A. No; I never thought Ruby wanted anything more than a trip and maybe an
opportunity to talk to the President or these Commission officials in this
setting, and if we had the information about connection to the Mafia and it had
led anyplace, then or if you had found something that led to some place, then I
could say, well, if we had gotten Ruby back here maybe he would have told us,
but unless you bring forth something that establishes Ruby had more to say, I
don't think it means anything.
Q. Of the five reasons one of them was devoted to conspiracy. Considering the
many, many, many problems that arise in trying to investigate conspiracy and the
many possibilities, in retrospect again with 20-20 hindsight might it have been
better to assign more resources than actually were assigned to investigate the
conspiracy possibilities?
A. Well, as I recall we really had a double concentration on that because of the
Cuban and the Soviet. It was not like one little patch, it was both and I think
that we really exhausted all that we had without this new material that you got
from the CIA and the FBI knowing about it. Certainly if we had had that it would
have bulked larger, the conspiracy area, the examination and the investigation
and report and we would have run out all the various leads and probably it is
very possible that we could have come down with a good many signs of a lead down
here to the underworld. Someplace in Cuba it got down to the end of that and we
could not get any more and that is all we could report, at least we would have
gone that far. We would have taken more personnel and more work and all the
rest. The same would be true it seemed to me as a whole area in the Government
that knew about these attempts at assassination, who was involved. It is an
ideal situation as I hope I--I was not unfair to your work in connection with
that but when I read those reports--it was not your committee but the Church
Committee's report-it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way
they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met
and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or
polish it off. I don't think that could have happened back in 1964. I think
there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It
might have only revealed that we are involved in all of these things and who is
involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that that would
have at least come out.
Q. Well, that is all I have right now.
A. As I told you before off the record, another member of our staff wanted to
speak to you a little bit but I wanted to afford you an
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opportunity now for the hours that we have spoken to say anything that you would
like to say.
A. Well, all I have to say is that up to date I have not found any proof in the
press or anyplace else that there was a conspiracy and had hoped that if
anything like that had to happen you would bring it all out, lay it on the table
and prove it beyond reasonable doubt but I assume that you have not got the
proof or any leads that you think are going to take you to that and I think that
the Commission did quite a remarkable job. I don't mean by that that I as
General Counsel did, I think the Commissioners have always said, felt that they
made the decisions, made the conclusions, and it was their work, and they ought
to be respected for it.
Q. Are you finished?
A. Yes.
Q. In that regard, I don't know whether I asked you earlier which is exactly
what were your responsibilities as General Counsel?
A. I was to see that a report got out and that all of the investigation was
completely thorough and exhausted and that we abided by the law in everything
that we did and that we had a very intelligent, intelligible report that could
be understood not only by the experts, but by the common people and that the
Congress and the whole Government and the American people would be pleased with
it. That was my assignment.
Mr. KLEIN. That is quite an assignment.
On behalf of the committee and myself also I would like to thank you very much
for sitting with us and talking with us.
The WITNESS. Pleased to do it.
By Mr. CORNWELL:
Q. I apologize first. I have been out of the room quite a bit and I just have a
few questions but they may have already been asked of you and if they have, I
apologize.
A. That is quite all right.
Q. During the early parts of your testimony you expressed the view based on your
experience that even though in one sense of the word a price is paid, a
sacrifice is made, for the choice of very active involved men to serve as Warren
Commission members, your opinion, based on your experience, is that nevertheless
oftentimes the busy people are best, on balance, simply because of their
experience, their talents, whatever. What I wanted to ask you was, accepting
that as being valid for the selection of Commission members, what is your view
the propriety of applying that principle to the Senior Counsel?
In other words, if you had that part of it to do over again, would you have
people on your staff who were hired with the agreement that they could follow
their private pursuits while they were also attempting to attend to Warren
Commission business?
A. I think I would. First with regard to the first part of your question about
the members of the Commission, I want to also add that it is the industry of
people that are busy that I also rely on. My experience in life is that people
that are very busy usually do well in anything that they undertake in addition,
while people that aren't busy, maybe never do anything very well, and so in that
compromise you get those benefits and you get the detriments that go with it.
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I also felt that these men on the Commission represented enough of the important
positions in the political life of our country so that, if anybody could be
believed by the people when they made a report those people who represent a
group that the public would tend to believe and especially being on both sides
of the aisle and the Chief Justice in his position and so forth. I thought that
would be helpful so I thought that was a skilled selection with benefits and
detriments all mixed up in the Commission.
Now with regard to the senior counsel, in recruiting all kinds of legal talent
over the years, some 40 years--more than that--I feel that
would be helpful to get men of more mature experience in the law to work with
younger men. They may not have the industry, they may not work as hard as the
younger men but they may have been over the ground and say, "Hey, look, we have
been over there, I have been over there, I have been over that, don't, waste
your time on that" and so forth. They may have tried cases before and know more
about witnesses, know about who is more believable than the younger man, and it
would be ideal to hire them. But if you get senior men of maturity in the
practice of law and they are available to hire, they probably have not got much
of a job and they may never have been successful in the practice, they may be
the failures and, therefore, you have to compromise there again. That is the
problem. So in my experience I found that I would rather have maybe an hour's
time of somebody like Bruce Bromley or Herbert Brownell or Nick Katzenbach with
a great depth of experience, who is a remarkable lawyer and is very thorough.
Few lawyers I know of are as thorough. He is somebody plodding about it,
sometimes tiresome but he never misses on some little point that may be
decisive. I don't mean these men who were senior counsel were all in that
catergory at all or any of them but generally I would prefer to have men of such
abilities.
Q. So if you had it to do over again you would opt for the same basic selection
process for the senior counsel that you used in 1964?
A. I probably should have--there is one member that you can see that did not
attend hardly at all and I certainly should have gotten rid of him really.
Q. Who was that?
A. That was Francis Adams and he really didn't contribute anything.
I had no Blacks except Coleman and I selected him because he was both a Supreme
Court law clerk and a fine record I think at Harvard. He was a clerk on the law
review and he was a member of one of the big firms in Philadelphia and where do
I get a Black that has that much background in those days? So I had to the only
way I could get him, he had just gone with that firm just 2 or 3 or 4 years or
something like that and he just could not afford to pull out and see what
happened to him. Then when I got him, he is a fine fellow, and he is a hard
worker and he has a fine legal mind but he had attracted a good amount of Black
business into this firm and they want whites all over the place waiting on them.
When they first got a Black man that they could take their law business to and
so they were constantly calling him back and nobody else to know that is not
true with a lot of firms. You know in Curvatt or Melbank Tweed of others they
have they can
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delegate up and down the line without any real difficulty as long as they keep
some supervision. But this was an entirely different problem but I could not--I
didn't think feel I should operate without ever asking a Black to be on and then
I didn't want just anybody and that was about--I could not name even two or
three in the country like that with that kind of a background.
Q. You were asked some questions and discussed at some length the question of
President Ford's relationship with the FBI?
A. Yes.
Q. I suppose that at least hypothetically anyone would recognize that in the
process of putting together an investigation of the magnitude that you all were
faced with various types of liaisons all of the agencies were necessary in order
to make the system work.
Did President Ford, to your knowledge, in any way perform such function with any
part of the FBI?
A. Not to my knowledge. I didn't know about it and I didn't mean to be critical
of this memo but I know that when the FBI writes memos when I was in the
Department and I understood this and I am sure you must see it, you have seen a
lot of the memos, they always write that the FBI way so whether or not President
Ford did what he said I would not believe unless President Ford said it or
somebody else rather than men in the Bureau, particularly in light of what has
happened in the last few years. I think it is too one sided.
Now former President Ford might have said something along this line, it might
look a lot more attractive to Mr. Hoover to have it in form where it says he
wants this to be very hush-hush between us, he is consulting, he is going to
keep right on giving us all the latest dope and here is a wonderful liaison that
this man has established with one of the members of the Commission but where are
all the other members? For the next so many 200 days or so? That is all I am
raising about.
Q. You may already have been asked this question but there were number of memos
written by the staff in the final days concerning the rewrite process. What was
the basic nature of the issues during that period? Was it hypothetically
something concerning some theory of persuasion? In other words, the way in which
you presented what in fact was a unanimous opinion or conclusion or on the other
hand was it in fact a dispute over what the facts were and then once you tell me
that, what was the source of the decision, who did it come from, who finally
decided how to solve those kinds of problems?
A. I finally decided any such issues and in all the cases that I now remember if
you can refresh my memory I will try to deal with them, they were only something
that I can consider an overstatement of what the evidence showed and then I said
it had to be cut back to the point that the evidence would sustain and then Mr.
Redlich worked on it, Mr. Willens with me rewriting and so forth and I never
said that it would be cut back until I had a hearing in which the person who had
letter written it or investigated, sometimes they didn't write, they never got
to the place where they would write it up, we had to take their materials and
write it up in a, few cases at the last because they just could not seem to
start to write but those that did write and those that had anything to say about
the draft that they wanted it differently
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stated were given a hearing at which they took the opposition that we thought
required to be cut down, they did that right in front of me and argued it out
and if they could convince their version went on the basis that they knew more
than anybody else but they had to be--they could not just talk it, they had to
produce the evidence. That is the way we worked.
Q. So it was simply a matter of conforming the choice of words to the actual
strength of the evidence?
A. That is right, and I didn't want any kind of an overstatement. I wanted
everything to be as precise as possible but I don't think there was any real
learning but if there was going to be any leaning it would be toward an
understatement rather than an overstatement.
Q. One particular contention in which this problem comes to our attention is the
Liebeler memorandums which were written after there were roughly polished drafts
and in some cases galley proofs and there are a number of different problems
that he focused on in those memorandums but a principal one was of the nature
you just described, what he felt according to the memorandums were
overstatements of the strength of the evidence on various points. You, I take
it, would have often found the same problem that Liebeler did.
A. That is right.
Q. And in what were the final drafts; is that correct?
A. Well, not often but that is the only thing that we did have any difficulty
about.
Q. Who prepared those drafts which created the problem of overstatements?
A. Usually the man working in the field. He would overstate it.
Now with regard to Mr. Liebeler you have to recognize that he was an extreme
conservative in a rather hot bed of liberals on our staff and he early became
disenchanged with some of the others, not really about the investigation but
they had a lot of crackpot liberal ideas as far as he was concerned and he had a
lot of crackpot conservative ideas, radical conservative as far as they were
concerned, and then when they would go to lunch they would go after each other
and they would come back and they would not be etble to talk to each other for a
couple of hours afterward while they were working sway and that just hung on and
so he got so that whatever he did they didn't think too much of and whatever he
saw of theirs he was always critical of.
I thought that I needed that in the staff so that I had some kind of a spectrum
in the kind of people and I didn't have just one outlook because I felt that
there was a considerable number of people in the country who were liberals that
didn't think that anyone like Oswald who was a professed Marxist could ever come
to the place of trying to kill President Kennedy who is a liberal. And there
were conservatives who thought that this was a liberal plot and to try to blame
the conservatives with it and they were both at each other's throats from all
our mail and everything all the time to try to show the others were involved in
some kind of a conspiracy and trying to plant this on the other crowd. So I
wanted to have at least an awareness of that frame of mind and approach on the
Commission at all times or in the staff and Liebeler was good for that, he
raised it constantly and it kept us from being blind to it. The fact that Oswald
tried to kill Walker and
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that he could try to even recruit himself into Walker's group was difficult for
both of the different factions to understand, how anybody---but it seemed to me
that was the key to Oswald's character. He wanted the limelight and if he could
not get it with the Marxist position he would get it with the Fascist position
or whatever would do it for him and so--- but that presented kind of a problem
to me about my staff working together and Liebeler tended to be critical and he
went so far as during the work of the Commission he grew a beam which was not in
the days of beards generally like they are now and it was a great beautiful
beard, all red, and it was--it irritated all these opposing groups. Another
thing that was bad about him and it irritated, I think, the Chief Justice some
but I always said, look, he has a right to have his hair the way he wants it and
if he wants a beard, he has a right to that, too. And so we forgot about that
but I think that it would have been hard for either one of them to write the
most polished, skillful report that could have stood up against the attack of
the others and so I had to act as a reference and determine that some of
Liebeler's positions were correct, supportable in the evidence and the other I
could not support why it had to go.
Q. People who have spent a good portion of their time analyzing and reanalyzing
the report over the years and have come to be known as critics have among other
things, criticized the report in part for overstating the evidence, especially
the strength of it as it might indicate there was no conspiracy. Was there any
pressure from the Chief Justice or the Commission members from a political
perspective in the good sense of the word, international relations or some other
sense to write the report that way, to try to be sure that the American public's
doubts and concerns could be washed away with the report?
A. None at all. It was a part that I watched very closely myself, that part of
the report, although I watched it all but I thought that that area was one that
was subject to attack and I thought that we had the task of trying to state
clearly what we did have and what we didn't and I think that is what we did.
Q. Why were there no public hearings ever held?
A. There was a public hearing, Mark Lane was there. That was the only one that
was ever asked for and he asked for it and some of the Commission members off
the record.
I said, look, we said we would give a public hearing to anybody that asked for
it and that is part of our rules and I don't want to be connected with a
Commission that does not do what it says. So we had it.
Q. Rephrasing the question, what I really wanted to ask you was why weren't
there more extensive public hearings or was it ever considered to wind up the
investigation with a series of public hearings at which the evidence could be
presented?
A. We never did give consideration of winding up with public hearings in which
evidence could be given. In looking at it now--and I think I can recall my
thoughts then, I would have been opposed to that because I wanted--I thought we
had two tasks. First, I thought when I first was asked to do this job I thought
we had an investigating job and I finally worked up to the proposition we had
not only an investigative job but a writing job and I wanted the writing to be
done with sufficient skill to be be a quality document and I thought that it
would
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not only be read by the American people and everybody up and down the line as
far as knowledge and experience and training is concerned but also by the world
and the press of the world and so I thought that newspaper accounts of what they
thought was important in the hearings would be destructive and I wanted to get
it consolidated in one place then I thought let them work on it as much as they
wanted to.
On the other hand, I strongly agreed that if anybody wanted a public hearing he
was entitled to it, that this was a matter of his own civil and personal rights
and while this was not a prosecution or a court hearing or anything that was the
right that I thought the Commission should grant.
Q. What, if any, impact do you think that decision that you all made has had on
the long-term acceptance of the report?
A. None. I don't think the public cares about the public hearing except that if
they had said it looks like a conspiracy here that would have stuck in people's
minds for the rest of the time no matter what was in the report.
Q. You don't think the public would have tended to believe your conclusions any
more if they had seen a number of the witnesses testify?
A. Well, you look at the areas of attack. One of them is a single bullet. You
tell me how you would present that so as to convince the American public that
one bullet went through two men in the way that did. I think it would take
considerable skill because it took a long time for the Commission to understand
that and they squirmed and squirmed to try to find some other rational
explanation and they could not find it and if you tell the American public in a
TV session, for instance, or public session that way that there is no
conspiracy, that you have not found any, that you have searched out this and
that, do you think that is going to convince them? That is not our problem. It
is not the fact of whatever is presented in the report, it is all those massive
things that come and someone comes from Paris and he says I will tell the
President alone, nobody else, who the conspirators are. I've got their names and
everything and that is believed in various places in the country.
Q. I understand.
I have one final subject to ask you about. We understand that the Chief Justice
as perhaps other members of the Commission was very reluctant to accept the job
and that several attempts were made to convince him. What, if any, arguments
were used in the process to try to brink him around?
A. I know there were. l know that he turned the job down when the President
first asked him to do it. I know that from his telling me and I know that he was
finally persuaded to do it by talking to the President in which the President
said it is not only important to the American people that you be the chairman
because you're believable but in all the capitals of the world where the story
is that our Government killed its own President I think you're about the only
person that they will believe. If you find that to be not the case and that
there was no conspiracy and he says that is terribly important to our country
standing its reputation throughout the world because he was firmly opposed to
the idea of either the Chief Justice or any member of the court being involved
in other activities.
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Q. Earlier you were asked questions about a memorandum which Walter Jenkins
wrote.
A. Yes.
Q. And in that particular a part of that memorandum which referred to several
aspects of a potential investigation which would complicate our foreign
relations. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not something along those
lines may have been said to the Chief Justice in order to get him to take the
job?
A. Well, the only thing that I know of was what he told me which was the effect
of his being chairman of such a Commission and that that would make whatever was
decided by the Commission believable when he knew of nobody else that would have
that credibility throughout the world.
Q. You, I believe, testified earlier that you had prior to us asking you the
questions about this memorandum no knowledge of the fact that Hoover had that
view; is that correct?
A. Yes; that is correct.
Q. And summarily, you told us that up until recent years you had no knowledge of
the assassination plots.
A. That is correct.
Q. Let me ask you then, let's assume that because of the lack of knowledge in
those two subject matters during the time whatever the Chief Justice might have
said to you might not have conveyed this impression :but now couch your
knowledge of those facts with your recollection of his conversations, did he
ever say to you which now looking back had in it an indication that he had
received such information himself that the President or perhaps Mr. Hoover or
someone else had explained to him there were particular aspects of the
investigation which were extremely sensitive and that he should take the job
because he could handle those problems?
A. No; not at all and I am convinced that my relationship with the Chief Justice
from my working with the Solicitor General with the court and from the first day
I acted as General Counsel that he would not have withheld that information from
me if he had had it and he would have insisted upon its investigation and I am
also convinced that what he did when he heard about that so typical of him I
think in 1967 that he said get busy and call the President and get this
investigated and he wanted it followed up which is the attitude throughout my
work with him on the Commission.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have no further questions. Thank you for taking your time.
Mickey Goldsmith has some questions for you.
The WITNESS. Fine.
[At this point, 4:10 p.m., the proceedings went into top secret session and is
contained in a separate transcript.]
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken,
do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing
deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by
me in Shorthand to the best of my ability
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and thereafter reduced to typewriting; that said deposition is a true record of
the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to,
nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was
taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested
in the outcome of this action.
ANNABELLE SHORT,
Notary Public in and/or the District of Columbia.
My commission expires November 14, 1980.
Attachment H
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(285) Attachment H: Deposition of Howard P. Willens.
EXECUTIVE SESSION DEPOSITION
FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1978
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of Howard P. Willens, called for examination by counsel for the
committee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on
Assassinations, room 3501, House Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets SW.
Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:15 a.m., when were present: G. Robert Blakey,
chief counsel.
Mr. BLAKEY. We will go on the record.
Would you swear the witness.
Whereupon, Howard P. Willens, was ca]led as a witness by the committee and,
having been first duly sworn by the notary public, was examined and testified as
follows;
By Mr. BLAKEY:
Q. Mr. Willens, would you state your name and address for the record.
A. My name is Howard P. Willens, W-i-l-l-e-n-s. My home address is 4242
Mathewson Drive NW., Washington, D.C.
Q. Mr. Willens, I would like for the record to thank you for returning and
Sharing with us some of your time on what I know is a very busy schedule.
Let me recall for the record that you appeared before the Kennedy subcommittee
on November 17, 1977. At that time did you have occasion to read our rules?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. You know then that tiffs deposition is voluntary.
A. Yes.
Q. And that you have a right to counsel.
A. Yes.
Q. And a right to transcript, et cetera.
A. Yes.
Q. We appreciate your coming back and helping us out.
In your appearance on November 17, 1977, the committee discussed with you your
biography, your assignment with the Commission, the organization of the
Commission, staff selection, staff performance, the various pressures that were
present in the operation
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of the Commission, its procedures and methods of investigation. I understand you
had an opportunity now to review that testimony, is that correct?
A. Yes, I have reviewed the transcript.
Q. Is there anything that you would want to change or clarify or add to that
testimony other than grammatical corrections?
A. Yes. I have submitted for you certain minor editorial suggestions with
respect to that transcript. At the conclusion of today's deposition I would like
to make a brief statement for the record regarding the work of the Warren
Commission and this committee. It is my understanding that your rules permit
such a statement to be made by a witness and I am confident that in any event
you would afford me that courtesy.
Q. That presents no problem.
Mr. Willens, when you appeared before the committee on November 17 I showed you
what was then marked JFK exhibit No. 66 and is now marked Willens exhibit No. 1.
[Willens exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]
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WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 1
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Q. I show you what has now been marked Willens exhibit No. 1. It is a retyped
version as you can see of JFK exhibit No. 66. Does that chart now accurately
reflect the broad organizational outlines of the Commission?
A. Yes; I believe this chart is a generally accurate portrayal of the
organization of the Commission.
Q. Thank you.
Mr. Willens, at page 8-108 of your testimony on November 17 I asked you about
the various possible pressures that operated on the work of the Commission.
Specifically I talked about the need perhaps to allay public fear, to bring
about a smooth transition in the National Government, issues of international
concern and the concen perhaps that the work of the Commission might become a
McCarthy type of witch hunt. You commented at that time generally on the
pressures that operated to shape the Commission's work. I wonder if I could ask
you specifically to comment on each of these four elements.
Did any outside source in any way put any pressure on you, and by you I mean the
Commission and the Commission staff to allay public fear?
A. I am not sure I understand the question, Professor Blakey. The concerns you
have listed were indeed concerns that were in the minds of many persons
following the assassination of President Kennedy. The question, it seems to me,
is not whether any one of these concerns in fact existed but whether it operated
in any significant way to influence the Commission and its staff to conduct an
investigation or reach conclusions differently than would be the case in the
absence of such a concern. Although I acknowledge the existence of this concern,
therefore, I do not believe that it operated to circumscribe our efforts in any
way that affected either the scope of the investigation or the substance of our
findings. Perhaps if you want to ask me a further more specific question
regarding this particular concern, I can be more responsive.
Q. Let me see if I understand your answer. Are you indicating that each of these
four concerns were at least present in 1963-64 in the general atmosphere in
which the Commission operated?
A. Yes, I believe so although I think your approach proceeding with them
individually is sound and it may be useful to continue doing that.
Q. Well, let me ask you specifically then. Can you recall any incident involving
an outside source in which an effort was made to pressure the work of the
Commission, and I don't use that in a pejorative sense, to act in such a way as
its work and its final report would allay public fear? Can you recall any
specific incidents in which that pressure was put on you?
A. No; I do not recall any incident involving an outside source that operated in
the way you have described.
Q. How about from inside the Commission, either the Commission itself or the
Commission staff? Can you recall any incident in which staff members or
Commission members expressed this concern and based on that concern made an
effort to shape the Commission's Work?
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A. No; I do not recall any such incident. There was a discussion widely in the
media at the time regarding this and the other concerns you have identified.
Speaking from my own knowledge alone I recall some occasional discussion among
members of the staff with respect to these widely publicized concerns. We
recognize these concerns and we respected their legitimacy. We did not, however,
believe that our investigation or findings should be influenced by them other
than trying to do the most conscientious and thorough investigation whose
conclusions hopefully would serve to allay some of the concerns you have
identified.
Q. What about the concern of effecting a smooth transfer of national power? Was
there any pressure outside the Commission on this question or based on this
consideration?
For example, did the White House or anyone associated with the White House ever
convey to the Commission a concern that its work go smoothly in order that the
transfer of power from President Kennedy to President Johnson would go smoothly?
A. I am not aware of any such a communication from the White House to
representatives of the Commission. I believe by the time the Commission in fact
was in the process of conducting its investigation that much of the earlier
concern regarding a smooth transition had been allayed by the developments of
the months of December and January. I am sure you recall, however, that there
were some allegations involving President Johnson that were before the
Commission and there was understandably among all persons associated with this
effort of a desire to investigate those allegations and satisfy the public, if
possible, that these allegations were without merit.
Q. Were you aware of any inside pressures stemming from this concern?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware of any pressures dealing with issues in international
relations that bore on the Commission from an outside source?
A. Of the various concerns you have mentioned, this is the one about which I
have the sharpest recollection. I do remember from discussions preceding my
designation to assist the Commission and subsequent to my beginning work with
the Commission involving this particular concern. As I mentioned in my testimony
before the subcommittee, there was considerable speculation and apprehension
arising from the fact that the apparent assassin of President Kennedy had lived
for several years in the Soviet Union and had married a citizen of the Soviet
Union. As a result of these and other facts there was considerable concern
whether the assassination was organized or promoted by any foreign power and
even if it had not been a part of a foreign conspiracy whether allegations to
that effect would have a detrimental impact on the relationships between the
United States and certain important foreign powers. Having said that, however, I
believe that this particular concern did not deter us from trying to conduct
such limited investigation as we could into the possibility of a foreign
conspiracy.
Q. In addition to the concerns stemming from Mr. Oswald's relationship to the
Soviet Union, was there any concern expressed from
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any outside source dealing with Mr. Oswald's at least expressed admiration for
the Cuban Government?
A. Yes. I would say really that there was almost an equal attention being given
to the hypothesis that Oswald's participation in the assassination was prompted
by or a part of a conspiracy originating in Cuba or with supporters of Cuba.
Q. Can you recall any specific incident involving an outside source bringing to
the Commission either the Soviet concern or the Cuban concern?
A. Well, these concerns were being pressed upon the Commission from several
different sources. First the investigative agencies and certain executive
departments, in particular the Department of State, were bringing to the
Commission their concerns with respect to these possible foreign entanglements
in the assassination. In addition, the media were full of allegations and
speculations regarding these possible foreign relationships with Oswald. Apart
from these as sources, I don't recall any more specific or pointed source that
either was necessary or did in fact serve to present these allegations or
concerns to the Commission.
Q. I believe the record would show that the two principal agencies that you
dealt with in an investigative capacity would be both the FBI and the CIA, is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. In general, how did the Commission perceive pressures from the FBI on the
question of international concerns? Was it to find a Soviet conspiracy or to
find a Cuban conspiracy or in the national interests to be careful in
investigating that an international incident occurred? I don't want to put words
in your mouth but you understand my question.
A. I do not remember any pressure from the FBI tending in either of those two
directions. For the most part I believe the record will reflect that the
investigation of the Commission directed at possible foreign entanglements was
conducted through the CIA rather than the FBI. On the other hand, the FBI
carried the major burden with respect to investigating, as I remember, Oswald's
affiliations with various Cuban groups to the extent those occurred within the
United States. So the FBI did have a substantial investigative commitment in
exploring that particular possibility of foreign enanglement. I do not remember
the FBI treating this particular area of investigative concern with any greater
or lesser concern or aggressiveness than characterized other areas in which the
Bureau carried the major investiative responsibility.
Q. What about the CIA, did they pull or tug you in any direction in this area?
A. It is hard to speak about the activities of the CIA now in view of the
disclosures that have been made during the past several years.
Q. I am really asking you from the perspective of one who was centrally involved
with the investigative agency or of putting requests to them and receiving them,
did you perceive at that time that the Agency was pulling or pushing the
Commission in any one particular direction?
A. I recall two reactions at the time. First, I remember that the Agency was
especially sensitive with respect to its investigative
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techniques and sources and that they certainly wanted to encourage us not to
make requests or more importantly make disclosures in the report that might
hamper the further utilization of their investigative sources and methods.
Second, my recollection is that some of the responsible officials at the CIA
were very experienced and aggressive investigators with a very, substantial
interest in satisfying themselves whether there was any illicit or
conspiratorial involvement by a foreign government in the assassination of
President Kennedy. In essence, my judgment at the time was that they were
thoroughly motivated to apply their best efforts to learn what the true facts
were regarding foreign involvement in the assassination although they recognized
that their ability to satisfy anyone on this score was rather limited.
Q. Specifically, did you perceive at any time on the basis of those people you
came in contact with at the agency that they were pressing or advocating a Cuban
based conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy?
A. No; I did not have an impression based on my contacts that they favored any
particular explanation of a foreign entanglement. I had rather the sense that
they considered almost every possibility of sufficient seriousness to be
explored by them, if not by us.
Q. In your judgment had they had that pet theory, do you think you would have
felt the pressure?
A. I think that they would have felt free to set forth their hypothesis to us if
they thought it might influence us or if they felt it was not being given
sufficient consideration by us. In retrospect though it is hard to recall any
very likely substantive discussions with CIA officials regarding their
hypotheses or the investigative avenues that we at the Commission would most
profitably pursue. I have the feeling now, and this is probably based on more
recent things, that the Agency was largely conducting its own inquiries separate
from those of the Commission and sharing with the Commission only such results
as they felt were absolutely required.
Q. You were the person on the Commission who had the greatest contact with the
investigative agencies, both in receiving and transmitting investigative
requests, weren't you?
A. I did have major responsibility in preparing and submitting investigative
requests to the investigative agencies. As I indicated earlier, I did typically
review proposed investigative requests, discuss them with the responsible staff
members and pursue any differences of views on the subject by presenting the
proposed request to Mr. Rankin for his final disposition. I did also meet at
regular intervals with representatives of the investigative agencies. Other
members of the staff, however, did have very substantial exposure and contact
with members of the investigative agencies, especially those members of the
staff engaged in some of the more technical work focusing on the physical
evidence.
Q. But apart from Mr. Rankin himself you would have been the only staff member
who had a perspective as broad as the Commission's mandate in dealing with the
various agencies, is that correct?
A. I think that is generally correct. My only caveat arises from my uncertainty
as to what Mr. Rankin and the Commission might have
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been doing independently with the agencies that I was not aware of.
Q. So at least then from your perspective if either the agency or the FBI was
trying to sell a pet theory of the Cuban involvement or the Soviet involvement,
do I understand you correctly that you were not aware of any particular selling
job being done on you?
A. That is correct. This line of questioning has been limited to theories
relating to foreign entanglement and I am purporting now to discuss whether
those agencies had any institutional interest in the investigation that they may
have been trying to protect or further by trying to influence the work of the
Commission.
Q. Mr. Willens, for example, it has been alleged at least in the press most
recently that the Cuban Government has taken the position that the CIA was at
that time attempting to lay the blame for the assassination on the Cuban
Government and I am asking these questions most pointedly to ascertain from you
who I would suppose to be one of the persons in a position to know or to have
felt that pressure if it existed in 1963-64. Do I understand you then to say
that if it existed you didn't see it?
A. In the sense of a strong and decided effort by the CIA to influence us to
believe there was a Cuban conspiracy, my answer is that
I do not recall any such pressure. I do recall the CIA personnel being keenly
interested in the possibilities of either a Soviet or a Cuban involvement in the
assassination. I recall also some considerable disquiet about the Oswald trip to
Mexico City shortly before the assassination.
I am not sure that the agency then or perhaps now feels that all the questions
with respect to that trip have been adequately resolved. To that extent I want
to suggest that they were committed to investigating these matters, I believe,
but that they did not have any special bias that came through to me at least in
conversations I had with officials of the Agency.
Q. I believe in your November 17, 1977 testimony you indicated that the
principal person through whom the Agency interacted with the Commission was Mr.
Helms, is that correct?
A. Yes; that is correct. He did have two deputies whose names were mentioned in
my earlier testimony who also participated in this effort.
Q. Can you recall anything in Mr. Helms' conduct that then you interpreted or
now that you might in retrospect interpret as an effort to sell Cuban-based
conspiracy to the Commission?
A. It seems now to be a matter of public record. The CIA in the years preceding
the assassination of President Kennedy had in place plans to explore ways of
assassinating Castro. It seems also to be a matter of public record that the
Agency did not in fact disclose these activities to representatives of the
Warren Commission or, to put it more precisely, I am not aware that any such
information was communicated to the Warren Commission.
Q. We can come back to that specific topic a little later.
A. Yes; but I am suggesting, and the reason I raise the question now is that
this failure would have cut against any effort by the CIA really to focus our
attention on involvement by the Cuban Government because it would have naturally
raised among representatives of the Commission a question as to the basis for
that hypothesis by the CIA and some further questioning regarding the
information in the Agency's possession relating to Cuba.
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Q. Did you perceive at the time any effort to push you away from looking into
possible Cuban involvement or a Soviet involvement by the Agency?
A. No. Let me just add that the record of the Commission's investigative
activities will show the kind of investigative reports that we received from the
CIA and it may be that this committee with the benefit of the last 14 years and
other techniques may conclude that the Agency did in fact communicate
information to us designed to minimize our concern about a foreign involvement.
Q. But at least you weren't aware in 1963 that there was an effort direct your
attention elsewhere?
A. I do not remember any such effort.
Q. All right. I have asked you the questions about outside pressures involving
the Agency. You mentioned the State Department. Can you recall any effort by any
of the people associated with the State Department; for example, Mr. Chayes
indicated to you concerns by the Department of State of an international
character?
A. My recollection is that the Department of State emphasized only the need to
deal with such allegations carefully and responsibly. As I recall, there was
considerable discussion regarding the substance and style of the communication
to be addressed to the Soviet Union relating to the work of the Commission.
Q. Can you tell us more about that specific contact and the role of the State
Department in shaping it?
A. I do not have a very specific recollection. My belief is that we consulted
with the State Department on more than one occasion regarding the kind of
inquiry to be addressed to the Soviet Union and the likelihood that any such
request would be honored by the Soviet Union.
Q. Can you recall the State Department's position on the likelihood that it
would be honored?
A. I believe that the Department of State had some preliminary indication that a
request for factual information with respect to Oswald from the Soviet Union
would be honored. Beyond that, however, I don't recall whether we were
encouraged not to ask particular questions or discouraged from the entire
effort.
Q. For example, do you recall making a distinction or discussing a distinction
between public record information and I suppose I would call it police
information? By public record information I mean a marriage certificate,
application for a visa. By police information I mean internal reports of the KGB
dealing with interviews or surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald.
A. I don't remember that distinction but it certainly sounds now as though it
makes considerable sense and might well have been discussed.
Q. Do you recall in fact that the form of the request seemingly called for only
public record information?
A. I do not have that specific recollection of the request that was actually
made.
Q. Do you recall getting anything other than public record information with
signatures that you could not read?
A. No; I do not have a recollection of receiving anything other than the
material such as you have described.
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Q. Was it ever brought to your attention or to the other staff members or
Commission members st least to your knowledge that there existed police
information in the Soviet Union dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald?
A. I do not remember.
Q. Do you recall any situation in which Mr. Helms discussed with you--by you I
mean either the Commission or you being a staff member---that Lee Harvey Oswald
was apparently subjected to police surveillance in the Soviet Union and that the
Soviet Union had that information?
A. I do have a recollection of either knowing or assuming that to be the fact. I
do not recall what the source of my knowledge or assumption was. Of course Mr.
Helms may have had conversations with members of the Commission, in particular
Mr. Dulles, that explored the kind of problem in detail other than in any
conversation in which I participated.
Q. Can you recall anything of this character influencing the way in which the
State Department requested the request should be made?
A. I may not be reconstructing this appropriately. My sense is that we recognize
that only certain kinds of information could be obtained through formal
diplomatic channels and that other perhaps more relevant or meaningful
information could be obtained only through channels available to the CIA. We
were trying to utilize both avenues to the best effect. I believe that the CIA
had the responsibility for utilizing what sources and methods it had in those
days to obtain such information as it could.
Q. What I am really specifically worried about now is the form of the
Commission's request and certain responses of the Soviet Government seemingly
operated on the level of public information and l am wondering whether the
agency and/or the State Department influenced any way in which the Commission
asked for information formally from the Soviet Union so that only public
information was asked for and received.
A. I don't remember the considerations that went into so limiting the request
through formal diplomatic channels. I have a general recollection that we were
depending on the CIA to get any nonpublic information that might be available to
it. I have the recollection also that we thought it would be clearly
inappropriate in a formal diplomatic communication to inquire of the Soviet
Union whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent of the KGB. It seemed to us that
there was a certain futility involved in asking that kind of question through a
formal diplomatic note and I assume that the Department of State would have
strongly advised against so doing.
Q. All right. Just to round out this point on a slightly different aspect of it,
do you recall receiving either formally or informally from the agency any
information that the agency had obtained other than through formal diplomatic
channels on Lee Harvey Oswald from the Soviet Union?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you share that with me now?
A. Well, I think such materials as we obtained are in the records of the
Commission. I do not know whether they continue to be protected by a security
classification or not.
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Q. For the record, you ought to be aware that the committee has access to all
the information, both classified and not classified, that is made available to
the Commission or is currently in existence in the agency. My question really
was not designed to ask you to disclose classification information as much as to
comment whether you were aware and more specifically of the existence of any
Soviet defectors at about 1963-64 and any information that they may have had
bearing on Lee Harvey Oswald.
A. Yes; I was aware of the reports from the CIA with respect to a Soviet
defector whose knowledge with respect to Oswald was being evaluated by the
agency at the time and as to which the agency eventually offered some assessment
on which the Commission felt it could rely. I do have a recollection also that
there was other information originating from sources in addition to the defector
of a kind that may have included nonpublic information of the sort you are
referring to.
Q. Can you recall for us what the agency's position was at that time on the
quality and accuracy of information obtained from Soviet defectors about Lee
Harvey Oswald?
A. I cannot speak in terms of more than one defector. There may have been others
and it was my understanding then and is even more fully understood by me now
that the handling of defectors by the agency is a very sophisticated and
controversial line of work. It is my understanding now that there was a
considerable controversy regarding the credibility of the particular defector to
whom I am making reference.
I think the record probably has to stand as the best evidence of what their
ultimate assessment was. As I recall, they cautioned us against premature or
extensive reliance on the information coming from this particular defector but
that near the end of our work my recollection is that we were given reason to
believe that the defector had supplied some information that was confirmatory of
conclusions that the Commission might otherwise reach with respect to the
absence of Soviet involvement in any conspiracy.
Q. Did the Commission rely to any degree on that information? It of course does
not appear as such in the Commission's report and I would ask then as to whether
any reliance was placed on that in writing the final report although there are
no citations to the testimony of a Soviet defector either given formally or
informally to the Commission.
A. I really could not answer that question without reviewing the records of the
Commission and the deliberations with respect to the findings set forth in the
Commission report.
Q. Could you make a comment in a general way? I am not really worried about any
specific three lines in the Commission's report but rather that the general
orientation of the Commission toward its conclusions. For example, the
conclusion of no Soviet involvement or single assassin to the degree that the
defector's information tended to support no Soviet involvement or single
assassin, can you recall that defector's confirmation of those two theses played
a role or was a factor in the willingness of the Commission to decide either of
those two issues?
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A. It is my recollection that the Commission tried to resolve those two issues
without reliance on the information coming from the Soviet defector. However, I
believe that some members of the Commission and staff undoubtedly found some
small comfort in the fact that a defector did exist who was characterized as
possibly reliable by the CIA. whose statements did not contradict the findings
that the Commission was otherwise disposed to make.
I think you can be confident that if the Soviet defector had stated knowledge of
Soviet Union involvement in the assassination that the Commission would have
qualified its conclusions with respect to the two issues even more than was done
in the report as published. To that extent therefore, the existence of this
defector and the assessment at the time by the agency were relevant to the
Commission's conclusions.
Q. Following up this same line of inquiry and perhaps jumping ahead in what I
hope would be a very orderly discussion, nonetheless it seems to be appropriate
to raise it here, the Commission had available to it information stemming from
what was described as unusually reliable sources dealing with the Cuban
Government. Do you recall receiving a transmission from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation outlining that the Bureau had an unusually reliable source of
information closely connected to the Cuban Government whose information, if
believed, would tend to indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone I am doing
my best to express this in indirect terms.
A. But your question refers to a transmission from the FBI, is that correct?
Q. To the Commission.
A. And by transmission do you mean something different than report?
Q. yes; a letter.
A. I have a recollection of a source described as confidential and reliable
being utilized in connection with the Cuban aspect of the Commission's
investigation. I do not have a recollection of that transmission or a reference
to a source from the FBI as opposed to the CIA but I may be mistaken in that
connection.
Mr. BLAKEY. Let me suggest that we take a 2-minute break and we can resume.
[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]
By BLAKEY. We can go back on the record.
By Mr. BLAKEY:
Q. Mr. Willens, let me show you a copy of what has been previously marked as
Warren Commission Document 1359 which is a letter from Edgar Hoover, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the Honorable J. Lee Rankin
and ask if you would look at it, please.
I might also note that the dental has a JFK document No. 002734.
Have you seen that letter previously?
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Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin
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Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin
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A. I think so.
Q. The letter in the form in which it has been shown to you had certain sections
excluded because of their sensitive character. Nevertheless, do you recall the
letter as well as the contents that are excluded in the copy shown you?
A. I do not have any recollection of the comments which were attributed to Mr.
Castro in that communication but which are not contained in the letter as was
shown to me.
Q. Can you recall generally whether what Mr. Castro may have said that time
concerning the assassination of President Kennedy may have played any part in
the Commission staff or the Commission itself being willing to find the absence
of Cuban involvement or to affirm the probable validity of a single assassin
theory?
A. I do not recall that we had any evidence or investigative leads implicating
Mr. Castro personally or his government generally in the assassination. I am
assuming that the comments attributed to Mr. Castro in that communication were
not admissions that Mr. Castro or government officials acting at his direction
had been involved in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy.
Assurances of that kind were undoubtedly considered by the Commission staff and
members of the Commission in evaluating the overall investigation and reaching a
finding with respect to the possibility of Cuban involvement. My concern now, of
course, is that additional sources of information may have been available to the
investigative agencies with respect to this matter that were not fully exploited
and results made available to the Commission pertaining to such results bore
directly on the possibility of an informed conspiracy.
Q. Let me ask you the last of the four elements that I discussed with you
previously. Can you recall any outside or inside pressures or discussions that
reflect a concern that the Commission's effort might be a McCarthy-type witch
hunt?
A. I have the recollection that concerns of that kind were presented to the
Commission both through the media and through ather sources. I believe it is a
desire to prevent any such accusation that the Commission developed certain
procedures with respect to its proceedings to protect the rights of individuals
whose activities were being investigated by the Commission and to exercise
caution in the framing of conclusions with respect to what the evidence showed.
Q. Can you recall any specific discussions with specific people where the
question of a witch hunt came up? Not necessarily in those terms.
A. As our records reflect, there was considerable controversy early on in the
work of the Commission regarding the protection of Lee Harvey Oswald's rights as
a criminal suspect who could not be brought to trial. As you know, those
deliberations resulted in certain procedures and safeguards being put in place
to try to make certain that the Commission's conclusions with respect to Oswald
were based on a fair assessment of all the relevant evidence. That is the only
context in which I remember this particular issue coming up over any period of
time. From time to time there were published expressions of concern that the
Commission not prematurely or unfairly reach a conclusion that because Lee
Harvey Oswald had gone to Russia that there was a Soviet conspiracy. These
expressions of concern balanced the other expressions
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to the effect that the the Commission should not reach inappropriately any
conclusion that this was the product of a right wing conspiracy prompted by
conservative interests who were dissatisfied with the administration of
President Kennedy. We had assured a wide range of concerns and wide
conspiratorial theories and the proponents of each were pressing their theories
and trying to urge the Commission to reject an alternative explanation.
Q. Mr. Willens, let me show you what has been previously marked as Willens
exhibit No. 2 which is a memorandum from the then Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Mr. Moyers in the White House dated November 25,
1963. I take it you have had an opportunity to see that before today, is that
correct?
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WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2A
Page 412
412
WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2A CONT.
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A. Yes; I have reviewed this memorandum in the course of preparing for my
testimony before this committee. I do not have a recollection of seeing this
memorandum at the time that it was prepared in 1963.
Q. Were you generally aware that memorandums of these kinds were circulating in
the Government at that time.
A. I was generally aware that Mr. Katzenbach was having conversations regarding
how best to deal with the assassination and what disclosures, if any, should be
made to the public with respect to the assassination.
Q. You did not know then of this memorandum in 1963 or 1964?
A. I do not recall seeing it at or about the time it was written. I do not
believe also that it came into the possession of the Warren Commission but I
might be mistaken in that regard.
Q. At page 8-112 of your testimony on November 17 we discussed a letter of Mr.
Katzenbach to the Chief Justice dated December 9, 1963. Let me show you a copy
of what has been marked as Willens and ask you whether you are familiar with
that letter.
You have seen that letter before today, this morning?
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WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2B
Page 415
415
WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2B CONT.
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WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2B CONT.
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A. Yes; I have seen that letter before my testimony here this morning.
Q. Were you aware of the letter in 1963 or 1964?
A. I was aware that the Deputy Attorney General officially sent to the
Commission copies of the FBI report. I do not believe that I participated in the
drafting of this letter at the Department of Justice although it is possible
that I was aware of its existence at the time even though I did not participate
in its drafting.
Q. Can you recall any member of the Commission discussing it?
A. I remember some very early conversations with Mr. Rankin and the Chief
Justice with respect to the question whether anything should be made public
about the assassination based on the work of the FBI. I think I was aware that
the Deputy Attorney General had expressed his views on this subject and that the
Chief Justice believed that no disclo-
sures should be made until the Commission had undertaken its inquiry. I think
this was one of the first policy issues presented to the Commission although I
was not at the meeting where it was discussed.
Q. Would it be fair to characterize this letter as an example of the kind of
outside pressures that were put on the Commission with an apparent design to
shape its work?
A. Well, I do have some difficulty with your use of the word "pressure." The
letter I think is an effort to inform the Chief Justice of a possible course of
action for his consideration and that of the other members of the Commission. It
was a question that had to be resolved because of the President's earlier
statement to the public that the results of the FBI inquiry would be made
public. Since that statement was on the public record there was obviously a need
to deal with it so as to either make a public statement as had been promised by
President Johnson or provide some satisfactory explanation as to why such a
public statement could not usefully be made at that time.
Q. Do you recall any staff discussions of the Katzenbach letter?
A. I do not recall discussions among the staff about the Katzenbach letter. By
the time the staff was assembled, more than a month had elapsed since the date
on that letter and the Commission in the interim had reached a conclusion that
there would be no public statement based on the FBI report. That was a
conclusion of the Commission with which I believe the staff was in general
agreement.
Q. At page 8-138 of your testimony of November 17 I showed you JFK exhibit No.
65 which was a memorandum from Mr. Hubert and Mr. Griffin to yourself dated
February 24, 1964, dealing with telephone records. At that time you raised a
question of the response that had been made to JFK exhibit No. 63 which was a
Hubert-Griffin memorandum to Mr. Rankin dated May 14, 1964, raising questions
about the adequacy of the Ruby investigation. You noted at that time that there
was also an exchange of memoranduras on June 1, 1964, between yourself and Mr.
Hubert and Mr. Griffin. In that context let me show you what has previously been
marked Willens exhibits Nos. 3 and 4. You have had an opportunity to see them
this morning, have you not?
[For copies of JFK 63 and 65, see supra testimony of Burt Griffin; and for
Willens Nos. 3 and 4; see IV HSCA-JFK Hearing, pp. 54860.]
A. Yes.
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Q. Are these the exchange of memorandums you referred to in your testimony of
November 17?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Is there anything that you would like to add to your testimony of
November 17 in light of these two exhibits?
A. Yes; there is. I am disturbed by the fact that these documents have been
produced for the purpose of securing testimony at this late stage in this
committee's investigation. I was troubled by the thrust of your previous
interrogation with respect to the adequacy of the investigation by the Warren
Commission in the Ruby area where the responsible attorneys were Mr. Hubert and
Mr. Griffin.
I understand furthermore that the adequacy of this investigation has been the
subject of testimony that the committee has elicited from witnesses other than
myself before I appeared in November. The general thrust of the questioning was
to the effect that the investigation in this Ruby area was incomplete and that
limitations had been placed on the responsible attorneys by myself or Mr.
Rankin. I think that hypothesis is a thoroughly appropriate one for the
committee to investigate but that if you do explore this issue you have a
responsibility to put into the record and elicit testimony concerning all the
relevant documents pertaining to the issue.
The fact that the staff did not present these two documents to me or others at
an earlier date gives rise to some concern as to why that happened. There
certainly are two possibilities. First, it is possible that these documents had
not been found by the staff of this committee in the course of reviewing the
Warren Commission records in which event the adequacy of this committee's
investigation is suspect. Second, it is possible that the committee staff found
these materials but elected not to present them to me or other witnesses whose
testimony was being sought regarding the adequacy of the Ruby investigation.
If the second hypothesis is accurate, it suggests that the committee staff is
biased in its underlying approach, and is motivated by a desire to document
preconceived notions regarding the adequacy of the Warren Commission
investigation. I mention these possibilities not really to suggest that either
is supportable but only to demonstrate that this committee's work is subject to
challenge and error as the work of the Warren Commission and to that extent I
hope that when the committee staff and the full committee addresses this issue
of the adequacy of the Ruby investigation you will take into light the substance
of these memorandums and the fact that some of the earlier testimony you have
obtained and the documents that predate June 1, 1964, must be evaluated in light
of the subject of these particular memorandums.
Q. In addition to seeing these two memorandums today, were they forwarded by me
to you shortly after your appearance on November 17?
A. Yes: they were.
Q. Would that indicate that the staff has had access to these documents since
the end of November?
A. Yes; it certainly would indicate that you did ascertain their existence and
presumably you realized them since late November 1977.
Q. And that would mean that there are at least three hypotheses or possible ways
of interpreting that these documents would be shown to
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you now. The third would be that they were found shortly after your testimony
and perhaps in light of your testimony and that they have indeed shaped the
committee's investigation since that time and are being shown to you now in a
deposition taken to complete your testimony of November 17 in a spirit of
fairness and completeness.
A. Yes. I appreciate that fact but my concern really goes to the testimony of
other witnesses that have been presented to this committee. My concern is that
other witnesses may not have had their recollection refreshed by these
particular memoranda and accordingly may have testified based on the earlier
memoranda that the investigative efforts in the Ruby area were improperly
restrained by persons like myself acting in a reviewing capacity.
Q. And if you learned that there was an exchange of correspondence between the
committee staff and other witnesses periodically making an effort to bring each
witnesses' testimony up in light of the developing investigation, I take it you
would be willing to indicate that your concern was allayed.
A. That would be helpful to allay my concern; it would still leave open both of
the hypotheses that I have identified regarding the adequacy of the staff's
search for the relevant materials or the existence of possibly a bias with
respect to this investigation.
Q. Which in any case could not be finally determined until our record was read
as a whole at the conclusion of our investigation; isn't that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Let me concentrate a little more on where we were on November 17. We had just
begun, I think, to discuss the relationship between the various Federal agencies
and the Warren Commission. Let me specifically, if I may, call your attention
back to subjects we covered a little bit this morning but I want to cover in a
little more detail and that is the relationship between the Warren Commission
and the FBI.
How would you characterize the relationship between the Bureau and the Warren
Commission on the question of its general attitude toward being cooperative or
uncooperative?
A. I think the FBI honored its responsibilities of generally cooperating to its
fullest capability with the Commission's investigation.
Q. Would you characterize its responses as timely or untimely or none of the
above?
A. I believe that the Bureau on the whole responded in a timely fashion to the
request of the Commission. There were, as the records reflect, some
investigative requests that took longer than others to answer and there were
instances where the Bureau representatives and the Commission staff negotiated
with respect to particular requests that caused some special difficulty.
Q. Did you perceive at any time, based on your contacts with the Bureau, that
there was any kind of an adversary relationship between the Commission and the
Bureau?
A. The relationship was certainly not free of controversy. Let us be clear about
the fact that the Bureau had conducted a substantial investigation before the
Commission was completed and had reached certain conclusions regarding the facts
of the assassination. In particular the Bureau had concluded that Lee Harvey
Oswald was a single assassin,
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that the assassination had occurred in a particular way and that there was no
evidence of any conspiracy. It would be completely understandable for the FBI to
be concerned about the possibility that the investigation of the Warren
Commission would disprove one or more of the findings of the FBI and they were
undoubtedly sensitive to this possibility that did contribute from time to time
to a relationship that might be described as arm's length if not adversarial.
Q. You indicated, and quite properly, that when the Warren Commission came into
existence it found an investigation substantially underway and I take it that
you would probably agree with the characterization of that investigation as one
that was largely self-directed by the FBI. After the Warren Commission came into
existence would you care to indicate for the record the degree to which the
locus of the decisionmaking in that investigation shifted from Bureau officials
to the Warren Commission?
A. Yes. I think that is a useful perspective and I have two things to say about
it. First, the Bureau remained free to conduct whatever investigation it desired
with respect to the assassination. It certainly was not inhibited by the
Commission regarding such investigative efforts as it might have decided were
appropriate under the circumstances. Second the Commission staff did believe
that its initial job was to review the investigative materials and by that I do
mean the underlying materials rather than the summary FBI report and make such
additional investigative requests to the FBI as seemed warranted.
The records of the Commission will reflect during the several months beginning
in approximately February a substantial number of detailed investigative
requests were designed to elicit from the FBI specific responses to specific
questions that members of the Commission staff thought should be explored. In
that respect the Commission entered the picture as a new decisionmaker to direct
the Bureau's investigative effort in the sense that the Bureau was one of the
investigative arms available to the Commission to develop the pertinent facts.
Q. In fact, did the Bureau continue to conduct the investigation on its own
initiative?
A. I do not know to what extent the Bureau did not conduct the investigation
other than that specifically requested by the Commission. I have the sense that
our invest, igative requests were so extensive and numerous that it engaged in
substantial Bureau resources but I do not know whether in addition they
conducted other investigation.
Q. You cannot recall now receiving the product of investigative effort that you
had not requested after you came into existence and had begun to make requests
of your own?
A. Well, no, that is not entirely correct. I do have a recollection of
occasional communications from the Bureau that were unsolicited in the sense
that they contained facts or allegations coming to the attention of Bureau
agents or informants.
Q. But it would be your judgment, if I understand your testimony correctly, that
the basic initiative was being taken by the Commission and not the Bureau?
A. All I can speak about is the initiative undertaken by the Commission, and as
to that it seemed clear that one of the important steps in our investigation was
to master the investigative materials supplied to the
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Commission by the FBI and the other investigative agencies and to organize a
further investigative effort to look at leads that came to our attention.
Q. Let me turn your attention now to the question of whether any relevant
evidence was withheld from the Commission by the February investigation and show
you what has been marked as JFK exhibit No. 70. You have had an opportunity to
review that prior to your testimony, have you not? For the record it is a
memorandum dated February 12, 1964, of yourself summarizing a staff meeting in
reference to the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was an undercover agent for
the FBI, is that correct?
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WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 5
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423
WILLENS EXHIBITS NO. 5 CONT.
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A. Yes; that is correct. I have had the opportunity to review this exhibit.
Q. How would you characterize this incident and its impact on the work of the
Commission?
A. Well, my recollection is refreshed by this memorandum and I do have the
recollection as indicated here that the omission of the Hosty information from
Oswald's address book was, and I quote, "of considerable importance and could
not be ignored by the Commission." End quote. I believe that was the predominant
staff sentiment at the time and we were generally upset by an incident which we
thought was some question on the readiness of the FBI to supply all information
forthrightly to the Commission.
Q. For the record, at this point let me kind of summarize some of what the Hosty
omission might be further described as. Mr. Robert P. Gemberging was a special
agent of the FBI who acted as a coordinator of the FBI's assassination
investigation. Gemberging's report dated December 23, 1963, submitted to the
Warren Commission on January 13, 1964, and labeled CD 205 contained a
transcription of Oswald's address book but omitted the entry of a name, office
address, telephone number and license number of Special Agent James P. Hosty.
His report dated February 11, 1964, submitted to the Warren Commission on
February 20, 1964, and labeled CD 385, however, contained the remaining content
of the address book including the Hosty entry. He Submitted to the Commission an
affidavit dated February 25, 1964, explaining the original omission. Special
Agent John T. Kesler who had reviewed the original transcription submitted a
similar affidavit. Both affidavits explained that the omission reflected
Gemberging's instruction to the effect that Kesler was to extract all names and
telephone numbers, the identities of which were unknown, together with any other
lead information. On this basis Special Agent Hosty's name was said to have been
excluded because it was neither unkown nor lead information.
What impact did this set of events in this meeting that you have had here have
on the trust between the staff and the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
A. I think it had an adverse effect on the relationship between the staff and
the Bureau that could be rehabilitated only over a fairly lengthy period of
time. That was healthy in the sense that it alerted the staff to the possibility
that the FBI might have institutional or other interests that were not fully
consistent with the objectives of the Warren Commission. To that extent I think
it caused the staff to exercise more initiative to review investigative reports
more carefully and to make certain that the investigation could be fairly
characterized when it was finally completed as an investigation by the
Commission and its staff rather than investigation by the FBI.
Q. It has subsequently become public that there was an apparent destruction of a
note delivered by Lee Harvey Oswald to the FBI. Let me read to you a short
description of that situation.
Sometime approximately 2 weeks before the assassination it is said that Lee
Harvey Oswald left a note at the Dallas office of the FBI Special Agent James P.
Hosty. The receptionist who took the note remembers its contents more or less as
follows:
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Let this be a warning. I would blow up the FBI and the Dallas Police Department
if you don't stop bothering my wife.
Special Agent Hosty has not acknowledged that he received the note on the same
day. Nevertheless, he remembers it as saying:
If you have anything you want to learn about me, come talk to me directly. If
you don't cease bothering my wife, I will take appropriate action and report
this to proper authorities.
Hosty says he put the note in his workbox. He also indicates that on the evening
of November 24, 1963, he was instructed by Gordon Shanklin, the special agent in
charge of the Dallas field office, to destroy the note and a memorandum he wrote
discussing the note and his contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald. Accordingly, Hosty
destroyed them.
Hosty testified before the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964, and during that
testimony he made no mention of the note or its destruction because he had been
instructed by the FBI not to volunteer information.
Had you been aware of this information in 1964, do you think it would have
affected the course of your investigation?
A. Are you talking about the Oswald note or are you talking about the knowledge
that the Oswald note had been destroyed by Mr. Hosty?
Q. Both.
A. If we had known about the Oswald note, I think it would have provided us
still further confirmation of the findings reached by the Commission with
respect to the adequacy of the liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service.
If the substance of the note was more or less as recalled by the receptionist,
it would have revealed a particular level of emotional intensity and capacity
for threatened violence that might plausibly have prompted the Bureau to be more
concerned about Oswald in light of the impending Presidential visit than was in
fact apparently the case. At the same time though the note itself would have
been largely confirmatory of facts already known to the Commission from the FBI
and other sources; namely, that the FBI did have a file on Oswald and numerous
contacts with him before the visit of President Kennedy to Dallas in November
1963.
With respect to the destruction of the note, I think it is clear that knowledge
of this fact would have prompted the most serious kind of criticism of the FBI
by the Warren Commission. I find that reported destruction of a note to be
inexcusable and the saddest possible commentary on the mentality that apparently
prevailed in those days at the FBI. I do not think our knowledge of either fact,
however, would have prompted any additional investigation with respect to the
substance of our inquiry that might have developed facts other than those that
were ultimately set forth in our report.
Q. Both of these incidents raise questions about the relationship between Lee
Harvey Oswald and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I am sure you are
familiar with the concern expressed by some that Lee Harvey Oswald far from
having an adversary relationship with the Bureau as the note destruction
incident might 'have indicated had instead an agent's relationship with the
Bureau.
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What significance do you think there would have been to the fact, assuming it
could be established, that Oswald may have been an informer or an undercover
operative for the FBI?
A. I don't think I understand the question.
Q. Suppose your inquiry into Oswald's background had demonstrated that he was an
informant for the FBI reporting on the activity of an organization such as Fair
Play for Cuba. Had that informant file not been more complicated than what I
described to you as being among the materials considered by the Commission,
would that (a) have affected your investigation or (b) assuming that nothing
additional was known, would that have affected your ultimate conclusions about
the assassination?
A. I certainly think that knowledge that Oswald was an informant of the FBI
would have affected our investigation. It would have raised serious questions
regarding the origin of that relationship between Oswald and the Bureau and any
knowledge by the Bureau regarding Oswald's propensity for violence or his plan
to assassinate the President. It would have raised 14 years ago an issue that is
very much in the newspapers today regarding the extent to which law enforcement
agencies find themselves acquiring information from informants who themselves
participate in criminal conduct, so at the very least it would have involved an
investigation addressed toward that kind of possibility arising from Oswald's
status as an informant of the FBI.
I cannot begin to speculate whether it would have resulted in any differing
conclusion of the Commission since by this time we are piling speculation upon
speculation since it remains my conviction that Oswald was not in fact an
informant of the FBI as that term is customarily used. In fact, the destruction
incident that we have just been reviewing cuts against any suggestion that
Oswald was an informant in my view because the Bureau would perhaps have engaged
in a more substantial reconstruction of the pertinent records if they had not
been trying to conceal any such relationship.
Q. Let me show you what has been previously marked as JFK Exhibit No. 71 which
is a letter dated November 14, 1977, from you to me and ask you if you are
familiar with it and its attachments?
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT NO. 71 cont.
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A. Yes; I am.
Q. The letter and attachments speak pretty much for themselves. Nevertheless, is
there anything that you would like to add for the record at this time about the
newspaper article and your own previous letter which is an attachment to your
letter of November 14, 1977?
A. No.
Q. Let me turn your attention now to the relationship between the agency, the
CIA, and the Warren Commission. Would you generally characterize that
relationship as cooperative or uncooperative or none of the above?
A. I would describe it as cooperative.
Q. How would you describe their performance on the question on the issue of
time? Were they timely in their responses with you?
A. Yes; I think they generally were although I think there were one or two
investigative requests that were not responded to promptly.
Q. We previously talked about the possible adversary character of the
relationship between the Commission and the Bureau. Did a similar relationship,
however characterized, exist or come to exist between the Commission and the
agency?
A. I did not think so at the time although with the benefit of hindsight it
probably should have.
Q. We have also previously discussed the dynamics of the nature of the
investigation shifting to some degree from the Bureau to the Commission. Did a
similar process take place between the agency and the Commission?
A. I would not describe it in the same way. We made many fewer investigative
requests of the CIA than we did of the FBI and I certainly never had the
impression was necessary or useful in connection with conducting any inquiry
that it wished to with respect to the assassination.
Q. Did they in fact furnish a great deal of information to the Commission of
their own initiative that was not in response to the specific questions by the
Commission?
A. I recall very little information that was submitted by the CIA other than in
response to a specific Commission request.
Q. Let me show you what has been previously marked as JFK exhibit No. 62 which
is a series of items basically dealing with a request made by the Commission of
the Agency and on the top having a memorandum in your own handwriting apparently
dated March 12, 1964. You have had an opportunity before today to see these
documents, have you not?
[For a copy of JFK 62, see supra, testimony of Burt Griffin.]
A. Are you referring to all the materials that you have just handed me?
Q. No; I am primarily referring to the materials associated with your short
cover memorandum.
A. Yes, I have seen these before.
Q. Can you recall to whom the request in the Agency was given?
A. Well, as I see by reference to a letter dated May 19, 1964, from Mr. Rankin
to Mr. Helms that the memorandum of February 24, 1964, was delivered to Mr.
Helms at a meeting on March 12, 1964. That
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would coincide with any recollection of how we generally conducted business with
the CIA.
Q. But you had no specific memory of giving it to Mr. Helms?
A. No.
Q. Can you recall why the investigative request was apparently held for
approximately 16 days from the time the draft memorandum was given to you until
you recall it having been given to Mr. Helms?
A. No; I don't have a recollection of the reasons for the decision to handle the
matter at a meeting rather than by correspondence. I think we all anticipated
that the matter would require discussion with the CIA representatives and it may
be that we had a meeting with the for other reasons and decided simply to add
this to the agenda of such a meeting. I don't recall that there was any
particular controversy about any inquiry to the CIA for a review of files to
acquire what information they might have in those files relating to Ruby or
other persons whose names arose during the course of the Ruby investigation.
Q. If only this written record were examined, it would tend to indicate that it
took from approximately March to September for the Agency to respond to this
request. There is testimony before the committee that the written record does
not always adequately reflect the verbal communications. Does that square with
your memory?
A. Well, as I indicated, I did recall a few investigative requests that were not
responded to promptly by the CIA. This may have been one of those that I had in
mind. I am confident that the failure to respond more promptly was undoubtedly
brought to my attention either by Mr. Hubert or Mr. Griffin with the request
that some followup be made as to the reasons for the delay. I do not recall
personally, however, any conversation that I had with a CIA representative on
this subject.
Q. Assuming this written record is correct or approximately correct, would
delays of this magnitude have been typical of the Agency's response?
A. I don't believe that delays of that kind would have been typical. Also, I
think that the agency was more responsive to our request than this particular
written record would suggest. I am reasonably confident that if the agency had
any information in its files with respect to Ruby or other of the figures
mentioned in that memo they would have advised us orally before any written
response was made so as to give us the substance of our information before they
confirmed it in writing.
Q. You recall then that there was an extensive oral dialog between the agency
and the Warren Commission?
A. I would not describe it as extensive but there were certainly occasional
telephone conversations relating to investigative requests and I am surmising,
and that is all it is, that the CIA might well have informed us of the substance
of the September communication if my date is correct in oral form before they
confirmed it in writing. Much of the correspondence in September was designed to
confirm on the record information that had been previously communicated orally
so that a committee such as this would have a firmer factual record on which to
proceed than the clouded recollections of ancient staff members.
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Q. I do understand you correctly saying though that if one were only to come and
read the written record, one might come up with an impression of substantial
delays that in fact might have had impact on the work of the Commission where in
fact they did not because oral communications had been made. What I am really
getting at, Mr. Willens, is that, as I am sure you are aware of, critics have
analyzed the record of the Warren Commission and through a series of Freedom of
Information suits the forms of the CIA, and relying largely on the written
record and not the memory of ancient staff members, have sharply criticized the
agencies for not being responsive to the Warren Commission and I am trying to
get for our record your judgment whether that kind of criticism where it is
based only on the written record is wholly accurate or wholly fair.
A. No; I don't think it is wholly accurate because the written record provides
only a partial record of what actually transpired.
Q. Let me change the direction a little bit of my questions. Since 1964 it has
been public knowledge that the Central Intelligence Agency and certain organized
crime figures were involved, as you previously indicated, in efforts to
assassinate Premier Castro. Had you been aware of the relationship between
agency personnel and organized crime figures in this kind of activity, do you
think it would have affected the course of the Warren Commission's
investigation?
A. Yes; I think knowledge of that particular relationship might have prompted a
specific investigative request to the CIA to utilize those relationships and
sources to find out what Cuban involvement, if any, existed with the
assassination. It may have been that the CIA utilized these relationships and
sources independently and satisfied themselves that no evidence of Cuban
involvement could be developed through these relationships and sources.
I do not know what in fact they did on this subject. In response to your
question, however, if we had known of these relationships, we would have
requested that every effort be made to exploit these relationships and sources
and to report to the Commission the results of any such inquiries. I cannot
state now that that would have in any way changed the ultimate findings of the
Commission but it would have added another dimension to our investigative
effort.
Q. Let me take two possible examples of investigative decisions and let's see if
we cannot analyze them with some hindsight. Let me show you initially the
exhibit previously marked as JFK exhibit No. 65. I believe you had an
opportunity to review this memorandum previously.
On November 17 we discussed at least preliminarily the question of to what
degree the Commission reviewed various phone records. This memorandum raises
that general question. Had you known of the Mafia-CIA plots involving Premier
Castro, in retrospect now do you think you might have pursued an effort to trace
the telephonic communications through toll records to a greater extent than you
did?
A. I think that is possible but I think it probably would have been done on a
more focused basis than was proposed in this memorandum of February 24, 1964. We
are discussing now a course of investigation prompted by full disclosure by the
CIA of its relationships with
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organized crime figures in connection with a possible assassination of premier
Castro. If we had been confided in by the Agency, we might jointly have
concluded that certain extensive investigative efforts should be directed at
particular members of organized crime or particular time frames when those
persons might have been in Cuba or in communication with people in Cuba or in
some other way have had leads that would have permitted a focused and
potentially useful course of investigation. In other words, knowing of the CIA's
relationship with a handfull of organized crime figures with respect to a
potential Cuban assassination does not necessarily make appropriate a broad
scale review of all telephone records of all organized crime figures who might
have any relationship whatsoever with the assassination.
Q. Apart from the question of the CIA's relationship to organized crime figures
that might have prompted additional investigation, was it presented to you as an
active possibility that organized crime figures on their own might have been
involved in the assassination?
A. That was one of the main allegations that was reflected in the original
investigative material supplied by the FBI.
Q. Was it ever brought to your attention in 1963 or 1964 that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation had conducted extensive unlawful electronic surveillance of the
major figures involved in organized crime in the period of 1963, 1964?
A. I do not think so.
Q. You seem somewhat hesitant in answering me. Do you have a little bit of a
memory that you may have known about it or heard about it?
A. Well, there is so much that has come to light in the intervening 14 years
with respect to the FBI's techniques of electronic surveillance. Some of the
electronic surveillance that I did become aware of in my capacity as a
supervisory lawyer in the Criminal Division related to what I believe was
considered lawful electronic surveillance at the time but then again I have a
feel where you are the expert and so it is unfair to me that I have any
recollection here that is useful to you.
Q. Let me be a little more specific. The committee has had brought to its
attention that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had hot wire taps that were
at that time thought to be lawful under section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act where there was only interception and no public disclosure
but rather bugs--that is, electronic bugs---placed inside a home or an office,
that the Bureau had in existence somewhere between 75 and 100 bugs on the major
figures of organized crime specifically--the Costa Nostra in New York, Chicago,
Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Detroit and some on the west coast--that
hundreds of volumes of logs and notes based on the work of the investigative
clerks in listening to this existed within the FBI in 1963 and 1964.
Was either the existence of this program or the products of that program ever
brought to the attention of the Warren Commission?
A. I do not recall. I was aware that an extensive investigative program was
underway with respect to organized crime. I had every reason to believe that the
FBI and the Criminal Division which had responsibility for the overall
prosecutorial effort would bring to the
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attention of the Warren Commission any information developed by any source that
pertained to the work of the Warren Commission. I was aware also that the Bureau
would frequently submit investigative reports attributing information to
confidential but undisclosed sources. To that extent I was aware that there were
sources to which the Bureau attached a considerable confidence and importance
and so it maybe that those undisclosed and confidential sources were the means
by which information obtained through this program that you referred to was made
available to the Department of Justice or to the Warren Commission.
Q. To your knowledge was there any effort made by the Commission, by the
Department of Justice or the Bureau to survey that electronic surveillance to
determine whether there was any indication in it either direct or circumstantial
that any of the major figures of organized crime might have had motive,
opportunity, or the means to assassinate the President in Dallas?
A. I do not know whether any effort of that kind was made. I do not believe it
was made, if it was made at all, at the request of the Warren Commission because
I for one did not know that such a program was in effect at the time.
Q. Had you known it, would you have asked for that kind of survey to be made?
A. That certainly would have been a very reasonable and logical investigative
request to have made and it is my hope that in fact it was done by the Bureau
but I am confidental that you and the committee have information one way or the
other.
Q. Do you know of any informal communications between the Bureau and the
Commission that might have given on a confidential basis and not in a written
form the product of any such examination by the Bureau of this material?
A. No.
Q. OK.
A. The only other thing I can say on this general subject is that the Commission
did have substantial confidence in the Bureau's ability to investigate
allegations with respect to organized cringe figures. There were many
investigative reports submitted on this general subject as I recall and I think
the Commission was inclined to regard this particular kind of investigation as
something peculiarly within the competence of the FBI and to involve none of the
controversy that was associated with some of the other kinds of investigative
activities in which the Commission and the Bureau were jointly involved.
Q. Let me show you what has been previousy marked JFK exhibit Nos. 72 and 73.
Exhibit No. 72 is a memorandum dated April 1, 1964, from Mr. Slawson to Mr.
Rankin and exhibit No. 73 is a memorandum of April 24, 1964, from Mr. Slawson to
Mr. Rankin. Both of these memorandums deal with an allegation by John B. Martino
that Castro may in some way have been involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy.
You have had an opportunity before this morning to see these memoranda; is that
correct?
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[EXHIBIT NO. 72]
[EXHIBIT No. 73]
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EXHIBIT No. 73 cont.
A. Yes; I have a recollection of seeing these.
Q. There is no indication on either of these memorandums that they went to you
or through you. Do you recall seeing them in 1964?
A. Yes. It would be frequently the case that I would see such memoranda even
though I was not the addressee.
Q. These memoranda indicate that this particular allegation was handled only
through field interviews, that there was no effort being made to subpena Mr.
Martino and request from him an identification of the source to which he
attributes the allegation. There is nothing here or in any other records of the
staff of the Commission that indicates that a subpena was considered as a
possible investigative technique in addition or that a subpena might be employed
whether or not Mr. Martino would have a lawful grounds on which to refuse to
answer. I am thinking now of the fifth amendment or some other lawful privilege.
Do you think that had you known in 1964 of the allegations involving the agency
in efforts to assassinate Premier Castro that this kind of lead that was
followed only through field interviews might have been more vigorously pursued
by subpenas and immunity grants or other more potent investigative techniques?
A. I can do nothing more than speculate in response to that question and I am
reluctant to do so. This particular investigative lead was pursued as the
memorandum reflect through FBI interviews of the principal figures and the
reports of those interviews were reviewed by the responsible Commission
attorney. I obviously took no objection then and I do not take any objection now
to the conclusion reached here that no further investigation was required at the
time.
If we had known of agency sources or specialized capability with respect to
Cuba, any such allegation as this would have appropriately been the subject of
an investigative request to the CIA as well as pursuing the normal FBI avenue.
This is an example of a kind of an allegation that one might have transmitted to
the CIA and asked for them to conduct such investigation as seemed appropriate,
particularly with respect to the individuals here involved, the conversations
that allegedly took place regarding a Cuban involvement. We obviously did not do
so with respect to the CIA and I think it is probably what we would have done
had we known then some of the facts that we have discussed here earlier today.
Q. An examination by the staff of the Warren Commission materials and the Warren
Commission report itself, 492, does not indicate that Mr. Martino was called
before the Commission and deposed or even placed under oath for an affidavit. In
addition to asking you whether any additional investigative techniques might
have been employed through the agency, I would ask you to reflect and perhaps
speculate whether if you may have had a more concrete understanding that Premier
Castro may have had a motive to take revenge on President Kennedy for the CIA
plots, might you not have more vigorously pursued this allegation, for example,
by deposing him and placing him under oath or by calling him before the
Commission?
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A. I see nothing now that would have held out any greater promise of our
obtaining relative information. from Mr. Martino than was available at the time.
I do not attach quite the same significance as you do to taking a deposition of
a person under oath but there is one assumption underlying your questioning that
I think deserves some examinmation. You are assuming that really we were not
aware of the possibility that Premier Castro had a motive to participate in any
way in an assassination attempt on President Kennedy. That is clearly not the
case.
There was ample evidence in the historical record at the time that Premier
Castro might have felt that the United States and President Kennedy in
particular were trying to overthrow his government and that certainly would seem
to provide a sufficient possibility of a motive so as to justify exploration by
the Commission staff of any meaningful allegations as suggesting Cuban
involvement with Oswald in this assassination attempt. It was for that reason
that we did try to explore to the best of our ability those allegations that
came to our attention that suggested some Cuban or Cuban-related involvement. I
am confident that with the benefit of hindsight there were some of those
allegations that were investigated excessively and other allegations that were
not sufficiently investigated.
Q. Let me see if I cannot rephrase your answer and see if you will accept it.
Without the concrete knowledge of actual Government participation in the effort
to assassinate Premier Castro, it is your testimony that if you had sufficient
knowledge nonetheless of the possibility that the Commission in your judgment
adequately pursued that line of inquiry and that had you known concretely of the
assassination plots, it is unlikely that you would have done too many things too
terribly different.
A. Well, that is generally my position with the exception that we would have
specifically enlisted the assistance of the CIA on a regular basis on any
investigations relating to Cuba. I am confident if we learned of any indication
that Castro personally was aware of the United States sponsored efforts directed
at his assassination, then in that case we would have attached a higher
priority--perhaps the highest possible priority--to these allegations so as to
satisfy ourselves if we were able to regarding any involvement of the Cuban
Government.
Q. Mr. Willens, let me see if I cannot clarify and perhaps pin down precisely
what the status of your knowledge was as to the possession on the part of the
Commission or Commission members, Commission staff, of the Castro plots.
Specifically to your knowledge did the Chief Justice have any information while
he was serving on the Warren Commission concerning any involvement of any U.S.
intelligence agency in plots against Cubs to assassinate Fidel Castro?
A. I do not know.
Q. To your knowledge did any other Commissioner have any such information while
he was serving on the Warren Commission?
A. I do not know.
Q. To your knowledge did any staff member have any such information while he was
serving on the Warren Commission?
A. I believe not.
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Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice from
which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information?
A. No.
Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any other Commissioner
from which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any staff member from
which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did you see any document from which you could have or might have inferred
that either the Chief Justice or other Commissioner or any staff member had such
information?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever present during any discussions from which you could have or did
infer that the Chief Justice or other Commissioner or any staff member had such
information?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever instructed by anyone including the Chief Justice or any
Commissioner or any staff member or anyone else while you served on the Warren
Commission staff not to pursue any area of inquiry?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever instructed by anyone while you served on the Warren Commission
staff not to pursue any area of inquiry because the area might endanger the
national security?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be explored
for any reason?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be explored
for reasons of national security?
A. No.
Q. Let me change the subject if I might a little bit. I have only this one last
subject. l hope to get you out in time for lunch, assuming you either eat a late
lunch or eat quickly.
Let me ask a little bit about the writing of the final report and its processes.
Let me show you what has been previously marked as Willens Exhibit 5. I believe
you have not had an opportunity to see it previously. Nevertheless it purports
to indicate which staff member had primary responsibility for writing the
various chapters or rewriting the various chapters of the report. I wonder if
you would look at it and indicate whether that generally corresponds with your
memory?
A. No; it does not.
Q. Would you indicate for the record to what degree that exhibit does not
reflect the true facts?
A. This exhibit is in serious error with respect to almost everyone of the eight
chapters of the report. I do not know what the source of this exhibit was and I
don't know that it is worth your time or the committee's time to try to correct
it.
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Q. The source of the exhibit is from Epstein's book.
A. I suspected as much and that is just further confirmation of the substantial
errors that characterize Mr. Epstein's original work. One of the difficulties of
Mr. Epstein's review of this subject was that he interviewed only selected
members of the Commission staff and among those that he interviewed several,
including myself, elected not to talk to him about some matters that we regarded
as confidential to the work of the Commission.
Have you questioned other witnesses with respect to this exhibit
A. Do you regard this as something that is to be addressed in your committee
report?
Q. Not necessarily. Perhaps the best way to handle this would be if you want to
write me a short letter later in which you could indicate to the best of your
memory who had the primary responsibility to each of these sections, we could
incorporate it at the end of your testimony.
A. Why don't I take this exhibit under advisement then and see whether I can
supply helpful information to you with respect to it.
Q. All right.
A. I would just generally say that the exhibit underestimates the number of
people who contributed to the writing of the report and it overstates the
contributions made by certain individuals. It also reflects a lack of precision
as to the origin of the material that went into these various chapters. The
chapters as they finally emerge in the Commission report were the product of
considerable discussion and debate among the Commission's staff and the full
Commission. Eventually proposed drafts that were prepared by some staff members
were divided and found their way into several different chapters as we elected
to reorganize the report and this summary neglects to trace back to the original
drafters the individual subsections of individual chapters in the report. There
were approximately 20 members of the Commission staff who participated in a
substantial way in writing the Commission report.
If you let me consider it further, Mr. Blakey, to see if I can supplement that
brief statement with any more detailed statement, that might be useful.
Q. I might say this is the actual identity of individuals who wrote the
particular sections and it may well only be of historical interest and for some
inquiry. Someday in the future one may want to go back and figure that out. The
Committee is, however, very interested in processes and not so much the people
by which the material examined by the Commission ultimately found its way into
the particular form that it took in the Warren Commission report. As I am sure
you are aware, there has been considerable criticism of the Commission,
sometimes not so much on the substance of what it said but on its manner of
presentation and sometimes what it omitted. Consequently, the processes that are
in the Commission document are a matter that the committee is very vitally
concerned in so that if you would make an effort to reconstruct as best you can
that process and its personalization and individuals, I can assure you that that
letter's content would find a way into the committee's report.
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A. If you have specific questions about the process, why don't you address them
to me and I will see if I can answer them.
Q. Why don't we try some. Let me show you what has previously been marked as JFK
exhibit No. 74. This is a memorandum of your own to Mr. Rankin dated August 8
commenting on what I take it is a relatively mature version of chapter 4
entitled "The Assassin." Let me ask you a couple of questions about that
memorandum.
[EXHIBIT No. 74]
Date: August 8, 1964.
Memorandum to: Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel.
From: Howard P. Willens.
Subject: Chapter IV--Draft dated 7/21/64.
I think that this Chapter needs substantial revision. I suggest the following
comments for your consideration.
1. As a matter of general style, this Chapter is different from any of the other
chapters and should be brought into conformity. I have the following specifics
in mind:
a. The headings and subheading used in the table of contents and in the text of
the chapter should be phrases rather than sentences.
b. Marina Oswald and Lee Harvey Oswald are occasionally referred to as Marina
and Lee Oswald. I do not think that Marina Oswald should ever be referred to as
Marina and believe that Oswald should be referred to as Oswald or as Lee Harvey
Oswald.
c. I do not think that we need to use the prefix Mr. in the text of the Report.
d. For witnesses who have appeared before the Commission or members of the
staff, I believe we should use the past tense when referring to their testimony
rather than the present perfect, i.e., "testified" rather than "has testified".
e. In many sections of the chapter there is an inadequate introductory paragraph
setting forth the conclusions documented in the subsequent discussion. The
paragraphing in the chapter needs watching, since there is no consistent
handling of paragraph length.
2. In view of the importance of the chapter, I think that we can afford more
than a single long paragraph as an introduction to the overall chapter. This
would permit the Commission to speak in the introduction of the other evidence
considered in the chapter, but not relied upon, although I have other
suggestions to make regarding the handling of this material.
3. I still have a question about the validity of including as a minor finding
Oswald's capability with a rifle. I think our case remains the same even if
Oswald had limited or negligible capability with a rifle. In a way, we are
emphasizing an argument we don't particularly need, which prompts controversy
and may tend to weaken the stronger elements of our proof. I believe that this
material should be discussed somewhere, and probably in this chapter, but I
question whether it should be elevated to one of our eight major conclusions on
which the Commission relies. An alternative to consider might be to place the
question of Oswald's capability as a subheading to one of the first two major
conclusions.
4. I think that the first major section should be entitled solely "The
Assassination Weapon". The first subheading should be "Purchase of Rifle by
Oswald". The subsequent discussion should set forth the conclusion of the
Commission that Oswald purchased the rifle based on (a) handwriting analysis of
the rifle purchase documents, (b) Oswald's rental of P.O. Box 2915, (c) prior
use of alias Hidell.
5. On page 4 I do not see the significance of the first full paragraph, with the
exception of the first sentence. We know that Oswald lived in Dallas at the
relevent time and I do not believe it is significant that Oswald did not receive
from the box after he left Dallas for New Orleans on April 23.
6. The next major subhead should be the section beginning on page 8 dealing with
Oswald's palmprint. I think there should be some reference here to the fact that
palmprints are as good a basis for identification as fingerprints, plus an
appropriate reference to the appendix.
7. In the third line from the bottom of page 8 the meaning of the word "lifted"
is not clear to the lay reader. Similarly with the reference to the "powder" in
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the second line on page 9. The last sentence of the first full paragraph on page
9 might be combined with the prior statement on page 8 about the metal of the
rifle in a separate paragraph offered as explanation for the lack of other
prints on the rifle, assuming recent use. If there are any statistics or other
evidence on this point, I think they should be set forth and explained. This is
a more controversial matter than I believe we have considered.
8. The section on fiber analysis lacks a conclusion in the text as opposed to
the subheading. On page 10 in the second line, I do not think that the fibers in
the shirt he was wearing should be described as "similarly colored" at this
point.
9. With regard to the section beginning on page 10 we should consider
reorganizing the discussion as follows:
First paragraph covering Marina's testimony in pictures including dates, places,
number, etc.
Second paragraph.--Setting forth the Commission's conclusion that the pictures
were in fact taken with Oswald's camera at Neely Street, and are not
superimposed.
Third paragraph.--Dealing with the conclusion that the rifle in the picture is
Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle. If this reorganization is not adopted at the very
least there should be an introductory paragraph setting forth the conclusions
reached by the Commission regarding these pictures.
10. With regard to the last paragraph on page 13 I would consider mentioning the
name of the magazine. I also think some reference should be made to the fact
that the Commission has examined these pictures and reached certain conclusions
regarding the curvature of the stock problem and the scope situation. In short,
I think it is necessary to expand this discussion.
11. I am concerned by the lack of introduction to the section beginning on page
13A and the fact that the conclusions drawn here seem to be somewhat elusive. If
we are stating only that he was on the 6th floor 35 minutes before the shots
were fired, that is one thing. If we are going to rely on Brennan in part, then
we should state a conclusion at the beginning of this section which reflects our
analysis of the eyewitness testimony. I realize that the "access" point has a
colorful history going back several months, but I am not persuaded that it
contributes very much.
12. It might be desirable prior to examining the scientific evidence to have a
short section dealing with the site, setting forth the descriptive material now
contained on page 14 and including other material in the chapter discribing the
cartons which were used to construct a barricade from the rest of the floor.
13. There still is a little too much of the Ball-Belin approach in this for my
taste. For example, on page 14 I do not see why the reader has to know the
cartons were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for chemical
processing, since subsequent testimony demonstrates that. Similarly, on page 15
the finding of the palmprint by Lt. Day is of no particular significance.
14. The conclusion sought to be drawn from this section seems to me to go too
far. I do not know why we place "great" weight on the fingerprint and palmprint
identification to prove he was at the window. The basic question is widen he was
at the window and when we come near to that question we back away from it.
Furthermore, we never do make an effort to refute the many other possibilities
for those fingerprints which are consistent with Oswald's innocence.
I would consider combining the section on the paper bag with the section on the
cartons. The section on the paper bag also lacks a topic sentence pointing out
the conclusion. I wonder why we have the description of the paper bag here since
it could be a sandwich bag and still be used to make the point that is involved
here. I question whether the whole section on carrying the rifle into the TSBD
should not be before this access--presence". That organization would permit us
to introduce the paper bag in the most appropriate context.
15. Much of the material in the first full paragraph of page 17 should be
relegated to the Appendix so far as I am concerned.
16. If we have any testimony as to the state of the southeast corner early in
the morning, I think it should receive greater emphasis in the text, since it
provides greater support for linking Oswald with the cartons and bag found in
the corner after the assassination.
17. In the section on eyewitness identification, we should make some reference
back to chapter 3 and Brennan's testimony there.
18. On page 21 the fact that another eyewitness identified Oswald in a way
similar to Brennan does not seem to me to help support Brennan's identification.
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I would eliminate this comparison here and perhaps make a reference to it later
on when the Tippit shooting is discussed.
19. Throughout the discussion of Brennan's testimony we should reaffirm his
testimony as to the source of the shots. On page 23 I think we go out of our way
to qualify the Commission's reliance on Brennan's testimony. I see no reason why
we should pick Brennan out as the subject for the second paragraph on page 23.
He is a good witness despite his declination to identify Oswald positively in
the police lineup. Why not place this paragraph at the end of the entire section
on eyewitness testimony. The record on Brennan speaks for itself. The last
sentence in this paragraph is obvious, since we have stated several times that
our findings that Oswald is the assassin is based on many different categories
of evidence.
20. It seems to me that the last paragraph on page 23B gives Fischer and Edwards
more weight than Brennan. At least they are blessed with the "consistent with"
characterization, which I think is overworked in his chapter.
21. I have substantial problems with the section beginning on page 24. I would
consider placing the first subsection, dealing with the rifle's location in the
Paine garage, in the first section of the chapter dealing with Oswald's
ownership and conditional possession of the rifle. I do not think that this
discussion here is necessary to the argument that he carried the rifle in on
Friday. Also the testimony discussed here is more relevant here to the
possession of the rifle than it is to the location of the rifle in the Paine
garage. The first of these two points is the more important conclusion and it
should be bolstered by all available evidence.
22. I do not follow the argument contained in the first full paragraph of page
24. We do not have to prove that Oswald never took the rifle out of the garage
in order to make the point that the garage was its usual storage place. I would
consider eliminating the paragraph entirely.
23. After the above relocation of the Paine garage section, I would consider
organizing this section as follows:
First conclusion.--The paper bag contained the assassination weapon.
Second conclusion.--Lee Harvey Oswald carried this bag to work.
(a) He made the bag from TSBD material;
(b) He had the opportunity to make the bag;
(c) He carried this bag on Friday;
(d) He had handled the bag.
Third conclusion.--He lied about the curtain rod story and the paper bag.
On reviewing this again I am persuaded once more that this entire section should
go before the section dealing with Oswald's presence in the window.
24. The discussion at the bottom of page 27 regarding disassembling seems to
have limited relevance. I would consider combining the paragraph with the one at
the end of this subsection.
25. On page 32 I question the relevance of the last sentence of the first full
paragraph dealing with the location of the bag. I do not see how this is
relevant to the conclusion that the bag contained the rifle. If this point is to
be made, I think it should be made as part of the general description of the
assassination scene as proposed in one of my earlier comments.
26. The third line on page 33, I do not think that the meaning of the word
"matched" is clear.
27. I think that the way that the Frazier-Randle testimony is handled on pages
38-40 may well be the best possible way. It does occur to me, however, that
under my proposed reorganization this testimony would be pertinent to the
conclusion whether the bag contained the assassination weapon. Perhaps the
organization should be changed so as to prove first that Oswald carried the
paper bag to work, and then turn to the question whether the bag contained the
assassination weapon. The Frazier-Randle testimony could then be set against the
scientific evidence as well as the other evidence bearing on this issue.
28. The characterization of the killing of Tippit on page 42 as a desperate act
of escape may be true, but I would like to discuss this further. Perhaps this
point could be made in the overall introduction or conclusion of the chapter
after all the other evidence is set forth.
29. On page 45 I would not begin the discussion of Tippit eyewitnesses with
Helen Markam. On page 46 I think we should have at least a paragraph on Helen
Markam's alleged description of Oswald as "short", stocky and bushy-haired.
30. The sentence at the bottom of page 59 is not necessary here in view of the
introductory paragraph which is contained in this subsection.
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31. The discussion at pages 60-64 gives me some difficulty. I do not see why we
have to proceed witness by witness in making the points to be made here. I would
suggest that the paragraphs might be along these lines.
a. Lee Harvey Oswald entered the theater at such and such a time.
b. Police officers were summoned to the scene and entered the building.
c. Lee Harvey Oswald was apprehended and in the source of this may have
attempted to kill the arresting officer.
d. Excessive force was not used by the Police officials.
32. I am still troubled by the location of the section dealing with the interval
of time between the assassination of President Kennedy and the murder of Officer
Tippit. Once we have found that he did both acts, what could have happened in
the interval which would be "inconsistent with" his having done this. In Other
words, once you prove that he did both acts what is the relevance of speaking of
the intervening events. If there is anything in the intervening events which
casts doubt on his committing either of the two acts, that is a different
matter. In that event, the activity during the intervening period would be an
element of evidence to be weighed in reaching the conclusion as to whether the
actor is guilty of the crime in question. That is not our case here. The end
result of this rambling may be the suggestion that this section be treated in
chronological fashion after the assassination of President Kennedy and prior to
the case against Oswald for the murder of Tippit.
33. Regardless of where it is located, I think that the full paragraph of the
section should state the basic conclusions regarding Oswald's movements during
this period of time. For example, the Commission concludes that Oswald went from
the 6th floor to the 2nd floor by the stairway, through the lunchroom and out
the front door of the building before 12:34 when the building was not closed
off. He then took a bus and a taxi, went to his apartment, and proceeded to the
site of the Tippit killing.
34. I do think that we should conclude that Oswald was in the process of flight
or at least that some of the events suggest that he was.
35. With the above recommendation in mind the testimony beginning at page 72
would be handled different. This testimony would be set forth and appraised on
the issue as to how and when Oswald descended from the 6th floor. In such a
discussion the Commission could rely on some witnesses and reject the testimony
of others, such as Victoria Adams.
36. On page 76, I think that we have to do something more with the Lovelady
picture. It occurs to me that we should probably do a paragraph or section
dealing with Oswald's known whereabouts at 12:30. In setting forth the limited
amount of evidence as to his whereabouts at this time we could reject the
allegation that the picture in question shows him standing in the doorway at the
time of the assassination.
37. With regard to the treatment of the General Walker shooting, I think that we
need a paragraph summarizing the investigation, or lack of it, conducted by the
Dallas Police Department after the Walker shooting. We also should set forth
briefly the fact that Walker initiated an investigation into the matter. Our
conclusion that Oswald was probably responsible builds of course on the fact
that it was an unsolved crime. We have to make some reference to the
investigation made by Keaster and Roberts, whose statements regarding Duff
should be made part of the record and have been collected by Liebeler.
38. I am of the mind now that there should be no other evidence section at the
end of the chapter. This means that we have to find a place for each of the
subsections. I think that the paraffin tests discussion should be set forth
early in the Report, after the discussion of Oswald's ownership of the rifle. It
could be set forth by the Commission in a frank statement that the Commission
has no scientific evidence as opposed to eyewitness and circumstantial evidence
that Oswald fired the rifle on November 22.
39. I would eliminate the section now labeled clothing identification and make
the point in the course of setting forth the testimony of the Tippit witnesses.
It is clear enough what the Commission relies upon and what it does not rely
upon and we do not need this section.
40. The Nixon attempt problem presents a more difficult problem. I would
consider discussing this under the case heading as the General Walker shooting
so as to cover all prior similar acts in one section. In the course of that
section we could state our evidence supporting the conclusion that he fired at
General Walker and why we believe he did not attempt to shoot Nixon. An
alternative
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to this would be to make referene to this incident only by a single sentence in
Chapter 4 and treat it more fully in Chapter 7, as an illustration of Oswald's
personality and treatment of his wife. I do not think it should be handled at
the end of this chapter.
41. The section drafted by Mr. Liebeler on the Irving sports shop story can be
handled earlier in the chapter dealing with the ownership of the rifle. I think
it is reasonable to set forth the evidence supporting the conclusion that Oswald
owned and handled this weapon and make the point also that the Commission has no
credible evidence that Oswald owned another rifle. It also might be worked in
where we state that the rifle was shipped with the scope already on.
For example, I note on page 2, paragraph 3, the memorandum employs words like
"case," "argument," "weaken." Aren't these the words appropriate to a brief, a
legal brief?
A. These are the words that come naturally to a lawyer reviewing a written
product. We thought it was important to have a fair and comprehensive treatment
of the evidence. We also thought it would be desirable to support the
Commission's conclusions in as useful and as persuasive a way as possible.
Q. It has been suggested by some that the Conunission's report was an fact not a
fair and objective analysis of the evidence but rather a brief in behalf of the
Government's position; to wit, the single assassin theory. I wonder if you would
comment on this.
A. I do not agree with that criticism obviously. I think there are several
examples in the report that could be allowed in a response to that critacism;
for example, the decision of the Commission not to rely on the eyewitness
testimony of Mr. Brennin.
Q. Let me explore that with you if I might. On page 3 of this memorandum,
paragraph 11, that very issue is raised and it is also raised on page 4,
paragraph 18, and page 5, paragraphs 19 and 20. How did the staff and the
Commission arrive at a decision in reference to Mr. Brennan's testimony? Would
you describe the processes that led you to handle Brennan in one way as opposed
to another?
A. Well, the process is not really very, very mysterious. There were initial
drafts of the report or assessment of the relevant evidence going back as early
as February and March of 1964. As we turned from the investigative stage of the
report to the writing stage of the report, the responsible attorneys would make
an initial cut at presenting the relevant evidence, evaluating it and supporting
their conclusions.
Q. In what sort of way?
A. In this particular case they were trying to use those standards that they
thought would be the likely product of a contested trial. They were sensitive in
this area in particular to the fact that there was no cross examination that
could be used to challenge the eyewitness testimony of a person such as Mr.
Brennan and there was a sensitivity to that concern supplemented by the fact
that other evidence seemed more credible that led the staff attorneys and
ultimately the Commission to conclude that some evidence should not be relied
upon and other evidence should be emphasized.
Q. Do I understand you correctly to be saving that where information or evidence
might have been subjected to sharp challenge in an adversary proceeding there
was an inclination of the Commission staff not to rely on it but to rely instead
on evidence that could not have been as sharply criticized or challenged?
A. That certainly was a general effort. I don't know how well it was achieved in
the overall report but I do know that it was of particular
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concern with respect to the evidence implicating Lee Harvey Oswald. This exhibit
that I have in front of me, JFK exhibit No. 74, reflects a process by which the
report ultimately emerged; it represents a detailed review by me of a proposed
draft including the substantive and organizational changes that I thought would
be useful.
I had the general responsibility of submitting my views with respect to any
portion of the report and I think I generally took advantage of that opportunity
and performed that responsibility. After such a memo would be prepared by me or
by Professor Redlich, customarily the drafts would be either rewritten by the
responsible attorneys or Mr. Redlich and I or in some instances Dr. Goldberg
would take the responsibility for incorporating the revisions into another
draft.
The drafts were generally commented upon by attorneys in other areas as well,
particularly the most sensitive parts of the report, so that as the redrafting
continued the use of a large number of staff members was taken into account. Mr.
Rankin had the final responsibility for the drafts that went forward to the
Commission and he looked primarily to Professor Redlich and myself to present to
him a draft with which both of us were in agreement.
Q. The committee has available to it in its record now testimony indicating that
there was some controversy over the general structure of the report, and now I
am referring to what the staff here has called the long-run/short-run report.
The short-run report was one that in relatively clear and black letter terms
made an effort ot resolve as sharply as possible most controversies presented to
the Commission appropriately qualified but nevertheless resolved. The long-run
version would have been a report that included with the language of the report
and its footnotes a great deal more of the ambiguity of the evidence and a
clearer and a franker recognition of the ambiguities in the testimony and the
unresolved questions.
I grant that neither of these two characterizations would fully or adequately
describe the document that was ultimately published. Nevertheless, they might
well represent tendencies in a draft. The testimony in the record tends to
indicate that the option taken by the Commission was the short-term. I don't use
that in a pejorative sense. That is, to write as clear and forceful and
determined a report as possible. The option of writing a report that contained
more ambiguity and more unanswered questions was not adopted. I wonder if you
would comment on that general description of the report and its tendencies.
A. Well, I don't accept those characterizations as having any relevance to this
end product. When the report came out it was regarded as being a lengthier and
more thoroughly documented report than most people had anticipated. There was a
considerable desire within the staff at least to prepare a report that would
deal substantially and usefully with all the important questions addressed in
the investigation.
The numerous appendixes attached to this report and the decision to publish
simultaneously the underlying evidence suggests to me a disposition quite
contrary to the suggestion that this was a short run product designed to avoid
controversy and overlook the ambiguities inherent in the investigation. The
report I think reflects the limitations
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of the Commission's efforts in important respects when it concludes as to the
existence of a conspiracy and only that. There is no evidence regarding such a
conspiracy and the significance of that conclusion has to be evaluated in light
of the investigation that was conducted up to that point by the Commission in
the various investigative agencies. I think as a qualified conclusion that was
appropriately made and that left others free, like this committee to explore
facts that have developed in the intervening years to re-examine that conclusion
and see whether it is still a legitimate conclusion or not.
I think the suggestion that the report should have reflected ambiguities and
hold open more serious questions is both unrealistic and not very useful. We
are, after all, dealing with a public report issuing over the signatures of
seven extremely experienced and prominent public figures. We are well accustomed
to the ambiguities of life and also the necessity of reaching conclusions
notwithstanding the existence of such ambiguities. They and the staff tried to
do so in an honest and complete way, and I am sure that we all anticipated that
criticism of whatever kind would come over the years and should be expected.
Q. Let me direct your attention to page 4, paragraph 13, of JKF exhibit No. 74.
There is a reference in the memorandum to the Ball-Belin approach. Do you recall
what that was?
A. This characterization was not intended to be a critical one. My recollection
is that the initial draft of this section of the report that was prepsred by Mr.
Ball and Mr. Belin devoted a considerable amount of space to tracing the chain
of custody of particular items of evidence, for example, in the way that you
would have to do if you were presenting the matter in court. That is completely
understandable in light of the considerable litigation experience of both of
them and particularly Mr. Ball.
My sense as someane who was trying to organize and present the material was that
the lay reader of this report did not need that kind of detail in a report that
already promised to be very long and ought to focus in on the issues of real
controversy. I think it is that which I had in mind by the reference here to the
Ball-Belin approach. That is more a difference in style than in substance and
reflects my views as to what kind of a report ultimately should be produced.
Q. Nevertheless I take it from your previous answers that trial-type standards
on custody and authentication were applied to the evidence that you ultimately
relied upon.
A. I would not want to go so far as to say that. I mean there was concern about
custody and authentication but even if there was some concern that does not
necessarily mean that the body of this report should contain a detailed recital
of the chain of custody of particular items of physical evidence if the writers
of the report are comfortable with the conclusion that the evidence that they
are relying upon was not tampered with during the relevant period.
Q. Let me make an effort to paraphrase you so I understand. You are saying that
the Commission staff in evaluating evidence if it didn't apply trial-type
standards on custody authentication at least only used that evidence that it was
comfortable with and then in writing the report did not necessarily set forth
the processes by which it came to
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arrive at a judgment that they were comfortable with; for example, whether the
rifle taken from the depository was indeed the rifle that Lee Harvey Oswald
bought or whether the rifle first found in the depository is indeed the rifle
ultimately examined by the ballistics people.
A. We certainly would not have relied on physical evidence where we had any
reason to suspect that there had been some substitution so as to make the
results of examining that evidence not reliable.
Q. The absence sometimes in the report of the detailed discussion of the
reasoning process that led you to decide that a particular rifle was identical
within a particular photograph that was authentic is not an indication what the
Commission staff did not explore those questions prior to relying on the
evidence.
A. That is correct, and I think that certainly is an option that that could have
been considered in writing the report; that is, to provide a more detailed
explanation of the reasoning process in general terms at least if not with
respect to each specific piece of evidence relied upon.
Q. Although I might be moved to comment that if your one-volume report lacked a
certain readership, then the two-volume report filled with the tedious record
systems entitled "Only to Lawyers" might have been even less well read.
A. I suppose we would have addressed that kind of issue the way we did the more
scientific questions that were considered in the appendixes but we did limit our
discussion of the quality of our evidence only to few very important items in
the report of the kind that we previously mentioned.
Q. What is included in the report is important. What is not included in the
report is sometimes important, too.
In that context let me show you what has been previously marked JFK exhibit No.
42. This deals with a question of a possible threat by Premier Castro to kill
President Kennedy and whether or not that threat might have come to the
attention of Lee Harvey Oswald. The memorandum addresses the issue of whether
that should have been reflected in the final report. The official report at page
414 and the New York Times report at page 390 in general terms discussed this
issue but at least to my reading do not explicitly adopt the suggestion that Mr.
Liebeler had made to Mr. Rankin in his memorandum on the 16th.
Do you think that had the Commission known of the CIA plots that this kind of
material might have found its way explicitly into the final report?
[EXHIBIT No. 42]
Date: September 16, 1964.
Memorandum to: Mr. Rankin.
From: Mr. Liebeler.
Reference: Quote from "New Orleans Times-Picayune" of September 19, 1963
concerning Fidel Castro's speech.
We previously discussed the possible inclusion in Chapter VII of the quote from
the New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 9, 1963 concerning Fidel Castro to
the effect that U.S. leaders would not be safe themselves if U.S. promoted
attacks on Cuba continued. You and Mr. Redlich took the position that we could
not include the quote unless there was some evidence that Oswald had actually
read that particular newspaper. I stated that the material was relevant and the
possibility that Oswald had read it should be discussed. I was not, however, at
that time able to indicate any other situation in which materials had been
discussed on the possibility that Oswald had read it, in the absence of any
specific proof that he had.
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I now note, however, in reviewing the galleys of Chapter VI, that an extensive
discussion of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for
Treason" handbill are included. The following statement appears in connection:
"There is no evidence that he [Oswald] became aware of either the 'Welcome Mr.
Kennedy' advertisement or the 'Wanted for Treason' handbill, though neither
possibility can be precluded."
Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious
political overtones. The discussion set forth in Chapter VI concerning the
"Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have
similar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout
this investigation is that the groups on both ends of the political spectrum
must be treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general, even
though we have disagreed at times on specific applications of it.
It appears clear to me, however, that if we are precluded from including the
quote from the New Orleans newspaper concerning Castro's speech on the grounds
that we have no evidence that Oswald actually read it, even though we do know he
read a great deal, the same must be true of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy"
advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill. The discussion in Chapter
VI actually admits that the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement in the November
22, 1963 "Dallas Morning News" probably did not come to Oswald's attention.
Under those circumstances it would seem to me that fairness indicates either the
deletion of the discussion of the advertisement and the handbill that is now set
forth in Chapter VI or the inclusion of the Castro statement in Chapter VII.
A. I can't say.
Q. Do you recall this particular controversy at all?
A. I remember seeing that memorandum. There were several such issues that were
raised in the last week's effort to conclude the writing of the Commission
report. People were working very hard. There was a keen sense of history
involved in preparing the report. There was apprehension of all kinds with
respect to our ability to complete a satisfactory report. There were numerous
instances where differences of views came to light with respect to what should
be contained in the report and how it should be stated.
Q. This is just one example.
A. This is just one example and reflects a very substantial contribution that
Mr. Liebeler made throughout the Commission's investigation to keep people's
attention focused or the need for fairness and political balance and to be
careful about matters of detail.
Q. Should any particular significance be attached to the omission in the final
report of explicit reference to the Castro threat?
A. I don't think so but I do not really recall very clearly now what, if
anything is included in the Commission report regarding this particular
hypothesis.
Q. You can, if you want to, examine this. I think on page 414 is the only
reference at least that I have been able to find. You have in this a general
section entitled "Entrance in Cuba" and you have a paragraph---I am reading now
from page 319 of the New York Times version. I think you have page 414 of the
official version.
A. I noticed on page 414 of the official version that there is a reference to a
substantial difference in political views between Cuba and the United States,
specifically the reference to a statement by Castro that Cuba could not accept a
situation where at the same time the United States was trying to ease world
tensions it also was increasing its efforts to tighten the noose around Cuba.
I note also a sentence from page 414 to this effect: "The general conflict of
views between the United States and Cuba was, of course,
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reflected in other medis to such an extent that there can be no doubt that
Oswald was aware generally of the critical attitude that Castro expressed about
President Kennedy."
On page 415 there is a sentence that reads as follows: "While some of Castro's
more severe criticisms of President Kennedy might have led Oswald to believe
that he would be well received in Cuba after he had assassinated the American
President, it does not appear that he had any plans to go there."
It seems to me that those sentences demonstrate the resolution of the
controversy raised by Mr. Liebeler's memorandum. The resolution seems to have
been a generalized reference to the kind of criticism that existed at the time
and that might have well come to Oswald's attention but without the need to
focus on particular embodiments that Castro criticism where there was no
evidence that Oswald did in fact see the specific newspaper item.
Q. That concludes my questions this morning, Mr. Willens. Let me say again I
appreciate your time and effort to come over and share with us your thoughts,
and I will look forward to reading your subsequent submission on the processes
that led to and were involved in the writing of the report. I would like at this
time to extend to you the opportunity to make any additional statement, that you
want to the record.
A. Thank you. It will be short.
I do want to summarize some of my views with respect to the work of the Warren
Commission and the review of that work by this committee.
First, I have not and do not oppose the work of this committee. It is certainly
most appropriate for an instrumentality of the Congress to evaluate the findings
of the Warren Commission in light of the technical developments and the
disclosures of the last nearly 14 years. In addition, anyone who serves the
public in any capacity, especially on a project as visible and historical as the
Warren Commission, must be prepared to have his or her work subjected to the
closest public scrutiny.
All I or anyone associated with the Commission can ask is that the Judgment this
committee ultimately renders be reasoned and fair. By reasoned I mean a process
of careful consideration of all the pertinent evidence and factors and the
framing of documented and balanced conclusions in light of the relevant evidence
and factors. By fair I mean the application of a mature and humane judgment that
recognizes that errors are inevitable and that the establishment of priorities
is necessary in any public endeavor. In particular I ask for some understanding
of the incredible public pressures operating upon the Commission and staff to
complete its work as the end of 1964 approached.
Second, I will not reiterate at any length my views regarding the ability or
integrity of the members of the Commission and staff. Any such opinions of mine
are obviously self-serving.
To the extent that the record of the Commission's work provides evidence of
conflicting viewpoints among staff members, two points might be made.
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First, the Commission had nothing to hide about the way it did its business. The
difficulties are reflected in the records of the Commission for all subsequent
interested parties to evaluate.
Second, such differences surely must be expected of a staff of reasonable,
mature and highly independent professionals. Nothing would have warranted
suspicion as much as a unanimity of views among the members of the Commission
staff.
Third, I hope the committee will have the courage to conclude publicly that the
Warren Commission was correct in its major. findings, if that is indeed its
conclusion. It will be an easy and attractive course to avoid such an assessment
by finding deficiencies in the way in which the Warren Commission did its work
and lamenting the passage of time that has made further investigation fruitless.
The public deserves more than this. If the findings of the Warren Commission are
soundly based on the evidence, this committee should so state but if the
opposite is the and the committee concludes that the Warren Commission was
essentially right, then the public deserves to be told this as well.
Last, as you approach public hearings I hope you will give careful thought to
the fairness of your presentation of the facts. If you have concluded that the
Warren Commission was deficient in its operating procedures, I hope you will
consider giving an opportunity to members of the Commission or staff to comment
on your findings or to testify in your public hearings. I offer this suggestion
not because of any vested interest in the findings of the Warren Commission but
in an age where governmental institutions are so persuasively distrusted it
seems only fair to make certain that all perspectives ere evaluated before
concluding that the Warren Commission or any other Government agency associated
with the assassination investigation of President Kennedy did anything less than
extend its best efforts to deal honestly with a most challenging public
assignment. Thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. BLAKEY. You're welcome.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the deposition concluded.]
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken,
do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing
deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by
me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting
by me; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said
witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am
not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel by the parties thereto nor
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
ANNABELLE SHORT,
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia.
My Commission expires November 14, 1980.
Attachment I
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(286) Attachment I: Letter and attachments from Judge Burt W. Griffin to G.
Robert Blakey, November 23, 1977.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113
BURT W. GRIFFIN
November 23, 1977
JUDGE
Mr. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel
House Committee on Assassinations
House Annex #2
3rd and D Streets, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
Dear Bob:
When I returned home from Washington on November 17th my 14 year old son (thank
God for 14 year old sons) mentioned to me that he had been rummaging in our
attic and had found a stack of Warren Commission papers.
Lo and behold when he brought them down, they were xeroxed copies of nearly
every memo which I had written in 1964, together with some other inter-office
communications to me from other staff members. I now remember that these were
sent to me some months ago by Paul Hoch, a Warren Commission researcher in San
Francisco. I had never looked at them and merely stashed them away.
I have now reviewed all of them and am forwarding four for your consideration.
The enclosed papers, together with others which I have not sent, suggest four
important amendments to my testimony:
1. There are memoranda in the file showing that Leon Hubert was at work in
Washington for the Commission at least as early as January 14, 1964, and it is
my recollection that I began work before Hubert. Perhaps, you do not fully
understand the significance of the pay records which you have summarized.
2. There are a number of inter-office memos dated prior to May 1, 1964, which
show rather substantial amounts of communication from Hubert and me to others
working in the conspiracy area and vice-versa. Your staff people are probably
aware of these.
3. The June 1, 1964 mero that I have enclosed shaqs quite clearly that Hubert
and I told Willens "we believe the investigative requests now underway will
serve to correct all the matters specified in our memorandum of May 14th." In
light of
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Attachment I cont.
that statement, I don't see how I can now ecruplain about the followthrough on
the investigative matters requested in paragraphs four and five of the
memorandum (pages 5,6,7,8,9 & 10). Moreover, other letters bearing Rankin's
signature, which I have not sent to you, show the nature of the investigation
that we requested with respect to the specific matters set forth in those pages.
There are also, among the papers sent to me by Paul Hoch, a few other letters
prepared around June 1, 1964, with Mr. Rankin's signature, which were not sent
to the investigative agencies. Apparently we did do some compromising. But
obviously I was prepared to put in writing to Howard Willing my satisfaction
with the investigation we were doing, and I will not now attempt to put the
jacket on someone else within the commission staff.
4. On page 46 of an unpublished early draft of the conspiracy chapter, I wrote
as follows:
"The CIA has no information suggesting that Jack Ruby was involved in any type
of Cuban or other foreign conspiracy."
Since that draft was obviously written before the September 14th letter which
you showed me from the CIA, I have to conclude that we had received oral
communications from the CIA telling us that they had no information and that we
ultimately insisted on their putting their oral statements to us in writing.
That, I believe, is why the CIA letter came so late. This may not change your
conclusion about the CIA cooperation in connection with our requests for
information on Ruby, but it does flesh in some more detail on how they responded
to that request.
Do not hesitate to contact me if you wish to discuss these matters further.
Sincerely,
Burt W. Griffin
Judge
BWG/mjm
Enclosures
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Memorandum
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Letter
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Memorandum
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Commission Exhibit
Attachment J
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(287) Attachment J:Letter from Howard P. Willens to G. Robert Blakey, December
14, 1978.
Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Bob:
In the course of my deposition on July 28, 1978, I undertook to comment on the
enclosed exhibit purporting to identify the members of the Warren COm~LiSSiOn
staff that authored particular chapters of the report.
I am sorry for the delay in responding to your request that I review this
document. I had hoped to find the time to review materials that I am confident
exist reflecting the internal workings of the Commission staff regarding the
writing of the report. I have not been able to do so, however, and I am
therefore unable to inform you and the Committee on this subject with the
thoroughness and precision that I would like to.
Most importantly, this summary is seriously flawed and should not be relied upon
by the Committee for any conclusions whatsoever. Without resurrecting old
controversies with Mr. Epstein, it is a matter of public record that he
interviewed only a few members of the Warren Commission staff
Page 462
462
Attachment J cont.
and that only some of those interviewed responded to his questions with respect
to the authorship of various sections of the report. Accordingly, his summary
substantially overstates the contributions of some members of the staff,
understates the contributions of others, and does a disservice to the 20 or more
members of the staff that participated significantly in preparation of the final
report.
Although I had originally intended to do so, I have decided that it would not be
productive for me to try and recall the contribution made by each member of the
Commission staff to each chapter of the report. Any effort by me to do so
without refreshing my recollection with materials from the files of the
Commission would undoubtedly suffer from the same inaccuracies that I attribute
to Mr. Epstein's effort to do so.
As I am sure you know from your own experience now, any final report emanating
from a committee has numerous authors. Each chapter of the Warren Commission
report went through 6 or more substantial redrafts, with different persons
assuming editorial responsibility at different times. I am sure this will prove
to be the case also as your Committee completes its final report.
I hope that this letter is useful and that you understand my reticence in trying
to be more exact.
Sincerely,
Howard P. Willens
Enclosure
Page 463
463
Attachment J cont.
Who Wrote What
Chapter 1 - "Summary & Conclusions" - Norman Redlich
Chapter 2 - "The Assassination" - primarlily written by Redlich, although
Specter and Stern contributed.
Chapter 3 - "The Shots from the TSBD" - originally written by Specter and
submitted in June. The chapter was rewritten by Redlich.
Chapter 4 - "The Assassin" - originally written by Ball and Belin. In late June
the Re-editing Committee rejected this chapter. Redlich rewrote the chapter
which took him ten weeks.
Chapter 5 - "Detention and Death of Oswald" - Griffin and Laulicht submitted the
draft in August. Goldberg rewrote it.
Chapter 6 - "Investigation of Possible Conspiracy," Pollak wrote the section on
LHO's movements abroad and Slawson wrote the rest. Pollak then rewrote the
entire chapter. Goldberg rewrote the chapter again.
Chapter 7 - "LHO: Background and Possible Motives" - Liebeler wrote it
originally and Goldberg rewrote it.
Chapter 8 - "The Protection of the President" - Sam Stern wrote the first draft.
Howard Willens rewrote the chapter.
Rankin appointed Norman Redlich, Alfred Goldberg, Howard Willens, and himself as
a "Re-editing Committee."
Goldberg also wrote the Rumors Appendix
References
Page 464
464
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. Johnson,
Mar. 73, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015037).
(2) Memorandum to the files by Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins, Nov. 24,
1963 (JFK Doc. 015038).
(3) Deposition of Nicholas deS. Katzenbach, Aug. 4, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Doe. 014569).
(4) Ibid., p. 8.
(5) Memorandum from Walter Jenkins to Bill Moyers, Nov. 25, 1963 (JFK Doe.
015038).
(6) Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deS. Katzenbach to Bill
Moyers, Nov. 2.5, 1963.
(7) See ref. 3, pp. 59-60.
(8) "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson,
Book 1: Nov. 22, 1963 to June 30, 1964" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965).
(9) Leon Jaworski interview, "Oral History Project," p. 21 (JFK Doe. 003411).
(10) Memorandum from Waiter Jenkins to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Nov. 29,
1963 (JFK Doe. 015039).
(11) See ref. 3, p. 9.
(12) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont,
Mohr, Sullivan, DeLoach, and Rosen, Nov. 29, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015040).
(13) Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Vantage Point" (New York: Popular Library edition,
1972), p. 26.
(14) Id. at p. 27.
(15) Ibid.
(16) "The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren" (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 356-358.
(17) Chief Justice Earl Warren, "Oral History Project," pp. 16, 17 (JFK Doc.
003409).
(18) Testimony of Gerald R. Ford, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House
Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. III, p. 578 (hereinafter referred to as
Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 578).
(19) See ref. 13, p. 26.
(20) Ibid.
(21) See ref. 9, pp. 22, 23.
(22) Id. at p. 24.
(23) See ref. 6; see ref. 2.
(24) Memorandum from Assistant FBI Director Cartha DeLoach to Associate PSI
Director Clyde Tolson, Dec. 12, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015040).
(25) Executive session testimony of Norman Redlich, Nov. 8, 1977, hearings
before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 144, 74 (JFK Doc.
014665) (see attachment A, this staff report); executive session testimony of
Arlen Specter, Nov. 8, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 57, 11 (JFK Doe. 014665) (see attachment A of this staff
report ).
(26) See ref. 13, p. 26.
(27) Memorandum to the files of Warren Commission staff member Melvin Eisenberg,
Feb. 17, 1964 (JFK Doe. 015041).
(28) Ibid.
(29) The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 15.
(30) "The Whole Truth," The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 36.
(31) The Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1963.
(32) "Indians Believe Oswald Was Only a Tool," The New York Times, Nov. 28,
1963, p. 33.
(33) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 71; see ref. 25,
Specter executive session testimony, p. 52; executive session testimony of
Wesley Liebeler, Nov. 15, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 114 (JFK Doe. 014668) (see attachment B of this staff
report); executive session testimony of Howard P. Willens, Nov. 17, 1977,
hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 85 (JFK Doc.
014694) (see attachment C of this staff report).
Page 464
465
(34) Executive session testimony of W. David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, Hearings
before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 88 (JFK Doc. 014668)
(see attachment B of this staff report).
(35) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 7.
(36) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 71.
(37) Executive session testimony of Judge Burr W. Griffin, Nov. 17, 1977,
hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 19 (JFK Doc.
014694) (see attachment C of this staff report).
(38) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10.
(39) Id. at p. 87.
(40) Id. at p. 88.
(41) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 143.
(42) Id. at p. 157.
(43) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, HSCA-JFK hearings. (44)
Testimony of John J. McCloy, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. III, p. 605 (hereinafter referred to as
McCloy testimony, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 605).
(45) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 6 (JFK Doc. 014027) See attachment D of this staff report).
(46) Warren Commission executive session transcript, Dec. 5, 1963 (JFK Doc.
000493.
(47) See ref. 18, Ford testimony Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings 47.
(48) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 91.
(49) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(50) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 79.
(51) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 15.
(52) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10.
(53) Id. at p. 48.
(54) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 60.
(55) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 105.
(56) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 11-12.
(57) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 73-74.
(58) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 58.
(59) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10.
(60) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 96.
(61) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, pp. 118-119
. (62) Ibid.
(63) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 43.
(64) Id. at pp. 97-98.
(65) See ref. 34, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 59.
(66) Ibid.
(67) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 78.
(68) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(69) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 129.
(70) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III JFK hearing, 602.
(71) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 583.
(72) Id. at 582.
(73) See ref. 37, Griffin executive testimony, pp. 17-18.
(74) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(75) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, pp. 94-96.
(76) See ref. 37, Rankin deposition, p. 13.
(77) Id. at PD. 14--15.
(78) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 16-17.
(79) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 97.
(80) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 82.
(81) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 22-23.
(82) Id. at p. 82.
(83) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 18.
(84) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 14.
(85) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 19.
(86) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 83.
(87) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 127.
Page 466
466
(88) Edward J. Epstein, "Inquest" (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 131;
minutes of the Warren Commission executive session of Sept. 18, 1964 (JFK Doc.
000076).
(89) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 14.
(90) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 197~, HI HSCA-JFK hearings, 607.
(91) "Warren Commission Report," p. 19.
(92) Testimony of John Sherman Cooper, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before House
Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office 1979) vol.III, p. 600 (Hereinafter referred to as
Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings,).
(93) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 20-21.
(94) Id. at p. 50.
(95) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 115.
(96) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 64; see ref. 25,
Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103.
(97) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 4950.
(98) Id. at pp. 86-87.
(99) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 27.
(100) See ref. 45, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 100.
(101) Id. at p. 101.
(102) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, 111 HSCA-JFK hearings, 601.
(103) See ref. 17, p. 28.
(104) Id. at p. 26.
(105) Id. at p. 17.
(106) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 52.
(107) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 10.
(108) Id. at p. 26.
(109) Ibid.
(110) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 125.
(111) Id. at pp. 16-17.
(112) See ref. 25, R£dlich executive session testimony, p. 144; fn. 25, Specter
executive session testimony, p. 57; and fn. 37, p. 24.
(113) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 154; see ref. 34, p.
101.
(114) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 130.
(115) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 11; see ref. 25,
iredlich executive session testimony, pp. 74-75; see ref. 33, Liebeler executive
session testimony, p. 154; see ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p.
11.
(116) See ref. 34, p. 11.
(117) Id. at pp. 101-102.
(118) See ref. 44, Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 19T8, III HSCA-JFK hearings,
601-02.
(119) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA -JFK hearings, 589.
(120) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 146-147.
(121) Ibid.
(122) See ref. 46, p. 1.
(123) Id. at p. 2.
(124) Id. at p. 39.
(125) S.J. Res. 137, Public Law 88-202.
(126) See ref. 46, p. 8.
(127) See ref. 46, Dec. 19, :1963, p. 3 (JFK Doc. 000501).
(128) Id. at p. 12.
(129) See ref. 46, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 11 (JFK Doc. 000475).
(130) Id. at p. 12.
(131) Id. at p. 18.
(132) Id. at p. 14.
(133) Ibid.
(134) Id. at p. 43.
(135) Id. at p. 44.
(136) Id. at p. 9.
(137) Id. at p. 15.
(138) Id. at p. 13.
Page 467
467
(139) Id. at pp. 46-47.
(140) Id. at p. 22.
(141) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Doc.
000094 and 003872); Memorandum from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, May 6,
1964.
(142) "The Documents," The New Republic, Sept. 27, 1975, p. 28.
(143) Id. at p. 27.
(144) See Warren Commission executive session transcript, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 128
(JFK Doc. 000001).
(145) Id. at p. 137.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Ibid.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Id. at p. 139.
(150) Id. at p. 140.
(151) Id. at p. 141.
(152) Id. at p. 142.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid.
(155) Id. at pp. 143-154.
(156) Ibid.
(157) Id. at p. 163.
(158) Id. at pp. 163-165.
(159) Id. at pp. 168--171.
(160) Id. at p. 177.
(161) Id. at p. 182.
(162) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Jan. 27,
1964.
(163) XVII Warren report hearings, 814.
(164) See CE 835, Warren Commission report.
(165) See CE 825, Warren Commission report.
(166) See Committee Report II, D. 3(d).
(167) See Warren Report at pp. 484-490.
(168) Secret Service Doc. No. 767 (JFK Doc. 002769).
(169) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 169.
(170) See ref. 46, Apr. 30, 1964, p. 5851 (JFK Doc. 000496).
(171) Ibid.
(172) Id. at pp. 5885-5886.
(173) Id. at p. 5864.
(174) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 115.
(175) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39.
(176) Id. at p. 11.
(177) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 15-16.
(178) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 120.
(179) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20.
(180) Ibid., p. 35.
(181) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 77.
(182) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 11.
(183) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 16.
(184) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20.
(185) Id. at p. 19.
(186) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10.
(187) Id. at p. 11.
(188) Id. at p. 13.
(189) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 18.
(190) Id. at p. 20.
(191) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 18.
(192) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 118.
(193) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39.
(194) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 28.
(195) See para. 228 ff. of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(196) Id. at p. 35.
(197) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103.
(198) Id. at p. 72.
(199) Id. at p. 122.
Page 468
468
(200) Id. at p. 95.
(201) Memorandum for the record by Howard P. Willens, "Staff Reaction to Hosty
Problem," Feb. 12, 1964.
(202) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 30-32.
(203) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, pp. 27-28.
(204) Id. at p. 53.
(205) Ibid.
(206) Id. at pp. 51-52.
(207) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 17.
(208) Ibid.
(209) Memorandum from W. David Slawson to Raymond Rocca, June 6, 1964 (JFK Doc.
002539 and 002962).
(210) Ibid.
(211) Id. at p. 34.
(212) Ibid.
(213) See Darn. 154, 157 and 158, of the HSCA staff report on the Warren
Commission.
(214) See ref. 209, p. 12.
(215) Id. at p. 104.
(216) Id. at p. 105.
(217) See para. 268 of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(218) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 103.
(219) Id. at p. 24.
(220) Id. at p. 61.
(221) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 164.
(222) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 72.
(223) Testimony of James R. Malley, September 20, 1978, 111 HSCA-JFK hearings,
444.
(224) See, e.g., infra para. 216-18.
(225) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy;
Performance of the/intelligence Agencies," book V, final report, Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence, 94th
Cong, 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 47
(S. Rept. 94-755) (hereinafter SSC, book V).
(226) Id. at p. 46.
(227) Ibid.
(228) See ref. 225, staff interview with William Sullivan, Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations, SSC, book V, pp. 78-79.
(229) Id. at p. 5.
(230) Id. at p. 85.
(231) Ibid.
(232) Ibid.
(233) See ref. 223, Malley testimony, p. 33.
(234) Id. at p. 41.
(235) Id. at p. 47.
(236) See ref. 223, p. 84.
(237) Ibid.
(238) Ibid.
(239) Ibid.
(240) Ibid.
(241) Memorandum of James H. Gale to Clyde Tolson, September 30, 1964, as quoted
in SSC, book V, p. 54 (see ref. 225).
(242) Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. September 21, 1978, 111 HSCAJFK
hearings, p. 50.
(243) Id. at p. 47.
(244) Ibid.
(245) Id. at p. 53.
(246) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 48.
(247) See para. 124, IlSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(248) Ibid., Darn. 114 and 115.
(249) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, p. 57.
(250) Id. at p. 31.
(251) Id. at p. 57.
(252) Ibid.
Page 469
469
(253) Ibid.
(254) Id. at p. 38-59.
(255) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, September 22, 1978, IV HSOA-JFK hearings,
31.
(256) Ibid., p. 2021.
(257) See para. 259, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(258) Ibid., para. 256.
(259) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, pp. 57-60.
(260) See Data. 257, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(261) Ibid., Data. 115
(262) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 29-30.
(263) Ibid.
(264) Id. at p. 149.
(265) See para. 183-187 and 137, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(266) See CE 3045, Warren Commission report.
(267) See CE 3146, Warren Commission report.
(268) Warren report, p. 324.
(269) Executive session testimony of Leon Brown, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 139 (JFK Doc. 008343).
(270) Id. at 138.
(271) Id. at 139.
(272) Ibid.
(273) Ibid.
(274) Id. at p. 141.
(275) Id. at p. 142.
(276) Id. at p. 144.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Id. at p. 143.
(279) Id. at p. 140.
(280) Id. at p. 144.
(281) Id. at p. 145.
(282) Ibid.
(283) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 133.
(284) Draft cover letter to a memorandum from Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin
to Richard M. Helms, "Jack Ruby--Background, Friends, and Other Pertinent
Information," Feb. 24, 1964 (JFK Doc. 001927).
(285) See ref. 284, attached routing slip.
(286) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 37.
(287) CIA internal memorandum for the record on CIA meeting with Leon D. Hubert
and Burt W. Griffin, Mar. 12. 1964.
(288) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, May 19, 1964.
(289) Memorandum from Thomas H. Karamessines to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 15, 1964.
(290) Letter from Burr W. Griffin to G. Robert Blakey, Nov. 23, 1978 (JFK :Doc.
003477 ).
(291) Ibid.
(292) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to John McCone, Director of Central
Intelligence, Feb. 12, 1964.
(293) Internal memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Mar. 3, 1964.
(294) Memorandum from Howard P. Willens to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 9, 1964.
(295) Ibid.
(296) Memorandum for the record, Mar. 12, 1964; letter from Rankin to Helms.
Mar. 16, 1964, see ref. 141.
(297) Memorandum from Samuel Stern to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964.
(298) See Warren Commission Doc. 674, National Archives.
(299) Warren Commission hearings, 129.
(300) CIA internal memorandum, Nov. 25, 1963, CIA item 173A.
(301) CIA internal memorandum, May 12, 1964, CIA item 298.
(302) Memorandum from David Slawson to Howard P. Willens, Feb. 21. 1964.
(303) Memorandum from David Slawson to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964.
(304) Ibid.
(305) See ref. 302.
(306) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 42-43.
(307) Ibid.
Page 470
470
(308) Executive session testimony of Robert Gemberling, p. 85.
(309) Ibid.
(310) Id. at p. 86.
(311) Ibid.
(312) Id. at p. 93.
(313) Ibid.
(314) Id. at p. 104.
(315) Ibid.
(316) Id. at p. 132.
(317) Id. at p. 104.
(318) Ibid.
(319) Id. at p. 107.
(320) Ibid.
(321) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 70.
(322) Id. at p. 74.
(323) Ibid.
(324) Id. at p. 70.
(325) Ibid., pp. 67-68, 73.
(326) See para. 363, IlSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(327) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 71.
(328) Ibid.
(329) Id. at p. 72.
(330) Id. at p. 73.
(331) Id. at p. 74.
(332) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 151, 172.
(333) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 178-9.
(334) Id. at p. 183.
(335) Memorandum from David Slawson to ff. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964.
(336) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 27.
(337) Ibid.
(338) Id. at p. 28.
(339) Ibid.
(340) Id. at p. 27.
(341) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 46.
(342) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 132.
(343) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 91.
(344) See ref. 242, Katzenbach testimony, p. 23.
(345) Id. at p. 19.
(346) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 28.
(347) See ref. 242 Katzenbach testimony, p. 20.
(348) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive testimony, p. 171.
(349) See tel. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 38-61.
Analysis of Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the Central
Intelligence Agency
Page 471
471
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE
WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(471)
Contents
Page 472
CONTENTS
Paragraph
I.
Foreword..................................................................................................................(1)
II. Organization of the CIA s investigation of President Kennedy's
assassination..................... (21)
III. The Warren Commission-CIA working
relationship............................................................(47)
A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA representatives regarding the
Warren Commission-CIA
relationship...............................................................(47)
B. The CIA's failure to disclose CIA anti Castro assassination plans to the
Warren
Commission..........................................................................................(60)
C. Agency's legal responsibility to protect sensitive sources and
methods-factors
affecting the CIA's response to Warren Commission
requests............................(69)
D. Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sensitive sources and
methods...................(88)
E. The photograph of an unidentified
individual......................................................(112)
F. Luisa
Calderon.....................................................................................................(133)
IV. Balance of the
evidence.....................................................................................................(163)
(472)
Foreword
Page 473
473
I. FORWORD
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) performance in providing support to
the Warren Commission has been a source of public concern during the past 15
years. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy
to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.
During 1976, these critics' assertions were the subject of official inquiry by
the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations (SSC). The SSC, in
its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," reached the following
findings:
The committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to
justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy.
The committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process by
which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the
assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission.
This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was
deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of
the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals
within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were
charged with investigating the assassination. (1)
(2) The committee sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of
the SSC. It particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether
the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed or withheld
information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren
Commission. In addition, the Committee attempted to determine whether, if the
Warren Commission were misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to
its investigation, it was because of conscious effort by the Agency or its
employees.
(3) In investigating this matter, the committee reviewed a 1977 task force
report by the CIA (1977 TFR).(2) This report was highly critical of the SSC's
findings pertaining to the AMLASH operation* and asserted that the SSC's Final
Report conveyed the mistaken impression that the CIA had made a limited effort
to assist the Warren Commission. The 1977 TFR disagreed with this
characterization and noted that the "CIA did seek and collect information in
support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and
submitted special analyses and reports." (4)
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(473)
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(4) In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to
the Warren Commission, the 1977 TFR. contained a coraprehensive listing of
CIA--generated material made available to both the U.S. intelligence community
and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In
this respect, the evidence supports the 1977 TFR, in which it is stated that:
This compilation [of CIA-generated material] is appropriate to consideration of
the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the
results of that effort. (5)
(5) In its examination of the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated
material, the committee followed the organization of these materials by the 1977
TFR. The 1977 TFR detailed four interrelated categories of Kennedy assassination
material:
(6) (1) Agency information disseminated to the intelligence community (formal
and informal disseminations);
(7) (2) Material disseminated to the Warren Commission;
(8) (3) Information disseminated to the FBI et al. regarding rumors and
allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination; and
(9) (4) Memorandum submitted by the CIA to the Warren Commission on rumors and
allegations relating to the President's assassination.
(10) In reviewing these categories, the committee concentrated its focus upon
those CIA materials that the 1977 TFR documented as having been made available
in written form to the Warren Commission.
(11) During the course of this study, additional Agency files were reviewed in
an effort to resolve certain issues that arose during the review of the 1977 TFR
materials. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files were
requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve those gaps. Where significant
substantive issues arose related to the kind and quality of information provided
the Warren Commission, files were requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve
those gaps. Where significant substantive issues arose related to the kind and
quality of information provided the Warrren Commission, files were requested and
reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. * In the end, approximately 30
files comprising an approximate total of 90 volumes of material, were examined
and analyzed in preparation of this staff report.
(12) The evidence set forth here must be qualified. During the course of the
past 15 years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to
the assassinat~on of President Kennedy. Certain documents requested by the
committee for study and analysis were not located. Whether these documents were
merely filed incorrectly or actually destroyed, gaps in the written record still
exist.
(13) Second, due to dissimilar standards with respect to the relevancy of
materials to the committee's investigation adopted by the CIA and the committee,
certain files requested by the committee for review were made available to the
committee in redacted form or were
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withheld.* The evidence collected in this staff report is based on the evidence
available to the committee, which might not have been all the relevant evidence
to which the Agency had access.
(14) Due consideration, moreover, must be given to the role that oral
discussions and briefings between the Warren Commission and representatives may
have played in the supply of assassination-related information. The subject and
substance of these discussions and briefings may not always be reflected by the
written record reviewed in this study. Consequently, the committee conducted
interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings with key Warren Commi.
ssion staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort
to resolve questions that were not addressed by the written record.
(15) This staff report examines the following subjects generated by the
committee's study in the following order:
(16) (1) The organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's
assassination;
(17) (2) The working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA
representatives concerned with Warren Commission inquiry;
(18) (3) The standards of investative cooperation that the Warren Commission
staff believed governed the quality and quantity of information supplied by the
CIA to the Commission
(19) (4) The CIA's responsibility for protection of its sensitive sources and
methods and the effects of the responsibility on the Warren Commission
investigation; and
(20) (5) The substance and quality of information concerning Luisa Calderon
passed on to the Warren Commission, the results of this committee's
investigation of Calderon and her significance to the events of November 22,
1963.
(21) The investigation by the committee of the CIA involved an extensive
analysis of some of its sensitive sources and methods. Because these sources and
methods are protected by law from unauthorized disclosure [see 505 U.S.C.
403(d)(3)], portions of this report have been written in a somewhat conclusory
manner designed to avoid referring explicitly to such sensitive sources and
methods. A classified staff report dealing explicitly with these sensitive
sources and methods is in the committee's files. (6)
Organization of the CIA's Investigation of President Kennedy's Assassination
Page 475
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CIA's INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION
(22) In his executive session testimony before the committee, Richard Helms, the
CIA's deputy director for plans during 1963, described the Agency's role in the
investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as follows:
(23) This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the
Federal Government was concerned, the
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primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation
without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely supportive in
the sense of what material we are [sic] able to acquire outside the limits of
the United States with reference to the investigation. * * * For investigative
purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all.
So when I used here the word "supportive,"I meant that in the literal sense of
the term. We are [sic] trying to support the FBI and support the Warren
Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any
investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to. (7)
(24) On November 23, 1963, Helms had called a meeting of senior level CIA
officials to outline the Agency's investigative responsibility via-a-via the
assassination. (8) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, a desk officer in the
Western Hemisphere Division and headquarter's Mexico branch chief, in charge of
the Agency's initial investigative efforts.* (9)
(25) Scelso testified before the committee that he was given charge of the
Agency's investigation on the basis of two considerations: (1) his prior
experience in conducting major CIA security investigations; and (2) the
observation of Oswald in Mexico (Scelso's headquarters responsibility) reported
to the CIA less than 2 months prior to the assassination. (13) Scelso also noted
that during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms did not pressure him
to adopt specific investigative theories nor reach conclusions within a set
period of time.**
(26) Scelso described in detail to the committee the manner in which he
conducted the Agency's investigation:
* * * practically my whole branch participated in the thing. We dropped almost
everything else and I put a lot of my officers to work in tracing names,
analyzing files.
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We were flooded with cable traffic, with reports, suggestions, allegations from
all over the world, and these things had to be checked out. We were checking out
just dozens and dozens of people all the time.(17)
(27) Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were
alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips
on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying
everybody participate in the investigation."(18) It was his recollection,
however, that throughout his tenure as coordinator of the Agency's
investigation, the Mexican branch was the only CIA unit directly involved in
investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination.* (19)
(28) Scelso effectively coordinated a voluminous flow of cable traffic related
to the assassination. During the first half of December, he issued a summary
report that described Oswald's activities in Mexico City from September 26,
1963, to October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete
by comparison to assassination related information then available to the FBI but
not provided to the CIA until late December 1963.**(20)
(29) Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted responsibility for the
CIA's investigation to the Counterintelligence Staff. (22) He testified that
this shift was a logical development because the investigation had begun to take
on broader tones. (23)
(30) Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca, chief of research and
analysis for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, who testified before the
Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part
by the establishment of the Warren Commission. (24) Rocca added:
(31) It was entirely appropriate in the [initial] phase that he [Scelso] would
have that [responsibility for the Agency investigation.] But the minute you had
a commission set up outside, the line obviously had to be the Director, and from
the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved
then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. [Scelso] being asked to sign off on
cables that had to do with [other international concerns,] and it would have
seemed to me utterly administratively simply a hybrid monster. (25)
(32) James Angleton, chief of the Counterintelligence Staff supported Rocca's
belief that "the spread [of investigative responsibility] involved... all of the
[CIA] divisions. Angleton testified to this committee that the Agency's efforts
to gather and coordinate information related to the assassination underwent a
metamorphic transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy
Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached the Warren Commission's
requirements
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piecemeal fashion. Eventually Angleton testified, the Agency was able to focus
its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide
a system for the central referencing of assassination-related information as
such information was developed. (26)
(33) The record reveals that during this second phase of CIA information
collection efforts in support of the Warren Commission investigation, the
concentration of Agency resources slurred in emphasis from exploration of
Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency in the Soviet Union during
1959-60, and possible association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. (27)
Rocca commented that during this phase, primary interest in support of the
Warren Commission was to pursue Soviet leads:
* * * on the assumption that a person who spends four years * in the Soviet
Union, under his circumstances, had to specific interest to Soviet State
security and their collateral authorities. (28)
(34) Rocca concluded that the areas on which the CIA tended to concentrate
concerned the Soviets:
(35) * * * because the people he [Oswald] was in touch with in Mexico had
traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and
obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in
those earlier contacts. (29)
(36) Nevertheless, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA
investigation were not ignored "because there was a lot of material that came
through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." (30)
(37) Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement was a source
of deep concern within the Agency. (31) He added, however, that development of
information pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation in the
assassination was very difficult to obtain. (32)
(38) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second
phase of the Agency's effort the CIA concentrated its resources on exploring
possible Soviet influence on Oswald. (33) He indicated that in part, this simply
reflected inadequate CIA resources:
(39) I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not
have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication [of the Cuban aspect]. I
don't think the capabilities were there. (34)
(40) As noted above, the counterintelligence Staff was given responsibility in
late December 1963-early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to
assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca
was designated point of contact with the Commission.(35) Rocca's research and
analysis component was concerned with:
(41) analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant all source, all
overt source comprehension; a study of cases
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that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is, closed cases, to
maintain the ongoing record of overall qualiy and quantity of
counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component; * *
* the Deputy Director for Plans. (26)
(42) Rocca testified that assassination-related information generated by CIA
components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the
Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day-to-day work.(37)
This information was then reviewed by Rocca or his assistants, who included
[Agency employee] (Soviet Expert), [Agency employee] (general research and
document search man for the U.S. intelligence community and its resources), and
[Agency employee] (who had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of years
prior to the assassination).(38) During the course of the Warren Commission
investigation, [this group] worked with those CIA divisions that were producing
substantive information related to the assassination.(39) Rocca and his group
effectively coordinated the large volume of cable traffic available to them
pertaining to the assassination.
(43) Rocca testified that even though the Counterintelligence/Research and
Analysis Unit was the Agency's point of reference with regard to the Warren
Commission, neither his staff nor the counterintelligence staff in general
displaced the direct relations of Helms or any other concerned Agency official
with the Warren Commission. (40) Rocca indicated that in some instances J. Lee
Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests; in
other instances, David Slawson, a Commission staff counsel, conferred directly
with [Agency employee] of Rocca's staff.* (41)
(44) The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensitivity Rocca
was not permitted to act as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren
Commission. He testified that "compartmentalization was observed notwithstanding
the fact that I was the working level point of contact."(44) Rocca cited by way
of example the case of the Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. Rocca testified that he
did not attend any of the Agency discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case. (25)
Rather, responsibility for the case was assigned to the Chief of Soviet Russian
Division, in addition to He]ms.
(45) Rocca described the counterintelligence Staff mail intercept program,
HT-Lingual, as a second example of an Agency matter about which he had no
knowledge nor input vis-a-vis the Agency's support role to the Warren
Commission. (47) Rather, Augleton and [Agency employee] handled the disposition
of this particular material. (48)
(46) In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally decentralized
information reporting function, coordinated by the
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Counterintelligence staff, best characterized the organization of this second
phase of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist the Warren Commission.(49)
The Warren Commission-CIA Working Relationship
Page 480
III. THE WARREN COMMISSION-CIA WORKING RELATIONSHIP
A. OPINIONS OF WARREN COMMISSION AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING THE WARREN
COMMISSION-CIA RELATIONSHIP
(47) The Warren Commission was created on November 29, 1963, by Executive Order
No. 11130. Pursuant to that order, the Commission was in part empowered "* * *
to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assassination * *
*." In addition, the order made clear that "all executive departments and
agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services
and cooperation as it may request from time to time."
(48) The committee contacted both members of the Warren Commission staff and
those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing,
CIA-generated information to the Commission. The general consensus of these
people was that the Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working
relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation.(50) William
Colenman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely
with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters that involved
the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as
highly competent, cooperative and intelligent.(51) Slawson expressed a similar
opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (52)
(49) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that
the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency
would cooperate in the Commission's work. (53) John McCone, Director of Central
Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the
Warren Commission's investigation, supported Rankin's testimony in this regard
by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both
responsive and comprehensive. (54) (McCone had been responsible for insuring
that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA. to the Commission.) (55)
McCone testified that:
(50) The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we
had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him
down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and
stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to
which we were giving him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think
he was quite satisfied. (56)
(51) Rocca likewise characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to
the Commission. He stated under oath that Helms had given the following
directive:
(52) All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren
Commission should be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued
very, very
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strictly worded instructions--they were verbal in so far as know--that we were
to leave no stone unturned. (57)
(53) Rocca added that to his knowledge, Helms orders were followed to the letter
by all CIA employees. (58) He concluded that on this basis "the CIA was to turn
over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be
of assistance to the Warren Commission? (59)
(54) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's
information to the Commission was offered by Helms. Helms, who served as the
CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation, was
directly responsible for the Agency's investigation of President, Kennedy's
assassination and the establishment of CIA policy vis-vis the Warren Commission.
(60) He testified to the committee that the CIA made every effort to be as
responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (61) He added further
details regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the
Commission:
(55) An inquiry would come over [from the Warren Commission]. We would attempt
to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as
individual items * * * Each individual item that came along we took care of as
best we could. (62)
(56) It was Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren
Commission primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. He
said:
STAFF COUNCIL. In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren
Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren
Commission?
Mr. HELMS. That is correct.
I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible. There may have been
times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but
my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to
the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to
them.
As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of
whether we volunteered it or not. (63)
(57) Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a
case-by-case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to
the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to Rankin's perception of the
CIA's investigative responsibility. Rankin was asked by staff counsel whether he
was under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond
to questions addressed it by the Warren Commission. In response, Rankin
testified:
(58) Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the
Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement
because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the
information and that would be absurd. (64)
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(59) Slawson supported Rankin's position, testifying that Warren Commission
requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that
they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (65)
B. THE CIA'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CIA ANTI-CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS TO THE
WARREN COMMISSION
(60) An unfortunate consequence of the Warren Commission's reliance on the CIA
to provide the Commission with all relevant material is reflected in the
subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots and the
Agency's failure to provide this information. (66) Rocca indicated that he had
no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency
efforts to assassinate Castro. (67) Consequently, he was not in position to
communicate this information.
(61) The record also reveals that the CIA desk officer to whom Helms initially
gave the responsibility to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination
of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investigation.
(68) Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots, the
following actions would have been taken:
(62) We would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent
(AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best
operative security had to see if he had [sic] been a double-agent informing
Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban
sources queried about it. (69)
(63) As the record reflects, these plots were known to few within the CIA. Mr.
Helms' testimony regarding these plots reveals that some Agency employees
compromised the policy of its Director to supply all relevant information to the
Warren Commission. The following exchange between committee counsel and Helms
illustrates the extent of the Agency's compromise:
STAFF COUNSEL. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is
that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's
work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why
the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination
plots.
Mr. HELMS. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about
our operations.
STAFF COUNSEL. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it
certainly was not in g position to ask you about it.
Is that not true?
Mr. HELMS. Yes: but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know
Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the
Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the
Warren Commission or to Congressional
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Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission.
STAFF COUNSEL. Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren
Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?
Mr. HELMS. I did not, as far as I recall. (70)
(64) McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's antiCastro
assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963.* He stated that
upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such
activities. (75) When asked whether the CIA desired to withhold information from
the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid
embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crisis, he gave the
following response:
(65) I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the
continuance of such plots) withheld the informotion from me. I cannot answer
that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the
information from me.(76)
(66) Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work
Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson, and Specter were in agreement that
such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission.(77)
(67) Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots,
his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against
president Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified.
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He stated that: "a completely different procedural approach probably would and
should have been taken? (78)
(68) Scelso offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' nondisclosure to the
Warren Commission:
STAFF COUNSEL. Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell
the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?
Mr. SCELSO. No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he
cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of
professional public service. (79)
C. AGENCY'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS--FACTORS AFFECTING THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMISSION REQUESTS
(69) The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the
Warren-Commission's request for information was dependent on (1) the
availability of information; (2) the complexity of the issues involved in the
request; and (3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon
sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Helms testified that
when the CIA was able to satisfy a Commission request, it would send a reply
back. With respect to timing:
(70) ... some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.
For example, some might involve checking aI file which in Washington. Other
inquiries might involve trying fo see if we could locate somebody in some
overseas country.
Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (80)
(71) Under law, the Director of Central Intelligence has always been required to
protect sensitive sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ([50 U.S.C..
403 (d) (3) ] ). As a result of this responsibility, in some instances the
Agency initially limited access by the Commission to CIA original source
materials. (81) J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that on occasion, the
Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods affected the
quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were
given access. (82)
(72) The committee was fully aware that traditional intelligence reporting
procedures do not normally include revealing sources and methods. Moreover,
Federal law obligates the CIA to protect. its sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Had the Warren Commission investigation been conducted
under normal conditions, revealing sources and methods would not have been
expected, much less required. Nevertheless, it may be argued because the
circumstances of this investigation were extraordinary, no possible source of
relevant evidence should have been considered an unauthorized disclosure.
(73) The committee identified two related areas of concern in which the Agency's
desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods may have impeded the Warren
Commission's investigation. These were:
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(74) --- Initially not providing the Commission with original source materials
pertaining to Oswald's trip to Mexico;
(75) --- The Agency's reluctance to reveal the origin of a photograph an
unidentified man who had mistakenly been linked to Oswald.
(76) The CIA's concern over revealing the existence of sensitive sources and
methods was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Scelso
commented that "we are not authorized at first to reveal all our [sensitive]
operations."(83) He did, however, testify that:
(77) We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our
sources, including [sensitive] sources, including the [sensitive sources] and
the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia. Duran, for example,
which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [sensitive
sources]. (84)
(78) Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to
the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission, dated January 31,
1964 regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (85) Much of the information
provided to the Warren Commission in tiffs report was based on sensitive sources
and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the
report.
(79) The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and
methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was
sent from CIA headquarters to a [foreign country] station. The cable stated:
(80) Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to
eliminate mention of [sensitive sources and methods] in order to protect [* * *]
continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents
of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave [State Department]. (86)
(81) The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963, cable, as it
specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI, is also set forth in a
CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (87) In that memorandum, [an Agency
employee] of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Special Investigations Group,
wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the
FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the
FBI's materials which supported or complemented the FBI's five volume report of
December 9, 1963, that had been submitted to the Warren Commission Agency
employee with this report, which indicated that some U.S. agency was conducting
a sensitive operation abroad and asked him whether the FBI could supply the
Warren Commission with the source of this operation. The [Agency employee]
memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion
with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to
the Warren Commission. The [Agency employee] then made the following notation
regarding sensitive sources and methods:
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486
(82) He [Scelso] was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available
to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI--sensitive information
winch could relate to sensitive sources and methods * * * [The] Agency desired
to establish some other policy with regard to meeting the needs of the
Commission.* (88)
(83) The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and
methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29,
1964, sent from CIA headquarters to a CIA [unit]. (91) This cable indicated that
knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the
Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to
present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission
that would be in a form protective of the CIA sources and techniques.(92)
(84) On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission. It is likely
that he discussed the CIA memorandum to the Warren Commission of January 31,
1964.** (93) On February 10, 1964, Rankin wrote Helms in regard to that CIA
memorandum.(94) A review of Rankin's letter indicates that as of his writing,
the Warren Commission had no information pertaining to CIA's [sensitive sources
and methods] that had generated the information on Oswald.
(85) Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964, letter whether Oswald's direct
communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City (as seated in
paragraph 1 of the January 31 memorandum) had been obtained by [sensitive source
and methods] or by interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been
informed of
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the sensitive source and method, this inquiry by Rankin would not have been
made.
(86) Nevertheless, it was Rocca's recollection that during the time period of
January 1964-April 1964, Warren Commission representatives had visited the CIA's
headquarters in Langley, Va., and had been shown the original source materials
derived from sensitive CIA sources and methods.(95) Rocca, however, did not
personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was
not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren
Commission first learned of these operations. (96)
(87) On February 19, 1964, the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10.
(97) The Agency response indicated that Oswald had contacted the Soviet
consulate and was also interviewed at the consulate. Nevertheless, the Agency
still did not explicitly reveal the source of this information.(98)
D. WARREN COMMISSION KNOWLEDGE OF CIA SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
(88) During the period of March-April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of
memorandums that, among other issues, concerned Warren Commission knowledge of
and access to the material derived from relevant CIA sensitive operations. CIA
headquarters had obtained the raw data generated by these sensitive operations
almost immediately after the assassination.(99) A review of these memorandums
tends to support the belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson,
Coleman and Willens, did not obtain access to CIA [original source] materials
until April 9, 1964. (100) On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with a
CIA [representative] who provided them with [raw data] derived from [sensitive
operations].* (89) It appears doubtful that the Commission had been given direct
access to this material prior to April 9. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the
record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware of the CIA
[sensitive operations] that had generated information concerning Oswald.(102)
Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned
that the CIA possessed information concerning conversations between the Cuban
Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and Cuban President Dorticos.** The
Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives
at a March 12 meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned
Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police.(104)
Helms responded to the Commission's request for access that he would attempt to
arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material.
(105)
(90) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964, concerned Oswald's trip
to Mexico. Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached
concerning Oswald's Mexico trip were derived
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from CIA memorandums of January 31, 1964, and February 19, 1964, and, in
addition, a Mexican Federal Police summary of interrogations with Silvia Duran,
her brother Ruben, husband Horacio, and a handfull of friends, conducted shortly
after the assassination. (106)
(91) Slawson said:
A large part of it [the summary report] is simply a summation of what the
Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of
the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only is accurate as Mrs.
Duran's testimony to the police. (107)
(92) These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance on the
Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been
provided the [raw data] pertaining to Duran that had been obtained by means of
[sensitive CIA sour's and methods]. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments
concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission
as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to
Silvia Duran. As Slawson revealed, the Commission had been forced to rely upon
the two memoranda that did not make reference to the [sensitive operations], and
a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had for
over 3 months precluded exposing [raw data] generated by its [sensitive
operations] to the actual review and analysis of the Warren Commission. (108)
(93) The evidence indicates that Slawson had not been given access to the [raw
data] pertaining to Duran that had been generated by CIA [sensitive operations.]
This is further suppored by his memorandum of March 27, 1964, in which he states
his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy at least twice and
probably on three occasions. (109) This conclusion, he again wrote, was based
upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This
memorandum bears no indication that he had reviewed any [raw data] pertaining to
this issue.
(94) The record supports the judgment that as of April 2, 1964, the Warren
Commission, although aware of their existence had still not been given access to
the above-referenced series of [original source materials]. A memorandum of that
date by Coleman and Slawson posed one quedion to the CIA and made two requests
for information from the Agency: (110)
(95) (1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram
that Oswald intended to settle down Odessa;
(96) (2) We would like to see copies of the [raw data] in all cases where the
[raw data] refer to the assassination of related subjects;
(97) (3) We would especially like to see the [raw data] in which the allegation
that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed.(111)
(98) The question initially posed by (item 1) in the above-referenced memorandum
of April 2 concerns a [sensitive CIA operation].(112) Obviously, if Slawson
found it necessary to request the source of the
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information, he had not as yet been provided access to the original material by
the CIA.
(99) Item No. 2 of the above listing tends to show that the Commission had not
been given access to certain [sensitive raw data] concerning the assassination.
(300)
(100) Item. No. 3 of the above listing reveals that the [sensitive raw data]
pertaining to the Dorticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the
passing of moneys was discussed, had not, as of April 2, been provided to the
Commission, despite the Commission's having specifically requested this
information at a March 12, 1964, meeting between Commission representatives and
Agency representatives. (113)
(101) On April 3, 1964 Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern about getting
complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:
(102) The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's
activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of
trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.
(103) * * * In order to make such a judgement (that all reasonable lines of
investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible
conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become
familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory
agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation,
if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.
[Emphasis added.](114)
(104) Nevertheless, as the record tends to show, Coleman's and Slawson's desire
for a thorough investigation was subject to the limitations imposed by the CIA's
concern for protecting its sources and methods from disclosure. Given the
gravity and significance of the Warren Commission's investigation, the Agency's
initial withholding of original source material from the Commission staff may
have impeded its ability to reach accurately reasoned conclusions with respect
to Oswald's activities while in Mexico City.
(105) On April 8, 1964, Slawson, Willens, and Coleman flew to Mexico City,
Mexico, to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and
the Government of Mexico.(115) The group was met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman.
Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clark Anderson of the FBI and a [CIA
representative]. (116) That same day, the [CIA representative] made available
the [raw data] concerning Oswald and Duran that the Agency had [collected].
(117) In addition, he provided the group with photographs for the time period
covered by Oswald's visit. (118) David Slawson wrote:
(106) * * * The [CIA representative] stated at the beginning of his narrative
that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the
sources of Iris information, and that he understood that all three of us had
been cleared for Top Secret and that we would not disclose beyond the
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confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained
through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We
agreed to this.(119)
(107) [CIA representative] described to the Commission staff members the CIA's
course of action directly following the assassination, indicating that his staff
immediately began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran and everyone else
throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald. (120) He
revealed that all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had quickly been
put under surveillance. Slawson concluded:
(108) The [CIA representative's] narrative plus the material we were shown
disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on
Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican (sic) Embassies.* Apparently the
distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had
entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown
by the [CIA representative] was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We
had previously planned to show the [CIA representative] Slawsons reconstruction
of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get the [CIA
representative's] opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information
was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to
take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later
time during our visit.(121)**
(109) It may be that the "informational distortions" that Slawson notes were
merely the product of Slawson's mistaken analysis of the CIA material provided
to him. The record does reflect that Slawson had reviewed the CIA's January 31
memorandum that accurately summarized all of the [raw data] in question. (123)
Nevertheless, is the result of his direct review of the active [raw data]
derived from the original source material, Slawson was able to clarify
substantially his analysis of Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. (124)
(110) It may be argued therefore that the CIA's reluctance to provide the Warren
Commission with its original source material may have hampered the efficiency of
the Commission's investigation of Oswald's Mexico City activities. In the
process, the CIA's reluctance conflicted with President Johnson's Executive
order that the executive agencies:
(111) * * * furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and
cooperation as it may request from time to time.(125)
E. THE PHOTOGRAPH OF AN UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL
(112) On November 23, 1963, an FBI Special Agent showed guerite Oswald a
photograph of a man. (126) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on
November 22 by the CIA. (127) It had
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been obtained in early October 1963 and at that time had been linked by some
[Agency employees] to Lee Harvey Oswald. (128) The subject of the photograph,
however, bore no resemblance to Lee Harvey Oswald.
(113) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren
Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the
photograph. (129) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to
have been of Jack Ruby. (130)
(114) Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas
Karramesines, assistant deputy director for plans (DDP), requesting both the
identity of the individual in the photograph and an explanation of the
circumstances by which the photograph had been obtained by CIA. (131)
(115) On that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to McCone regarding
materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963, to the Secret
Service, but not to the Warren Commission. He requested copies of these
materials, which included three CIA cables concerning the photograph of the
individual originally identified by some [Agency employees] as Lee Harvey Oswald
and thereafter shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother. (132)
(116) John Scelso testified about the reasons why the CIA did not explain to the
Commission the origin of the photograph:
(117) We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our
[sensitive] operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them
that we had [such operations] because the November photo we had [of the
unidentified man] was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you
see? (133)
STAFF COUNSEL * * * So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was
not relevant to the Warren Commission. (134)
Mr. SCELSO. Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our
[sensitive] operations. (135)
(118) On March 5, 1964, Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Helms that "we
have a problem here for your determination." (136) Rocca first outlined
Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12
regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,
1964.(137) Rocca then stated:
(119) "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on
the matter covered by paragraph 2 [of the above-referenced February 12 letter to
McCone requesting access to CIA reports provided the Secret Service after
November 22, 1963]. If they come back on this point he feels that you, or
someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the
material rather than pass it to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items
are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance
to the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted
leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald ...".
(138)
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(120) On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA
conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the
Secret Service by the Agency. (139) The record indicates that the Commission at
the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. (14O)
Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA
would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication
pertaining to the Secret Service materials
with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and
confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working
in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give
assurance that the paraphrases are complete. (141)
(121) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed
regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963,
which had not as yet been furnished Because it concerned sensitive sources and
methods. (142)
(122) Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 with two separate
communications. (143) The initial letter of response provided the Commission
with a copy of the October 10, 1963, CIA dissemination to the FBI, State
Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Navy Department (and to
the Secret Service on November 22) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence
at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response revealed that on October
23, 1963, the CIA had requested from the Navy two copies of the most recent
photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity the person believed to be
Oswald in Mexico City.(144) The CIA stated that it had determined at some
unspecified time that the photograph earlier obtained by a [sensitive source] *
and shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963, was not Lee Harvey
Oswald.(145) The Agency explained that it had checked the photograph against the
press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 1963. (146)
(123) The second letter from Helms revealed that on November 23 1963,
immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled
reports were received at CIA headquarters regarding photographs of an
unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October
and November 1963.(147) Paraphrases of these cables, which did not reveal
sensitive sources and methods, were attached to the second letter.(148) The
Agency wrote that the subject of the photograph referenced in these cables was
not Oswald. It was further stated that:
(124) In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, we will
arrange for Mr. Stern and Mr. Willens to review at Langley the original copies
of these three disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they
were based, as well as the photographs of the unidentified man. (149)
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(125) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:
(126) The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No.
631 ) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey
Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry
to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I know that the complete answers will give
us the additional information we requested. (150)
Coleman went on to state:
As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which
the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that
paragraph 4* of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 [CD 631] sent Mr. Rankin by the
CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry. (151)
(127) The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency
representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited headquarters in Langley,
Va. (152)
(128) Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file
with Rocca.(153) Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials
furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. (154) The file also
contained:
(129) Cable reports from the CIA of November 22 and 23, 1963, of a person who
had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November [sic]
1963; and reports on these cables furnished on November 23, 1963 by CIA to the
Secret Service. (155)
(130) Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the
attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. (156)
Stern also reviewed the October 9, 1963, cable from a CIA unit to CIA
headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
(157) In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA
headquartersjhkjh¢ reporting background information on Oswald.(158) Stern
recorded that these messages were accurately reported in the CIA's January 31
memorandum to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. (159)
(131) Last, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer
printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's
electronic data storage system. (160) He stated "there is no item listed [ . . .
] which we [the Warren Commission] have not been given either in full text or
paraphrased." (161)
(132) Thus, by March 27, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of
the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.**
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F. LUISA CALDERON CARRALERO
(133) The committee devoted considerable attention to the following memorandum
that was obtained as a result of a review of the Oswald file:(163)
(134) Subject: Comments of Luisa Calderon Carralero
1. A reliable source reported that on 22 November 1963, several hours after the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Luisa Calderon Carralero, a Cuban
employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be a member of the
Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), discussed news of the
assassination with an acquaintance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the
latest news, Calderon replied, in what appeared to be g joking manner, "Yes, of
course I knew almost before Kennedy."
2. After further discussion of the news accounts about the assassination, the
acquaintance asked Calderon what else she had learned. Calderon replied that
they [assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy] learned about it a
little while ago. (135) Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission
request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy, wrote regarding Calderon's comments:
(136) Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This
is the only item in the [sensitive operation] coverage of the Cubans and Soviets
after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or
expectation.* (165)
(137) Standing by themselves, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments may not have
merited serious attention. Her words may indeed have indicated foreknowledge of
the assassination but may equally be interpreted without such a sinister
implication. Nevertheless, the committee determined that Luisa Calderson's case
merited serious attention in the months following the assassination.
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(138) Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced in connection with the assassination,
on November 27, 1963, in a cable sent by then-Ambassador Mann to the State
Department. (166)
(139) In that cable, Mann stated:
. . . Washington should urgently consider feasibility of questing Mexican
authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and
Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers.
Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here. (167)
(140) This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon.1 Nevertheless,
the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page.
That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann for Sec. Rusk re:... persons involved
with Oswald in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent terms:"They may
all quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that
Mexican government could use them as witnesses." (169)
(141) According to CIA files, Calderon made reservations to return to Havana on
Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than 4 weeks after the assassination.
(170)
(142) Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning
by the Mexican Federal Police.2 Nevertheless, Silvia Duran, a friend and
associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact
with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the
Mexican police on two separate occasions.
(143) During her second interrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her
association with Calderon. There is no indication in the reinterrogation report
accounting for the questioning of Duran about Calderon. (173) The information
regarding Duran's interrogation was passed by CIA to the Warren Commission on
February 21, 1964, more than 2 months after Calderon had returned to Cuba. (174)
(144) During May 1964, information from a Cuban defector tying Luisa Calderon to
the Cuban Intelligence apparatus was reported to the CIA. The defector, [A-h],
was himself a Cuban intelligence officer who supplied valuable and highly
reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban intelligence operations. (175)
At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special
Affairs Stafff, 3 reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector,
[A-1]. Langosch's memorandum stated that [A-I] had no direct knowledge of Lee
Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based
upon the comments of certain Cuban intelligence service officers. (176)
Specifically, [A-1] was asked if Oswald was known
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to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. [A-l] told
Langosch:
Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or
three occasions. Before, during; and after these visits, Oswald was in contact
with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa
Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. (177)
(145) Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI
was not clear. As a comment on this statement, he set forth the CIA cable and
dispatch traffic that recorded her arrival Mexico during January 1963 and
departure for Cuba within 1 month after the assassination.(178)
(146) On May 7, 1964 Langosch recorded additional information had elicited from
[A-1] regarding Oswalds possible contact with the DGI. (179) Paragraph 3 of this
memorandum; stated in part:
(147) a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba has been paid a regular
salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in
the Vedado section where the rents are high. b. Source [A-1] has known Calderon
for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of
Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empresa
Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the
department named in the previous sentence. (180)
(148) On May 8, Langosch further disclosed [A-1's] knowledge of the Oswald case.
(181) He paraphrased [A-1] knowledge of Calderon as follows:
(149) I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I
learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she
had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer
was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed
strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she
apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that
hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been
recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro,
the Head of the DGI, did not agree. I recall, (the case officer) had
investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico
the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER
(phonetic) or something similar. As you -know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon
names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by [the
Cuban case officer] should be spelled. It could have been "Howard'; or something
different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love
letter but indicated that there was a clandestine professional relationship
between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer)
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that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the
company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald .... (182)
(150) On May 11, 1964, Rocca wrote a memorandum to Helms regarding the
information Langosch had elicited from [A-1].(183) Rocca proposed that:
The DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the [A-1]
situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience
either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place,
it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (184)
(151) On May 15, 1964 Helms wrote Rankin regarding [A-1s] information about the
DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (185) Attached to
Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5
memorandum.(186) In that attachment, the intelligence associations of two Cuban
diplomatic employees, Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez, were set forth.
Nevertheless, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.
(152) Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested, as a followup to the
May 15 memorandum access to the questions used in Langosch's interrogation of
[A-1].(187) On June 18, 1964, an [agency employee] of Rocca's
Counterintelligence Research and Analysis Group took the questions and [A-1's]
responses to the Warren Commission's office for Willens' review. The only
mention of Calderon Willens found in the May 5 memorandum was as follows: "The
precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about
six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964:."(188)
Willens was not shown Langosch's memoranda of May 7 and May 8, 1964, that
contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including [A-1's]
report of her possible association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American
intelligence.* (189)
(153) The evidence indicates that the CIA did not provide a report of Calderon's
conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission. Consequently, even though
the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon reportedly had connections to
intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between
her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission
by the CIA. The agency's omission in this regard may have foreclosed the
Commission's actively pursuing a lead of
great significance.
(154) In an effort to determine the manner in which the CIA treated the Calderon
conversation, this committee posed the following questions to the CIA:
(155) 1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever
given access to the [raw data] of Calderon's
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conversation dated November 22, 1963? . . . If so, please indicate when this
report was provided to the Warren Commission or its staff, which CIA official
provided it, and which Warren Commission members staff reviewed it.
(156) 2. Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any
Warren Commission staff member ever informed orally or in writing of the
substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so,
please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which
CIA official provided it.(190)
(157) The CIA responded by memodandum:
Although the Mexican unit] considered the conversation of sufficient possible
interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with
it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may
have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing
information provided by the agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret
classification does not reveal whether the conversation was given or shown to
the Commission.* (191)
(158) The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren
Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could
evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President
Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided with
this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and
her comments following the assassination, it may well have given more serious
investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban
Government's possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy.
(159) Two difficult issues remain that were raised by the evidence. First, why
did the Agency not provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission?
Second, why did the Agency not reveal to the Warren Commission its full
knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of
Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA?
(160) The first question can be explained in neutral terms. It is reasonably
possible that by sheer oversight, the report of conversation was filed away and
not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its
investigation and published its report.**
(161) As for the Agency's failure to provide information concerning Calderon's
intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was rarely
informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI.(193) The memoranda
that provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not
made available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum
written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of [A-1] indicated that
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[A-1] and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Calderon to be a CIA
operative. (194) Nevertheless the evidence would seem to indicate that this
information was not provided the Warren Commission because there was no basis in
fact for the allegation.
(162) The committee sought to determine whether Calderon had any possible
association with the CIA. Agency files reviewed and interviews with Agency
personnel reveal no connection between Calderon and the CIA.(195)
Balance of the Evidence
Page 499
IV. BALANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
(163) As this staff report indicates, the Warren Commission and the CIA
struggled with serious issues bearing on President Kennedy's assassination and
the protection of national security. In most, instances, the evidence indicates
that the CIA acted in a responsible and professional manner. Nevertheless, the
evidence does show at least three separate instances of deficiencies in the
reporting of information to the Warren Commission. (164) The first instance--the
Agency's failure to report the anti-Castro assassination plots to the Warren
Commission has been explained in terms of the Commission's failure to request
this information (implicit in this logic is the argument that the plots were not
relevant to the Commission's investigation). The evidence, however, shows that
these plots were in fact highly relevant and should, therefore, have been
reported to the Warren Commission. Moreover, as the Commission was apparently
unaware of the plots, it presumably was not in a position specifically to
request this kind of information.
(165) The second instance--stemming from the CIA's legal responsibility to
protect its sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure resulted in delayed
access by Warren Commission staff members to original source materials. Although
the CIA exhibited high standards in reporting to the Warren Commission
information derived from sensitive sources and methods, the evidence indicates
that the Commission's investigation might have been added had such sources and
techniques been directly available.
(166) Finally, the evidence shows that Luisa Calderon;s comments expressing
possible foreknowledge of President Kennedy assassination should have been
reported to the Warren Commission. Her known association with Cuban diplomatic
personnel in Mexico City and reported association with the DGI add to the force
of the facts. Had her comments been reported to the Warren Commission, they
might have merited the Commission's serious attention. In this regard, the
Commission did not have the opportunity to make its own judgement.
Submitted by:
CHARLES M. BURKE,
Research Attorney
References
Page 499
REFERENCES
(1) The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, book V, final report, Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence, 94th
Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976),
pp. 6-7 (Senate Report 94-755) (hereinafter cited as SSC, book V).
Page 500
500
(2) CIA Classified Document 1977 Task Force Report, Introduction to tab E
(hereinafter cited as 1977 TFR).
(3) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, pp. 67-75.
(4) See ref. 2, 1977 TFR.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Classified Staff Report, "HSCA Investigation of CIA Support to the Warren
Commission," Dec. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
classified document 015036).
(7) Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations. pp. 17-18 (JFK classified document 014719)
(hereinafter Helms Executive Session Testimony).
(8) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, p. 25.
(9) Deposition of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, House Select Committee of
Assassinations, pp. 111-112 (JFK classified document 014728) (hereinafter Scelso
Deposition): see ref. 6, Helms Executive Session Testimony, p. 10.
(10) Deposition of [Agency Employee], June 20, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 7 and 52 (JFK classified document 014735); see ref. 9,
Scelso Deposition, p. 80.
(11) Id. at p. 52.
(12) Id. at pp. 52-53.
(13) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, p. 25; see ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, pp. 111-112.
(14) See ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, p. 112.
(15) Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK classified document 014718 ) (hereinafter Rocca,
Deposition).
(16) Ibid.
(17) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 131.
(18) Id. at p. 133.
(19) Id. at p. 134.
(20) Id. at pp. 114-115; CIA report by John Scelso to chief/counterintelligence,
Dec. 13, 1963.
(21) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 114.
(22) Ibid., Scelso deposition, p. 136; see also ref. 15, Rocca deposition, in
which Rocca stated that responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI staff on
January 12, 1964.
(23) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 14; see also Scelso
deposition. p. 138.
(24) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 12-13.
(25) Id. at p. 12.
(26) Deposition of James Angleton, Oct. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 76-77 (JFK classified document 014720 (hereinafter Angleton
deposition); see a]so ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 23.
(27) Id. at pp. 32-33 and 44: see ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p.
23.
(28) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 32-33.
(29) Id. at p. 33.
(30) Id. at p. 44.
(31) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 21.
(32) Id. at p. 138.
(33) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 86.
(34) Id. at p. 93.
(35) Ibid.
(36) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 7; see also ref. 26, Angleton deposition,
p. 77.
(37) Id. at pp. 16-17.
(38) Id. at p. 17.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.; Rocca testified that neither CI staff nor his staff displaced the
CIA's Soviet Division (represented by [Agency employee] Chief of the Soviet
Russian division and his assistant, [Agency employee] in its contact with the
Commission; nor did counterintelligence/research and analysis displace Scelso in
his contact with the Warren Commission).
(41) Id. at p. 36.
(42) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 17-18. See ref. 26, Angleton deposition,
p. 78.
Page 501
501
(43) Id. at p. 81.
(44) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Id. at pp. 19-20.
(48) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 113, in which Scelso stated that counter
Intelligence staff, including [Agency employee], was repository of HT-Lingual
intercepts; but see also deposition of [Agency employee], HSCA, July 20, 1978,
pp. 83-84 (JFK classified document 014735), in which [Agency employee] stated
that he did not know whether the Warren Commission had knowledge of the
HT-Lingual program because it was not his responsibility to provide the
Commission with material derived from the HT-Lingual program.
(49) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 10; ref. 26, Angleton deposition, pp. 75,
80; see also CIA document, Raymond Rocca memorandum for the record, April 1,
1975, re: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1, 1975; in which it is stated
that Helms remained the senior official in charge of the overall investigation,
with counterintelligence staff acting as a coordinator and depository of
information collected.
(50) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18; see also ref. 6, Helms executive
session testimony, pp. 9 and 24.
(51) Staff interview of William Coleman, Aug. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations.
(52) Executive session testimony of W. David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (JFK document 008625) (hereinafter
Slawson executive session testimony); see also JFK exhibit 23, hearings before
the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol.
p. 190 (herein after HSCA-JFK hearings).
(53) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 7, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Classified Document 014874) (hereinafter Rankin
Deposition); see also deposition of John McCone, August 17, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK Classified Document 014729) (hereinafter
McCone deposition ).
(54) See ref. 53, McCone deposition, p. 5.
(55) Id. at pp. 5-6.
(56) Id. at p. 9.
(57) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 14.
(58) Id. at p. 24.
(59) Id. at p. 26.
(60) Id. at p. 23.
(61) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 10.
(62) Id. at pp. 10-11.
(63) Id. at p. 34.
(64) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, p. 4.
(65) See ref. 52, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 29.
(66) See ref. 1, SSC, book V; see also Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Operations, S. Rep. No. 94-465, 94th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 (hereinafter cited as
SSC. Alleged Plots).
(67) See ref. 15, Rocca, p. 50.
(68) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, pp. 73 and 142-143.
(69) Id. at p. 166.
(70) See ref. 6. Helms executive session testimony, pp. 30-31.
(71) Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana,
from Richard Helms. August 16, 1963, in SSC Alleged Plots, p. 107 (see ref. 66).
(72) Id. at pp. 107-108.
(73) Ibid.
(74) CIA Inspector General's report, p. 70.
(75) See ref. 53, McCone deposition.
(76) Ibid.
(77) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 61-63; ref. 52, Slawson executive
session testimony. p. 27; executive session testimony of Arlen Specter. November
8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations. pp. 45-46 (JFK document
013094) (hereinafter Specter executive session testimony); but see also
executive
Page 502
502
session testimony of Wesley Liebeler, November 15, 1977, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 71 (JFK Document 008625) (hereinafter Liebeler executive
session testimony).
(78) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 45.
(79) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 153.
(80) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 25.
(81) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 158.
(82) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 22-23; see ref. 9, Scelso deposition
158.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803.
(86) Classified CIA Document, December 20, 1963, DIR. 90466.
(87) CIA memorandum for file, December 20, 1963, CI Soft File.
(88) Ibid.
(89) CIA FOIA Document No. 474-191.
(90) Ibid.
(91) CIA FOIA Document No. 498-204.
(92) Ibid.
(93) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803; CIA FOIA Document 498-204.
(94) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, February 10, 1964 (JFK
Document 003872 ).
(95) See tel 15, Rocca deposition, P. 89.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Letter from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, February 19, 1964, CIA FOIA
Document No. 553-808A.
(98) Ibid.
(99) See classified staff study, "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City,"
House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 178-185.
(100) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
April 22, 1964, p. 22.
(101) Staff interview with W. David Slawson, August 11, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 010623).
(102) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 12, 1964.
(103) CIA FOIA Document No. 509803.
(104) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Apr. 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, and 45-46.
(105) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 12, 1964, p. 6.
(106) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 25, 1964, p. 20.
(107) Ibid.
(108) See refs. 73-75 and accompanying text in this report.
(109) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 27, 1964, p. 2.
(110) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and
W. David Slawson, Apr. 2, 1964.
(111) Ibid.
(112) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Apr. 21, 1964, p. 1.
(113) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 12, 1964.
(114) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and
W. David Slawson, Apr. 3, 1964, p. 11.
(115) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Apr. 22, 1964, p. 1.
(116) See ref. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 9-10.
(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Id. at p. 24.
(122) Warren Commission classified document of W. David Slawson, Apr. 1964.
(123) See ref. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 52-54.
Page 503
503
(124) Id. at p. 24.
(125) Executive Order No. 11130, Nov. 29, 1963.
(126) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 364
(hereinafter cited as the Warren Report).
(127) CIA classified document, Mar. 24, 1964, DDP4-1555, Warren Commission
document 64.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Warren Report, Vol. I, p. 153.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Thomas Karramesines, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK
Document 003872 ).
(132) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to John McCone, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK Document
003872 ).
(133) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 158.
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid.
(136) CIA FOIA document No. 579-250.
(137) Ibid.
(138) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, pp. 131-132, in which Angleton stated
that the only reason for not providing the Warren Commission with access to
(these materials) was due to the Agency's concern for protecting its sources and
methods.
(139) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document
003872); Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 12, 1964.
(140) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson,
Mar. 12, 1964.
(141) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document
003872 ).
(142) Ibid.
(143) CIA FOIA document No. 622-258 (hereinafter CD 631); CIA classified
document FOIA 621-259 (hereinafter CD 674).
(144) See ref. 143, CD 631.
(145) Ibid. (See also testimony of Marguerite Oswald, I Warren Commission
Hearings, 152.)
(146) Ibid.
(147) See ref. 143, CD 674.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Ibid.
(150) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman, Mar.
24, 1964.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of Samuel Stern, Mar.
27, 1964.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid.
(155) Ibid.
(156) Ibid.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Ibid.
(159) Ibid.
(160) Ibid.
(161) Ibid.
(162) Affidavit of Richard Helms, Aug. 7, 1964, XI Warren Commission Hearings,
469-470.
(163) This memorandum paraphrased the original source materials. See JFK Exhibit
F-518, HSCA-JFK hearings.
(164) CIA document memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, undated
1979, p. 1.
(165) CIA classified document, memorandum of Raymond Rocca, May 23, 1975, p. 15.
(166) CIA FOIA document No. 138-598.
(167) Ibid.
(168) See ref. 1, SSC, Book V, pp. 28-30 and 40-43.
Page 504
504
(169) Ibid.
(170) CIA classified document, Apr. 26, 1965.
(171) CIl FOIA document No. 717-312, attachment C.
(172) CIA FOIA document No. 98-137, CIA FOIA document 34-595.
(173) CIA FOIl document No. 559-243.
(174) Ibid.
(175) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Langosch, June 23, 1964.
(176) Ibid.
(177) Ibid.
(178) Ibid.
(179) CIA FOIA document No. 687-295, attachment 2.
(180) Ibid.
(181) Ibid., attachment 4.
(182) Ibid.
(183) CIA FOIA document 687-295.
(184) Id. at p. 2.
(185) CIA FOIA document 697-294.
(186) Ibid., attachment.
(187) CIA FOIA document 739-316.
(188) Ibid.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Classified letter from HSCA to CIA, August 28. 1978.
(191) CIA classified document, memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon conversation,
Aug. 28, 1978, p. 8.
(192) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 18-19.
(193) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Langosch, May 5, 1964.
(194) CIA FOIA document No. 687-295, attachment 4.
(195) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 136: see ref. 15, Rocca
deposition, p. 148; classified staff summary of interview of former CIA
employee, Joseph Langosch, Aug. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK classified document): classified staff summary of interview
with CIA employee, Aug. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
classified document 014740). Further details analyzing this issue are set forth
in the classified HSCA staff report upon which this study is based. Classified
staff report, "HSCA Investigation of CIA Support to the Warren Commission,"
House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dec. 10, 1978 (JFK classified document
015036).
(196) See ref. 2, 1977 TFR, p. 10.
Politics and Presidential Protection the Motorcade
Page 505
505
POLITICS AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION:
THE MOTORCADE
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(505)
Contents
506
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Summary......................................................................................................(1)
I. The origins of the plan for President Kennedy
to visit
Texas.............................................................................(10)
II. The process of the selection of dates for
the trip and the planning of the
itinerary...................................(16)
III. The Texas Christian University appearance..............................(22)
IV. The political controversy surrounding the
selection of a speech site for the President's
appearance in
Dallas.................................................................(30)
V. The role of the Secret Service in the resolution of
the selection of the speech site and the motorcade route............(36)
VI. The publication in Dallas newspapers of the motorcade route (52)
VII. The residual role of the Secret Service in motorcade plannng:
(a) The Main Street-Houston-Elm turn...............................(60)
(b) The Protective Research Section....................................(64)
(c) Physical protection along the motorcade route..............(80)
(506)
Summary
Page 507
507
SUMMARY
(1) It has been suggested that the selection of a motorcade route that resulted
in the passage of President John F. Kennedy's open limousine at low speed
immediately below the Texas School Book Depository Building in Dallas, Tex., and
in the closest possible proximity in Dealey Plaza to the grassy knoll, was
probably no mere coincidence; that the use of a motorcade and the selection of
its route was more likely controlled by the conspiracy that planned the
President's death; and that the Secret Service, since it had responsibility for
protecting the President, may have been more than simply a negligent bystander
in the decisionmaking process.(1) The list of suggested conspirators who
allegedly arranged this aspect of the assassination ranges from the Secret
Service itself, to right-wing businessmen, and even includes the Governor of
Texas, John B. Connally (2)--the Governor, perhaps, being an innocent dupe,
since it is unlikely (in the extreme) that he would have wittingly arranged to
have shots fired the limousine in which he and his wife were also to ride.
(2) The results of the committee's investigation of these allegations are
described in this start report. In summary, the evidence indicates that
political considerations dictated that there would be a motorcade, and what its
route would be, and that the Secret Service's protective responsibilities were
subordinated to those political considerations. The committee found no evidence
of conspiracy in the processes that led to the use of the motorcade or the
selection of its route.
(3) The political considerations that apparently led to those two fortuitously
critical decisions were traditional Democratic Party politics and, as such, were
characterized by a struggle between liberal and conservative wings of the party:
between the conservative wing of the party in Texas led by Gov. John B.
Connally, and liberal elements, including Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough, but
primarily, of course, centering around the President himself. In the end,
ironically, it was the tension and compromise between the two views that
produced the fatal motorcade route. If either side had been able to dictate its
desires without compromise, the assassination might never have occurred.
(4) On one hand, Governor Connally, who was asked by the President to arrange
the trip as a means of broadening and strengthening his support among
conservatives in Texas, selected the Dallas Trade Mart, a new and attractive
convention hall on the Stemmons Freeway, for the luncheon site. It had the
attribute of appealing to the conservative business element, but the drawback of
limiting the number of guests that could be accommodated.
(5) The President, on the other hand, believed that his availability the people
by motorcade was a major factor in his successful campaign for the
Presidency,(3) and since his schedule in Dallas did involve a major public
speech before a large audience, but included
(507)
Page 508
508
only a "limited" speaking engagement before a "select group" at the Trade Mart,
the President felt even more strongly that a motorcade should be used to broaden
his exposure. (4) Both Governor Connally and Frank Erwin, executive secretary of
the Texas State Democratic Committee, objected to the staging of a downtown
motorcade.(5) Connally opposed the motorcade because the strain placed on
Kennedy of "exuding enthusiasm" would have been excessive: especially in view of
his tight schedule, and because he considered it a possibility that an
embarrassing picket or sign might be held up before the" President during the
motorcade.(6) Erwin objected to a downtown motorcade because it exposed the
President unnecessarily to the possibility of an embarrassing incident provoked
by the right-wing element: in Dallas.(7) Supporters of right-wing extremist
leader Gen. Edwin: Walker were feared, (8) since Lyndon Johnson and Adlai
Stevenson, in 1960 and 1963, respectively, had been publicly assaulted by
radical conservatives in Texas. (9) The memory of these occurrences was still
vivid, and many Connally associates were still concerned that the image of
Dallas would be tarnished by an incident in which the President would be
publicly embarrassed.(10) Erwin was so concerned about this aspect of the trip
that when he first heard that the President had been harmed, his first thought
was that a right-wing extremist had been responsible.(11) In the end, President
Kennedy's wishes prevailed, and there was a motorcade.(12) Its route was a
simple by-product of the decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade Mart. (13)
(6) Two luncheon sites had initially been considered:the Women's Building at the
fair grounds which was located in the central southern part of the city,(14) and
the Dallas Trade Mart, which was located on Stemmons Freeway to the west and
north of Dealey Plaza. (15)
(7) The Secret Service initially preferred the Women's Building for security
reasons,(16) and the Kennedy staff preferred it for political reasons. (17) If
the Women's Building had been selected, the Presidential motorcade would have
entered Dealey Plaza on Main Street west of Dealey Plaza and traveled eastward
on Main Street, traversing the Plaza briefly, at high speed,(18) without taking
any turns in or around the Plaza. (19) Such a west-to-east route through Dealey
Plaza on Main Street would have decreased the probability of the occurrence of
the assassination for two reasons. First, the Presidential limousine would have
presented a more difficult target at which to shoot because it would have been
moving more quickly and would have been positioned one block farther away (to
the south) from the assassins' locations than it was when the assassination
occurred on Elm Street.(20) Second, the President,, who rides in the right rear
of the limousine in accord with military protocol, would have been positioned so
that Mrs. Kennedy would have been seated between him and any gunfire emanating
from the Texas State Book Depository (TSBD) and the grassy knoll.(21)
(8) Nevertheless, in this case the President deferred to the Governor: the
Women's Building was rejected. and the Trade Mart was selected. (22) The result,
then, was the deployment of the motorcade westward through downtown Dallas and,
in turn, the inclusion of the turn, northward from Main Street onto Houston
Street and then
Page 509
509
westward from Houston onto Elm Street, which placed the limousine directly in
front of the line of fire.
(9) The Secret Service was in fact, a bystander in the process; its protective
functions were subordinated to political considerations. The committee found no
evidence indicating that a conspiracy affected either the President's decision
to incorporate a motorcade into the Dallas itinerary, or the Governor's decision
to insist on a Presidential appearance at the Trade Mart or the Secret Service's
acquiescence in those controlling decisions.
The Origins of the Plan for President Kennedy to Visit Texas
Page 509
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PLAN FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO VISIT TEXAS
(10) Governor John B. Connally of Texas indicated that the idea of a
Presidential visit to Texas arose first in the spring of 1962, during the Texas
gubernatorial campaign. (23) Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson approached
Connelly with the information that the President wished to come to Texas for the
purpose of fundraising.(24) Connelly was not interested at that time in
attempting to coordinate such a trip for various reasons. First, he was in the
midst of a campaign for Governor, was running against an incumbent. and his
initial showing in voter polls had been poor.(25) Second, he became involved in
a statewide campaign for the general election after winning the primary and he
had doubts about the capacity of his organization both to do justice to a
Presidential visit and simultaneously to run an effective campaign. (26)
Nevertheless, since Connally won the gubernatorial election and apart from Vice
President Johnson, was the Texan who was closest to the administration, the Vice
President continued to remind him about the President's interest. (27) Connally
continued to hesitate to commit himself to a specific time for the Presidential
visit. As Governor, he had to prepare a legislative program for his first
session with the Texas State Legislature, which was scheduled to convene on
January 20, 1963. That session was to last 120 days. Nevertheless, upon its
completion, Connelly became willing to undertake the organization of a
Presidential visit. (28)
(11) It was his understanding from the beginning that the President wanted to
raise money.(29) It also became apparent that the President wished to shore up
his sagging popularity in a State that he considered, with Massachusetts, to be
one of the two primary political objectives for the Presidential campaign of
1964.(30) In 1960. Kennedy had carried Texas by the small margin of 46,000
votes, despite Johnson, a Texan was his running mate. (31)The President's
legislative program had net fared well in the first year of his Presidency, and
the President was concerned about the 1964 election. For these reasons, a visit
to Texas had assumed great importance. (32)
(12) Connally believed that, for specific reasons, the President wished to come
to Texas under Connally's auspices rather than under the auspices of Vice
President Johnson or on his own. Since a Governor of a State is the titular head
of his party and sets the political tone of his State, neither Kennedy or
Johnson would have considered it politically advisable to visit a State without
the political support of the Governor. (33) And in Connally's opinion, Kennedy
had another, more narrowly focused reason for wanting to come to Texas. Connally
had
Page 510
510
developed a base of support among the moderates and conservatives in the Texas
Democratic Party.(34) The President hoped to obtain political benefit by
associating with Connally, the leader of the modcrate and conservative interests
whose support Kennedy needed in Texas. (35) The liberal wing of the party still
supported Kennedy; but the moderates and conservatives thought of Kennedy as
anti-business. (36) The President mentioned this to Connally and said that it
disturbed him because he had no intention of dismantling the free enterprise
system. (37) Kennedy wanted to talk with and, he hoped, to appeal to the people
who had not supported him in the Presidental campaign of 1960. (38)
(13) The first important meeting between the President and the Governor took
place in El Paso, Tex., in June. 1963.(39) Kennedy suggested August 27 as a
possible date for the visit because that was the Vice President's birthday. The
Governor objected since inclement Texas weather at that time of year resulted in
the absence of many Texans from the State for vacations. (40) Apart from the
President's suggestion that four or five fundraising dinners be held in the
major Texas cities, no final decision was reached regarding the date for the
trip or the itinerary. (41) Nevertheless, the decision to make the trip was
considered final as of this time. (42)
(14) From June to early October 1963, the Governor and the Vice President
intermittently discussed the objectives and format of the trip. (43) Johnson
advised Connally that the President felt that four or five fundraising dinners
would constitute an acceptable program. The Governor expressed the opinion that
it would be a mistake so to organize the visit, Johnson responded by saying that
that was what the President wanted and Connally had better have "a real good
reason" for objecting. (44)
(15) In early October the President and Governor Cormally met in the Oval
Office. Connally told Kennedy that a Presidential visit consisting of four or
five consecutive fundraising dinners would be considered by Texans as a
financial rape of the State. (45) On the basis of Connally's discussions of the
matter with political leaders in the State, the Governor's recommended course of
action was that the President meet with moderate and conservative business and
political leaders who had not supported him in 1960 and that he attempt to
convert them in nonpolitical settings. The President agreed. (46)
The Process of the Selection of Dates for the Trip and the Planning of the
Itinerary
Page 510
II. THE PROCESS OF THE SELECTION OF DATES FOR THE TRIP AND THE PLANNING OF THE
ITINERARY
(16) The specific dates of the trip had been resolved prior to this October
meeting. Presidential advance man Jerry Bruno stated that although he was given
formal notice of the Texas trip on October 21 by Presidential Appointments
Secretary Kenneth O'Donnell,(47) he believed the President and O'Donnell had
developed long range plans prior to the 11 State conservation tour in late
September.(48) No dates for Texas were mentioned at that time, but the September
26, 1963. issue of the Dallas Morning News printed an article stating that on
November 21 and 22, 1963, the President would visit several Texas cities.
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(17) Connally made it clear to the President that it would be Kennedy who would
pick the dates of the trip. (50) Although in testimony Connally stated he had no
specific recollection of having in, own prior to October that November 21 and 22
were the selected dates for the Texas visit, he did acknowledge that he must
have known. (51)
(18) Governor Connally was careful to emphasize that the purpose of the
Presidential visit was not to resolve differences within the Democratic Party of
the State of Texas. (52) Appointments Secretary O'Donnell had advanced this view
in his testimony before the Warren Commission. According to O'Donnell:
There were great controversies existing. There was a party problem in Texas that
the President and Vice President felt he could be helpful, as both sides of the
controversy were supporting President Kennedy, and they felt he could be a
bridge between these two groups, and this would be helpful in the election of
1964. I think that is the major reason for the trip. (53)
As Governor Connally stated:
. . . this (the complaints that Texas liberals were not being permitted to
participate in the planning of the trip or to obtain tickets to the various trip
functions) raised the question that has since been discussed in great length
that the President came to Texas to resolve the differences in the Democratic
Party in Texas. Nothing could be further from the truth. The two individuals who
were most involved in the split in the Party were Senator Ralph Yarborough and
Vice President Johnson, and both of them were in Washington, D.C. This is where
the trouble was.
The trouble arose basically over Federal patronage and Federal appointees and
Vice President Johnson was trying to get every Federal appointee he could get,
and so was Senator Yarborough...
And indeed if the President was interested in resolving that difficulty, he had
Vice President Johnson right across the street in the Old Executive Office
Building, he had Senator Yarborough right here on the Hill, and he could have
gotten them together in 10 minutes. But that wasn't the purpose of his trip to
Texas at all, it had nothing to do with it.
The Governor stated that Texas was basically a one-party State where political
differences had divided liberal from conservative elements for many decades and
where, throughout the Governor's political career, recurrent conflict between
the two forces was considered a normal state of affairs. The Govenor, recalling
an incident during which fist fights broke out within the Texas delegation on
the floor of the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in 1940, stated that the
President was too astute a politician to attempt to resolve the differences in
the Democratic Party in the State of Texas.(55)
(19) The Governor stated that an early consensus was achieved about concluding
the trip with a major fundraising dinner in Austin, an event that would have
allowed the Texas Legislature a chance to meet the President. (56) The Governor
understood at this point that
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the visit would involve a single day. (57) To make the most of time available,
the Governor suggested to the President that he visit San Antonio,, Houston,
Fort Worth, Dallas and Austin all day.(58) This itinerary is confirmed by Bruno,
Kennedy's advance man, who met with Walter Jenkins, described as "Vice President
Johnson's right-hand man," on October 24. Bruno's notes record that he and
Jenkins discussed "....the proposed stops for the trip were San Antonio, Houston
overnight, Fort Worth. Texas Christian University, and a fundraising dinner in
Austin."(59) Although the luncheon in Dallas was omitted from Bruno's original
note, Dallas was always included.(60)
(20) The passage quoted above, because of its reference to an overnight stop,
indicates that the l-day tour planned by Governor nelly was modified to include
a testimonial dinner for Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston on the evening of
November 21, 1963. (61) Congressman Thomas chairman of the Appropriations
Committee was considered one of the most powerful members of the House. He
enjoyed the support of both conservatives and liberals in his Houston
Congressional District.(63) As a result of his terminal illness, and in
appreciation of his distinguished career in public service, a testimonial dinner
was being given for him. This occasion, along with the President's close
relationship with Thomas, resulted in a Presidential decision to extend the span
of his visit, adding the afternoon and evening of November 21 to the 1-day trip
already planned for the 22nd.(64) The San Antonio visit to inspect the new
Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks Air Force Base was rescheduled for Thursday.
(65) Originally, the President had planned to remain overnight in Houston, then
fly to Fort Worth on the following morning in order to receive an honorary
degree from Texas Christian University, and then fly to Dallas for a midday
luncheon.(66) site for the luncheon had been selected as of Bruno's arrival in
Texas on October 28. (67) As late as October 30, Bruno visited Houston to
finalize plans for the President's appearance at the Thomas dinner and to
examine the accommodations for Kennedy and his party at the Rice Hotel. (68) The
overnight stop at Houston was changed to overnight stop at Fort Worth when
Kennedy accepted an invitation to the Houston dinner. (69) In the meantime, TCU
had decided not to award the President an honorary degree. (70) That change was
made on November 1.(71) A breakfast with the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce was
substituted on November 1 for the canceled honorary degree ceremony. (72)
(21) Since the Governor personally emphasized the scheduling of
a luncheon in Dallas.(73) and because that suggestion dovetailed conveniently
with the President's insistence on the staging of a motorcade through downtown
Dallas,(74) the final sequence of cities to be visited was established without
opposition from any person when the overnight stop was changed from Houston to
Fort Worth.(75). It was then decided that on November 21 Kennedy would dedicate
the Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks AFB in San Antonio.(76) This would
precede the President's appearance at the Albert Thomas testimonial dinner,(77)
the event around which the Texas trip was built. (78) In Fort Worth, a
prebreakfast speech in
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front of the Texas Hotel(79) and Kennedy's breakfast appearance before the
Chamber of Commerce filled the time gap caused by the cancellation of the
ceremony at TCU. (80) The Dallas luncheon and the fundraising dinner at the
Governor's mansion in Austin completed the schedule for the day. (81) It was the
Governor's opinion that Austin was the best city in the State for a major
fundraising affair because it was the Texas capital. (82)
Texas Christian University Appearance
Page 513
III. TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY APPEARANCE
(22) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Connally did not specify
whose idea it was to have the President appear at Texas Christian
University.(83) Advance man Jerry Bruno first learned of the TCU appearance when
Connally associate Walter Jenkins mentioned it in their first meeting on October
24.(84) The itinerary presented to Bruno by Jenkins represented Connally's
preferences. (85) Jenkins told Bruno that Connally had proposed the trip, and
from this Bruno inferred that Connally had proposed the itinerary. (86)
(23) Nevertheless, Bruno's interpretation does not establish the fact that the
honorary degree was Connally's idea originally, because Jenkins did not assert
this, and Bruno's notes of the meeting do not record any specific information on
the point. (87)
(24) The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees of TCU held on November
1, 1963, did not mention this question. Those minutes record only that,
"Concerning a special item presented by Chancellor E. Sadler on the
recommendation of the University Council", the University would "tender its
facilities to the Governor of Texas and the City of Fort Worth . . . for the
purpose of extending a warm invitation to the President of the United States to
speak on the TCU campus during his visit to Texas in November. Motion passed."
(88) This language permits the inference that it was Chancellor Sadler's idea to
invite the President, but no specific identification of the original proponents
of the TCU appearance is made.
(25) A resolution of the question is offered by TCU trustee Sam P. Woodson, Jr.,
who was present at the November 1, 1963, trustees' meeting. (89) Although he was
not able to produce any documentation to support his recollection, Woodson
recalled that in late October 1963, the Governor contacted Chancellor Sadler and
proposed that the President be awarded an honorary degree. Woodson's
understanding at the time was either that the President "wanted an excuse to
come down to Texas" or that the Governor "in some sense wanted to provide the
President with such an excuse."(90) He recalled also that the chancellor thought
it was appropriate and decided to introduce the matter to the board. (91)
(26) Woodson's explanation of the reasons for the board's decision not to confer
the degree is as follows:
(27) University procedure required that candidates for honorary degrees be
nominated from within the university and be evaluated by both the faculty senate
and the student senate, this provided opportunities for approval or disapproval
individual cases.(92) In Kennedy's case, because of the belief that the Governor
was trying to
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manipulate the board at the expense of democratic university procedures,(93) it
was decided that normal procedures should be maintained because they protected
the university from awarding degrees to recipients who had not been scrutinized
by all concerned interests.(94)
(28) On the other hand, some Board members felt that it would be disrespectful
to the Office of the President to turn the President down. In such a unique case
as this, no precedent that would be harmful to the university's procedures would
be established.(95) Woodson himself voted in favor of the award on these grounds
and believed that the trustees would have approved the award if there had been
time for the proposal to go "through channels". (96)
(29) Bruno stated that no consideration of an alternative program at TCU was
given by the Presidential staff. The embarrassment to the President, were it to
become known that he had been turned down for an honorary degree, eliminated the
possibility of an appearance at TCU for some other purpose. (97) It is ironic
that if the honorary degree ceremony at TCU had been held, especially with a
subsequent reception of some kind, logistical complications might have delayed
the President's arrival in Dallas and thereby interfered with the scheduled
occurrence of the mid-day motorcade. If such a delay had occurred, the
opportunity might have been lost for an assassin to take advantage of certain
conditions that promoted Kennedy's assassination. Such conditions included the
physical absence of many employees from their places of employment (such as the
TSBD) during the midday lunch hour, and the presence of large crowds on the
streets immediately after the shooting.* (98)
The Political Controversy Surrounding the Selection of a Speech Site in Dallas
Page 514
IV. THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE SELECTION OF A SPEECH SITE FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCE IN DALLAS
(30) The decision to send the motorcade in an eastward or westward direction
along Main Street was dependent upon the prior selection of site for the
President's luncheon speech. (103)
(31) In Dallas, Governor Connally arranged (104) for the cosponsorship of the
luncheon by several prominent civic organizations: the Dallas Citizens' Council,
the Dallas Assembly, and the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest.(105)
Connally indicated that such groups were chosen because they could give the
occasion a nonpolitical flavor.
(32) Connally's understanding of the political function of the trip--to permit
the President an opportunity to meet with the constituency in Texas whose
support would be indispensable during the 1964
------------------------------
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Presidential campaign, the moderate and conservative business and financial
interests--led him to conceive of the Dallas visit in limited terms. The
President would arrive in Dallas, proceed directly to the Trade Mart, the city's
prime commercial center, deliver a speech to the leadership of Dallas' business
community, and leave the city. (106A) Frank Erwin, the executive secretary of
the Texas State Democratic Committee, believed that Connally's introduction
might well convince that leadership that the President was "OK" and "could be
trusted" with the Presidency. (107) For Connally, the Trade Mart was the
appropriate setting for the Presidential speech. Architecturally it had the
style and flair of the Kennedys themselves. The building was new, convenient to
reach from the Stemmons Expressway, and generally impressive. (108)
(33) Frank Erwin, who assisted Connally through the process of planning the
Presidential visit, commented on Connally's relationship with big business and
financial interests in Texas. In Erwin's opinion there was no possibility that
the conservative, affluent supporters of Connally would have wanted to mix at a
public occasion of any kind with the various elements in the liberal wing of the
party. (109) Erwin stated his belief that even such high-ranking persons as the
liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas and the president of the AFL-CIO were
not welcome at social and political functions sponsored by Connelly's
conservative supporters.(110) The appearance of such liberals would have led to
a walkout by the conservative Connally associates. Hence, the State democratic
committee, of which Erwin was Executive Secretary, insisted that the luncheon be
held at the Trade Mart. (111)
(34) The Kennedy staff, on the other hand, preferred the Women's Building, which
they saw as providing a better forum for contact with liberal elements in the
party. Politically, the large size of the Women's Building would have allowed
4,000 people to be admitted and would therefore have benefited Kennedy by
permitting his liberal constituents to participate in the luncheon. (112) In
their view, that location, in conjunction with a motorcade, would have enhanced
their ability to reach the poor, the middle class, labor, and ethnic minorities.
(113)
(35) The route necessitated by the Kennedy staff's preference for the Women's
Building would have led eastward along Main Street toward the fair grounds,
which lay to the southeast of the Main Street business district. (114) The
motorcade's access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of
Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the
Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. (115)
After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at
what Bruno stated was the President's customarily high rate of speed to or 50
miles per hour--into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. (116) The distance on Main
Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be
gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed at that
speed. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were
reached. (117)
The Role of the Secret Service in the Selection of the Speech Site and Motorcade
Route
Page 516
516
V. THE ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE SELECTION OF THE
SPEECH SITE AND THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(36) On November 4, 1963, Gerald Behn, special agent in charge (hereafter SAIC)
of the White House detail of the Secret Service, telephoned Forrest Sorrels, the
SAIC of the Dallas field office, stating that the President would probably be
visiting Dallas "about November 21" and that two buildings had been suggested
for a luncheon site. (118) One was the Trade Mart, which according to Behn's
Information had about 60 entrances and 6 catwalks suspended above the floor area
where the luncheon was planned. The second was the Women's Building at the fair
grounds, whose structure and appearance Behn did not, according to Sorrels,
describe in equally complete detail.(119)
(37) On that same day, Sorrels made a survey of both locations and reported back
to Behn by telephone. He stated that he and Special Agent (Hereafter SA) Bob
Steuart of the Dallas office had visited the Trade Mart and the Women's
Building. Sorrels reported that the Women's Building was preferable from the
standpoint of security because the building had only two entrances at either
end, each of which was large enough to permit only one car to pass through.
(120) Nevertheless, Sorrels told Behn that the Women's Building "was not
satisfactory for that [Presidential] type of function" because of its low
ceilings, exposed air-conditioning, and highly visible steel suspension
supports. As for the Trade Mart, Sorrels told Behn that because of the many
entrances and exits in the Trade Mart, there would be a problem of acquiring
sufficient manpower to cover all areas securely. (121)
(38) Sorrels did not say that the Trade Mart would be impossible to secure
because he felt that the necessary precautions could be undertaken. (122)
(39) Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the
Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail,
the catwalks suspended above the floor. (123) Bruno was concerned about the
catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. (124)
Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that,
while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat
upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. (125) Bruno was concerned that someone
could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President.
(126)
(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5
that he favored the Women's Building. (127) According to Bruno, Behn was in
charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the
Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally
confirmed this version of the course of events. (128) Behn, in his testimony
before the committee, stated that O'Donnell held the power to make the ultimate
decision, that Behn himself lacked such power, and that O'Donnell simply
informed Belin that the Trade Mart was the final selection and ordered him to
secure it.(129) Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was
reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances,
Behn announced to Bruno
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in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building.
(13O) It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas
field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either
place. (131)
(41) For Bruno, the input of the Dallas field office was of secondary import. It
has been his impression from working with Belin that he was the Secret Service
official who had power, as SAIC of the White House detail, to make final
decisions in matters of security. (132) The basis for this assertion by Bruno
was that Bruno had personnally accompanied and observed Behn during the advance
work for the entirety of the President's 11-State conservation tour that had
begun on September 24, 1963. He and Behn had looked at every stop on that tour.*
(133)
(42) In accordance with standard operating procedure in the Secret Service, a
special agent from the White House Detail went to Dallas to advance the trip and
arrange for the President's security once the speech site and motorcade route
were selected. (134) In this case, the White House Detail advance agent was
Winston G. Lawson. (135) Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that he
arrived in Dallas on November 12, and that on the morning of November 13 he
visited the Trade Mart with Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels, Dallas SA Robert
Steuart, and with Jack Puterbaugh, an advance man serving the Democratic
National Committee and the White House. (136) Lawson gave Behn a positive report
on the Trade Mart because of factors that Sorrels did not mention: (1) the
Mart's internal security system, which barred entry to everyone but lessees of
commercial space and their customers; (2) the absence of a kitchen at the
Women's Building: and (3) the obstruction of proper TV coverage by the Women's
Building interior. (137) Lawson agreed with Sorrels that the interior decor at
the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.(138)
(43) The Warren Commission obtained no testimony or other information from Behn
or Bruno about the controversy over speech site selection that was initially
resolved, according to Bruno, by the selection of the Women's Building. (139)
Hence, the Warren Commission evaluated Lawson's and Sorrels' testimony without
reference to Bruno's perspective. Bruno's perception as of the period between
November 6 and 12 was that:
We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had looked at the site
[Trade Mart] and this is coming from Governor Connally, and they saw no reasons
not to go there. (140)
(44) Apparently, by "local agents," Bruno was referring to Sorrels and the
special agents under his supervision in the Dallas field office. Bruno stated
that the local agents in Dallas had decided to withdraw
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518
their earlier objections to the Trade Mart, and instead recommended it. If any
local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior decision
on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a clear
case of a subordinate agent contradicting the SAIC of the White House detail.
(141) Bruno insisted that this in fact took place:
Jerry [Behn] got word that the local agents claim that they could secure it [the
Trade Mart] and we were going to have to go with that. (142)
(45) Apart from Bruno's assertion, the committee found no record of any such
communication from any local agent. Sorrels was not asked by the Warren
Commission whether he made any recommendations to Behn, or had any contact with
Belin about speech site security, after November 4; nor did Sorrels inform the
Committee that any such contact between himself and Behn took place. Hence, it
is largely speculative as to whether Sorrels or any Dallas agent had any impact
subsequent to Behn's November 6 selection of the Women's Building. (144)
Further, Lawson could not recall for the Warren Commission whether his oral
report of November 13 was made to Behn or to one of his assistants. (145) Lawson
had "no idea" whether Belin had made any recommendations. (146) Lawson was not
sure how much weight his opinion carried in such situations. All he knew was
that the decision about the motorcade was made in Washington, and that, he
assumed that it was made by the White House. (147) His statement to the
committee added to his Warren Commission testimony only the information that the
selection of the speech site and motorcade route involved Behn and O'Donnell "at
very least." (148)
(46) Bruno's explanation of how the matter was finally resolved is found in his
journal in the entries of November 14 and 15, 1963:
November 14-- The feud became so bitter that I went to the White House to ask
Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the Peace Corps, and close to both Connally
and Johnson, if he would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President
and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell decided that there was no other way
but to go to the mart.
November 15--The White House announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I
met with O'Donnell and Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on the
verge of cancelling the trip. They decided they had to let the Governor have his
way. (149)
(47) If Bruno's assertions are true, the role of the Secret Service is clear:
Although security considerations were taken into account, in the end political
considerations prevailed. The determinative factor was the desire of President
Kennedy and Mr. O'Donnell not to place the President in the untenable position
of appearing unable to lead the party in solving party disputes and of appearing
weak in the South.(150)
(48) Moyers' recollection about these matters was less than clear. He could not
recall whether it was ever questionable that a motorcade
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could occur in Dallas. (151) He could not recall whether there had been a debate
about the selection of the speech site.(152) He could recall no discussion with
Governor Connally about the site for the president's luncheon,(153) but instead
said his discussions involved -"who was participating and the necessity of
cooperation." (154) In fact, he could not remember whether he had even visited
Dallas. (155)
(49) Moyers did confirm one aspect of Bruno's November 14-15 entries, however.
He stated that the Presidential staff would overrule the Secret Service-when
"overriding political considerations were paramount."(156) O'Donnell would
listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their suggestions. (157)
None of the President's political advisers "ever let [the Secret Service] have
the last word" 'because the advisers' interest in the President's political
welfare out-weighed security factors.(158) Moyers characterized the reaction of
the Secret Service when being overruled as that of "good soldiers," that "loyal
to their obligation, but they accepted the fact that the President of the United
States is also the chief political figure of our society."(159) This seems
consistent with Bruno's statement that, when faced with the political dilemma of
how to react to Connally's insistence on the Trade Mart, the President and
O'Donnell made a decision based on political concerns. (160) The Secret Service
was powerless to that point, much less to intervene.
(50) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Cormally recalled that the
issue of having a motorcade was not resolved until the week of the
assassination, ss Bruno had stated.(161) But with respect to the problem of
choosing a speech site, Connally stated that he was largely ignorant of any
controversy. (162) Connally's version of the decisionmaking process was that
whenever such problems could not be resolved on the staff level, he would "just
make a decision we are going to do thus and so," or sometimes "call somebody at
the House and get it worked out." (163) With respect to the interrelationship
between the speech site and the motorcade route, Connally did acknowledge that
"if the Women's Building had been chosen, the motorcade could have gone another
route and probably would have."(164)
(51) Bruno indicated that Moyers was asked to visit Texas on behalf of the
President to settle the conflict over the speech site and motorcade route. (165)
Moyers indicated that both O'Donell and Kennedy asked him to smooth over the
differences between different Democratic Party factions. (166) Moyers at first
objected on the grounds that as Department Director of the Peace Corps, his
presence in Texas would involve that agency in partisan politics. The President
overrode Moyers' objection by saying that Moyers, a Texan with close personal
and professional ties to Vice President Johnson and good professional relations
with Connally, should go to Texas and permit the President worry about the Peace
Corps. (167)
The Publication in Dallas Newspapers of the Motorcade Route
Page 519
VI. THE PUBLICATION IN DALLAS NEWSPAPERS OF THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the President, was to
insist that the motorcade route be published. (168) Moyers coordinated the
President's visit to Texas from Austin. He
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520
worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representative, Ms.
Elizabeth Harris.(169) He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas native,
had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of
Moyers in the Peace Corps. (170)
(53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made with respect to Dallas
was that:
. . . some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a dispute as to
whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, arid Betty Harris called me
. . . and said they were not going to print the route of the . . . [motorcade]
procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming down here to hide.
He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the decision is to print the
route of the President's procession," and I don't know what Betty did after
that, but the route was printed. (171)
Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred.
I think it was the second night before his--preceding his arrival... and we were
printing the route in the other papers, and I couldn't see why an exception
should be made in Dallas. (172)
(54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time, and was aware
of the security implications of printing the motorcade route.
He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him Austin, whom
Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of Dallas trip," whether there
was any reason why the route should be printed. Moyers believed the agent agreed
with him that the route should be published. (173)
(55) In Dallas, Ms. Harris was working directly with the Connally
representatives and the Secret Service. Her conception of the "basic problem",
as she defined it for Moyers over the telephone, was that the conservative city
fathers of Dallas did not want to do anything,: for the liberal Democrats, who
were led by Senator Ralph Yarborough. The two groups were fighting both about
the distribution tickets for the luncheon and also about the publicity to be
given about the motorcade. The conservative faction wanted it to look like
Kennedy was not popular in Dallas, and hence frowned upon publication of the
route because that would draw crowds. (172) The matter of popularity was of
special significance because at that time the polls reflected a decline in the
President's popularity on the national political scene. (175)
(56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on either the Monday
or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described as a "confrontation
meeting" that was attended by Governor Connally Robert Strauss (a Connally
associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas advertising man in charge of publicity for
Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she described as
"totally neutral". (176) She recalled that she took one side of the argument
regarding publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom Strauss took the
other.(177) During this meeting, she used "pressure"--an appeal for the status
and prestige of the office of the Presidency--to persuade Bloom to publish the
route not on Friday morning, November 22, but a few days earlier. (178) Her
purpose in having
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it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd out."(179) Hence, the
route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon and the
Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (180)
(57) Ms. Harris' perception of the role of Secret Service Agent Lawson during
the controversy was that he seemed concerned primarily about route selection
because of the time factor and only secondarily about the security factors.
(181) Lawson did not seem to "get too much into the political aspect;" "he was a
nuts and bolts man" who worked closely with the local police "to make sure that
all of the arrangements were as his superiors in Washington wanted to have them.
(182)
(58) Ms. Harris and Lawson were not oblivious to the threat of right-wing
extremism. They did not consider it when planning the publicity and motorcede
route. Ms. Harris stated that, in the case of the Adlai Stevenson incident, "he
had been spat upon . . . I was aware of that. We knew that." (183) As to the
Edwin Walker assassination attempt, "We did know he had been shot at;" "Lawson
and I were very well aware of it because I saw Lawson quite often and we worked
late . . . . I knew that he was working with Curry on getting a fix ou the known
troublemakers." (184) But nothing Ms. Harris learned about right-wing extremism
caused her to reduce the pressure she put on Bloom to publish the route earlier
than November 22:
You got (sic) to remember that in 1963, it was very hard for anybody to
recognize that anything worse than a spitting incident would occur. I was
extremely anxious and Moyers and I frequently discussed this. We wanted to bend
over backwards to avoid another Stevenson episode because it had gotten
tremendous publicity, and we felt it would not at all be in the interests--in
Kennedy's interests for a thing like that to happen. Except for the kooks that
might go out with a gun, I can't say that it ever occurred to any of us that
there was-that death would occur. We were worried about appearances.(185)
(59) Before the Warren Commission, Lawson stated that at a meeting in Dallas on
November 18, he announced that the routes had been finalized "unless it was
changed later." (186) This remark implied that he did not have control over the
final determination of the route, and that such a decision might well be made by
civilian political persons. (187) He recalled (from reading the paper the
following day) that the route was published on November 19; but at the time he
did not know who announced it. (188) It thus seems clear that communication with
the Secret Service about publication of routes was minimal.
The Residual Role of the Secret Service in Motorcade Planning
Page 521
VII. THE RESIDUAL ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN MOTORCADE PLANNING
(A) THE MAIN STREET-HOUSTON-ELM TURN
(60) As the Dallas SAIC, Forrest Sorrels told the Warren Commission, he selected
the Main-Houston-Elm turn through Dealey Plaza because it was the "most direct"
route to the Trade Mart. (189)
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522
Sorrels' questioning by Warren Commission staff counsel Samuel M. Stern,
however, prevented a total picture of motorcade route logistics from emerging.
Stern asked Sorrels why the expressway was proached from the Elm Street ramp
instead of from Main Street just beyond the triple overpass at the westen
boundary of Dealey Plaza. Sorrels explained that the size and cumbersomeness of
the motorcade, along with the presence of a raised divider separating the Elm
Street lane from the Elm Street lane at the foot of the ramp up to the
expressway, deterred him from trying to route the motorcade under and through
the overpass on Main Street. Such a route would have assigned the drivers in the
motorcade the almost impossible task of making a reverse S-turn in order to
cross over the raised divider to get from the Main Street lane into the Elm
Street lane. (190) However, this question-and-answer process failed to make
clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such
a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway.
The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main
Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to
the Trade Mart. (191)
(61) George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963, was consulted
by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security planning. (192)
Lumpkin explained that the alternate route, continuing straight on Main through
and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching the Trade Mart on Industrial
Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding Industrial
Boulevard was "filled with winos and broken pavement." (193) Additionally,
Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there would have been no
crowds cn Industrial Boulevard. (194)
(62) Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that he had nothing
to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before November 14, since
only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected for the motorcade at that
time. He did not specify the exact date on which the turn was selected nor did
he identify the person selecting the turn.(195) Sorrels stated that he and
Lawson did drive the entire route together, but did not specify when this
occurred. (196)
(63) Sorrels' Warren Commission exhibit No. 4 suggested that both men drove the
entire route on November 18. (197) It is not certain that both men knew about
the turn earlier than this date.
(B) THE PROTECTIVE RESEARCH SECTION
(64) In making a determination as to whether the advance agents for the Texas
trip, as well as local field agents, were duly informed of any potential
problems that might occur, a thorough review of the function of the Secret
Service Protective Research Section was conducted. The Protective Research
Service (PRS) was meant to function both as repository of information about
threats to the security of Secret Service protectees and as a provider of such
information to agents in all types of assignments. It acquired and made
available information received from its own agents and from other sources. (198)
(65) In 1963, information acquired from any source external to the
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Secret Service, when presented informally to a local Secret Service office, was
relayed by the local office of PRS headquarters in Washington. (199) What was
not set forth in the Warren Commission report was a description of how threat
information was processed and analyzed by PRS and of how the results of its
analysis were communicated to local field offices. Lawson's Warren Commission
testimony suggested that the Washington, D.C. office would ordinarily provide
agents with information about Presidential trips within that city, and that PRS
seldom provided advance agents with threat information before their departure.
But nothing more specific was given.
(66) Roy Kellerman was the special agent in charge of the Texas trip. Since that
assignment required him to travel with Kennedy, (201) he was removed from active
investigation in Dallas concerning evidence that suggested danger to the
President. Nevertheless, his testimony is important due to his account of
breakdowns in Presidential security during the Texas visit.
(67) Secret Service procedure required an inquiry to be made of the PRS about
one week before a trip was assigned. Kellerman testified that he received the
assignment to coordinate the Texas trip on November 17, 1963, and that by custom
the check with PRS was made a week ahead of that date (on or about November 10).
(202) Kellerman was not sure who made the check but believed it was either
Gerald Behn, Chief of the Secret Service White House Detail, Floyd Boring,
Assistant Chief, or one other agent whose name he could not recall. (203) He
further stated that he received no information, and that he considered this
"unusual." (204) By comparison, Winston Lawson, advance agent for Dallas, knew
of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, (205) 9 days before
Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the overall responsibility, (206)
began to undertake basic trip planning.
(68) On November 8, Lawson checked with PRS at the Executive Office Building,
learning that there were no active subjects in the Dallas area and that no JFK
file existed. (207) Further comparison discloses that by November 13, Lawson was
in Dallas and in contact with local Secret Service Agents' Sorrels and John Joe
How]ett, with whom he met concerning protective investigations of local anti-JFK
suspects. (208)
(69) Kellerman also testified about an inquiry in Dallas which was conducted
prior to November 22, in order to locate anti-JFK subjects. When asked
specifically about right-wing individuals, scurrilous literature, and extremist
groups known to be in Dallas, he claimed virtually total ignorance. (209) He
insisted that no one told him anything about an investigation of threat
information submitted to the Secret Service in Dallas on November 21 and 22 by
the FBI. (210) Additionally, Kellerman observed that it was strange that among
five cities in one State and despite the anti-Adlai Stevenson demonstration in
Dallas on October 1963, no information about suspects was forthcoming and
nothing had been given him. (211)
(70) The Secret Service final report for the November 21 trip to Houston
mentioned two active subjects. (212) Both individuals had made specific threats
in Houston. (213) Nevertheless, Kellerman was not questioned about Houston.
(214)
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(71) However, without being questioned about the San Antonio leg of the Texas
strip, Kellerman did recall the receipt of PRS information prior to November 21
regarding anti-Presidential picketing that did in fact occur in San Antonio on
that date. (215)
(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was
in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was
therefore ideally placed to relay information: that provided cause for alarm, he
was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with
maximum protective effort.
(73) As regards SAIC Sorrels' role, both Sorrels and Howlett cooperated with the
special services bureau of the Dallas Police Department, the police in Denton,
Tex., Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald, and the FBI.(216) The FBI was
interested in a Ku Klux Klan suspect from a neighboring area. (217) Additionally
on November 21, Dallas field office FBI agent James Hosty informed the local
Secret Service office of a handbill accusing Kennedy of being a traitor. (218)
(74) The results of these investigations indicated that there were no. known,
periodically checked PRS subjects; that no formerly institutionalized persons
were out on release; and that neither the-DPD nor the Secret Service could link
anyone with the "traitor" handbill. (219)
(75) White House Detail agent Lawson's position was that, the responsibility for
any investigation was that of the PRS or Sorrels, and was not his.(220) Although
Secret Service procedure allowed him to investigate or not, on the basis of
discretion, he did not because he knew that the Service preferred to have the
local agents, who have to work with the police on a daily basis, maintain
liaison and conduct investigations.(221) Secret Service procedure would not,
necessarily require him to receive information solely from the local office. It
could come from Washington PRS as well. In his opinion, the handbill presented
no "direct threat" to John Kennedy. (222)
(76) When interviewed by the committee, Sorrels stated that in November 1963 all
known PRS subjects within the jurisdiction of the Dallas field office were in
mental hospitals. Hence, he was surprised when he heard about the circulation of
the "JFK--Wanted for Treason" handbills. His reaction was to determine who the
printer was, bring him in and interview him. (223) Sorrels stated that the
standard procedure for the White House Detail advance agents and the field
office SAIC was to become familiar with the entire threat profile before
endeavoring to contact the local police department. (224)
(77) When interviewed by the committee, Lawson said that as White House Detail
agent, his duties were limited to shift work and advances, and that in effect,
he was not encouraged to participate in the process of investigating threats at
the local level and referring them back to PRS. (225) Lawson's only recollection
concerning PRS procedures was that when PRS received information about a threat
subject from a local agent or a White House detail agent making an advance. the
subject was given a file number. "In the old days." files consisted of a folder
containing 3 by 5 cards and PRS had the job of coordinating a what were called
"collateral" investigations in the same or an adjacent district. (226) At no
time while he was in Dallas did
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525
Lawson receive information about threats to the President made in other regions.
(227)
(78) White House Detail SAIC Gerald Behn described to the committee the
procedures in use in PRS at tiffs time. He disclosed the great extent to which
the PRS was the central focus of protective operations. Information from the
field about, active or potential threats to the President were referred to PRS
directly from the local office before they were referred to the Chief of the,
White House Detail. The SAIC of the White House Detail (Behn) would receive
reports from the field only from White House Detail advance agents. He and the
SAIC of the PRS (Robert I. Bouck) would then discuss the matter with the overall
Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James Rowley. (228)
(79) Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson
the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor
could he recall whether any information was distributed prior to the, November
21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker. Behn
specifically stated, as to the availibility to him of information about both
Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." (229) When asked if he
himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he
did "not remember any discussion with any agent? (230)
(C) PHYSICAL PROTECTION ALONG THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(80) In reviewing the performance of the Secret Service, consideration must be
given io the Dallas Police Department also, since the agency defined and
supervised the functions of the police during Kennedy's visit. The activities of
the Secret Service, in collaboration with the DPD, covered many areas of
security apart from PRS activities.
(81) Arrangements made by the Dallas police included provisions for traffic
control to contain the crowd; followup assignments for each officer directing
him, to subsequent stations after the motorcede has passed his post; assigning
at least two officers to each intersection, one to cover traffic primarily the
other to control the crowd: and the stationing of officers at all over- and
underpasses. (231) The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their
joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no followup
instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson as the Dallas advance agent,
make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was
not normal for there to be such written directions. (232)
(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the
landing area. Detectives mingled with the crowd, while officers patrolled both
sides of a chain-link barricade fence. One of the two service roads linking two
general public areas were closed off for motorcade use. The danger from rooftops
was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President
disembarked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was
blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building
as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices
providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would
land.
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526
(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not
check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances:
Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign
country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years. (234)
(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and Lawson as to
possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings when a
mororeade route has been standard for years. (235) Sorrels stated categorically
to the Warren Commission that Main Street was the best choice for parades in
that it went through the heart of the city, flanked on either side by tall
buildings which maximized the opportunity for large numbers of people to see the
parade. He added that this route was used for a Presidential motorcade in 1936,
when President Roosevelt traversed Main Street from east to west, just as
Kennedy's motorcade would have done had the Women's Building been selected.
(236)
(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating procedure required
agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the instructions to
watch them.(237) He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch windows was greater
than his own. His duties, while stationed in the lead car immeditely in front of
the Presidential limousine, included looking directly to the rear at the
President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and maintain radio
contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about adherence to schedule.
(238) Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository Building, he was doing
too many things at once to notice it.(239)
(86) Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did not have the same supervisory duties
as Lawson end was in fact freer to observe windows. He recalled observing the
facade of the Depository, but recalled nothing unusual; hence, he did not study
it intently. (240)
(87) Lawson readily admitted that windows posed an added danger in a narrowing
area that required the motorcade to slow down, especially given the President's
"usual" action of standing up to wave.(241)
(88) Lawson further testified that on the morning of November 22, he received a
call from Kellerman in Fort Worth asking about weather conditions in Dallas and
whether the bubble-top on the President's car would be used or not. During that
call, Dawson was told the bubble-top was to be on if it was mining, and off if
it was not.
(89) The final decision in this matter was made by Bill Moyers. Moyers had been
on the phone to Ms. Harris, informing her that the President did not want the
bubble. He told Harris to "get that Goddamned bubble off unless it's pouring
rain."(243) Shortly thereafter the weather began to clear. Ms. Harris approached
Sorrels about the bubble-top and together they had the special agents remove the
glass top.(244)
(90) Dallas Police Department Capt. Perdue W. Lawrence was assigned, on the
basis of his familiarity with escort security, to be in charge of traffic
control for the motorcade. (245) He recalled that he received this assignment on
November 19. (246) His immediate superior was Deputy Chief Lunday, head of the
traffic division, who was in turn commanded by Assistant Chief Char]es
Batchelor.(247)
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527
Lawrence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he
discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At
this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18
motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the Presidential
limousine. (248)
(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting between Chief
Curry, Deputy Chief R.H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on November 19, it was
agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used, "with men on either side of the
motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and
three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks."
(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating meeting held on
November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting. (250) It was here
that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination meeting,
according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs
Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter, Lawrence, and King,
Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David Grant.
The meeting touched on various topics, however, particular emphasis was given to
the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts. (251)
(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the Secret Service
is as follows:
. . . I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not
desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the
crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear. (252)
. . . when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers alongside the
President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers should be back
and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there was any movement at
all where the President was endangered in any way, these officers would be in a
position to gun their motors and get between them and the Presidential car . . .
(253)
(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the November 21
meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit assertion that the Secret
Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a rearward
distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:
Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on either side of the
motorcede immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated
that this was too many. that he thought two motorcycles on either side would be
sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was
instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the
rear. (254)
(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated that the
alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution concerned the number
of motorcycles, not their physical locations in relation to the Presidential
limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence
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528
versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of
security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.
(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding that the
President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles
surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with conversations
taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were
positioned "just back" of the limousine. (255) Lawson stated to the committee
that he had "no recall of, changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the Dallas
Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21. (256)
(97) There are several instances of failure by the motorcycle officers to adhere
to Lawson's final plan involving two cycles on each side and to the rear of the
Presidential limousine. (257)
(98) Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence testimony as to the
alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had originally been
instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later informed by his sergeant
that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the officers were to fall in
beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10 minutes before the
motorcade left Love Field.(258)
(99) As to actual deployment of the cycles, DPD officers Billy Joe Martin and
Bobby W. Harris were assigned to ride immediately to the left and rear of
Kennedy's limousine.* (259) Martin stated that he rode 5 feet to the left and 6
to 8 feet to the rear of the back bumper. (260) He indicated that he saw Hargis
to his right as he left Houston for Elm.(261)
(100) Hargis, too, rode to the rear left side of the limousine and remained even
with its bumper rather than move "past" the President's car. He testified that
as he turned left onto Elm Street, he was staying right up with Kennedy's car
though crowd density prevented him from staying right up next to it.
Nevertheless, because of the thinning out of the crowd by the triple overpass.
Hargis stated that he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy when he heard the first
shot. (262)
(101) Officers M.L. Baker and Clyde A. Haygood were assigned to the right rear
of the Presidential limousine. (263) The activity of both indicated again a
departure from standard maximum security protection. Haygood, for example,
admitted that although he was stationed to the right rear of Kennedy's car, he
was generally riding several cars back(264) and offered no explanation for this.
Haygood testified before the Warren Commission that he was on Main Street at the
time of the shooting. (265)
(102) Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his sergeant not to
ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to fall in beyond
the press car. (266) Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to place
himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy.(267) Baker was on Houston Street
at the time of the first shot.(268) Haygood and Baker were too far from the
presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no
position
--------------------------------
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to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level incident, yet
the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale
for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (269)
(103) Kellerman who rode in the right front seat of the Presidential limousine
testified before the Warren Commission that there were two motorcycles on each
side of the rear wheel of the President's car. (270)
Nevertheless, he was not asked either about the reason for that positioning or
whether the two motorcycles on the right side were there at the time of the
shooting.
(104) The Secret Service`s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department
motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security
precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the
limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward
deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles
originally intended for use.
(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motor cades during
the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the
Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey
Report for the November 21 visit to Houston stated that in all motorcade
movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional
33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcede and cover the
intersections."(271) There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final
Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential
limousine. (272)
(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November that the President
did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the Presidential
vehicle. (273) If the word "flank"' denotes parallel deployment, and if in fact
such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering
Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan the Secret
Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day
before in Houston. (274)
(107) Besides limiting motorcycle protection, Lawson prevented the Dallas Police
Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the Vice-Presidential car,
a Dallas Police Department squad car containing homicide detectives. For the
Secret Service, the rejection of this Dallas Police Department suggestion was
not unusual in itself. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that-with
the exception of New York City motorcades, it was not the Secret Service's
standard practice to insert a police homicide car into a motorcade. (275) He did
not remember who recommended either its insertion, its proposed placement, or
its cancellation. (276)
(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels and Dallas
Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of
vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be."(277)
Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he "thought we
had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade
behind the Vice President's car."(278) Sorrels spoke up at that point
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530
and stated that "nothing was discussed on that."(279) Lawson explained that a
car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added
that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of
the motorcade. (280) Curry then structed Deputy Chief Lunday to take care of the
matter. (281)
(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary survey report of
November 19,(282) he made no mention in the sequenced list of motorcade vehicles
of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on November 14 to have been included
and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of November 21. He answered
that "the DPD could have put it [a DPD car] in on their own"; that "he could not
recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was scheduled to be there";
and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car because he didn't know who
decided to include it."(283)
Submitted by:
G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief counsel and Staff Director.
GARY T. CORNWELL,
Deputy Chief Counsel.
BELFORD V. LAWSON III,
Staff Counsel.
References
Page 530
REFERENCES
(1) Scott, Peter Dale, Government Documents and the Kennedy Assassination
(unpublished draft), House Select Committee on Assassinations, chapter I, page
12 (JFK document No. 000814).
(2) Ibid.; chapter III, page 32 (Secret Service); chapter II, pages 1-12
(rightwing businessmen); chapter III, pages 28, 31, 34, 35 (Governor John B.
Connally). See also outside contact (with anonymous phone caller), August 17,
1978, pages 1-2 (JFK document No. 010827).
(3) Deposition of Jerry Bruno, August 18, 1978. House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pages 27-28 (JFK document No. 014025).
(4) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, hearings before the
President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) (hereinafter referred
to as Warren Commission Hearings); volume 7, page 443.
(5) Staff Interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 010696). See also testimony of John B.
Connally, September 6, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), volume I, page 28 (hereinafter referred to as Connally
testimony), September 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 28.
(6) Ibid., HSCA-JFK hearings. 29.
(7) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).
(8) Id. at p. 10.
(9) Id. at p. 10. See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 19644, Warren
Commission hearings, volume VII, page 444.
(10) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 014025). See also deposition of J. Eric
Jonsson, July 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 17 (JFK
document No. 014022).
(11) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, :1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).
(12) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
volume VII, page 443.
(13) Id. at p. 443.
(14) Map of Dallas, Tex., copyright by Rand McNally, House Select Committee on
Assassinations JFK document No. 014976).
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531
(15) Ibid.
(16) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 9 (JFK document No. 010696). See also deposition of Jerry
Bruno, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pages 34-35
(JFK document No. 014025). See also, testimony of Dallas Field Office SAIC
Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, volume VII, page 335.
(17) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 31 (JFK document No. 014025). See also testimony of Kenneth
O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, volume VII, page 443.
(18) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 41 (JFK document No. 014025).
(19) Id. at pp. 40-41.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
(22) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 443. See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 48 (JFK
Document No. 014025).
(23) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 11.
(24) Id. at pp. 11, 12, 13.
(25) Id. at p. 11.
(26) Id. at p. 12.
(27) Id. at p. 12.
(28) Id. at pp. 12-13.
(29) Id. at pp. 11, 12, 13.
(30) Id. at p. 13.
(31) Id. at p. 13.
(32) Id. at p. 13.
(33) Id. at p. 14.
(34) Id. at p. 13.
(35) Id. at pp. 13, 16.
(36) Id. at p. 13.
(37) Id. at p. 14.
(38) Id. at p. 16.
(39) Id. at p. 16.
(40) Id. at p. 15.
(41) Id. at p. 15.
(42) Id. at pp. 15, 16. See also affidavit of Clifford Carter, May 20, 1964,
Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 475.
(43) Id. at p. 16.
(44) Id. at p. 16.
(45) Id. at pp. 16, 17.
(46) Id. at pp. 16-17.
(47) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 4-5 (J.F.K. Document No.
014025). See also notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK Document
No. 004074).
(48) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 5, 6 (JFK Document No. 014025).
(49) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 19-20. See also JFK
Exhibit No. F-17.
(50) Id. at p. 24.
(51) Id. at p. 24.
(52) Id. at p. 18.
(53) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. III, pp. 441-442.
(54) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 18.
(55) Id. at p. 18.
(56) Id. at p. 25.
(57) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(58) Id. at p. 26.
(59) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025). See
also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 1 (JFK document No.
004074).
(60) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 11. See also
handwritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, p. 1 (JFK document No. 011337).
Page 532
532
(61) Connally testimony, July 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(62) Id. at p. 26.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025).
(67) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp. 1, 2 (JFK
document No. 004074).
(68) Id. at p. 4.
(69) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(70) Id. at p. 26.
(71) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document
No. 004074).
(72) Id. at p. 8. See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK
hearings; 26.
(73) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(74) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 12 (JFK document No. 014025).
(75) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK Document
No. G04074). See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK heatings,
26.
(76) Connally testimony, Sept. 16, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid. See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren
Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 442.
(79) Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
(80) Id. at p. 29. See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13. 1977,
HSCA, p. S (JFK document No. 004074); Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
26, 29, 32.
(81) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 24-25, 26.
(82) Id at p. 25.
(83) Id. at p. 26.
(84) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025). See
also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document
No. 004074).
(85) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 15 (JFK document No. 14025).
(86) Id. at p. 15.
(87) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp. 1, 3, 7, 8 (JFK
document No. 004074).
(88) Minutes of the Board of Trustees of Texas Christian University, June 1,
1978, HSCA, p. 208 (JFK document No. 008813).
(89) Id. at pp. 6, 8.
(90) Staff interview of Sam P. Woodson, Jr., May 10, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK
document No. 013381).
(91) Id. at p. 5.
(92) Id. at p. 6.
(93) Id. at p. 6.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Ibid. See also staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. (JFK
document No. 010696).
(97) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 22 (JFK document No. 014025).
(98) Testimony of Buell W. Frazier, Mar. 11, 1964, Warren Commission hearings.
vol. II, p. 233. See also Warren Commission Exhibit 698; JFK exhibit F-13.
(99) Connally testimony, Sept. 6. 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49.
(100) Ibid. See also JFK exhibit F-17.
(101) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49-50.
(102) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno. Sept. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 9 (JFK document
No. 011337).
(103) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document
No. 007066).
Page 533
533
(104) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(105) Deposition of J. Eric Jonsson, July 26, 1978, HSCA, pp. 443 (JFK document
No. 014022).
(106) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978. I HSCA-JFK hearings, 27 (statement of
the basic plan), 28 (objection to a lengthy downtown motorcade).
(106A) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, pp. 2-7, 9 (JFK
document No. 010696).
(107) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document
No. 010696).
(108) Connally testimony, Sept. 6. 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
(109) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document
No. 010696).
(110) Ibid.
(111) Id. at p. 9.
(112) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 31 (JFK document No. 014025).
(113) Id. at p. 32.
(114) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 39-40 (JFK document No.
014025).
(115) Id. at p. 39.
(116) Id. at pp. 41-42.
(117) Id. at pp. 41-42.
(118) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1969, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 334.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Id. at p. 335.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, p. 2 (JFK
document No. 007062).
(123) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 35 (JFK document No. 014025).
(124) Id. at p. 30.
(125) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 25
(JFK document No. 013152).
(126) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978. HSCA, p. 30 (JFK document No. 014025).
(127) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document
No. 004074). See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 197S, HSCA, pp. 34-35 (JFK
document No. 014025).
(128) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p- 35 (JFK document No. 014025).
(129) Executive session testimony of Gerald Behn, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, pp. 73,
74 (JFK document No. 014670).
(130) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA. p. 35 (JFK document No. 014025).
See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 8 (JFK document No.
004074).
(131) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 36 (JFK document No. 014025).
(132) Id. at pp. 34, 35.
(133) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, pp. 318, 319. See also staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31,
1978. HSCA, pp. 1-5 (JFK document No. 007066).
(134) Ibid.
(135) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p.
319.
(136) Id. at pp. 322, 336.
(137) Lawson testimony, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 337.
(138) Id. at p. 337.
(139) For the basis of Bruno's belief that the Women's Building was initially
selected as the final choice, see footnotes 127, 128, 130, supra. The omission
of the Warren Commission to obtain exhibits or to take testimony either from
Behn or from Bruno is documented at Warren Commission hearings, vol. XV, pp.
755, 757, 815.
(140) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 36, 37 (JFK document No.
014025).
Page 534
534
(141) Id. at p. 36.
(142) Id. at p. 37.
(143) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, pp. 335-341. See also staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 1978,
HSCA, pp. 2-3 (JFK document No. 007062).
(144) See footnotes 127-131, supra.
(145) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol IV, p. 337.
(146) Id. at p. 337.
(147) Id. at pp. 337, 338.
(148) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document
No. 007066).
(149) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, IlSCA, p. 9 (JFK document
No. 011337).
(150) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, IlSCA, p. 49 (JFK document No. 014025).
(151) Deposition of Bill Moyers, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 26 (JFK document No.
014018).
(152) Id. at p. 26.
(153) Id. at p. 28.
(154) Id. at p. 28.
(155) Id. at pp. 25, 29.
(156) Id. at p. 32.
(157) Id. at p. 33.
(158) Ibid.
(159) Ibid.
(160) See footnote 149, supra.
(161) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 49.
(162) Id. at p. 51.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Ibid.
(165) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978. IlSCA, p. 9 (JFK document
No. 011337). See also Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, D. (JFK document
No. 014018).
(166) Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 6 (JFK document No. 014018).
(167) Ibid.
(168) Id. at pp. 22-23.
(169) Id. at p. 22.
(170) Id. at pp. 22, 23.
(171) Id. at p. 23.
(172) Id. at p. 23.
(173) Id. at p. 24.
(174) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 11
(JFK document No. 013152).
(175) Connally testimony, Jan. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 13.
(176) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 13
(JFK document No. 013152).
(177) Id. at p. 13.
(178) Id. at p. 14.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Id. at pp. 21-22.
(181) Id. at p. 22.
(182) Ibid.
(183) Id. at p. 25.
(184) Id. at p. 26.
(185) Id. at p. 25.
(186) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 341.
(187) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA. p. 7 (JFK document
No. 007066).
(188) Id. at p. 7. See also Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964. Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, pp. 340, 341; staff interview of Jack Puterbaugh, Apr. 14,
1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 008580).
Page 535
535
(189) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964. Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 337.
(190) Id. at pp. 337, 338.
(191) Staff interview of George L. Lumpkin, Nov. 3, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK
document No. 003087).
(192) Id. at p. 1.
(193) Id. at p. 2.
(194) Id. at p. 2.
(195) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA p. 3 (JFK document
No. 007066).
(196) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, p. 4 (JFK
document No. 007062).
(197) Sorrels Exhibit No. 4, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, p. 2,
vol. XXI, p. 547.
(198) Executive session testimony of Robert I. Bouck, Nov. 17, 1977, HSCA, pp.
7-31 (JFK document No. 014609).
(199) Ibid. See also deposition (book II) of 1963 Secret Service Chief James
Rowley, Aug. 24, 1978, HSCA, pp. 8, 64 (JFK document No. 014026). A report from
a field office, if addressed to the office of the chief, would be delivered
either to PRS or to the office 0£ the head of protective operations.
(200) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p.
343.
(201) testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
II, pp. 63, 105.
(202) Id. at pp. 106, 107.
(203) Id. at p. 107.
(204) Id. at p. 108.
(205) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 319.
(206) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
Vl, p. 105.
(207) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, p. 321.
(208) Id. at pp. 322, 323.
(209) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
II, pp. 108, 109.
(210) Id. at p. 109.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Id. at pp. 109-111.
(213) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 21, 1963 to
Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No. 014979).
(214) Id. at p. 7.
(215) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
II, pp. 108--112.
(216) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol
VII, pp. 338, 339.
(217) Id. at p. 339.
(218) Id. at p. 339.
(219) Ibid. See also Warren Commission Exhibit No. CE 770.
(220) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, p. 345.
(221) Id. at pp. 323, 345.
(222) Id. at pp. 323, 344, 345.
(223) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1979, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK
document No. 007062).
(224) Id. at p. 3.
(225) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK
document No. 007066).
(226) Id. at p. 11.
(227) Id. at p. 9.
(228) Staff interview of Gerald Behn, Jan. 30, 1978, HSCA, p. 4 (JFK document
No. 012998).
(229) Id. at p. 4.
(230) Id. at p. 5.
(231) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, p. 326.
Page 536
536
(232) Id. at pp. 326, 327.
(233) Id. at pp. 339, 340.
(234) Id. at p. 333.
(235) Id. at p. 333.
(236) Testimony 0£ Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 337.
(237) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 2.3, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, pp. 328, 329.
(238) Id. at p. 331.
(239) Id. at p. 330.
(240) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 343.
(241) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. IV, p. 330.
(242) Id. at p. 349.
(243) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 28
(JFK document No. 013152).
(244) Id. at p. 28.
(245) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearIngs,
vol. VII, p. 581.
(246) Id. at p. 378.
(247) Id. at p. 579.
(248) Id. at p. 579.
(249) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, vol
XXI, p. 567.
(250) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 580.
(251) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. XXI, pp. 589-571.
(252) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, p. 580.
(253) Id. at p. 581.
(254) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. XXI, p. 571.
(255) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964. Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VII, pp. 338, 339.
(256) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document
No. 007066).
(257) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission, vol. IV, p.
338. See also footnote 257, supra,
(258) Testimony of Marion L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. 111, p. 244.
(259) Staff interview of Billy Joe Martin, Sept. 27, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK
document No. 002393). See also staff interview of Billy Joe Martin, Jan. 17,
1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014372). Martin confirms the Presidential
objection to the close positioning of motorcycles.
(260) Testimony of Billy Joe Martin, Apr. 3, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VI, p. 290.
(261) Id. at p. 290.
(262) Testimony of Bobby W. Hargis, Apr. 8, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VI, p. 294. See also staff interview of Bobby Weldon Hargis, Jan. 17, 1979,
HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 14362). Crowd pressure removed Hargis from his
position and pushed him rearward. See also staff interview of Robert W. Hargis,
Oct. 26, 1977, Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK document No.
003300).
(263) Testimony of Clyde A. Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. VI, p. 297. Cf. staff interview of Clyde A. Haygood, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK
Document No. 002392).
(264) Testimony of Clyde Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
Vl, p. 297.
(265) Id. at p. 297.
(266) Testimony of Marion L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. III, p. 244. See also staff interview of Marion L. Baker, Jan. 17, 1978,
HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014899). Baker corroborated Martin's account (see
footnote 259, supra) of the President's objection to close positioning of
Page 537
537
motorcycles and asserted that the President was responsible for Baker's position
near the press bus.
(267) Id. at p. 245.
(268) Id. at p. 245.
(269) See footnote 253, supra.
(270) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 5964, Warren Commission hearings, vol.
II, p. 70.
(271) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 21, 1963,
to Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA p. 6 (JFK document No. 014979).
(272) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 22, 1963,
to Fort Worth, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 014980).
(273) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. II, pp. 136-137. See also testimony of Winston G. Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964,
Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 338.
(274) See footnote 271, supra.
(275) Warren Commission testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 334.
(276) Id. at p. 334.
(277) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings,
vol. XXI, p. 563.
(278) Id. at p. 570.
(279) Id. at p. 570.
(280) Id. at p. 570.
(281) Id. at p. 571.
(282) Warren Commission Exhibit No. 767, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XVII,
p. 596.
(283) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, pp. 7, 8 (JFK
document No. 007066).
Page 538
538
(Blank Page)
Possible Military Investigation of the Assassination
Page 539
539
POSSIBLE MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF
THE ASSASSINATION
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(539)
Contents
Page 540
540
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Huff allegation .............................................................(1)
The committee's investigation ....................................... (2)
Huff interview and deposition ......................... (11)
Moffitt interview......................................... (22)
Roberts interview.......................................... (27)
Morgan Interview.......................................... (31)
Contacts with CID officers................................(33)
Morgan letter ............................................. (41)
(540)
Huff Allegation
Page 541
POSSIBLE MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE
ASSASSINATION
HUFF ALLEGATION
(1) In March 1977, the committee received information that the military had
conducted an investigation of Oswald after the assassination. The information
came in a letter from Gloria Deane Huff of Pinehurst, Idaho, who wrote that her
present husband, Larry Huff, had participated in one of the investigative teams
while in the military. (1) Mrs. Huff indicated that she wanted to bring this
information to the attention of the committee because, despite all the published
reports about the assassination and subsequent Government investigations, she
had never seen any information about the investigation in which her husband
participated. (2)
The Committee's Investigation
Page 541
THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION
(2) Pursuant to the information received from Mrs. Huff, the committee undertook
to verify the alleged investigation and any reports that may have resulted. The
committee requested pertinent files of the appropriate agencies* and interviewed
persons who would have had direct knowledge of such an investigation.
(3) The committee contacted Larry Huff at his home in Pineburst, Idaho, by
telephone on March 21, 1977. (3) At that time, he confirmed the substance of the
letter his wife had sent the committee. He additionally identified the
commanding officer, Lt. Gen. Carson A. Roberts, who, according to Huff, would
have been in charge of the investigative team at Camp Smith, Hawaii, which was
purportedly the base from which one investigative team originated. (4) Huff said
during the telephone interview that Lieutenant General Roberts served as
commander in chief of the fleet of the 1st Marine Brigade, Pacific Marine
Force.(5) According to Huff, the teams were dispatched to Japan and Dallas and
the report of the investigation was classified "Secret--For Marine Corps Eyes
Only."(6)
(4) On March 23, 1977, the committee wrote Lt. Col. Carl Miller of the Marine
Corps Liaison Office and requested all Marine Corps documents concerning the
assassination of President Kennedy; (7) the request was phrased broadly to
include any materials of such an investigation which might not be easily
identifiable. On June 6, 1977, the committee wrote Gen. Louis Wilson, Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and made a similar request.(8)
(5) The committee then sought to contact the individuals who were responsible
for compiling records of Oswald's military background. It
-------------------------------
(541)
Page 542
542
was believed that evidence or reports of such an investigation after the
assassination would have appeared in Oswald's file. The committee contacted Lt.
Col. Bill Brewer of the Intelligence Division of Marine Corps Headqurters on
August 1, 1977. (9) Brewer had been in charge of compiling the Oswald military
file for the use of the Warren Commission. (10) Brewer stated that the Warren
Commission had been interested primarily in records concerning Oswald's security
classification in the military and that his records check had only included
local records within the individual commands where Oswald had served and did not
include records that were classified secret or top secret. (11) He said his
office had no investigative jurisdiction.
(6) The committee has contacted Roy Elmquist of the Office of Naval Intelligence
on August 1, 1977. Elmquist stated that the only investigative request to the
Office of Naval Intelligence from the Marine Corps that had any bearing on
Oswald or the assassination concerned the death of Martin Schrand, who had
served at Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines at the same time
Oswald had in 1958 and who had died from a gunshot wound while on guard duty.
(13) Elmquist stated further that any other investigation pertinent to the
assassination would have been conducted by the FBI(14).
(7) On August 2, 1977, the committee wrote Capt. Donald Nielsen, the Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense, and
requested all material concerning Lee Harvey Oswald and the investigation of the
assassination of President Kennedy in the possession of the Naval Investigative
Service. (15)
(8) On February 15, 1978, in a phone conversation with committee staff, Huff
further identified the airplanes that he said were used in the investigation by
the military. He stated at that time that one plane flew from El Toro or Camp
Pendleton in California to Dallas in December ]963. (16) He said the plane was a
KC-130. The second plane had flown from Camp Smith, Hawaii, to Atsugi Naval Air
Station in Japan between December 7 and 22, 1963. (17) It was a C-54 plane with
serial No. 50855. (18) Huff identified the commander of the plane as Chief
Warrant Officer Morgan. (19)
(9) On March 9, 1978, the committee requested the following documents from the
Department of Defense:
1. Any and all records (including logs and crew lists) pertaining to or
concerning the flight of a C-54 military plane, serial No. 50855, which departed
Camp Smith, Hawaii on December 7, 1963 for Japan and returned on December 22,
1963.
2. Any and all records (including logs and crew lists) pertaining to or
concerning the flight of a KC-130 military plane which departed El Toro or Camp
Pendleton base in California the first weekend in December 1963 for Dallas, Tex.
3. Any and all records, including classified material, concerning or referring
to an investigation by the Marine Corps or the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations into the J.F.K. assassination. It is believed the investigation
took place at Atsugi Air Base, Japan, and the El Toro Marine Base, Santa Ana,
Calif., in December 1963. (20)
The committee also included in that request that Lt. Gen. Carson Roberts and
Chief Warrant Officer Morgan be made available for
Page 543
543
interview, or if either man is no longer a member of the military, that the
committee be provided with the last known address for each. (21)
(10) On April 19, 1978, the Department of Defense responded that the Air Force
had no records on Roberts or Morgan and that it had no flight records concerning
either military plane identified in the committee's request. (22) Regarding the
records of the alleged military investigation, the Department of Defense
responded that it had no record that the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations had conducted an investigation into the assassination of
President Kennedy in Japan or California in 1963. (23) The Department explained
that it believed the alleged investigation was being confused with an
investigation that was conducted on Oswald's half-brother, John Edward Pic. (24)
According to the Department, the Pic investigation records were destroyed
because no "derogatory information" (which presumably means information which
would have been relevant to the assassination investigation) was developed;
portions of that file relating to Oswald, however, were still on file and
available for review by the committee at the Pentagon. (25) In May 1978, the
Department of Defense provided the committee with the present addresses of
Lieutenant General Roberts(26) and Chief Warrant Officer Morgan,(27) who had
both retired from the military.
Huff Interview and Deposition
Page 543
HUFF INTERVIEW AND DEPOSITION
(11) Larry Huff was interviewed and deposed by the committee on May 8 and 9,
1978, to get further details of the investigation Huff related to the committee.
During the deposition in U.S. district court for the Eastern district of
Washington at Spokane, Wash., on May 9, 1978, Huff stated under oath that on
December 14, 1963, he departed Kaneohe Base in Hawaii in a C-54-T aircraft,
serial number 50855, for Wake Island, with Chief Warrant Officer Morgan as
pilot. (28) He stated that the plane continued from Wake Island to Tachikawa.,
Japan.(29) Huff stated that there were 10 to 12 CID military investigators on
that flight. (30) They disembarked at Tachikawa, Japan, which Huff identified as
the closest landing base to the base at Atsugi. (31)
(12) Huff stated that he would have received written orders for the flight the
day before from Major Rice, who was the commanding officer at Kaneohe Bay. (32)
Huff said that the orders from Rice normally originated from the command of the
Fleet Marine Corps of the Pacific at Camp Smith, over which Lieutenant Genera]
Roberts was commanding officer. (33) In the case of this flight, Huff did not
know for sure where the orders originated, but that they could also have come
from Marine Corps headquarters. (34).
(13) Huff explained that he had served as a navigator at Camp Smith and that his
normal responsibilities included transporting military crews. (35) He had
received no debriefing or special instructions for this flight; he said he
learned the purpose of the trip by the CID investigators through conversations
on the plane during the flight. Huff said that no other intelligence personnel
were present on the flight.
(14) During the deposition, Huff used a log he maintained during his career in
the military for the exact dates of the flights and other
Page 544
544
data about the plane. He made those logs available to the committee. The log
entry for December 14, 1963 states that a C-54 with serial No. 50855 flew from
Kaneohe Bay to Wake Island with Warrant Officer Morgan as pilot; the flying time
was 11.1 hours.(38) On December 15, the same plane continued from Wake Island to
Guam; it flew from Guam to Okinawa on December 16 and then to Tachikawa by way
of Hong Kong on December 20, 1963. (39)
(15) Huff stated in the deposition that he returned to Kaneohe Bay after leaving
the investigators in Japa.n to investigate Oswald's activities at Atsugi. (40)
He also said that he believed he returned to Japan to pick the CID team up later
in December 1963. (41) According to Huff's logbook and his testimony, he made
two trips from Tachikawa during that period, one on December 22, 1963 (which
presumably would have been the flight when Huff returned to Hawaii after leaving
the investigative team) and another on January 1964, from Kaneohe Bay to Iwakuni
and Atsugi in Japan; he returned from the latter trip on February 5, 1964. (42)
The trips in January had Captain Kruse as pilot of the plane, which was
identified as a VC 54-P, serial number 90392. (43)
(16) Huff stated in the deposition that the return flight from Japan to Kaneohe
Bay included the same team of CID investigators he had flown earlier.(44) On the
return flight, he had spoken with the investigators about their work in Japan
and was told they had spent the entire stay investigating Oswald. (45) Huff said
that during that flight he was allowed to read the report prepared by the
investigators.(46) He described the report as being typewritten, about 20
pages,(47) and classified "Secret, for Marine Corps Eyes Only." (48) Huff
recollected that the substance of the report dealt with interviews of
individuals and that it contained psychological evaluation of Oswald.(49) Huff
remembered the conclusion being that Oswald was incapable of committing the
assassination alone.(50) Huff said he read the report for about 30 minutes. (51)
(17) Huff was asked during the deposition what circumstances existed that would
have allowed him to see such a report.(52) He replied that it was not unusual
for him to have had access to it; he had been granted a secret clearance by the
military on March 5, 1956, which would have allowed him access to classified
materials.(53) Huff stated that he has never seen the report again nor heard any
reference to it. (54) He surmised that the report would be kept intelligence
files either at the Intelligence Division of Camp Smith or with the Commandant
of the Marine Corps in Washington, D.C.(55)
(18) Huff stated during the deposition that he did not recall the names of any
oF the CID team and that he had never flown with them before. (56) Besides the
captains of the two flights, Huff could not recall exactly who the other members
of the crew were. Nevertheless, he stated that he usually flew with a radio
operator named Ralph K. Fall and another navigator named Roy Gibson. (57)
(19) Huff also stated that soon after the assassination in November 1963, he had
received word of another investigative team which was to travel to Dallas to
investigate the assassination. Huff said in the deposition that he was at El
Toro Marine Corps Air Station in
Page 545
545
California on November 23, 1963. (58) His logbook entry for that period
indicates that Huff flew from Kaneohe Bay to El Toro on November 16 and 17 and
that he left El Toro and returned to Kaneohe Bay on November 23. (59) Huff said
that while at El Toro, he had had a conversation with George Moffitt, a friend
who was also a senior navigator at El Toro.(60) According to Huff, Mofitt told
Huff that he, Moffitt, had received orders to prepare a navigation team to
assist a flight going to Dallas to conduct an investigation. (61)
(20) Huff said he left El Toro soon after hearing this from Mofitt and never
heard any results or the outcome of that flight. He did not know if Moffitt
actually went along on the flight.(62) He identified Moffitt as a master gunnery
sergeant at El Toro. (63)
(21) When the committee interviewed Huff at his home on May 8, 1978, in
preparation for the deposition the next day, Huff give them a list of addresses
and phone numbers of military friends he had served with. (64) Huff explained
that the list had been mailed to him earlier that year in preparation for a
reunion being planned. (65) The list contained a cover letter outlining plans
for the reamion.(66) George Moffitt's address and phone number were included on
that list. (67) In an attempt to provide the names of other personnel from
Kaneohe Bay and Camp Smith, Huff stated additionally that Tom Allen was the
chief mechanic at Camp Smith and that Allen might be able to remember details
about the use of military planes at Camp Smith. (68) The list also contained an
address and telephone number for Tom Allen. (69) The Committee attempted to
locate Allen at that address but could not do so.
Moffit Interview
Page 545
MOFFIT INTERVIEW
(22) The committee did contact George Moffitt in California and arranged time
for in interview. When contacted by the committee, Mofitt stated that he wanted
to clear the interview with the interview with the military and have the
assistance of military counsel. (70) The interview took place on June 15, 1978,
in the Office of Legal Counsel at El Toro Marine Base. During that interview,
Moffitt stated that he worked as a navigator at El Toro with the rank of master
gunnery sergeant. (71)
When asked about his activities in November and December 1963. Moffitt stated
that he did not believe he had participated in a flight to Dallas.(72) Moffitt
stated he is certain that he never told Huff that he participated in either the
planning or execution of a trip to Dallas in connection with an assassination
investigation.(73) Moffitt said additionally that he had no information or
knowledge of anyone participating in such a military investigation following the
assassination. (74)
(23) Moffitt said he knew Larry Huff and that they were tog¢her at the time of
the assassination. (75) Mott said he knew the names of Chief Warrant Officer
Morgan, Major Rice, Tom Allen, Ralph Fall, and Captain Kruse, but that he could
not recall where he knew each of those men. (76) He recalled that Lt. Gen.
Carson Roberts was the commanding officer of the Fleet Marine Force operating
out of Camp Smith. (77) He said that at least one C-54 plane was detailed to
Roberts. (78)
Page 546
546
(24) Moffitt said that it would not be unusual for him to transport CID
personnel; (79) he had received a top secret clearance in 1961. (80)
(25) Moffitt said he did not know for sure if he traveled to or from Dallas in
November 1963 but that master logs maintained by the military would indicate the
record of such flights (81) In addition, Moffitt provided the committee with his
personal log book which he also maintained during his military career. (82) The
only entry by Moffit for November 1963 indicates a total flight time of 17.5
hours and a notation of "KO-130 F", presumably referring to a type of plane.
(83) The log book spans the period from August 1957 through 1964; however, the
period December 1962 through December 1963 only carries notations for the types
of plane, with no information regarding origins of flights or destinations such
as are made for all of the other months in the book. (84)
(26) Moffitt was asked by the committee during the interview if he knew of any
reason why Huff would give the information to the committee regarding an alleged
military investigation of the assassination contrary to the information being
given by Moffitt. Moffitt responded that he knew of no such reason and that he
had no reason to question Huff's credibility. (85) Moffitt explained that he and
Huff were good friends and that their relationship had included house sitting
for each other when one was sent overseas.(86) During the interview the Marine
Corps attorney who was present repeated the question of whether Moffitt knew of
any reason to doubt Huff's credibility and Moffit repeated that he did not. (87)
The Marine Corps attorney then repeated the question a second time; that time
Moffitt relied that he believed Huff had a mental problem in the past and
perhaps that was a reason to question Huff's credibility. (88) Moffitt did not
elaborate or offer any details about Huff's purported mental problem.
Roberts Interview
Page 546
ROBERTS INTERVIEW
(27) Lt. Gen. Carson A. Roberts was interviewed by a committee staff
investigator on May 25, 1978, at his home in Whispering Pines, N.C. Roberts had
retired from military service on March 1, 1964.(89)
(28) During the interview, General Roberts stated that he was in command of Camp
Smith at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, at the time of the assassination in November 1963.
(90) He knew of no military flights nor investigations by military or civilian
personnel connected with the assassination of President Kennedy.(91) General
Roberts was asked specifically if he recalled any information about a flight of
CID investigators from Kaneohe Bay to Atsugi. Japan, to probe into the
background and associations of Lee Harvey Oswald.(92) General Roberts said that
he had no such knowledge, did not issue the orders for any such flight, and that
if such a flight or investigation had come to his attention, he would have
remembered it. (98) However, he also stated that it would be possible for such
orders to be issued from naval headquarters in Washington, D.C., and that he
might not necessarily have known about those orders. (94)
(29) When asked about the planes which were, under his personal command, General
Roberts consulted the log book he maintained during
Page 547
547
his military service which he then kept at his home. After reviewing the log, he
stated that a V-5-54-P model plane with serial No. 90392 was assigned to him at
the time of the assassination. (95) General Roberts said the log book indicated
that he did not participate in any flights from June 1963 to January 1964. (96)
He stated that it would have been unusual for his plane to have been used for
any missions without his knowledge. He explained also that he only maintained
records of flights on which he personally flew.(97)
(30) General Roberts told the committee investigator that log books and any of
official records concerning the plane would be sent to either Marine Operations
or to the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington, D.C., when the plane was no
longer in use by the military.(98)
Morgan Interview
Page 547
MORGAN INTERVIEW
(31) Roger G. Morgan was interviewed by committee staff by telephone on November
7, 1978. He stated that he was a commanding officer of military transport
flights at Kaneohe Bar in Hawaii at the time of the assassination. (99) When
asked if he had flown a team of CID investigators to Japan in December 1963 in
connection with an investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy,
Morgan said that he would not normally have known who his passengers were on the
military transports, even if they had included a team of CID investigators.(100)
Further, his flight orders would not necessarily have included that
information.(101) Morgan also said that after so many years, he could not
remember such a flight or incident, but that he had no recollection of having
had anything to do with an assassination investigation. (102) Morgan was asked
if he would consult his personal flight logs to see if they shed any light on
any flights to Japan he might have participated in after the assassination.
(103) He then asked that the committee write him what specific information it
wanted from his log books and he would consult them for that.(104) The committee
sent a letter to Morgan on that same date requesting information about the
dates, crews and destinations of military flights on which he participated from
Kaneohe Bay to Atsugi or Tachikawa, Japan, in December 1963.(105)
(32) Morgan identified Lt. Gen. Carson Roberts as the Commander of the Pacific
Fleet at Kaneohe Bay at the time of the assassination. (106) He stated that Maj.
Don Rice was also an executive of Hcer at Kaneohe Bay at that time. (107)
Contacts With CID Officers
Page 547
CONTACTS WITH CID OFFICERS
(33) Based on that information from Morgan, the committee requested on November
9, 1978, that the Defense Department make Major Rice available for
interview.(108) On June 26, 1978, the committee had already requested that Major
Rice be made available based on the information provided by Larry Huff;(109)
however, the Defense Department had not been able to locate material
identifiable with Major Rice because the committee could not at that time
provide Rice's first, name.
(34) In a further effort to determine whether the military had in fact conducted
an investigation of Oswald or the assassination which
Page 548
548
might contain information not released previously, the committee requested that
the Department of Defense identify the chief CID officers who would have had
knowledge of or involvement in such an investigation. On June 19, 1978, the
committee requested in writing that the chief CID officers who were stationed at
El Toro Marine Base in California and Camp Smith in Hawaii in November and
December 1963 be made available for interview. (110) The committee also
requested that the chief CID officer for the Marine Corps for that period also
be made available to the committee.(111)
(35) Because Huff, Moffitt, Lieutenant General Roberts had all indicated their
belief that information concerning flights master logs for military air and
crews of military aircraft would be located in files permanently at Marine Corps
headquarters, the committee requested in writing to the Defense Department on
June 26, 1978, that it be provided access to "any and all master logs,
concerning or referring to military aircraft stationed at Camp Smith, Hawaii and
El Toro Marine Base in November and December 1963." (112)
(36) In a letter dated July 26, 1978, the Department of Defense provided
information concerning the number and type of military aircraft stationed at El
Toro and Kaneohe Bay in 1963. According to that letter, 15 model KC-I30F planes
were among the total aircraft stationed at El Toro from October through December
1963; those planes were further identified as Lockheed transport planes.(113)
Additionally, two model C-54P planes were stationed at Kaneohe Bay during the
same period. (114) Those planes are identified as Douglas Skymaster transport
planes. (115)
(37) In the July 26 letter, the Department of Defense stated that no master logs
for military aircraft could be obtained through Marine Corps headquarters, but
that the committee could request that information through the Washington
National Record Center of the General Services Administration. (116)
(38) In a memorandum dated July 14, 1978, the Department of Defense responded to
the committee's letter of March 19, 1978, requesting that CID personnel be
identified and made available for interview.(117)
(39) Based on the last known address provided by the Defense Department, the
committee was unable to locate retired gunnery sergeant H.E. Aubrey, who was
identified as the chief CID investigator st Camp Smith in November-December
1963.
(40) On November 6, 1978, the committee interviewed by phone Harold Flower, who
served as a CID officer at El Toro Marine Base at the time of the assassination.
Flower stated Howard Bearden was in command of the CID unit at that time;
Bearden was deceased. (118) Flower stated that to his knowledge, no
investigation of the assassinator of Oswald was conducted in his command. and he
had no knowledge of such an investigation. (119) Flower said that if the Office
of Naval Intelligence had conducted such an investigation out of El Toro, he
would have known about it. (120) Flower was also asked if it were possible that
such an investigation could have been conducted out of El Toro using civilian
investigation personnel who would not have necessarily been under the command of
his CID unit. Flower said that if the local FBI office had conducted an inquiry
at El Toro, he would
Page 549
549
have known about it, because he personally knew all of the Special Agents
stationed at the local FBI field office in nearby Santa Ana, Calif.(121) Flower
said that although he had heard that Oswald had been stationed at the Marine
Corps Air Facility at Santa Ana, he had no other knowledge of Oswald's military
background.(122) Flower stated additionally that the Air Facility at Santa Ana
bad its own CID unit, which would be the appropriate repository of information
about Oswald. (123)
Morgan Letter
Page 549
MORGAN LETTER
(41) On December 8, 1978, the committee received a letter from former CWO Roger
G. Morgan dated December 5, 1978. In the letter, Morgan said he had consulted
his personal log books of his military service as had been requested by the
committee. (124) Morgan stated in the letter:
My personal log books do reflect the fact that I was the commander of a flight
from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii to Tachikawa AFB in Japan and return on the dates in
question.
The aircraft type was a C-54, assigned to Marine Aircraft "Group 13, Kaneohe
Bay, Hawaii. The aircraft bureau number was 50855. The names of other crew
members or passengers is not contained in these personal records, but could be
found in official records. (125)
Submitted by:
ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief Counsel and Staff Director.
GARY CORNWELL,
Deputy Chief Counsel.
SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.
References
Page 549
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from Gloria Huff, Mar. 8, 1977 (JFK document No. 01354S).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Staff outside contact report, Larry Huff, Mar. 21, 1977, HSCA (JFK
Document).
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Letter to Lt. Col. Carl Miller, Mar. 23, 1977, HSCA (JFK document No.
013563).
(8) Letter to Gen. Louis Wilson, June 6, 1977, HSCA (JFK document No. 013562).
(9) Staff outside contact report, Aug. 1, 1977, HSCA (JFK document No. 015030).
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Staff outside contact report, Aug. 1, 1977, HSCA (JFK document No. 015029).
(14) Ibid.
(15) Letter to Capt. Donald Nielsen, Aug. 2, 1977, HSCA. (JFK document No.
013564).
(16) Staff outside contact report, Larry Huff, Feb. 15, 1978, HSCA.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
Page 550
550
(19) Ibid.
(20) See outside contact report, Nov. 9, 1978, for reference to letter to Harold
Brown, Secretary of Defense, Mar. 9, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 015048).
(21) Ibid.
(22) Staff outside contact report, Apr. 19, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No.
007369).
(23) Id. at pp. 6-7.
(24) Id. at p. 7.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Staff outside contact report. May 1, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 007656).
(27) Staff outside contact report, May 5, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 008120).
(28) Deposition of Larry Cecil Huff, May 9, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No.
014615).
(29) Ibid.
(30) Id. at p. 9.
(31) Id. at p. 7.
(32) Id. at p. 8.
(33) Ibid.
(34) Id. at p. 9.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Id. at p. 10.
(37) Id. at p. 15.
(38) Aviator's flight log book of Larry Huff (JFK document No. 013552).
(39) Ibid.
(40) See ref. 28, Huff deposition, p. 11
(41) Ibid.
(42) See ref. 38.
(43) Ibid.
(44) See ref. 28, Huff deposition, 12.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid., p. 13.
(48) Ibid.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Id. at p. 15.
(52) Id. at pp. 13-14.
(53) Id. at p. 14.
(54) Id. at p. 15.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Id. at p. 9.
(57) Id. at p. 10.
(58) Id. at p. 16.
(59) See ref. 38.
(60) See ref. 28. Huff deposition, p. 16.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Id. at p. 17.
(63) Id. at p. 16.
(64) Letter from Roger E. Leblanc, June 15, 1977, with list attached (JFK
document No. 013551).
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid.
(68) Huff interview, May 8, 1978, HSCA, p. 2 (JFK document No. 008531).
(69) Ibid.
(70) Staff outside contact report, June 14, 1978, HSCA (JFK document 010037).
(71) Staff interview of George Moffitt, June 15, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document.
No. 10145).
(72) Ibid.
(73) Id. at p. 3.
(74) Id. at p. 2.
(75) Ibid.
Page 551
551
(76) Id. at p. 3.
(77) Id. at p. 1.
(78) Id. at p. 2.
(79) Ibid.
(80) Id. at p. 3.
(81) Id. at p. 2.
(82) Aviators flight log book of George Moffitt (JFK document No. 013554).
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) See ref. 71, Moffitt interview, p. 5.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Ibid.
(89) Staff interview of Gen. Carson A. Roberts, May 25, 1978, HSCA, p. 1. (JFK
document No. 009408).
(90) Ibid.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Id. at pp. 1-2.
(93) Id. at p. 2.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Id. at p. 3.
(96) Id. at p. 2.
(97) Id. at p. 3.
(98) Id. at p. 2.
(99) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No.
013020).
(100) Ibid.
(101) Id. at pp. 1-2.
(102) Id. at p. 1.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Staff letter to Roger G. Morgan, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No.
013080).
(106) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 2 (JFK document No.
013020).
(107) Ibid.
(108) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 9, 1978, HSCA (JFK
document No. 015048).
(109) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 26, 1978, HSCA (JFK
document No. 015048).
(110) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 19, 1978, HSCA (JFK
document No. 015048).
(111) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 26, 1978, HSCA (JFK
document No. 015048).
(112) Ibid.
(113) Fact sheet from Department of Defense, July 26, 1963, tab A (JFK
classified document No. 103).
(114) Ibid.
(115) Ibid.
(116) Ibid., enclosure 2, p. 10.
(117) Memorandum to the House Select Committee on Assassinations from Judy
Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 14, 1978 (JFK document No.
009986).
(118) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 6, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No.
013005).
(119) Ibid.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Id. at p. 2.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Letter from Roger G. Morgan to House Select Committee of Assassinations
staff, Dec. 5, 1978 (JFK document No. 013576).
(125) Ibid.
Volume XII
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
APPENDIX TO
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
VOLUME XII
CONSPIRACY WITNESSES IN DEALEY PLAZA
OSWALD-TIPPIT ASSOCIATES
GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT
DEPOSITIONS OF MARINA OSWALD PORTER
THE DEFECTOR STUDY
OSWALD IN THE SOVIET UNION: AN INVESTIGATION OF
URI NOSENKO
MARCH 1979
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 052-070-04983-9
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut
District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan
California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the
Assassination of Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr. John F Kennedy
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman
HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE
FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE
STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER
LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio
STAFF
G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
GARY T. CORNWELL, Deputy Chief Counsel
(II)
Contents
CONTENTS
Page
Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza 1
Oswald-TippitAssociates . . . .. . . . . 33
George de Mohrenschildt . . . . . . 47
Depositions of Marina Oswald Porter 317
The Defector Study . . . . . . . . . . 435
Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko 475
(III)
Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza
Page 1
DEALEY PLAZA CONSPIRACY WITNESS
--------------
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(1)
Contents
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CONTENTS
Paragraph
Foreword
..................................................................................................(1)
I. Presence of two men in the upper floor windows of the
Texas School Book Depository...............................................(3)
II. Presence of possible gunman on grassy knoll ...........................(24)
III. Accounts of persons fleeing from Texas School
Book Depository
................................................................... (34)
IV. Accounts of persons fleeing Dealey Plaza area .........................(44)
V. Accounts of bullets hitting Plaza area
......................................(109)
VI. Accounts of smoke in Dealey Plaza at the time of
the shots
..............................................................................(126)
(2)
Foreword
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FOREWORD
(1)* In addition to the information from witnesses regarding what they heard in
Dealey Plaza at the time the shots were fired at the Presidential motorcade, the
committee examined the statements of witnesses in the Plaza, who provided
information about the possibility that other individuals were present in the
area who may have been involved in the assassination. The committee attempted to
locate each of those persons; the search was hampered, however, to a great
extent since the last known information on their addresses and whereabouts often
dated back to 1963 or 1964. Nevertheless, each witness who was located was asked
to read all prior statements he had made to the Warren Commission or law
enforcement officials in connection with the assassination and then to indicate
in a affidavit prepared by the committee whether those statements were a
complete and accurate record of the information related by the witness. Each
witness was given the opportunity to either refute, correct or delete inaccurate
information contained in the statements and testimony.
(2) In the case of those witnesses who could not be located, the committee still
examined their existing statements to form an opinion about the nature of the
information provided as it related to what had been verified by other witnesses.
Presence of Two Men in the Upper Floor Windows of the Texas School book
Depository
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I. PRESENCE OF TWO MEN IN THE UPPER FLOOR WINDOWS OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK
DEPOSITORY
(3) Three witnesses gave statements to law enforcement agencies after the
assassination that they saw two men at the sixth floor window of the Texas
School Book Depository (TSBD) from which they believed the assassin had fired.
(4) In an FBI interview on December 5, 1963, Mrs. Ruby Henderson related that at
the time of the motorcade, she was standing on the east side of Elm Street "just
north of Houston Street."(1) She said that right after an ambulance left the
area with a man who had suffered an epileptic seizure, she looked up at the
Texas School Book Depository; she Saw two men in the window on one of the upper
floors.(2) She could not recall exactly which floor they were on, but stated
that she did not recall seeing any other persons on any floors above the two
men.(3).
(5) Mrs. Henderson described one man as being dark-complexioned, possibly either
Mexican or Negro.(4) That man had dark hair and a white shirt.(5) The other man
was taller and was wearing a dark shirt.(6) According to the FBI report, she
also said that "she could
_______________________
(3)
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not definitely state that one of the men * * * was not a Negro." (7) Mrs.
Henderson said she only saw the men from the waist up and therefore could not
further describe their attire.(8) They were standing back from the window, but
looking out toward the motorcade.(9)
(6) Mrs. Henderson said she saw the two men in the window before the motorcade
reached the corner of Elm and Houston Streets, but did not know how much before
it reached the corner that she was the men.
(7) Mrs. Henderson was not called to testify before the Warren Commission.
(8) Mrs. Carolyn Walther was interviewed by the FBI on December 4, 1963, and
stated that at the time of the motorcade, she was standing on the east side of
Houston Street, about 50 or 60 feet south of the south curb of Elm Street.(10)
After the ambulance left with the epileptic, Mrs. Walther looked up at the
windows of the Texas School Book Depository and saw a man in the southeast
corner window of the fourth or fifth floor; according to the FBI report, Mrs.
Walther was "positive" the window as being the "most easterly" on the south side
of the building.(12)
(9) Mrs. Walther saw the man was holding a rifle in his hands; the barrel of the
rifle was pointing downward and the man was looking toward Houston Street.(13)
Both his hands were extended across the window ledge.(14) She described the man
as having light brown or blond hair and wearing a white shirt.(15) She described
the rifle as having a short barrel and being possibly a machine gun. She noticed
no other features of the rifle.(16)
(10) Mrs. Walther said also that she saw at the same time a second man standing
in the same window to the left of the man with the rifle.(17) This man was
wearing a brown suit coat; she could only see his body from the waist to the
shoulders and his head was hidden by part of the window.(18)
(11) Mrs. Walther told the FBI that almost immediately after she saw the second
man in the window, the presidential motorcade approached on Houston Street.(19)
(12) Mrs. Walther was not called to testify before the Warren Commission.
(13) Arnold Louis Rowland testified before the Warren Commission that he and his
wife standing near the corner of Houston and Main Streets at the time of the
motorcade.(20) Rowland said that at about 12:15 p.m. he looked up at the Texas
Book Depository and saw a man in a sixth floor window in the west corner of the
building holding a rifle.(21) The man was standing back from the window.(22)
Rowland described the rifle as a "fairly high-powered rifle" with scope.(23) He
thought it might have been a .30 size six rifle.(24) Rowland said he noted also
that two windows were open where he saw the man standing.(25) According to
Rowland, the man was holding the rifle in a "port arms" military position, with
the barrel at a 45 degree angle downward across his body.(26)
(14) Rowland described the man as being "tall and slender in build in proportion
with his width."(27) He also said the man could have weighed 140 to 150
pounds.(28) He appeared to be light-complexioned
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with dark hair, possibly "light Latin" or Caucasian, and his hair was closely
cut.(29) Rowland said the man was wearing a very light-colored shirt with an
open collar and a T-shirt beneath, and he had on either dark slacks or
jeans.(30) The man appeared to be in his thirties.(31) Rowland said that he
mentioned to his wife that he had seen a man in the window, but the man was gone
when they looked back.(32) Rowland estimated the man was standing 3 to 5 feet
back from the window.(33)
(15) Rowland testified also that before he saw the man with the rifle, he saw
another man in another window of the sixth floor.(34) He said that window was in
the east corner of the building, "the one that they said the shots were fired
from."(35) Rowland said he believed it was a "colored" man and that the man was
"hanging" out the window.(36) Rowland said that at that time he noticed there
were several people hanging out of windows; it was then that he looked again and
saw the man with the rifle in the western window.(37) He said he saw both men at
about 12:15 p.m.(38)
(16) Rowland described the man in the window of the southeast corner of the
sixth floor as an "elderly Negro," but could give no further details on the
man's appearance.(39) Rowland said the Negro man in the window remained there
until the motorcade reached the corner of Main and Ervay Streets at about 12;30
p.m.(40) Rowland said he last saw him about 5 minutes before the motorcade had
reached the corner of Main and Ervay, the man was gone.(41)
(17) In an FBI interview on November 22, 1963, Rowland repeated that as he stood
on Houston Street at the west entrance of the sheriff
s office at approximately 12:15 or 12:20 p.m., he saw a man standing in the
window of the second floor from the top";(42) there was no further information
in that report about the location of that window. The man was standing 10 or 15
feet back from the window and was holding a rifle which appeared to have a
scope.(43) The FBI report described the man's position as "parade rest."(44)
According to that report, Rowland described the man as a white male of slender
build with dark hair.(45) He was wearing a light-colored shirt which was open at
the neck.(46)
(18) Rowland told the FBI that he heard the first shot about 15 minutes after he
had seen the man with the rifle at the window. He said he did not look at the
window again after the shots began.
(19) In an FBI interview on November 23, 1963, Rowland was quoted as saying that
the window in which he saw the man with the rifle was in the southwest corner of
the sixth floor, which is nearest the overpass on Elm Street.(47) That report
contains the description of the man as wearing a light-colored shirt and the
rifle as being a .306 with a telescopic sight.(48) Rowland said he was not close
enough to identify the man and could not say if it was Lee Harvey Oswald.(49)
(20) Rowland also gave a sworn statement to FBI agents on November 24, 1963. In
that statement, Rowland again recounted that he saw a man with a rifle at about
12:15 p.m. on November 22, 1963.(50) He described the location as the area of
the two rectangular windows "at the extreme west end of the Texas School Book
Depository on the next to the top floor. * * *"(51) He said again that the man
was standing
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10 to 15 feet back from the window.(52) The description he have at this time was
consistent with his earlier reports: Slender in proportion to his height,
wearing a white or light-colored shirt, which was either collarless or open at
the neck.(53) The man had dark hair.(54) Rowland also described the rifle as
having a scope and said that the man was holding it in a "port arms"
position.(55) He also said again that he would not be able to identify the
person because of the distance.(56)
(21) There is no mention in any of the FBI reports that Rowland said he also saw
another man in a window on the eastern corner of the building. Nevertheless, in
his Warren Commission testimony, Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig stated that soon
after the assassination of the afternoon of November 22, 1963, Rowland gave him
a description of two men in sixth floor windows of the depository before the
assassination.
(22) Creig testified that after the shots, he began talking to witnesses in the
area of the depository.(57) This is Craig's description of his conversation with
Rowland:
I talked to a young couple and the boy said he saw two men on the-uh-sixth floor
of the Book Depository Building over there; one of them had a rifle with the
telescopic sight on it---but he thought they were Secret Service agents on guard
and didn't report it. This was about-uh-oh, he said, 15 minutes before the
motorcade ever arrived.(58)
Craig said he remembered the boy's name to be Arnold Rowland.(59) He said the
conversation with Rowland took place about 10 minutes after the shots were fired
at the motorcade.(60) Rowland told him that the man with the rifle was located
on the west end of the depository in the second window from the corner.(61)
Rowland also told him that the two men were "walking back and forth" on the
sixth floor.(62) Rowland related that when he looked back a few minutes later,
only the man with the rifle remained.(63) He was holding it at his side and
looking out the window in a southerly direction.(64) Craig said Rowland's wife
said she had not seen the men.(65) Craig also said that at the time he talked to
Rowland, there had not yet been a report that the shots had come from the
depository.(66) In fact, Craig testified that he had a first assisted officers
searching in the area of the railroad tracks before he returned to the area of
the depository building to talk to witnesses.(67)
(23) Rowland also gave a report to the sheriff's department on November 22,
1963. According to that report, Rowland said that at about 12:15 p.m. he was a
man with a rifle in a window on the second floor from the top of the
depository.(68) The man was about 15 feet back from the window and was holding
the rifle as high powered because it had a scope on it.(70) He described the man
as white, wearing a light-colored shirt which was open at the neck; he said the
man appeared to be of slender build with dark hair.(71) There is no mention in
that report that Rowland described a second man on the sixth floor before the
shots.
Presence of Possible Gunman on the Grassy Knoll
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II. PRESENCE OF POSSIBLE GUNMAN ON THE GRASSY KNOLL
(24) The committee also examined information about the presence of a man near
the concrete structure on the grassy knoll near the area where some witnesses
said they believed gunfire had originated.
(25) The photographic evidence panel examined photographs make by Phillip Willis
of the area of the grassy knoll and concluded that a photograph taken by Willis
did show a person standing behind the concrete wall on the knoll.(72) The panel
determined that photograph was taken at approximately frame 202 of the Zapruder
film, which was after President Kennedy received the neck wound but before the
fatal head shot.(73) According to the results of the panel's photographic
enhancement and analysis, the figure in the Willis photograph was consistent
with that of an adult approximately 5 feet 6 inches to 6 feet in height (74) and
wearing dark clothing.(75) The panel also noted that in another photograph by
Willis, which was taken after the Presidential limousine had left Dealey Plaza,
the figure standing behind the concrete wall had disappeared.(76) The panel
concluded that movement by the object was consistent with the presence of a
human being.(77)
(26) The photographic evidence panel also noted that in the first Willis
Photograph, which shows the person standing behind the concrete wall, there is
visible, near the region of the hands of the person at the wall, "a very
distinct straight-line feature," which extends from lower right to upper
right.(78) Nevertheless, because of the blur of the object in the photograph,
the panel was not able to determine the actual length of the object and could
not conclude whether it was or was not a weapon.(79)
(27) The committee interviewed Willis' daughter, Rose Mary Willis, on November
8, 1978, at her home in Dallas. Ms. Willis stated that she was present with her
father and a sister in the area of the grass section of the plaza at the time of
the Presidential motorcade on November 22, 1963.(80) The other was a person who
was standing just behind the concrete wall near the triple underpass.(84) That
person appeared to "disappear the next instant."(85) Ms. Willis further
described the location of this person as the corner section of the white
concrete wall between the area of photographer Abraham Zapruder's right side and
the top of the concrete stairway leading up to the center of the grassy
knoll.(86)
(29) Ms. Willis said she was aware of three shots being fired.(87) She gave no
information on the direction or location of the shots, but stated that her
father became upset when the policemen in the area appeared to run away from
where he thought the shots came from; that is; they were running away from the
grassy knoll.(88)
(30) Committee investigators also interviewed Ms. Willis' sister, Mr. Linda
Pites, on November 7, 1978, in Dallas. Mrs. Pites explained
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that she was also present in the plaza at the time of the shots.(89) The only
information she provided relevant to the shots was that she had a distinct
impression that the head wound to President Kennedy was the result of a
front-to-rear shot.(90) She also heard three shots and saw the President's head
"blow up."(91)
(31) Mrs. Pites testified before the Warren commission of July 22, 1964.(92)
During her testimony, she said that she heard three shots and that she saw the
President grab his throat after the first shot.(93) She was not asked by the
Commission about any other activity she may have seen in the plaza at the time
of the shots.
(32) Phillip Willis also testified before the Warren commission on July 22,
1964. He had positioned himself on the curb in front of the Texas School Book
Depository at the time the President's motorcade passed.(94) Willis stated that
he took 12 pictures of the motorcade, including of President Kennedy when he was
first hit.(95) Willis said he was certain that three shots were fired and that
they came from the direction of the depository.(96)
(33) During his testimony, Willis was asked if at the time of the shots he
looked in the direction of the railroad tracks which go across the triple
underpass.(97) Willis stated that he saw policemen and spectators there, but
that he saw no evidence of shots coming from that area.(98) Willis was not asked
during the testimony about his film, which shows a figure behind the concrete
wall on the knoll.
Accounts of Persons Fleeing From the Texas School Book Depository
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III. ACCOUNTS OF PERSONS FLEEING FROM THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY
(34) Richard Randolph Carr stated to the FBI on January 4, 1964, that he saw a
man looking out of a window on the top floor of the depository a few minutes
before Carr heard shots.(99) He described the man as white, wearing a hat, tan
sport coat and glasses.(100) He said that at the time of the motorcade, he was
standing on about the sixth floor of the new courthouse which was under
construction at Houston and Commerce Streets.(101) Carr said that from that spot
he could only see the top floor and roof of the depository building.(102) It was
from that location that he observed the man in the depository window.(103) Carr
said that after the shots he was going toward the direction of the triple
underpass; when he got to the intersection of Houston and Commerce Streets, he
saw a man whom he believed to be the same individual he had seen in the window
of the depository.(104)
(35) Carr was not called to testify before the Warren Commission. He did testify
on February 19, 1969 in the Parish County Criminal District Court in New Orleans
in State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw, a case involving charges of conspiring to
assassinate President Kennedy. According to the transcript of his testimony,
Carr stated that he saw the man in the fifth floor window of the Texas School
Book Depository.(105) He said he later saw the man going down Houston Street;
turning at Commerce Street.(106) Carr also described the hat worn by the man as
felt and said his glasses were heavy-rimmed with heavy ear pieces.(107) He had
on a tie and a tan sport coat.(108)
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As the man ran, he was continually looking over his shoulder as though he was
being followed.(109)
(36) During his testimony at the Clay Shaw trial, Carr also reported seeing men
in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination who were not mentioned in the
report of his FBI interview in January 1964. Carr was asked during the Shaw
trial if he noticed any movement after the shots which seemed "unusual."(110)
Carr then said that he saw a Rambler station wagon with a rack on top parked on
the wrong side of the street, heading north and facing in the direction of the
railroad tracks, next to the depository.(111)
(37) Carr said that immediately after the shots he saw three men emerge from
behind the depository and enter the station wagon.(112) He gave a description of
one of them: he was "real dark-complected" and appeared to be Spanish or Cuban;
he drove the car away, going north on Houston Street.(113)
(38) During the Shaw trial testimony, Carr said he had reported this information
to law enforcement officers and that someone had told him not to repeat this
information.(114) At that point, defense counsel objected to hearsay by carr,
and no further details were elicited about the reported coercion of Carr, other
than his statement that he did what the FBI told him to do, "I shut my
mouth."(115)
(39) Committee investigators did not locate Richard Carr to discuss this
information with him.
(40) James Richard Worrell also reported to the FBI on November 23, 1963, that
he saw a man leaving the FBI that he saw the man leave the depository building
and run in the opposite direction; at the time,
Worrell said that he was running from Elm to Pacific Street along Houston.(116)
He described the man as white, 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 10 inches in height,
with dark hair and wearing some type jacket and dark clothing.(117) According to
the FBI report, when Worrell later saw Lee Harvey Oswald on television that
night Worrell believed Oswald was the person he had seen running from the
depository.(118)
(41) In an affidavit for the Dallas Police Department on November 23, 1963,
Worrell also related seeing the man run from the depository in the opposite
direction from Worrell. At that time, he said the man was wearing a dark shirt
or jacket which was open down the front and that he did not have anything in his
hands.(119)
(42) When Worrell testified before the Warren Commission on March 10, 1964, he
said he was running along Houston Street when he saw the man "come bustling out
of the door" of the depository.(120) At that time, Worrell described the man as
5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 10 inches in height, weighing 155 to 165 pounds, in
his early thirties, with brunette hair.(121) He was wearing a dark sports
jacket, which was open, and light pants.(122) Worrell said the man came out of
the "back entrance" of the depository building.(123)
(43) Richard Worrell died on November 5, 1966, in Dallas from severe head
injuries sustained when his motorcycle went out of control.(124)
Accounts of Persons Fleeing Dealey Plaza
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IV. ACCOUNTS OF PERSONS FLEEING DEALEY PLAZA
(44) After the assassination on November 22, 1963, Mrs. Jean Lollis Hill of
Dallas gave a notarized statement to the sheriff's department regarding what she
had seen in Dealey Plaza at the time the shots were fired at the motorcade. Mrs.
Hill said that she was standing at the curb on the south side of Elm Street
halfway to the triple underpass during the parade.(125) After the last shot was
heard and the Presidential limousine sped away, Mrs. Hill looked up the hill of
the grassy knoll and saw a man running toward the monument.(126) She said she
began running toward the man; she was turned back by policemen who had arrived
on the knoll when she got up to the railroad tracks.(127) In the sheriff's
statement, there is no description or further details of the man seen by Mrs.
Hill.
(45) An interview report dated November 23, 1963, by the FBI gave only this
account for its total report on Mrs. Hill:
--Jean Hill, 9402 Bluff Creek, telephone EV 1-7419, stated that she on November
22, 1963, was standing on Elm Street in the vicinity of Texas School Book
Depository observing the Presidential party composed of the President of the
United States, his wife and Governor Connally of Texas, pass, and accompanying
her was Mary Moorman, residing 2832 Ripplewood, telephone DA 1-9390, who with a
camera took pictures of the Presidential party passing down the street.
--Jean Hill advised she heard something like a rifle shot and observed President
Kennedy crumple in his seat in the automobile. She was standing nearby, as the
vehicle was passing the spot where she stood at the time.(128)
(46) The FBI reinterviewed Mrs. Hill on March 13, 1964. In that report, Mrs.
Hill was quoted as saying that after the shots she noticed a white man in a
brown raincoat and a hat running west away from the depository in the direction
of the railroad tracks.(129) The report states that Mrs. Hill said she was
stopped by a motorcycle policeman and lost sight of the man.(130) It also states
that she did not get a good look at the man, but that she described him as being
of average height and heavy build.(131)
(47) According to that report, Mrs. Hill said that men who were either FBI or
Secret Service agents were present later that afternoon when she was being
questioned in the sheriff's office.(132) Mrs. Hill related that one of the men
referred to a bullet hitting the ground near her feet; she told him she did not
recall such an incident.(133) When she told the men that she had heard four to
six shots, one of them said: "There were three shots, three bullets, that's
enough for now.(134) The report states that despite that remark, Mrs. Hill said
no law enforcement officers attempted to force opinions or statements from
her.(135)
(48) Mrs. Hill testified before the Warren commission 11 days after that FBI
interview, on March 24, 1964. At that time, Mrs. Hill recounted again the events
in dealey Plaza at the time of the shots. As she discussed the reaction of the
crowd to the shots, she volunteered that she saw a man "running, getting away or
walking away or
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something----I would say he was running."(136) She said the man was at the top
of the slope near the west end of the depository building. She repeated that the
man was wearing a brown raincoat.(137) She said her attention was drawn toward
him because he was the only thing moving after the shots rang out.(138) Mrs.
Hill also said that at the time she thought, "that's the man that did it" and
began running toward him.(139) She did not recollect seeing his hands and did
not see a weapon.(140)
(49) Mrs. Hill testified that she ran up the hill toward the railroad tracks
after the man.(141) She said when she got in the area of the railroad tracks,
she lost sight of him.(142) At that point she thought she heard someone say: "It
looks like he go away," or words to that effect; she said that was consistent
with the thought in her own mind that the man she saw running was involved in
the assassination.(143)
(50) When Mrs. Hill was first asked during her Warren Commission testimony by
Counsel Specter if she could give a description of the man she saw running, Mrs.
Hill said she did not want to. She was concerned because she had earlier given
statements that the man looked like Jack Ruby in build and thought this would be
viewed as "using a figure and converting it to (her) story."(144) Later in her
testimony, Mrs. Hill said she had been bothered and laughed at because of the
information she provided, specifically because she had once said she saw a dog
on the seat in the limousine between President and Mrs. President(145)
Nevertheless, she continued to say that the man was about Jack Ruby's height and
wasn't any bigger than Jack Ruby in weight.(146) She said also at that time that
the man had been wearing a brown hat.(147) She estimated that he was
middle-aged, approximately 40 years old, and Caucasian.(148) When asked by
Counsel Specter is she thought the man was in fact jack Ruby, Mrs. Hill replied
that she didn't know.(149)
(51) Mrs. Hill explained in her testimony that when she mentioned to the law
enforcement officers at the sheriff's office that she had heard four to six
shots, one of the men responded that he had also heard more than three shots,
but that they had three wounds and three bullets, so they were not willing to
say that more than three shots had been fired.(150) She repeated also at that
time that a Secret Service man asked her about a bullet hitting the ground near
her feet, but she had not seen a bullet hit the ground.(151) She said she was
not coerced into any statements by the law enforcement officials.(152)
(52) Mrs. Hill said she had been contacted by Attorney Mark Lane a few weeks
before her Warren Commission testimony.(153) Among the things she related to
Lane was that she had been told by a man from the FBI or Secret Service not to
mention the man she saw running in the area of the depository.(154) At that
point in her testimony, Mrs. Hill also said that a reporter named Featherstone
from the Dallas times Herald had told her she was wrong about seeing a man
running up the hill from the depository, and not to mention it on the air.(155)
It was not further clarified in her Warren Commission testimony whether it was
in fact law enforcement officers or the reporter, or both, who advised her not
to mention again seeing the man running.
(53) Mrs. Hill said in her testimony that she had been reinterviewed by the FBI
on about March 16 or 17, 1964 because of statement Mark
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Lane had made about her when he testified before the Commission.(156) Mrs. Hill
said she had talked to Lane about 4 or 5 weeks before; she said he took down
correctly what she said, but that it was reported out of context because his
account did not reflect his questions.(157)
(54) Mark lane had testified before the Commission on March 7, 1964. Lane gave
this account in his testimony of information he had been given by Mrs. Hill of
the events in Dealey Plaza:
---She said further that after the last shot was fired, she saw a man run from
behind the general area of a concrete facade on that grassy knoll, and that he
ran on to the triple overpass. (158)
(55) Mrs. Hill was not located by the committee.
(56) In another voluntary statement to the sheriff's department dated November
22, 1963, Jesse C. Price of Dallas was quoted as saying he also saw a man
fleeing from the plaza after the assassination. Price said in his notarized
statement that at approximately 12:35 p.m. on November 22, 1963, he was on the
roof of the Terminal Annex Building and saw the Presidential motorcade
proceeding west on Elm Street until it was a short distance from the
overpass.(159) After hearing the volley of shots, Price saw a man run toward the
passenger cars at the railroad siding.(160) In the sheriff's statement, Price
described the man as about 25 years of age with long, dark hair.(161) He was
wearing a white dress shirt with no tie and khaki-colored trousers.(162) Price
said the man was carrying something in his hand and that it may have been a
"head piece"(163)
(57) Price was interviewed by the FBI in Dallas on November 24, 1863. However,
that report quotes Price only as saying he looked in the direction of the
overpass at the time of the shots, but "saw nothing pertinent."(164)
(58) The committee learned that Jesse C. Price was deceased.
(59) Lee E. Bowers, Jr., reported to the FBI after the assassination on November
22, 1963, that he had observed three cars parked in the lot west of the
depository building before the assassination. He said the first arrived at about
11:55 a.m.; it was a 1959 Oldsmobile station wagon, blue over white, with an
out-of-State license plate consisting of six black numbers on a white
background.(165) He noted that the car was extremely dirty.(166) There was one
white male in it, who Bowers said could have been middle aged.(167) the second
car arrived at about 12:15 p.m.(168) It was a 1957 Ford Tudor, black with a gold
stripe on the sides, and had a Texas license plate.(169) Bowers said he thought
the man in that second car was a police officer because he was talking into a
radio telephone or radio transmitter in the car.(170) Bowers described him as
white, about 30 years old.(171) The third car was a 1961 or 1962 white Chevrolet
Impala four-door and it arrived at approximately 12:22 p.m.(172) Bowers said the
license on the third car was like the out-of-State license on the first, with
six black numbers on a white background.(173) That car, too, was very
dirty.(174) The man in it was a white male about 30 years old, with long, dirty
blond hair, wearing a plaid sports shirt.(175)
(60) Bowers told the FBI that after the shooting he did not see any of these
cars in the parking lot.(176)
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(61) Lee Bowers, Jr., testified before the Warren Commission of April 2, 1964,
and gave the same account and descriptions of the three cars.(177) Nevertheless,
in his warren Commission testimony, Bowers also stated that the first car first
drove in front of the depository, circled the area of the tower in the railroad
yard "as if he were searching for a way out, or was checking the area," and then
left at the Elm Street outlet.(178) Bowers stated also that he noticed the car
had a "Goldwater" sticker on its bumper.(179) About 15 minutes later, Bowers
noted the second car; it drove in front of the depository, cruised around the
area for 3 or 4 minutes, and then left.(180) The third car appeared about 8
minutes before the President's motorcade; it circled the area and probed in the
area of the tower, and then slowly cruised back in front of the depository, at
which point Bowers lost sight of it.(181)
(62) Bowers testified that at the time of the motorcade on November 22, he was
located in the Union Terminal Tower in the railroad yard.(182) When asked what
people he noticed standing between the tower and Elm Street at the underpass on
the high ground, Bowers stated that he saw two man standing within 10 or 15 feet
of each other.(183) One of them was middle aged, heavy set, and was wearing a
white shirt and dark trousers.(184) The other man was in his mid-twenties,
wearing either a plaid shirt or a plaid jacket.(185) Bowers said those two men
were directly in his line of vision toward the mouth of the underpass and
appeared to be watching the progress of the motorcade.(186) Bowers said he saw
the man in the white shirt standing there at the time of the shots, but that he
could not see the younger man in the plaid clothing because of the trees, which
made him harder to distinguish.(187)
(63) Bowers said that at that point a motorcycle officer ran up the incline
toward the trees in the general area of where the two men were standing; Bowers
said there was some kind of commotion at that place, but that he did not know
what had happened.(188)
(64) The committee was told on November 11, 1978, by Bower's parents that he
died from injuries sustained in a car accident 3 years ago.(189) Mr. and Mrs.
Bowers, Sr., were unable to provide any additional information about the events
reported by their son; they mentioned that he was reticent by nature and told
them practically nothing of what he had observed on November 22, 1963.(190)
(65) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 23, 1963,
Malcolm Summers of Dallas reported that he saw a car speeding from the area of
the plaza immediately after the shots.(191) Summers stated that he was located
on the terrace of the small park on Elm Street when the Presidential motorcade
passed in front of him.(192) After the shots and the president's car had sped
away, Summers went to the area of the railroad tracks because he "knew that they
had somebody trapped up there."(193)
(66) After about 20 minutes, Summers returned to his truck, which was parked on
Houston Street.(194) As he began to pull away from the curb, an automobile
traveling in what Summers described as a "burst of speed" passed his truck on
the right, which Summers thought was dangerous.(195) Summers said the car then
slowed when it got in front of him, "as though realizing they would be
conspicuous in speeding."(196)
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(67) Summers said there were three men in the car; he described them as of
slender build.(197) He said they appeared to be "excited" and were motioning to
each other.(198) He described the car ad a 1961 or 1962 Chevrolet sedan, which
was maroon in color.(199) The car went across the Houston Street viaduct, turned
off on Marsalis Street, and continued in the direction of Zangs Boulevard.(200)
Summers said he did not believe he could identify the men again, but that he
would recognize the car.(201)
(68) Summers was not called to testify before the Warren Commission. No FBI
files concerning this information have been located. Summers was contacted by
the committee on October 30, 1978. At that time, he confirmed the substance of
the information provided to the sheriff's department and signed a statement
indicating that the information was accurate and complete.(202)
(69) The Dallas County Sheriff's Department had also received another report of
a car speeding from the direction of Dealey Plaza on the afternoon of November
22, 1963. In a report dated November 22, Deputy Sheriff jack watson reported
that he had received information through the sheriff's office radio about the
car. Watson reported that the Carrollton, Tex., Police Department called in that
they had received a citizen's report that a car had been parked near the Harry
Hines Circle for several days before November 22.(203) According to the
information from the Carrollton police, "very shortly after the shooting" that
car was seen traveling north on Harry Hines Boulevard "at a very high rate of
speed."(204) The Carrollton police described the car as red 1963 Chevrolet
Impala with Georgia license plate 52J1033.(205) Watson's report stated that the
information on that car was broadcast to all stations north.(206)
(70) the committee was unable to locate Jack Watson to get further details of
the car report received by the Dallas County Sheriff's Department.
(71) According to an FBI report on the car with the Georgia license plate, the
Dallas County Sheriff's Office had received the call on the radio between 1:54
and 2:11 p.m., and it reflected that the car had been spotted speeding along
Harry Hines Boulevard Just Prior to that.(207) The FBI was advised on March 27,
1964 by its Atlanta office that the 1963 Georgia license 52J1033 was listed to
J.C. Bradley to Twin City, Ga.(208) That license was issued for a four-door 1960
Chevrolet.(209)
(72) The owner of the car and license, James Cecil Bradley, was interviewed by
special agents of the FBI on May 14, 1964. At that time Bradley informed the FBI
that he owned a 1960 Belair Chevrolet.(210) The color of the car was not given,
but Bradley stated that he has never owned a red 1963 Chevrolet Impala.(211)
Bradley said that in August or September 1963 his 1963 license plate was stolen
from his car as it was parked overnight with a flat tire on Highway 80 between
Swainsboro and Twin City, Ga.(212) Bradley said that he reported the theft to
law officers in Twin City and Swainsboro.(213)
(73) The FBI interviewed the friend who was with Bradley when Bradley returned
to his car to repair the flat and noticed that the license plate was missing.
That friend confirmed that the plate was in fact missing from the car and that
he had advised Bradley to report it stolen.(214)
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(74) Official records also confirmed the report by Bradley. Charles Oglesby, the
chief of police in Twin City, Ga., stated to the FBI that he recalled Bradley
reporting the stolen license tag some time in 1963.(215) According to records of
the Georgia State Motor Vehicle Registration Bureau, the original 1963 license,
52J1033, was issued to Bradley on March 28, 1963, for a 1960 Chevrolet with the
vehicle identification number 1619A154729.(216) A duplicate or replacement tag
was issued to Bradley on September 10, 1963, for use on the same vehicle.(217)
(75) The committee has been unable to locate any further identification of the
persons or car with whom that license was reported in Dallas on November 22,
1963.
(76) In an interview in Dallas with committee investigators on August 26, 1978,
Tom Tilson reported that he saw a man running from the plaza immediately after
the shots. Tilson stated that on November 22, 1963, he was off duty from his job
as a Dallas Police Department patrolman.(218) At the time of the motorcade, he
was driving east from Commerce Street and was approaching the triple
underpass.(219) He had already heard the report on his police radio that there
had been shooting at the motorcade and had seen the Presidential limousine
travel at high speed from the underpass.(220) as he was in the are of the triple
underpass, Tilson saw a man "slipping and sliding" down the embankment on the
north side of Elm Street west of the underpass.(221) Tilson said the man
appeared conspicuous because he was the only one running away from the plaza
immediately after the shots.(222) Tilson said that because of his speed, the man
rammed against the side of a "dark" car which was parked there.(223) Tilson said
he then saw the man do something at the rear door portion of the car, like
"throw something inside, then jump behind the wheel and take off very
fast."(224)
(77) Tilson told the investigators that his 17 years of experiences as a
policeman, combined with the radio broadcast of the shooting and this
conspicuous man, caused him to "give chase" to the man speeding away from the
direction of the plaza.(225) He then saw the same "dark car" going south on
Industrial Boulevard, and he followed it.(226) As the car approached a toll road
toward Ft. Worth, Tilson was within 100 feet and called out the license number,
make, and model to his daughter, Dinah, who was riding with him. She wrote it
down on a slip of paper.(227)
(78) Tilson described the man as white, 38 to 40 years old, 5 feet 8 inches to 5
feet 9 inches in height, with a round face.(228) Tilson said he had dark hair
and was wearing dark clothing.(229) Tilson said he know Jack Ruby, and the man
looked enough like Jack Ruby to be his "twin."(230) That impression was so
strong in Tilson's mind that he noted that Ruby showed a lot of
"resourcefulness" in arranging to be identified in a newspaper office at the
time of the assassination with a lot of influential witnesses.(231)
(79) Tilson said he called the homicide office of the police department and
reported the information on the car that afternoon.(232) He said he never heard
any more from the Dallas police homicide squad about his report.(233) Tilson
said he dept the slip of paper with the information his daughter had
written.(234) Nevertheless,
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Tilson believes he threw it out about 3 1/2 years ago when he discarded many
items in his home upon the death of his wife.(235) Tilson explained that he
never followed up on the report with the homicide squad because of his
perception that the homicide office was run as a kind of "elite," which resented
any encroachment on its authority.(236)
(80) The committee also examined the allegation that other men were in Dealey
Plaza before the shots were fired at the motorcade, which was related by Julia
Ann Mercer. Ms. Mercer gave statements concerning the men, including one who was
carrying a gun case, to law officers right after the assassination. Ms. Mercer's
report continued to receive much attention by writers, but has never been
resolved. This committee has been unable to locate Ms. Mercer for further
examination of the reports.
(81) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 22, 1963, Ms.
Mercer is quoted as saying that on November 22 she was driving in the area of
the plaza going toward the overpass.(237) When she got to a point just east of
the overhead sign for the right entrance road to the overpass, she noticed a
truck parked on the right-hand side of the street with its hood up.(238) The
truck as described as a green Ford pickup with a Texas license.(239) According
to the sheriff's report, Ms. Mercer said the truck had a sign on the driver's
side in black letters which said "Air conditioning."(240)
(82) In the report, ms. Mercer was quoted further as saying that a white male,
approximately 40 years of age, was "slouched" over the steering wheel.(241) She
was described as heavy set, with light brown hair, and wearing a green
jacket.(242)
(83) The statement also describes another man who was standing at the rear of
the truck; he was reaching over the tailgate into the truck and took out what
appeared to Mrs. Mercer to be a gun case.(243) She described the gun case as
about 8 inches wide at its base, 3 1/2 to 4 feet long, and 4 or 5 inches thick;
it was brown.(244) The man walked up "the grassy hill which forms part of the
overpass," and that was the last Mrs. Mercer saw of him.(245) As he walked up
the hill with the gun case, the case appeared to become stuck momentarily in the
grass.(246) She described the man as a white male, 20 to 30 years old, wearing a
gray jacket, brown pants, and a plaid shirt.(247) He had a wool stocking cap
with a tassel on it.(248)
(84) In the statement, no time is given for the incident observed by Ms. Mercer.
Nevertheless, she noted also that at that time three policemen were standing
near a motorcycle on the overpass bridge.(249)
(85) In a letter to committee staff dated July 15, 1977, former New Orleans
District Attorney Jim Garrison stated that he had interviewed Julia Mercer and
transcribed corrections made by her to the purported notarized sheriff's
statement.(250) According to the corrections on garrison's copy of the
statement, Ms. Mercer claimed she never said in the sheriff's statement that the
truck had "air conditioning" written on its side, and the signature at the
bottom of the statement was not hers.(251) Further, she never said that she did
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not see the driver's face too clearly.(252) According to the corrections, Ms.
Mercer said that she looked right in the man's face.(253) She also said that
"this is why I was able to recognize him when I later saw him shoot Oswald on
TV."(254) Garrison's copy included Ms. Mercer's signature at the bottom of the
corrections.(255) The corrections were dated January 18, 1968.(256)
(86) In an FBI report dated November 23, 1963, Ms. Mercer was again quoted as
giving the account of the truck parked near the knoll and of the two men she had
described in the sheriff's report, including the same information of their
physical descriptions and gun case.(257) That report also stated that Ms. Mercer
said the truck had the words "air conditioning" printed on the side.(258) The
time given for the incident in the FBI report is 10:50 a.m. on November 22,
1963.(259)
(87) the copy of that FBI report provided to the committee by Jim Garrison also
included corrections dated January 15, 1968, and the signature Julia Ann
Mercer.(260) In the corrections, Ms. Mercer was quoted by Garrison as saying
that she did not tell the FBI that there was no writing on the truck.(261) Her
corrections contain this statement:
---Furthermore, even before Ruby shot Oswald, when the FBI agents showed me
pictures I selected Jack Ruby's picture as one of those which appeared to be the
driver. When one of the agents turned the picture over I saw "Jack Ruby" on the
back.(262)
On that statement, in the margin in the same handwriting as the Julia Ann Mercer
signature, it says that it was on November 23, 1963, when she selected the
photograph of Jack Ruby.(263)
(88) In another FBI report dated November 28, 1963, Ms. Mercer is said to have
been shown a group of photographs in an FBI interview on November 27, 1963.(264)
According to that report, Jack Ruby's photograph was among those viewed by Ms.
Mercer.(265) The report states that Ms. Mercer could not identify any of these
photographs as being the picture of the man she had reported seeing at the
driver's wheel of the truck.(266) Regarding the picture of Jack Ruby, Ms. Mercer
is quoted in the report as saying that the driver had a round face similar to
Ruby's, but that she could not identify Ruby as that person.(267) The report
also states that Ms. Mercer was shown a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald, and
that she said the second man she had seen at the truck with the gun case was the
same general build, size and age as Oswald, but that she could not identify
Oswald as that man.(268)
(89) In the corrections taken by garrison, with a Julia Ann Mercer signature
dated January 15, 1968, Ms. Mercer is quoted as repeating that she had selected
four photographs of the driver of the truck and that one of the photographs was
a picture of Jack Ruby.(269) She stated again that she selected the picture of
Ruby on November 23, 1963, the day before Ruby's murder of Oswald was shown on
television.(270)
(90) Dallas Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig reported on November 23, 1963, that after
the shots, he saw a man run down the grassy knoll and
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18
get into a light-colored Rambler station wagon with a luggage rack on its
roof.(271) Craig said in the report that his attention had been drawn to the man
because he heard a shrill whistle.(272) the station wagon pulled up to the curb.
Craig described the driver as a dark-complected white male.(273) There was no
description of the man Craig reportedly saw running down the hill.(274) Craig
said he tried to stop the car and talk with the two men, but was unable to reach
it because of heavy traffic.(275)
(91) Craig said he immediately reported it to a Secret Service agent in the
area.(276) Later that afternoon, Craig was told to come to city hall; he said
that when he arrived at city hall he identified the "subject" they had in
custody as the same person he saw running down the hill and entering the Rambler
station wagon.(277)
(92) When Roger Craig testified before the Warren Commission of April 1, 1964,
he repeated his account about the running man. Craig said that the man was in
line with the southwest corner of the depository building, and he started to run
toward Elm where it curves under the overpass.(278) Craig said the station wagon
was driving "real slow" on Elm Street and that the driver was leaning to his
right looking up the hill at the running man.(279)
(93) During his testimony, Craig described the man running down the hill as a
white male in his twenties, 5 foot 8 inches to 5 foot 9 inches in height, with
medium brown, sandy hair.(280) He was wearing medium blue trousers and a light
tan shirt.(281)
(94) Craig described the driver of the car as very dark complected, with real
short dark hair, Craig thought at first that he was Negro.(282) He was wearing a
thin-looking white jacket like a windbreaker.(283) Craig said he did not get a
good look at the driver.(284)
(95) Craig said also that the car looked white and appeared to have a Texas
license.(285)
(96) Roger Craig reportedly committed suicide on May 15, 1975.(286)
(97) Another person also reported seeing a Rambler station wagon in Dealey Plaza
immediately after the shots. In an FBI interview on November 23, 1963, Marvin
Robinson said that he was traveling west on Elm Street toward Houston Street
after the assassination.(287) Just as he crossed the intersection of Elm and
Houston and was in front of the depository, a light-colored Nash station wagon
appeared before him.(288) He said the station wagon stopped, and he saw a white
male come down the grassy hill between the building and the street and enter the
station wagon.(289) The car then headed toward the Oak Cliff section of
Dallas.(290) Robinson said he would not be able to furnish a description or
identify the man who entered the station wagon.(291)
(98) Robinson did not testify before the Warren Commission, and he has not been
located by the committee.
(99) The committee also attempted to pin down information about cars which were
parked in the area of the depository at the time of the Presidential motorcade
for any further identification of cars reported fleeing from Dealey Plaza.
(100) Earle V. Brown was a Dallas Police Department patrolman at the time of the
assassination who was assigned to stay on the railroad overpass over the
Stemmons Freeway and to prevent any unauthorized
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persons from standing on the overpass at the time of the motorcade.(292) In his
testimony before the Warren Commission, Brown stated that he and Officer James
Lomax had been ordered after the assassination to return to the area of the
depository and list the license number of all cars parked in the vicinity.(293)
Brown was not asked during his testimony whether any further investigation
resulted from the list of the license number or what had happened to the list.
(101) Brown was interviewed by the committee in Dallas on October 26, 1978. At
that time, he recalled the assignment to get the license plate numbers about an
hour after the assassination.(294) He said that about four to five officers were
involved.(295) He believed he turned the list in to Sergeant Howard, who was his
supervisor.(296) He gave no further details concerning the list or the cars
parked near the Texas School Book Depository.
(102) During the interview with the committee, Brown also added that soon after
the Presidential motorcade passed, after the last shot was heard, Brown saw a
man run down the stairs on the west side of the depository and then turn north
away from the front of the building.(297) Brown estimated that this occurred
approximately 15 minutes after the shots.(298) He said he was not able to follow
the path taken by the man because of an obstructed view.(299)
(103) Brown described the man to the committee as young, of medium size, fair
complexion, and not having dark hair.(300) He said the man was dressed in light
blue work pants and a shirt which was similar.(301) He did not see anything in
the man's hands.(302)
(104) Brown was shown a picture of Dealey Plaza and the depository during the
committee's interview.(303) At that time, he noted that his view of the west
door world have been obscured by an add-on shed section of the building.(304)
Investigation by the committee indicated that the section was added to the
building prior to 1956.(305) There is a door there at the west side of the
building, but the door is hidden by uncut bushes and trees; no determination was
made of the age of the bushes trees.(306) The doorway does face the trestle on
which Brown was standing at the time of the assassination; the estimated
distance to the trestle is approximately 500 yards.(307)
(105) Brown told the investigators that he had not mentioned seeing the man
leaving the building when he testified before the Warren commission because he
had not been asked by the Commission counsel, and also because he was not able
to identify the man as Lee Harvey Oswald, although the man was about Oswald's
size.(308) Brown said he thought he had mentioned the incident to his wife and
to his partner at the time, Officer Lomax.(309)
(106) Brown also mentioned that he had experienced an extrasensory perception
premonition before the assassination about the President being shot by a rifle
barrel protruding from a window in a brick wall.(310)
(107) The committee interviewed James Lomax in Dallas on October 27, 1978. Lomax
had never been interviewed by any law enforcement officers of the Warren
commission about events in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination. During
his interview, Lomax gave no information about the assignment to list the
license numbers of cars
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in the area of the depository after the assassination. Lomax had no other
information to report about persons fleeing from the depository or dealey Plaza.
When asked by committee investigators about Earle Brown's report of a man
leaving the depository, lomax stated that Brown never mentioned it to him and
that he did not observe the reported incident.(311)
(108) The committee was unable to locate a list by the Dallas Police Department
of cars parked near the depository or any other reports relating to cars leaving
the area.
Accounts of Bullets Hitting in the Plaza Area
Page 20
V. ACCOUNTS OF BULLETS HITTING IN THE PLAZA AREA
(109) In view of the acoustics analysis that points to more than three shots
being fired at the Presidential motorcade, the committee undertook to examine
evidence that other bullets did in fact stride in the plaza at the time of the
fatal shots. The most useful analysis of this evidence would have, of course,
included a trajectory analysis to determine the path of those "bullets" and,
most significantly, the point from which they were fired, in order to determine
the presence of other assassins. Nevertheless, based on the reports of those
witnesses made soon after the assassination, insufficient data remained to
conduct such a trajectory analysis. The experts engaged by the committee to
determine the path of missiles in Dealey Plaza have explained that the minimal
data required would include the path of the missile, as well as its point of
impact.(312) In none of the information collected on the presence of other
missiles in Dealey Plaza was that information complete. The committee,
therefore, attempted to set the information out as completely as possible, even
though it was not possible to conclude on the basis of the scant information
remaining what those reports meant in reference to the presence of other gunmen
in Dealey Plaza.
(110) In an FBI interview on November 24, 1963, Mrs. Virgie Baker (nee Rackley)
reported that at the time she heard the first shot, she looked in the direction
of the triple underpass and saw what she presumed to be a bullet bouncing off
the pavement.(313) Mrs. Baker was located immediately across the street from the
depository when she heard the shots.(314) She thought they came from the
direction the triple underpass.(315) In the FBI report, no further details or
information were given by Mrs. baker about the location or direction of the
object she believed to be a bullet.
(111) Mrs. Baker testified before the Warren Commission of July 112, 1964. At
that time, she stated that the object she believed to be a bullet hit the
pavement in the street at the point of the Stemmons Freeway sigh on Elm
Street.(316) She said it hit in the middle of the lane on the other side of the
street, which would have been the left-hand lane going in the direction of the
triple underpass.(317) At first Mrs. Baker said the bullet hit behind the
President's car. Then she said she could not remember whether it hit to either
side or behind the President's car.(318) Mrs. Baker said she was sure she saw
the object hit before she heard the second shot.(319)
(112) Committee investigators were unable to locate Mrs. Bader.
(113) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 22, 19963,
Royce Skelton stated that he also saw a bullet hit the
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pavement in the left or middle lane, to the rear of the President's car.(320)
Skelton gave this account of the sequence of events:
---We saw the motorcade come around the corner and I heard something which I
thought was fireworks. I saw something hit the pavement at the left rear of the
car, then the car got in the right hand lane and I heard two more shots. I heard
a woman said "Oh no" or something and grab a man inside the car. I then heard
another shot and saw the bullet hit the pavement. The pavement was knocked to
the south away from the car.(321)
(114) In his Warren Commission testimony on April 8, 1964, Skelton said that he
saw smoke rise from the pavement when the bullet hit.(322) Skelton said also
that the sound of the gunfire came from the area of the President's car.(323)
Skelton said he was located on the overpass directly over Elm Street at the time
of the motorcade.(324) He said the sound of the shots definitely did not come
from where he was.(325) Skelton also offered that the smoke he saw rising from
the cement when the bullet hit "spread" in a direction away from the depository;
he said the "spray" of flying cement went toward the west.(326) On the
photograph designated Skelton exhibit No. 1, Skelton marked where on the street
he saw the bullet and in which direction he saw the "spray."(327)
(115) Committee investigators were unable to locate Royce Skelton.
(116) In testimony before the Warren commission on July 22, 1964, James Thomas
Tague of Dallas stated that at the time of the Presidential motorcade, he was
located near his car at the bridge abutment of the triple underpass.(328) Tague
said that during the shots he felt something sting him on the cheek; after the
shots, a policeman noticed that Tague had blood on his cheek.(329)
(117) On Commission exhibit No. 354, commission Counsel Labeler placed a "6" on
the photograph to indicate the place Tague was standing; it is described in
Tague's testimony as approximately 3 to 4 feet from the concrete embankment of
the bridge going over Main Street.(330) Tague said he and a police officer
discovered a "fresh" bullet mark on the curb about 12 to 15 feet from the
embankment.(331) Tague said the police officer attempted to go in the direction
the mark on the curb seemed to indicate the she had come from; he talk Tague he
had seen "something" there.(332) The letter "C" was placed on Commission exhibit
No. 354 to indicate the spot the policeman had indicated as the "source" of the
shot which hit the curb.(333) On the photograph, "C" is located in the area of
the railroad tracks. Tague said he was not sure but that he thought he was hit
on the cheek by the second or third bullet.(334)
(118) The piece of curb was examined by committee experts to determine if
neutron activation analysis could determine the type of metal present at the
scar, which might indicate what kind of bullet or missile hit the curb.
Nevertheless the neutron activation analysis expert was unable to make any
comparisons with the curb sample because it had previously been scraped by the
FBI and the remaining metal was too small for testing purposes.(335) Also, it
was felt that
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the metal still left on the curb portion would have been too contaminated by
cement material to yield any meaningful results.(336)
(119)During its acoustical reenactment of the assassination that took place in
Dealey Plaza on August 20, 1078, the committee used the location of the mark on
the curb described by James Tague as one of the "targets" at high ammunition was
fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository and the grassy
knoll to determine if the acoustical impulses on the Dallas Police Department
radio tape, made contemporaneously with the shots. The curb target spot used
during the reenactment was described as follows:
* * * measurements used at the position were devised by measuring to the fifth
curb stone slab on the south curb of Main Street. This is the slab known to have
been removed by the FBI on August 5, 1964.(337)
That spot was designated target 4 during the reenactment.(338) Gunmen then fired
at target 4 from the Texas School Book Depository and from the grassy
knoll.(339) None of the acoustical impulses that resulted from the shots fired
at target 4 during the reenactment matched the acoustical impulses on the
original Dallas Police Department radio tape that contains the sound of actual
gunfire at the time of the assassination.(340) That indicates that in all
probability the mark on the curb was not made by a direct shot from either
supposed assassin locations.
(120) When Richard Randolph Carr testified in the Kennedy assassination
conspiracy trial of Colay Shaw in New Orleans on February 19, 1969, he stated
that heard a shot and then three more shots in succession at the time of the
assassination.(341) When asked if he could tell where the shots came from, Carr
replied that "the last three" came from behind the picket fence located at the
top of the grassy knoll, and that one of the shots "knocked a bunch of grass
up"; he could tell by the way the grass was "knocked up" that the bullet came
from that area.(342) Trying further to pin down the supposed location of the
shots he heard, Carr stated that the sound came from the end of the cement
arcade at the top of the knoll which was closest to the underpass.(343) When
asked if he could determine from the direction in which the bullet hit the
ground which direction it was traveling in, Carr said that if the bullet had
continued, it would have gone from the area of the picket fence in the direction
of the Criminal Courts Building.(344)
(121) On August 13, 1978, the committee received information that a person in
Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, had noticed a bullet fall to the ground near
the motorcade at the time of the shots. Charles Rodgers of Lake Dallas, Tex.
called the committee to report that he was present in Dealey Plaza at the time
of the assassination with a friend, Mike Nally.(345) According to Rodgers,
Nally's uncle was a motorcycle policeman riding in the motorcade.(346) The uncle
had apparently related to his nephew that when the shots were fired, he heard a
clanging noise of the fender of his motorcycle.(347) the policeman looked down
and saw a .45 caliber slug roll of into the
Page 23
23
street.(348) The policeman then had to leave the area quickly ad the motorcade
was speeding from the plaza.(349)
(122) Rodgers said the next day Mike Nally came to him and said Nally's uncle
had instructed him not to report the story and Nally passed that instruction on
to Rodgers.(350)
(123) Based on the data provided by Rodgers, the committee was unable to locate
Nally or to identify Nally's uncle.
(124) On August 5, 1978, the committee received information from former Dallas
policeman Starvis Ellis that Ellis had also seen a missile hit the ground in the
area of the motorcade at the time of the assassination. Ellis said he rode on a
motorcycle alongside the first car in the motorcade, approximately 100 to 125
feet in front of the car carrying President Kennedy.(351) Ellis said that just
as he started down the hill of Elm Street, he looked back toward President
Kennedy's car and saw debris come up from the ground at a nearby curb.(352)
Ellis thought it was a fragment grenade.(353)
(125) Ellis said also that President Kennedy turned around and looked over his
shoulder.(354) The second shot then hit him, and the third shot "blew his head
up."(355)
Accounts of Smoke in Dealey Plaza at the Time of the Shots
Page 23
VI. ACCOUNTS OF SMOKE IN DEALEY PLAZA AT THE TIME OF THE SHOTS
(126) Several witnesses have given statements that they saw "smoke" in the plaza
that coincided with the gunfire. The committee considered these statements
relevant to the question of whether a gunman or gunmen were located somewhere
other than the depository.
(127) In a Dallas County Sheriff's Department notarized statement dated November
22, 1963, Austin Lawrence Miller stated that at the time he heard three shots
and saw people in the Presidential limousine react, he saw "something which I
thought was smoke or steam coming from a group of trees north of Elm off the
railroad tracks."(356) At that time, Miller was standing on the bridge of the
triple underpass.(357) Miller said he did not see anyone in the area of the
railroad tracks.(358)
(128) Miller testified before the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964.(359) At
that time, Miller was not asked about his prior statement to the sheriff's
department and did not give information about the smoke he had earlier reported.
(129) The committee was unable to locate Austin Miller.
(130) In an FBI interview on March 17, 1964, Clemon Earl Johnson, of Dallas,
stated that he saw smoke near the pavillion at the time of the shots.(360)
according to the FBI interview report, Johnson told the FBI that he believed the
smoke came from a motorcycle, which was abandoned near the spot by a Dallas
policeman.(361) At the time of the shots, Johnson was located on the Elm Street
viaduct overlooking the Presidential motorcade.(362)
(131) Johnson was not called to testify before the Warren Commission, and he was
not located by the committee.
(132) In testimony before the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964, S.M. Holland
stated that he was employed by the Union Terminal Railroad at the time of the
assassination and was located in the middle of the overpass at the time of the
Presidential motorcade.(363)
Page 24
24
Holland stated that between the third and fourth shots, he saw smoke rising from
the trees located at the top of the knoll:
There was a shot, a report, I don't know whether it was a shot. I can't say
that. And a puff of smoke came out about 6 or 8 feet above the ground right out
from under those trees. And at Just about this location from where I was
standing you could see that puff of smoke, like someone had thrown a
firecracker, or something out, and that is just the way it sounded. It wasn't
loud as the previous reports or shots.(364)
(133) In a report to the sheriff's department on November 22, 1963, Holland had
also reported seeing the puff of smoke at the time of the shots. Nevertheless,
in that statement, Holland placed the time of the puff of smoke as coinciding
the first "noise":
* * *when they got just about to the Arcade I heard what I thought for the
moment was a firecracker and he slumped over and I looked over toward the arcade
and trees and saw a puff of smoke come from the trees and I heard three more
shots after the first shot but that was the only puff of smoke I saw. I
immediately ran around to where I could see behind the arcade and did not see
anyone running from there. But puff of smoke I saw definitely came from behind
the arcade through the trees.(365)
(134) James L. Simmons, of Dallas, reported to the FBI that from his location on
the Commerce Street Viaduct he saw "exhaust fumes or smoke" near the embankment
in front of the depository building.(366) In the FBI interview on March 17,
1964, Simmons said that after the shots he saw a policeman jump off his
motorcycle and run up the hill of the knoll toward the Memorial Arches.(367) It
is not clear from the report if Simmons was describing the smoke as coming from
the motorcycle or someplace else.
(135) Nolan H. Potter was also employed by the Union Terminal Co. at the time of
the assassination and was with Simmons at the time of the shots.(368) In an FBI
interview on March 17, 1964, Potter said that he heard three shots, saw the
President slump over in his car, and that he also saw smoke in front of the
depository, which was rising from the trees.(369) Potter gave no other details
about the location of the smoke. in the interview, Potter also mentioned seeing
the policeman leave his motorcycle and run up the knoll,(370) but he did not
describe the smoke as being in the area of the motorcycle.
(136) Neither Simmons nor Potter testified before the Warren Commission.
(137) Based on the statements of these witnesses, if the smoke they reported was
in fact the result of gunfire, it would have originated in the area of the top
of the grassy knoll. There is no way of determining what type of ammunition was
used in that "gunfire" so that is can be stated conclusively whether the smoke
seen by the witnesses is consistent with smoke produced by the type of
ammunition used in any gunfire from the knoll. Nevertheless, a firearms expert
engaged by the committee explained that irrespective of the exact type of
ammunition used, it would be possible for witnesses to have seen smoke if a gun
Page 25
25
had been fired from that arena. According to the expert, both "smokeless" and
smoke-producing ammunition may leave a trace of smoke that would be visible to
the eye in sunlight.(371) That is because even with smokeless ammunition, when
the weapon was fired, nitrocellulose bases in the powder which are impregnated
with nitroglycerin may give off smoke, albeit less smoke than black or
smoke-producing ammunition.(372) In addition, residue remaining in the weapon
from previous firings, as well as cleaning solution which might have been used
on the weapon, could cause even more smoke to be discharged in subsequent
firings of the weapon.(373)
Submitted by:
MS. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.
References
Page 25
REFERENCES
(1) FBI report, Dec. 6, 1963, contained in Warren commission Exhibit 2089, pp.
35-36, in Hearings before the President's Commission of the Assassination of
President John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964), volume 24, p. 524 (hereinafter Warren Report Hearings).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) FBI report, Dec. 5, 1963, contained in Warren Commission Doc. No. 7 (JFK
Doc. No. 013074).
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Testimony of Arnold Louis Rowland, Mar, 10, 1964, 2 Warren Report Hearings,
168.
(21) Id. at p. 169
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Id. at p. 170
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Id. at p. 171
(28) Id. at p. 172
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Id. at p. 173
(34) Id. at P. 175
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Id. at p. 176
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
Page 26
26
(42) Interview of Arnold Rowland by Wallace Heitman, FBI report, Nov. 23, 1963.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Interview of Arnold Rowland by J. Calvin Rice and John V. Almon, FBI
report, Nov. 23, 1963
(48) Ibid.
(49) Ibid.
(50) FBI affidavit of Arnold Rowland, witnessed by Paul E. Wolff and James W.
Swinford, Nov. 24, 1963.
(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Ibid.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Testimony of Roger D. Craig, Apr. 1, 1964. 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
263.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Ibid.
(61) Id. at p. 264
(62) Ibid.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Id. at p. 265
(67) Ibid.
(68) Voluntary statement of Arnold Louis Rowland, Sheriff's Department, Dallas
County, Nov. 22, 1963.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Scientific report of Photographic Evidence Panel, par. 293-302.
(73) Ibid., par. 292.
(74) Ibid., par. 301.
(75) Ibid., par. 295.
(76) Ibid., par. 301.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid., par. 302
(79) Ibid.
(80) Staff interview of Rose Mary Willis, Nov. 13, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013056).
(81) Ibid.
(82) Ibid.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Id. at p. 2.
(89) Staff interview of Mrs. Linda Pites, Nov. 7, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 002559).
(90) Ibid.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Testimony of Linda Kay Willis, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p.
498.
(93) Ibid.
(94) Testimony of Phillip L. Willis, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p.
493.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Id. at p. 496.
(97) Id. at p. 497.
(98) Ibid.
Page 27
27
(99) FBI interview of Richard Randolph Carr by SA John T. Kesler and Vernon
Mitchem, FBI report, Jan. 14, 1964, file no. DL 100-10461
(100) Ibid.
(101) Ibid.
(102) Id. at p. 2.
(103) Id. at p. 1.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Transcript of proceedings, Tate of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw, district
court, Orleans Parish, New Orleans, Feb. 19, 1969 (JFK Doc. No. 002028), p. 4.
(106) Ibid.
(107) Id. at p. 11.
(108) Ibid.
(109) Id. at p. 18.
(110) Id. at p. 17.
(111) Ibid.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Id at pp. 17-18.
(114) Id. at pp. 18-19.
(115) Id at p. 20.
(116) FBI interview of James Richard Worrell, FBI report by SA Louis M. Kelley,
Oct. 26, 1964, file No. DL 89-43.
(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Affidavit of James Richard Worrell, Jr., Nov. 23, 1963 (JFK Doc. No.
003641).
(120) Testimony of James Richard Worrell, Jr., 2 Warren Report Hearings, p. 194.
(121) Id at p. 196
(122) Ibid.
(123) Id. at p. 200
(124) Certificate of death of James Richard Worrell, Jr., Dallas, Tex., Nov. 7,
1966 (JFK Doc. No. 009219).
(125) Voluntary statement of Jean Hill, Dallas County sheriff's Department, Nov.
22, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 479.
(126) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.
(128) Interview of Jean Hill, FBI report by SA Robert C. Lish, Nov. 23, 1963,
file no. DL 89-43.
(129) Interview of Jean Hill, Mar. 17, 1964, FBI report by SA E. Ja. Robertson
and Thomas T. Trettis, file no. DL 89-43, p. 2.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Ibid.
(132) Ibid.
(133) Ibid.
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid.
(136) Testimony of Jean Lollis Hill, Mar. 24, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
210.
(137) Id. at p. 211.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Ibid.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Id. at p. 213.
(142) Ibid.
(143) Ibid.
(144) Id. at p. 212.
(145) Id. at p. 214.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Id. at p. 215.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Ibid.
(150) Id. at p. 221
(151) Ibid.
(152) Ibid.
Page 28
28
(153) Id. at p. 217.
(154) Id. at p. 221.
(155) Id. at p. 222.
(156) Id. at p. 217.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Testimony of Mark Lane, Mar. 7, 1964, 2 Warren Report Hearings, p. 42.
(159) Voluntary statement of J.C. Price, Dallas County Sheriff's department,
Nov. 22, 1963, contained in Decker exhibit, no. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings,
p. 492.
(160) Ibid.
(161) Ibid.
(162) Ibid.
(163) Ibid.
(164) FBI interview of Jesse C. Price, FBI report by SA J. Clavin Rice and
Alfred D. Neeley, Nov. 25, 1963, file No. DL 89-43.
(165) FBI interview of Lee E. Bowers, Jr., FBI report by SA robert M.a Barrett
and John V. Almon, Nov. 22, 1963, file No. DL 89-43.
(166) Ibid.
(167) Ibid.
(168) Ibid.
(169) Ibid.
(170) Ibid.
(171) Ibid.
(172) Ibid.
(173) Ibid.
(174) Ibid.
(175) Ibid.
(176) Ibid.
(177) Testimony of Lee E. Bowers, Jr., Apr. 2, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings,
pp. 285-286.
(178) Id. at p. 285.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Id. at p. 286.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Id. at p. 284.
(183) Id. at p. 287.
(184) Ibid.
(185) Ibid.
(186) Ibid.
(187) Id. at p. 288
(188) Ibid.
(189) Staff interview of Mr. and Mrs. Lee E. Bowers, Sr., Nov. 1, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations JFK Doc. No. 014354).
(190) Ibid.
(191) Voluntary statement of Malcolm Summers, Dallas County Sheriff's
Department, Nov. 23, 1963, Decker exhibit 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, P.
500.
(192) Ibid.
(193) Ibid.
(194) Ibid.
(195) Ibid.
(196) Ibid.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Ibid.
(199) Ibid.
(200) Ibid.
(201) Ibid.
(202) Statement of Malcolm Summers, Oct. 30, 1978, House Select committee on
Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014277).
(203) Supplementary investigation report, Dallas County Sheriff's Department.
Decker exhibit No. 5232, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 523.
(204) Ibid.
(205) Ibid.
(206) Ibid.
Page 29
29
(207) FBI report, serial No. 105-82555-4354x, p. 185.
(208) Id. at p. 186.
(209) Ibid.
(210) Id. at p. 187.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Ibid.
(213) Ibid.
(214) Id. at p. 188
(215) Ibid.
(216) Id. at p. 189.
(217) Ibid.
(218) Staff interview of Tom G. Tilson, Jr., Aug. 26, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 011374).
(219) Ibid.
(220) Id. at p. 2.
(221) Id. at p. 1.
(222) Ibid.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Ibid.
(225) Id. at p. 2.
(226) Ibid.
(227) Ibid.
(228) Id. at pp. 2-3.
(229) Id. at p. 3.
(230) Ibid.
(231) Ibid.
(232) Id. at p. 2.
(233) Ibid.
(234) Id. at p. 3.
(235) Ibid.
(236) Ibid.
(237) Voluntary statement of Julia Ann Mercer, Dallas County Sheriff's
Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p.
483.
(238) Ibid.
(239) Ibid.
(240) Ibid.
(241) Ibid.
(242) Ibid.
(243) Ibid.
(244) Ibid.
(245) Ibid.
(246) Ibid.
(247) Id. at pp. 283-284.
(248) Id. at p. 284.
(249) Id. at p. 283.
(250) Letter from Jim Garrison to Jonathan Blackmer and enclosures, July 15,
1977 (JFK Doc. No. 002967).
(251) Id. at p. 10.
(252) Ibid.
(253) Ibid.
(254) Ibid.
(255) Ibid.
(256) Ibid.
(257) FBI interview of Julia Ann Mercer, Nov. 23, 1963, Warren Commission Doc.
No. CD 205, p. 8 (JFK Doc. No. 002967).
(258) Ibid.
(259) Ibid.
(260) Ibid.
(261) Ibid.
(262) Ibid.
(263) Ibid.
Page 30
30
(264) FBI interview of Julia Ann Mercer, Nov. 28, 1963, p. 9, (JFK Doc. No.
002967).
(265) Ibid.
(266) Ibid.
(267) Ibid.
(268) Ibid.
(269) Ibid.
(270) Ibid.
(271) Supplementary investigation report by Roger Craig, Dallas County Sheriff's
Department, Nov. 23, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings,
p. 524.
(272) Ibid.
(273) Ibid.
(274) Ibid.
(275) Ibid.
(276) Ibid.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Testimony of Roger D. Craig, Apr. f1, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
266.
(279) Ibid.
(280) Ibid.
(281) Ibid.
(282) Ibid.
(283) Ibid.
(284) Id. at p. 267.
(285) Ibid.
(286) Dallas Police Department homicide report, May 15, 1975, as quoted in
"Assassination of JFK by Coincidence or Conspiracy?" Bernard Fensterwald, Jr.,
New York, Zebra Books, 1977, p. 449, fn. 98.
(287) FBI Interview of Marvin Robinson, FBI report by SA John V. Almon and J.
Calvin Rice, nov. 23, 1963, file No. DL 89-43 (JFK Doc. no. 013840).
(288) Ibid.
(289) Ibid.
(290) Ibid.
(291) Ibid.
(292) Testimony of Earle V. Brown, Apr. 7, 1964, 5 Warren Report Hearings, p.
231.
(293) Id. at p. 234.
(294) Staff interview of Earle V. Brown, Oct, 26, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 00634).
(295) Ibid.
(296) Ibid.
(297) Id. at p. 2.
(298) Ibid.
(299) Ibid.
(300) Ibid.
(301) Ibid.
(302) Ibid.
(303) Id. fat p. 3.
(304) Ibid.
(305) Ibid.
(306) Ibid.
(307) Ibid.
(308) Id. at p. 2.
(309) Ibid.
(310) Id. at p. 3.
(311) Staff interview of James A. Lomax, Nov. 17, 1979, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014352).
(312) See scientific report of the photographic evidence panel, trajectory
analysis, par. 110.
(313) FBI interview of Virgie Rackley, FBI report by SA Bardwell Odum and Joseph
G. Peggs, Nov. 25, 1963, file No. DL 89-43, Warren Commission Doc. No. 5.
(314) Ibid.
(315) Ibid.
Page 31
31
(316) Testimony of Mrs. Donald Baker, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings,
p. 509.
(317) Id. at p. 510.
(318) Ibid.
(319) Id. at p. 513.
(320) Voluntary statement of Royce Glenn Skelton, Dallas County Sheriff's
Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings,
p. 496.
(321) Ibid.
(322) Testimony of Royce G. Skelton, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
237.
(323) Ibid.
(324) Id. at p. 236.
(325) Id. at p. 237.
(326) Id. at p. 238.
(327) Id. at p. 239.
(328) Testimony of James Thomas Tague, July 23, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings,
p. 553.
(329) Ibid.
(330) Id. at p. 554.
(331) Ibid.
(332) Ibid.
(333) Ibid.
(334) Id. at p. 555.
(335) A report to the House Select Committee on Assassinations on the subject of
1977 neutron activation analysis measurements on bullet-lead specimens involved
in the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, by Dr. Vincent P. Guinn,
Ph.D., Sept. 1978, pp. 7-9.
(336) Id. at p. 9
(337) Staff memorandum re Dealey Plaza test shooting on Aug. 20, 1978, Aug. 22,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4. (JFK Doc. No. 013285).
(338) Ibid.
(339) Id. at p. 6.
(340) Report of Bolt Beranek & Newman, Inc., analysis of recorded sounds
relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (No. 3947), section
5.3. The acoustics experts compared the results of the test firings in Dealey
Plaza on Aug. 20, 1978, with the acoustical impulses on the original Dallas
Police Department radio tape to determine what correlation coefficients exist
between the two sets of impulses. From that correlation, the acoustics study
determined that none of the impulses from target 4 were consistent with the
known location of the Presidential limousine at the time of the shots, which
would mean that the alleged assassins would not have been aiming at the
limousine at all, but in the opposite direction, to have produced the acoustical
impulse which would have matched that which was produced during the acoustical
reenactment.
(341) See ref. 105, p. 12.
(342) Id. at pp. 12-13.
(343) Id. at p. 16.
(344) Id. at p. 32.
(345) Telephone interview of Charles Rodgers, House Select committee on
Assassinations staff outside contact report, Aug. 13, 1978 (JFK Doc No. 010697).
(346) Ibid.
(347) Ibid.
(348) Ibid.
(349) Ibid.
(350) Ibid.
(351) Staff investigator rough notes, of staff interview of Starvis Ellis, Aug.
5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013841).
(352) Ibid.
(353) Ibid.
(354) Ibid.
(355) Ibid.
(356) Voluntary statement of Austin Lawrence Miller, Dallas County Sheriff's
Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Warren Commission exhibit 2003 (p. 41), 24 Warren
Report Hearings, p. 217.
(357) Ibid.
(358) Ibid.
Page 32
32
(359) Testimony of Austin L. Miller, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
223.
(360) FBI interview of Clemon Earl Johnson, FBI report by SA Thomas T. Trettis
and E. J. Robertson, Mar, 18, 1964, Warren Commission exhibit no. 1422, 22
Warren Report Hearings, p. 836.
(361) Ibid.
(362) Ibid.
(363) Testimony of S. M. Holland, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings pp.
239, 242.
(364) Id. at pp. 243-244.
(365) Voluntary statement of S. M. Holland, Dallas County Sheriff's Department,
Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit no. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p.480.
(366) FBI interview of James L. Simmons, FBI Report by SA Thomas T. Trettis and
E.J. Robertson, Mar. 19, 1964, file No. DL 100-10461 (contained in JFK doc. No.
013291).
(367) Ibid.
(368) Ibid.
(369) FBI interview of Nolan H. Potter, FBI report by SA Thomas T. Trettis and
E. J. Robertson, Mar. 19, 1964, file No. DL 100-10461, Warren Commission exhibit
1418 (contained in JFK Doc. No. 013291).
(370) Ibid.
(371) Telephone interview of Monty Lutz, Wisconsin Crime Laboratories, Dec. 12,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations staff outside contact report (JFK
Doc. No. 013637).
(372) Ibid.
(373) Ibid.
Oswald - Tippit Associates
Page 33
OSWALD-TIPPIT ASSOCIATES
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(33)
Contents
Page 34
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Foreword (1)
I. Approach (2)
II. Marie Tippit Thomas (7)
III. Murray James Jackson (8)
IV. William Anglin (9)
V. Morris Brumley (10)
VI. Basil Robinson (11)
VII. Calvin Owens (12)
VIII. Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon (13)
IX. Mary Ada Dowling (14)
X. The Wise allegation (15)
XI. Austin's barbecue (39)
(34)
Foreword
Page 35
FOREWORD
(1) Even though the warren Commission indicated that no credible evidence was
found proving that Lee Harvey Oswald and Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit knew
one another prior to the assassination, speculation has continued over the years
about the circumstances of Tippit's murder on the afternoon of November 22,
1963. This speculation has grown because of the circumstances surrounding
Tippit's death: Questions have persisted about why Oswald would have been in
that neighborhood, including, had Tippit received enough information on the
suspected assassin of President Kennedy to have been able to identify Oswald as
the possible suspect, and was there anything suspicious about Tippit's location
in that part of Dallas after the assassination, when other police officers had
been ordered to the Dealey Plaza area or Parkland Hospital immediately after the
assassination?
Approach
Page 35
I. APPROACH
(2) Because there was little direct evidence to answer any of these questions,
the committee concluded that the most effective way to learn if Oswald and
Tippit knew one another world be to investigate the associates of the two men.
Over the years, rumors have persisted that Oswald and Tippit were seen together
at various public places. No effective way to investigate or verify those claims
exists because of the passage of time and the general unreliability of such
identifications.
(3) On the other hand, the committee concluded that if the two men had any
associates in common, the fact of that association could be more easily
discerned and might shed light on the nature of the relationship, if any,
between the two.
(4) The committee undertook to compile the names of the associates and relatives
of Lee Harvey Oswald and J.D. Tippit. Each associate interviewed was asked for
the names of other persons each man was known to have associated with closely.
Special attention was paid to the possibility of "overlaps" on the two lists,
that is, persons who appeared to be associates of both men. After the lists were
compiled, the committee requested data on each associate from the following
Government agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Secret Service and, where appropriate, Departments of Defense and
State.
(5) On the basis of the initial investigation of the associates of each man and
the review of the Agency files, further investigation was conducted where
warranted either to clarify a relationship or probe a possible association.
(6) No relative or associate of J.D. Tippit had been called to testify before
the Warren Commission about Tippit's associations or activities. Despite the
fact that confusion existed even at the time of the Warren Commission about the
transcriptions of the Dallas Police
(35)
Page 36
36
Department radio despatches that contained information about Tippit's location
and activities on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, none of the police
officers with whom Tippit worked were called to testify about the details of his
assignment if Oak Cliff.(1) The committee interviewed nine persons who were
reported to have had close personal and working relationships with Tippit.
Marie Tippit Thomas
Page 36
II. MARIE TIPPIT THOMAS
(7) Tippit's widow, Marie Tippit Thomas reported in an interview to the FBI in
May 1964 that her husband's only associates were fellow police officers.(2) She
stated that her social life with him involved the families and wives of many of
those same officers.(3) Mrs. Thomas was interviewed by the committee on October
12, 1977.(4) At that time, she could provide no new information about Tippit's
associates. She did mention that Tippit's closest friend had been Bill Anglin,
another Dallas police officer who lived a few houses away on Glencairn Street in
Dallas.(5) She further stated that his other close friends were Charlie
Harrison, Bud Owens, and Richard Stovall. Mrs. Thomas also repeated her earlier
information that Tippit had been employed at the time of the assassination
part-time at Austin's Barbecue in Dallas.(6) Tippit worked as a security guard
at the restaurant on Friday and Saturday nights from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m.(7)
Murray James Jackson
Page 36
III. MURRAY JAMES JACKSON
(8) The committee interviewed members of the Dallas Police Force who were
purported to have been personal associates of J.D. Tippit. The first of these
was Murray James Jackson. Jackson was working the dispatch system on the Dallas
police radio when Tippit was killed.(8) Jackson reported to the committee that
he had worked with and come to know J.D. Tippit very well over a 20-year
period.(9) He stated that they "socialized when off duty".(10) Officer Jackson
is the officer who was responsible for having sent Tippit into the Oak Cliff
area according to the transmissions from the dispatches.(11)
William Anglin
Page 36
IV. WILLIAM ANGLIN
(9) The committee also contacted William Anglin. Anglin indicated that he
socialized with J.D. Tippit.(12) He said in the interview that "he and J.D. had
coffee or tea at 'the Old Drive-In'" about 11:30-11:45 on the morning of
November 22.(13)
Morris Brumley
Page 36
V. MORRIS BRUMLEY
(10) Another of Tippit's associates who was spoken to was Morris Brumley.
Brumley had known Tippit since 1934 when they attended school in Fullbright,
Tex.(14) Brumley indicated that he had no information concerning the outside
interests, associates, or attitudes of J.D. Tippit.(15) Brumley described Tippit
as a good family man and conscientious in his work but not very sharp.(16)
Brumley stated that Basil Robinson, another Dallas police officer assigned to
the Oak Cliff section was also a good friend of Tippit's.(17)
Basil Robinson
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37
VI. BASIL ROBINSON
(11) Basil Robinson was another member of the Dallas Police Department who had a
rather long association with J.D. Tippit. Tippit's acquaintance with Robinson
dated back to the Tippit stay at Bogata, Tex.(18) When interviewed by the FBI,
Robinson indicated that he had been a "close personal friend" of Tippit and his
family.(19) He said that Tippit had few outside interests because he was working
all the time.(20)
Calvin Owens
Page 37
VII. CALVIN OWENS
(12) Sergeant Calvin Owens was Tippit's immediate supervisor at the Dallas
Police Department.(21) When questioned by the FBI, Owens indicated that Tippit
was strictly a family man. He also said that he knew of no associates of
Tippit's except members of the police force.(22)
Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon
Page 37
VIII. MRS. JOHNNIE MAXIE WITHERSPOON
(13) Committee investigators also interviewed Mrs. Johnnie Maxie
Witherspoon.(23) Mrs. Witherspoon stated that she became acquainted with Officer
Tippit during his employment at Austin's Barbecue.(24) Mrs. Witherspoon informed
the committee that she and Tippet engaged in a relationship and started dating
for a couple of years.(25) She said that the relationship ended in the summer of
1963 when her husband returned home.(26) She also indicated that Bill Anglin was
an associate of J.D. Tippit's.(27)
Mary Ada Dowling
Page 37
IX. MARY ADA DOWLING
(14) One other person who was interviewed about Tippit was Mary Ada Dowling, a
waitress for the Dobbs House Restaurant on North Beckley Street. She indicated
to the FBI that Tippit had a habit of coming into the Dobbs House each
morning.(28) She also indicated that on one occasion when Tippit was in the
restaurant, Lee Harvey Oswald came in to be served.(29) She did not know if they
knew each other.(30)
The Wise Allegation
Page 37
X. THE WISE ALLEGATION
(15) The committee also learned of an allegation about the assassination
involving an associate and friend of J.D. Tippit's which was not reported in the
Warren Commission Report. Interviews were conducted by the FBI in December 1963
about that allegation, and were furnished to the Warren Commission, but the
substance of those interviews was not included in the report made public by the
Commission.
(16) In February 1977, the committee received information from Wes Wise, a
reporter with KRLD-TV in Dallas at the time of the assassination and later mayor
of Dallas, that he had received information about a car near the scene of the
Tippit shooting that was traced to Carl Mather, a close friend of Tippit's.
According to Wise, on December 4, 1963, he was giving a speech at the Ol Chico
Restaurant in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas.(31) After the subject of the
speech had turned to events surrounding the assassination, a man in the audience
named Pate approached Wise and said a mechanic who worked
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38
for Pate had observed a car in the parking lot of the El Chico Restaurant on the
afternoon of November 22 after radio reports were being broadcast about the
shooting in Dealey Plaza.(32)
(17) Wise went to Pate to discuss the story with the mechanic.(33) The mechanic
told Wise that after the assassination there were sirens blaring and police cars
"all over the area" near the garage.(34) He noticed a man sitting in an
irregularly parked car in the restaurant parking lot; the car was slightly
hidden by a billboard.(35) The man in the car appeared to be hiding, according
to the mechanic.(36) All of the circumstances seemed so suspicious that the
mechanic went across the street to get a better look.(37) When he was about 10
or 15 yards from the car, the man turned around.(38) The mechanic was able then
to get a good look at his face; he saw also that the man was wearing a white
T-shirt.(39) He made a note of the license number of the car.(40)
(18) When the mechanic saw news accounts of the assassination that night on
television, he saw Lee Harvey Oswald and recognized him as being the man he had
soon in the car that afternoon.(41) The mechanic had been afraid of reporting
the incident.(42) Nevertheless, after Pate brought Wise to meet him, Wise was
able to convince the mechanic that he should report the incident to the FBI.(43)
The mechanic took with him the note paper on which he had jotted the license
number.(44)
(19) Wes stated also that he later took employees of CBS to meet the owner of
the license number.(45) Wise said that during that meeting, which was arranged
as a dinner between the owner and his wife and the person from CBS, the man
appeared "so upset" and "agitated" that he was unable to eat.(46) At that time,
the man explained his plate number was noticed under the suspicious
circumstances and that he was a friend of Tippit, who had been killed at almost
the same time very nearby.(47)
(20) Wise told the committee that he jotted down the information he received
from Pate and the mechanic on a piece of paper he was carrying in his pocket at
the time of his speech at the El Chico Restaurant.(48) He turned that paper over
to the committee. Wise also told the committee that he thought he was still in
possession of the slip of paper containing the license number that had been
written by the mechanic. Wise told the committee that after several attempts he
has been unable to locate that slip of paper among his records at his home.(49)
(21) The license number appearing on the paper provided by Wise from his
conversation with Pate and the mechanic was Texas license PP 4537. The car was
only described on the paper as a 1957 Plymouth 4-door, with no further
description.(50)
(22) The FBI interviewed Wes Wise about this allegation on December 4, 1963. At
that time, Wise said the mechanic, whom he refused to identify for the FBI,
claiming he did not want to reveal the identity of his source, told him the car
he saw in the restaurant parking lot was a red 1957 Plymouth with the license PP
4537.(51)
(23) In an FBI report dated December 14, 1963, Milton Love of the Dallas County
Tax Office advised that the 1963 Texas license PP 4537
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39
was issued for a 1957 Plymouth automobile in the possession of Carl Amos Mather,
4309 Colgate Street, Garland, Tex.(52) In a report dated December 14, 1963, FBI
special Agent Charles T. Brown reported that he observed a 1957 Plymouth with
1963 Texas license PP 4537 parked in the driveway of the house at 4309 Colgate
Street, Garland, Tex.(53) Brown reported that car was light blue over medium
blue in color.(54)
(24) Mrs. Carl A Mather was interviewed by FBI agent Charles T. Brown on
December 5, 1963, at the Mather home at 4303 Colgate Street in Garland, Tex. She
identified the 1957 Plymouth with Texas license PP 4537 as belonging to her and
her husband.(55) Mrs. Mather told the FBI that her husband was at work on
November 22, 1963, at Collins Radio, Co., in Richardson, Tex., until
approximately 2 p.m., when he came by their home to the the family to the Tippit
home to offer their condolences.(56) Mrs. Mather said the two families were
friends.(57) According to Mrs. Mather, Carl Mather was with them at the Tippit
home from about 3:30 p.m. until about 5 p.m., when he took the two Mather
children home.(58) Mrs. Mather did not state in the interview which car her
husband was driving that day at the time of the assassination of the Tippit
shooting. No FBI report of an interview or contact with Carl Mather was located.
(25) On December 9, 1963, Wes Wise told FBI Special Agent Brown that he could at
that time reveal the identity of the person who had provided him with the
information about the car and license number.(59) He identified the mechanic as
T.F. White, who worked at the Mack Pate Garage at 114 West Seventh Street in
Dallas.(60) Wise advised it would be permissible for the FBI to interview White
to get further details of the allegation.(61)
(26) T.F. White was interviewed by Special Agent Brown on December 13, 1963. In
the interview, White said he saw a red car in the parking lot of the El Chico
Restaurant at approximately 2 p.m. on November 22, 1963.(62) At the time of the
interview, White said he believed the car to be a red 1961 Falcon with 1963
Texas license PP 4537.(63) White said he saw the man in the car from the side,
and that when he saw pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald that night on television, he
was identical with the man he had seen in the car that afternoon.(64) White said
that after he saw the man sit in the car for a short time, the man left in the
car at a high rate of speed, going west of Davis Street.(65)
(27) During the interview, Special Agent Brown advised White that the car to
which the license number was traced was a 1957 Plymouth that was light and
medium blue in color.(66) Brown also told White that Oswald had been apprehended
at approximately 2 p.m. on November 22, 1963, in the Texas Theater.(67)
(28) According to the interview report, when confronted with those facts, White
reiterated that he had correctly copied the number of the car and that after
seeing the news reports of Oswald, he thought Oswald was possibly identical with
the man White had seen in the car.(68)
(29) Carl Mather and his wife were interviewed by the committee on March 28,
1978. Mather stated that his family had been close friends with the Tippits
since 1958 when the two families lived on
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40
Glenfield Street in dallas.(69) The Mather family moved away to Garland, Texas,
in 1961.(70) The relationship between the two families consisted of visits
together to "family-type" clubs and babysitting.(71)
(30) Mather said that on November 2, 1963, he worked all day at the Collins
Radio Co. in Richardson.(72) Mather said his boss at the time at Collins was
J.A. Pickford.(73) The Mathers said that they were familiar with the allegation
about the car with their license tag parked in the restaurant parking area.(74)
Barbara Mather said she talked to FBI agents about their car twice, but that
Carl Mather was never interviewed.(75) The Mathers said they attached no further
particular significance to the incident since the FBI apparently dropped the
issue.(76)
(31) During the committee interview, Barbara Mather stated that she and her
husband never owned any kind of red car.(77) She stated that at the time of the
assassination they owned a Ford station wagon, which was white over blue, in
addition to the blue 1957 Plymouth which carried the license number reported by
T.F. White.(78)
(32) mather described his background as including a security clearance for
electronics work.(79) He has been employed with Collins Radio Co. for 21
years.(80) One assignment involved work in Brandywine, Md., at Andrews Air Force
Base, where he did electronics work on then Vice President Johnson's airplane
Air Force Two.(81)
(33) Soon after the assassination, the Mathers met with Wes Wise and Jane
Bartell from CBS to discuss the allegation about the mysterious car.(82) They
noticed Mrs. Mather's name listed in the credits of a television documentary
later done by CBS, but heard nothing more regarding the incident.(83)
Eventually, new tags were issued for their car, and the 1963 tags were
discarded.(84)
(34) The committee interviewed Wes Wise again on November 2, 1978, in Dallas. At
that time, Wise repeated the details of his contacts with the Mathers and the
mechanic who originally reported the story to Wise.(85) Wise recalled having
dinner with the Mathers and described Carl Mather as "too nervous to eat," but
his wife was "cool, very cool."(86)
(35) There was an additional allegation of a red car near the scene of the
Tippit shooting. A witness to the Tippit murder, Domingo Benavides, testified
before the Warren commission that he saw a red Ford at the scene of the Tippit
murder. He testified that at "about 1 o'clock" on november 22, 1963, he was
driving west on Tenth Street between Denver and Patton streets.(87) he saw a
police car stopped four or five feet from the curb on Tenth Street, facing in an
easterly direction.(88) A man Benavides described as Oswald was standing on the
curb side of the police car.(89) Benavides said he saw the officer step around
to the front of the car, and he was then shot.(90) Benavides said that at that
point he "looked around to miss a car" and pulled his truck into the curb and
ducked down.(91) He then heard two more shots.(92)
(36) After giving further details of the shooting of the officer and the flight
of the man, benavides said in his testimony that a car which he believed to be a
red Ford was parked in front of him on Tenth Street.(93) He described the driver
of the red car as about 25 or 30
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41
years old.(94) Benavides said the man pulled over in his car "when he heard the
scare" but did not get out of the car.(95) He was located about six cars from
the police car.(96)
(37) The committee did not locate any public documents or Warren Commission
reports which identified the driver of the red car. However, through
investigation in Dallas, the committee did locate and interview a man who said
he was at the scene of the Tippit shooting but never came forward with
information.
(38) Committee investigators interviewed Jack Ray Tatum at his office at the
Baylor University Medical center in Dallas on February 1, 1978. Tatum stated
that on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, he was driving north on Denver
Street and stopped at Tenth Street.(97) At that point he saw a police squad car,
and a young whit male walking on the sidewalk near the squad car.(98) Both the
police car and the young man were heading east on Tenth Street.(99) As Tatum
approached the squad car, he saw the young male leaning over the passenger side
of the police car with both hands in his zippered jacket.(100) Tatum said that
as he drove through the intersection of Tenth and Patton Streets he heard three
shots in rapid succession; Tatum said he went through the intersection stopped
his car and turned to look back.(101) At that point he saw the police officer
lying on the ground near the front of the police car, with the young male
standing near him.(102) Tatum said the man ran toward the back of the police car
with a gun in his hand.(103) The man then stepped back into the street and shot
the police officer as he was lying on the ground.(104) The man then started to
run in Tatum's direction.(105) Tatum said he then sped off in his car and last
saw the man running south on Patton toward Jefferson.(106)
Austin's Barbecue
Page 41
XI. AUSTIN'S BARBECUE
(39) The FBI interviewed Austin Cook on May 15, 1964. Cook said that he had
employed J.D. Tippit at his drive-in, austin's Barbecue, at 2321 West Illinois
in Dallas, for about 3 years at the time of the assassination.(107) Tippit
worked on Friday and Saturday nights from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. at the barbecue as a
"deterrent" to any teenage trouble from youths who frequented the
establishment.(108) Cook told the FBI that he was a member of the John Birch
Society, but that he had never discussed politics with Tippit and did not
believe Tippit was interested in politics.(109)
(40) Cook told the FBI that he never heard Tippit mention Lee Harvey Oswald or
Jack Ruby or any of Jack Ruby's clubs.(110) The FBI report of the interview with
Cook did not mention whether Cook had any knowledge of or acquaintance with Ruby
or Oswald.
(41) The committee interviewed Cook on March 9, 1978. Cook was asked if he had
known Jack Ruby. Cook replied that he may have met Ruby, but he could not
recall.(111) He stated further that if he had met Ruby, that would have been the
extent of their association.(112)
(42) In discussing his business, Cook told the committee that he originally went
into business in 1946 in a grocery store at Ninth and Jefferson Streets in
Dallas.(113) Cook bought the store from a woman
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42
named Bowman.(114) Her son, Bert, stayed on at the store for about 6 months
after cook bought it, and Cook and Bert Bowman remained friends for many
years.(115)
(43) Cook said that he and Bowman became partners in 1950 at a place they named
the Bull Pen at 2321 West Illinois.(116) That business ended about 1958 when
Bowman bought out his share of the establishment and took the name Bull Pen with
him.(117) Cook then renamed the business Austin's Barbecue.(118)
(44) Cook stated that about 8 or 10 years ago, Ralph Paul bought the Bull Pen
from Bowman, and Bowman in turn opened Pudnug's in Arlington, Tex.(119)
(45) Bert Bowman';s wife was interviewed by FBI Special Agents Robert Lish and
David Barry on November 24, 1963. She stated that she had known Ralph Paul since
he first moved to Dallas from New York about 1951.(120) Mrs. Bowman said that at
the time of the assassination, Ralph Paul was living in the lower level of the
Bowman home on Copeland Road in Dallas.(121) Mrs. Bowman said Ralph paul was a
close friend of Jack Ruby and had been of financial assistance to both Jack Ruby
and Bert Bowman over the year.(122)
(46) According to Mrs. Bowman, Ralph Paul expressed great concern for his friend
Jack Ruby after the shooting of Oswald.(123) On November 24, 1963, Paul told
Mrs. Bowman that he had spent the whole day at a lawyer's office.(124)
(47) Mrs. Bowman said she was not acquainted with any friends of Paul.(125)
However, on one occasion he brought a woman to the house whom he introduced as
Tammy.(126) About 4 1/2 years before, Paul had brought Jack Ruby by the
house.(127) Mrs. Bowman said that Ruby remained for only a short time.(128)
(48) On March 9, 1978, committee investigators interviewed Masbert Leolla Cook,
the former wife of Austin Cook. Mrs. Cook related that she knew J.D. Tippit when
she still worked with her husband at Austin's Barbecue, where Tippit worked as a
security guard.(129) Mrs. Cook stated further that she did not know either Lee
harvey Oswald or Jack ruby, but that Ralph Paul was a mutual friend of the Cooks
and Jack Ruby.(130)
Submitted by:
MS. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.
References
Page 42
REFERENCES
(1) The Warren Commission did, however, request that the FBI conduct a "limited"
background investigation on Tippit. That check included interviews of the Tippit
family, associates and business acquaintances. The FBI included the results of
that check in a report in May 1964. It appeared in the Warren commission
documents as Warren Commission exhibit 2985 (CE 2985).
(2) See ref. 1, CE 2985, p. 6.
(3) Id. at p. 7
(4) Staff interview of Marit Tippit Thomas, Dec. 8, 1977, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003988).
(5) Id. at p. 2.
(6) Id. at p. 1.
(7) Ibid.
(8) See ref. 1, CE 1974
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43
(9) Staff interview of Murray J. Jackson, Nov. 3, 1977, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003090).
(10) Id. at p. 2.
(11) C.C. 1974. See ref. 8.
(12) Staff interview of Bill Anglin, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003532).
(13) Ibid.
(14) See ref. 1, CE 2985, p. 12.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Id. at p. 13.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Testimony of Calvin Bud Owens, Warren Commission Hearings. April 9, 1964,
vol. VII, p. 78.
(22) See ref. 1, CE 1985, p. 9.
(23) Staff interview of Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon, Sept. 24, 1977, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 002372).
(24) Id. at pp. 1-2.
(25) Id. at p. 2.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Id. at p. 4.
(28) See ref. 1, CE 3001, p. 2.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Staff memorandum to Bob Tanenbaum from Andy Purdy, Feb. 19, 1977, House
Select committee on Assassinations, p. 2. (JFK Doc. No. 00837).
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Id. at pp. 2-3.
(39) Id. at p. 3.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Id. at p. 4.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid.
(48) Staff interview of Wes Wise, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008721).
(49) Ibid.
(50) Investigative notes received from Wes Wise (JFK Doc. No. 013919).
(51) FBI Interview of Wes Wise, Dec. 4, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown,
file No. DL 89-43 (JFK Doc. No. 013912).
(52) FBI Interview of Milton Love, Dec. 5, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T.
Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013918
(53) FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown. Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461
(JFK Doc. No. 013916).
(54) Ibid.
(55) FBI Interview of Mrs. Carl a Mather, Dec. 5, 1963, FBI Report by DA Charles
T. Brown, dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013914).
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Ibid.
(59) FBI Interview off Wes Wise, Dec. 9, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T.
Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013915).
(60) Ibid.
(61) Ibid.
Page 44
44
(62) Interview of T.F. White, Dec. 13, 1963, FBI Report by SA charles T. Brown,
Dec. 14, 1963, file No. 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013913)>
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid.
(68) Ibid.
(69) Staff Interview of Carl Amos Mather, Mar. 20, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 006910).
(70) Ibid.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Id. at p. 4.
(73) Ibid.
(74) Id. at p. 2.
(75) Id. at 4.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Id. at p. 3.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Id. at p. 2.
(80) Ibid.
(81) Ibid.
(82) Id. at p. 2.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Id. at p. 3.
(85) Staff Interview of Wes Wise, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013219).
(86) Ibid.
(87) Testimony of Domingo Benavides, Apr. 2, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p.
447.
(88) Ibid.
(89) Ibid.
(90) Ibid.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Id. at p. 453.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Staff Interview of Jack R. Tatum, Feb. 1, 1978, House select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 6905).
(98) Ibid.
(99) Ibid.
(100) Ibid.
(101) Ibid.
(102) Ibid.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Ibid.
(106) Ibid.
(107) FBI Interview of Austin Cook, May 15, 1964, Warren Commission Exhibit
2985, p. 10, 26 Warren Report Hearings, p. 488.
(108) Ibid.
(109) Ibid.
(110) Ibid.
(111) Staff Interview of Austin Cook, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Doc. No. 14231).
(112) Ibid.
(113) Ibid.
(114) Ibid.
(115) Ibid.
(116) Ibid.
(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Ibid.
Page 45
45
(120) FBI Interview of Mrs. Bert Bowman, Nov. 24, 1963, FBI Report by SA Robert
C. Lish and David H. Barry, Nov. 15, 1963, file No. DL 44-1639 (JFK Doc. No.
004766).
(121) Ibid.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Id. at p. 2.
(126) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Staff Interview of Maevbert Leolla Cook, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No 006909).
(130) Id. at p. 2.
Page 46
46
Blank Page
George De Mohrenschildt
Page 47
GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT
--------------
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(47)
Contents
Page 48
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Foreword (1)
I. De Mohrenschildt's background (5)
II. Allegations of do Mohrenschildt Nazi activity (10)
III. Knowledge of Oswald's possession of the rifle (19)
IV. Allegations of do Mohrenschildt intelligence connections (29)
V. De Mohrenschildt activities in Haiti (37)
VI. De Mohrenschildt military connections (80)
Page
Appendix: Manuscript by George de Mohrenschildt, "I am a Patsy! I am a Patsy!"
69
(48)
Foreword
Page 49
FOREWORD
(1) The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in the
assassination of President John f. Kennedy, that he was not tied to any
intelligence agency, and that none of his associates were tied to the
assassination. Nevertheless, speculation continued to center about one of
Oswald's associations: George de Mohrenschildt and de Mohrenschildt's
background. The Warren Commission concluded about de Mohrenschildt:
The Commission's investigation has developed no signs of subversive or disloyal
conduct on the part of either of the de Mohrenschildts. Neither the FBI, CIA,
nor any other witness contacted by the Commission has provided any information
linking the de Mohrenschildts to subversive or extremist organizations. Nor has
there been any evidence linking them in any way with the assassination of
President Kennedy.(1)
(2) Despite this disclaimer of any subversive or disloyal activity on the part
of de Mohrenschildt by the Warren Commission, de Mohrenschildt was rumored to
have had ties with the intelligence communities of several countries. Indeed de
Mohrenschildt himself admitted some involvement with French intelligence, but
his actual role with them was never fully disclosed, and he emphatically denied
any other intelligence associations. He explained his travels to Haiti with the
cooperation of the Haitian Government as innocuous business deals with no
political overtones.
(3) Speculation also continued about Oswald's relationship to de Mohrenschildt
because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men. De Mohrenschildt
was described as sophisticated and well educated, moving easily in the social
and professional circles of oilmen and the so-called "White Russian" community,
many of whom were avowed rightwingers. Oswald's "lowly" background did not
include much education or influence, and he was in fact shunned by the same
Dallas Russian community that embraced de Mohrenschildt.
(4) The committee undertook to probe more into the background as associations of
de Mohrenschildt to determine if more light could be shed to either explain the
relationship between Oswald and de mohrenschildt or to determine if any new
information contradicts that which was available to the Warren Commission. This
probe seemed justified in view of the controversy that continues to surround the
relationship, and the additional speculation that was caused by the apparent
suicide of de Mohrenschildt in 1977 on the day he was contacted by both an
investigator from the committee and a writer about Oswald.
De Mohrenschildt's Background
Page 49
I. DE MOHRENSCHILDT'S BACKGROUND
(5) De Mohrenschildt testified extensively before the Warren Commission about
his childhood in Russia and Poland and his family. He
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was born on April 17, 1911, in Mozyr in Czarist Russia.(2) His father, Sergius
Alexander von Mohrenschildt, was a "marshal of nobility" in Minsk Province, and
he served as director of the Nobel interests in Russia.(3) his mother, Alexandra
Zopalsky, was of Russian, Polish, and Hungarian descent.(4) (6)De
Mohrenschildt's family had long had ties to the United States. A descendant of
the de Mohrenschildt family, Baron Hilienfelt, who was a Baltic Swede, fought in
the american Army of Independence, according to de Mohrenschildt.(5) An uncle,
Ferdinand de Mohrenschildt, was First Secretary of the last Russian Embassy in
Washington under the Czarist government.(6) De Mohrenschildt's brother, Dimitri
von Mohrenschildt, emigrated to the United States and became a professor at
Dartmouth University.(7)
(7) De Mohrenschildt's father was jailed by the Communist regime in 1920 for
criticizing the Communist Government.(8) Friends of the government intervened to
secure his release.(9) He was jailed again in 1921 and was banished to
Siberia(10) for life. De Mohrenschildt explained that sentence was imposed when
his father maintained that the kind of government he favored for the Russian
people was a constitutional monarchy.(11)
(8) Sergius von Mohrenschildt escaped with his family to Poland; de
Mohrenschildt's mother died soon after from typhoid fever which she had
contracted during the escape.(12) While living in Poland the elder de
Mohrenschildt successfully fought to regain an estate he had held in Russia near
the Polish border.(13) It was money from that estate that George do
Mohrenschildt brought to the United States in 1938 when he started his first
business interest.(14) The size of the estate at that time was estimated at
approximately $10,000.(15)
(9) De Mohrenschildt testified that his brother Dimitri remained a "ferocious
anti-Communist."(16) he served in the Czarist Russian Imperial Navy.(17) After
the Russian revolution, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt joined anti-Communist groups
and was jailed by the Communists and sentenced to death.(18) He was released
from jail in a prisoner exchange with the help of a Polish Catholic bishop.(19)
Dimitri von Mohrenschildt emigrated to the United States in August 1920.(20)
Allegations of De Mohrenschildt Nazi Activity
Page 50
II. ALLEGATIONS OF DE MOHRENSCHILDT NAZI ACTIVITY
(10) On October 8, 1942 the U.S. Department of State placed a "refusal" or
"lookout" in de Mohrenschildt's passport office file.(21) The committee was
informed by the State Department that the effect of such a "lookout" would be
that when the person applied for any type of passport action the file would be
reviewed to determine if the person posed a security threat or had made false
statements upon entering the United States.(22)
(11) The reason given for the lookout in de Mohrenschildt's file was: "Alleged
to be Nazi agent. Refer any application to Fraud Section."(23) the file was
cross-referenced to the file of Lilia P. Larin.(24)
(12) De Mohrenschildt entered the United Stated in 1938.(25) According to his
Warren Commission testimony in 1942 de Mohranschildt
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met and fell in love with Lilia Larin, a Mexican citizen, and they traveled to
Mexico together.(26) They stopped at a beach in Corpus Christi, Tex., enroute to
Mexico and were then confronted by American Government agents, whom de
Mohrenschildt thought might have been FBI agents.(27) The agents accused de
Mohrenschildt of being a German Nazi spy.(28) Their car was searched but they
were then allowed to continue on their way into Mexico.(29)
(13) After de Mohrenschildt lived in Mexico for several months, the Mexican
Government informed him that he was a persona non grata in Mexico and ordered
him to leave the country.(30) De Mohrenschildt speculated that the expulsion was
prompted by General Maxino Camacho of the Mexican Army, who was jealous of de
Mohrenschildt's relationship with Lilia Larin.(31)
(14) De Mohrenschildt's passport file also contained a document dated January
23, 1943, that referred to the censorship of mail of Lilia Larin. According to
that document, al letter by Larin to the Mexican Government was intercepted; in
that letter, Larin was seeking to intercede on de Mohrenschildt's behalf in
getting permission for him to enter Mexico.(32)
(15) When de Mohrenschildt applied for a U.S. passport in January 1957, his
application contained a pencilled notation referring to the earlier lookout in
his file.(33) Nevertheless, the application was approved and de Mohrenschildt's
passport was issued on January 23, 1957.(34) A similar notation was made on de
Mohrenschildt's application in March 1960 when he applied for a passport
renewal.(35) The refusal was similarly disregarded at that time, and he
continued to receive passport renewals.(36) there was no further reference in de
Mohrenschildt's State Department file about the original allegation or the
determinations to later disregard the refusal.
(16) The Warren Commission also questioned de Mohrenschildt about the background
of his cousin, Baron Maydell, and the allegations that Maydell may have had
connections with the Nazis. De Mohrenschildt described Maydell as a White
Russian who was opposed to communism and thought he could get the return of his
Russian estate through intervention of the Germans.(37) In De Mohrenschildt's
opinion, it was Maydell's German sympathies that created controversy and
speculation that he was a German spy.(38)
(17) In 1941 de Mohrenschildt began work with Maydell's company, Film Facts,
Inc., in New York.(39) De Mohrenschildt said he saw the work as an opportunity
to learn something about making documentary movies.(40) With Maydell he make a
documentary about the resistance movement in Poland and solicited the
sponsorship of the Polish Consulate.(41) De Mohrenschildt said the movie was
also used to benefit Polish refugees.(42)
(18) De Mohrenschildt's Central Intelligence Agency file contains a memo dated
July 30, 1942, that referred to some type of film enterprise. the memo is
written by Ensign Horrigan and directed to Commander Vanderbilt of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS). In the memo Horrigan states that de Mohrenschildt said
he was representing an Irish film company that had taken pictures during the
Spanish Civil War.(43) Horrigan Wrote de Mohrenschildt's uncle's apartment was
raided and that many films of a pro-Nazi nature were discovered which
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52
were intended to show the force and effectiveness of the German Army.(44)
Knowledge of Oswald's Possession of the Rifle
Page 52
III. KNOWLEDGE OF OSWALD'S POSSESSION OF THE RIFLE
(19) George de Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that one
evening when he and his wife visited the Oswalds at their Neely Street address
in dallas, Marina Oswald exclaimed that Oswald had bought a gun and showed the
gun to Jeanne de Mohrenschildt.(45) De mohrenschildt testified that this took
place around Easter in the spring of 1963 and that the occasion of the visit was
to take an Easter present or toy to the Oswald's daughter.(46)
(20) In his testimony de Mohrenschildt related that during that visit he and
Oswald stood talking in the front room.(47) Marina Oswald opened a closet door
to show the gun to Jeanne, and Jeanne in turn called out to George who was in
the next room that Lee had a gun.(48) De Mohrenschildt said he did not look at
the gun, but that Marina said Oswald used it for target shooting and that it had
a telescopic sight.(49)
(21) De Mohrenschildt said he then asked Oswald "jokingly" if Oswald had taken
the shot at General Walder, which had occurred in Dallas on April 10, 1963.(50)
De Mohrenschildt said Oswald became tense, 'sort of shriveled" and made some
kind of face in answer to the question without specifically answering the
question.(51)
(22) Nevertheless, in an interview at the American embassy in Haiti in December
1963 with State Department officials, the de Mohrenschildts claimed that the gun
incident had occurred in the fall of 1962.(52) Mrs. de Mohrenschildt stated that
Marina Oswald had said "Look how crazy he is, he has bought a hun."(53) Mrs. de
Mohrenschildt said she thought Oswald had only recently purchased the gun, that
it was about 4 feet long, and that she did not know if it was a rifle or a
shotgun.(54) she said Marina Oswald told her there was something special about
the gun, that it was either automatic or had a telescopic sight.(55) In that
interview, de Mohrenschildt claimed that the last time he and his wife saw the
Oswalds was in January 1963 and that the de Mohrenschildts were too busy
preparing for their upcoming trip to Haiti to see the Oswalds after that.(56)
(23) De Mohrenschildt had contacted the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince,
Haiti, immediately after the assassination and said he had been acquained with
Lee harvey Oswald, volunteering to be of assistance during the assassination
investigation.(57)
(24) An April 1, 1977, the committee received from Jeanne de Mohrenschildt, the
widow of George de Mohrenschildt, a photograph of Oswald standing in a yard and
holding a rifle in one hand and two newspapers in the other hand.(58) A gun was
strapped in a holster on his hip. This photograph, which was similar to other
photographs recovered in a search of Oswald's property on November 23, 1963, had
never been seen by the Warren Commission or law enforcement official.
(25) On the rear of the photograph was the notation "To my friend George from
Lee Oswald," with the date "5/IV/63" and another notation "Copyright Geo do M",
and an inscription in Russian reading "Hunter of facists, ha-ha-ha!"(59) a
handwriting panel engaged
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53
by the committee determined that the writing "To my friend George" and the
Oswald signature were the writing of Lee Harvey Oswald.(60) The panel was not
able to conclude whether the other writing was written by Lee Harvey Oswald,
Marina Oswald, or George de Mohrenschildt.(61)
(26) On April 1, 1977, the committee also received from Jeanne de Mohrenschildt
a copy of the manuscript of the book, "I Am A Patsy, I am A Patsy," which George
de Mohrenschildt was writing about his relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald at
the time of de Mohrenschildt's suicide on March 29, 1977.(62) In that
manuscript, de Mohrenschildt wrote that he and his wife had stumbled upon the
gun photo in February 1967 in boxes of their belongings that they had placed in
storage in early 1963 before their departure for Haiti im May 1963.(63) De
Mohrenschildt speculated in the manuscript that Oswald had in a sense left them
a "gift from the grave," placing the photograph where it could later be
discovered by de Mohrenschildt.(64) He explained that the photo was among
English practice records that he and his wife had loaned to Marina Oswald, and
that somehow the Oswalds had managed to return those records, including the
photograph, to the de Mohrenschildts's possessions.(65)
(27) In the manuscript de Mohrenschildt identified the handwritten date of the
photograph, "5/IV/63" as April 5, 1963-and stated that at that time he and his
wife "were thousands of males away in Haiti."(66) That statement contradicts the
statement de Mohrenschildt gave to Warren commission and State Department
official about the dates of his travel to Haiti.
(28) The circumstances of the de Mohrenschildts's learning that Oswald owned a
rifle, de Mohrenschildt's comment to Oswald about the Walder shooting, and the
circumstances of the "discovery" of the gun photograph in the de Mohrenschildts'
possessions may indicate knowledge the de Mohrenschildts had about the violent
turn Oswald's political inclinations had taken that have not been fully
explored.
Allegations of De Mohreschildt Intelligence Connections
Page 53
IV. ALLEGATIONS OF DE MOGRENSCHILDT INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS
(29) During his Warren Commission testimony, de Mohrenschildt was asked by
Counsel Jenner if he had "ever been in any respect an agent."(67) De
Mohrenschildt responded that he never had.(68) He testified that none of his
foreign ventures had ever involved any political activity.(69) Nevertheless, de
Mohrenschildt explained that in 1941 he was involved with Pierre Fraiss who was
connected with French intelligence work in the United States.(70)
(30) De Mohrenschildt said he went to work for the Shumaker co. in New York as a
salesman when he first arrived in the United States in 1938.(71) she identified
Fraiss as the chief of export of the Shumaker Co. and one of his best
friends.(72) de Mohrenschildt said he knew Fraiss was connected with French
intelligence and that he worked for Fraiss "collect(ing) facts on people
involved in pro-German activity."(73) De Mohrenschildt said the work with Fraiss
took him around the United States.(74) It also involved contacting oil companies
in the United States about selling oil to the French in competition against
German oil supplies during the war.(75) De Mohrenschildt was compensated for
expenses incurred in the "data collection"
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54
for Fraiss, but was not paid a salary, according to his sworn testimony.(76)
(31) In his Warren commission testimony de Mohrenschildt stated that he believed
he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald with J. Walton Moore, whom de Mohrenschildt
described as "a Government man-either FBI or Central Intelligence."(77) De
Mohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed him when he returned from Yugoslavia
and that he was known as the head of the FBI in Dallas.(78) De Mohrenschildt
asserted that he asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald to
reassure himself that it was "safe" for the de Mohrenschildt to assist
Oswald.(79) According to his testimony, de Mohrenschildt was told by one of the
persons he talked to about Oswald, although he said he could not remember who it
was, that "the guy seems to be OK."(80)
(32) This admitted association with J. Walton Moore fed the rumors of some
involvement by de Mohrenschildt in intelligence activities.
(33) In 1963 J. Walton Moore was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency in
Dallas, Tex., in the Domestic Contacts Division.(81) According to Moore's CIA
personnel file, he was assigned to the Domestic Contacts Division in 1948.(82)
Moore's duties in the Dallas office were contacting individuals in the area who
had information on foreign topics.(83)
(34) In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977, contained in george de
Mohrenschildt's CIA file, Moore set forth facts to counter a claim which had
been recently make by WFAA-TV in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald was employed by
the CIA and that Moore know Oswald. In that memo, Moore is Quoted as saying that
according to his records the last time he talked to George de Mohrenschildt was
in the fall of 1961.(84) Moore said that he had no recollection of any
conversation with the de Mohrenschildt concerning Lee Harvey Oswald.(85) The
memo also noted that Moore recalled only two occasions when he met de
Mohrenschildt: First, in the spring of 1958 to discuss the mutual interest the
two couples had in mainland China; and then in the fall of 1961 when the de
Mohrenschildts showed films of their Latin American walking trip.(86)
(35) Other documents in de Mohrenschildt's CIA file indicated more contact
between Moore and de Mohrenschildt than was stated in the 1977 memo by Moore. In
a memorandum dated May 1, 1964, from Moore to the Acting Chief of the Contacts
Division of the CIA, Moore stated that he had known George de Mohrenschildt and
his wife since 1957, at which time Moore got biographical data on de
Mohrenschildt after de Mogrenschildt's trip to Yugoslavia for the International
Co-operation Administration.(87) Moore said also in that 1964 memo that he saw
de Mohrenschildt several times in 1958 and 1959.(88)
(36) De Mohrenschildt's CIA file contained several reports submitted by de
Mohrenschildt to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavea.(89)
(37) In an interview with the committee on March 14, 1978, Moore stated that he
did interview de Mohrenschildt in 1957 after the Yugoslavia trip.(90) At that
time Moore also indicated he had "periodic"
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55
contact with de Mohrenschildt for "debriefing" purposes over the years after
that.(91) Moore said that none of that contact or conversation with de
Mohrenschildt was related to Oswald; Moore said that the allegations that de
Mohrenschildt asked Moore's "permission" to contact Oswald were false.(92)
De Mohrenschildt's Activities in Haiti
Page 55
V. DE MOHRENSCHILDT'S ACTIVITIES IN HAITI
(38) According to State Department documents, George de Mogrenschildt and his
wife were living in Haiti at the time of the assassination.(93) They arrived in
the country on June 2, 1963.(94) De Mohrenschildt had earlier been in Haiti in
March 1963 and returned to Dallas a week later.(95) He told State Department
officials that he left Dallas April 19, 1963, traveled to New York and
Philadelphia, and then returned to Dallas for "2 days" to make preparations for
the final trip to Haiti.(96)
(39) De Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that he first
visited Haiti in 1956 when he was working for the Sinclair Oil Co. At that time
he did a geological prospect for oil drilling in the northern part of Haiti.(97)
The project was abandoned because of the expropriations of companies which were
going on in the Caribbean area.(98) When de Mohrenschildt returned to Haiti in
1961 after his South American walking trip, he continued working on plans for a
possible geological project in Haiti.(99) During 1962 de Mohrenschildt continued
to negotiate and promote the business venture and in that year he formed the
Haitian Holding Co. an listed as the principals of the company himself, B.
Juindine Tardieu, a financier living in Haiti with real estate holdings who
served as an adviser to the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti in Port-au-Prince, and
Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.(100) The
objectives of the company, as outlined by de Mohrenschildt, were the development
of industries and enterprises in Haiti, using Haitian and American capital, and
some economic assistance from the governments of the two countries.(101)
(40) De Mohrenschildt testified that his work in the Haitian enterprise was to
include conducting a geological survey of Haiti to plot out oil and geological
resources on he island.(102) He said that on March 13, 1963, he concluded a
contract with the haitian Government, which guaranteed that he would be paid
$285,000 for the survey; $20,000 was paid in cash and the remainder was to be
paid out in a 10-year concession on a sisal plantation.(103) He explained that
Clemard Joseph Charles continued the administrative work on the sisal plantation
while de Mohrenschildt pursued his geological work.(104)
(41) De Mohrenschildt identified before the Warren Commission newspaper articles
about Charles, which he used in his promotional efforts to secure capital for
the holding company. In one of the articles, Charles is identified as entering
into a multimillion-dollar housing project with the financial assistance of
large American banking
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interests.(105) In another article, it was reported that Charles had been
presented with the keys of the city of New York.(106)
(42) De Mohrenschildt stated to the Warren Commission that the undertaking in
Haiti was a purely commercial and geological interest, with no other "purpose or
intent."(107) De Mohrenschildt explained that the office he used in
Port-au-Prince was in fact the office of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, but
that the maps he developed were not to be used by any nation or group for any
type of work other than his own geological interests.(108)
(43) De Mohrenschildt testified to the Warren Commission that he left Dallas in
May 1963 and traveled to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., before
arriving in Haiti in June.(109) He stated that in Washington, D.C., he was
"preparing for the eventuality of this project, checking with the people, bureau
of Mines, and so forth.(110) He gave no further details, and was not asked for
any by the Warren Commission, about his activites in those cities or his
contacts.
(44) In a CIA Office of Security memo dated December 30, 1974, contained in de
Mohrenschildt's file, the agency noted that the de Mohrenschildts left Dallas
after April 19, 1963, for a trip to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington,
D.C., but they had not given any information in their testimony "on whom they
had contact with or what they were doing 19 April to late May 1963."(111) The
memo also noted that another individual had requested an "expedite check" on de
Mohrenschildt for "exact reasons unknown."(112) It was stated further in the
memo:
It is interesting that (name deleted) interest in de Mohrenschildt coincided
with the earlier portion of this trip and the info would suggest that possibly
(name deleted) and de Mohrenschildt were possibly in the same environment in
Washington, D.C., circa April 26, 1963.(113)
(45) It was not brought out in his Warren Commission testimony, but de
Mohrenschildt did meet in washington, D.C., in the spring of 1963 with the
Department of Defense personnel and Clemard Joseph Charles, the Haitian banker
through whom de Mohrenschildt was negotiating his Haitian contracts.
(46) George de Mohrenschildt's Agency file contained a memorandum of a phone
call on May 7, 1963, to Dorothe Matlack of the office of the Army Chief of Staff
for Intelligence about de Mohrenschildt and Charles. According to the memo, the
purpose of the call was to arrange a meeting between Charles and an Agency
representative for noon of that day.(114) Mrs. Matlack had appparently made
hotel reservations for the de Mohrenschildts and Charles.(115)
(47) In an interview with the committee on september 4, 1978, Dorothe Matlack
stated that she served as Assistant Director of the Office of Intelligence of
the Army until her retirement in 1974.(116) Her work included "human source
collection of intelligence" and involved serving in a liaison capacity with the
Central Intelligence Agency.(117)
(48) Mrs. Matlack said she was first informed about the visit of Clemard Joseph
Charles to the United States in 1963 by Col. Sam
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Kail,* an Army Intelligence officer who was working in Miami at that time.(118)
Kail suggested that Mrs. Matlack talk to Charles when he visited Washington,
D.C., because of Charles' relationship to President Duvalier of Haiti and
Haiti's strategic position relative to Castro's Cuba.(119)
(49) During the committee interview, Mrs. Matlack said that she arranged a
meeting for Charles in May 1963 in downtown Washington with Tony Czaikowski of
the CIA, whom she introduced as a professor from Georgetown University.(120) She
described Charles as "frantic and frightened" during the meeting.(121) He urged
Mrs. Matlack to get the U.S. Marines to invade Haiti and overthrow
Devalier.(122)
(50) Mrs. Matlack said George and Jeanne de Mohrenschildt accompanied Charles to
this meeting and that their presence was a "surprise" to her.(123) She did not
know what role de Mohrenschildt was serving, but felt he "dominated" Charles in
some way.(124) Mrs. Matlack said that despite the explanation of Charles and de
Mohrenschildt that they were in the jute business together, she did not believe
the was the reason for their presence together at the meeting.(125) Referring to
de Mohrenschildt, Mrs. Matlack said, "I knew the Texan wasn't there to sell
hemp."(126)
(51) Mrs. Matlack said she was so disturbed by de Mohrenschildt at the meeting
that she discussed it with the FBI liaison, Pat Putnam.(127) Mrs. Matlack said
she never heard what action, if any, was taken by the FBI about de
Mohrenschildt.(128)
(52) According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had no military information of value to
offer.(129) She did not recall Charles ever discussing the question of arms
sales to Haiti.(130) Because of the potential political information Charles
could give about the current situation in Haiti, the CIA became the primary
contact with Charles.(131) Mrs. Matlack said that except for a few phone calls
after that meeting she never had any further contact with Charles.
(53) A Washington Post article by Norman gale, dated September 29, 1964,
reported that Haitian President Francois Duvalier had received two T-28 fighter
planes from Dallas, Tex.(132) The article stated the planes were flown to haiti
illegally.(133)
(54) According to the article, Duvalier made down payment on the planes with a
letter of credit for $210,000 drawn on the Banque Commerciale of Port-au-Prince,
Haiti.(134) The article identified Clemard Joseph Charles as president and
principal stockholder of the bank and a close ally of Duvalier.(135)
(55) The article stated that Charles visited the United States earlier in 1964
to buy boats and other weapons, and that he visited Dallas during that
trip.(136)
(56) The article reported that I. Irving Davidson, Washington lobbyist, visited
Haiti in May 1963 with two Dallas arms suppliers.(137)
(57) I. Irving Davidson was interviewed by the committee on November 2, 1978, in
Washington, D.C. At that time Davidson was asked
_______________
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about his business involvement with Haiti and the Haitian Government and
possible ties with George de Mohrenschildt.
(58) Davidson said he first became involved in business in Haiti in 1962 or 1963
through Sam Ferber, whom Davidson described as an import-export dealer from New
York.(138) Davidson said that he registered at that time with the State
Department as a lobbyist on behalf of the Haitian Government.(139) His
relationship with the Haitian Government prospered to the extent that he became
friends ith the President of Haiti, Francois Duvalier, and remained in contact
with him for several years.(140) His business deals also involved working with
the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Davidson said he was able to create
warmer feeling toward Haiti by the American Government.(141)
(59) Davidson denied that he had ever participated in any arms deals for the
Haitian Government;(142) he said Duvalier never had the money to buy arms.(143)
Davidson said in the interview that he met with him again nor transacted any
business with Charles.(144) He said he was unaware of newspaper accounts that he
had arranged arms sale deals for Charles.(145)
(60) Davidson said he was not acquained with George de Mohrenschildt in
Haiti.(146) In fact, Davidson claimed that he was not aware of de Mohrenschildt
until 1978, when a newspaper article by Jeremiah O'Leary of The Washington Star
suggested that Davidson had approached the FBI to find out what information the
Bureau had on de Mohrenschildt in connection with the Kennedy
assassination.(147) The Article mentioned an FBI memo about a meeting at the
Bureau between Davidson and two fBI agents in October 1967.(148)
(61) According to the FBI memo, which is dated November 1, 1967, and directed to
Cartha De Loach of the Bureau from T.E. Bishop, Bishop and Special Agent Hobson
Adcock met with Davidson at FBI headquarters on October 31, 1967.(149) According
to Bishop, Davidson telephoned the Bureau on October 28, 1967 and requested a
meeting with Clyde Tolson.(150) Davidson said he had been approached by Leonard
Davidov and Hugh McDonald because they wanted Davidson to make inquiries about
de Mohrenschildt's background(151) Davidov and McDonald were allegedly working
to uncover evidence that de Mohrenschildt was involved in the assassination and
that former President Lyndon Johnson had prior knowledge of the conspiracy to
assassinat President Kennedy.(152) According to the memo, Davidson also said
that McDonald was engaged in some type of business arrangement with Howard
Hughes' business empire in Las Vegas.(153)
(62) Bishop added in the memo that davidson volunteered that after he made some
inquiries about de Mohrenschildt for Davidov and McDonald, he would turn the
information over to the Bureau.(154) Despite Davidson's offer of assistance to
the Bureau, Bishop characterized Davidson's interest in the de Mohrenschildt
aspect of the case in this way:
During yesterday's interview, he (Davidson) alleged his only concern was that of
protecting President Johnson from being "smeared," however, it is strongly
believed that his
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real motive was that of seeking information on de Mohrenschildt and McDonald. In
support of this, it is noted that prior to coming to Bureau headquarters he had
already contacted Edward Cohen for background information on de Mohrenschildt
and spent the previous weekend in Dallas, Tex., allegedly for the purpose of
attending a football game. However, Dallas is also the residence of de
Mohrenschildt.(155)
(63) In the memo Bishop identified Edward Cohen as having previously been the
subject of an FBI investigation.(156) Bishop noted also that cohen had conducted
an investigation into Lyndon Johnson's alleged association with Overseas
National Airways.(157)
(64) During the interview with the committee, Davidson stated that he never met
with Bishop and Adcock as stated in the memo.(158) Davidson said Davidov and
McDonald did contact him about the possibility of de Mohrenschildt being
involved in the Kennedy assassination and he did then relate the substance of
that meeting to the Bureau.(159) Nevertheless, he said the memorandum takes the
import of the meeting at the Bureau out of context and suggests an interest in
de Mohrenschildt when he in fact had none.(160)
(65) A CIA Office of Security memorandum dated January 7, 1964, reported that a
confidential informant advised that the President of Haiti sent a confidential
message to Davidson during the last week of December, 1963; the contents of the
message were not known.(161)
(66) The U.S. State Department further documented some involvement by Charles in
the sale of American military planes. In an airgram dated May 2, 1967 from the
Department of state to the American Embassy at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, it was
reported that Edward Browder had leased a plane for 1 year starting on November
24, 1964, in the name of a phony company and had flown the plane to
Port-au-Prince and left it there.(162) The airgram reported also that Browder
later cashed a check for $24,000 signed by Clemard Joseph Charles.(163)
(67) Another airgram from the state department to the Embassy dated May 25,
1967, verified that the check to Browder was drawn from the personal account of
Clemard Joseph Charles at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank.(164)
(68) Edward Browder was interviewed by the committee on January 12, 1978, at the
Federal penitentiary at MacNeill Island, Wash., where he was serving a 25-year
sentence for securities violations.(165) During the interview, Browder discussed
a series of gun-running and smuggling operations he was involved in during the
1960's that were intended to result in the eventual overthrow or assassination
of Fidel Castro.(166) Browder stated that this work included assistance by the
CIA in the form of money and operations.(167)
(69) Browder said that during that period he did purchase at least two B-25
planes to be used in "smuggling operations" which would be used to assist the
gun-running and raids against Cuba.(168) Browder said he could not recall where
he bought the planes.(169) However, he said a man named Pedro Diaz Lanz flew one
of the planes to him.(170) Browder said he was a former test pilot for Lockheed
Aircraft and has also flown for Pan American Airlines.(171)
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60
(70) In May 1978 the committee received information that a stockbroder in Palm
beach, Fla., had known George de Mohrenschildt in Haiti. The information came
from Jack cogswell of Palm Beach. According to Cogswell, he ran into Joseph
Dryer, who is a stockbroker with Loeb & Rhodes & Co. in Palm Beach and Dryer
offered information about George de Mohrenschildt.(172) Dryer told Cogswell that
when he knew de Mohrenschildt in Haiti, de Mohrenschildt's behavior was
"strange" and included following people in his car.(173) Dryer related that de
Mohrenschildt was associated with a man named Charles who was the president of a
bank in Prt-au-Prince, Haiti.(174) Dryer stated that he was told by Charles that
a large amount of money had been placed in de Mohrenschildt's account in
Charles' bank just before de Mohrenschildt left Haiti in 1967.(175)
(71) Joseph Dryer was interviewed by the committee in Palm Beach on July 6,
1978. At that time, Dryer said that in the early 19550's he became involved in a
program sponsored by the U.S. Government to develop a subsitiute for Jute.(176)
Dryer explained that the Government's interest was in helping Caribbean and
Latin American countries develop their own jute producing capacity and thereby
save millions in the import of the product from other areas of the world.(177)
In connection with that program, Dryer set up a jute subidiary operation in
Cuba, the North Atlantic Fiber Corp.(178) Dryer said that in 1958, Francois
Duvalier, the President of Haiti, sent an emissary to Cuba to discuss the
prospects for a jute enterprise in Haiti; Dryer said the emissary was clemard
Joseph Charles.(179) Dryer said additionally that Charles was involved in the
mid-1960's in a deal with President Johnson to buy jets in Texas. According to
Dryer, the deal did not go through, but he said Charles may have had a
successful deal for the sale of gunboats.(180) Dryer said Charles had "many
connections" with the Central Intelligence Agency, and Dryer believed the Agency
may once have "planted" a secretary on Charles.(181)
(72) Dryer said he met George de Mohrenschildt through Charles.(182) Dryer said
that de Mohrenschildt claimed he came to Haiti to scout for oil, but Dryer
stated that "I could never figure out what he did."(183) Dryer expressed the
belief that de Mohrenschildt had "some intelligence connection," but Dryer did
not know with which country.(184)
(73) According to Dryer, he, Charles and de Mohrenschildt were associated with a
woman named Jacqueline Lancelot who owned a well-known restaurant in
Petionville, Haiti.(185) Dryer said the restaurant was frequented by many
American intelligence personnel from the American Embassy and other
foreigners.(186) Lancelot had contact with the American intelligence operatives
and passed them information about the Duvalier government.(187)Dryer's
relationship with Lancelot included passing messages for her to people in the
United States whom Dryer assumed were connected in some way to the CIA.(188)
Dryer said one of those contacts was a person who worked for French intelligence
and cooperated with the CIA.(189) In 1978, the person lived in the South.(190)
(74) Dryer said in the interview that Lancelot told him shortly after the
Kennedy assassination that a "substantial" sum of money, $200,000 or $250,000,
had been deposited in de Mohrenschildt's account
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61
in a bank in Port-au-Prince.(191) According to Lancelot, it was not Charles'
bank.(192) Lancelot said her source of information was the person who handed out
the funds at the band.(193) the money in the account was subsequently paid out,
although she did not know to whom, and de Mohrenschildt left Haiti soon
after.(194)
(75) According to Dryer, Jacqueline Lancelot related to him that President
Duvalier had once implied that the American President might not remain in
office.(195) Lancelot reportedly said that during a speech to Haitian troops in
a port city, Duvalier allegedly said that "the big man in the White House wasn't
going to be there much longer."(196) Lancelot told Dryer that she was not sure
if that statement was made by Duvalier before or after President Kennedy's
assassination.(197)
(76) During the interview with the committee investigator, Dryer was asked if he
were familiar with the names of a number of people who may have had some
connection or association with George de Mohrenschildt. Of the names, Dryer
recognized Dorothe Matlack and william Avery Hyde.(198) He remembered Matlack as
one of the people Charles asked Dryer to contact for him in the United
States.(199) Dryer could not remember in what connection or context Hyde's name
had been used by de Mohrenschildt.(200)
(77) The possible association between George de Mohrenschildt and William Avery
Hyde may have some significance because Hyde is the father of Ruth Paine, the
woman with whom Marina Oswald was living at the time of the assassination. The
connection was intriguing because there was never any intimation by the Warren
Commission that de Mohrenschildt had more than a brief acquaintance with Ruth
Paine.
(78) De Mohrenschildt stated in his Warren Commission testimony that he met Ruth
Paine on only one occasion, at a party at the home of Everett Glover in
Dallas.(201) De Mohrenschildt said the party took place in either January or
February of 1963.(202) De Mohrenschildt stated that it was his "recollection"
that that was the only time he was Ruth Paine.(203)
(79) In her Warren commission testimony, Ruth Paine stated that she first met
George de Mohrenschildt and his wife at the party at Everett Glover's, and that
she never saw then again after that.(204) Ruth Paine gave the date of that party
as February 22, 1963.(205) She stated that she had "no conversations, no
letters, no contact whatsoever" with the de Mohrenschildts either before or
after that party.(206)
De Mohrenschildt Military Connections
Page 61
VI. DE MOHRENSCHILDT MILITARY CONNECTIONS
(80) In addition to being present with Clemard Joseph Charles at a meeting in
Washington, D.C., in May 1963 with a member of the Army Chief of Staff for
Intelligence Office, George de Mohrenschildt had other personal association with
military personnel.
(81) An FBI memorandum dated September 15, 1942, stated that at that time de
Mohrenschildt lived at 3022 Benton Street NW., in Washington, D.C., with Quinten
Keynes, whom the memorandum described as a member of British intelligence, and
two American
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62
naval officers.(207) The memorandum also stated that de Mohrenschildt was
allegedly "very pro-Nazi."(208)
(82) In October 1942 the FBI interviewed the man who rented the Benton Street
house, Paul Joachim. Joachim told the FBI that he was employed at the time in
the Navy building.(209) The other occupants of the house were Lt. Cdr. Harry
Hull of the U.S. Navy, and Quinton Quines, who Joachim said worked at the
British Embassy.(210) Joachim said de Mohrenschildt lived at the house during
the end of May and all of June 1942.(211) He said de Mohrenschildt never make
any statements about feelings toward any country, and no statements which were
pro-Nazi.(212)
(83) De Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that at the time he
first met Oswald in fort Worth in the summer of 1962 he was accompanied by Col.
Lawrence Orlov.(213) De Mohrenschildt discribed Orlov as his "very close friend"
and stated that the two men were on business together in Fort Worth when de
Mohrenschildt suggested that they visit the Oswald family.(214) No further
information about Orlov was elicited; he was presumable retired from the
military at the time.
(84) De Mohrenschildt testified further that during the first period of his
acquaintance with the Oswalds in the fall of 1962, he and his wife took the
Oswalds to a party in Dallas at the time of retired Navy Adm. Chester
Bruton.(215) De Mohrenschildt said he and his wife were close to the
Brutons.(216) During the party Bruton asked Oswald about his service in the
Marine Corps, and according to de Mohrenschildt, received such a negative
response from Oswald that the conversation was quickly terminated.(217)
George De Mohrenschildt Chronology From Warren Commission Testimony
Page 62
GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT CHRONOLOGY FROM WARREN COMMISSION TESTIMONY
April 17, 1911---Born in Mozyr, Russia, to Sergis Alexander Von Mogrenschildt
and Alexandra Zopalsky.
1918---Returned to live in Minsk after the Russia revolution.
1920---Father seized and put in jail by the Communists.
1921---Father banished to Siberia after second arrest; sentenced to life
imprisonment.
1922---Father released from prison due to illness and escaped with family to
Poland; mother died soon after from typhoid fever.
1929---Graduated from gymnasium in Wilno, Poland. Volunteered for Polish Army
and attended Polish Military Academy in Grudziondz.
1931---Graduated from military academy with rank of sergeant candidate officer.
Went to Belgium and enrolled in Institut Superieur de Commerce at Antwerp.
Returned to Poland to take part in military summer maneuvrs.
Approximately 1936---Received masters degree equivalent at Institut. Entered
University of Liege.
1938---Received equivalent of doctor of science of international commerce from
Liege. During university studies ran sport shop business with girlfriend.
May 1938---Emigrated to the United States with approximately $10,000 from his
mother's estate and sports business. Worked for Chevalier Garde in New York
selling perfumes. worked as salesman for Shumaker & Com Met Jackie Kennedy and
her mother at Belport, Long Island, during the summer vacation.
1939-41---Dabbled in insurance business but failed to pass broder's examination.
1939---Worked for Humble Oil in Houston, Tex. Visited Louisiana home of Margaret
Clark Williams who had large oil property in Louisiana. Returned to Louisiana
and returned to New York to recover. Mobilized by the Polish Army; contacted
Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C., but, "It was too late to join the Polish
Army."
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63
1941---Cousin Baron Maydell offered de Mohrenschildt job making documentary
movies. Assisted making of movie on Polish resistance.
1941---Worked with Pierre Fraiss at Shumaker Co.; assisted Fraiss in "collecting
facts on people involved in pro-German activity" on behalf of French
intelligence in the United States. Traveled to Texas to attempt to contact oil
companies about French purchases.
Approximately 1941---Received 4-F deferment from American Army. Met Lilia Pardo
Larin through "King of Bananas" of Brazil, Dr. Paulo Machado, and went to live
with her in Mexico. Car stopped by FBI agents at Corpus Christi and de
Mohrenschildt accused of being German spy. Remained in Mexico approximately 9
months; invested in sugar company. Expelled from Mexico for allegedly illicit
relationship with Lila and returned to the United States.
1942---Met Dorothy Pierson in Palm Beach.
1943---Married Dorothy Pierson. Exhibited paintings at Newton Gallery in New
York.
1944---Traveled to Texas. Got a loan from the Russian Student fund. Applied at
Colorado School of Mines, Rice Institute and University of Texas. Entered
University of Texas School of Geology with minor in petroleum engineering.
1945---Received masters degree in petroleum geology. Worked as field engineer
for Pantepec Oil Co. in Venezuela.
1946---Returned to the United States. Went to work for Rangely Field Committee
in Colorado and worked in drilling statisitcs and technology. Met Phyllis
Washington during vacation in New York.
1947---First went to Haiti and began establishing mining and development
business.
July 1949---Became American citizen.
1949---Received divorce from Phyllis Washington.
1950---Moved to Denver. Formed Hooker and de Mohrenschildt partnership in
drilling and leases.
April 1951---Married Wynne Sharples.
1952---Terminated partnership with Ed Hooker, returned to New York.
1953---Son Sergei born.
1954---Daughter Nayda born. Formed Walden Oil Co. with wife's uncle, Col. Edward
J. Walz.
1956---Took job in Haiti with Sinclair Oil co. Traveled to Nigeria, France,
Mexico on oil exploration, also Ghana, Togoland, France. Traveled to Cuba for
Pantetec Oil Co. Traveled for Charmex, Cuban Venezuelan Trust, Warren Smith Co.,
Three States Oil and Gas and Legman Trading Corp.
1957---Contacted by Core Lab of Dallas about work in Yugoslavia for
International Cooperation Administration and Yugoslav Government.
1957---Divorced from Didi Sharples.
Feb.-Oct. 1957---Worked in Yugoslavia under ICA. Accused by Communists of making
sketches of military fortifications in Yugoslavia. Met Jeanne Le Gon in Dallas.
1958---Returned to Yugoslavia to develop drilling venture using Yugoslav labor
for John Mecom of Cardwell Tool Corp. Visited Poland for 10 days. Visited
Dominican Embassy in Washington, D.C., to discuss oil project with Ambassador.
1959---Married Jeanne Le Gon.
1959 or 1960---Went to Mexico City for Texans Eastern Corp. and encountered
Mikoyan.
1960---Son Sergei died of cystic fibrosis. Became chairman of Cystic Fibrosis
fund of dallas. Started National Foundation for Cystic Fibrosis with Jacqueline
Kennedy as honorary chairman.
Fall 1961---Returned from walking trip.
Early 1962---Went to Haiti to set up project to review mining resources of
Haiti. Returned to Luisiana on lykes Line ship. Began geology consulting work in
Dallas.
Summer 1962---Told by George Bouhe of young American defector who returned to
United States with Russian wife living in forth Worth. A few days later, went
with Colonel Orlov to visit Oswalds; Marina was home alone; Oswald
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64
arrived home later. A few days after that saw Marina alone again when his wife
took her to a dental clinic at Baylor. Offered to help Oswald find a job;
introduced him to Samuel Ballen-later said that may have occurred in December
1962 or January 1963.
Sept. 1962-Visited Oswald home in Oak cliff: Marina had a black eye and claimed
Oswald was beating her. Helped Marina move in with the Mellers.
A few days later oswald came by and asked for the address of the Mellers. Talked
to Max Clark about Oswald and J. Walton Moore.
Oct. 1962-Visited Elena Hall while Marina was living with her.
Christmas 1962-Invited Oswalds to party at home of Declan Ford. Did not see
Oswalds in October, November, and December 1962 until the Christmas party.
January 1963-Took Oswalds to party at home of Everett Glover. Met Ruth Paine for
the first time at Glover's party; never saw Ruth Paine again. During same period
took Oswalds to party at home of Adm. Chester Bruton.
March 1963-Went to Haiti to arrange geology contract with Haitian Government.
Stopped over in dominican Republic.
March 13, 1963-Congress of Haiti approved de Mohrenschildt's geological survey
for $285,000; part of payment to de Mohranschildt is to be interest in sisal
plantation with 10 year concession.
Easter 1963-Visited Oswalds at Neely Street address; Marina showed Jeanne
Oswald's gun. Asked Oswald about the Walker shooting.
May 1963-Left Dallas for Haiti; stopped over in New York, Washington, and
Philadelphia.
June 1963-Went to Haiti. Stopped over in Dominican Republic.
April 1964-Went to Dominican Republic from Haiti to get Bureau of Mines
information. Went to San Juan, P.R.
Submitted by:
MS. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.
References
Page 64
REFERENCES
(1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 283-84
(hereinafter Warren report).
(2) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Hearings of the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1964), Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 168 (hereinafter "Warren
Commission")
(3) Id. at P. 169.
(4) Id. at p. 168.
(5) Id. at p. 183.
(6) Id. at p. 173. (de Mohrenschildt testified that Ferdinand do Mohrenschildt,
who died in 1924 or 1925, was married to the daughter of William Gibbs McAdoo.)
(7) Id. at p. 271. (Counsel Jenner of the Warren Commission asked de
Mohrenschildt if Sergius de Mohrenschildt, who was reportedly born in
Pennsylvania and went into the oil business, was his grandfather, but de
Mohrenschildt could not confirm the information.)
(8) Id. at p. 171.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Id. at p. 172.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Id. at pp. 172-73.
(13) Id. at p. 174.
(14) Id. at p. 178.
(15) Id. at p. 179.
(16) Id. at p. 176.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Id. at p. 177.
(20) Ibid (George de Mohrenschildt explained in his testimony that he ceased
using the prefix "Von" in his name when he became an American citizen and
adapted the French "de." His brother Dimitri, however, retained the original
name.)
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65
(21) Department of State, Passport Office document, October 8, 1942, House
Select committee on Assassinations, Tab B, p. 2. (JFK Classified Document no.
172).
(22) Staff outside contact report, Oct. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document No. 013224).
(23) Department of State, Passport Office document, Oct. 8, 1942, House Select
Committee on assassination, Tab B, p. 2. (JFK Classified Document No. 172).
(24) Ibid.
(25) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22,
1964, vol. 9, p. 179.
(26) Id. at p. 185.
(27) Id. at p. 186.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Id. at p. 187.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Department of state, Office of Censership Document, Jan. 23, 1943, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, Tab B p. 3. (JFK Classified Document No.
172).
(33) Department of State, Passport Office document, passport application, 1/ /57
(date illegible), George de Mohrenschildt Passport Office file.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Department of State, Passport Office document, passport renewal
application, Mar. 10, 1960, George de Mohrenschildt Passport Office file.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22,
1964, vol. 9, p. 182.
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Id. at pp. 182-83.
(42) Id. at p. 182.
(43) CIA classified document, OSS Memo, July 30, 1942, George de Mohrenschildt
201 file.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23,
1964, vol 9, p. 249.
(46) Id. at p. 248.
(47) Id. at p. 249.
(48) Ibid.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid.
(52) Department of State airgram, Dec. 8, 1963, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 3. (JFK Document No. 011353).
(53) Ibid.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Affidavit of Receipt of de Mohrenschildt items, Apr. 1, 1977, House Select
Committee on Assassinations. (JFK Document No. 001145. JFK exhibit F-382.
F-383).
(59) Ibid.
(60) Testimony of Joseph McNally, Sept. 14, 1978, hearings before the House
Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C.; U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979, vol. II, p. 376 (hereinafter referred to as
McNally testimony (Sept. 14, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 376).
(61) Ibid.
(62) Affidavit of receipt of de Mohrenschildt items, Apr. 1, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 001145).
(63) De Mohrenschildt manuscript, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document No. 001198).
(64) Id. at p. 184.
(65) Id. at p. 182.
(66) Id. at p. 183.
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66
(67) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren commission Hearings, Apr. 22,
1964, vol. 9, p. 212.
(68) Ibid.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Id. at p. 184.
(71) Id. at p. 183.
(72) Ibid.
(73) Id. at p. 184.
(74) Ibid.
(75) Ibid.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Testimony of George do Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission hearings, Apr. 23,
1964, vol. 9, p. 235.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.
(80) Ibid.
(81) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, biographic
profile, reviewed Feb. 20, 1975.
(82) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, memorandum, Dec.
8, 1949.
(83) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, fitness report,
Apr. 1, 1963-Mar. 31, 1964.
(84) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file memorandum, Apr.
13, 1977, to Chief DCD.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid.
(87) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file, memorandum, May
1, 1964, to Acting Chief, Contacts Division, from Dallas resident agent.
(88) Ibid.
(89) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file, process sheet
for OO/C collections.
(90) Staff interview of James Walton Moore, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document No. 014893).
(91) Id. at p. 3.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Department of State Airgram No. A-131, Dec. 8, 1963, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (contained in JFK Document No. 009963).
(94) Department of State Incoming Telegram No. 013865, Dec. 19, 1963, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (contained in JFK Document No. 009963).
(95) Ibid.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Id. at p. 276.
(98) Ibid.
(99) Ibid.
(100) George de Mohrenschildt exhibit 6, Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 19, p.
551.
(101) Ibid.
(102) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23,
1964, vol. 9, p. 280.
(103) Id. at p. 282.
(104) Id. at p. 281.
(105) George de Mohrenschildt exhibit No. 12, Warren Commission Hearings, vol.
19, p. 544.
(106) Ibid.
(107) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23,
1964, vol. 9, p. 280.
(108) Id. at p. 281.
(109) Id. at p. 277.
(110) Ibid.
(111) CIA classified document, Office of Security memo, Dec. 30, 1974, George de
Mohrenschildt Office of Security file.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Ibid.
(114) CIA classified document, memo, May 7, 1963, De Mohrenschildt 201 file.
(115) Ibid.
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67
(116) Staff interview of Dorothe Matlack, Sept. 4, 1978, House Select committee
on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 015042).
(117) Ibid.
(118) Id. at p. 2.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Ibid.
(126) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Id. at p. 3.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Ibid.
(132) The Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1964.
(133) Ibid.
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid.
(136) Ibid.
(137) Ibid.
(138) Staff interview of I. Irving Davidson, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select
committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 013230).
(139) Ibid.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Ibid.
(143) Ibid.
(144) Ibid.
(145) Ibid.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Ibid.
(148) The Washington Star, Jan. 24, 1978.
(149) FBI memorandum, Nov. 1, 1967, serial 62-109060-5837.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Ibid.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid.
(155) Id. at p. 3.
(156) Id. at p. 2.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Staff interview of I. Irving Davidson, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select Committe
on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 013230).
(159) Ibid.
(160) Ibid.
(161) CIA classified document, memo, Jan. 7, 1964, I. Irving Davidson Office of
Security file.
(162) Department of State airgram, from State Department to American Embassy,
Port-au-Prince, May 2, 1967.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Department of State airgram, from State Department to American Embassy,
Port-au-Prince, May 25, 1967.
(165) Staff interview of Edward Browder, Jan. 12, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 005081).
(166) Id. at pp. 2-3.
(167) Id. at p. 4.
(168) Ibid.
(169) Ibid.
(170) Ibid.
(171) Ibid.
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68
(172) Staff outside contact report, May 17, 1978. House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document No. 009434).
(173) Ibid.
(174) Ibid.
(175) Ibid.
(176) Staff Interview of Joseph Dryer, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 009765).
(177) Ibid.
(178) Ibid.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Ibid.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Ibid.
(183) Ibid.
(184) Ibid.
(185) Id. at p. 2.
(186) Ibid.
(187) Ibid.
(188) Ibid.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Ibid.
(191) Ibid.
(192) Ibid.
(193) Ibid.
(194) Ibid.
(195) Id. at p. 3.
(196) Ibid.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Ibid.
(199) Ibid.
(200) Ibid.
(201) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23,
1964, vol. 9, p. 257.
(202) Ibid.
(203) Id. at p. 258.
(204) Testimony of Ruth Paine, Warren Commission Hearings, Mar. 18, 1964. vol.
2, p. 438.
(205) Id. at p. 435.
(206) Id. at p. 436.
(207) FBI memorandum. Sept. 15, 1942, Serial No. 100-32965-34.
(208) Ibid.
(209) FBI memorandum, Oct. 1942, Serial No. 100-32965-34.
(210) Ibid.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Ibid.
(213) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22,
1964, vol. 9, p. 225.
(214) Ibid.
(215) Testimony of George do Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22,
1964, vol. 9, p. 253.
(216) Ibid.
(217) Ibid.
Appendix
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69
APPENDIX
MANUSCRIPT BY GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT
The manuscript of the book George de Mohrenschildt was writing at the time of
his death in March 1977 is included in this staff report as an appendix. In it
de Mohrenschildt gave many details about his activities and associations, and
perhaps most significantly, an insight into how he perceived his relationship
with Lee Harvey Oswald.
The facts and information in the manuscript in many respects differ from, and
occasionally boldly contradict, statements that were made by de Mohrenschildt to
several Government agencies at the time of the assassination and other
information that has been made public. While there is no longer any way to
resolve those factual conflicts or to confront de Mohrenschildt with the
discrepancies, the manuscript is, nevertheless, included here to shed light on
at least how George de Mohrenschildt himself viewed those facts and how he
wanted the public record to read about himself and Oswald.
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70
I AM A PATSY! I AM A PATSY!
Preface in Haiti.
I am a patsy! I am a Patsy! These last words of my friend, Lee Harvey Oswald
still ring in my ears and make me think of the terrible injustice inflicted on
the memory of this "supposed assassin".
November 1963 was fairly ineventful in Haiti-no shootings and no invasions. My
young geologist Alson Boyd and I had worked in our office located on Avenue
Truman in the center of Port-au-Prince. Since we started very early in the
morning to avoid the infernal daily heat, our daily chores were over at 2 p.m.
This office occupied a large room of a quanset building belonging to the Haitian
Government and we were kept there virtually incommunicado since it contained
government maps and other "strategic information".
Alston and I drove to my house overlooking Port-au-Prince in the area called
Tonton Lyle and a block away from the presidential retreat, then we ate and took
a siesta, like any self-respecting Haitian. Then later the afternoon we dressed
and went to the reception at the Lebanese Embassy.
The usually animated streets of the capital seemed deserted. "I feel trouble in
the air," said my wife Jeann. The air was balmy, the soldiers and the tontons
macoutes were absent and we could not hear any shots.
We greeted the Lebanese Ambassador and joined the crowd. George Morel,
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head of the Pan-American Airways in Haiti came up to us immediately. "Didn't you
know your president was killed?" He asked in a strained voice.
At first we thought he was talking about the President of Haiti, Docteur
Francois Duvalier who was my nominal boss in Haiti. Seeing our blank expression,
Morel explained. "President Kennedy was assassinated to-day."
I hoped that it wouldn't happen in Texas as especially in Dallas. But Morel
summarily explained the situation-and it was in Dallas.
Gloomily we filed out of the Lebanese Embassy, were people did not seem to be
too badly concerned about President Kennedy's fat, got in the car and drove
away. "If he had his tonton-macoutes around, this would not have happened." I
said angrily and this was my first serious criticism of our services supposed to
protect the President of the United States.
We drove gloomily to the American Embassy, located near the sea-shore and not
too far from my office. The doors were wide opened and two marines stood there
on both sides of a book where the American residents would sign their names as a
gesture of reverence to the dead head of state. Having signed our names, we were
the first to have done it, we drove to the house of an old friend of mine
Valentin (Teddy) Blaque, an attache at the Embassy.
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Teddy's house was similar to ours, but more elaborate, with a large terrace
overlooking the sparkling bay of Port-au-Prince. Several mutual friends stood
around, looking at each other with stunned expression, and seemed to ask the
same question: "Why him?"
"For the fist time we had a president who was young and energetic. And he was
trying to solve the problems of the world," said Jeanne sadly, holding back her
tears. "And he had to go..."
The beautiful view seemed funeral to us, as we stood there silently.
"And in Dallas," I mused aloud, why there? A conservative and somewhat
provincial city, but successful and proud of its success. We knew the Mayor-a
charming man-and many city fathers.
"But who did it?" I asked Teddy.
"I just listened to the radio and a suspect was arrested already," he said.
Before he mentioned the name, I thought of Lee and his rifle with the telescopic
lense. "Could it be Lee? No it was impossible."
And driving back home, in stunned silence, we thought of Lee and the predicament
he was in.
But since the official version had it that Lee Harvey Oswald was the main
suspect, we made our deposition at the Embassy. We did know him and
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we were aware of the fact he owned a rifle. We would be happy to testify what we
knew about him and about our relationship with him and his wife. Be we did not
believe he was the assassin.
Then we learned that a letter was sent by someone influential in Washington to
the official of the Haitian government to drop me from the payroll and to exile
me as fast as possible. Fortunately I had good friends and the latter did not
happen. And later, little by little, we were ostracized by the United States
Ambassador Timmons, then by the American businessmen and government employees,
with whom we had been on very good terms and, finally, came the news of the
investigation of all our friends and even acquaintances in the United States.
Then came the man with the white teeths and a flannel suit, an FBI agent trying
to scare us off. At last, after a long time, we were officially invited to come
to Washington and help the Warren Committee in their investigation. Although we
could contribute very little, we still accepted ot go to Washington and testify.
Although our depositions were supposed to remain confidential, all the three
hundred paged of irrevelant conversation were printed and promiscuously
distributed. Actually our depositions were longer than Marina's and Mrs.
Marguerite Oswald's put together! Why?
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We assume two reasons-to waste taxpayer's money and to distract attention of the
American people from the people involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy. All the gossipy, futile stuff, related to our private lives, half of it
not relevant to Oswald, boring and useless. And all this because my wife and I
liked Lee Harvey Oswald, tried to defend him and because Lee said, before he
died: " I liked and admired George de Mohrenschildt."
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Getting to know Lee Harvey Oswald and his wife.
Early in the summer of 1962 the rumors spread out among the Russian speaking
people of Dallas and Fort Worth of an unusual couple-the Oswalds. He was
supposedly an ex-marine, an unfriendly and eccentric character, who had gone to
Russia and brought back with him a Russian wife. He had lives in Minsk where I
had spent my early childhood. And so I was curious to meet the couple and to
find out what had happened to Minsk.
Someone gave me Lee's address and one afternoon a friend of mine, Colonel
Lawrence Orloff and myself drove to Fort Worth, about 30 miles from Dallas. We
drove over the dreary, sewage smelling miles separating the two cities. Texas
does have lovely open spaces, but here they were degraded and polluted. After
some searching, we found a shack on Mercedes street in a semi-industrial, slummy
area, near Montgomery Ward.
I knocked and a tawdry but clean young woman opened the door. I introduced
myself and the colonel, giving a reference the name of George Bouhe from whom I
obtained the address. George was an elderly refugee, very friendly, the father
superior of all the Russians in the Dallas Fort Worth Area. So this was Maring
Oswald.
To Orlov she was beautiful not withstanding bad teeths and mousy blond hair.
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I did not find her very attractive although she had a certain charm and she
spoke beautiful, melodious Russian, so different from the language used by us
who anglicized our language and bastardized it by foreign intonations and words.
Marina offered us some sherry and said that Lee would be over soon. We spoke a
little fooling around; she had a pretty good sense of humour but the opinions
she expressed seemed trite to me. And then entered Lee Harvey Oswald who was to
become so famous or so infamous. He wore overalls and clean workingman's shoes
on. Only someone who had never met Lee could have called him insignificant.
"There is something putstanding about this man," I told myself. One could detect
immediately a very sincere and forward man. Although he was average-looking,
with no outstanding features and of medium size, he showed in his conversation
all the elements of concentration, thought and toughness. This man had the
courage of his convictions and did not hesitate to discuss the. I was glad to
meet such a person and was carried away back to the days of my youth in Europe,
where as students, we discussed world affairs and our own ideas over many beers
and without caring about time.
Lee was looking tenderly from time to time at Baby June. He loved her.
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We shook hands and left. Driving back the colonel mused: "she is so charming and
young!"
"But I found the ex-marine so much more interesting," I said. My friend, the
retired air-force colonel resented Lee, his offhandedness, his ironic smiles and
especially his ferocious spirit in independence. All his sympathy went to
Marina, the poor Russian refugee.
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We spoke English first and then, somehow, we switched to Russian. Lee spoke it
very well, only with a slight accent. Maring did not say very much. "Doesn't
your wife speak any English at all?" I asked Lee.
"No, and I don't want her to know English. I want her to continue speaking her
own language. Russian is beautiful and I don't want to forget it." And he added
with deep conviction. "Russian literature is marvelous and the people I met in
the Soviet Union were so warm and nice to me. Yes, I made many friends there,"
he added thoughtfully.
"And how about the Soviet Government?" I asked anxiously.
"Well, that's another story. The trouble with me I always look for an ideal
which probably does not exist."
"Maybe your friend does not understand Russian,: said Lee looking at Colonel
Orloff. "Let's speak English then. you know I was a marine and have respect for
the brass," he smiled and added a few kind words to my friend.
And then it was time for us to go. "My wife speaks Russian also and she would
like to spend some time with you Marina, and the baby of course," I said.
"I would like to but it will depend on Lee," she answered humbly.
"I am sure Lee will let you go and will come himself." A bond of friendship was
already formed between the two of us.
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First meeting with Lee.
Lee called me a few days after our trip to Fort Worth. "Marina and I will come
over to-night, if you don't mind," he said.
"Maybe I could drive to Fort Worth and drive you?" I asked.
"No, thank you, we will come by bus," he answered laconically.
And here they were, Marina, Lee and the baby June. We lived at the time in a
pleasant area called University Park, a few blocks from the Southern Methodist
University, a conservative stronghold. Both my wife and I were fairly free at
the time and welcomed our guests, so different from the local society. Jeanne
liked Marina immediately and offered to help her with her English. "Yes, I have
to know the language," she agreed and then added inexpectedly. "People already
asked me why I liked Lee," and her eyes darted about the furniture and
decoration of our rather modest home, "and I answer them, why did Lee like Me?"
Jeanne liked this humble remark and her sympathy for Marina increased.
In the meantime Lee and I sat on a comfortable sofa and talked all evening.
Naturally I do not remember the sequence, although a recorded what I remembered
a few years later, but mostly I asked questions and he answered them. Naturally
I wanted to know what make him go to the Soviet Union and he answered me by
telling me of his youth in New Orleans. Since his childhood he
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was keenly aware of social and racial injustices. Instead of playing basketball
or baseball, like any other red-blooded American youth, he read voraciously.
Among the books he read was Marx's "The Capital" which made a deep impression on
him. Ironically, he said, he borrowed this book from the Loyola University
library.
"What did you like in it?" I remember asking him.
"It made clear to me the intolerable fact of the exploitation of the poor by the
rich."
"But," I said, "Lee, you must have seen it all over the world, the weak or the
poor are exploited everywhere by the powerful and the rich. Listen to this: two
dogs meet on the crosspoint between East and West Berlin. One dog is running
away from the capitalism, the other from communism. The capitalist dog asks-'why
do you run away!'-'Because I can eat but I cannot bark. Why are you running
away? 'If I bark I cannot eat' answered the capitalist dog"
Lee laughed and answered by a joke he heard somewhere in Minsk. "As you knew,"
he said, "Russians grab all the can from the satellite countries. So one day at
the meeting of the communist party in Rumania, one of the workers stood up and
said. 'Camrade Secretary, may I ask you 3 questions?'-'Go ahead." I want to know
what happened to our wheat, our petroleum and our wine?" 'Well' said the
Secretary, "it's a very complex economic question I cannot
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answer it immediately."
"Well a few months later the workers are holding the same type of a meeting and
another comrade raises his hand and says: 'Comrade Secretary may I ask you four
questions?' - 'Shoot' says the secretary. 'I want to ask you what happened to
our petroleum, wine and wheat and also what happened to the comrade who had
asked the three questions some time ago?' - Silence."
We both laughed. "At least here we are not being sent to a concentration camp,"
I said.
"You are wrong," answered Lee seriously, "most of the prisoners, convicts in
American jail are political prisoners, the yare victims of the system."
I reak similar opinions recently in several liveral books and Lee was way ahead
in thought of all of them. This was over fourteen years ago.
I remember concluding this conversation by telling Lee. "If you want to be a
revolutionary, you have to be a fool or to have an inspiration. And your actions
will be judged by the success or failure of your life."
Lee agreed. What I liked about him was that he was a seeker for justice-that he
had highly developed social instincts. And I was disappointed in my own children
for lack of such instincts.
Incidentally I remember some details pretty well because I made noted of them
later and also made tapes of my recollections fairly soon after the
assassination.
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That night Jeanne served a Russian dinner which Marina found delicious but Lee
hardly touched. He was ascetic in his habits, was indifferent to foods and
didn't like deserts. In the meantime baby June slept quietly in bed all wrapped
up. Lee looked tenderly at her. That night we learned a lot about him - he
neither drank or smoked and objected if others, especially his wife did. Since
neither my wife or I smoked and drank very little, he liked it and considered
that we were on his side.
Jeanne was appalled finding out that baby June hadn't had any injestions usually
given to a child. Also Marina would pick up a pacifier from the floor -then
tried it herself before putting it in June's mouth. Unfortunately she had
infected teeth at the time, so the baby was exposed also.
My wife had high ideas on Russian hygiene and generally on the high standards of
the Soviet youth, so she was outspokenly critical. "Your infected teeth have to
be removed as soon as possible," she told Marina. When Marina objected that she
didn't have any money and couldn't speak English, Jeanne promised to help her.
After dinner Lee and I went back on the sofa and renewed our conversation.
"I served in the Marine Corps not because I was a patriot but I wanted to get
away from the drudgery and to see the world," admitted Lee.
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"Did you like the service?"
"Not particulary. But I had time to study, to read and indeed we traveled a
LOT."
"You told me you lived in Japan. How did you land there?"
"Just an accident of the Marine Corps duty. The military duty was boring and
stupid. But fortunately I moved around, began visiting places where youngsters
meet and established contacts with some more progressive and thinking Japanese."
"and this," said Lee thoughtfully, "is what led me to Russia eventually. I also
learned there of other, Japanese, ways of exploitation of the poor by the rich.
Semi-feudal, industrial giants which act paternalistically yet exploiting the
workers - proletarians. the wages in Japan were ridiculously low," Lee added.
"Well, it's changing now," said I. "Say, Lee, it's in Japan that you got your
discharge from the marine corps?"
Lee did not like to elaborate on this touchy subject. "I had to work to support
my mother."
But it developed later, as we all know, that he did not go back to USA to
support his mother but changed his mind and instead went to Russia. He obviously
used the money obtained at his discharge for this trip. He first went to Western
Europe then drifted to USSR via Finland if I remember well.
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Later on Lee's honorable discharge was changed to undesirable discharge and he
hated to talk about it and considered it unfair to him. This explains his hatred
of Connelly who was Secretary of the Navy at the time of this change of Lee's
discharge.
But that day he did not discuss this subject and went on talking about Russia.
"I got to Moscow and stayed there until the Russians had confidence in me and
gave me a permit to work." He did not mention that he tried to commit suicide in
desperation and cut his wrists.
Marine took part in the conversation. "Lee, you threw your passport in the face
of the American consul and you said that you denounced your citizenship," she
said.
Later Lee talked to me about his ordeal in Moscow but not this time. He went
talking about his impressions of Minsk because he knew I was interested in this
subject. He have me a general description of the city I know from my early
childhood. "I was assigned to work there without any particular reason, in a TV
factory, possibly because I had a little electronic training in the Marines," he
said candidly.
"Tell me more about the countryside," I asked him.
"Swisloch river is pretty clean, we used to go by row-boats to the forest nearby
to picknich on weekends. The forests are beautiful there, huge pine trees, clean
grass, full of berries of all kinds."
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I remembered the cathedral, several other picturesque churches and the main
building - GPU, NKVD, KGB - police headquarters, where my father spent several
months and where he almost died of starvation and was finally sentenced to life
exile in Siberia. But these were childhood memories and resentment on my part
had disappeared. Lee have me a perfect description of all these landmards, they
were still there, unchanged. But there were many new factories built, one of
them where he worked.
"Did you like your job?"
"Not particularly, but the pay was sufficient, about a hundred rubles a month,
an average for the Soviet Union. I could live on it. My apartment and all
utilities were burnished by the factory for a nominal fee, as well as medical
insurance etc."
He gave me the prices of bread, produce, milk etc., which were reasonable and of
clothing, which were outrageoulsy high. "Sometimes I used to run short of meat,
but you know I am not a big eater, it was of no importance to me."
Marina listened in and gave more precise information, especially complaining
about clothing and shoes. She was a practical one.
"You must have been somewhat privileged," I said, "being a foreigner, but how
did the other workers live in Minsk, the Russians?"
"Not too well. Usually one roof for a couple, community kitchens and
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lavatories," he admitted. "This led to quarrels, gossip, jealousy a rather
dismal situation. But what does it matter if everyone is in the same boat, if
everyone suffers. No rich exploiters like here, not great contrasts between the
rich and the poor."
"Butter and meat were out of my reach," said Marina bitterly, "but you
foreigners could afford these luxuries."
She was ready to continue talking more but since she was from Smolensk, the town
I was not familiar with, I asked Lee to talk mor about minsk and he did. To me
his sescriptions were most touching.
That night Maring announced that Lee was going to be laid off from his job in
Fort Worth at Leslie Welding Company, if I remember correctly. It was a poor job
anyway, minimal wages long hours, unhealthy conditions but Lee did not complain,
he never complained, it was Maring who was containtly dissatisfied. The air of
American prosperity bothered her, he was envious of other people's wealth or
wellbeing. Lee's mind was of a stoical, philosophical type, that's why, I
guessed, he had gotten along so well with the other Russians he met in the
Soviet Union. Russians do not mind to suffer and even go hungry if they can
spend entire nights talking and speculating on some ezotheric matters.
Next time the Oswalds came to visit is, we began speaking of Minsk again. I
reminisced that when I was five years old, my father used to talk to
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me to the forst and I helped him as well as I could in his awkard efforts to cut
down a big pine tree. It was a tough job for my father who had never been a
physically able man and he constantly hurt himself. Once he jammed his finger to
badly that the bone abrode and the finger remained useless for the rest of his
life. Surprisingly I grew adept at that sort of thing and quite able with an ax.
"Is that lovely forest north of town still in existence?" I asked Lee and
explained exactly where it was.
"Yes, we used to go there frequently by bus with my fellow workers. We took food
along and spent the whole day talking freely. I explained the United States to
them and they informed me on life in Russia."
Lee generally did not complain about his life in Russia but Marina did very
frequently, sincerely or not, I do not know. She considered me a capitalist and
tried to please me.
I promised Lee that night to give him introductions to a few influential people,
since I wanted him and his family to move away from the gruesome of Fort Worth
slum. I hoped that the other members of the Russian community would help him
also and told him so.
"Thanks a lot, I can take care of myself, I don't need those creeps, I shall
find something," he answered gruffly. This was an example of Lee's
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independence, he refused help, objected even to my help. Rather than to be
indebted to someone, he would rather starve on his own.
While Marina was usually a lot of fun, laughed easily but did not say anything
that would make you think - Lee was serious and did not take life as a joke. But
if he happened to be in a good mood, he became an excellent companion,
remembered political jokes, told them well and laughed at yours.
"Do you know this one about an American tourist carrying a small transistor
radio in Moscow?" Lee asked me.
"No, I don't know the story.
"Well, the Moscovite stopped the American and said: 'we make them much better
than you do. What is it?'"
We both laughed. Then I countered and asked Lee.
"What is the difference between the capitalism and the socialism?"
Lee did not know.
"Capitalism makes social mistakes and socialism makes CAPITAL mistakes."
"A Russian Commissar is asked at the holy gates where he would like to go - to a
capitalist hell or to a communist hell," said Lee.
" The Commissar answers: ' would like to go to a capitalist hell, I am so tired
of communist hell."
Then I told Lee a few foolish jokes about Kennedy, they were very po-
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"President Kennedy tells a group of businessmen: 'the economic situation is so
good that if I weren't your president I would invest in the stock marked right
now! And the businessmen answer in unison:' so would we if you were not our
president."
We both laughed.
"Kennedy had a terrible nightmare. He wakes up Jacquie: 'honey what a terrible
thing, I dreamed I was spending my won money, not government's."
Again we laughed, but without resentment, we both liked President Kennedy. So I
finished my foolish jokes by this one:
"John Kennedy runs to his mother at night. 'Mama! Mama! Help! Bobby tries to,
run MY country."
I think it was at that time that I told Lee that I had known Jacqueline Kennedy
as a young girl, as well as her mother, father and all her relatives and how
charming the whole family was, I especially liked "Black Jack" Bouvier,
Jacquie's father, a delightful Casanova of the Wall Street.
Lee was not jealous of Kennedy's and Bouviers' wealth and did not envy their
social positions, of that I was sure. To him wealth and society were big jokes,
but he did not resent them.
Now I want to tell something which my seem foolish to people who are not dog
lovers. At the time we had two lovely black Manchester Terriers.
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Nero and his faithful wife Poppea. Nero had followed us on a long trip over the
mountains of Mexico and Central America and saved our lives on several
occasions; Poppea was bought for him upon our return to USA and was a wonderful
wife for him. I cannot tell how much intuition Nero developed during our trip
and how easily he recognized friends from enemies. Well, on the first evening
our dogs did not express any interest in Marina or in Baby June but they were
fascinated by Lee. Nero especially showed his complete confidence and affection
for him. He seldom did it to anyone even to our close friends. He snugged up to
Lee and looked at him with affection. He sensed that he was an utterly sincere
person and was deprived of hatred. Poppea also licked his hand in a rare display
of affection.
Incidentally, many of our friends and even our own children complained that our
dogs were either unfriendly or totally indifferent to them.
And do Lee finally found a job at Taggart's Reproduction Company through the
Texas Employment Agency without help from anyone. I was a good job for him as he
had been interested in photography for a long time. I guessed that he took a
course at the Marine Corps. Anyway he brought a good camera from the Soviet
Union and took excellent pictures. Later he showed me excellent enlargements he
made himself. These were in black and white he was not advanced enough to
develop and enlarge colored photographs.
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But Lee's job did not pay well and as began to trust me more, he accepted an
introduction to a successful businessman-banker, Sam Ballen, who owned, among
other companies, a large reproduction outfit, for maps, electric logs, and
records. It was not a successful meeting. Lee and my friend did not like each
other. To the businessman Lee was a radical and a maverick. and Lee considered
Sam an ordinary bourgeois with no redeemin features to this credit. Actually,
both were interesting people, they just did not appeal to each other.
Another conversation comes to my mind. One evening Lee was in a blue mood and
confided that he was not particulary pleased with this reception in Minsk.
Somewhat naively, he expected to be treated as a special person, a prominent
refugee, and nothing happened, there was little difference between his condition
in Minsk and that of an ordinary Soviet worker. And do he had become depressed.
That evening Lee expressed an opinion that he did not appreciate the Soviet type
of government.
"Why?" I asked.
"It ks somewhat too regimented for me," he said. "We were obliged to go to the
meeting at the factory after work, dead tired and listened to inflammatory
speeches. It was lucky if I was able to to to sleep. Indoctrination of any kind
are not to my taste."
I saw his point.
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Our first evenings with the Oswalds were spent in conversations and discussions
and we got to know each other bery well. New something else happened in our
relationship. Before Lee got his job at Taggart's, I asked my daughter Alex and
my son-in-law Gary Taylor to help the Oswalds moving to Dallas. The Taylors went
to visit the Oswalds in Fort worth and right there they offered Marina to stay
with them and to keep the baby. Whatever furniture they had would be stored in
her garage. This generous proposition was accepted, Marina moved to Dallas. Lee
stayed for a short time in the apartment in Fort Worth and then moved to a small
room at YMCA in Dallas, close to his work at Taggart's. During Marina's stay at
my daughter's place, my wife helped her, drove her to the Baylor Hospital where
they pulled out her rotten teeth. Thus baby June was kept healthy and well fed.
But this short separation did not prevent Lee from coming to see us, even alone.
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Further conversation with Lee in 1962.
At the time we knew Lee, nothing could be further from our minds that he might
become such a historical figure. His visits were very frequent - sometimes he
would come for a short time, sometimes he would spend the whole evening with us.
Some bribes of our semi-bantering, semi-serious repartees remain in my memory.
"You are an extremely sincere person, Lee," I told him. "You do not lie even to
yourself. Most of the people I know are the opposite of you. They put ou a
front, they confuse, they deceive, they lie even when thinking.:
"I guess it's dangerous to be that way. I know I make a lot of enemies. But what
the hell," he acknowledged, "my position is that I am afraid of a very few
things in life. I am not cautious. I am not," he smiled, "a turket which lives
only to become fat." And he showed me his non existing belly. He was becoming
very thin.
"Lee, your way of life is so un-American, it scares me to think what may become
of you."
"It is true," Lee said, "I am probably committing a sin in not being interested
in possessions or money. When a rich man dies, he is loaded with his possessions
like a prisoner with chains. I will die free, death will be easy for me."
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"Stop talking about death, you are only 22. If you want to talk about gruesome
subjects, let me tell you this joke: a usurer is on is deathbed. A priest gives
him a crucufux to kiss and to confess his sins. And the usurer blabbers: 'I
cannot loan you much money for it'".
"Regarding your attitude on money and possessions," I said, "I couldn't agree
more with you. You would rather do something unusual than drive a Cadillac. I am
the same way."
"Life for me," continued Lee, "is like a hungry crocodile. I'd better defend
myself. I have to defend myself against the studpidity of this would. It is
enormous! Life must be the work of a perfect idiot. Or maybe the stupidity, like
breaking of the atom, is selfperpetuating?"
"Not too bad for a 22 years old American proletarian and a high-school dropout,"
I thought. "Lee, you have a very original mind."
"Thank you," he said. "I do not often hear the compliments. But let me tell you
more why I despise money-loving middle-class. Such people are simply stupid, not
serious, they are curiously attracted by crooks and aventurers. And so you hear
how often they are sheared off their wook, like sheep, by various financial
schemers."
"Diderot," I said, "thinks very much like you. "You have nothing, I
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have very little now, so a real friendship is possible between us. We are
sincere with each other."
Lee agreed.
"Another thing Diderot said," I continued, "he was very happy being poor and
living in a shack. When he achieved opulence and found a nice apartment in
Paris, he knew he was going to die..."
"The philosophers talk but you did it," said Lee enviously. "This trip of your,
what a freedom! 3,600 miles on foot on tough trails of Latin America. This
demanded a complete change in life - willingly, suddenly, for this you needed an
extradorinary moral audacity."
"This time I want to thank you, Lee. But do not exaggerate; this was an act of
desperation rather than audacity, after the death of my only son. Finally this
trip was very satisfying to Jeanne and to me."
And so we chatten in an open and friendly manner and I must of Lee.
"My opinion of this guy changes completely and frequently, which happens only
with people who are close and important to me. I usually judge the others
superficially and label them once for for all."
But now I should explain the reasons why I had introduced the Oswalds to my
daughter Alex and to her husband. They were about the same age. Gary was a
scatter-brained, simple-minded but pleasant young man and as most of his
financial schemes failed, he had plenty of time on his hands. His
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fondest ambition consisted of becoming rapidly another Clint Murchison or H.L.
Hunt and that was hard to achieve. Frankly I hoped that my daughter and her
husband Gary would acquire some of the world-wide interests that Lee certainly
possessed. His serious approach to life contrasted sharply with the foolish
flippany of Gary's; I also hoped that Marina would teach my daughter some
interesting facts about Russia. When these two were together that they were
somehow able to communicate, as my daughter was and is an excellent linguist.
But, introducing people of such different backgrounds led to unpleasant results.
First of all we caused a separation between Marina and Lee. We did understand
that it was not the first separation between them, but we actually caused this
one. It amazed my daughter that Lee called Marina on the phone unfrequently and
did not express much desire to be with her. But he missed baby June. It was
peculiar for a young husband but I already suspected that he was pleased being
alone at YMCA and was already bored with Marina's company. Next the
personalities of Lee and of Gary clashed. Lee considered Gary a spoiled, rich
American, foolish youngster and Gary looked down at him as a supercilous,
unpractical lunatic with revolutionary ideas. My daughter's opinion of Marina
was low also, she was slovenly and didn't know anything about baby-care.
Although she had obtained a degree of "registered pharmacist" in USSR.
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My daughter's opinion of Lee was low also, he was not good-looking, did not care
about his appearance, neither was he inclined to make money. As for me, I
regretted that Alex did not see any qualities I liked in Lee - the fact that he
was socially motivated, was a dreamer and a seeker of truth. But such people was
a very hard time in life and that's why so many people considered him a failure
and a loser (in quotation marks).
Maybe, had he lived longer, he would have fitted better into the scheme of
American life, he would have joined the group of love-children, would have grown
a beard and certainly would have been among the protesters against the was in
Viet-Nam.
It was probably Marina, dissatisfied with my daughter's attitude, who made Lee
hustle and find an apartment. Very soon the Oswalds settled in their own
ground-floor apartment on Elsbeth street, in Oak Cliff, suburb of Dallas. it was
far away from us, while we wanted them to live nearby. Probably Lee wanted to be
as far away as possible from the other Russian refugees, whom he disliked.
Anyway, the apartment was ten miles or more away from our place at University
Park.
With Lee's job secured at Taggart's and away from the gruesome slum in Fort
Worth, Jeanne and I though the the Oswald family would be happy.
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Jeannne registered the baby in children's clinic for regular check-ups and
Marina was treated almost gratis in the dental clinic of the Baylor hospital.
This involved long trips for Jeanne to drive back and forth but she did not
mind.. Staying so far away from anyone put Marina in a condition of total
dependancy on Lee, since she could not communicate with anyone around, we were
the only source she could understand. to invite the couple for dinner, we drove
back and forth, almost forty miles for a four-way trip.
Jeanne became quite close to Marina at the time, while Lee and I saw each other
frequently. Soon, however, these trips became difficult for us as we both became
busy in our professions, yet we wanted to continue seeing the Oswalds. One
solution would be for them to buy some second-hand car but Lee did not know how
to drive, nor did Marina of course. I did not doubt Lee's word. I mention this
here because later Lee's lack of driving ability became a contoversial issue. I
believed him because I knew about the abject poverty of his childhood in New
Orleans. In these prospersous United States, Lee's family occupied a position at
the poverty line, similar to poor Blacks and Mexican-Americans.
Due to my wife's help, Marin's four spoiled teeth were removed and her system
was not poisoned by them any mor. Baby June became healthy also.
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The Russian colony collected a small amount of money for Marina and the care of
the baby June. Lee did not know about it, he would not have accepted any
charity, so it was done secretly. I think Jeanne handled the operation and
Marina spent nights in the house while the next morning Jeanne would drive her
to Baylor dental clinic or to the child care center.
An amusing incident happened on the way to Baylor, recalls my wife. he had to
drive by the predominantly section of town, gaudy but cheerful Hall and
Washington streets, almost every decrepit house lodging either a night-club,
strip-tease joint or a dance hall. Hookers and flashy pimps strolling along the
broden payments. Suddenly Marina excitedly attracted my wife's attention
shouting in Russian to slow down. She looked at the tall, muscled, black
youngster standing proudly at the corner and surveying the situation.
"Look at him! Look!" She pulled at my wife's sleeve in a frenzy. "What a
handsome man!"
"Oh yes," agreed Jeanne, "he is very handsome."
"No, he is fantastic, fantastic!" Exulted Marina.
Such an enthusiasm surprised my wife.
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"He is so big and strong! What muscles he must have..."
As my wife related this incident, she observed that is was not a question of an
attraction of a nordic woman to an exotic man of a dark race, but addressing
fact that a young married woman with a child would show such an uninhibited
admoration for a sexy male.
I drove her myself on the same street and teased her myself about her attraction
to black men. "Marina," I guessed, "you did not see in Russia such, uninhibited,
natural men."
She laughed: "neither Russians nor American whites can compare to such beautiful
men," she said candidly. "Maybe the Cubans I met in Minsk were just as
attractive."
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The Oswalds in Minsk.
The storied related by lee and Maring about Minsk were especially interesting to
me. It seems that Lee was very unhappy at the beginning of his stay there and he
even tried to slash his wrists out of despair. Since he was supposed to have
done it already in Moscow, in order to obtain a permit to remain in the Soviet
Union, the wrist-slashing became somewhat of a habit if not a subterfuge with
him. Marina held a job of a pharmacist in the hospital where Lee was treated,
she took care of him flirted with him very nicely and began conquering his
heart. Later he polyps problem so he dept on going to the some hospital. An
that's how the romance began and flourished.
Marina came from a fairly good family from our point of view, since her father
belonged to a former tharist officer group. After his death her mother married a
man called Prussakov. Later her mother died and Marina got tired of living with
her stepfather and her half-brothers and sisters. And so she decided to move
from Smolensk to Minsk where she received soon a degree of a registered
pharmacist. I remember Marina's amusing repartee when I asked her is she linked
her half-brothers and sisters.
"They were good, normal children, not like me. I was a bad one." And she
laughed, showing a good sense of humour and a great deal of charm.
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After the hospital meetings, Lee and Marina began going out together to dances
and movies and eventually the relationship of affection and love developed
between them.
"I remember looking at the new apartment building near the river Svisloch,"
reminsced Marina, "but only high technical and political personnel lived there,
as well as some foreigners, Lee among them."
It was a wonderful setting for a Soviet romance - love, an American refugee, a
rever and a new apartment building... Actually the building belonged to the
factory where Lee worked at the time, his staying there was no particular favor.
But for the girl who had lived in crowded rooms with a stepfather and several
children, this new house seemed a real paradise.
And so they married and moved to that apartment building. Why did she marry him?
She could have cohabitated with him, this happened frequently with young couples
in Russia. the reasons are unknown to me and known only to Marina: love, pity or
desire to come to the United States. Probably the latter, as soon after their
wedding Lee decided that he wanted to go back to the United States. He traveled
to Moscow without a permit, went to the United States embassy, got back his
passport and borrowed there $500 for the return.
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While in Texas, he paid religiously back each month installments due on that
loan. Marina freqently complained that he was too punctual in his payments - but
he was. I ask you where do you find another man in Lee's position, on the verge
of starvation, who would be in such a hurry to repay a government loan, which
would be very difficult to collect from a poor man like Lee. But somehow Lee
felt this obligation very sincerely.
Another question puzzled and still puzzles us: how come the Soviets permitted
Marina to leave her homeland so easily, while it was hard for Lee to obtain a
permit to leave USSR. The had to make another trip to Moscow to arrange it and
he never explained to me clearly how he got the permit to take Marina along.
"Well, I did it," Lee smirked, "because all bureaucrats, all over the world, are
stupid..."
Marina had an uncle, a colonel of special forces NKVD - KGB to-day - Department
of Interior, called Medvedev; I think he was her mother's brother.. For some
time she had loved with him, in Smolensk I think, and Lee told me that this
important man was dead set against his niece marrying him. Later something made
him change his mind. We were not interested at the time in the why's and the
wherefore's of this colonel activities, now it is too late to find out. Maybe
this colonel for his own reasons helped his niece to get out of Russia. Possible
it was a good reddance of a Prussakova
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niece, possibly something else...
The loyal decrepit Russian refugees liked Marina only because her real father
had been a prerevolutionary officer or some tzarist official. This matter was
indifferent to us and we did not inquire further. But the permission to leave
USSR was puzzling to us, uncle or no uncle, because we knew of many cases of
Americans who never obtained a permit to leave Russia for their Soviet wives.
Personally I know of one case, one of the reporters of the Christian Monitor
successfully extracted his wife from Russia at the time of Stalin.
One day jeanne asked Lee a straightforward question: "why did you decide to go
xxxxx to USSR, answer frankly! "You risked never to return to your country."
"I was looking for an ideal," Lee answered sadly.
"And why did you decide to return here?" Jeanne insisted.
"Because I did not find my ideal. Obviously utopia does not exist. I could
travel and change countries the rest of my life and never find it."
We liked this statement and agreed with Lee.
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We are becoming close friends.
From time to time my wife would prepare a special Russian or French dinner for
the Oswalds, always deeping in mind that both of them were under furnished. And
I would talk with Lee in the meantime, often late into the night. Although he
unquestionably had had some unpleasant experiences, as the slashing of his
wrists proved, Lee was never hostile or emotionally upset about his life in the
Soviet Union. He spoke of his co-workers humbly and engagingly. "They were
hospitable, friendly and sincere, they invited me to their homes, fed me from
their meagre supplies and we discussed all the subjects frankly as we do it
here."
"Did they tell you any jokes about their regime? I asked.
"Here is one I remember," Lee said. "And American worker comes to the Soviet
Union and sees big apartment complexes. He asks: 'to whom do they belong?' - 'To
the state' - 'They belong to the state also.''" Then lee smiled. "The Russian
worker comes to visit United States. He asks: 'these huge factories, to whom do
they belong?" - 'To the capitalists' comes the fast answer. 'Aha says the
Russian this is terrible!' Then he notices nice suburban homes, now cars. He
asks: 'to whom these belong?' - 'To the workers', comes an immediate answer."
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Then I asked Lee: "did you ever hear that one about a Soviet worker who was
wandering from one factory to another asking 'is there a place that would pay as
little as the little work I intend to do?'"
Lee did not laugh. "That is a rather vicious joke. Soviet workers work almost as
hard as here and certainly they get paid much less."
Then he reminisced: "nobody in the Soviet Union tried to intimidate me or
influence me. But I encounter these tendencies here. Nobody ever tried to make a
communist out of me. I was a sympathzed but I never joined the party."
He is probably on the level, I thought.
"And what were your living conditions there?" I asked.
"Not bad at all, ample meals, clean surroundings, good companionship."
"And they pay?"
"Sufficient; the apartment cost me five per cent of my pay, and I don't eat
much, as you know. With Marina's additional salary we could manage quite well."
"Expensive but adequate and I am not interested, as you know, in stylish
clothes. Of course, the Cubans dressed to kill." he smiled.
Marina must have missed good clothes there, I thought.
"And how about transportation? I asked.
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"Of course I could not afford a motorcycle, but I like to walk and the public
transportation was cheap and good."
"What was most annoying to you in the Soviet Union?" Asked Jeanne who was
listening in.
"Those endless, endless meetings we had to attend after work, listening to those
deadly, monotonous speeches. You were lucky if you were in the back and could
take a nap...We listened to those bureaucratic outpourings half-dazed, like
children during a very boring lesson. Then we voted, rather indifferently, on
various trivial issues. Later we would file out, exhausted and would return
home. And, "Lee smiled, "we never received any extra pay for the hours lost, and
we certainly deserved it."
I approved his attitude, nodding agreement. I would also hate to waste my time
on such meetings.
Lee spoke of other foreigners living there, some Cubans whose names I forgot,
one family of refugees from Argentina; the father was an experienced engineer
and Lee had a great respect for him. It wasn't once that he mentioned this
family to me, taking mainly of the daughters who "were so pretty" and so
friendly to him. All in all Lee spoke frequently to me of his interest in women
and he even bragged amusingly and somewhat naively of his conquests in Russia.
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Here in the United States Lee wasn't certainly a ladies' man, he felt depressed
and confined. I think he frequently regretted having left Minsk.
But there I can visualize him cutting a path of Casanova among the Russian
women. And why not? He was a foreigner, he acted freely, he looked pleasantly
and his interest in Russian people was warm and genuine.
Marina admitted herself one day. "He was something out of the ordinary. He
looked like an American, he was easygoing, loose and alert - not like the other
guy." That Lee was a perfectly normal and well adjusted individual of Minsk -
Marina insisted frequently. "The only trouble with him was, his interest in
books - serious books - serious books, politics, discussions, rather than sex."
Maybe it is not nice to talk about confidential sex matters, between the
Oswalds, but might as well do it, they show light on the personalities of this
interesting couple. Marina was close enough to my wife ot be completely one with
her. "Lee does not have sex with me but rarely," she admitted, "very rarely,
about once a month and he is in such a hurry, poor fellow, that I do not get any
satisfaction. It's most frustrating." When Jeanne repeated this matter to me, I
laughed and told Marina a well-known Texas joke translating it, probably for the
first time, into Russia.
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"Mandy was a good-looking black prostitiute. A handsome, tall Black, by the name
of Rastus came to see her. How much do you charge Mandy?' - For fifteen dollars
I does it all, for ten we does it, for five you do it all! Rastus had only five
dollars, so they agreed and went to bed. But while Rastus began making love to
Mandy he turned out to be such a formidable male that in extasy Mandy ailed:
'Rastus I shall do it all on credit, you have such an honest face!"
Naturally in Russian it did not sound very hot, but we all loughted and possibly
it was the beginning of Marina's arden interest in our racial minority - the
Blacks.
But aside from such foolishness, we talked with Oswalds of their lives in the
Soviet Union. And soon we acquired a certainty that Marina wanted a richer and
materialistically more rewarding life then the one she had at home and it was
she who convinced Lee to go to the American Embassy, to ask for the return of
this passport and for money all this in view to go with him to the United
States. Another interesting fact: the first time he went from Minsk to Leningrad
or Moscow he did it illegally, but the second time he obtained a legal Soviet
permit to go there by train. As a foreigner Lee was not supposed to leave town
without notifying the police and obtaining a permit. Not an easy matter for some
of the people who had tried to leave Russia.
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I remember Marina telling me without any emotion that she had been discharged at
the time from the Komsomol, an organization of communist youth, and that it
happened because she had married an American. In the Soviet Union it was a
disgrace, but she did not attach any importance to it while in Minsk, because
obviously she know she would leave her country anyway. Both Lee and I laughed
about her naive belief that the streets of the United States were paved with
gold and that the poor people were the ones who had to wash themselves their
Cadillacs. I remember Lee telling us a joke, which circulated at the time among
the young Russian. Capitalism to them meant champagne, luxurious cars, jazz,
caviar for dinner and Gina Lollobrigida for a girl-friend. Marvelous! Communism
to them meant vodka, dirty tramway, balalaika, black bread and their own mother!
Marina laughed goodnaturedly.
Very often people ask me with suspicion why I, a person with several university
degrees and of fairly good financial and social standing - with friends among
the rich of the world - became such a friend of that "maladjusted radical" - Lee
Harvey Oswald? Well, I hope that this book clarifies Lee's personality and
endows him with a lot of most attractive features. I already spoke of his
straightforward and relaxing personality.
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of his honesty or his desire to be liked and appreciated. And I believe it is a
privilege of an older age not to give a damn what others think of you. I choose
my friends just because they appeal to me. And Lee did.
It never occurred to me that he might be an agent of any country, including
United States - although he might have been trained in Russian for some ulterior
motive - Lee was too outspoken, naively so. In this way I was similar to him. In
1946 when I was working in Venezuela for William Buckley's family company-
Pantepec Oil Company- I met the soviet Ambassador there who had been before
world was one a rostabout for Nobel Oil interests, and my uncle was a director
of that outfit. So the Ambassador knew my name and was extremely friendly to me.
We spent many an evening talking and drinking vodka. As a result he suggested
that be would offer me a contract to work in the Soviet Union. But after
listening to me and my outspoken opinions, he advised me: "my friend, you talk
too much, you critize too much, you would be a babe in the woods in my country
and would end up in Siberia."
Also Lee was very interested in other people, in their work, he tried to improve
his own education by reading, observing and studying. Sometimes he was amusing
when he used long, difficult words in English - words like
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charisma, politicomania, extravaganzas, eletism - the knowledge of which he
liked to display. We even laughed together about his use of such words, the
exact meaning of which eluded him. Occasionally Lee's constant search for truth,
for the answers to the mysteries of life, seemed tragic and disturbing to me.
But this proves also that it seems highly improbable that any government would
try to make an agent of such a man. He own element of sel-inquiry, self-denial
and self-doubt, mixed with instability worried Lee. But I told him not to worry,
in my opinion instability, doubt, constant search were elements of youth and
were indicative of exuberant life.
I told Lee that I pitied people who did not possess such characteristics, were
living dead, they form the mass of obedient slaves in all countries.
A strong desire for adventure was also one of Lee's motivations. That's why he
became a marine, that's why he switched jobs just because he did not like what
he had to do so far. And routine was deadly to him. However his last job at the
printing company fitted him well and he seemed fairly happy.
"Why didn't you stay in the Marine Corps?" I asked him one day.
"Oh, did not care for the military, not much fun being and underline, not much
adventure either."
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"You could become an officer, you are intelligent enough," I countered.
"Oh, no, to hell with being an officer, I don't like to command other guys."
Often I was asked with suspicion, long before the assassination, "how did you
get along so well with Lee Oswald?"
"In my life I have done many things, I was often a promoter, an originator of
new ideas, so I liked now ideas, even if they seemed strange and outlandish, I
enjoyed meeting people of various types, evaluated their thoughts, did not
criticize them," I retorted.
Later on, when I was in the hot water because of my friendship with Lee, a
friend of mine testified: "George always liked stray dogs and stray people."
Many people considered Lee a miserable misfit, an insult to the American way of
life, and completely disregarded him. A Russian refugee living in Dallas told me
once: "I am scared of this man Oswald, he is a paranoid."
"Paranoid or not, he is as intelligent as you are. Listen to him, there is a lot
of sense in what he says," I would reply.
Probably to annoy Lee, the Russian refugees and some ultra-conservative
Americans showered Marina with gifts and gave her too much attention. Since
Americans could not communicate with her, their efforts were wasted. But the
gifts give his wife by the refugees annoyed Lee. Unquestionably Marina
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added oil to the fire bragging about the gifts and talking how successful some
of the donors were - owning their own homes and two automobiles. He might have
been wounded in his pride, although he never complained to me.
At the time Lee did not want Marina to learn English. She could only say yes and
no and if she went to the store, he had to point out the articles she wanted.
"It''s ver egotistical on your part Lee," Jeanne told him, "you have to let her
study English so she can communicate with other people than the Russian
refugees. You cannot keep her a recluse."
Sensing that Lee resented them, the members of the Russian colony gave Marina
some hundred dresses. Baby June received a new crib, a carriage and a lot of
toys. Unquestionably it annoyed Lee. The more people gave Marina, the more it
disturbed Lee. Disturbed is not the right word - maddened. And so he declined
invitations to these "benefactor's" homes, he was often rede to them. That
situation had very sad consequences for this family.
As far as we are concerned, we continued our good relationship with the Oswalds,
even after the situation in Soviet Russian and in Minsk especially have been
thoroughly discussed. Instead of questioning them, we became concerned in the
welfare of this couple. Be nice to the poor was always Jeanne' motto.
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Seeing that Lee's situation was also gradually deteriorating, I became even
nicer to him. Never kick a man who is down, help him, was my belief. Sometimes
Lee's action and his sensitivities annoyed me, but I did not try to show any
resentment and attempted to find a solution for him and his wife.
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Contrasts between the Oswalds.
One day Lee brought to me typescripts of his experiences in Russia. He was
interested in publishing them in a form of an article in a magazine or possibly
to develop them into a book. A few typed pages, and poorly at that, in substance
could not add much to what he had already told me. And what he had told me was
of interest only to me, because I was familiar with the locale, but not to other
readers. But it was important for him to get my recognition since he knew that I
published many articles in Europe and in this country did some theatre reviews
for the Variety Magazine. And so Lee sat on the sofa and looked hopefully at me.
"What do you think of this?" he asked.
"Remember I am not a professional writer, I was lucky enough to have had some
articles published, your story is simple and honest but it is very poorly
written. It is deprived of any sensational revelations and it's really
pointless. Personally I like it because I know Minsk but how many people know
where Minsk is. And why should they have interest in your experiences? Tell me!"
"Not many," Lee agreed mildly.
I did not say, not to affend him, that his grammar was poor and the syntax was
atominable. And those long, pompous words...
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But that was the result of his poor, formal education. And the only things in
his favor stood out - his sincerity and his obvious good will to inform
correctly.
"If you add some sensational, detective story type details, a beautiful female
spy, depraved, mesochistic policemen, if you depict all Russians as degenerate
xxxxxxxmonsters, then your script will be published.
"No, thank you," said Lee proudly. "I do not want to tell lies. My purpose is to
improve Soviet-American relations." And he added quickly, "People here should
know how decent and generous Russians are. How well they treated me, a simple
American ex-marine, with kindness and generosity - I did not find anything
monstrous in Soviet Russia."
"I agree with you personally. Also you talk about some individuals you met
there. It's good and factual, they are decent people. But who is interested in
comrate this or that, in refugees from Argenina or in some cheerful Cuban
students? Correct?"
Lee agreed and I handled him back his pages.
The same typescripts were shown me later for identification by the Warren
Committee Lawyer and they were printed in the Warren Committee report. So Lee's
wishes came true after his death.
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This was a period of relative tranquillity for Lee, as he was working for
Taggart's developing and enlarging photos, posters and maps and he seemed to
enjoy his work. But Marina was dissatisfied and complained to Jeanne again. "He
comes home tired, hardly talks to me, only to the baby, then reads Russian books
and is seldom tender and loving to me."
Incidentally I never saw him interested in anything else except Russian books
and magazines. He said he didn't want to forget the language - but it amazed me
that he read such difficult writers like Gorki, Dostoevski, Gogol, Tolstoi and
Turgenieff - in Russian. As everyone knows Russian is a complex language and he
was supposed to have stayed in the Soviet Union only a little over two years. He
must have had some previous training and that point had never been brought up by
the Warren Committee - and it is still puzzling to me. In my opinion Lee was a
very bright person but not a genius. He never mastered the English language yet
he learned such a difficult language! I taught Russian at all level in a large
University and I never saw such a profficiency in the best senior students who
constantly listened to Russian taped and spoke to Russian friends. As a matter
of fact American-born instructors never mastered Russian spoken language as well
as Lee did.
The fact that Lee reserved Marina as a perfect Russian conversationalist
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for himself was foolish and selfish. Being in close relationship with the
Oswalds we noticed the signs of the coming disintegration of their already
fragile relationship. Lee seemed to be fond of Marina but he mostly cherished
baby June. Maybe he was too secretive a person to show his affection and
Marina's slavic nature demanded more attention and tenderness. But Lee never
spoke badly to us about his wife, he never criticized her but neither did he
ever express any deep feeling for her. Even in his typewritten memoirs he spoke
very little of her.
Marina, on the other hand, annoyed and criticized Lee, due possibly to a
perversity of her Russian character. "He is so puny, so dull, he never drinks,
only works, tries easily, is only interested in books" she complained to me and
my wife. And she said that behind his back and obviously to him directly when we
were to there. Never did we hear from her that she loved her husband. But there
was nevertheless an element of strong attachment which tied together these two
so different people, but we did not notice it at the time.
Lee was indeed all wrapped up in his work, books, his ideas on equality of all
people, especially of all races; it was strange indeed for a boy New Orleans and
Texas poor white family, purely Anglo, to be so profoundly anti-racist.
"Segregation in any form, racial, social or economic, is one of the most
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repulsive facts of American life", he often told me. "I would be willing any
time to fight these fascistic segregationalists - and to die for my black
brothers."
He obviously intended to do just that, as we shall see from the later chapters
and from Marina's inscription on Lee's picture. Warren Committee completely
disregarded this unusual aspect of Lee's character and eliminated my statement
from the report.
Otherwise, we seldom heard from Lee much talk about women, Marina, on the other
hand, spoke freely to Jeanne add to myself about her pre-marital experiences,
her admiration for strong, sexy men. She spoke enthusiastically about the Cubans
she met in Russia. "They were outgoing and gay. Often they carried their guitars
with them, sand their catchy Carribean tunes, danced so well. They were such
fun!"
This was fan indirect criticism of her husband who did not like music, except
Russian folcloric sad tunes, who did not play any musical instruments and could
not dance. And let's face it he wasn't particulary entertaining with her.
Here I want to dispel once more the impression I may have given that Lee did not
have a keen sense of humour. For instance I remember this one he told me. "A
Russian doctor had a parrot who was able to say 'how do you do', 'good night'
etc.
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One hot evening the doctor left the parrot on the windowsill to cool off. A
Russian mujik passes by and hears parrot's greetings. He takes his hat off and
says: 'excuse me, comrade, I thought you were a bird!"
On American politics he expressed the following opinion. "Under dictatorship
people are enslaved but they know it. Here the politicians constantly lie to
people and they become immune to these lies because they have the privilege of
voting. But voting is rigged and democracy here is a gigantic profusion of lies
and clever brain-washing."
Also he said something about FBI which did not strike me at the time as very
clever, but history proved his judgement correct. "Knowledge is a great power,
especially if you know it about very important people." Obviously J. Edgar
Hoover's files must come to your mind.
Also he told me the joke which must have been circulating at the time in the
Soviet Union, "A strip-tease joint was opened in moscow for the tourists. It was
decorated and run just like in Paris and lots of money was spent on this
establishment. Yet it did not attract much trade. A state Economic Commission
questioned the worried director. He explained: 'I did my best, hired the best
decorators, imitated a place in Paris.' - 'How about the girls?" asked a member
of the commission. 'No trouble with them, they are all at least for thirty years
good, party members.'"
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Lee also liked jokes about southern hillbillies and rednecks but I cannot recall
any of them not. He subscribed to "Drokodil" a Soviet satirical publication,
somewhat similar to the New Yorder of to the British Punch. Krokodil, which we
often read together, featured mainly Russian self-criticism in the form of short
stories or cartoons. Animals frequently featured local politicians, and in the
manner of Krilov's fables, emphasized the foibles of the Soviet bureaucracy. It
also took swipes at the bourgeois world quite sharply.
Lee read Russian classics and discussed some at length with me, especially I
remember "The Idiot" by Dostoievski, a psychoanalytical study. He understood the
pre-revolutionary life in Russia, which I did not know but heard about from my
parents. Russian classics belong exclusively to the pre-revolutionary or early
revolutionary days and modern Russians are fascinated by those days of
extravagant aristocracy, tzarist power and abuses of it, great wealth and great
waste, ownership of slaves, temporal strength of the Greek-Orthodox church -
these aspects of the old days Lee observed with distaste but the elegance and
the gayety of the certain occasions gave him a feeling of nostalgia, as he were
Russian himself.
Marina did not care about any of this, she was a super-materialist, really
destined by nature for the mediocre, middle class American life: new clothes
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new buildings, plastic, neutral surroundings, tall, well-dressed men.
"Lee, when shall we get a car/" She kept on nagging. "Everyone here has one,
even the poorest people!" And poor Lee even did not know how to drive a car. And
when Marina was talking to Jeanne he said: "I never wanted a middle-class wife,
mediocre, obscure, money-loving who would have the taste of vanity, of luxury,
of comfort, of all that bourgeois nonsense."
Well, you have one, I thought.
Marina liked wine, he objected to it. She smoked, he detested the smell of
tobacco. So whenever she was without him she would become a chain-smoker,
inhaling deep, asking for drinks, enjoying these forbidden pleasures. He called
Lee, a slender, ascetic man, but by no means a weakling, a bookworm. He
respected education and knowledge, especially in others, she was just the
opposite; she didn't value her degree as a pharmacist.
"It must have been difficult ot get it?" I asked her once.
"Not for me, I got by easily, used ponies and passed my examinations," she
answered breezily.
But she would remember some handsome fellows and had met and shared bed with, of
real soviet type orgies. She confided in Jeanne. Those parties were organized in
Minsk by richer sons of the bureaucrats who disposed of comfortable apartments
while their parents were gone. The kids drank and
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sleeps indiscriminately. "This was terrific, "she reminisced. "And I also
remember a handsome boy who instead of joining us on holidays would take a book
and would go all day to the forest to study. Some people are crazy," she
concluded.
In my conversations with Lee, I found out that he was an open and
straightforward agnostic. Religion did not interest him. He saw that was
probably since his early childhood. His agnosticism was on the type of
Jefferson's or Franklin's - and it was fine. He was not an aggressive atheist
who wanted to impose his point of view with violence. He must have read Toynbee
and bertrand Russell because his argumentation against organized religion was
solid. One day he said, "The doctor sees a man at his weakest, the lawyer sees
the man at his wickedest and the priest sees a man at his stupidest," he
chuckled. "I read it somewhere, it's pretty good?"
Lee was always very humble with me and he really blossomed when I showed some
interest in what he had to say. But aren't we all the same way?
Only once, while discussing organized religion, he expressed his views with cold
disdain. "What I dislike," he said, "are the materialistic aspects of the
American type religion, to all, but the large denominations with their
ridiculously garish churches, their tax-deductible tricks and finageling." Lee
seems quite versed in the matter. Here he was rather
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instructing me. And I had to agree with him on the greedy aspects of our modern
Christianity, so far removed from the original teachings of poverty and
humility.
I remember talking to my wife about Lee and she mentioned that we both treated
him on a perfectly equal basis, and never scorned him, while other people who
helped the Oswalds did it for Marina only or for the child. And Lee did not like
any help, especially that type. He was occasionally rude to the people who
interfered in their lives being intrisically a very independent, selfsufficient
person. And so he began refusing invitations which infuriated Marina.
Many local people, especially Russian refugees, resented Lee because he had
deserted these United States, the "country of the brave and the free" and many
considered him an outright traitor. And he, a hundred percent, native-born
American smiled and would say: "who are the real Americans? Only the Indians,
Blacks and the Mexicans from the South-Western states, to whom this country
originally belonged."
We have a different attitude. We like young people who search to solve some
problems which bother them. He disliked many aspects of American life and
thought that maybe somewhere else it was better. Being with him took me back to
my young days at the University of Liege, when we spent entire
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discussing various problems of life without any respect for the rules or for the
establishment.
It was not the first time that he mentioned that he was disappointed in the
Soviet Union because he did not find there his ideal of justice. "Maybe it does
not exist..." he said sadly one day. "And so I came back."
The narrow-minded people condemned him without understanding his motivations,
without giving him a chance to explain himself. fAn later on our Dallas police
let im die without explaining himself and telling the truth.
But we are talking of the year 1962 and of people he met then. Many resented him
- and he answered in kind. And we were the only ones who took interest in him
and gave him a chance to express himself.
Since I had mentioned Lee's agnosticism, let's go back to Marina's attitude
towards religion. We were positive that at the time Marina was also an agnostic,
even an atheist, after all she was brought up in Soviet Russia in purely
communist surrounding. She did not have the slightest idea of God, not any
interest in anything divine - or so it seemed to us. But soon she realized that
being religious in the United Stated would help her, as it usually dows. And so
she had her child June christened later in the Greek-Orthodox church in Dallas
during one of her separation from Lee. This exacerbated their conflict. He told
her in our presence: "you
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doublecrossed me, you should have consulted me before doing this to my child.
This is unforgivable!"
And so there was another element added to their disputes.
Personally I do not criticize faith or religion, but these should be true and
profound feelings, not the outward manifestations. Lee's faith, his strongest
belief was - racial integration. He told me at many occasions - "It hurts me
that he Blacks to not have the same privileges and rights as white American."
And I agreed with him. This was the time when Blacks had to sit at the back of
the bus, couldn't eat in restaurants or stay in the hotels and motels reserved
for the whites. It angered and annoyed me. At the time I didn't have many
contacts with the Blacks, except with some artists, teachers and preachers. But
in my profession I couldn't afford to have Black friends often in the house, I
would have been blackballed and eliminated from the competitive field.
Fortunately now the situation changed for me and I am very happy.
Lee also resented the poor care of his child. This led to frequent quarrels and
recriminations. Gradually fights between the Oswalds became frequent and
vicious. Marina would arrive by bus with the baby and would complain to Jeanne:
"He beat me up again," and showed bruises on her body to Jeanne and a black eye
to me.
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One day we visited them in their apartment on Elsbeth Street in Oak Cliff. It
was on the ground-floor of a dreary red-brick building, the atmosphere of the
house and the neighbourhood conducive to suicide. The living-room was dark and
smelly, the bedroom and the kitchen facing bleak walls. But Lee was proud of his
own place and showed me his books and magazines as well as some letters from
Russia which we read together. The place was spruced up by the lovely
photographs of the Russian countryside taken by Lee there and later enlarged by
him. Trees and fields, charming peasant huts and cloudy skies contrasted
strangely with the dreary walls and the lugubrious atmosphere. Some pictures
were framed by Lee, others unframed were assembled carefully in an album. I also
remember artistically taken pictures of Moscow and Liningrad, especially of the
river Neva which I also slightly remembered from my childhood. He was happy to
have access to elaborate photographic equipment. "Look at these churches, look
at these statues," he exclaimed proudly. Indeed almost all his pictures had a
professional touch, he was justly proud of them.
While Lee and I were chatting on that moth-eaten sofa of his in the living-room,
Marina invited Jeanne to come to the kitchen. There she cried and showed an
infected spot on her shoulder. "The son of the bitch caught me smoking and he
grabbed the cigarette and put it out on my bare flesh,"
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"This is terrible, this is terrible" shouted Jeanne, coming out of the kitchen.
"Lee what have you done to your wife?"
"Well, she smoked against my orders," he said sullenly.
"You lived abroad only two years and picked up those customs," Jeanne attacked
Him. "You could not have picked up this brutality in Russia where women are
independent. And here you have no right to brutalize a woman just because she
smokes occasionally."
Right there we discussed with them very frankly their growing antagonism and
tried to find a solution to it. We came up with an idea of a temporary
separation but let it up to them. "Take it easy," I told Lee, "and stop abusing
your wife."
"But she enjoys brutality," he answered calmly. "Look at me. I am all scratched
up." Indeed, even in the darkish room we could see long red marks on his face -
traces of Marina's fingernails. "She is provoking me," he added sadly.
"Still it's no excuse," I said. "Your temperaments obviously clash - it's
another reason for separation."
The Oswalds remained silent, wrapped up in their misery.
"Do it," said Jeanne, "before you really hurt each other. And you Lee are
responsible because you are stronger."
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"Man, that woman loves to fight," countered Lee seriously.
Marina and Jeanne went back to the kitchen where Marina cried on my wife's
shoulder. On the way home Jeanne related the complaints. "He is cold and
hostile," said Marina. "He goes to bed with me so rarely now. Once in a couple
of weeks. He makes me so god-damn frustrated.:
Jeanne was amused by such frank revelation but could not find a better solution
for Marina than advising her to be more feminine, use some perfume in the
evening and occasionally put on a sexy, transparent negligee.
But before leaving I remember taking a close look at baby June, layin in her
crib, rather fat and not being able yet to say a work. "She reminds me of
someone, of some celebrity." I said.
And then the answer came to me. "Look at June," I shouted. "Look she is a baby
edition of Nikita Krushchev!"
I did not mean it as an insult, just the opposite. I rather liked that outgoing,
earthy old man, and so did the Oswalds. So we all laughed and assembled around
the crib, examining the baby. "Same pinkish color of the skin," observed Jeanne.
"Same rare, fluffy hair," said Marina. "Same round Russian face," agreed Lee
smilingly.
And so we left that evening advising our young friends to talk over there
problems and to stop torturing each other. Whatever their decision
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would be, we would be glad to help them in any way we could.
Driving back from the Oswalds we spoke of their problems and laughed
June-Krushchev comparison. "Yes, the baby has the same slanting eyes and the
same belligerent expression," said Jeanne, "how come I did not notice it
before?"
Yes, June was not a pretty baby at the time but perfectly normal and healthy. We
have not seen her lately, for reasons I shall explain, but I am sure she grew up
to be a lovely young girl. She has a step-father and knows probably little or
nothing about her real father. And we remember with sadness how much Lee was
devoted to her. "He is an unusually loving and tender father," I mused aloud
while driving.
"And he has a very good hearth," said Jeanne, "Look how much our dogs love him."
"It's so touching when Lee kisses June and calls her "moia malenkaia devochka."
And never gets mad at her, I concluded while we approached our house.
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Increased animosity between Lee and Marina
Conflicts in married couples develop slowly like a cancer, and then from the
slow development the sickness attacks the couple with alarming rapidity. In
previous chapter we showed how slowly but insidiously the animosity developed in
the case of Oswalds. Looking back at Lee and remembering his reactions, he
became suddenly standoffich, sometimes supercilious and spoke only to people
whom he liked and trusted. And there were not many of them. Lee was not close to
his mother and seldom spoke of her. But neither did he criticize her. He harldy
spoke of his brother Robert and not at all of his wife. Yet, the Oswalds stayed
with them for a short time upon their arrival in the United States.
As a matter of fact we never met any member of the Oswald family and we are
sorry not to have met Lee's mother. Even Marina spoke nicely of her.
Later we admired when Marguerite Oswald tried desperately to clear up her son's
name and reputation. We wish her the best of luck.
One of the reasons we agree with Mrs. Marguerite Oswald that her son was
probably innocent of Kennedy's assassination - and we insisted on this during
the Warrin Committ interviews (although it was never brought up publicly) - was
the following: Lee actually admired President Kennedy in his own reserved way.
One day we discussed with Lee Kennedy's efforts to
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bring peace to the world and to end the cold war. "Great, great!" Exclaimed Lee.
"If he succeeds, he will be the greatest president in the history of this
country."
Kennedy's efforts to alleviate and to end segregation were also admired by Lee,
who was sincerely and profoundly committed to a complete integration of Blacks
and saw it in the future of the United States. "I am willing to fight for racial
equality and would die fighting if necessary," He told me once. Because of his
poor, miserable childhood, he probably compared himself to the Blacks and the
Indians and commiserated with them. In this he was so different and so noble
compared with the Southern trash and rednecks, whose segregationism stems from
their fear of the Blacks, of their strength and of the possibility of their
prominence in every field of human endeavor. Education for the Blacks was an
anathema for them, while Lee was fullheartedly for it. He loved black children
and admired their cute and outgoing ways. He also was fond of the black music
and folklore with which he as familiar from his childhood days in New Orleans.
Lee despised the reactionary groups, the whit supremacists, the so called "hate
groups" and did not hide his feelings. I naturally agreed with him. Marina, on
other hand was not interested in anything except acquiring possessions. Her craa
materialism, envy of other refugees' success,
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compared to Lee's idealism, lead inevitably to confrontations.
Lee was rather neat and orderly, Marina was lazy and devil may care about her
household and herself. This unusual Russian-American couple was too much for the
average Anglo. Hence their cohabitation with Robert Oswald and his family was
short. It all became clear to my wife as she had the opportunity of observing
Marina more than I did. This ex-Russian activist and member of the Communist
youth stayed in bed 'till noon or later and avoided domestic chores. This was
what happened when she stayed in our house. The same opinion was shared by my
daughter with whom Marina stayed also for a while.
Marina was simply deprived of energy while Lee, capable of an effort, was not
however an average go-getting type of a person who succeed in America. I often
regretted that Lee did not get a better education, he would have done well in
the scholastic world and would have been a useful citizen.
In the meantime Lee's relationship with Marina worsened as she became more
enticed by the American "luxuries". I was a sensuous joy for her to wear my
wife's silk nighties when she stayed with us and my daughter said that she did
the same when she stayed in her apartment.
As Marina was luxuriating, Lee was rending whenever he could his Russian books
(he had brought a lot from the Soviet Union) and his friends kept providing him
with new supplies of books and magazines.
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Although I did not notice any special signs of jealousy regarding Marina - for
obvious reasons, she could not communicate with Americans and the Russian
refugees were too old for her - but it annoyed him that his wife kept
corresponding with her boy-friend, or an ex-lover, in Russia Lee intercepted a
letter from this man and became very bitter. I do not remember whether he beat
her up on that occasion, Marina did not complain. But he told me that the letter
contained reference of Marina's plan to return to the Soviet Union without him.
It could be that Lee amagined it . Anyway, the situation became tenser. Lee
obviously loved Marina in his own way and did not want to lose her.
Marina's smoking and occasional drinking gave fits to Lee, he hated the smell of
tobacco on Marina's breath. Laughingly I told him to avoid this problem and to
approach Marina, when he was in an amorous mood, from the back. He did not laugh
this time.
Junie's upbringing also caused bitter disputes, Lee accused his wife of not
paying enough attention to his daughter, not to change her diapers fast enough
and to be tender enough with her. Actually Marina was not a bad mother, but Lee
was too much of a perfectionist and June was his idol. In our opinion he spoiled
the child too much and we told him so.
The Oswalds quarrelled in front of us bitterly but without physical
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violence. But gradually the tempo of their fights increased and we saw Marina
more often with abruises and Lee with scratches on his face.
Jeanne tried to convince Lee to change his ways to be more tolerant otherwise
this confrontation would end in a tragedy. I did not believe that Lee would
seriously hurt Marina and laughed - "even prominent people occasionally beat
their wives, the most important is not to maim them."
My wife liked Marina and found her amusing and stimulating but we were both
annoyed to hear her complaints about "that idiot Lee who does not make enough
money."
"Why don't you try to make something out of yourself?" asked Jeanne. "I came
penniless to America, worked hard and became a successful designer. Go to
school, learn English, revalidate your degree."
Marina was not interested.
To encourage Marina and prevent her from bitching at Lee, Jeanne gave her a
series of records to teach Russian-speaking people English. They were her own
records, as she came to the United States from China, without knowing the
language well. But she learned fast and made a superhuman effort to become
independant and to give an excellent education to her daughter.
We also gave the Oswalds a phonograph. But instead of learning English
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she played melancholy Russian tunes and did not obviously cherish the idea of
finding a job.
One day both of them were reading to us a letter from Marina's girlfriend in
Russia. "Marina," it read, "I knew you would make it, you were destined to be
great and your success in America is a proof of it."
Lee smiled sadly: "Marina what were you saying to your friend?"
Ironically Marina did become famous after the assassination, was on the cover of
Time Magazine, received a lot of money from charitable but foolish Americans,
and is now well off financially.
At the time it was pathetic to read such a nonsense. But is is possible that
Marina in her own strange way considered her arrival in America a great success,
maybe the hundred odd dresses donated to her turned her head?....Who knows?
One day she told Jeanne that she always wanted to come to the United States - at
any price. All the foolish gadgets and all the junk which clutter our lives in
this country.
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Idea of separation
We were appalled at the Oswalds' marital troubles which from being bad became
desperate. One day Marina came to our house without announcement, crying, badly
bruided all over and carrying baby june along. It would be dangerous for her to
Lee. And so we discussed the situation with a charming couple - the Mellers -
very kindly people without children of their own. He had been a professor in
Eastern Poland and she a Soviet displaced person. They met in a camp in Germany,
fell in love, married and eventually came to the United States. They met Marina
and liked her and at the same time they were not prejudiced against Lee. Not
being rich, they were generous, and they accepted to host Marina and the child
'till the situation would clear up.
The same day I invited Lee to come to the house to discuss the situation with
him. We spoke very calmly and as a matter of fact of the need for separation.
our dogs, Nero and Poppea, sitting snugly next to Lee were a living proof that
he was not either frantic nor nervous. When it came to the last beating, result
of Oswalds' desperate quarrels, Jeanne said: "separate as fast as you can. Stay
away from each other. I will let you know Lee later where Marina will be. But
not before some time lapses."
At that Lee became indignant, our dogs went into hiding, "you are not
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going to impose this indignity of me!" He shouted. "I shall tear up all of June
and Marina's clothes and break the furniture." He was incoherent and violent. We
never saw him in this condition before.
"If you did this, you will never see June and Marina again. You are ridiculous,"
she said quietly. "There is a law here against abuse."
"By the time you calm down, I shall promise you will be in contact with baby
June again," in interceded, knowing that Lee was afraid that someone would take
the child away from him. And so he calmed down, promised to think the situation
over, assured us that there would be no more violence and after a while we drove
the coupleback to the dreary Elsbeth street apartment.
The next evening Lee was back with us, all alone. Again he wanted to talk the
situation over. He sat gloomily on our famous sofa and both of us tried to talk
some sense.
"I heard of love accompanied with beating and torture," I said half seriously,
read Marquis de Sade or observe the life of the underworld - l'amour crapule, as
they say in France. But your fights seem to be deprived of sex, which is
terrible..."
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"If you think you are fond of each other, cannot you do it without scratching,
biting and hitting?" Jeanne tried another reasoning.
Lee sat gloomily without saying a word.
"Separation will be a test for both of you," continued Jeanne, "you will se if
you can live without each other. If you can, Lee you will find another woman and
will be happier with her."
"If not," I laughed, "you will separate or divorce again. Look at me. I did it
four times until I found somebody who can stand me."
Jeanne kept on talking about a nice temporary home for Marina and the baby and
the good care both of them will have. Naturally we did not mention the name of
Mellers.
"I promise you, Lee, that after a cooling off peried, I shall give you the
address and the telephone, so you can communicate with your child. Nobody should
separate a child from her father."
Lee believed my promise because he knew that myself I had been a victim of a
vindictive wife who prevente me from seeing my children.
Jeanne had called one of two families who knew the Oswalds and they
wholeheartedly approved of the proposed arrangement because they thought that
Marina would be better off alone than with Lee. And I personally was sure that
Lee would be happier without Marina.
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Since Marina had been for this arrangement from the start, it was only Lee we
were worried about.
That night we separated rather sadly. "You may hat us, Lee, or maybe you will be
grateful to us one day for enforcing this separation," I said, "But I don't see
any other way out under the circumstances. This is Saturday, we are free
tomorrow and will come in the morning to help Marina and the baby move our."
Lee agreed but he was on the verge of tears. "Remember your promise. You will
give me soon their address and the telephone."
We shook hand and Lee left.
The next day, a Sunday, we drove to Oswalds' apartment of Elisbeth Street. Lee
hardly said hello to Jeanne to who he has always been most cordial.
"This is not the end of the world, Lee," she told him. "Cheer up!" And she went
to help Marina. I sat on the sofa with him and tried to talk to him. He was
gloomy and hardly said a word. He did not try to help us move the crib, baby's
belongings, but when it came to Marina's clothes, he became infuriated. In the
meantime our big convertible Galaxie - which we kept for years in memory of
Oswalds - was filling up high. Seeing all those innumerable clothes, Lee grabbed
a bundle of them and shouted: "I will not permit it! I will not permit it! I
shall burn all this garbage."
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And so back we went into the apartment following Lee and the bundle of Marina's
clothers. "You cannot go back on your promise to be calm, Lee!" Shouted Jeanne.
Disgusted, I wanted to call the police for help. But Lee looked so desperate
that I sat on the sofa again, grabbed him by the arm and tried to reason with
him. "Brutality won't help you, Lee," I said. "If you keep on with these
tantrums, Marina and the baby will be gone anyway and you won't see them again.
So better submit and keep your word."
He sat gloomily not sure of what he was going to do.
"We are wasting our valuable time helping your kids, "I shouted loosing my
patience. "To hell with you and your quarrels!"
And Lee calmed down and agreed to everything. He even helped carrying Marina's
clothes acquired from the hateful Russian-American benefactors, and put them on
top of our overloaded car. with all this junk, our convertible sank almost to
the ground and groaned.
And so we departed Jeanne holding up to all that stuff to prevent it from
falling out, Maring holding on to baby June. As I was driving I laughed because
we looked so obviously ridiculous. But fortunately this was a Sunday, there were
few people on the streets and I drove slowly, avoiding main arteries from Oak
Cliff, the far Western part of Dallas, to the Lakeview area, in the Eastern part
of Dallas, a distance of some fifteen miles.
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And so we reached the apartment of that gentle couple, the Mellers, who came
out, greeting Marina and the baby and helped to unload all that junk.
Little did they suspect that this kindly action would cause them so much trouble
after November 23, 1963 and that their gentle life would be disturbed by the
insane suspicions and crazy publicity following Kennedy's assassination.
Marina complained for the last time about that stupid Lee and all the trouble he
had caused all of us. I was worried about him. "Let's get over with it," I said
gloomily, finishing the unloading. "And let's get out of here. We have done
enough for these crazy kids."
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Separation and more trouble.
Obviously the separation which we caused and worked so hard at was not the right
solution for the couple's problems. It was a heavy burden on this charitable
Polish-Russian couple - the Mellers - who were used to their own ways and who
had to share Marina's temperamental problems. She would not help Mrs. Meller in
her household chores and behaved like a primodonna. And for Lee the separation
was much worse. He missed Marina and the child and came to our house daily,
asking how they were, did June miss him, were they well taken care of. In other
words he practically forgot that this separation was not a joke and that he had
caused it to a great extent.
Again we had a chance to talk together, in al less cheerful mood than before.
"One can arrive at truth by trial and error," he said. "In my case I commit so
many errors and I still do not know whether I arrive at truth."
"It is possible, Lee," I countered, "that you take things too seriously. Don't
do things which are unpleasant or uncomfortable because of some great ideology
you may have. You see all the mess you are in. You must have read Arthur
Koestler's book where he repents for his years as an ideological communist
revolutionary."
Lee remembered the book.
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"Stop living miserably, do like a normal person dows, live pleasantly and keep
your own ideology to yourself. Don't disclose yourself."
"You are right," of course, said Lee. "But this society we live in, it's so
disgusting and degrading. How can you stand it?"
"Well, my friend, that's why we have built in distractions, stupid TV, moronic
movies, rock and roll music for most of the people."
"And good books for us," concluded Lee, rather aptly.
"Lee, you are too straight, your back does not bend enough. One of these days
someone will break your back. You have to learn to bend, be resilient."
"But look at the politicians here, most of them. They want to be praised
publicly of their honesty and good will. Connelly, the governor of Texas, for
example. In reality they will do all the degrading actions and yet try to appear
in good light."
This was the first time he mentioned his loathing for Governor Connelly. What
caused it, we shall show later.
"What you need, Lee, is a good wall in the jungle, like we did. That would bring
you back to the essentials of life - survival."
"Marina is not Jeanne, she will not do anything of the sort. And we have the
baby..."
Later we were asked many times with great suspicion - "why were you wasting your
time on this crazy Marxist and his unappealing wife?"
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The answer is - first to help a young couple in despair and secondly-more
complex answer - I found Lee a most interesting and invigorating individual, he
never bored me. Maybe the reader will agree...
Talking to Lee was a balsam for his raw nerves, a sincere conversation calmed
him down and it wasn't bad for me either. Fortunately I remember well so much of
what he said. I remember distinctly that one of those evenings together we
talked of John F. Kennedy. Lee liked him and certainly did not include him among
those despicable politicians he mentioned before. I showed him President's
picture of the cover of Time Magazine and Lee said -"how handsome he looks, what
open and sincere features he has and who different he looks from the other ratty
politicians."
I don't remember exactly the words but Lee spoke most kindly of the gradual
improvement of the racial relations in the United States, attributing this
improvement to the President. Like most young people he was attracted by the
Kennedy's personality but he also knew that JFK's father was a rascal who made
money off whisky and being bullish on the stock-market which is betting against
this country's economy.
Lee often mentioned that the two party system did not work well, that other
points of view were not represented. He did not see the differnce between a
conservative democrat and a fairly liberal republican - and in that I agreed
with him.
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"Both republicans and democrats really did not oppose each other," he mentioned
one day, "they do not represent differnt points of view, but they are both
solidly against poor and oppressed."
But regarding JFK, Lee did not have such a gloomy attitude and he hoped that
after the Bay of Pigs fiasco Kennedy would accept coexistence with the communist
world.
As I mentioned before, he did not like Marine Corps and consedered it racist and
segregationist. "Do you know that President Truman wanted to abolish this Marine
Corps and I would agree with him on that." Lee did not like any militarists,
Russian or American, he thought that some day there dould be a "cop d'etat" in
this country organized by the Pentagon and that the country would become a
militaristic, nazi-type, dictatorship.
Maybe this negativist attitude was the result of the separation, these days he
was gloomy and did not smile at my jokes. Yet I tried my best. I remember
telling him about the meeting of four girls, French, English, american and
Russian. "The French girl said, "my lover will buy me a dress." The English girl
said: 'my husband promised to buy me a new coat.' The American girl bragged: 'my
boss will buy me a mink stole'. And the Russian girl concluded: 'Girls, I am a
prostitute also'."
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One of those evenings Lee spoke for the first time of his discharge from the
Marine Corps. "I received an honorable discharge and then those bastards, in the
Navy, changed it into an undesirable discharge, just because I went to Russia
and threw my passport in the face of the American consul."
"Didn't they do it because you lied? You were supposed to go back to the States
to help making a living for your mother..."
"Oh, hell, that was just a crooked excuses," He said sullenly. "And Connally
sighed this undesirable discharge."
Those days Lee was bitter about religion, which he generally seldom mentioned.
He explained his avowed agnosticism: "money waster of these innumerable
churches, garish and costly, should be spent much more usefully on hospitals,
asylums, homes of the poor and elderly, on eliminating slums."
But Lee did not like the communist party either. "In Russia party members are
mostly opportunist, carrying their cards proudly in order to get better jobs, or
they forced into the party by the circumstances or families."
Again I tried to cheer up Lee by telling him a joke I heard in Yugoslavia.
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An uneducated Montenegian communist arrives in Belgrade where he sees for the
first time changing lights in a main intersection. 'Comrade,' he asked a passer
by. 'What are these lights for?' He asked timidly. The slyde answer was: 'the
red lights are for the communists to cross over, the yellow for the communist
sympathizers, the green for all the others.' And so the reasant tried to cross
on the red light, almost got killed and strongly admonished by the policeman:
'what kind of fool are you?'-'But I am a member of the communist party, but I
didn't really wanted to join it, I was forced into it.'
He did not laugh but concede that the joke proved his point. "People without any
party affiliation were the nicest among those I met in Russia, he concluded.
I remember that Lee did not like any political parties, anywhere. He was just a
native-born nonconformist. But he told me that when he used to teach his
co-workers English in Mainsk, he tried to present United States in the most
favorable light and wasn't too popular with the authorities because of that. In
USSR he defended USA, in USA he defended USSR.
This type of attitude I like very much and I tried to do the same when I worked
in Yugoslavia in 1967. I remember deeply offending the secretary of the
communist party of Slovenia comparing him to my ex-father-in-law,
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ex-chairman of the Republican party of Pennsylvania and an extremely rich man.
Both of them, communist and a super-capitalist were made in the same mold. When
he hear this, Lee finally smiled.
And so Lee tried to create good feeling in two opposing countries, in two
opposing systems of government. This is not an attribute of a violent man, just
the opposite. I must say that I never considered Lee capable of a truly violent
act. Marina annoyed him, he beat her up, but she scratched him back and hurt him
worse. Lee regretted his acts but Marina did not. Lee threatened to destroy toys
and clothers but he did not do it. Look how he accepted our intervention... I am
not a very violent person, but I would not stand for somebody else to take away
my wife and my only child, whatever the reasons were.
Unquestionably Lee was a very sincere person, he meant what he said, even if it
meant trouble for him. Marina, I remember, had the same feelings regarding the
religion as Lee, she found all religions absolutely ridiculous, a childish
farce. But at the same time she had her baby baptized - just in case. She knew
it would create a favorable impression among Americans and Russian refugees. She
did it at the time of this separation, we did not know about it, and she did it
without Lee's consent.
And so baby June was baptized in the Russian-Orthodox church, where
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the priest, father Dimitri, was a good friend of mine. Being a neophite himself
- he had been a strong Baptist - he was somewhat fanatical about his new faith
and considered this baptism a great achievement. And he did well in the church
and at present time he is bishop of California.
When Lee heard of this baptism, he became infuriated and it led him into more
religious or rather anti-religious discussions, which I remember well.
"You know all those theories of immortality cleave me cold," said Lee. "And who
would be this mysterious judge who would punish or reward me? It's out of
sight."
"Yes, I agree with you but becoming just gas after death seems too simple to
me."
"Eternity, immortality, what highfaluting ideas," continued Lee. "Anyway I have
hard enough time in this short existence of mine," he smiled bitterly. "What
shall I do with immortality?"
"Somebody said," pursued Lee, "this man is not intelligent to doubt - he is a
BELIEVER."
"My friend," I said, "hope and religion are a peculiar mixture. They make lots
of people happy but they also made Jewish people go to gas chambers singing
Hebrew songs, instead of fighting the Nazis."
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"That won't happen to me," said Lee. "I don't need hymns to pep me up when I
die. And I don't know where I shall go after death and I don't care. But I shall
not be like a rich American - who eats, sleeps, drinks, amuses himself and then
dies painfully leaving all his belonging and a large bank account. I shall die
poor and free."
I was frequently asked - was Lee a good husband? Now we have seen his unpleasant
characteristics. But he often helped Marina in the household work. He gave her
all the money he earned. Sometimes he complained that she was too lazy - and so
he did the job himself, cleaning dishes even washing clothers. He was tender to
the baby. As far as sex is concerned, we have heard Marina's complaints but we
know that the greatest mystery in the world is what happens between the married
couple at night, behind the closed doors. And we never looked in the keyhole.
I don't remember Lee ever saying that he would go back to the Soviet Union, even
when his marriage was going on the rocks.
If Marina had any brains, she should have known that a man like Lee, who was not
a money-maker but a barely a wage earner, would never provide her with all the
luxuries, all those desirable items, that America seemed to possess in such
limitless quantities. She picked at him, annoyed him, as if she desired a
separation, which she finally achieved through us.
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This letter from Marina's ex-lover that Lee intercepted, why did she let it drag
around. Maybe he wanted to end this unsuccessful marriage?
What annoyed us also was that Marina liked to ridicule Lee. She called him a
fool, a moron. "you are always thinking of politics instead of making money -
you act like a big shot!"
Marina had a bad habit of constantly correcting Lee when he was speaking Russian
and that annoyed him and me. Lee, for a man of his background, had a remarkable
talent for Russian and Marina foolishly tried to blow up his occasional mistakes
or ridicule his slight accent. It's difficult to know two languages to
perfection and Lee's English was perfect, refined, rather literary, deprived of
any Southern accent. He sounded like a very educated American of undeterminate
background. But to know Russian as he did was remarkable - to appreciate serious
literature -- was something out of the ordinary. He had affinity to the Russian
ways of life, customs, music and food.
Therefore to criticize this remarkable fellow was an act of nastiness or idiocy,
especially for Marina who knew only two English words - "yes" and "no". That's
how she went around and did her shopping pointing at the articles with her
finger.
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Lee asked me once - "what is your philisophy of life? You make me talk a lot but
tell me jokes instead of being serious."
"Well, jokes sometimes express more than thick, serious doctoral theses," I
answered. "Frankly I am not interested in politics, I lost most of my relatives
- and so did Jeanne - through various wars and revolutions. What I believe in -
live and lt live. But let the minorities and the por live decently, then I for
that type of a government. I had voted Republican so far but I am considering
switching to the Democratic party. there is a guy there by the name of Eugene
McCarthy whom I like. I also consider that each country deserves the government
it has, let the communists live the way they want, same goes of the socialists
or even dictators. For instance the Germans definitely deserved Hitler."
Lee nodded agreement.
"This country has too many damn problems to bust into other countries and impose
our ways. We must solve our problems first."
FBI later annoyed me to no end and intervened in my life. Immediately after the
assassination and Lee's declaration that I was his best friend and the only one
he respected, I became marked as a suspect number one by the FBI and CIA.
Various agents, in disguise and officially representing their agencies invaded
my friends and business acquaintances asking: "is
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he a communist, is he an anarchist, is he an agent provocateur, what country is
he working for;" some even intimitated that I was a hypnotist and that I held
Lee under my spell.
Just imagine the effect of such massive inquiries? And both my wife and I had
left Dallas for Haiti eight or nine months before the assassination, working on
the geological survey of that country.
Some morinic agent comes to your friend and asks: "Is George a potential
killer?" Then your best friend begins to worry. The same thing happened to my
wife, a famous designer: "is she a marxist? Why was she born in China? Is she an
agent of the Mao Tse Tung?" Stupid questions, but your businesss contacts begin
to worry and you lose them.
You have to investigat like the Scotland Yard does, or do it through the private
detectives, cautiously, not by innuendo, gossip or plain brutal imposition.
Finally, assembling of a bunch of such depositions into volumes of gossip at a
large expense to the taxpayer - and that's what the Warren Report is - is a
height of foolishness and a bureaucratic nightmare. But we shall talk about
these matters later.
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What did Lee dislike about the United States.
Lee was frequently critical of the United States and this was understandable
considering his poor and sad childhood in New Orleans, Texas and New York. But
also there was some logic in his arguments.
"America is a racist society from its very origin. The arrival of the pilgrims
and elimination of the Indians. United States is dishonest country because it's
based on the spoliation of its rightful owners. This country is based of hate
and intolerance. And finally," concluded Lee, "I think American Anglos hate this
country because they ruined it to such an extent. Just look around - ugliness
and polution.
"You exaggerate, Lee, " I argued, "There are lovely places in each town."
"The plastic ghettos of the rich, you call them lovely," he answered angrily.
"In this country of great economic wealth, the jobs are hard to find even in
times of prosperity. In depression, it's awful."
"One thing you are right about," I said, "there are few happy people here. I
remember an old joke: 'in America the poor get poorer, and the rich get . . .
Porfirio Rubirosa."
He did not laugh, Lee probably did not know who Porfirio Rubirosa was.
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"What kind of a country this is, if an Alabama ignorant redneck calls a Black
professor from Dillard University - 'a nigger!" And Lee continued angrily.. "You
like jokes, so listen to this one: 'two white policement sit in their office
somewhere in Mississippi. A voice from outside calls: 'a sheriff, come over a
man is drowning.' A fat-bellied sheriff rises, goes out and comes back shortly.
'Goddamit', he says, 'another nigger tries to drown himself, the bastard wrapped
himself in chains, cannot swim.'"
Yes, Lee could be justifiable angry. But he hated FBI most of all.
"Those sob's annoy me and Marina constantly. They keep on inquiring about me and
her. They intimate that I am a suspicious character and that she is a communist.
And so I cannot hold a decent job..."
"I agree with you, Lee, why don't you write FBI a letter and complain?"
"I did that and promised to blow their god-damn office," he said angrily.
As we know now, the existence of this letter was carefully concealed by FBI from
the warren committee.
A banker, friend of mine, to whom I introduced Lee, knew the situation and shied
away from him. He did not want investigators in is warroom.
Lee could have moved away from Dallas, and he did already move from Fort Worth
here, but those lousy investigators followed him everywhere. That's
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why the Oswalds moved to New Orleans, but this happened after our departure to
Haiti. I could have advised him to stay on his job.
The bander, I mentioned above, gave Lee an interview, on my insistence, liked
him, found him an independent, clear-thinking man, yet he did not hire him. "I
am afraid getting involved with this guy," he told me later. "He is a hot-head,
FBI will keep pestering him. And his undesirable discharge...I am sorry."
This same friend of mine testified at Warren committee that had I stayed in
Dallas, there would have been no assassination (if Lee was involved) as I would
have known what he was up to. And I am thankful for this one intelligent remark,
although at the same time the same banker said some disagreeable things about
me. But I am a Christian, so I forgive him.
Some other good friends understood what we were trying to do for the Oswalds -
trying to improve their position materially, socially and emotionally. And had
we been successful, Lee's animosity might have disappeared or would become
constructive criticism. and, God, we need it!
Marina testified at the Warren Committee hearings that Lee had been a different
person in the Soviet Union, a friendly and compatible man, but in the States he
resentful and a recluse. he disliked the life of Russian refugees, comparing
their bourgeois ways, soft and comfortable,
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with the tough and ascetic life of their compatriots in Russia. He considered
them fools, who did not understand the problem of the United States and even as
traitors ot their own mother-country. Why Lee did not resent our soft ways of
life, I shall never know...
Lee disliked people who were lavish with Marina, spoiled her; and she foolishly
bragged: "look at this, look at that. They gave it to me. They can affordit."
Naturally it infuriated him.
And so, testified Marina, Lee became somewhat of a recluse, and all that giving
backfired making Oswalds life miserable and empty. It could be that this was
intentional; some elderly lonely people are jealous of an unusual couple,
seemingly in love, so they get mixed up in their affairs.
Lee disliked and even despised bureaucracy in every form here or in the Soviet
Union. "Here they are nasty', he said to me once, "in the Soviet union they are
naive and stupid." This outburst came out after I asked him: "how the hell did
you get out so easily out of Russia?"
I outsmarted those Russian bureaucrats. Man! They are just an amorphous bunch of
people. They make a mistake and go to a concentration camp like a bunch of
sheep."
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Comparing Soviet Union and this country, Lee told me one day: "both sides have
made a lot of mistakes, enormous mistakes, but which side is right and which
side is wrong, I shall be demned, I don't know."
And he added seriously. "I hope at least China will be right and will do well."
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Effects of the separation.
Several interviewers and even good friends asked me constantly the same
question: "you belong to a different sphere of society - why did you get mixed
up with these 'low class' people, the Oswalds?"
Most of the reasons were explained in previous chapters but there was another
important explanation. In the 1096 I lost my only son a congenital disease -
Cystic Fibrosis - CF in short. although the fatal issue was expected, when it
happened it affected me so strongly that I knew that I had to get "away from it
all". I asked my wife Jeanne to give her successful designing profession and
join me on an expedition on foot by the trails of Mexico and all of Central
America. This effort helped me immersely and then we met the Oswalds very
shortly after our return.
Lee understood the nature of my ordeal - and so did Marina - which was a Russian
way of going back to nature, to be alone in the wilderness with the image of the
lost person in our minds. And so we experienced a communication with a departed
child. But walking among the poor and despossessed opened our eyes to the
realities of life. Before that, like most people in this country, we were
hustling after our business, quite successfully most of the time, and dismissed
poverty and inequality from our mind.
I became receptive to some of Lee's ideas, listened to them, discussed
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them freely and came to look at his as a friend, almost a son.
Our experience of living with the poor people of Mexico and of Central America
interested Lee immensely and he dept asking intelligent questions. Because of
his childhood in New Orleans and his early contact with Latin Americans, he
understood complex, semi-feudal problems and was searching for solutions. Marina
was not involved in these discussions. Thus, possibly I identified Lee with my
los son, unconsciously, of course, an as far as age is concerned he could be my
son. Maybe this is the reason why Lee accepted our paternalistic in his private
life.
Lee trusted Jeanne and I implicitly and felt that whatever we tried to do would
be beneficial to him.
I can think of another element of our closeness. At one period in my life, I was
an officer the Polish cavalry where I always prided myself on excellent
relations with the soldiers. Maybe I treated Lee also like a soldier firmly but
fairly. And on Jeanne's part there was the same element vis-vis Marina, who was
about her daughter's age. And do the Oswalds might have considered us our foster
parents.
After the forced separation, Lee came to our house every day. Once he brought
some visiting cards he printed for me at Taggert's . A touching
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gesture and I still keep these cards. Lee obviously liked my impossibly long
name and spelled it correctly, but he printed the cards on shiny bristol paper
with fancy letters and black borders, as if they were madi for a funeral.
The evening he brought my cards he appeared completely despondent from
lonesomeness. "Give me Marina's telephone," he begged me, "I want to talk to her
and the child."
We consulted each other. By consensus we have Lee Marina's telephone and
address, against Marina's will. We just did not believe that she would be afraid
of Lee. Whether our decision was a right one, we don't know but starting that
evening Lee began calling his wife at all times of day and night, disturbing
everybody until this charming couple, the Mellers, asked Marina to move out.
This time we had nothing to do with the move and it seems that Marina refused to
be with Lee and moved first to Mrs. Katia Ford's place - a Russian refugee
married to an American geologist - and later she moved to another family named
Rays (she was also a Russian refugee and he an American advertising executive).
Eventually she returned back to Lee. But before that she gave Lee each time her
telephone and address. Marina returned to her domicile after a tearful scene -
which we did not see-
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Supposedly Lee swore her his love, stood on his knees and promised to make some
money.
Later on we were told that Marina had moved away from Lee for a few days in Fort
Worth, and then went back to him...
The separation we were involved in so painfully was too short to have a positive
effect, I told Lee. He should have been more patient and we were angry with
ourselves for this intervention in their lives.
And life was catching up with us - time became very valuable for both of us.
Jeanne had to finish some urgent designing jobs and my long awaited project of a
geological survey of Haiti was coming to fruition. At the same time I was chosen
chairman of the local Cystic Fibrosis campaign, which meant writing letters,
seeing lots of people, participating in various meetings and above all - raising
money. Jeanne was most useful spending her energy most usefully, raising large
amounts of money from our rich neighbours and from the executives of the
clothing industry. The campaign was a great success.
And here is another coincidence: my ex-wife and I had started this Cystic
Fibrosis foundation on a small scale in Dallas and eventually it became a
national organization with headquarters in Atlanta. At the time of our
friendship with the Oswalds, Jacqueling Kennedy became an honorary
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chairman of our Foundation for which, we all, afflicted parents were profoundly
grateful to her. Lee oswald was aware of this fact and out of friendship to me,
he expressed several times how much he admired our President's wife.
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Our meetings at the end of 1962
Somebody familiar with things Haitian know how difficult is to organiza anything
worth-while in that country. But I have always been very fond of Haiti and
especially of people there. Fortunately my many friends were helpful and we were
assured now that my survey was developing a firm base. Also I was trying to
organize a company to help developing a firm base. also I was trying to organize
a company to help developing the sagging economy of this impoverished by
beautiful country. So the time was short for us and we were seeing the Oswalds
rather seldom.
One night he came alone and seemed very depressed.
"Lee, my friend," I told him. "You like Tolstoy, don't you. He said many clever
things but his one applies to you. 'Man must be happy. If not he has to work on
himself to correct this misunderstanding which makes him unhappy.' I think I
know what your 'misunderstanding is'"
Lee nodded sadly. "My tragedy is," he said, that my suffering is inflicted on me
by a person close to whom I want to be and from whom I would want to find
protection and consolation."
These words, which I remember distinctly, touched me greatly.
"You try to change Marina into your image. It's difficult, if not impossible.
You should like her for what she is, not for what you would want her to be. Do
you my point?"
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"But she is becoming like an American middle-class wife," Lee fought feebly.
"She thinks only of foolish comforts. He is becoming like the rest of them,
talking of washers, driers and other gadgets as if they were the most important
things in life."
"Lee, you are too demanding. She is new in this country and is affected by it.
Take it easy. Try to be friends with her. Somebody said: 'friendship is a quiet
and exquisite servant, while love is a ferocious and demanding master'"
"I am a fool and I am very unhappy," said lee quietly. "But thanks for advice
anyway. You are a very good friend."
When he left I thought. Here is a good fellow whose tragedy is a complete
misunderstanding of himself. He wants love from a woman who does not understand
him. And he himself does not face squarely the issues. What is the most
important to him? In the meantime the despair is like an organism which destroys
him. He begins to lose hope.
And so Lee went back home and to his miserable life. But he seemed to be
resigned to unhappiness and we have not had any complaits from Marina - -no
black eyes and no burned cigarettes on her delicate white flesh.
In the meantime a big party was to be given for Christmas of 1962 by Declan Ford
- the geologist - and his wife Katia - the Russian refugee-
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who knew the Oswalds well but tried to steer away from them. They were probably
annoyed by Marina's stay with them, as far as Lee was concerned they were rather
indifferent to him. Being younger than most ex-Russians, Katia was relatively
liberal person.
After we received the invitation, Jeanne called Katia and asked her permission
to bring the Oswalds who were extremely lonesome as the time, KATIA WAS NOT TOO
enthusiastic at Jeanne's suggestion but with a little of arm-twisting she
accepted, but asked specifically not to bring the baby June. Or maybe the baby
was just a pretext and Oswalds had no money to hare a baby-sitter. So I got on
the phone and said: "Oswalds are lonesome, isolated, nobody sees them except us
and we are not giving a party this year. We will not come without the Oswalds."
"Marina will not have anyone to speak to if we invite her to another, purely
American party. At your party she will find some Russian-speaking people. I have
a solution, I shall find a baby-sitter for June."
Fortunately Jeanne's friend, an American-Italian lady, a good Christian,
volunteered for the job and stayed with June that whole night.
That Christmas eve both Marina and Lee were well dressed and looked very
elegant. Lee didn't always had to be a non-descript individual, he had sometimes
a very pleasant appearance and could dress well.
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The self-appointed baby-sitter, Anita, liked June and took care of her in a
typical warm, italian manner and the Oswalds and two of us, chatting pleasantly,
to Ford's attractive house in North Dallas. It was a clear, cold night and a
slight layer of snow, unusual for Texas, cheered all of us and gave the city a
Christmas-like appearance.
Most of the guests had already consumed lots of drinks and they were chattering
excitedly in a dozen languages. The loveliest girl of the crowd was a Japanese
musician, Yaiko, staying in Dallas for a short time with her friends from Tokyo.
She was a delicate, elegant, sophisticated girl, restrained and dignified, a
little lost in our Dallas society of noisy, self-assertive, aggressive females.
Marina did not look too well, she seemed to be afraid of the crowds. She looked
to operate with men one-to-one, and appeared bashful, like a country-girl. Lee,
on the other hand, blossomed and was the hit of the party. Naturally a good
conversationalist - if he wanted to - both in English and Russian, he was
outgoing and friendly possibly because the people were more liberal than usual,
his behavior was exemplary. Serious, attentive and polite, he answered questions
intelligently, if the person who asked the question was serious. He reacted well
to the surroundings.
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Somebody played Russian tunes on the piano and some good voices could be heard.
marina unfortunately was not musical and Lee was engrossed in conversations. I
stayed around him and noticed that several women flirted with him and displayed
their charms. Some were quite attractive. But Lee's greatest conquest was this
Japanese girl yaiki, I had mentioned before, and who I also found the most
interesting woman of all. He noticed her also and angled towards her - or
possibly it was vice-versa - anyway soon they were engrossed in a conversation.
Of course Lee had served in Japan and there he had learned a lot about the
contry and the people. He had told me that he met there some interesting leftist
youngsters.
Maybe Yaiki had met G.I.'s whatever it was, but they were engrossed in each
other and I left them alone. Marina stayed around, but not being able to
understand she fretted and did not know what to do with herself. As far as I was
concerned, I was delighted. How many times I'd heart her call Lee a bore, a
fool, a bookworm, how many times she degraded his masculinity and here the
loveliest girl of of all was in a trance. Now Marina became just a jealous
woman, she even forgot to smoke cigarettes and to drink wine - bith were free
and plentiful - she just watched Lee with plentiful - she just watched Lee with
narrow, jealous eyes. "We should go home," she muttered to me. "It's getting
late. I am
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worried about June."
"Don't worry, she is well taken care of. And we are having a good time," I
answered, enjoying the situation sadistically.
And Lee this time was not to be budged. It was the first time that I saw him
truly shine in the crowd. He enjoyed the evening and insisted staying there to
the end of the party.
The other Russians at the party, unknown so far to the Oswalds, like cultured
Russian Jews, were amazed by Lee's almost perfect command of the language. He
spoke very fast to an elderly lady and she said: "I have lived here in America
thirty years and I cannot speak English and well as you, young man, speak
Russian."
The party finally became boisterous and noisy. Lee and Yaiko lost track of each
other. But she forced me and asked timidly: "what an interesting friend you
have. What's his name?"
"Lee Harvey Oswald."
"Oh, what a lovely name."
"I agree with you that Lee is an unusual and intellegent young man, but many
others, the majority, disagree with me. They don't seem to understand him.
"I do," said Yaido. "He had so many true things to say about Japan. He is
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a very sensitive person and he understood my country. The New Japan is very
complex."
"Yes, Lee is not one of those GI's who believe that for a bar of chocolate and a
pair of stockings you can conquer a woman - and for a larger stake - the whole
country."
"Where does he work? She asked bashfully.
I gave her Taggart's address and the telephone number and thought to myself:
"he! he! A real romance is in the making..."
At last something good was happening to my friend Lee, new horizons are opening
for him.
Unfortunately I cannot say whether this romance has materialized, as I my life
became hectic and I did not have much time for the Oswalds, their conflicts and
even Lee's love life. They did communicate however and I wouldn't have known
about it had it not been for Marina who came over day furious and told me.
"found in Lee's pocket this Japanese girl's address. What a bastard, he is
having an affair with her."
I did not say anything just smiled and thought: "good for him."
"That Japanese bitch," she cried bitterly, "we had a fight over her - and look
at the result."
She sported a new black eye.
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"She provoked me to a fight," Lee told me later, showing his scratched face.
"This time she fought like a mad cat."
The situation was normal again, they were at each other's throat.
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Rare meetings in 1963
This last incident, due this time to Lee's romantic interlude, showed us that it
was only up to them to iron out their difficulties. We even began to agree that
the Russian refugees were perhaps right in eliminating this unhappy couple from
their lives.
We did not show to Lee or Marina this change of our attitude but our meetings
became rarer. When we saw each other we spoke mostly about Lee's job, our coming
departure and about June's health. Only one evening led to some serious
discussion. I remember Jeanne complimented Lee for his serious attitude towards
life, she was tired of people teasing her and did not enjoy this American
pastime. My teasing annoyed her also.
"Excessive vanity is related to jokes and constant teasing," she told Lee.
"People who tease are trying to be brilliant at others' expense. That you don't
do, Lee, neither to us to Marina." The teasers and constant jokers," she
continued, "want to show themselves superior."
Lee was grateful for the compliment. He sat on that sofa of ours and told us
something very touching. "I think that i shall be moving away from here after
your departure. When my heart is heavy - and it will be when you will be gone -
It will be hard for me to remain in one place."
"Don't impose new changes on Marina and the child, think of them," said
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Jeanne. "If everyone works out well, we shall invite you to stay with us in
Haiti."
Then she gave the Oswalds this advice: "you seem to be still in love with each
other. Cultivate this love as you would cultivate a fire, adding affectionate
actions like little pieces of wooD. Otherwise the fire will be extinguished."
"Study, Lee," I had to add my piece of advice. "Study is the best consolation
against worst adversities. Some philosopher said that, it's not my own idea."
"Kids," said Jeanne. "We shall miss you, although you have been giving us a lot
of headaches. We shall be basking in the sun of Haiti, drinking the beauty of
our favorite island and eating sunshine and mangoes."
"Maybe it won't be so pleasant," said I, not wanting the Oswalds to think of
their dismal lives on Elspeth Street in Oak Cliff. "Remember life in America is
fun...fun...fun... and then worry...worry...worry..." I quipped. "Try to have
more fun than worry."
As a result of our admonishments marina promised not to smoke and Lee said: "I
won't put out cigarettes on your ar, since you won't be smoking." Peace for a
while in the Oswald family.
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Practical issues of life took over, I had to spend all the time on my geological
work and on preparations for departure and Jeanne was designing furiously for
several companies at the time trying to make some money. our finances were
almost exhausted.
But one evening with Oswalds, frought with incidents, stands out in our memory.
That evening we decided to show the 8mm. movie of our walking trip which lee did
not see and insisted on seeing. This was sometime in January of 1963. A
scientist working for the research department of an iol company, Edward Glover,
arranged for the projection in his house. And he invited all his friends,
acquaintances and colleages. Most scientist and skillful technicians dream of
wilderness and free life in the open. And so the large room was full. Our only
guests were Lee and Marina. they had found someone to babysit for baby June.
I did not show this film often as this original was precious to us and we didn't
have a copy of it. Taken all outdoors, this film came out amazingly well
starting with our departure from the "civilized" world and ending a year later
south of Panama canal. What we did was a little walk from the Texas border, all
on foot - and we did not cheat even once.-
This trip began in October of 1960 and we returned from Panama in a civilized
way by plane, to Jamaika first and then to Haiti where we took a good rest.
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During this hegira we made a complete breadaway from all comforts, slept
exclusively outside, on the ground, ate whatever the Indians had to sell and I
exchanged occasionally my knowledge of minerals against food supplies. We walked
freely as much as we wanted, slowly at first, much faster later, guiding
ourselves by old mining maps and by compass. We lost a lot of disgusting fat in
a hurry and after three months became lean and bronzed like savages, able to run
up a high mountain without breathing hard.
The film, taken periodically, showed this amazing change in us, from slobs to
healthy individuals, the rest consisted of beautiful scenery, of Indians we met,
of our wonderful Manchester Nero and of our unpredictable mule-Condessa.
We stopped in a rach south of Panama canal and left our mule there, to be
retired from hard work. I hope she ended her life peacefully.
Quite a few of Glover's friends from Dallas and New york, mostly your career
people, although conservatively inclined, were interested in meeting Lee Harvey
Oswald. Some were more interested in him than in our movie. and they got their
money's worth. After the showing they asked Lee some pointed questions and he
answered them aggressively and sharply without hiding, and even exaggerating,
his feelings. Lee wanted to show
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these well dressed, prosperous youngsters that he was different radically from
them. I wanted to stop him but he went on nevertheless talking of his sympathies
of revolutionary movements all over the world, of his respect for Fidel Castro
and for Che Guevara. This made him hardly popular with this group, composed
mainly of big oil companies' employees, dreaming not of revolutions but of
advancement of their respective careers.
And there is nobody more conservative and even race conscious than an oil
company employee or executive. Lee knew that. "I bet you" he said sharply, "that
your companies do not employ any Blacks or Mexicans in any positions, not
executive but average position..."
Nobody answered Lee's challenge.
"Naturally abroad you act differntly, you use natives of all colours that
American oil companies are soooo liberal."
Incidentally, now the situation changed somewhat, possibly because of President
Kennedy's assassination which put in sharp prospective racial discrimination in
this country.
But there was an exception in this conservative group - a tall, dark-haired,
attractive woman in her late twenties. She took a vivid interest in Marina and
did not take offence to Lee's utterances. She asked me if Marina spoke any
English. I said - "no."
"Would you introduce me to her? My name is Ruth Payne."
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I did. And to my great surprise Ruth began to speak in fluent Russian to equally
flabbergasted Marina.
Mrs. Ruth Payne, an eccentric American, came from a wealthy Philadelphia queker
family and went to some Eastern college where she took Russian studies very
seriously. She was one of those gifted people who learn a difficult language
well and are infatuated by the Russian culture. Mrs. Payne was probably bored in
the suburban Irving atmosphere and wanted to practice Russian; her husband being
a research engineer for Bell Helicopter, she had energy and time on her hands.
She saw a native-Russian who did not speak any English - Marina was a real find
for her. Some people accused her later of an infatuation of a different type,
but I did not notice it. Anyway she was more interested in Marina than in Lee
Who in the meantime continued his furious and extravagant discussions with our
conservative friends.
Thus began a friendship between these two women, a friendship which lasted till
the days of assassination. Ruth Payne has done more for marina and June than any
other person, yet, for some reason Marina refused to see her after Lee's death.
All in all the showing of our picture was a success, beautiful scenery,
waterfalls, volcanoes in eruption, outcrops of brilliantly hued deposits showed
up well - and scientists, being adverturers at heart, loved
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wilderness. Marina could not care less, she was not an outdoor woman, but being
polite, she did not express her dislike and kept on chatting amicably with Ruth
Payne.
Lee, on the other hand, commented late excitedly how much he liked the film and
that he envied us for having lived for a year close to nature, an ascetic life
of complete freedom. "You have walked almost 4,000 miles to get away from
people, comforts, stupid gadgets and conventions. It would be my dream also . I
envy you. I have never been completely free."
"Yes it was a great privilege," I told Lee, "but it was tough, believe me. We
wore out twenty two pairs of shoes and guaraches each."
The subject of our film filled most of our last conversations with Lee. I
advised him to try the same, we spent quite a lot of money on our trip but some
American lunatic who pretended that he was a saint had done part of our
itinerary by himself, without spending a cent, people fed and clothered him out
of charity.
"I would never do anything without paying for food and lodging," said Lee. "And
Marina is not an outdoor woman like you wife."
Some newspapermen and writers atttribute to me the part of Svengali, of
sinister, evil adviser to Lee. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He was
strong and stubborn man, a hundred-per-cent American, who had made
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a decision early in life, in his childhood as a matter of fact, that the
American way of life means unabridged capitalism, crooked politics, violence,
racism, pursuit of luxuries rather than ideals, living up to Joneses etc.. and
that conviction motivated his escape to Russia. Nothing could have persuaded him
to the contrary.
Lee's views on Latin America were determined long before we met. On the basis of
our trip I began to look at things somewhat like Lee always did. Previously I
lived in several Latin American countries, where the social injustices were
obvious, but then I was looking at life as an eager petroleum geologist, not as
a sociologist.
This time our primitive trip put us close to simplest people, we lived with them
and understood the problems of the poor. And it was exactly what had happened to
Lee in Japan - hence his immediate close relationship with Yaiko who was a
sensitive and perceptive woman.
Lee told me that the same phenomena of awakening to the fate of the poor
occurred to the Che Guevera when he carried his assignment as a doctor in
Central America, in places we visited ourselves. The desperate plight of the
poor could not be denied by anyone with open eyes and a little bit of feelings
for a fellow-man.
Che Guevera understood the situation well," said Lee, "although his stay
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in Central America took place years before your trip. But still you saw dismal
poverty in parts of Mexico, in Guatemala, San Salvador, Nicaragua and panama,
didn't you?"
"Yes we did. But in Costa Rica we found a somewhat differnt situation. Why?"
We knew the answer but asked Lee anyway.
"Simply because," he said, "that this country has never been occupied and
corrupted by us, Americans."
Right he was. the ignorant "high-school dropout" knew the history of differnt
United States interventions in Latin America.
And so Costa Rica is Switzerland of Latin America, with a true democratic
government, limited police force, no army or air force. yOu can talk there
freely and meet the president in the barbershop in San Jose. You can also find
refuge there if you steel millions in USA.
All these problems are clear and open now but they were not in 1963.
We discussed with Lee the dismal poverty of overcrowded El Salvador, where the
wealth of the whole country belongs to 23 families, latifundistas since the
Spanish conquest. It's still true today.
And then the tragi-comical history of Nicaragua. Somoza family owns most of
Nicaragua and this regime was imposed by the wife of an American ambassador
during the occupation by the Marines. An elderly Nicaragual geologist told us
the story of a handsome and husky telephone lineman, who seduced the lonesome
wife of the Yankee
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Ambassador - the name was mentioned but I forgot it - and his subsequent
appointment as chief of police, which was equivalent to a dictator for life. His
and children's.
These discussions with Lee took place 13 years ago. Today the frequent support
of the United States of oligarchs, crooked generals and ruthless dictators is
discussed openly in the Congress, Senate and in the United Nations. But in 1963
such conversations might have been considered subversive. new, after Vietnam and
Watergate we all see a little clearer and talk more freely.
"Lee, how do you understand the Latin American situation so well?"
"I am from New Orleans, as a kid I met a lot of refugees from all these banana
republics, no better source of information."
In this way both Lee and I were non-conformist, even revolutionaries. But my
long years of experience in Latin America, followed by my son's death and the
ensuing saddness, made me commiserate with the fate of the poor and of the
starving. A younger man, I was career and mony mad, a hustler...But Lee was the
same since his childhood, which made him such a beautiful and worthwhile person
to me.
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I had been in the Social Register, played with the jet-set, knew innumerable
rich people, including the Bouvier family, father and mother, and Jacqueline and
Lee when they were young girls - all this foolish activity makes me today
disgusted with myself. Now all this opportunis-waste of time is meaningless but
Jeanne, my wife, and Lee had always been on the side of the underprivileged and
she had lived in China and saw new-born babies thrown in the garbage because
parents were too poor to feed them. To Lee, commiseration for the dejected came
naturally. Poor as his family was in New Orleans, he never really experienced
hunger. But his inner nature he belonged to the socially motivated people.
In our last meetings Lee often expressed his concern about this country - past
and present. Its origins - according to him - by the hypocritical pilgrims,
through Indian genocide, invation of the continent by the greedy and hungry
European masses, who, meeting racist attitudes of the Anglos, became even more
racist themselves. Before busing confusion arose in this country, Lee was keenly
aware of the racist cancer eating America's healthy tissues. "All people are
sob's" he often said, "but the strongest and more ferocious always win,
physically but not morally."
Jeanne often participated in our discussions. Let me explain her background a
little and to clarify why she got along so well with Lee.
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Social attitudes are unpredictable and do not depend on your parents or on your
environment. Jeanne's family in china was well to do, her father built a
railroad, how lived a luxurious childhood, but she preferred from early days to
give than to receive. He remembered the Chinese as humble and kind people,
dismally poor, who hated to fight and rather insulted each other and stamped
their feet. Even in huge families, violence was seldom seen. These subjects were
interesting to Lee who discussed them with my wife. She told him of the
formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, of the Japanese invasion and of the
ensuing cruelties, of her flight from the Japanese to the United States.
Lee compared her experiences of the old militaristic japan with the present
Japanese movement, which he knew so well. And do both of them got along
fabulously well, instructing each other on the Far-Eastern situation thirty
years ago and now.
Since Marina never participated in these discussions, we would talk with Jeanne
of this curious couple after their departures from our home.
"The opposites attract," was Jeanne's opinion.
"I think it's sex," was my opinion," but what type of sex I don't know." But
there must have been a strong emotional bond between those two. They always came
to each other, except just before the assassination Lee
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begged Marina to come and live with him, he had a job with the Book Depository,
everything seemed fine. And Marina refused because Lee could to buy a washing
machine to which she had had access in Mr. Payne's house. From this incident
came the theory attributed to me by some publication (Esquire, I think)-"A
washing machine theory of Kennedy's assassination". Supposedly I compared Marina
to a typical Texas woman who would not go back to her husband because he could
not afford a new Cadillac. But in poor Marina's case it was a washing machine...
The comparison is not bad but I did not enunciate it since for me Lee is
innocent of Kennedy's assassination. I cannot prove it but the later events,
which will be discussed, tend to prove Lee's innocence.
I did not know Lee to be a dangerous man, a man who would kill like a maniac
without any reason - with reason any man is a potential killer - and we proved
that he was rather an admirer of Kennedy's. Lee's connections, when we knew him,
were fairly liberal, equalitarian, not even communist but rather vague, Marxist
believes. He did not try to influence me in any way nor did I try to exert any
influence on him. "That's why it's so easy to be with you," said Lee one day,
"everyone tries to influence me one way or another, in the Soviet Union, in
Japan, here, and you leave me strictly alone."
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Our film recurred frequently in our conversations and even Marina participated
in these discussions. "How could you have done such a thing at your age?" she
asked Jeanne. "And to look so trim, strong and beautiful?
"Effort and constant exercise. Control over your body," would lecture Jeanne.
But to no avail. Neither was I successful to convince Lee to be sportier. "Get
your troubles, your sadnesses, your anger out of your systems through hard
physical exercise," I advised them both. "It worked so well in our case.
Unfortunately neither of them would follow our advice.
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Lee and Admiral Chester Bruton.
There was a hiatus in our meeting with the Oswalds as I had to fly to Haiti to
sign a contract there and then spent some time in New York preparing for the
survey. Jeanne during that time did not see the Oswalds, she was finishing her
designing assignments and was packing. We would take a minimum of things to
Haiti, leaving our furniture and heavy items in a warehouse in Dallas.
Then I came back from New York and asked Jeanne to invite the Oswalds. They
arrived immediately and brought baby June along. I remember this was a
beautiful, spring day, warm enough to swim. And so Jeanne called Frannie, the
were of Admiral Chester Bruton, both good friends of ours and incidentally
long-time enemies of Richard Nixon, whom they knew from his California days when
he made his career ruining good citizens' reputations.
Admiral Bruton was submarine hero of World War II and I do not recall whether he
had four of five naval crosses. He never talked about them and a most humble and
charming person.
Frannie Bruton, an ex-school teacher, a painter, an admirable woman in many
respects had invited us that same day to a swimming party. Jeanne asked her if
we could bring a couple of friends along and we mentioned the name of Oswalds.
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Although we had spoken to her about this unusual couple, Frannie was not sure
who they were but asked us to bring them along anyway.
And so we arrived to Bruton's lovely place with a huge swimming pool and Frannie
was delighted to see us. When I reminded her that Lee was an ex-maring, she went
to get the admiral who was a congenial man and linked to meet the enlisted men.
In the meantime Marina sat by the swimming pool with the baby. She either did
not know how to swim or disliked showing her figure which was not too hot.
Jeanne gave her a conservative bathing suit but she refused to use it. Lee sat
quitely, immersed in his thoughts. That was frequent with him when he was in new
surroundings. Before diving in, I told him jokingly: "Lee isn't that funny that
you get punished for your actions - which are only an appearance - but you don't
get punished for your thoughts, which are the real thing."
While he was pondering over that, I continued: "this is a nice place, makes you
think of oppressed workers etc... but you should see the places of the real
moguls of finance. this is a poor admiral's retirement home."
Frannie and Jeanne were talking in the meantime with great animation about
China. Frannie, a world-traveled woman, of most varied interests,
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knew China where she spent several years with her husband. She loved the country
and the people - so she and Jeanne hit it off fabulously well.
I went back to Lee and told them quietly, so that the ladies could not hear.
"Does the wife of the Admiral strike you as an aristocratic, rich woman?"
He just nodded agreement.
"Do you know that she is the daughter of a tenant-farmer widow's from Oklahoma.
In her childhood the motor was so poor that she stood washing in. Frannie walked
to school four or five miles. She couldn't afford to buy paper and used the
margins xxxxx of old newspapers to write on or to do her arithmetic. And the
Admiral was also a poor farm-boy from Arkansas. He got his education in the Navy
and is both a lawyer and an electronics engineer."
I do not know why I wanted to talk so much, but this time I wished xxxxx to
convince Lee that all is not bad in this world and that comforts obtained
honestly are not to be despised. But Lee did not say anything.
At that time came the Admiral Chester Bruton, not tall, broad of shoulders, a
typical submariner. "When I was in a submarine in the Pacific he used to joke
goodnaturedly." I couldn't turn around in the tower
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because I was constantly excited thinking of all those women on the mainland. So
I had to forge ahead, and that's how I got my Navy crosses."
We used to call him Henri, in the French manner, because he loved to speak
French to us and so did Frannie. Both spoke French very well and were well read.
Later they went to live in France.
But this day he greeted everybody and began talking disgustedly of his new job
with Collins Radow, actually an important position he took after his early
retirement from the Navy. He did not like the commercial aspects of his work. "I
should have stayed in the Navy a bit longer," he said irritably, "I am make to
be a salesman."
Then he began talking warmy to Lee, asking him about his duties in the Maring
Corps - but my friend remained cool and aloof - although Henri was kind and
continued chatting amicably.
"That Marine Corps was the most miserable period in my life," he said
disgustedly. "Stupid work, ignorant companions, abusive officers. Boy, was I
happy to have gotten out of it. To hell with the Navy."
Here I saw for the first time his profound dislike for the military and
especially for the brass. The term "admiral" irritated him.
"He is somewhat of a rebel and a little bit a Marxist," I told the
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admiral, trying to smooth over the disagreeable incident.
I never saw Henri mad, but he was this time and I knew that he could hardly
restrain himself from telling Lee to stand at attention first and then to order
him out of the house. Instead he just walked away. Lee did not continue being
insulting and spoke politely with Frannie about his stay in Japan. "You lived in
the compounds there, being officers wives, and did to have the chance to meet
the real people in Japan, like I did."
"I wish I could have," answered Frannie diplomatically.
Marina was the personification of charm that afternoon. We had to translate what
she said, of course. But she loved the arrangement of the house, as we took her
around, the luxury really quite relative of the furnishings, Frannie's paintings
(she was an excellent amateur painter) - the whole thing. And the surroundings
were an incredible contrast to the gloomy apartment of Elsbeth Street. And so
she smiled politely and even flirted with the Admiral.
Excellent snacks were served later by our hosts, not a real dinner, and nothing
out of ordinary happened any more. Henri was a good host and restrained himself
while Lee, finally relaxed, told some funny, if slightly derogatory, about his
Marine Corps life.
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"We had a sargeant in the Marines who was as racist as any German SS trooper,"
he began telling us. "But then his sex habits..."
"Please, Lee," I stopped him.
"I could sing you the Marine anthem but, fortunately, I never learned it," Lee
tried to be funny again.
I cannot say that this evening was a great success. But we left quite late,
still amicably, because most of the conversation at the end of the evening was
carried on in French between four of us.
Four years later was saw the Brutons again in Washington D.C. They moved to
Arlington permanently and we spent a couple of days in their house. Naturally
the subject of the assassination came up and the Brutons were absolutely
flabbergasted. They did not associate the rude young ex-marine with the
"presumable" assassin of President Kennedy. They probably did not catch Osvalds'
names when they had met them and then they had traveled extensively in the
meantime.
Frannie became quite excited that she had entertained "that horrible
individual." Henri, being an adventurous man, was rather amused than appalled by
this fortuitous acquaintanceship. "Well," he said jokingly, "we met Nixon and we
also met Lee Harvey Osvald..."
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Neither of the Brutons were ever approached by the FBI agents and had never been
asked to testify at the Warren Committee, nobody seems to have known of this
strange meeting. It seems to me that I had mentioned it to Albert Jenner, of the
Warren Committee, but possibly he did not take me seriously and then it may be
that the Committee would not bother an American admiral. The "so called
foreigners" were to bear the brunt of the suspicions and innuendoes.
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Easter of 1963
In April 1963 we were at last ready to leave to New York first and then to
Haiti. I could begin to work on my long-awaited contract, which was officially
finalized, signed by the President Francois Duvalier and published in the
Haitian Congressional Record. All our light belongings were packed, furniture
ready to be sent to the warehouse.
During the commotion before departure we saw little of Oswalds and we knew that
they were living practically like hermits, nobody visited or invited them,
except maybe the Paynes. On April thirteenth, if I remember correctly, we sat
exhausted in the evening. "This is a big holiday," said Jeanne. And the Oswalds
are alone. Even Marina is abandoned by the conservative refugees as she had gone
back to her "Marxist" husband."
I agreed with Jeanne and commiserated with Marina. Being left alone was a
penalty for her because she preferred Lee not withstanding all the fights and
the beatings.
Jeanne had previously bought a huge toy rabbit, practically June's size - a
fluffy thing for the poor child. Oswald's new apartment was on Neely Street, a
few blocks away from the old place on Elsbeth Street. This was our first visit
to their new abode which was infinitely better than the previous one. They had
the second floor here, all to themselves.
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Huge trees shaded the structure and in the back yard the climbing roses hung up
on the trelisses. The house itself was a white frame of the usual type of
southern structure.
We rang the bell. The lights were off as it was obviously late for our sedentary
friends. Although it was about 10 p.m. we had to keep ringing a long time.
Finally the front window opened. "Who is there?" Asked Lee's familiar voice.
"Jeanne and George, open up, we have something for June," I answered cheerfully.
Lee came down, opened the front door and then led us up a dark staircase.
New Marina was up also and the apartment was lit up. It was clean and spaceous
baut almost void of furniture. "Isn't this a nice place?" Confided Marina in
Russian. "So much better than the old hole-in-the-walls"
We agreed and congratulated them on finding such a good place.
Che was cheerful and Lee was smiling also, which hadn't often happened or late.
He was happy that they were left alone by the emigres and even by the rare
Americans they knew. Lee's feelings for the emigres could be compared to those
of pro-Castro Cubans towards all the refugees crowding the streets of Miami.
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Lee appeared satisfied with his job and proud of being able to provide a better
place for his family. This was the first time we did not see any conflict
between him and his wife. Of course, what follows will prove that all was not
honey in the Oswald family.
Marina served soft drinks and began discussing some domestic affairs with
Jeanne. Lee and I walked to the balcony and began to chat. He was very curious
about my project in Haiti but so far neither one of us were sure it would
materialize. Now it was "a fait accompli". Lee envied my profession and a chance
I would have to help an undeveloped country and the poor people there.
Incidentally he knew Haiti from his readings - he was aware the oldest,
independent, Black Republic in the world. He had learned that Haiti had helped
United States during the War of Independence, a fact not known to many Americans
of his age and background. He also had heard about United States intervention in
Haiti after World War I - actually at the end of the war - and of the long
American occupation of that country. He even learned which part of the Espagnola
Island the Republic of Haiti occupied and her size.
"You are very lucky going there, it will be an exciting experience," he said.
And this opinion was valuable and encouraging to me because most
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xxxxxxxxxxx of my friends and acquaintances had a very dim view of my whole
project and thought it would be dangerous and a waste of time. It turned out to
be one of the most useful and pleasant experiences o our lives. But most of
these advisers knew little about Haiti - and I man well educated, prominent
people. To them it was an insane, tropical, Black Republic - rather a ferocious
dictatorship. Some had predicted the worst disasters if we lived there.
Then we talked pleasantly of his job, of June who was growing nicely and we also
spoke of the unfortunate rise of ultra-conservatism in this country, of racist
movement in the South. Lee considered this the most dangerous phenomenon for all
peace-loveing people. "Economic discrimination is bad, but you can remedi it,"
he said, "but racial discrimination cannot be remedied because you cannot change
the color of your skin." Of course, he greatly admired Dr. Martin Luther King
and agreed with his program. I just mention it here, but he frequently talked of
Dr. King with a real reverence.
In the meantime Marina was showing Jeanne her bedroom, kitchen and the
living-room. There she opened a large closed, next to the balcony, and began
showing Jeanne her wardrobe, which was considerable. On
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the bottom of the closet was rifle standing completely openly.
"Look! Look!" called Jeanne excitedly. "There is a rifle there."
We came in and I looked curiously. Indeed there was a military rifle there of a
type unknown to me, something dangling in front.
"What is that thing dangling?" Asked Jeanne.
"A telescopic sightxxxxxx," I answered.
Jeanne never saw a telescopic sight before and probably did not understand what
it was. But I did, I had graduated from a military school
"Why do you have this rifle here?" Jeanne asked Lee.
"Lee bought it," answered Marina instead, "devil knows why. We need all the
money we have for food and lodging and he buys those damn rifle."
"But what does he do with a military rifle?" Asked Jeanne again.
"He likes shooting at the leaves."
"But when does he have time to shoot at the leaves and the place?" Asked Jeanne
curiously.
"He shoots at the leaves in the park, whenever we go there."
This did not make much sense to us, but liking target shooting ourselves we did
not consider this a crazy occupation.
All this time Lee stood next to me curiously silent.
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"Did you take a pot shot at General Walker, Lee?' I popped a question
spontaneously. And then a guffawed. "Ha! Ha!" Think this is a pretty good joke.
Lee's reaction was strange. I often tried to reconstruct it. He did not say
anything. He just stood there motionless.
It was naturally a very foolish joke because there was an attempt a few days
before at General Edwin Walder, a rather notorious character who was asked to
resign his post in Germany by General Eisenhower, if I remember correctly.
Anyway he was an ultra-rightist who had tried to run for governor of Texas. And
he got surprising number of votes, some 200,000 on a politiacal platform
somewhat to the right of Hitler's.
This joke just popped out because General Walker loved fairly close to us, on
Turtle Creek. Everyone knew his house with a huge American flag in front,
sometimes replaced by a Confederate flag - and much later by South Vietnamese
and Rodesian flags.
As I said, Lee's facial expression remained calm. He became just a little paler.
This was the last time I was him and yet I cannot say with precision what his
reaction was. I think he mumbled something unintelligibly and I did not ask. For
sure he was embarassed, possibly stunned. And Marina was definitely shocked.
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Neither Jeanne nor I laughed much at my Walker joke. And certainly not Marina
nor Lee. Only later we realized how stunning and inexpected this joke was to
them. It his the nail on the head.
Marina testified at Warren Committee that I KNEW that Lee shot at General Walker
and she also testified under oath that Lee did shoot at General Walker and had
missed him narrowly..
I do not blame General Walder, we called him jokingly General Foker, whom I
never had the pleasure of meeting for calling me a dangerous radical I stupidly
laughed at a bullet which might have killed him....
This joke cost me a lot of money by hurting badly many of my business contacts.
Marina testified also that Lee indeed considered General Walker a fascist and
tried to kill as the most dangerous man for this country. Marina's testimonies
turned out to be constradictory and vague but there is another thing which makes
me believe that Lee possible tried to shoot General Walder. A man, whose name I
do not recall, a Jewish man, whom Lee met at the Ford's Christmas party,
described General Walker as the most dangerous man in the United States, a
potential neo-facist leader.
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I noticed that Lee kept on asking why. And the other fellow explained clearly
his reasons. Lee might have been influenced by this statement.
Another possible reason is the inscription of Lee's photograph, which we
received posthumously and Marina's inscription on it. I shall talk about it
later.
This innocuous remark of mine influenced our lives, but we heard later from
Albert Jenner, counsel of the Warren Committee, that Marina's testimony was even
more damaging to me. She supposedly remembered by saying: "Lee, why did you miss
him?"
That I naturally did not say and Marina was so vague in her recollections that
even the Warren committee did not take her seriously.
Actually I think Marina believed that knew somehow of Lee's shooting at General
Walker and that's why she was so afraid that evening that I might tell the
police of FBI about it. Lee, on the other hand, never considered me capable of
treason and then he KNEW of course that I was completely unaware of his attempt.
Lee was a little scared of my extra-sensory perception - which I still have with
my students - Had I known anything about it, I would have persuaded him not to
try any such crazy foolishness.
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Lee often commented with amazement that I could guess his thoughts. And I do
believe in existence of ESP, especially among people attuned to each other. I
happens to me constantly that I guess who is on the line when the phone rings. I
know when somebody close to me writes me a letter or wants to get in touch with
me. It even happened that I thought suddenly of a well-known person - but barely
known to me - turn on the TV and there he would be. This happened I remember
with Captain Rickenbacker whom I know slightly but admired a great deal We were
sitting in a living-room with friends in New Orleans and I said suddenly: "turn
on the radio, Captain Rickenbacker is going to speak." And he did.
Anyway this evening of Easter of 1963 ended in an amicable manner. We walked in
the small garden and Marina gathered a gorgeous bouquet of yellow roses and gave
it to Jeanne in appreciation of the rabbit she had brought for the child. the
Osvalds were also happy that I did not mention any more the rifle or the Walker
joke, instead of making an issue out of it.
It was our last meeting and a friendly one. We said that June looked less now
than Chrushcheff, she was growing up. She did not have such a a bald head, her
eyes got bigger and she was less chunky.
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Lee himself mentioned it, caressing the child: "look, she is much better-looking
now than our great Russian leader."
"I hope she keeps his amusing and friendly personality," said Jeanne..
He is gone now, God bless his Bible-quoting soul and his earthy personality. His
sudden bursts of anger and beating of the table with his shoe, are all gone and
belong to history. Millions of Russians miss him.
After this Easter visit things began to move so fast for us that we could not
see the Oswalds and we did not even talk to them on the phone.
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Our move to Haiti.
Our move to Haiti ended our personal contacts with the Oswalds. But other
contacts were not interrupted, including the strangest one, the posthumous,
which I will describe later. Soon after arrival in Port-au-Prince, capital of
Haiti, we received a post-card from Lee, giving us his new address in New
Orleans. At our last meeting for Easter neither of Oswalds mentioned that they
intended to leave Dallas. So, this was surprise for us. Obviously they moved
from Dallas at about the same time we did, but we, we do not know. Maybe they
were just lonesome. Maybe Lee wanted to remove himself and his family from
General Walker's neighbourhood?
And so Lee gave us this, now famous, address on Magazine Street in New orleans,
Louisiana, the town where he spent most of his youth. Incidentally it was
written in English. The card got lost somehow and Jeanne failed to put the exact
address in her book. So she stell has under Lee Harvey Oswald's address - 214
Neely Street, tel. RI. 15501. and the business address of his reproduction
company. We did mena to send them a CHristmas gift but the tragic events of
November 1063 occurred in the meantime.
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Any time we look at this address-book we think of Lee and wish he were alive,
not only because we liked him so much, but also because he could have proved his
innocence, or, if he were involved, to tell the whole truth about the
conspiracy. He always had enough integrity to tell us all the truth, even if he
had done anything wrong. Remember, he did not deny - or accept - his guilt in
shooting at General Walker.
What I had to say here, and it bothered me for a long time that I did not do it
before, relates to the type of person Lee Harvey Oswald was, the reader will
have to form his opinion of his guilt, or lack of it. Several new elements will
be brought in here, which, in our opinion, are favorable to Lee. Both my wife
and I still miss him and are deeply sorry that he met such an untimely death at
the hand of such a repulsive individual.
And so we led a delightful existence in Haiti in our beautiful house overlooking
the Bay of Port-au-Prince, doing useful work with my internationl group of
geologists: one Italian, on Swiss and one American, as well as the Haitian
helpers. Incidentally, I may have gotten this assignment because there were no
Haitian geologists in the whole country at the time. There may have been some in
exile.
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But after November 22, 1963 the situation changed for us. Information trichled
from the Embassy personnel, and through the Miami papers that I had been Lee
Harvey Oswald's "best friend", that both Jeanne and I "befriended" the assassin
of the President of the United States. Of course, we ourselves did tell the
political officer at our Embassy that indeed we knew Lee and Marina and that we
were ready to help in any investigation, we also wrote to our friends about it -
all our letters were incidentally intercepted by FBI - and finally I wrote a
letter of condolences to Jacqueline Kennedy's mother, whom I had known better
than her illustrious daughter. Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss of Washington D.C., ex Mrs.
Jack Bouvier of New York and Southhampton, was a dear friends of my in-laws and
mine.
In this letter I expressed my grief over the death of a great President and a
wonderful man. Being influenced by the barrage of one sided propaganda in the
newspapers, on radio and TV, I added to this letter: "I am deeply sorry I have
ever met lee Harvey Oswald and had befriended him."
Living abroad and not having any inside information on the case we were
"brainwashed" by the media which emphasized and explained constantly
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that indeed Lee was unquestionably the lone and only assassin. Without any facts
and Lee dead, everyone in Haiti considered him the assassin. Even cynical and
well informed European diplomats in Haiti were of the same opinion. But they
began to grumble asking themselves the same question: "where is the motif?"
Now something unusual happened. A gray-suited, bulky, Miami suntanned, with
false teeths and an artificial smile, Mr. W. James Wood, an Agent of FBI arrived
in Port-au-Prince for the sole purpose to make me deny a statement I had made to
my friends and to the political officer at the Embassy. What was this disturbing
statement. It had contacted a government man in Dallas, the only one knew
personally, probably a CIA agent, or possible an agent of FBI, very nice fellow
by the name of J. Walton Moore. Looks like it's a specialty of these government
agents to have a capital letter instead of the first name. Purely Anglo-Saxon,
you know...Anyway Mr. J. Walton Moore had interviewed me upon my return from a
government mission to Yugoslavia and we got along well. He had lived in China,
was born there as a matter of fact, in a missionary family. So I invited him and
his wife to the house and he got along
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fabulously well with Jeanne. I used to see Mr. Moore occasionally for lunch. A
cosmopolitan character, most attractive. A short time after meeting Lee Harvey
Oswald, before we became friends, I was a little worried about his popinions and
his background. And so I went to see Mr. J. Walton Moore to his office, in the
same building I used to have my own office, Reserve Loan Life Building on Ervay
Street, and asked him point blank. "I met this young ex-Marine, Lee Harvey
Oswald, is it safe to associate with him?" And Mr. Moore's answer was" "he is
OK. He is just a harmless lunatic."
That he was harmless was good enough for me. I would decide for myself whether
Lee was a lunatic...
And that was the statement which greatly disturbed W. James Wood and his
superiors. And that same statement disturbed later Albert Jenner, a counsel of
the Warren Committee, when I gave my testimony. As disturbed Jenner was and he
knew that my testimony was truthful, W. James Wood who came to see us in Haiti
was more than disturbed. He tried to make me deny this statement. And so we were
sitting in a luxurious Embassy room, staring with animosity at each other, and
this repulsive, replete bureaucrat dared to tell me: "you will have to change
your statement."
"What do you mean?" I asked incredulously.
"That false statement of yours that a government man told you that
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our President's assassin was a harmless lunatic.."
"False statement! man, you are out of your mind!" I answered sharply.
And so the gray-suited man in no uncertain terms threatened me: "unless you
change your statement, life will be tough for you in the States."
"Nuts!" Was the only answer I could make.
After meeting Mr. W. James Wood, I immediately began having doubts of Lee's
guilt. And while I was talking to him, the conversation lasted quite some time,
he constantly tried to intimidate me reminding me a lot of undesirable people I
had met in my life and puritanicaly challenging me on the grounds of moral
turpitude, i.e. too many women.
I told this obnoxious FBI agent that either FBI or CIA or any other agency was
in any way implicated in President Kennedy's assassination. I just took
precaution which seemingly backfired. But I did imply that these government
agencies were negligent. Still my statement was of utter importance to FBI and
Mr. Wood and he kept on trying to force me to deny it.
I categorically refused to deny anything and we ended this stormy session
without shaking hands.
Then my wife went through the same routine. Threats and allusions to
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her belonging to some leftist organization of scouts (imagine - leftist scouts!)
which marred her background. Since she did not have any material turpitude
behavior pattern, except her guilt to have been born in China, she ANSWERED Mr.
Wood in a quiet and icy manner and absolutely refused to influence me to change
my statement.
"You don't seem to like FBI," said the gray-suited man with an artificial smile,
at the end of the interview.
"I do not like your methods. They are both brutal and naive. Learn from Scotland
Yard, they know how to conduct themselves. When they inquire they do it with
discretion not by innuendo and gossip. You do harm to the people you investigate
and don't discover anything useful about the case."
A friend of mine in Dallas, an investment bander, told later the Warren
Committee investigators that our emotions were probably tensed up during our
interview with Mr. Wood. And he was right.
The assurance that he was harmless naturally influenced me very positively in my
relationship with Lee. And still I kept asking him many embarrassing questions
like: "how did you get to Russia? It's expensive to travel so far? how did you
come back so easily? His answers were good enough to me. He did not work for any
foreign government, nor for
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our government - the latter is more doubtful - if I thought he did, he would not
have been a good friend of mine. On the other hand, after this interview, my
opinion of FBI under H. Edgar Hoover (another letter instead of the first name)
became very low and this was confirmed by recent events, destruction of Lee's
letter to FBI in which he demanded to leave him and his wife alone.
As I mentioned before the whole bouvier family were very close friends of mine,
I met them upon arrival in the United states. They were very warm, friendly
people. The newspapers all over the country made a big issue out of it: "a
mystery man who was close to Lee Harvey Oswald and to Jacqueline Kennedy." Some
newspapers put forth some odious insinuations...My life seems to be full of such
strange coincidences. It's probably in the grave that I shall stop meeting
strange prople and form peculiar friendships.
Even Dr. Francois Duvalier, president of Haiti, hot alarmed by all these goings
on. Incidentally, President Duvalier was no friend of John F. Kennedy who cut
down to nothing United States help to Haiti. But there was another factor: my
house was located on the same mountainous development as President's palace, on
Tonton Lyle Estates, and the implication was obvious: living next to the man who
befriended
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a president's assassin presented a problem...
In a small country like Haiti, government people know more of what was going on
in the American Embassy than the Ambassador himself. The visit of the FBI man
was blown completely out of proportion. Americans were scared of me and even
Haitians avoided visiting us.
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The Warren Committee.
As the atmosphere of Port-au-Prince became oppressive for us and my work was
suffering from it, we were considering abandoning my survey, disbending my small
personnel and return to the States. But President Duvalier found himself a
solution to this situation. He asked Dr. Herve Boyer, Minister of Finance -
Secretary of Treasury - and a good friend of mine who had helped me to get the
Survey contract, to invite me to his office and to have a chat with me. This was
a friendly office which I visited often when some problems had to be solved, and
the secretary who was also Boyer's mistress, a gorgeous Mulatto girl, was no
less amicable to me as usual.
But not so Dr. Boyer. He said decisively: "you are in the hot water. Everyone is
talking about you and your wife. Do no abandon your survey but go back to the
States and clear your name somehow. If you cannot, come back, wind up your work
and leave the country."
I so happened that on the same day our Embassy received a letter, addressed to
me and my wife, from Mr. J. Lee Ranakin, General Counsel of the Warren
Committee. Mr. Rankin invited us to come to Washington D.C.., if we wished, and
to testify. This letter also sated that if we accepted to testify, the Warren
Committee would pay all our expenses to Washington
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and back to Haiti. Of course we were most anxious to cooperate as much as we
could to solve this crime. But Jeanne refused to travel without our two dogs -
Manchester terriers - and, after the exchange of wires, Mr. Rankin accepted the
additional "dog expense".
It was unfortunate that Nero and Poppaea, our terriers, were blissfully unaware
that this trip was caused by Lee Harvey Oswald whom they liked so much. For them
this expedition was a ball.
We stayed at the old Willard Hotel, not far from the Veterans' Aministration
Building, where the Committee was located.
I was the first to testify. The man who took my deposition was Albert Jenner, a
lawyer from Chicago, who much later became well known in connection with the
Watergate case. Jenner was a well known trial lawyer and I have to admit that
niether he was much clever than I or that I was impressed by the whole setting
and the sitration as it unfolded in Washington at the time. Anyway Jenner played
with me as if I were a baby.
Also people I met there were rather impressive. Allen Dulles, head of CIA at the
time, who did not interfere in the procedings but was there as a distant threat.
Judge Warren himself, a rather sympathetic, paternal figure who had a weakness
for Marina, we found later. Representative General ford, friendly and
youthful-looking. The last ten years changed him
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considerably. And then innumerable, hustling lawyers, all of them trying to
figure out how a single man, Lee Harvey Oswald, could have done so much damage
with his old, primitive, Italian army rifle. Having around such a galaxy of
legal and political talent, you don't have to be tortured, you would impressed
and intimidated to say almost anything about an insignificant, dead ex-Marine.
And during my lengthy deposition, I said some unkind things about Lee which I
now regret. The reader must imagine my situation, sitting there and answering an
endless flow of well prepared and insiduous questions for more than two
days....Was this an intimidation?
"We know more about your life than you yourself, so answer all my questions
truthful and sincerely," Jenner began.
I should have said, "if you know everything why bring us all the way from
Haiti?" But I did not and began to talk. And my answers were very nicely edited
in the subsequent Report. "Say the whole truth and nothing but the truth," he
intoned.
Jenner was a good actor, very cold and aloof at first, he switched to flattery
and smiles when he felt that I was getting tensed up and antagonistic. "How
cosmopolitan you are! How many important people you know! Yes, you are great!"
said Jenner ingratiatingly. And probably this
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flattery worked well on me, proving to me that Albert Jenner was such a good
friend of mine. So I answered all the questions to the best of my ability, with
utter sincerity, without even asking to have my lawyer present and he, the
sneaky bastard, did not say a word that the whole testimony would be printed and
distributed all over the world. And so my privat life was shamelessly violated.
During this time Jeanne and the dogs were languishing in the old Willard Hotel.
At the end of this long testimony Jenner seemed convinced that I was not
involved in any way in this "already solved" assassination. He began showering
compliments on me and I felt like a star of a pornographic movie. Before
leaving, I told Jenner of the harm this affair was causing me, mainly of the
attitude of the American Ambassador. Of the reflexion on my work in Haiti. He
inserted therefore some nice statements, putting me above all suspicion. Big
deal! The harm was already done. And how could I have been suspected of
anything, being so far away from Dallas, unless President Duvalier and I used
vodoo practices and inserted needles or shot at a doll resembling President
Kennedy. Since everything was known, Jenner concluded my useless testimony with
the following words: "you did all right. Keep up the life you have been leaking.
You helped a poor family." And he added
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as an aside "remember, sometimes it is dangerous to be too generous with your
time and help."
Then followed one and a half days of testimony for my wife and our Manchesters.
They were not "material witnesses" but Jeanne refused cathegorically to leave
them in the hotel. If our dogs could have talked, their testimonies would have
been more valuable than ours.
As Jeanne and I discussed our experiences as witnesses, many details came to our
minds. For instance: "Lee Harvey Oswald must have asked you a question about
your political philosophy. What did you say?" Asked Jenner slyly.
"Live and let live," I answered simply. Jenner made some comments on that but
generally seemed satisfied.
I said to Jeanne later: "It was an unpleasant experience, but in Russia we would
have been sent to Siberia for life." She agreed.
Jeann's opinion regarding our experiences were somewhat different from mine. I
was anxious to clear up my name and return to Haiti. "I considered it a favor of
mine to come and help the Committee," she had said. "I was completely relaxed.
The counsel was pleasant and reserved. However, instead of asking pertinent
questions, for instance 'when did you meet the Oswalds?' and 'how many times you
talked to him
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and Marina and about what?' Instead they asked me: 'where were you born? Who
were your parents?' I never suspected that my personal life would be broadcast,
although I had nothing to be ashamed of. Still it's my property, my life, the
whole report was a washup, a coverup."
Later we shall say whom the Warren Committee tried to cover up, maybe
unconsciously.
"I can never forgive the cheek of asking me how many children I had," continued
recollecting for fiery wife, "how many jobs I changed, and why, whom I had
worked for, how many times I went to Europe on buying trips, how much I earned.
I had expected to speak only of Lee and Marina. So I have a grudge and if I
could, I would try to make them pay for the harm and insult they done to me.
Where is the privacy we are supposed to have here?" Said Jeanne bitterly.
"And so I spoke of my wonderful parents, of my life in China, my arrival in USA.
Poverty, hard work, success finally. But I hoped that this would be a country
free of prejudice, of racial discrimination. Financial opportunities in USA were
not the prime reasons for my coming here. My Faith, or lack of faith, all was
polluted by this porno-exhibitionist questioning. Finally we began discussing
Lee in a desultory manner," concluded Jeanne.
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Naturally our testimonies regarding Lee and Marina coincided. We said the same
things in our own ways and we never even bothered to read our own testimonies.
Obviously everything we said coincided perfectly. When you said truth, you don't
have to remember it, so we did not discuss further details.
"Finally," remembered Jeanne, "they made me identify the hun. nero, the
Manchester was there, he sniffed at the gun, he could have made a better
identification than I. For me the gun seemed familiar, but whether it was the
same we saw in the closet, I couldn't say. I seemed to have a telescopic sight.
So I told Jenner-'ask Marina, he could identify the gun!"
We both felt that the minds of the members of the Warren Committee were already
made up, they were obsessed with the idea that Lee was the sole assassin. The
idea of Cuban refugees with mortal grudge against Kennedy did not interest them.
We bother were investigated the same way. Any time we said anything favorable to
Lee, they passed it up. And Jenner jesutitically kept asking questions which
were incriminating to Lee.
An amusing detail of Jeanne's interrogation: Jenner shied away from Nero - and
Jeanne promised that he would not bite, that he never bit Lee who was a good
human being - to which Nero would be willing to swear.
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We discussed also what we had heard from the committee members - most other
witnesses were nervous and contradicted themselves, probably intimidated by the
awesomeness of the proceedings and the fact that many were not even naturalized
citizens. And so some good people spoke very unkindly and untruthfully of Lee
just because they were frightened and they wanted to please the Committee. They
really should be forgive.
All the favorable facts we mentioned about Lee were subsequently misinterpreted
in the printed edition of the report or not mentioned in it at all.
Both of us we furthermore felt that Jenner was displeased whenever he heard some
favorable facts about Lee.
Then we asked ourselves: why did Warren Committee spent all the money bringing
us back and forth, keeping us in an expensive hotel, doing all that hellishly
expensive investigation around the world about us, even carrying our mutts to
Washington and back to Haiti? Why such a waste of the taxpayers' money if they
did not want to hearthe truth?
We discovered that we both told Jenner independently: "why don't you send good
detectives to new Orleans and to Mexico, find who were Lee's contacts at that
time and what he was up to at the time of the tragedy. It seems that a Senate
Committee is going to do just that now, in the summer of 1976.
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We sondered why the Committee paid so much attention to the testimonies of
people who had known Lee and Marina in Dallas, long before the assassination or
others who had known him long before that? And the answer was - just to fill up
the pages and tranquillized American populace.
Jeanne dispute with Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss, Jacqueline Kennedy's mother in the
evening when we finished our deposition. Jeanne asked her: "why don't you, the
relatives of our beloved President, you who so wealthy, why don't you conduct a
real investigation as to who was the rat who killed him?"
"But the rat was your friend Lee Harvey Oswald," was the cold answer.
Thus the mink of not only the members of the Committee but of President' family
were all made up.
Jenner kept asking me constantly - "why did Oswald like you and didn't like
anybody else?" As if there was some homosexual link between us...
"I don't have the slightest idea, maybe because I liked him.."
"Maybe he liked you because you were a strong person?" Jenner asked again
intimating that maybe I was a "wolf" or a devil influencing him to do evil.
"Maybe he identified you as an internationalist?" Intimating again some dark
connections I might have.
"Maybe," I answered. "I am no admirer of any particular flag."
"You and your wife were the only ones who remained his friends?
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Continued Jenner his line of inquiry.
Their question was asked of both of us. And we answered both in about the same
terms: "to us they were warm, open, young people, responsive to our
hospitality."
Albert Jenner then brought to my attention part of a letter I wrote to Mrs.
Auchincloss from Haiti. He used this as my admission of Lee's guilt, and I had
explained already under what circumstances this letter was written. "Since we
lived in Dallas we had the misfortune to have met Lee Harvey Oswald and his wife
Marina. I do hope that Marina and her children (now he has two by Lee) will not
suffer too badly through life and that the stigma of the assassination will not
affect her and the innocent children."
This was my foolish letter and my speculation, not Jeanne's.
And again, after the impact of this letter read to me, Jenner very cleverly
mamboozed me into a possible motive of Lee's guilt. "The only reason for Lee's
criminal act," I continued, "would be that he might have been jealous of a
young, rich, attractive president who had a beautiful wife and was a world
figure. Lee was just the opposite; his wife was bitchy and he was a failure."
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Now, away from the pressure of the Committee, I conseder this statement of mine
most unfair. It would not have made him a here to have shot a liberal and
beloved president, especially beloved by the minorities, and Marina was not such
a bitch, while Jacqueline was not so beautiful. Especially she was not beautiful
inside when she married that gangster of international shipping Aristotle
Onassis.
If you read the Warren Report, there is another leading question by Jenner: "as
a humanitarian person you cannot imagine anyone murdering another person?" A
childish, naive question, of course.
"I cannot imagine doing it myself," I answered equally supidly, but at least I
did not express opinion about Lee's guilt.
Lee, an ex-Marine, trained for organized murder, was capable of killing but for
a very strong ideological motive or in self-defence.
But a few more words about my letter to Mrs. Auchincloss, Mrs, Kennedy's mother.
the copies of these letters were given Warren Committee by Allen Dulles, her
close friend, as well as the copies of her letters to me. On January 29, 1964
she wrote to me: "it seems extraordinary that you knew Lee Harvey Oswald and
Jacqueline as a child. It certainly is a strange world. And I hope, like you do,
that Lee Harvey Oswald's innocent children
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will not suffer.
Very tired by our testimonies, we were invited after our ordeal to the luxurious
house of Jacqueline Kennedy's mother and her step-father, Mr. High Auchincloss.
This luxurious home was located in Georgetown and Auchincloss' money originated
of some association of Hugh's family with John D. Rockefeller, Sr. of the oil
fame. We spoke about another coincidence on our lives. I flew one day from
Dallas to Washington and Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss happened to be on the same plane.
She was fling from some health-farm in Phoenix, Arizona, where rich women stay
on a diet, exercise and put themselves in an acceptable shape again. This was
the year of presidential election and Mrs. Auchincloss, a staunch republican was
for Nixon and was sure than her son-in-law, JFK, did not have the slightest
chance to win the elections.
I, on the other side, was sure that Kennedy would win the elections and was
going to vote democratic for the first time.
I told her that the mood of the country was for her charming son-in-law, and she
answered that I did not understand American politics . . .
Eventually, we had to talk sadly about the assassination. Allan Dulles was there
also and he asked me a few astute questions about Lee.
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One of them was, I remember, did Lee have a reason of hating President Kennedy?
However, when I answered that he was rather an admirer of the dead President,
everyone took my answer with a grain of salt. Again the overwhelming opinion was
that Lee was the sole assassin.
I was still thinking of poor Lee, comparing his life with the life of these
multi-millionaires, I tried to reason - to no avail It seemed to me that I was
facing a conspiracy, a conspiracy of stubborness and silence. Finally both
Jeanne and Janet (Mrs. Auchincloss) got very emotional embraced each other and
cried together, one ever the losss of her son-in-law, another over the loss of a
great president she admired so much.
"Janet," I said before leaving, "you were \xxx Jack Kennedy's mother-in-law, and
I am a complete stranger. I would spend my own money and lots of my time to find
out who were the real assassins or the conspirators. Don't you want any further
investigation? You have infinite resources."
"Jack is dead and nothing will bring him back," replied she decisively.
"Since he was a very beloved president, I wouldn't let a stone unturned to make
sure that the assassin if found and punished," implored Jeanne. "We both have
grave doubts in Lee's guilt."
Later we discussed for a long time why a woman so close to President
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Kennedy, nor Robert Kennedy and the rest of Kennedy family, as we discovered
later, would be so adamant on this subject. A later chapter, dealing with Wellem
Oltman's strange adventure, will raise further grave doubts in readers mind.
Would it be possible, as much as it sounds like a sacrilege, that Lee was a
"convenient" assassin to all the relatives and friends of the late President
Kennedy? Convenient not in any derogatory sense but just because was a PATSY, a
patsy not involved in any revenge arising out of JFK's biggest and costleist
mistake - the Bay of Pigs.
Isn't better to think, maybe subconsciously, that the assassin was a crazy,
semi-literate, ex-Marine, screwed-up, Marxist lunatic, with an undesirable
discharge and a poverty-stricken childhood, unsuccessful in his pursuits both in
USSR and in USA - and with a record of marriage verging on disastrous. It's
better to hold to this belief for them and for the rest of the country rather
than to find out that the assassination was a devilishly clever act of revenge
caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster...
This would explain Lee's desperate scream: "I am a patsy!" But we were still in
the Auchincloss' luxurious mansion, about ready to leave. "Incidentally," said
Mrs. Auchincloss coldly, "my daughter Jacqueline never wants to see you again
because you were close to her husband's assassin."
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"It's her privilege," I answered.
Hugh, who was a very silent man, asked me suddenly: "and how Marina is fixed
financially?"
"I do not know, I just read that she received quite a lot of money from the
charitable American people - maybe eighty thousand dollars."
"That won't last her long," he said thoughtfully and, almost without transition,
pointed out to an extraordinary chest set: "this is early Persian valued at
sixty thousand dollars."
We said goodbyes amicably to the Auchinclosses and drove off back to our hotel.
"That son-of-the-gun Hugh has an income running into millions," I told Jeanne
thoughtfully.
"Such figures are beyond my comprehension," she said sadly.
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Our return to Haiti.
When we had received Rankin's letter inviting us to come to Washington and
testify at the warren committee, we knew that we would be of poor help, as we
had been out of contact with Lee for over eight months prior to the
assassination. We could not say what happened to him and Merian after we had
left Dallas. But, naturally, I was anxious to testify in order to clear my name
and to be able to work on my survey.
But the American colony in Port-au-Prince were in an uproar when they were told
that we were going to Washington to testify. "How horrible!" said some. "Aren't
you afraid?" said the others. Even my old friend at the Embassy, Teddy Blaque,
said: "but he was an assassin and you were so deeply involved with him.
Many thought that we would be put in jail and would never come back to our
lovely house in Port-au-Prince.
Fortunately the Haitian Ambassador in Washington was reassured by the Warren
committee that we were decent people, the Ambassador transmitted this message to
the President Duvalier and we could return safely to Haiti. But my contract
became hopelessly harmed by the intervening publicity and by the peculiar
attitude taken by the American Embassy towards us.
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And President Duvalier, the astute Papa Doc, knew through his informants that
our Embassy would not protect my rights any more. And the old fox was absolutely
right, the payments for my Survey began drying up and in later years I never
received any cooperation from anyone in our Embassy or in the State Department
in trying to recover the large balance of my contract still due to me.
I cannot even give a complete resume of incongruous theories and suppositions
which evolved - and are still evolving to-day- in feverish minds of various
writers and reportsers as a result my past friendship with Lee and the colorful
excerpts from the Warren Committee depositions which were leaked out.
One theory had it that Lee was operated by me via long distance, from Haiti to
Dallas. Impolses were transmitted very diviously because I, a geologist and a
famous scientist, had previously inserted a transistor in Lee's skull (either
under the skin or deeper I do not remember). A book was published in New York
discribing this whole operation in detail. Since Papa Doc disliked President
Kennedy, we would sit in his office, surrounded by "Tonoon-Mascouts" - and would
operate poor Lee, who would blindly obey us.
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As a credit to the American reader, I may say that this book didn't have much
success and I seldom meet anyone who had bothered to read it.
However another book was published in Luxembourg - to avoid criminal prosecution
- and it had an enormous success in Europe. "L'Amerique brule" - America burns -
contains over 400 pages of outrageous innuendoes against the American
insituations. The writer, Jeames Hepburn, an invented name is actually a group
of European newspapermen who had been assembling dirt about the United States.
This collective James Hepburn calls both Lee Harvey Oswald and myself CIA
agents. Let me translate this nonsense which appears on page 356. "Oswald was
suspected, as any other agent returning from a mission in the enemy territory of
having been 'manipulated'. He was put therefore under surveillance by CIA and
then interrogated and 'tested' by one of the specialists utilized at the same
time by Washington (CIA) and by Houston (oil men) and whose 'nom de guerre' was
George S. de Mohrenschildt, and whose nickname was `chinaman'".
This 'well-informed' book which still has flashed of success in Europe, goes on
describing yours truly: "the Chinaman was 'presumed' to have been born in the
Ukraine and was an ex-officer in the Polish cavalry.
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He was recruited during the war by O.S.S. (Officer of Strategic Services) and
was registered in 1944 at the University of Texas where he obtained a degree of
geological engineer, specializing in petroleum geology.
The CIA used him in Iran, in Egypt, in Indonesia, in Panama, in Guatemala, in
Nicaragua, in San Salvador, in Nigeria, in Ghana, in Togo, in Haiti etc. where
he worked - in principle - for the Sinclair Oil Company.
George do Mohrenschildt was closely connected with petroleum circles (and member
of Dallas Petroleum Club, of the Alilene Country Club, of the Dallas Society of
Petroleum Geologists) and had close personal connections with the managers of
the following companies: Kerr McGee Oil Company, Continental Oil Company,
Cogwell Oil Equipment, Texas Eastern Corporation and also with John Mecom (of
Houston). He was a distinguished and cultured man (Mr. Hepburn obviously buried
me already) who was part of the establishment and frequented the Social Register
of New York. His wife, a White-Russian lady, burn in China, worked frequently
with him.
Another of his covers was the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A. -
sic) in Washington."
This "book" also accuses Lee of working for a photographic firm in
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Dallas, a cover for CIA, which specialized in making and reproduction of maps
and confidential documents for the United States Federal Government.
But enough of all this nonsense. However, it let us remember, that all these
idiocies and distorsions were based on the Warren Report.
If I were a CIA agent, I would not have been so miserably treated by the
American Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and especially by the Ambassador.
It is discouraging to say that the Warren Report contained mostly the "words
which were put in our mouths" so to say. However, there were a few good and
truthful facts in this report. For instance, a friend of mine, an investment
banker in Dallas, testified that he met Lee and that he found him intelligent
and alert. Another young man, who had lived in Fort Worth, also had some kind of
words for my friend.
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Effects on our lives.
The publication of the Warren Committee Report brought an immediate and drastic
change in our lives in Haiti. Only the close and true friends understood the
real resons of our involvement with the "presumed assassin" of the generally
beloved President Kennedy. In this manner the phony friends were weeded out of
our lives but still too many people, in addition to the publicity caused by the
Report, were contacted by the FBI agents at various times asking imbecillic and
insulting questions, implying grimly the worst suspicions about us. The same
thing happened to Jeanne. A good friend recalls that an FBI agent asked for the
whole day of his precious time just to talk about us. Discussing Jeanne's
background in China, the agent asked our friend: "is she loyal to the United
States?"
Our friend answered without hesitation: "yes, she is, in my opinion."
"Whom are you kidding..." said sarcastically the FBI agent.
Insulting and stupid articles appeared in the newspapers and in the magazines
all over the world, and still do, about Jeanne and I, callin us "mysterious
associates of Lee Harvey Oswald."
Just a few months ago Chicago Tribune and San Francisco Chronicle
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published articles implying that I had received a consederable amount of money
in Bahamas just to keep quiet about the mystery of Kennedy's assassination. A
physter in Washington by the name of Fensterwald assured a European newspaperman
of similar monetary operation.
I would have probably sued the authors of such vicious allegations, but this
would have added additional publicity.
Even a nice and fair book by Gerald Ford, "the Portrait of the Assassin", in
which he mentions us very favorably, had disastrous effects on our lives: "Oh!
you were mentioned in that book about the assassin..."
Money was offered for interviews, which we refused to accept. Overseas telephone
service in Haiti was inadequate - very few people had private telephones - I
happened to be one of the few with the telephone in my office, but not at home.
This office telephone dept buzzing for months: some unknown voices asking me
insidious questions: "what was your relationship with Oswald? What did you think
of him? Did you have the same convictions as he did? Did he kill Kennedy? Why
are you hiding in Haiti?"
Some man called me from Hong-Kong just to ask me a single question: "who are
you?"
And this was so false, because I had been working on my contract
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in Haiti a year before we met the Oswalds and we arrived in this island nine
months before all hell broke loose in Dallas - and we were living there without
interruption all during this time.
And so after a few particulary insisting reporters kept on calling me, and
spending their evil money, I would hang-up.
But the worst was the attitude of the Ambassador Timmon, the charge d'affaires
Curtis and all the other sycophants. But more on that subject later.
Then came an officer for us to appear on a televised interview for the NBC's the
Warren Report. The reporter's name was George McMillan and he asked if he could
come all the way to Haiti to visit us. He sounded like an intelligent man and
was provided with a good recommendation by a mutual friend. I did not commit
myself to a televised interview but told McMillan that he was welcome to visit
us in Haiti.
A gruesome incident took place the day of his arrival at the old Port-au-Prince
airport. After a season full of invasions - a group landed from cuba and made
havoc all over Easter Haiti. They were well armed, familiar with the terrain and
murdered indiscriminately. Eventually all of
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them were executed by the faithful "tonton-macoutes", TN's as we used to call
them. One of the invaders was brought in to Port-au-Prince, publically executed
to show the Haitian populace that it wouldn't pay to attack Papa Doc and his
government: the dead body was the exhibited on the plaza near the airport with
all the suppplies and ammunition. The exhibit was attached to the chair and the
swarm of flies around him was like a funeral smoke.
When McMillan, an experienced newsman arrived, he saw the commotion and the
crowds surrounding the body. I did not want him to see the gruesome and drove
around it at full speed without comment. Later in the evening, however, around
the drinks, he began to talk about it.
Incidentally when we invited McMillan we were not sure whether he wanted to talk
to us about Oswald or about the situation in Haiti, which was the center of
attention at the time. Since I was in charge of the geological Survey and the
only American working independently in Haiti at that time, I thought that
McMillan wanted an interview with me. And I certainly knew the situation well,
and it was different from what the American press had described. In my opinion
Dr. Duvalier was an advocate of the poor Blacks against the rich,
French-educated Mulattoes.
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This was a simplified version of the situation but better than the full
condemnation of the Devalier regime in Graham Green's "The Comedians".
Anyway, I didn't want him to see that dead man attached to the chair without
giving him some facts surrounding the execution. What an impact his report would
have on the public in USA if he would start it with the statement about the dead
body and the flies.
We brought McMillan to our house because he seemed as a very pleasant
individual. He had told us that he defended Blacks' equal rights and that
somewhere in the Carolinas, where he lived, KKK burned crosses on his lawn and
forced him to leave. Anyway he wanted all our friends who came to visit us in
Haiti to know the true facts about the regime - the good and the bad.
Later on when we sat on our terrace to the sounds of the delicate tinkling of
"anolis" - small lizzards - and looking at the fantasitc view of the city and
the dark Bay, McMillan mused aloud: "why didn't you want me to see the
cadaver?". He stopped suddenly as a huge tarantula moved slowly on its long legs
close to him, he shuddered. "Don't worry, I reassured him, "these big ones are
to dangerous, not the small ones."
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"Very simple, I didn't want you to see the dead guerilla, without telling you
the facts surrounding his death first." I esplained. "After all, papa Doc is my
employer."
But instead of listening to me, or even answering, McMillan launched into the
diatribe about the great program NBC were preparing about Warren Report, that we
would be the main personalities in it etc. He even offered to bring in the whole
TV crew, if we accepted. But sick of all this unwanted publicity, we refused
firmly.
Fortunately George McMillan turned out to be an interesting and pleasant a good
tennis player. He did not waster his time altogether and we being boycotted by
the Americans in Haiti were glad to have with us a liberal, independent person.
He left Haiti two days later asking us to re-consider our decision and mentioned
a substantial fee.
I asked several friends for advice regarding this TV matter and they all
answered that remaining silent and invisible would harm us. "You are the only
ones who could say a few kinds words about Oswald," wrote one of my best friends
who had met Lee and wasn't entirely convinced of his guilt. "This national TV
appearance would despel the dangerous aura of mystery in your relationship with
Lee," wrote another.
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And so, after battling it between us back and forth, we reconsidered our
decision. I called McMillan and arrangements were made immediately by NBC to
bring us and our faithful pooches to New York City.
The weather was stormy, we had circled for two hours over the city, but the
ordeal was over and we landed safely. NBC reserved for us an apartment at the
Plaza Hotel and the next day we spent the whole afternoon in front of the
cameras.
And again, as the interview progressed, it became obvious that the producer and
McMillan tried to make me say something derogatory about Lee and to dragout of
me insidiously some damaging comment to his memory. To them he was definitely
the assassin and we, possibly, the conspirators or his secret advisers. As
Jeanne and I were positive in our non-sensational statements, the whole
interview did not make any sense. We were invited to New York on wrong premises
that either we would produce some inside information or would prove to millions
of Americans who would watch the show that Lee was the only assassin.
Since the Warren Committee, slanted as it was, could never find any reason in
Lee's involvement in this crime "of the century", the promoters
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of the NBC show hoped that I, as his best friend would finally explain his
insane action. And that was the reason why we were brought in to New York.
And to Jeanne and I, who did not have any more information than anyone reading
newspapers and magazines, Lee remained the same person we knew - eccentric,
interestic, warm, close friend and we never considered him seriously as
President Kennedy's assassin.
Of course, insanity is a possibility but all the previous incidents and
conversations with Lee did not sugest impending insanity. Nor was he ever to us
a poor loser, a stupid high-school dropout, a bookthirsty revolutionary nor a
person jealous of other people's success and money. Such people are met everyday
on the streets of any American city in groves.
The enclosed picture of Lee with the rifle and Marina' inscription would
indicate that he might have been considering hunting facists - and in his mind
General Walker was one - but certainly not our president Kennedy.
A few days later, while still in New York, I saw a complete 40 minutes preview
of our appearance, and again we saw what a poor job we did trying to present
Lee's side. And later, the worse parts of these
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forty minutes interview were used for an hour show, called "The Warren Report"
that so many millions saw.
It was like a McCarthy era, the time of the government's witchhunt against the
"leftists". This was a general hunt, government's and media's against a
defenseless dead man.
Upon return to Haiti we knew immediately that something went awry with our
relationship with the Haitian government. Usually, we used to go through customs
first, cheerfully greeted by Mr. Jolicoeur, a clownlike be charming public
relations man for Papa Doc. This time our luggage was searched subrepticiously
while militia examined our papers in a different parts of the building. When our
luggage and we were reunited - the bulk of maps and information I had carried
with me were
Since they were my property, I lodged a strong protest with our Embassy and the
Duvalier's cabinet. Both parties laughed at me... What maps? What search? Where
were you? How naive can you be...
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Our return to the United States.
The incident with the stolen maps destroyed my desire to continue working for
the Haitian Government and the American Ambassador declared in a hysterical way:
"I hate you. You cause me nothing but trouble!"
"I am a Christian, Mr. Timmon, I don't hate anybody. But I wish you would help
me to recover my maps."
Before this incident the Haitian Government insisted that I try to develop some
of the resources I'd discovered in Haiti: Copper, titanium, bauxite, excellent
oil possibilities. Therefore, whenever I left the country I took the bulk of
information (not all, fortunately) with me and each time I acted as an agent for
the Government. Here, with my maps gone, the trust was destroyed and I began
preparing for departure. Since the Haitians owed me large amount of money for
the Survey, I was able to dispatch most of my valuable information through
friends to a safe place to the States. Anyway, most of my work was completed and
I began worrying that the Haitians would detain me as a hostage. Just recently
an American citizen, an ex-air force officer, domiciliated in Haiti was accused
by Papa Doc of dealing with his enemies abroad. The poor fellow looked for
asylum in our Embassy - but
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it was refused to him (all other embassies do gove asylums to political
refugees, ours doesn't). In addition to this the chief of police came and
assured the Ambassador that nothing would happen to the poor ex-US officer. And
so he was carried out screaming and shouting and nothing was heard of him again.
My friends in the know told me that he was beaten to death in the dungeon of the
presidential palace.
Such a fate was to to our taste. Since nobody expected our immediate departure,
we made a very secret deal with a small German line - plying the trade in the
Carribean islands - using the good offices of the German Ambassador, and the
little ship accepted us on board late in the evening. How we avoided the customs
etc.? I still had a liasse passe from the President Duvalier and nobody bothered
to stop our truck with our furniture and supplies and our personal car.
Late in the evening the only person who came to say good-bye to us was the
delightful Ambassador and his charming Austrian wife, we a few glasses of
champagne and department into the dark Carribean.
Incidentally on the manifest of this ship we signed our names as follows: Jeanne
- a cook; - reckoned. And that's how we landed in miami, having skirted very
close to the Cuban Coast.
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The crew, most international, was composed of a German ex-submarine commander,
an engineer - a young Norwegian genius who could repair anything on board, and a
meldey of Haitians, Jamaicans, Trinidadians and other picturesque Carribeans.
Since Jeanne decided to cook some delicious European melas for the captain and
the crew and I, in excess of energy, painted the whole deck, a pleasant surprise
awaited us in Miami. When I asked the captain for the bill, not only for us but
also for the car and the luggage, the answer: "it was a pleasure having you on
board. You earned more than the price of your transportation." The only way to
reciprocate was to invite the officers to a suptious dinner.
From Miami we drove slowly to Texas. Incidentally as we were skirting late at
night Lake Okochobee on a deserted road, a brilliant comet crossed the dark,
tropical sky, lighting the weird scenery around and even scaring our dogs. A
comet for some is considered a good omen but for us it foretold very bad times
indeed.
In Dallas we hoped to meet some good, old friends, quite a few had come to Haiti
and enjoyed our hospitality. Instead we encountered suspicion and an outright
hostility. Surprised at first, we soon discovered the reason - the Warren
Committee Report.
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Immediately after our testimonies, the transcripts of which we signed without
even bothering to read - it was supposed to be truth and nothing but the truth -
who would want to quibble over the words. After our depositions were so sick and
tired of the whole affair. We put the matter of the inquiries by these various
agencies and even our own testimonies completely out of our minds, and while
driving an open car back to Dallas along the coast, we breathed in the fresh
marine air and wanted to forget the whole tragic incident.
But in Dallas we had to face another situation.
"Have you read the Warren Report?" a lawyer, a good friend of ours, asked us.
"No." I answered, "I head there is a comprehensive resume of various
depositions."
"Aren't you going to read it. It contains some sixteen volumes and one of them
is almost exclusively about the two of you."
The aura of suspicion, of innuendoes, of gossip, of semi-lies and con- cealement
polluted the air around us. But the events forced us to read what we had said in
Washington D.C. and especially what has been said about us in these voluminous
sixteen tomes.
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Still we postponed reading these dry, bureaucratic, insipic pages until one day
we saw with some friends in Fort Worth (they had known Lee and Marina also but
had avoided interrogation by some hook and crook) and they loaned to us the
volume in which we figured so prominently. "Read it carefully and don't miss a
word. Actually you should read all the volumes and you will understand the
attitude of many people towards you."
And indeed, after reading several deposition, I was ready to vomit and I
understood what Albert Jenner, our "inquisitor" at the Warren Committee had
mentioned: "you will be the only people in the world to know exactly what others
think about you." he did not dwell further on these words and did not indicate
that our depositions and those of other people we knew or had even remote
relations with, would be printed, after careful editing, to probe the nebulous
point that Lee was the sole assassin. It turned out that some decent people
volunteered to testify on the condition that their testimonies would remain
secret and available only to Warren Committee members. But FBI insisted that all
depositions should be printed and distributed to the public.
The shades of J. Edgar Hoover mush regret that decision after it was discovered
how many falsehoods his organization was involved in.
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And never again these patriotic and decent people will expost themselves in the
degrading positions of "informers".
It was saddening to read the opinion of an old business associate that "he never
trusted me completely." My ex-secretary divulged that I had made many suspicious
and intriguing trips to Houston, texas - such an exotic and mysterious place to
her underling's mind. A scurrilous remark was made by an old Russian emigree, a
biddy whom we never considered bright but harmless "that Chinese woman never
even believed in God," she declared indignantly, as if religion was not a very
personal matter. "He always wanted to be the commissar of Texas,' was an opinion
of a slight acquaintance. And finally the testimony of my ex-son-in-law, Gary
Taylor: "if anyone had finagled this assassination or had influenced Lee Harvey
Oswald in that direction, that person would be obviously George de
Mohrenschildt.
Of course, in the meantime my daughter had abandoned him and he kept a grudge
against me because I had not approved of their teen-age marriage.
Reading all this I even thought of writing a short book, assembling these
opinions and give the book the title "I arranged Kennedy's assassination".
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Or another title that would attract customers: "My affair with the teen-age
Jacqueline bouvier and how I got rid of her husband."
The same people, Russian refugees and Americans, who had detested or ignored Lee
and Marina, made money out of them later, especially out of the resulting
unbelievable promotion of the "poor Russian Marian," - "that defenceless,
God-fearing, miserable wife of that brutal monster Lee Harvey Oswald."
The stary reminds me somewhat of another specimen, Svetlana Stalina the daughter
of the greatest assassin the world had seen (including Adolf Hitler and Atilla
the Hun), communist and daughter of the ferocious communist, who came to the
United States in search of God...
But back to Marina. She finally "made it in the United States", just like her
girl-friend put it in her letter from Soviet Russia in 1962. She became a
success, had her cover in Time, money poured from the naive Americans. Her
arrival in this country was superbly fulfilled: Lee Harvey Oswald had finally
become a real money-maker after his death. Poor fellow, even his tomb was stolen
and desecrated from the public cemetary near Arlington, Texas.
Lee became subject of articles and books - and will be for a long time - by the
scavengers from a poor man's death.
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I would not dare to call our dear President Gerald Ford a scavenger, but his
book was the first one, directly accusing Lee Harvey Oswald - on "his" Portrait
of the Assassin." Naturally the book was ghost written, inept and uninteresting,
yet he was the first one (he or his ghost-writer) to have the information
assembled by the Warren Committee.
Again, I have to give credit to the American people, the book was a failure.
Newspapermen kept on calling us, they were geniuses at discovering our
whereabouts, we did not have a listed number and stayed with some friends. They
should have used their talents investigating Lee's activities in Atlanta, New
Orleans and Mexico City just before the assassination. Garrisson did it and his
career as district attorney was ruined. People who had the slightest connection
with Lee and whose testimonies were not exactly "cosher" as far as the official
version was concerned, died mysteriously.
The owner of the apartment house on Gillespie, an excentric lady who, like us,
was extremely fond of Haiti - she almost had a fit when she saw Haitian car
licences on our car - asked discreetly for police protection for us.
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With the exception of the European press, the majority of the American books and
articles accepted an almost prepostrous thesis introducted by some lawyer of the
Warren committee that the same bullet killed Kennedy and gravely wounded
Governor John Connelly. Yet, Connelly himself distinctly remembers two
consecutive shots and he had never changed his testimony.
Only some more logical and cynical writers mentioned the fact that there was no
reason whatsoever in Lee's action; but they approve the thesis that Lee was
aiming at Governor Connelly, whom he had reasons to dislike, but being a usual
flop and f--- up, he killed Kennedy instead and only wounded Connelly...
Notwithstanding these superficial conclusions, favored in USA, the general
opinion in other countries\ stopped accepteding the theses of Lee's guilt. Many
people suspected LBJ, as a party which profited directlly from the assassination
and who always thoroughly disliked JFK and the whole Kennedy clan, who used to
cold-shoulder him and his wife... It's not for us to judge but the latest
discoveries of FBI's finageling add some credence to this theory. After all LBJ
was a most devious man and jointly with it his ignorance was also out of the
ordinary. They say that he was not sure of the location of Vietnam.
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And so, here again, Lee Harvey Oswald was the most convenient patsy.
And so, little by little, even naive and credulous Americans, annoyed by this
constant harping on Lee's guilt, by the serving of platitudes and repetitious
statements, began to disbelieve in Lee's guilt, or at least they began to doubt
the non existence of any conspiracy. After all, Americans are business-minded,
if somebody performs an act as assassination, without any rime or reason and
without any financial reward...something stinks in Dennmark.
We personally, retained our doubts to ourselves, saw fewer people that before,
restrained our social life and eliminated false friends and acquaintances.
A dear friend of ours, a staff writer for the Dallas Herald insisted on
interviewing us and pointed out my deep-felt opinion how harmful it is for the
United States to believe that a lone lunatic killed the President and then,
another lunatic killed him. And then, shortly afterwards, the brother of the
President was murdered in cold blood by another lunatic, without any apparent
reason. What is it a country of homicidal maniacs? Had a reasonable theory of a
plot or plots had been substantiated, I think it would be benificial to this
country.
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A message from Lee
In February of 1967 we finally found a suitable place to settle down, before
that we moved from one place to another and visited our children in California
and Mexico. the place called conveniently "La Citadellle" was exactly fitting to
us and was ample enough to accomodate all the furniture which had been stored in
the warehouse since the beginning of 1963... It was about time to settle as four
years storage at the Southwestern Warehouses began to axhaust us financially.
I thought of abandoning the whole junk and leave it to the warehouse - it's good
sometime to start anew, but there were books...
And so we went to the warehouse with an old, faithful friend, always ready to
help and to pick up some old junk for himself, and, before our furniture was
taken out, we began looking through the accumulation of various and sundry items
that could be eliminated. I was less intrested in this task, so I chatted with
my friend, a good guy who had followed us on many of our trips, while Jeanne was
finishing the selection of things to take and to discard.
Suddenly, he rushed out of the warehouse with a crazy look on her face, shouting
excitedly: "Look, look, what I found!"
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She dragged me to the pile of open crates and I saw inside a slightly
familiar-looking green box. "What the hell is this?"
"This is the box with the records I gave Marina before our departure," she
shouted.
"How did they get there? We left them such a long time ago?"
"I haven't the slightest idea, I considered them lost." Jeanne was short of
words, this was so weird. "I had used them myself to learn English when I came
to this country. They served me well. Then I loaned them to Marina long before
our departure for Haiti."
"Remember how punctiously honest Lee was," I said. "He would not keep any of our
belongings. But how the hell did they into this warehouse? Possibly he
remembered where we were storing our furniture. Or, maybe he have the package to
Glover to whom we had loaned some of our furniture and who finally added it to
the rest of stored boxes at the Southwest Warehouse?"
This remains a mystery to this day, because we lost track of Glover, a good guy
who got so frightened of his very slight acquaintanceship with the "President's
assassin" that he moved out somewhere without leaving an address.
My wife began taking the albums out of the box and as she opened
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to see if the records were not broken, she shrieded almost hysterically.
"Look, there is a picture of Lee Oswald here!"
This was the same, so controversial picture of Lee, which appeared on the cover
the defunct "Life". Many newspapermen and "investigators" had assumed and had
written hundreds of pages that this picture was a fabrication, a "fake", a
superimposed photograph. Frankly we did not care but now, right there, was a
proof that the picture was genuine.
We stood literally frozen stiff, Lee staring at us in his martial pose, the
famous rifle in his hands. like in a Marine parade. It was a gift for us from
beyond his grave.
"What did he mean by leaving this picture to us?" I wondered aloud. "He was not
a vain kind of a person."
Then Jeanne shouted excitedly again: "look there is an inscription here. It
read: "To my dear friend George from Lee." and the date follow - April 1963, at
the time when we were thousand of miles away in Haiti. I kept looking at the
picture and the inscription deeply moved, my thoughts going back when Lee was
alive.
Then I slowly turned the photograph and there was another
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epitaph, seemingly in Marina's handwriting, in Russian. In translation it reads;
"this is the hunter of fascists! Ha! Ha! Ha!"
Here Marina was again making fun of her husband, jeering Lee's very serious
anti-fascists feelings, which we knew so well and described in several chapters
of this book.
It's hard to describe the impact of this discovery on us, especially Lee's
dedication and Marian's enscription. This message from beyond the grave was
amazing and shocking. From the grave we did not even dare to visit, because FBI
considered with suspicion all the visitors at Lee's burial place. The
confirmation that Lee considered me his best friend flattered me but Marina's
message expressed a chilling scorn for her husband. Anyway, if he were a hunter
of fascists, and we agree with such a description, who was the making fun of
him?
First of all it makes in doubt her assertion that Lee tried to shoot General
Walker, secondly for a Soviet Russian refugee the word "fascist" is not a
laughing matter - some fifteen million people lost their lives fighting them.
And how many more died of cold and hunger?
We kept this photograph for ourselves and showed it only to a few close friends.
Their reactions were interesting: to some the photograph indicated that Lee was
a maniac, a killer, it constituted a proof of
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his aggressiveness, of his guilt. To others, just the opposite - it gave him the
aura of a militant idealist. The man of such anti-facist inclinations COULD NOT
be the assassin of the most liberal and race conscious president in the history
of the United States.
We did not show the photograph to any authorities, to them Lee Harvey Oswald's
case was closed and we did not want any further involvements. Neither did we
show it to any investigators or reporters in the United States.
But I did write a letter to a friend, one of the editors of Life Magazine,
explaining that I had a message from Lee Harvey Oswald and I did ask him to keep
the matter confidential. I added to my letter a short resume of the facts - how
this picture got into our possession.
Immediately I received a call from my friend saying that Life had a team working
on Oswald's case, a team of investigators, because the magazine had doubts of
Warren Committee's conclusions.
The next day a reporter assigned to the assassination case called me and we
talked for a long time. He was intimately familiar with all the details,
psychological and technical, of this unbelievable complex case, having worked on
it since November 1963. Like ourselves, he was at Marina's inscription and gave
it the same meaning as ourselves.
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"We shall use to as a main feature of our special edition if and when we know
something definite about Oswald's involvement or of his innocence he said.
Again I asked the man to keep this matter confidential temporarily and he
promised to do so.
Obviously either Life's people were talkative or, more probabble, our telephone
was tapped. This we found at several occasions.
New we know much more about "Watergate" type tactics of our government agencies,
especially FBI, but at the time we did not have anything to conceal - except the
existence of this picture - and this only for our own sentimental reasons.
Whenever we heard a suspicious noise on the telephone, we laughed, spoke in
foreign languages or made offensive remarks at whoever was listening in. Some
voluminous files must be hidden somewhere contaning "transcripts", translations
and obliterations of our conversations.
Again, being faithful taxpayers for years and years, we could but marvel at the
unbelievable waste of our money. But what was it compared to 140 billion U.S.
dollars spent in Vietnam. But one bad habit leads to another...
Now something should be said as to why we did not contact Marina
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regarding picture. Naturally she knew of its existence from our mutual friends,
the Fords. But as this story clearly indicates, there is not love lost between
Marina and us. We had helped her with the baby care, with her own health and
finally made a supreme effort trying to solve her unsolvable conflict with Lee.
We never received a word of thanks from her. But this is not important, we
helped her when she was not poor and desperate.
Unfortunately, after Lee's death she showed herself a real "operator". She
created an appearance of a helpless victim, of a woman searching for God, and
naturally God-fearing Americans sent her substantial contributions or donations,
all tax-free. We heard from some reporters that donations were sent frequently
stuck between the pages of Bibles and she would grab the money and flung the
Bible furiously on the floor.
We did not treat her very nicely in our testimonies, but we were utterly
truthful. Marina should have recognized it, had she taken the trouble of reading
our depositions. She might have come then to a true evaluation of herself and of
her dead husband.
Well, she is settled now, when we see each other we say "hello" politely. As a
matter of fact the last time I even did not recognize her.
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She looked prosperous and spoke excellent English.
Another reason we did not contact Marina and haven't had a serious conversation
with her, was her attitude towards Mrs. Ruth Payne. Ruth was a perfectly
charming, charitable Quaker, a Christian in the true sense of this word, who,
like us, helped the Oswalds out of pure humanitarian impulses. Actually she did
more for them than anyone else. Marina lived with her for and off, took
advantage of her hospitality. Ruth drove her to New Orleans and back. She showed
utter kindness to her occasionally Lee, and especially to baby june. She and her
husband were simply admirable people. Yet ruth had her own family to take care
of as well as her teaching profession. Her only reward consisted of lessons in
conversational Russian.
Lee, on the other hand, seldom accepted hospitality and certainly did not ask
for it. And yet, Ruth's and Marine's great friendship ended abruptly after the
assassination.
As Ruth told us later, upon our return from Haiti, Marina said that she did not
want to see her ever again. And Mrs. Payne was too proud a person to insist.
It is possible that Marina was advised by the authorities to shy away
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from her former independent-minded friends and she must have been scared stiff
of authorities. Time will tell. But still many years went by and she still does
not see mrs. Ruth Payne.
Short sketches of various incidents involving Marina will prove to the reader
these peculiarities of her character, which may incidentally appear admirable to
many readers. Her dreams of America bristling with high buildings, criss-crossed
with high-speed roads, blessed with luxury for everyone and especially with fast
automobiles for all teenagers and adults. And she was right, some economist
calculated fifteen years ago that if the automobiles dept on proliferating at
the same rate, each family in America would possess five hundred automobiles at
the end of this century. A paradise of earth!
Yet we never disliked Marina, there was really nothing to dislike, there was no
substance in her. She was amusing sometimes, witty, naive mostly, like some
Russian peasants, yet with great deal of shrewdness underneath. My wife used to
call her affectionately - "that rascal Marina" - and that description fitted her
perfectly.
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Unusual visitors.
The photograph we found in the record album is identical to the one Life
magazine published shortly after the assassination. I think Marina took it, at
least she so testified. Only the dedication to me and the inscription by Marina
constitute new elements. This picture, unquestionably did a lot of damage to
Lee. It shows him in a militaristic pause, holding a rifle, a pistol on his
side.
But let's not forget that Lee was trained by the Marine Corps to hold, show and
respect weapons. The Beretta we saw in his apartment was well oiled and
immaculately clean. Another bow to the United States Marine Corps. But whatever
later testimony tried to prove, I knew that he was not a particulary good shot.
He did not have that cold stare in his eyes - incidentally he had rather
attractive gray eyes - he did not have a very steady hand and a stiff stance
which indicate to anyone familiar with things military a good marksman. To
Jeanne and I he did to have an ugly expression of a killer, and we knew
professional killers, Jeanne in China during the Japanese occupation, I in other
parts of the world. He owned a pistol but we never discussed why, I assumed for
self defence, he lived in a very disreputable part of Dallas.
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Maybe Lee liked to shoot at the leaves, but he did not have a decisive,
self-assured, automatic attitude of a sharpshooter. On the contrary, he was
nervous, jittery, poorly coordinated type, and, as I said before completely
unathletic. Also devoid of any mechanical ability. I had observed boys and men
of that type in my own regiment and the were totally unfit for military
performance - and usually very poor shots.
We had tried to keep the existence of Lee's photograph as secret as possible,
just a few friends saw it and Life's reporter knew of it. Something, however,
leaked out and about two weeks after my conversations with Life's writers, I
received a strange telephone call. A slightly accented voice said, and I quote:
"we are from Life Magazine,' and he mentioned the name of the reporter I had
spoken to, "we are here in Dallas and would like to see you?"
"Certainly," I agreed immediately. "Come over."
They knew the address and an hour later two men appeared in our house. A strange
pair; one slight, Latin-American type fellow, the other a big bruizer, beefy,
powerful, Anglo type. They sat down, announced that they represented Life
Magazine, the Latin mentioned
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his repetorial qualifications, the beefy character said he was a photographer.
Indeed he was loaded with cameral of all types. The names were respectively -
Smith and Fernandez. Smith mentioned also that he was a staff photographer for
Fortune Magazine, which put me completely at ease.
"We would like to ask you a few questions the other Life reporter failed to
discuss with you," said Fernandez.
I obliged him. These questions were unimportant, mostly about Lee's habits and
his character. Then they became more specific. "Was he sociable? Whom did he
know well? What were his relations with fellow workers in this country and in
USSR? Did he have many friends in addition to us? What did he do in Mexico? Whom
did he meet there? Could he speak Spanish? Why did he go to New Orleans? Could
he drive a car? And many other questions, which I do not recall now.
I answered these questions to the best of my ability, but naturally many had to
remain unanswered, since I was out of the country and did not have any contacts
with Lee during that time.
The question may arise; why was I so frank with Lefe Magazine people and let
myself pumped out so naively. The answer is that one of my most admired friends
used to be a staff writer for Life and he
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had performed an extremely kind and difficult intervention of behalf of my
father stranded in Europe during the war. Incidentally, I felt very much at ease
with these two character because I had a visitor at the time, an economist from
the East, a very athletic fellow and a good friend and he was there all the
time.
Later in the afternoon jeanne arrived, very surprised to see the unusual guests.
I explained who they were. "But you have a very strong Spanish accent?" she
asked Fernandez.
"Yes, of course, I am of Spanish origin and I had worked as a reporter for life
mostly in Latin America. So, excuse my poor English."
This sounded reasonable enough.
Then Smith, "the photographer", producer a series of excellent, very clear
photos of some twenty men, mostly of Latin appearance and asked pointedly if we
had ever met any of them.
We both looked carefully at these strange, sometimes brutal, faces.
"I am not sorry not to have met any of them," I quipped. "They look rather
disreputable. Who are they ?"
Somehow this question remained unanswered.
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"I have an excellent memory for faces and I am positive not ot have ever seen
any of them," I addid.
Jeanne, in a more cheerful and confident mood pointed out three better-looking
ones: "This one has a cute moustache! That one has an interesting look about
him. And this one is so handsome! Oh, I would like to meet these three men," he
concluded laughingly.
This cheerfulness was met by a stony silence, a kind of hostile attitude.
Fernandez did not say a word. He seemed disappointed. Smith broke the awkard
silence and asked: "May I take a few pictures of you and the dogs?"
The mentioning of the dogs conquered Jeanne and we obliged again. Many
photographs were taken.
The conversation lingered for a while longer. Fernandez became more amiable and
called our dog Nero in the Spanish manner "Senor Neron" which pleased Jeanne to
no end. Finally the two strangers left, promising to contact us again from new
York, to gove our regards to my friend there and to send us copies of the
pictures.
A few days went by. We both were busy and didn't have time or occasion to
discuss this visit. One evening, lying in bed, I asked Jeanne:
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"What did you think of those two characters who came to visit us the other day?"
"Rather suspicious," she said. "I was thinking of them at this very moment. This
is ESP. How did you know they were from Life?" She asked. "Did they have any
identifications?"
"None," I mused. "And I did not ask for any. But they knew exactly what I was
talking about with the Life reporter in new York. Fernandez remembered all the
questions and all my answers."
"You were very careless," said Jeanne convincingly. "Don't you know that the
house has been bugged on and off. More on than off."
She was absolutely right. These men were imposters. Next day I checked with the
Life office in New York. Smith and Fernandez did not exist as far as Life was
concerned.
But it is very possible that my naivete and the very certainty that we did not
know any of the men on the photographs, put these two men at ease, otherwise we
might have joined the other twenty or thirty people who had died mysteriously
just because of their accidental knowledge of some details or people which might
have affected the official version of Oswald's guilt.
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We never communicated to anyone, except to a few very selected and faithful
friends, what had occurred. The Government agencies would have made a usual mess
out of this situation and we might have become victims of an eventual revenge.
But to our minds, this visit was very significant: people at whom we glanced so
casually, were unquestionably involved in some way in President Kennedy's
assassination. New they have disappeared swallowed in the mass of our population
or, possibly, they had left the country altogether. It's a mystery to solve but
not for clods from our bureaucratic mass of officials, unsophisticated,
under-educated, and like the Englishmen said during the war of our GI's:
"overpaid, over-fed, over-sexed and ....over here.
And Lee's opinion comes clearly to my mind: "the bureaucrats all over the world
are the same..." And I am adding my own definition: most of them would not be
able to make an honest living in the world of business and free competition.
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Who are the real criminals?
Over twelve years went by since the tragic events of 1963. Kennedy's widow
remarried. Questions arose in some decent people's minds: did Jacqueline know
what type of an individual she espoused or was it a huge bank account, not a
real person. The Dean of women at the University of Texas where I had been
lecturing at the time, was pale with indignation when she heard the news. Then
Mrs. Aristotle Onassis became widow again. And then Robert Kennedy was
assassinated carrying with him the reason for the strange warning he had given
my friend Wellem Oltmans... Worst of all, Dr. Martin Luther King was shot in a
cowardly way by an ignorant redneck, possibly encouraged by another redneck -
but clever and powerful that one - J. Edgar Hoover, who hated and despised the
Blacks. The award of the Nobel price for Peace to Reverend King was an ultimate
insult to him. Then the shrews and unscrupulous CIA agents and their associates
assembled large fortunes by illicit profits in Korea, Vietnam, Thailand,
Cambodia, and Laos....
And the discoveries will forthcoming - of deals, corruption, doublecrossings,
discoveries annoying to me because the have to do with taxes I had been paying
for years. And in this manner American money will be soon "Chinese" money.
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In a way, the high-school dropout, that "inferior American, Lee harvey Oswald,
had forseen all that by calling our bureaucracy - stupid but crooked. But,
knowing him the way I did, he would have also understood "Gulag Archipelago" and
would have approved Solzenitzin's indignation...
My wife and I spent many an agonizing moment thinking of Lee, ashamed that we
did not stand up more decisively in his defence. But who would have listened to
us at the time and would have published anything true and favorable to him?
If you, dear reader, are interested not in the assassinations but on organized
murder for profit, follow the articles in the French publication "Le Canard
Enchaine". You will learn that Aristotle Onnassis' fortune, made during the war,
was based o na very simple formula: old tankers are overinsured, duly sank by
the Nazi submarines, motley, ignorant crew members drown and their no less
ignorant poor families receive peanuts in a way of compensation. Repeat the
operation dozens, maybe hundreds of times. Later, when a huge fortune is made,
acquire exclusive rights for transportation of Arab oil...
If you believe in just punishment, Aristotle's rotten soul will remain forever
in the Greek-Orthodox hell.
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Conscience is the most stretchable substance - Ari's friends found him cheerful,
amicable, cosmopolitan, intelligent - although his education was not more
advanced than Lee's, he danced well and sang Greed and Argentinian forklore
songs. Only his end was somewhat gruesome...
Our performance at the Warren Committee was very lukewarm and not decisive
enough in favor of Lee. I hope he will forgive us... And I hope also that Mrs.
Marguerite Oswald will also forgive us.
Lee's innocence or his being just a patsy is our conviction. And now we can
speak more objectively of the reasons of our conviction. That the younger
generation in America does not believe in Lee's guilt is a fact but why would
old fogies, like ourselves, have such unorthodox opinions?
Let us talk of the clever "leaking on" by the choice lawyers of the Warren
Committee, which forced us, Lee's friends and acquaintances to appear somewhat
antagonistic to him.
The general opinion setup in the United Stated at the time puts pressure on you,
warps your judgement, changes your words.
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In these short chapters we tried to correct the distorted image of this good
friend of ours. Some will say that the intriduction of the late Aristotle
Onassis in these chapters may be in bad taste - others may find an interesting
and significant relevance.
Somebody else will prove who fired the fatal shots, will prove or disprove Lee's
involvement or lack of it in the conspiracy to commit the assassination. If
there are good Catholics involved in this affair, maybe a confession will solve
the problem.
We like to speak of Lee's occasional, clever repartees, of his frequent
outbursts of justifiable anger at the existing situation in this rotten world of
ours, of his deep concern for the starving and poorer than himself, of his worry
and his pity for the racially segregated, for masses deprived of their just
rights by the clever manipulators.
Had Lee lived most of his life in the totalitarian country, he would have landed
in a concentration camp for his outspoken opinions - for his loose tongue.
More should be said of Lee's interests in the world affairs. I can hear his
clear speaking voice, sincere, simple, without affection - its attractive
modulation.
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Lee did to have a trace of nasal, Southern drawl, his was a voice of a thinking,
refined individual. Incidentally, I never heard Lee use any four-letter
Anglo-Saxon words, no profane language in English or in Russian. This was most
unusual for a man of his background, I mean New Orleans and Fort Worth slums and
the United States Marine Corps.
But do not think he was a sissy, as there is a wide-spread belief that if you do
not swear, you are not a red-blooded American. I am guilty of constantly cussing
myself and the students with whom I associate happily these days, conseder me OK
and a good guy.
Segregationists are still here but they are losing ground. Still we have a long
way to go. A professor of medecine from Kentucky but born in Alabama, believes
that intermarriage and any sexual integration is the only way to combat racism.
The ones who disagree "should be shot", says he. Lee agreed with this opinion, I
remember.
We wish that our dogs, Nero and Popppzea (both gone now) could have barked on
his behalf. Such a testimony would have been very flattering for Lee, and you
cannot fool an animal says a truism. And yet, they were mefiant little creatures
and trusted very few.
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We constantly shout - "communists at fault", "It's a Marxist conspiracy",
instead that most of our mishaps come from own mistakes - commited or good
actions - omitted. What fiendish names were given our friend Lee Harvey Oswald -
communist, traitor, misfit, insane killer!
In the meantime our top capitalist, Harold Lamar Hunt called John F. Kennedy a
"traitor" and a confrontation between the US Government and the Soviet Union,
during the missle crisis, a "dispute between two communist states".
Everything is relative: we waster 140 billion and 45,000 lived (our only) to
prove that democracy is right and Lee Harvey Oswald wanted to improve our image
around the world in his own way, humanizing United States. Remember his nice but
naive defence of the American ways to his friends-workers, during his stay in
Minsk...
Listening ot Lee describes his experience in the Soviet Union, one saw clearly
that the Soviet Union was not a UTOPIA but just another livable country,
enormous, with endless problems, full of good, friendly people - and many
others, stupid, cruel and limited.
Judge the man after reading this book: no easy solution is offered, no criminal
presented on a dish, I am not even offering an analysis of
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his complex personality. Make up your own mind.
Why, with passing time we became more and more convinced that the whole story of
Lee Harvey Oswald has not bee n told, we are adding just another chapter to ..
It should be useful, as I had known him well, better than anybody else,
according to the Warren Report, better than his mother and wife, according to
the lengths of our depositions.
How the oppressive weight influenced my testimony can be seen so clearly by me
now, looking at it after several years, as if it were somebody else deposition,
deprived of a warm feeling for Lee, full of my own stupid jokes, which make me
sad now. i was not expressing myself recall, I didn't defend Lee vigorously and
passionately enough, which I am sure he would have done if he had to defend me
in a similar situation. I was cleverly led by the Warren committee counsel,
Albert Jenner, into saying some things I had not really want to say, to admit
certain defaults in Lee, which I wasn't sure were his', in other words I
conseder myself a coward and a slob who did not stand up to defend proudly a
dead friend, whatever odds were against him.
That big, clever boy, the trial lawyer handled me like a baby: first he bullied
me, then led me to tell him carefully all about my life by saying: "don't
conceal anything, we know more about yourself than
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you do."
I should have answered: "if you do why ask the questions? Why all the
rigomarole?"
And then later, in a friendly manner this time, Jenner would put forward some
suppositions regarding Lee, suppositions which seemed innocuous enough at the
time but sufficiently cleverly termed that would make me admit that possibly,
just POSSIBLY, he might have committed a crime...After all, he was so cruel, he
put a cigarette on his wife's bare flesh...A torturer!
It makes me remember now that Lee was keenly aware of the fact that it was the
white man he had brought in "scalping" during the American-Indian war. And
later, somehow, the Indians, cruel and contemptuous were charged with this
unpleasant procedure.
Almost everyone has a skeleton hidden in a closet, so did I, I shall talk later
about it. But it was such an insignificant, small skeleton.. I should have taken
a stronger stand. Instead, I talked, talked, talked, drunk with words and
descriptions...Talking about oneself, as everyone knows, is the sweetest past
time. And Jenner got me into this talking mood by calling me "distinguished,
handsome, virile," -
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intimated that I knew people all over the world, that I led a very colorful
life, was a great Casanova, member of the jet-set, he lauded my university
degrees. In reality the bastard despised me, my independence and especially my
liberalism.
Jenner was an impressive trial-lawyer, somewhat like Bailey, it was hard to
resist him, he knew how to cajole and how to threaten.
In reality Jenner spoke much more than I did, the Warren Report so well
doctored, does not show it. At lunchtime and between the sessions he offered me
suggestions, tried to find answers - a clever plan and a good preparation, makes
me think of the Tukhachevski trial in the Soviet Union. There, of course, drugs
were also used. The results on paper were proving General Tukhachevsky's
treason, the results for the Soviet Union was the fall of the Red Army and
Nazis' original, gigantic success. I am not comparing myself to Tukhachevsky,
but rather the whole Warren Report and its distastrous effect on the American
credibility.
In my case, such a long deposition had a sopophoric effect on me, you get deadly
tired of these official proceedings, you begin to agree with the questioner just
ot get out of this boring room away from the
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annoying, dry individual. You only dream to get away from all this nonsense, to
go back to your sunny house in Haiti, to my few real friends there, to my
interesting work and to the week-ends of skindiving in the beautiful,
transparent waters of the carribean near the Arcaclin Islands.
My idiotic interrogation had lasted almost three full days then the same torture
was inflicted on my wife, somewhat shorter and enhanced by the presence of our
Manchesters, Nero and Poppaea, who testified, silently, unfortunately, for their
friend Lee.
The final conclusion, after observation of all this bunch of lawyers is a short
pun.."Have you ever met an honest lawyers?" someone asked. "Yes, I did, only
recently. He paid for his own lunch..."
Jeanne's best suggestion, eliminated from the Warren Report, was a suggestion,
similar to mine: "don't try to solve the crime of the century be deposition, ie.
gossip, ninety per-cent irrelevant to the issues. Have good detectives hired, we
are supposed to be the heaven of private dicks. Don't use FBI's or CIA's or any
other federal agents, they are recognizable a mile away."
During our walking trip through Guatemala, where we happened to be
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there just be for the Bay of Pigs. The town was full of crew-cut American, not
speaking a word of Spanish, out of place. I told Jeanne "but these are Marines,
or rather Marine pilots. What the hell are they doing here?"
No question that the same idea occurred to all the pro-Castro Guatemalans, and
the country is full of them.. And messages were sent on time to Fidel Castro...
Looking over marina's deposition recently, I was amazed how closely our opinions
on Lee matched, they almost coincided, as if they had been dictated to us. "The
weight of the evidence" must have influenced both of us. First we were both
angry at Lee for putting us into such a horrible situation. bad enough for me,
but think of Marina's plight, especially the first days after the assassination.
I cannot talk of her feelings, but I know how deadly scared she was, in a
foreign country, not knowing the language and used to the Stalinish tactics.
We know, Jenner and Dulles told us, that Marina had made innumerable mistakes -
perjuries if you wish - being under a tremendous pressure and frightened out of
her wits. The pressure we were under was of a different type, yet very strong.
We had lived here for a long time and were familiar with the "American" ways.
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But we cannot forget the attitude of the American Embassy in Haiti, the
Ambassador's animosity towards me, the hard and soft approach of the FBI agent,
the possibility of losing my contract in Haiti. A mysterious letter at the
Embassy from Washington (this I found through a few remaining friends there),
warning the personnel there against us. There was a pressure from our friends,
by the Radio, newspapers, TV - finally this powerful Warren Committee - all
saying "disassociate yourself from this assassin Lee Harvey Oswald!"
Everybody was on a bandwagon condemning this insignificant ex-Marine
Now let us ask ourselves a question: was there a conspiracy of the part of the
Warren Committe members, this powerful and impressive group of people to promote
a deliberate lie, to inculpate an innocent person? No, I don't think so, they
acted naively and sheepishly for a purpose which seemed right to them and good
for the country. The country was in an upheaval, it was necessary to pacify the
public opinion. And the dead eccentric is the easiest subject of condemnation.
Personally, I think that such a mentality is tragic and detrimental to this
country. it's the same self-illusion as throwing Prince Sihanouk out of
Cambodia, accusing him of being a "red prince".
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Then financing and supporting to the bitter end his enemies. Fortunately for the
"Red Prince" he is well and back in his country, while his enemies are either
dead or exiled.
And now I am sorry to cast an accusation at John F. Kennedy's family, especially
on his brother Robert, who wanted to sanctify the President's memory and to make
us all - all American citizens - forget our President's biggest mistake, the Bay
of Pigs. Willem Oltmans strange incident, described here, is explainable by this
attitude. Also our conversations with Jacqueline Kennedy's family.
The bay of Pigs resulted in an unbelievable hatreds and desires of revenge among
the Cuban refugee groups as well as among Castro's followers, but to a lesser
degree because their losses were smaller and the result was Castro's triumph.
But the desire of revenge among the refugee groups here were thus covered up and
whenever somebody like Garrisson in New Orleans would try to establish a
connection between the assassination and the Bay of Pigs, he would be put down
as a drunkard, incompetent and silenced. Garrisson was completely completely
discredited and lost his district attorney's position. His latest book is a
fiction dealing with the assassination.
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Willem Oltmans and his clairvoyant.
After our return from Haiti, we were literally assailed by a great number of
journalists, who wanted to interview us. The most interesting among them was
Willem Oltmans, United States representative of NOS Television (Dutch State
Television) with headquarters in New York.
Oltmans, a Dutchman but educated in the United States - a yale graduate - told
me how he became interested in the President's murder in 1964, while we were
still in Haiti. He flew to Dallas on March 9, 1964 on an American Airlines from
Kennedy airport in New York to address the next day the criterion Club in
Wichita Falls, Texas. At the counter in New York he ran into Marguerite Oswald.
The two sat together during the following dinner-flight and it was during this
journey that Oltmans first began to doubt to truth as to Lee Oswald being the
killer of President Kennedy all by himself and miserably alone. It was
Marguerite Oswald who told him that the chief of police in Dallas interrogated
Lee for forty-eight hours, without making a tape-recording of the hearing and
even keeping his notes. When the Warren Commission asked the Dallas police
official whether they didn't think Oswald an important enough subject to borrow
a tape-recorder for the investigation of the murder of
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the president of the United States, the answer had been negative.
Upon returning to the Netherlands. Oltmans discussed his conversation the
Marguerite Oswald with the famous clairvoyant, Gerard Croiset in Utrecht, the
Netherlands. It was Doubleday who had published in 1964 the biography of this
amazing dutchman, who has been solving crimes and murders all over the world,
including in the United States.
It was Croiset who first described to Oltmans in a tape-recorded interview
(which is being kept at the Institute of Parapsychology of the University of
Utrecht, the Netherlands) that I existed. Croiset told Oltmans that Lee had a
friend in Dallas, in his fifties. He described some of my physical features,
including that my name held the letters ach and the word de.
Oltmans immediately consulted the chief of programs of National Dutch Television
in Hilversum, Carel Enkelaar. He received the assignment to return to Dallas and
try to locate this mysterious friend of Oswald's, who, according to the Dutch
clairvoyant, was of noble decent and was a geologist. He, mysterious X, was,
according to croiset, the architect of the ambush in which Kennedy had been
killed. Oswald was only the fall-guy.
Oltmans returned to Fort Worth and visited Mrs. Marguerite Oswald.
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It was Lee's mother who, following Croiset's description, pointed to a volume of
a complete set of the Warren Report and indicated our name and existence to the
Dutch journalist.
Oltmans reported back in Hilversum that Croiset's indication had been correct.
There was a friend, in his fifties, and his name did match the words de and sch.
He was George de Mohrenschildt.
NOS Television then instructed Willem Oltmans to phone me April 22, 1967, to ask
for a TV interview. I replied that I had to attend the World Petroleum Congress
in Mexico City and that he should contact me in two weeds. I did not hear from
him again until later that year.
When Oltmans reported to Hilversum that he had contacted me, the Dutch
television presidium felt Oltmans was in grave danger. They reasoned that so
many people, directly or indirectly connected with trying to unravel the Kennedy
assassination had been killed or mysteriously disappeared, that Oltmans was
immediately instruted to contact the office of Robert F. Kennedy, at the time
the Senator of the State of New York.
This office was located at the US Post Office building, near 43rd street.
Oltmans saw Tim Hogan, Robert F. Kennedy's press assistant, and explained the
situation, including Croiset's analysis, that Kennedy
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had been killed in a plot an that I was the engineer of the ambush.
Tim Hogan said the Senator was making a speech in Albany that morning and was
flying back at 1 p.m. in the "Caroline". He would inform the Senator immediately
relaying Oltman's request whether he could have some protection from FBI. NOS
Television had figured that Robert Kennedy, former Attorney-General of the
United States was as safe a person to ask advice in this delicate manner.
Tim Hogan called back around 2 p.m. in Oltman's apartment in Kew-Gardens, New
York. He relayed to Oltmans that RFK had personally picked up the phone and
talked to J. Edgar Hoover in Washington, D.C. FBI agents were to contact him
later that day.
Indeed, already at 4 p.m. two agents called at Oltman's apartment. they stayed
two full hours, but Oltmans only relayed to them that he was instructed to
interview us in Dallas and that, at the same time, NOS TV had told him to
contact Robert Kennedy.
When the agents left the Oltmans apartment, they assured him that from that
moment on he would be 24-hours a day under surveillance of the FBI and there
would be nothing to worry about.
The next evening Oltmans wanted to visit an Indonesian friend in Greenwich
Village, an architect, who was designing a cover for a book
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Oltmans was writing about the late President Sukarno of Indonesia.
Driving southward on Westside drive at around 8 p.m. in a Sunbeam Tiger, with a
V-8 motor, a convertible sports model, with aluminum racing wheels, at a speed
of about sixty miles per hour. Oltmans was being overtaken by a cab with a
passenger riding in the back-seat. The cab cruised for a while next to Oltmans'
car until the 53rd Street exit was reached. Then the cab made a fast move, in
which Oltmans was cut of in such a way that he crashed in the rails. his car was
a total loss. His head was bleeding. He was brought to the Kew-Gardens hospital,
where he was examined, bandaged and sent home. The insurance awarded him within
ten days a new car, which Oltmans quickly shipped to the Netherlands. He himself
left a few days afterwards.
Two months later, Oltmans received in his bungalow in the country near Utrecht a
telephone call from a certain Glenn Bryan Smith, attorney from Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. Smith announced that he was conducting an invesitgation into the JFK
murder for......................, the author of "Green Berets". He wanted to
discuss with Oltmans the Dallas affair and compare note. Oltmans agreed to a
meeting in Hotel Terminus in Utrecht, but only in the presence of Carel
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Enkelaar, NOS TV boss. It so happened.
During the conversation, however, Glenn Bryan Smith slipped in some threats. He
cautioned Oltmans in the presence of Enkelaar to stop investigating President
Kennedy's assassination because "you would not be the first person to die or
disappear in this matter. What they do is, they will kidnap you in a New York
street, drive you to a private airport, and dump you over the Atlantic Ocean.
You would not be the first person to die this way either."
Oltmans says that he remained unperturbed. He waited a few months more
publishing an extensive report on his automobile accident in the leading weekly
magazine "Haagse Post", showing on the cover pictures of John F. Kennedy and
myself. Oltmans then returned to the United States in October 1967 and came to
film us with the Dallas CBS TV crew on October 15th. It was a very pleasant
meeting for us.
From that moment on, this Dutch journalist, who initially approached us, because
he had received indications that we might be involved indirectly through Oswald
with the Kennedy assassination, became a very personal friend. He has visited us
every year since 1967.
He will by now be convinced, that we had nothing to do whatsoever with the JFK
assassination.
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As a matter of fact, he told us, that despite of Gerard Croiset's great gifts
for solving crimes, at the same time some forty per-cent of his indications and
prognoses are always false.
Nevertheless, Oltmans relayed to us as recently as the summer of 1976, that this
famous Dutch clairvoyant is still deadly convinced that I am the man who tricked
Lee harvey Oswald, and who set up, financed by the Dallas oil lobby, the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. I am supposed to have done it from Haiti,
porbably through some vodoo trick...
I probably should have sued that Dutch clairvoyant but I presume that he is
probably brode and an international law suit would be very costly.
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Why Lee and I agreed on FBI.
Recently it was established that FBI had concealed and destroyed a letter from
Lee Harvey Oswald written to the Dallas office before the assassination. I do
not think we have an exact text of this letter but the newspapers report was
extremely angry at they way FBI kept annoying him and his wife and therefore
made his normal pursuit of life impossible. This explains, naturally, why in our
conversations Lee had such a dim view of this "great" institution and its leader
J. Edgar Hoover.
I had a personal grudge against FBI, which I will explain in this chapter and I
had a personal distasteful impression when I saw J. Edgar Hoover one day, in La
Jolla, California. I remember that Jeanne and I were there to visit a partner of
mine who had a ranch nearby and made some investments in the oil ventures. In
the evening, having dinner at one of the best motels, facing the sea, I
recognized Mr. Hoover, sitting together with some of our oil magnets, and
behaving in such an obsequious manner, is if he were a servant of these very
wealthy people. And he looked like a pompous waiter, or possibly, head waiter. I
knew some of the people sitting with him and a meeting could
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have been very simply arranged, and thus a lot of difficulties would have been
avoided for both of us in the future. But something retained me from approaching
the group and I did not do it. Jeanne did not have any special reason to like or
dislike the man, but I had a previous experience with FBI which was ridiculous
and could have ended badly for me.
Outside of my unimportant experience, similar to Lee's in a way, the final
result is that a letter of paramount importance to the investigation of
Kennedy's assassination was concealed, that president Kennedy's assassination
was concealed, that President Kennedy was killed and the old idol, head of FBI,
remained untouched and secure until his natural death. The President did to get
the right type of protection - while mediocrity or failure, or both, remained
unpunished.
New back to my trago-comic trouble with FBI. This will answer possibly why so
much money and effort was spent on the investigation of my wife and of me. I had
already mentioned it. Why choose us? Why try to persecute us with such a
persistence? The reason we knew Lee so well were not enough.
We both traveled a great deal, Jeanne as a famous fashion
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designer, and she was famous before I met her and ruined her career with my own
adventurous deals and this walking trip; I traveled even more as a patroleum
consultant, had several wives and was part of the "so called" establishment,
mainly for business reasons. People in the "jet-set" or the "cafe society" are
really very boring, the same world over, while an eccentric like Lee, was of
great interest to me.
In other words, we were successful in our own fields and neither one of us
never, but never, paid any attention to politics in the United States, left or
right.
My early scrap with FBI dates from 1941, soon after my arrival in the United
States. At that time I was very young, had some money which I brought from
Europe and made a little more in this country and about to be drafter to the US
Army. Frankly I was not in a ver militaristic mood at the time, as the Germans
saved my father from the Russians. We are of, so called, Baltic decent, which
means a mixture of people of Scandinavian, German, French and other lineages,
descendants of the knights who had conquered Estonia, Latria, Finland and even
parts of Russia.
Now, many of the Balts were German oriented, but I
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had relatives of this type, personally I was French-oriented. I also had spent
two painful years in the Polish Military Academy and later "manouevering" on
horse-back around the Soviet border, a rather dangerous occupation. So I was
about to be drafted in the United States Army and did not feel very enthusiastic
at the prospect to start in the boot-camp all over again.
But, instead, the doctors found that I had a very high blood pressure and
declared me unfit for service. I still suffer from this high blood-pressure, so
really I owe my life to the good American doctors who had discovered it so
early. Now I can keep it under control.
At that time I was not yet an American citizen, but a resident of New York, and
madly in love with a Mexican young widow, whom we shall call, Senora L. After
meeting her in New York, I asked a Brazilian friend who knew Senora L. well: "I
am madly in love with her, shall I marry her?"
"If you marry her, you will be unhappy. If you do not marry her you will be
unhappy also," answered my friend smilingly.
Of course, he was absolutely right. But still we were madly in love with each
other. And so, she invited me to drive with her across the
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United States to her own country Mexico, which she would explore with me. She
had been brought up in Europe and lived there most of her life, hence her lack
of knowledge of her own country.
Incidentally, she spoke very little English, and I very little Spanish, so we
communicated in French, which probably made us most suspicious to FBI. Maybe
someone denounced us? We both had enemies. Anyway, our delightful trip in a new
convertible Chrysler, along the Eastern shore, then along the Guld of Mexico was
rudely interrupted. This happened near Corpus Christi, Texas, where we had
rented an apartment in the Nueces Hotel as Mr. and Mrs. X (I forgot the
fictitious name we used). We left the hotel early to go to the beach at Arkansas
Pass and spent a delightful day there. I like to paint water-color landscapes
with beautiful female bodies in the foreground, and I made several sketches.
Driving back from the beach we were stopped on a deserted road by a bunch of
people, who, we thought were plain American gangsters. We had little money with
us, the care was insured, so we stopped without too much fright. The characters
identified themselves: they were FBI agents who had taken us for German spies
observing United States fortifications . . .
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When I was telling the story to Lee, he could not stop laughing. "This is so
typical of FBI. Taking you, at that time you were a reserve officer in an Allied
Army, driving along the coast with a beautiful Mexican woman, talking French to
her, and painting..." He guffauwed. "You were a typical German spy."
But, my friends, don't laugh at FBI's ingenuity. Soon after having verified our
papers and listened to angry Spanish shrieks of Senora L. - they had followed us
to the hotel and inspected our luggage - the agents realized they made a foolish
mistake. I even understood that one or two of them followed us all the way from
New York (another expense to the AMerican taxpayer, but he is always the
victim), so the mistake was a very cold one. And so I was accused on an
infraction to the old Mann's Act. Mann Act prohibits, still dows, crossing the
border from one state to another with a woman who is not your wife for the
purpose of committing a licencious act...
Of that we were certainly guilty, we had crossed dozens of borders on the way to
Mexico and committed dozens, maybe hundred of licencious acts. However, we were
not put in jail, just had to sign some papers that we were not married and
proceeded all the way to the Mexican border. We felt as if someone dirty put his
filthy hands in
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our very personal affairs. Senora L. made a strong complaint to the Mexican
Ambassador in Washington and received much later apologies for the FBI agents.
As far as I am concerned, five years later, when I was applying for United
States citizenship in Denver, an FBI agent came to the hearing and reopened the
case, accusing me of immorality and of a fragrant infraction of the Mann Act.
I still would like to find out some day what kind of a puritannical,
hypocritical, sob this Mann was...
I already passed my citizenship examinations without a single mistake and was
holding an important position with a group of oil companies. So I did get a
defence. My lawyer threatened the FBI agent of a personal damage suit in the
amount of a million dollars, for damage done to my reputation. And so, the Mann
Act was quickly forgotten, the judge laughed at the FBI story, and I was made
American Citizen. Maybe not first class, because naturalized, but a citizen
still.
And Lee concluded: "and so you lived forever afterwards happy as a naturalized
American citizen."
"You don't realize, Lee, how important is was for me to be a citizen, as I
became after the war a man without a country, a "heimatloss."
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"I guess it's better to be without a country than to live in a country like
this, run by FBI," was Lee's bitter conclusion.
I guess in these days of open immorality and of pornography staring at you from
each bookstore, nobody would be accused of breaking such an antiquated law as
Mann Act. It's probably buried for good.
During these unbearably long sessions with the counsel for the Warren Committee,
Albert Jenner, I got the warning from him that FBI was after my neck. "Better go
to see those FBI guys and straighten up your situation with him," was his
advice.
Of course I did not waste my time on visits to FBI, both my wife and I were
anxious to get back to Haiti. But now, looking at the report, I think that there
must have been other reasons that millions of dollars were spent on my
unimportant life, also my wife's and our children's, with the final result that
our depositions became three times more voluminous than Marina's. And so much
costlier to the American taxpayer. Look at all those innumerable places we lived
in, in various countries and different continents, everywhere these FBI agents
were sent to and received information through interrogation, bribery or
subterfuge. And, naturally, the incident with the rifle
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activated all this insane activity.
Again Jenner gave me a hint at the beginning of the interrogation. He asked me:
"didn't you know that Oswald tried to shoot General Walker?"
you already know from the previous chapters what had actually happened, and what
Marina had said later.
"Of course not," I answered, "my pot-shot joke was in a dubious taste but only a
joke nevertheless."
"But Marina said," continued Jenner, "you knew about it, you said it yourself."
Now, after all these years, reading for the first time the text of the Warren
Committee Report, which had been too repulsive for me to touch, I can see her
statement. She quotes me: "how is it possible, Lee, that you missed? (page 23)
This is what I was supposed to have said that Easter night when my wife and I
arrived to give a stuffed rabbit to little June. And I was supposed to have said
that before entering the apartment and seeing the rifle. This statement make me
Lee's conspirator, of course.
However, soon afterwards, in her deposition she affirmed in these words: "George
de Mohrenschildt didn't know about it, he was smart enough to have guessed it."
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And so, such a contradictory and insane testimony forced the US Government, via
FBI to order the cost complete, the most costly and most useless
investigation....
Could it be that Marina was told by someone in the Government, especially in
FBI, to use this inane accusation, then to change it?
Maybe Marina some day will admit how all this nonsense came about. Generally,
she speaks well of both of us in her further deposition, she calls Jeanne a good
friend, and me "a strong man" and a "liberal".
Considering how foolish bureaucracy could be, maybe Marina's deposition was
poorly translated, hence contradictory. Also there was a piece of gossip going
on in the Committee Building that Chief Justice Warren liked Marina so much,
that he advised her to incriminate us, to take pressure from herself. After all,
we were mysterious Europo-Asiatics, living abroad and leading a strange life.
This would take away the sting of her guilt, because she did know that Lee tried
to shoot General Walker and missed. If it were true, he would have been taken
out of the circulation.
Anything is possible in this gossipy, bureaucratic atmosphere in innuendo, the
first Watergate of the American Government, The Warren
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Committee. Because the second version of Marina's deposition was different
again. I would like to quote it exactly: "de Mohrenschildt did not know anything
about the shooting. Simply he thought that this was something he thought Lee was
likely to do. He simply made a joke and the sting of it hit the target."
And this finally, by all these devious say we came to the correct version of the
incident.
And then Mr. Rankin asked her: "from your knowledge were they (Lee and I) close
enough so that your husband would make George de Mohrenschildt a confident of
anything like that?"
"No matter how close he might have been to anyone," answered Marina "he would to
have confided such thing."
And thus, again, we came to a reasonably true answer.
It's hard to say whether lee would have confided in me, this is pure speculation
and I tend to agree with Marina. had he done so, I would have certainly
persuaded him not to follow such a foolish enterprise. As much as I dislike
fascists, I would have been against such a violent action against such an
insignificant man like General Walker. We used to call him for laughs "General
Foker".
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Marina is the only one to know the truth whether Lee actually shot at General
Walker. If he did, his mind had been made up firmly. He would have remained
secretive about it.
But there is a contradiction there; Lee wasn't a fool, if he had shot at anyone,
he would not have dept his rifle right in front of the closet for anyone to look
at it. Now, when he had a large apartment with a lot of hiding places, he would
have put his rifle in a well secreted corner.
In conclusion, poor Marina was so mixed up in her testimonies, that she did not
even remember the incident described in this book, when we took her away from
Lee's apartment on Beckley street and carried her and the baby and the
belongings to Mr. and Mrs. Meller's Place. She had probably forgotten the burned
flesh on her arm, anything, she mush have been terribly frightened.
And so, with her, at first, extremely damaging testimony, we got investigated
through and through, at a great expense to American taxpayers, and fortunately
for us, came out unscathed fatally, just damaged morally and financially.
A few more words about this lovely institution - FBI, which might have played a
good part during the ganster days in the prohibition.
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FBI should change and be more controlled by the Congress. This institution
should adopt more modern and sophisticated way of Surete General or of Scotland
Yard to become more sophisticated, more secretive and less naively viscious.
Frankly I even preferred the straightforward methods of the Haitian police, the
famous "tontons macoute", these boogie men with dark glasses, as they had
effectively protected the lives of President Duvalier "Papa Doc" and of his
family and still do protect the life of his son "Baby Doc." And FBI could not
protect the lives of the President John F. Kennedy, of his brother Robert nor,
the most important, the life of Dr. Martin Luther King.
FBI did os much damage to us because, while still in Haiti, I often expressed an
opinion that Lee was a patsy, that he was not interested in preparing an
assassination of the man he liked and respected. And I was also an open critic
of our Government agencies, because J. Walton Moore whom I had contacted
regarding Lee, told me that he was a "harmless lunatic." And, as a result of
this frank criticism, FBI tried to crucify is in Haiti, to damage our contract
there, with the convience of the American Embassy. In the final result I lost a
lot of business contacts because FBI had pried too much into my private life and
exposed it in the wrong light.
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I am a patsy . . .
We are alive and enjoying life in a very different way. We moved away from the
business world to the academic world and it's more rewarding. For this I have to
thank Lee harvey Oswald and FBI.
Fortunately also, we did not lose our real friends. New were we sent to a
concentration camp like the Japanese in World War II or the Navajos in XIX
century in Arizona. And we do not complain, life is interesting and exciting for
us. Often we wish Lee were here with us to share some of the good changes we are
having in this country and in the world. He was too young when he died.
But more often we think of shady aspects of this gruesome "investigation", of
the harm done to this country and especially to the damage to the memory of Lee,
my dead friend.
Jones, the editor of the Midlothian, Texas newspaper, and a simple honest man,
told me upon my return to the United States: "I shall never forget Le Harvey
Oswald's face, beaten brutally to a pulp, of his terrified expression when he
was being led by beefy policemen the day of President Kennedy's assassination.
And this young man kept shouting 'I am a patsy'...I am a patsy!...' And,"
continued this elderly
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newspaperman, "I swear to God I knew that he was telling the truth."
I had a premonition the day of Kennedy's assassination. 3,000 miles away, in
Haiti, that Lee was involved in some way, that he was in deep trouble. It's
strange how those things work...
Think on the inscription on the picture we had discovered in our luggage. How
could a hunter of the fascists be the assassin of a young and liberal President?
Would Lee address this photograph so endearingly to me, knowing well how much I
liked John F. Kennedy, had he intended to assassinate him?
Would his wife call him even sneeringly, "the fascists" hunter, if her husband
was preparing to assassinate the most liberal President America ever had?
Whether you were responsible, even partially, even as a patsy, in the conspiracy
to assassinate, I do hope that this book will help you sleep in peace.
Knowing Lee and his truthfulness, my wife and I believe that had Lee had the
chance to speak, he would have told the truth. If he even had some part in the
assassination, he would have proudly thrown to the world his reasons for it.
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Lee was above all an individualist, an idealist who hoped to change the world,
not a blind slave led by his prejudices, by an excessive devotion to a defined
doctrine, to proconceived notions.
He denied that he was the assassin to the last moment of his life. And while
Dallas police questioned him for forty some hours, he never admitted anything.
For some reason, the police chief never reseased to the Warren Committee any
notes of this interrogation and he denied that the interrogation had been
tape-recorded. Dallas police supposedly had not a single tape-recorder at the
time. As primitieve as the Dallas police had been, such negligence is hardly
credible.
Chief Justice Warren, while interrogating the chief of police who had said "we
never got around to buy a tape-recorder", asked acidly: "wasn't it worth while
to borrow a tape recorder when the assassination of the President of the United
States was beign investigated?".
The City of Dallas was certainly rich enough at the time to have acquired a
tape-recorder.
And so the tape of Lee's interrogation either did not exist or had mysteriously
disappeared.
In my opinion Lee would have told the truth during this lenthy
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interrogation, during which he must have been beaten and maybe tortured, he
would have cracked down but his last words were: "I am a patsy!" And so he was.
What I have been trying to concentrate on was Lee's personality and on what I
had remembered, taped and noted, of his opinions, his jokes and his remarks in
our conversations.
Naturally, I could to avoid to relate what our relations with Lee and Marina,
and especially my friendship with Lee, had had on our lives.
I hope that this book will correct the generally low opinion people in this
country have had on Lee. Maybe this new focus on him will have some influence on
the ultimate judgement on the assassination of President Kennedy.
Lee Harvey Oswald might have been sometimes violent, like almost anyone amongst
us, he might kill a person he hated, he might have been violent to a racist or a
pseud-racist, to someone who might want to hurt him and his family. But to
assassinate the President he rather admired, just for the glory of it, is
entirely foreign to his personality.
Lee cared for freedom in this country and he cared for the improvement
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of the world tension at the time. And this type of a person was beign moved from
one place to another by the Dallas police, the movements were announced, the
crowds were there, and thus he was shot and killed.
Some other aspects of Lee's personality must emerge from this book. It shows
that Lee was not a harmful person, on the contrary a rather inspiring
individual." his deep desire to improve relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union. It took twelve years and a man like Kissinger to achieve
partially this purpose. At last the latent anomosities between these superpowers
are dissipating.
But Lee hoped for more he hoped that these two powerful countries would become
friends and he thrived to achieve it in a naive and maybe foolish, but sincere,
way. It is clear now that the war between these two countries would end in a
holocaust. And so, Lee Harvey Oswald had dreamed and hoped for a detente and for
friendship, not so bad for a high-school dropout from a New Orleans slum.
It is always better for all of us to be friends than to fight, only insane
people would want to fight now with the available nuclear arsenal. These insane
people are forcing other to believe in the superiority
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of any weaponry. We can kill all the Russians hundred of times over and they can
do the same to us. So where does a "superiority" lead?
It is my firm opinion that lee was never sure he was right, but he was always
groping for truth, for a light.
It must come out clearly from all the material I had gathered here that Lee was
above all anti-segregationist, he was anti any people who discriminate against
any minorities, against any underprivileged.
Both Lee and I firmly believed that subservience to any dominant pollitical idea
is wrong, people should try to discover an ideology which fits them, even though
it might be unpopular, and follow it. If not , we would becon\me the same
dummies Russians were during Stalin's time. Their servility backfired and they
became victims of it. "They did not try to find out who was right and who was
wring," Lee told me during one of our conversations, which often dealt with the
Stalinist times in Russia. He had learned a lot in Minsk. "Free people," he had
said, "should not remain mere pawns in the world game of chess played by the
rulers."
Some time ago I saw a program, sponsored by some safety razor firm,
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which featured Lee talking in New Orleans on the radio. This was regarding his
pro-Cuban activity. The program was taped and Lee's photos were inserted. Lee
spoke rather intelligently but the inserted photos made his look ugly and
threatening. It was a nasty way to portray a dead man. Technically the program
was awful; had no much sense anyway, but its purpose was to brainwash the
American people into believing more firmly that Lee was the sole and only
assassin.
And we will never know the whole truth until someone will come forward, confess
and will accept the guilt.
Let's recall some of my conversations with Lee regarding Fidel Castro. Lee was
rather an admirer of Fidel and especially of Che Guevara, a romantic,
swashbuckling personage. In his mind Fidel was a sincere man who aimed to the
best for his country, to eradicate racial prejudice and to bring a social
equality to his people. I do not think he knew very much about Cuba and his
information came through his contacts with Cuban students and technicians he had
met in Minsk.
Lee liked Fidel as a representative of a small country, an underdog, facing
fearlessly a huge and powerful country like United States.
Che appealed to him as a handsome, brilliant doctor, who had
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traveled around Latin America, discovering basic injustices and who eventually
tried to correct them . He did know that in some of the poorest parished of
Mexico the peasants considered him a new Savior. New Che is dead, the man who
killed him was assassinated recently in Paris. So it's all immaterial.
Regarding the Bay of Pigs, Lee thought it was an utter disaster. He wassure that
we would not have gotten involved in the internal affairs of Cuba. He was
against the Cuban refugees, but this subject was not discussed too much between
us. He thought that Cuba before Castro was a whorehouse for the American
tourists, headquarters of American recketeers like Lansky and Co. there were his
opinions.
As far as I was concerned, I was not sure whether he was right or not, I knew
Cuba very slightly myself, I was there a year or so before Castro's victory over
Battista. To me it was a cheerful, corrupt country; but austerity did not seem
to fit the Cuban sunny natures.
Lee thought President Kennedy should not allow any invasion of Cuba, but he was
not vegement or violent in his views on this subject. I have the impression that
the matter was of not much interest to him. Lee never expressed any hatred for
Kennedy because of the Bay of Pigs, he just calmly assessed as a very foolish
action.
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Remember that many Cuban refugees and their relatives paid with their lives for
this invasion, and the ones who remained alive and here consider the disaster
Kennedy's fault. I cannot visualize Lee being in cahoots with these Cuban
refugees in New Orleans, as some sources suggest but he might have played his
own game, meeting some of them, checking just for the hell of it what their
motivations were.
The amusing and attractive side of Lee's personality was that he liked to play
with his own life, he was an actor in real life. A very curious individual.
On the other hand, I can very easily visualize Lee joining a pro-Castro group.
In my humble opinion, as indicated by some events and conversations in this
book, the Kennedy family did not want to pursue the matter of finding the real,
unquestionable, assassin, nor a conspiracy. And they could have done it with
their own, immense, privat resources. If somebody would kill my son or my
brother, I certainly would want to be sure who did it. But possibly the
personality of Lee Harvey Oswald suited perfectly the political purposes of the
Kennedy family.
Lee was a "lunatic" and a "Marxist" who killed John F. Kennedy
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without any reason and made a martyr of him. And so, the matter was closed for
ever. Why look for more responsible people?
Regarding Lee's real or imaginary attempt at General Walker's life will remain a
myster. There are stories going around that, according to Marina, Lee also
wanted to shoot Nixon, whom he considered a reactionary of the same type as
Walker. This was at the time when Nixon was Vice-President. But Lee never even
spoke to me about Nixon, so it remains pure speculation.
The picture appearing with this book, was taken by Marina, so she says in her
deposition in January or February of 1962. Dedications were made probably at the
same time.
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Final conclusion for us, Lee's friends.
We are alive and fairly healthy. I returned to teaching and am happy to be with
young people. But I often miss Lee and his stimulating presence. Real friends
remained faithful and good to us, the superficial and false relationship
disappeared.
Yet, this past friendship with Lee had strangely adverse effects on our lives.
People read superficially this gossipy Warren Report and wonder who these
strange people are. They call us, ask foolish questions. Even to-day insidious
articles appear claiming that we were "bribed" (by whom?) to hide the truth
about Kennedy's assassination. Subsequent publicity make us controverial and
even gruesomely threatening.
Up to this day I read strange idiocies about myself. An example is a book
published in French "L'Amerique Brule" - America Burns. The publishers are in
Luxembourg where they cannot be sued. In this book I am an alleged CIA agent
assigned to Lee Harvey Oswald. Let me translate a chapter regarding my
relationship with Lee.
Oswald was put under supervision by the CIA and interrogated as well as tested
by one of the specialists utilized by the CIA in Washington D.C. and by its
Houston Branch. He was an oilman, whose nom de
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guerre (operative name) was George de Mohrenschildt.
It certainly should have chosen an easier nom de guerre!
His nickname was "the Chinaman' and he pretend to have been born in Ukraine and
was an ex-officer in the Polish Cavalry. He was recruited during the war by OSS
and was inscribed in 1944 at the University of Texas where he obtained a degree
of a geological engineer, specializing in petroleum Geology. The CIA had
utilized him in Iran, in Indonesia, in Egypt, in Panama, in Nicaragua, in San
Salvador, in honduras, in Ghana, in Togoland and finally in Haiti, where he
worked "in principle" with Sinclair Oil Company. De Mohrenschildt was closely
connected with or mixed up with oil circles and was member of Dallas Petroleum
Club, Abilene Country Club, Dallas Society of Petroleum Geologists. He had very
close relations with manager of Kerr-McGee Oil Company, Continental Oil Company,
Coswell Oil Equipment, Texas-Eastern Corporation and also with John Mecom of
Houston. He was a distinguished and cultured man, who was part of the
establishment and member of the social register. His White-Russian wife, born in
China, often operated with him.-Another of his covers was ICA, Washington D.C.-
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And so I hare standing for judgement. I have never been to some of the countries
mentioned here (for example Egypt and Indonesia) and I lived and worked in many
other countries this article did not mention. In each case I either worked for
myself or for some oil companies, but I never, never worked for CIA. And I do
not think CIA will hire me in the future.
As for the I.C.A. mentioned above, this was the name of the division of the
State Department, a shortening of International Cooperation Administration which
dealt with economic help abroad. I was hired as a petroleum technician in that
capacity worked for a year in Yugoslavia.
I cannot say that I never was a CIA agent, I cannot prove it. I cannot prove
either that I ever was. Nobody can.
Only recently disclosures have been made giving names of the CIA agents who were
at the same time our State Department employees and worked in our embassies and
consulates in various capacities. Before this the fact of belonging to CIA was a
well kept secret.
And so, almost everything I had done in my life became distorted
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and suspicious by unscrupulous reporters and gossip-mongers.
The latest infraction into my privacy come from the people who want to write
about Lee Harvey oswald. They rehash the Warren Committee information.
Just a few months ago in the San Francisco chronicle and in the Chicago Tribune,
suggesting snidely that I had gone to the Bahamas after the assassination to be
paid off there by someone, to keep some secrets regarding Lee Harvey
Oswald...And what can you do about it? Suing is not my style and I have no time
for it. And so I write to these writers and receive letters of apologies.
Another painful annoyance to us to think that some of our good friends, in the
foreign countries where I had worked, read this trash and may believe that I was
some kind of an agent and that they had befriended a double-faced individual.
The same suspicion applies to my wife and her friends abroad.
Let us hope that this book, poorly written and disjointed, but sincere, will
help to clear up our relationship with our dear, dead friend Lee.
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Blank Page
Depositions of Marina Oswald Porter
Page 317
DEPOSITIONS OF MARINA OSWALD PORTER
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(317)
Contents
Page 318
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 319
Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 20, 1977 319
Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, Aug. 9, 1978 349
(318)
Introduction
Page 319
INTRODUCTION
During Marina Oswald Porter's public testimony before the committee on September
13, 1978, Congressman Preyer stated the two depositions she had previously given
the committee's staff would be make part of the committee's final report. Those
depositions are reprinted in their entirety in this appendix.
September 20, 1977
Page 319
DEPOSITION
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1977
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:44 a.m., in room 16G28, Federal
Building, Dallas, Tex.
Present: Ken Klein, assistant deputy chief counsel, and Clifford Fenton, chief
investigator.
Mr. MULLOY. For the record, I am Patrick H Mulloy, U.S. Magistrate for the
Northern District of Texas, here for the purpose of swearing in Marina Oswald
Porter for a deposition this morning.
Will you raise your right hand?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give on this deposition will be the
truth, so help you God?
Mrs. PORTER. I do.
Mr. MULLOY. Further, pursuant to the laws of the United States, I am
authorized--I wish I had a copy of the Code--I am authorized to take oaths.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Mr. KLEIN. Good morning. My name is Kenneth Klein and I am the assistant deputy
chief counsel for the House Select committee on Assassinations.
Today is September 20, 1977, it is approximately 10:55 in the morning.
Present is Clifford Fenton, who is the chief investigator for the House Select
Committe on assassinations. To your right is Mrs. Jewel McGrath, who is a
stenographer and, as you can see, she is taking down everything we are saying
here.
For the record, would you please identify yourself?
The WITNESS. Mrs. Marina Porter.
By Mr. KLEIN:
Q. Please give your address.
A. I live on Route 1, Box 228A, Rockwell, Tex.
(319)
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Q. We are in the conference room in room 16G28 of the Federal building here in
Dallas, Tex.
Now, I have been designated to obtain statements from witnesses under oath by
the Select Committee on Assassinations.
Up to this point I met you approximately 1 hour ago and I have not spoke to you
about any of the facts pertaining to the death of President Kennedy, is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Before we go any further, is this statement that you are giving us now a
voluntary statement?
A. It is.
Q. you have not been subpenaed to appear here, you are appearing voluntarily, is
that correct?
A. that is correct.
Q. I have advised you that you have a right to have a lawyer present during this
statement, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Do you wish to have a lawyer present?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Now, do you at this time have any difficulties speaking or understanding
English?
A. I don't think so. I will ask if I don't understand something.
Q. You have lived in the United States for how many years?
A. Just a minute-1962.
Q. From 1962 to 1977, that is 15 years?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you speak English in the course of your every day activities here?
A. I do.
Q. If you do have any problem understanding anything that I say, please ask me
and I will put it into a form that you will understand.
Is to fair to say you have no problems communicating with people in English from
day to day?
A. Usually I don't; if I do not understand a certain work, I will ask the
meaning of it.
Q. Before me I have a copy of our committee rules. It is entitled Committee
Rules of the Select committee on Assassination, U.S. House of Representatives,
95th Congress. I also have a copy of House Resolution 433 and a copy of House
Resolution 222 and I am making all three documents available to you and I also
should note for the record that I made these available to you approximately 15
minutes ago when we entered this room.
A. Right.
Q. I am going to ask you questions, many of which will pertain to testimony that
you gave before the Warren Commission when you testified before that body. In
some cases I am asking the question because I want to know if you might remember
any more, or I am asking it because I have more detail to ask than they asked.
A. I don't know what the word "pertain" means. Is that a source of information?
Q. About, in other words-which was the sentence? What I mean is, that many of
the questions I ask you, you were asked similar questions by the Warren
Commission about the same subjects.
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A. OK.
Q. I would like to see if I can possibly get some more detail on some of the
questions and in some cases I will ask you question the Warren Commission did
not ask you at all.
A. OK.
Q. I realize that it has been approximately 15 years since some of these events
occurred and you might have difficulty remembering particular facts or
information, so I would just request that you do your best and, if you don't
remember something, you can say you don't remember.
A. Excuse me, you know how memory plays tricks on you.. Do you think if I try to
answer some questions to the best of my ability from the memory, it would be not
entirely contradictory to what i said before but maybe details may be different
from what I said then so can I just go by what I said?
Q. What you can do is-I have here your testimony and if at any point you would
like to look at a particular part of the testimony, you can.
A. Can you read it for me, what I said, and can I agree with it?
Q. As I said, I am interested in most cases in things that were not asked of you
by the Warren Commission or where they might have touched on a subject or not
asked you about particular aspects of it which I am going to ask you about.
A. OK.
Q. But if there is a point where you don't remember a particular fact, then just
tell us you don't remember that.
A. OK.
Q. Do you recall testifying before the Warren Commission?
A. Yes; I do.
Q. Did anyone ever tell you what you should testify to them?f
A. No.
Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you in any way how you should testify, or what you
should say to the Warren Commission?
A. No.
Q. to your knowledge, as you sit here today, is there anything which you
testified to before the Warren Commission which you now believe to be incorrect?
A. No; I never read my own testimony but whatever I said was the truth.
Q. My next question was going to be now that you speak and understand english
much better than you did at the time you testified before the Warren Commission,
have you ever had the opportunity to look over the printed testimony, your
testimony before the Warren Commission?
A. No; I never have. I had an interpreter, I believe.
Q. At that time you had an interpreter. What I am saying is, in the years since
then, if you testified now you wouldn't need an interpreter, I take it, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What I am asking is, did anybody ever give you the transcripts of what you
testified before the Warren Commission and let you read that transcript?
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A. I had the privilege of reading my testimony, it was offered to me but I
didn't read it.
Q. You never did?
A. No.
Q. Is there anything which you didn't tell the Warren Commission about relating
to the assassination of President Kennedy which you can tell us now?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Is there any area where the Warren Commission did not ask you any questions
and yet you know that you did possess some information that related to the
assassination of President Kennedy, but they didn't ask you about it?
A. I did not study the Warren Commission report so I was not looking for faults.
Q. I am not saying a fault, am saying is there any area where they didn't ask
questions in a particular area so you did not volunteer the information which
you can think of at this time?
A. I think I lost you. Would you please repeat that?
Q. What I am saying is this, is there any information which you might have
possessed which related to the assassination of President Kennedy where the
Warren Commission, for whatever reason, did not ask you a question in that area
and therefore you wouldn't have told them about it. Is there anything like that
that you can tell us about now?
A. What you really mean, if I had hidden something inside that will maybe open
up something more?
Q. Not necessarily that you have hidden something.
A. Or forgot?
Q. An area where they simply did not ask you about it and at the time you didn't
remember to tell them about it so it was never told.
A. I don't think so. You see, when you listen to the news and television you
don't know where the sources come from, the Warren Commission or somebody else,
you never question going back to the Warren Commission and reading it, was it
there or not.
Q. I would like to ask you a few questions now concerning your background in
Russia.
A. OK.
Q. When you met Lee Harvey Oswald, where were you living at that time?
A. With my aunt and uncle in Minsk.
Q. What was your uncle's name?
A. Ilya Proosakov.
Q. When you testified before the Warren Commission, you stated that he worked
for the Ministry of Interior, is that correct?
A. Just a minute, let me translate from Russian to English. Yes; Minister in
Internal Affairs.
Q. Ministry of Internal Affairs?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he do for the Ministry?
A. He was engineer by profession but that is all I know. He had some kind of
ranking, military ranking as well. He had to wear a uniform.
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Q. Do you recall testifying he was a colonel or lieutenant?
A. Lieutenant colonel.
Q. Do you have any idea what his job was?
A. No; he never discussed his job at home.
Q. Sonce you testified before the Warren Commission, since that time, have you
ever heard from that uncle?
A. I did place a telephone call once to my uncle, it was about 4 years ago. At
first I wasn't sure that it was him. You never know with the Russians. But then
I asked him to speak to my aunt and he said that she is not available, so I
asked him what time it was over there, he said just wait a minute and let me go
and check. It took a little while, so then I knew it was him. He was very cold
on the telephone, he was like an icicle. I do not expect a relative to be so
cold. He didn't answer any questions except yes and no and that was it. then I
asked to speak to my aunt, but she was out of the apartment.
Q. Did you ever speak to him about the assassination at all?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever meet your uncle when you were in Russia?
A. He met him before we were married, sure.
Q. What kind of relationship did they have?
A. Just polite. They were courteous to each other, sometimes they discussed
politics and each of them had a different opinion but they really didn't argue,
you know, that loudly.
Q. Did they ever spend any time together when you were not present?
A. Probably.
Q. Did they ever, to your knowledge, go anywhere together?
A. I don't think so. Sometimes we would visit. Lee would sometimes visit my aunt
and uncle when I would be home with the baby or sometimes me and my aunt would
talk and they would talk together.
Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever speak to you about your uncle?
A. Of course he did. We discussed our relatives.
Q. What generally was his feeling toward your uncle?
A. That he consedered him kind of cool and really-just a minute, let me phrase
it right--not very open person, that he was kind of secretive and he said that
he had been under--I mean worked with the Government so long or whatever his
schooling was, that he does not open up that quick.
Q. Was your uncle associalted in any way with the secret police?
A. I don't think so. I would not know. That is my guess.
Q. What do you really mean by secret police, doing arrests or something like
that?
A. Since I don't know what kind of job he really was doing, I cannot speculate
so whatever I said could be true or not true.
Q. when you say you don't know what kind of job he was doing, was it unusual
that you wouldn't know what kind of job your uncle, who you were living with,
was doing?
A. No; it is an official building, lots of people would live in the same
building live there. There were doctors and engineers, professions. Once the ago
behind the doors you don't know what the were doing. I know what his profession
was.
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Q. Did he make an effort to not let you know what his job was?
A. It never entered my mind to ask him what particular things he was doing.
Q. Did you live with him?
A. Yes, and it was understood that the job that he is doing is not to be
discussed at home. He telephone number there was unlisted, only his wife knew
it. She have me his telephone number once I called him. He was upset and he told
me never to call his telephone number again. I thought it was sick.
Q. You have no idea what his actual function was?
A. Sometimes he brought books home and they would be concerned with-just a
minute, I don't know how to translate the name of the college he finished-can we
go off the record?
Q. Ask the question on the record.
A. For example, a person working with the wood, the forest, it doesn't mean a
ranger or lumberjack, but you have to study all about grains, mathematics, and
things.
Q. Are you saying the books he brought home were concerned with wood?
A. The industry, everything having to do with the wood. That is what he
mentioned. Sometimes like college kids would have exams and he would be present
and check their papers, too, once a year.
Q. Did your uncle ever express any views to you about the United States?
A. Oh, yes, every time I mentioned something about America and other countries,
he said, well, you think everything in foreign countries are better, he said
they have just as much junk as we do. He was quite patriotic.
Q. Did he ever say he liked or disliked the United States?
A. My opinion was that he did like it because we had a subscription to American
Magazine that was prohibited by law but until then we always had it.
Q. Did your uncle ever mention President Kennedy?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. To your knowledge, is he still alive?
A. I don't know if I would hear if he died, because he was pretty old then. He
had one heart attack. My aunt was pampering him all the time. She was afraid he
was going to die.
Q. Do you recall the name of the person who introduced you to Lee harvey Oswald?
A. I forgot most of the Russian names. Do you have any names. Could you have any
names with you? I can tell you if it is correct or not.
Q. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you you testifies to the warren
commission it was Yuri Mereginsky?
A. I don't remember anybody by that name, but it is probably correct.
Q. M-E-R-E-G-I-N-S-K-Y? Do you recall-
A. That is probably correct but I do not remember it.
Q. When I say that name, do you remember the person?
A. No.
Q. Nothing at all?
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A. No, because it was a group of young men around and right now in my mind I
can't remember exactly what the figures looked like who introduced me to this is
so and this is so and so.
Q. Could you tell us what were the circumstances under which you were introduced
to Lee Harvey Oswald?
A. I had a date. I was invited for the dance and I promised the boy for 6 months
that I would go to the ball with him. We were there. It was another group of
people and I was introduced to him by somebody.
Q. Was it just-was it a coincidence that you were introduced to him or did
somebody intend you to meet him, did somebody want you to meet this particular
person?
A. It was a coincidence.
Q. You have no recollection of the person that actually introduced you to him?
A. No.
Q. You have no recollection of the person Yuri Mereginsky?
A. No I wish I knew who it was.
Q. Do you recall what year you and Lee Harvey Oswald left the Soviet Union?
A. I believe it was June 1962.
Q. Was it unusual for a Soviet woman who had married an American to be granted
permission to leave the country?
A. I was surprised they granted me permission, I really was.
Q. Do you have any idea why you were granted permission?
A. I considered it just being lucky.
Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever indicate to you whether he knew how come you were
allowed to leave the country?
A. He had his doubts as well.
Q. he had his doubts as to whether you would be---
A. As to whether I would be able to leave.
Q. Did you ever say to him, "Why do you suppose they let me Leave?"
A. A don't remember if I ever asked him this question but I sure did ask myself.
Q. Did he ever say anything after you were granted permission?
A. We were just very happy that we would be going to go.
Q. Do you recall when you were informed that you would be allowed to leave?
A. I could be May.
Q. I am not asking so much for the date as for where you were, where he was and
just in what manner you were informed.
A. I think we received some kind of letter, or information, it was through the
mail. Nobody came and announced.
Q. Were you both, that means you and Lee Harvey Oswald, present when you opened
that particular letter?
A. I don't remember whether I was alone or he read it-had the message.
Q. Do you remember what his reaction was when he first learned that they were
going to allow you to leave?
A. Oh, whoopee, you know.
Q. Was it a surprise?
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A. It was a joyful event.
Q. What I am asking is did he appear to be surprised that you were allowed to
leave or did she seem maybe to expect that you would be able to leave?
A. He did not expect that. I felt like I was just worthless to the Russians so
they just let me go. That is the only explanation I can give because I have a
very bad characteristic from work.
Q. I should indicate for the record that the U.S. attorney, U.S. Attorney
Mighell just entered the room and gave me a piece of paper and then left the
room.
Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever speak to you at any time about-I mean after you were
granted this permission, did he ever speak to you about how it came about that
you were granted this permission to leave?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Would you tell me what physical markings you recall on the body of Lee Harvey
Oswald, I mean any scars, anything that you could describe, any marks on his
body?
A. He had a thin scar on his wrist.
Q. Which wrist?
A. The one he wore his watch on, I don't know whether it was right or left.
Q. The one he wore his watch on?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was the scar?
A. On the inside.
Q. You pointed to the inside of your left wrist.
A. Yes.
Q. Any other scars on his body?
A. I think one behind his ear.
Q. Do you recall which ear?
A. No.
Q. The one behind his ear, was it noticeable?
A. Maybe it wasn't noticeable; you had to look for it.
Q. Could it bee seen without pushing his hair back or was it---
A. No; you could not see it.
Q. You had to look for it to see it.
A. yes.
Q. To your knowledge did he have any other marks on his body?
A. I don't remember. I don't think he had an appendix scar.
Q. The Warren Commission questioned you and you testified that at certain times
FBI agents spoke with you, is that correct?
A. I recall that we had some visits from some men and since I didn't speak any
English, I have been told by Lee that is was FBI man. Then once that I remember,
it was an agent who claimed to be from the FBI. It was Ruth Paine, the agent
from the FBI came, and he spoke to me through her. he was the interpreter.
Q. What did she tell you the FBI man said?
A. He said-he asked questions if I had been approached by any foreign agent at
any time since I arrived from Russia and would I tell him or call him right away
if anybody would do such a thing.
Q. Do you recall the name of the FBI agent?
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A. Since I have been listening to the news and testified a few times, I think
the name is Hastings, but as far as remembering the man being introduced by this
name at the time, I do not.
Q. Is the name James Hosty, familiar?
A. Yes; that is familiar, that is the name of an associate with the man who came
to the house with Ruth Paine.
Q. Now, you testified before the Warren Commission that at sometime in August
1962 Lee Harvey Oswald went outside and spoke to some FBI men for a couple of
hours?
A. If I testified to it, that is probably--I mean that is true.
Q. Do you remember right now as you sit here today, do you remember that
incident where he went outside and spoke to FBI agents?
A. Very vaguely. Was it in Fort Worth?
Q. I believe that was what your testimony was.
A. That is the memory that I have, that it was in Fort Worth.
Q. Do you recall anything he said to you after he finished speaking to the FBI
men?
A. I recall when he came inside he was quite upset over it and wished that they
had left him alone.
Q. What did he tell you about his relationship with the FBI? What were his
feelings toward the FBI?
A. The information that he gave me and his reasons for being upset was because
he said he was annoyed by them checking on him; the only reason for that is that
he just returned from Russia.
Q. Were the feelings that he expressed about the FBI-did they ever change or was
he always annoyed at them?
A. I think he was annoyed all the time.
Q. Was there any time when he ever appeared to like them or to be friendly with
them?
A. I don't think so. I think he was reserved and polite and that was it. I
didn't hear the conversation. If I did, it was in a different language anyway, I
mean from mine.
Q. I am talking more about what he would say to you at times when he was alone
with you about his contacts with the FBI. Did he ever appear to be friendly
toward them?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. This agent Hosty--
A. Excuse me, what do you mean, invite for a cup of coffee and be very
hospitable, is that what you mean?
Q. You testified before the Warren commission and to us just now at times he was
angry with them for bothering him. What I am asking you is, were there any other
times when he might have said to you, "Gee, I like the FBI; I think they do a
good job," or something like that?
A. No; he never said that.
Q. This agent James Hosty who spoke with you at one time, have you ever seem or
spoken to him since the date of the assassination?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Since you spoke to the Warren Commission, have FBI agents come and
interviewed you at any time or spoken to you at any time since you testified
before the Warren Commission?
A. I testified for the Warren Commission I believe three times.
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Q. Right.
A. You mean after the third time did they ever contact me?
Q. That is correct.
A. If I have been in contact with them, it does not have anything to do with the
warren Commission testimony.
Q. My question, I will make it more specific, did they ever contact your or you
have contact with them on anything relating to the Warren Commission or the
assassination of President Kennedy?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware that a short time before the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald
delivered a note to the FBI office in Dallas addressed to agent Hosty?
A. When I heard this on the news, I was surprised.
Q. When you heard it on the news, was that the first time that you ever knew
anything about this?
A. That was news to me that a note like that even existed. I had my doubts
because knowing a little bit of Lee's personality and my knowledge he had been
annoyed by the FBI and wanted to be left alone, I wondered if he would go-I
don't know the right word for it-and threaten somebody with a note. The content
of the note I found out through the news media. I seriously doubt---
Q. Forgetting what the news said the content of the note was, you had no
indication from him that he had ever written a note to them?
A. I do not remember that. He slightly mentioned something. I do not recall at
all because I was surprised when I heard on the news. It didn't bring any
memories, like, well, I forgot. Lee said, "Well, I am going"--he mentioned he
was going to talk to them and tell them to stop harassing him, that is true, but
I don't recall that he mentioned anything about the note.
Q. Did you tell him that they were harassing you?
A. No; I just told him about the incident that the man came alone and what he
asked me and it make him angry.
Q. It make Lee Harvey Oswald angry?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he say what he was going to do, that he was going to do anything about
it?
A. He said he was going to ask them to leave me out of all these visits.
Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald tell you that he spoke to the FBI when he was arrested
in New Orleans?
A. I don't remember that.
Q. Are you surprised to learn that Lee Harvey Oswald, upon being arrested in New
Orleans, asked to speak to the FBI?
A. I didn't know that he asked to speak to the FBI.
Q. I am saying if I were to tell you that, that he did do that, would that
surprise you?
A. Really not, because I think the FBI is a Government branch and beside the
police, to call somebody else when it is something international you don't call
the police; you would call the FBI, that is what I would call.
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Q. When the Warren Commission took your testimony they asked you if to your
knowledge did Lee Harvey Oswald ever work for the FBI. And you testified he
didn't.
(Witness shook her head no.)
Q. Is there anything you have thought of or learned in the intervening years
which might make you either change your answer or question whether he might have
worked for the FBI?
A. You know, so many different speculative things have been raised through the
news media--
Q. I am not saying things you read in the newspaper, I am saying from your won
personal memories.
A. No; not from my personal life.
Q. Let me say this before going further. All the questions I am asking you I
would like you to answer from your own personal knowledge and memory of events
and, unless I specifically ask for it, I would hope you would not answer any
questions based on what you read in the newspaper or saw on television.
A. Yes; it is very confusing.
Q. I want to make that clear.
A. Whatever you are asking right now, it will be from my personal memory. OK.
Q. Have any people ever contacted you either before or after the assassination
and identified themselves as members of the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. No.
Q. Have any people ever contacted you either before of after the assassination
and identified themselves as agents for any U.S. Government agency?
A. No. You are a government representative, so--
Q. That is correct, so other than myself, has anybody ever contacted and asked
you or told you anything relating to Lee Harvey Oswald or relating to the
assassination of the President?
A. I give the answer no first but now, since I look back, I have been surrounded
by FBI agents and Secret Service men all the time. I didn't ask for
identification all the time.
Q. The FBI and Secret Service, any other Government agents?
A. No.
Q. Now, you testified before the Warren Commission that after Lee Harvey Oswald
was arrested in Dallas you had one oportunity to speak with him; is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. To the best of your recollection would you tell us everything that was said
at that time by you and by him?
A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember the details of the conversation. The
thing I recall was it was in jail and it was a glass window and we spoke by the
telephone, or through the telephone.
Q. Did you speak in English or Russian?
A. In Russian. He pointed with his eyes on the telephone and the way I
understood it was that he tried to say it was bugged so be careful what you say
so we just spoke about the casual things at home. That is all I can recall. I
was thinking you probably have documents of the conversation.
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Q. I just wanted your remarks.
A. I just asked him what the bruise was about, how he was feeling. He assured me
not to worry, everything would be all right.
Q. When he told you everything would be all right, did he give you any
indication of why he thought it would be all right?
A. He did speak to his mother as well, or brother. Since I didn't speak English,
I thought maybe he have them places that they might call for help, a lawyer. He
mentioned to me something about Red Cross. If I need anything that is where I
should call.
Q. On the date of the assassination he was working in the Texas School Book
Depository; is that correct?
A. That is right.
Q. Did he discuss with you that job at any time?
A. If he did, I don't remember what he was telling about the job, anything
specific.
Q. Did he ever have any conversation with you about whether he could take that
particular job?
A. I don't remember.
Why not, a job was a job and it wasn't very easy for him to find a job. I would
welcome any job he could get.
Q. you testified before the Warren Commission that you spoke to him on the
Thursday right before the assassination. The assassination was on Friday; is
that correct?
A. Yes. I don't remember the dates but, if you say it was a Thursday, I believe
you.
Q. Do you remember seeing him-
A. The night before? Yes.
Q. The night before.
Did he discuss with you at that time the fact that the President would come to
Dallas the next day?
A. Yes; he did.
Q. Did he discuss the fact that the President would be passing by the Texas
School Book Depository?
A. No. I kept asking questions because I was very curious about President
Kennedy being in Dallas. It was very exciting and his answers were very, very
cold and he looked like he didn't want to talk about it.
Q. You also testified before the Warren Commission that he had mentioned on that
day renting an apartment in Dallas; do you recall that?
A. We were separated not for the reasons of having a divorce or something like
that, it was because of the financial difficulties and there was only one way we
could manage to save some money, if we lived apart. He wanted to come back; we
were planning to get together as soon as possible, so he did mention the
apartment.
Q. Do you remember him saying, on that day before the assassination, if you
wanted he would rent an apartment in Dallas for you and him to live together?
A. I think so.
Q. Did he indicate to you-I withdraw that.
A. I think we had an argument that week or the night before, I don't know,
because when I tried to contact him at his apartment by the
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number he gave me, they say there is no such person living there so he
apparently didn't give the right name to them so I was very frustrated-I don't
know why he shouldn't use his own name, why he should hide.
Q. Do you recall testifying before the Warren Commission that he was very
secretive?
A. Yes; he was.
Q. How else was he secretive; what else did he do that was secretive? A. I would
like to learn English, I would like to meet neighbors because it was very lonely
to live all by yourself. He didn't want me to speak to anybody or even try to.
He didn't want them to find out I was from Russia. I didn't think is was that
embarrassing.
Q. Did he ever tell you why he didn't want people to know you were from Russia?
A. The way I understand, it looks like in this couantry people would be very
suspicious of people coming from Communist country and he doesn't want people to
stare at us or give us any difficulty; that was his explanation. I found out
differently ever since.
Q. Did he hide the fact that he had been to Russia? Did he try to hide that from
people?
A. I think so.
Q. Did he hide the fact that he wanted to go to Cuba? Did he hide that from
people?
A. Sure.
Q. Do you remember this particular discussing the day before the assassination
about him renting an apartment in Dallas?
A. I think so.
Q. What was your answer to his suggestion that he do so?
A. I really don't remember. I don't remember if I was still angry with him; I
really don't recall.
Q. Do you recall if he said when in particular he would rent this apartment?
A. The location, no.
Q. Not the location but when he would rent it?
A. In the very near future, maybe a week or two.
Q. Do you recall how he got a job in the Texas School Book Depository building?
A. Through a friend.
Q. Do you recall what particular friend?
A. I think it was Ruth Paine, but I am not sure. The way I remember right now I
think she was the one who was very helpful and she spoke to somebody she knew
who worked there. I was very happy she helped him find a job.
Q. Were you present when Lee Harvey Oswald first learned he could have a job in
the Texas School Book Depository?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Was it you who told him about the job?
A. Maybe it was Ruth. I probably was present because it is all in the same
house.
Maybe he went over there and they told him he can have a job. I really don't
recall at all how it was all about.
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Q. At the time that he took the job in the Texas School book Depository, were
you aware of any other offers that he had for jobs in other places?
A. You se, I read sonce so that is a very confusing-
Q. I am not interested in what you read.
A. I don't remember if I knew or not.
Q. If he would have had another job offer at the same time for more money, can
you think of any reason why he might have taken the job in the Texas School Book
Depository instead of another job?
A. I do believe he did like Ruth and, since she went to all the trouble to get
the job for him, I think that would have been the courteous thing to do.
Q. Do you think he might have taken a job for less money just because hi liked
Ruth?
A. No; it doesn't sound logical.
Q. I am asking you, you knew the man.
A. I wish I did know the man. I thought I did but apparently I didn't.
Q. From what you knew, would he turn down a job for more money?
A. To tell the truth, we were very poor and I think a better offer of a job
would probably be more likely he would take.
Q. Did he ever indicate to you he could have had a job-
A. Unless he didn't like the person maybe, he would not.
Q. Did he ever indicate to you he could have had another job which would have
paid more than the job at the Texas School Book Depository?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did he like photography?
A. I don't think so. That is a very expensive hobby.
Q. To your knowledge, did he own-will, did he own a camera?
A. I really don't remember.
Q. Did he own any kind of--
A. I remember in Russia, he took pictures. It was our camera or somebody's
camera but I know he was taking pictures. I do believe it was our camera because
he was carrying it with him.
Q. When you lived in Texas did he own a camera?
A. I don't recall but, according to some pictures we had he might have because
he had some pictures that were taken recently, I mean during our living there. I
do believe he probably had. But I would not recognize the camera. If somebody
said was that yours, I would not claim it.
Q. Did he ever to your knowledge have any photography equipment, like developing
or other photography equipment?
A. I don't remember.
Q. You don't remember anything?
A. I don't remember. What would that include?
Q. I mean any kind of equipment that would relatek to photography other than a
camera, for example, equipment so he could develop film, anything like that?
A. I don't know anything about photography.
Q. Did he have any kind of equipment that you ever saw and-
A. Didn't he work once with some kinds of photography? He could use their
equipment.
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Q. I can't answer the question. I have to ask you the questions.
A. Oh, I am sorry about that.
Q. Did he ever have possession of any equipment for developing film that you
know of?
A. I can honestly say I do not remember.
Q. I want to mark these two photographs. On the back of the first one, which I
would ask be marked JFK committee exhibit No. 1, it says in the bottom
right-hand corner copy from the National Archives, records group No. 272, under
that it says CE-133B. I will ask that be marked JFK exhibit No. 1.
(The above referred to photograph was marked JFK committee exhibit No. 1 for
identification.)
Q. New, this second picture that I will ask to be marked says copy from the
National Archives, record group No. 272, CE-133. I would ask that this be marked
JFK committee exhibit No. 2.
(The above referred to photograph was marked JFK committee exhibit No. 2 for
identification.)
By Mr. KLEIN:
Q. I will show you those two photographs which are marked JFK exhibit No. 1 and
exhibit No. 2, do you recognize those two photographs?
A. I sure do. I have seen them many times.
Q. What are they?
A. That is the pictures that I took.
Q. What do you recall as far as the circumstances leaking up to you taking these
pictures and when you actually took them and what happened?
A. I do believe it was a weekend and he asked me to take a picture of him and I
refused because I don't know how to take pictures. That is the only pictures I
ever took in my whole life. So we argued over it and I thought the pose, or
whatever he was wearing was just horrible, but he insisted that I just click,
just push the button and I believe I did it twice and that was it. I do not know
whether he developed them, at home or somewhere else, I have no idea.
Q. What is he wearing in those photographs and what is he holding?
A. What was a surprise for me was for him to hold his rifle and a pamphlet, some
kind of newspaper. It puzzled me, it was a ridiculous way to pose for a picture.
Q. Does he also have a pistol in his arm?
A. I don't see that, it looks like it-yes, I see now.
Q. And you recall testifying about these same two photographs when you testified
to the Warren Commission?
A. Yes; I remember them asking if I ever took the pictures and I had completely
forgotten because it was only once in my life and I didn't know who to take
pictures. Yes, when they showed me that, yes, I did take the pictures.
Q. The camera you took them on, was that Lee Harvey Oswald's camera?
A. I believe so.
Q. Was it the same one he had in Russia or a different one, do you
know?
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A. I don't know, but I do believe it could be the same.
Q. What did he tell you to do with the camera as far as taking the pictures?
A. He just told me which button to push and I did.
Q. Did you hold it up to your eye and look through the viewer to take the
picture?
A. Yes.
Q. And after you took the picture what did you do after you took the first
picture?
A. I went into the house and did things I had to attend to.
Q. How many pictures did you take?
A. I think I took two.
Q. When you took the first picture you held it up to your eye?
A. Yes; that is what I recall.
Q. What did you do next?
A. I believe he did something with it and told me to push it again.
Q. The first time you pushed it down to take the picture?
A. Yes.
Q. And the first time, what happened before you took the second picture?
A. He changed his pose.
Q. What I am getting at is, did you give the camera to him so he would move the
film forward or did you do that?
A. He did that.
Q. So you took the picture and handed the camera to him?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he do?
A. He said, "Once again," and I did it again.
Q. So he have you back the camera?
A. For the second time; yes.
Q. Did he put the rifle down?
A. You see, that is the way I remember it.
Q. Did he put the rifle down on the ground between--
A. I don't remember. I was so annoyed with all this procedure so the sooner I
could get through, the better, so I don't recollect.
Q. But you do remember taking the picture?
A. Yes; I am the one who took the picture and the weather was right.
Q. What did you say?
A. Somebody speculated the picture couldn't be taken; the weather was wrong.
Q. I am not interested in what people speculated.
A. There is nobody to blame for it but me.
Q. When you took the first picture and you gave him the camera, did you walk
over to him and give him the camera or did he walk over to you?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Are these the only two pictures you ever took in your life at least up to
that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you taken any pictures since then?
A. I try at home, to photograph the kids at home with a Poloroid camera. They
didn't come out right.
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Q. When you took the picture did he tell you to hold your hands steady?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you try to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. After you took the two pictures-were there just two that you took?
A. Yes; as far as I remember.
Q. When you say as far as you remember, could there have been more than you
took?
A. I don't think so. You mean the same day, if that is the only pictures?
Q. The same day at the same time you sure you only took two?
A. I remember I clicked the thing twice. If it was four times or six times, I
don't have any more pictures to prove it. I remember definitely two.
Q. Could it have been more than two?
A. If it could be more, I would tell you I remember, it was four times or a
whole hour.
Q. I am asking are you sure it was two or are you not sure, or it was at least
two?
A. At least two. I am not sure because I do not remember all the details. I
remember definitely two and it wasn't clothers changing and another session.
Q. What I am getting at is are you sure you didn't take three, for example?
A. No; I am not sure.
Q. Do you know what he did with the film after these pictures were taken?
A. No; I don't.
Q. Did there come a time when he showed you photographs? In other words, when he
had the film developed and showed you the photographs?
A. I really don't remember that. He probably did.
Q. You don't remember if he ever showed them to you?
A. There is a lot of things I don't remember by now.
Q. I am just asking, I am not saying you should or shouldn't remember, I am just
trying to clarify what you are saying. Are you saying you don't know if you ever
saw these pictures while he was alive and you were with him?
A. Right now it is not clear in my memory. I have seen the pictures so many
times, I don't know if it was the Warren Commission report, the news media, or I
saw them at the apartment.
Q. You are not sure when you first saw the pictures?
A. I am not sure.
Q. Do you know if you ever saw them in his presence, that is Lee Harvey Oswald?
A. I do not remember right now. But I did, in the testimony before the warren
commission, if I said I did, I did.
Q. But do you have any recollection now?
A. No; I don't
Q. Do you have any recollection of him ever saying anything about these
particular poses or the photographs?
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A. Let me turn back what strikes my memories, George de Mohrenschildt came--I am
not trying to confuse you, you know, give you a false statement. I try to get my
memory to go. What strikes me, I think I was surprised that he showed pictures
to George de Mohrenschildt because I thought the rifle and the gun, first of all
I was always against it so, if in my memory I remember being surprised at him
showing pictures like that to George, so apparently I saw them at the apartment.
Q. You remember him showin the pictures to George?
A. Something strikes my memory that how dare he show pictures like that to a
friend.
Q. Would you think about it for a few moments and tell me if you can remember
anything else about him showing either or both of these photographs to George de
Mohrenschildt?
A. I don't want to cast shadows on somebody that is maybe innocent and comments
they maybe did not make.
Q. I am not asking you to say anything good or bad about Mr. De Mohrenschildt,
just simply tell me if you remember that particular incident, him showing these
pictures to George de Mohrenschildt.
A. It is so hard to dig in your memory 13 years ago.
Q. Take your time.
A. I vaguely remember because it still strikes my memory it surprised me that he
showed them to him, so apparently it was at the apartment.
Q. When he was arrested and you spoke to him at the jail, did he say anything
about these photographs?
A. No.
Q. May I be excused for a second?
A. At this time it is approximately 5 minutes after 12, and at the request of
Mrs. Porter we will take a break for a few minutes.
(A short recess was taken)
By Mr. KLEIN:
Q. I is now approximately 10 minutes after 12.
I didn't speak to you at all during the break, did I?
A. No; I didn't see you during the break.
Q. You left the room?
A. Yes.
Q. The same people are present, Clifford Fenton, Mrs, McGrath, myself, and you,
you being Marina Oswald Porter.
When you took that break I was asking you some questions about these two
photographs which we marked JFK exhibit 1 and JFK exhibit 2. I just wanted to
clarify one thing. You said that Lee Harvey Oswald was the one who moved the
film forward after you took the first picture?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. Do you recall exactly what happened? You snapped the first picture; did you
give him the camera at the point?
A. I don't remember. I think I did. I probably did because I don't know what to
do with it and he insisted on the second take so he had to do whatever had to be
done with the camera.
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Q. So you didn't.
A. I didn't know the procedure to take one picture from the other.
Q. So to move it forward, you must have given him the camera; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether you were standing in the same place when you took both
of these pictures?
A. I think I was.
Q. What is the address where these pictures were taken?
A. I don't know.
Q. Where was it?
A. It is in Dallas. I think it is the Oak Leaf area.
Q. You were also telling us that you remember that he showed one or both of
these photographs to George de Mohrenschildt; is that right?
A. I vaguely remember or try to remember.
Q. Do you remember anything about that, what was said, who was present?
A. I do not remember what was said but I believe George and G-E-A-N-E-A, his
wife, were there.
Q. What did you say?
A. I am trying to clear my memory. I do not remember the details of the
conversation, but why I think I remember this incident was I was surprised at
him showing these pictures to George.
Q. Do you recall anything he said to George when he showed them to him?
A. No; I don't.
Q. Do you have any knowledge of what happened to the originals of these
photographs?
A. I assume the Warren Commission or FBI or police have them.
Q. Do you have any knowledge of what happened to them after Lee Oswald had them
developed?
A. What happened to them?
Q. What he did with them.
A. He probably kept them in his closet where he kept all his junk.
Q. Do you know that or are you just guessing?
A. I am just guessing because I didn't have them among my things or anywhere
around, lying around the living room or bedroom.
Q. To your knowledge, were any copies make of these photographs before the
assassination?
A. No; I don't.
I can see the position of his hands are changed.
Q. Do you know whether Lee Harvey Oswald might have given a copy of this
photograph to anybody?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did he ever speak to you about these photographs at any time after taking
them?
A. No.
What was there to talk about?
Q. And you never had a copy of either of these photographs?
A. Apparently they were in the apartment.
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Q. I am saying did you have the original or a copy of these photographs before
the assassination?
A. Apparently they were at the apartment.
Q. I am saying personally--
A. Me as a memento, no.
Q. Did you ever possess a copy of these photographs, have it in your possession?
A. For me to keep?
Q. Yes.
A. Not that I remember. I wasn't that enthused about these pictures. Q. Did you
ever write anything on the back of either the original or a copy of one of these
photographs?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever write a note or anything to George de Mohrenschildt on the back
of the original or a copy?
A. No.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes.
Q. Who had the money in your family?
A. Lee.
Q. Who possessed it?
A. He did.
Q. He possessed it?
A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge did he ever come up with money that was unaccounted for,
you know, all of a sudden he had more money than he should have?
A. He just gave me a grocery allowance; that is all I had.
Q. Were you aware of how much money he had at any time?
A. No; it is not my habit to go and check through somebody's pockets. I knew
there was some money he tried to save but I never went and tried to count,
unless he told me to.
Q. Did you ever see him with an amount of money or did he give you an amount of
money and you wondered where did he get that much money?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall that when you left Moscow that he sighned a promissory note to
the U.S. Embassy there for $435?
A. He told me about it, that he had to borrow money from the Government.
Q. He paid that back; is that correct?
A. To my knowledge he did.
Q. Are you aware that he paid $10 a month for a number of months but then in
December 1962 he paid $190?
A. No; I don't know about that. I know he paid little by little by little.
Anyway, we had to save for it to pay it.
Q. Are you aware of that, that he paid $190 at one time?
A. No.
Q. Then January 9, 1963, about a month later from December 11, 1962, a month
later he paid $100?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Then January 29, 1963, 20 days later, he paid $106?
A. I am not aware of that.
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Q. Does it surprise you from a period of December 11, 1962, to January 29, 1963,
which is approximately 1 1/2 months, he was able to pay-
A. Does it surprise me right now?
Q. Almost $400. Does it surprise you that he could pay almost $400 in 1 1/2
months?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this the first time that you ever learned about it, right now?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any idea how he could have come up with that much money?f
A. No.
Q. Did he ever mention to you paying off this note?
A. I have just little peanuts he gave to me. How much was left I don't know.
Q. Does this seem like a lot of money for him to pay off in a month and a half?
A. Yes.
Q. From your knowledge of his finances?
A. Yes. How much did he make per week, do you know?
Q. Do you know how much he made per week?
A. He told me like $55 a weed, then another job was $65 a week; that is what I
remember.
Q. Now, if that was his salary, you don't have any knowledge of how he came up
with the sums I just mentioned?
A. No; I don't remember anybody giving him the money or he had an extra job
where he earned the money. I could guess maybe his brother lent it to him, the
money to pay the debt.
Q. If he would have had an extra job, would it be fair to say you would have
known about that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think it would be possible to have an extra job without your knowing
about it?
A. No, because then he would have to come later from work than he would come. If
he had na extra job, he would let me know.
Q. So you would have known if he had an extra job?
A. Yes. His brother was very helpful, so that could be the source of his extra
money.
Q. Did your husband ever mention the name Hunt; H-U-N-T ?
A. No.
Q. Are you sure?
A. Yes. Right now I am sure, if I said before than maybe I just don't remember
the name.
Q. Did you ever hear about a letter-withdraw that.
A. That he supposedly wrote?
Q. I don't want to hear what the media may have said, I want to know if you have
any knowledge of him writing a letter to anybody hamed Hunt?
A. No.
Q. Did he write many letters to people?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see him writing a letter to anybody?
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A. To his mother while we were in Russia.
Q. Other than in Russia?
A. He wrote to our friends in Russia.
Q. Did he enjoy writing?
A. Yes; I think so.
Q. When you met him in Russia, what kind of work was he doing?
A. He was working at a radio factory. It is something equivalent to our Texas
Instruments right here.
Q. What did he do in particular, do you know?
A. I know it was a very plain job. Some kind of mechanical job.
Q. Is it correct that when you testified to the Warren Commission you said that
he was living in an apartment in Russia and that you had always dreamed about
that particular apartment?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you suppose he had enough income to pay the rent for that apartment?
A. In Russia you don't pay as much for your apartment, you pay only a certain
portion of your salary. If you make $400, you pay $40 for the same apartment, if
you make $600, you pay $60.
Q. It was not unusual he could afford that apartment?
A. No. It was unusual for young men without family to live in an apartment like
that, but they usually granted better positions for a foreigner in Russia.
Q. Was it unusual for single foreigner to live in an apartment like that?
A. No, it was not unusual for a single foreigner but, if he was Russian, he
would not live in an apartment like that.
Q. Did he have many Russian friends?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember his closest friends?
A. I remember one name-there was one young man who visited us quite often-maybe
you can help me to remember the name, I don't remember.
Q. I don't have the name.
A. All the names I mentioned in the Warren Commission. He had one that I don't
think I ever met, maybe once, or maybe never met, but he mentioned him, that he
spoke to him at work, then one that visited us. Then he had-we had close friends
that I met through him, Mr. Ziger.
Q. Could you spell that as best you could?
A. Z-I-G-E-R. Mr. Ziger.
Q. This is a friend--
A. They were immigrants from Argentina.
Q. He knew them in the United States?
A. He knew them before and through him I met them.
Q. In Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he correspond with any people in Russia after coming with you to the
United States?
A. I think so.
Q. Did he write them letters?
A. Yes.
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Q. Did they write him letters?
A. I do believe we received some mail.
Q. Do you know what happened to those letters?
A. No; I wrote some of my friends and I got answers but, after all this
happened, my letters never go through.
Q. I am not as much interested right now in your letters, I want to know did he
write letters to his friends in Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the names of any people who he wrote ot or who wrote him?
A. I think it is the same friends that we had before, I have fort the names.
Q. Did he ever say anything about these letters that he received from them or
what he said to them?
A. It was just a friendly contact and, of course, we discussed it when we
crceived the letters back.
Q. Were you allowed to read the letters he received?
A. They were written in Russian language.
Q. You speak Russian, so did he show the letters to you or just tell you about
them?
A. Yes.
Q. He showed you the letters?
A. Yes; but I don't remember what they were about or who from, it wasn't
anything so important.
Q. Are you now a citizen of the United States?
A. I am not. I would love to be.
Q. Is there a reason why you are not at this time?
A. The only reason is my own, because I do not take the time to study the
Constitution and keep up with the politics, up to date, and with a busy
household you don't have time really to sit down and study and I don't want to
fail the exams, it is very embarrassing.
Q. Has anybody ever indicated to you that you couldn't become a citizen?
A. I don't believe-in the earlier testimonies to the FBI sometimes when I was
very difficult and didn't want to answer the questions, sometimes it has come
up, "Well, would you like to live in this country?" I felt it was a little
threat. I didn't know if I had a constitutional right to anything then.
Q. You testified about that to the Warren Commission?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Since you testified before the warren commission has anybody else ever made
that same suggestion to you?
A. No.
Q. You are familiar with Pricilla Johnson?
A. Sure.
Q. How do you know her?
A. Oh, I met her when she came here with the offer to write a book about my life
and we worked for quite a few months together. I gave her all the information
that she needed. That was 13 years ago.
Q. When did you first meet her?
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A. Thirteen years ago, I don't remember the exact date.
Q. Where?
A. She--I believe she came to my house.
Q. In Russia?
A. No; right here.
Q. In Texas?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did she come, what was the purpose?
A. I had many offers from differnt writers to write the book and I didn't think
it was right for me to do so. I was embarrassed. She keep sending telegrams and
telephone calls, she would like to meet me and we talk things over. I still
refused. Finally, later on she told me she decided to see me in person and, when
we met, I liked her, so agreed. There was an agreement between us, I gave her
information so she could write a book.
Q. Was it the first time you ever met her or saw her after the assassination?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she ever indicate to you she had met your husband?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said when she worked in Russia for some magazine, she worked there for a
year or two, and she would like to have an interview with Lee, but he granted it
ot another lady reporter instead of her. She spoke but full Russian, so that was
another point that helped me to make up my mink she is the right person.
Q. This book that is coming out, I believe you have a book coming out next
month?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything in that book which relates to Lee Harvey Oswald or to the
assassination of the President which you have not told the Warren commission and
which you have not told me? What I mean is something about Lee Harvey Oswald
which relates to the assassination of the President?
A. I don't know, I didn't read the book.
Q. You know what you told Priscilla Johnson.
A. I told her everything I know. I told everything I know to the Warren
Commission.
Q. I am saying in sitting down for these many months and telling her everything
you know, did you come across anything that might have popped into your mind you
might have forgotten about when you were talking about the book?
A. I would have to read the book, the Warren Commission report and see if I
forgot to put it there, things like that.
Q. Just give me 1 moment.
I asked you before whether you had any contacts since the assassination with any
U.S. Government agency. Have you had any contacts since the assassination with
any foreign, with any agencies of any foreign governments.
A. No.
Q. Had you had any contacts since coming to the United States with Lee Harvey
Oswald, were you ever contacted by any agency of the Soviet Government?
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A. No.
Q. Were you ever contacted by any agent of the Cuban Government?
A. No.
Q. You testified before the Warren Commission that the name Hidell was used
because it rhymed with Fidel?
A. I assumed that.
Q. You assumed that?
A. I think we discussed that and I just jokingly made that, "Because it is
Fidel" and he said yes.
Q. Fore the record, somebody just opened the door and asked if somebody else was
here, and who was not here. That was a 1-moment interruption.
On these two pictures I have shown to you, committee exhibit 1 and committee
exhibit 2, can you give us an estimate, the best you can, how much time elapsed
between the time the first picture was taken and the second picture was taken?
A. No; I can't.
Q. Did you know how much a minute is?
A. OK, it could be 5 minutes. I don't know how long it takes to do whatever is
supposed to be done.
Q. You don't have any idea how long it took?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever taken-you said you have tried to take pictures since this time
of your children, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. When you took pictures, did you ever move the film forward?
A. No; I have a Polaroid camera, that is the only one I can use. I don't believe
how many pictured I ruined.
Q. Do you recall when you took these photographs about how far away from him you
were standing when you took it?
A. I know the little yard, the back yard wasn't very big. No; I don't know in
feet.
Q. Let me say this, the distance I am standing away from you now, do you think
this was more or less than when you took those photographs?
A. I wouldn't speculate. I don't know how many feet.
Q. You are just not sure?
A. No. The place still exists, you can measure it. I think it exists.
Q. The camera that you took the photographs with, do you know what happened to
that camera?
A. No.
Q. Do you know where he bought the camera?
A. No. I think that that is the camera he brought with him from America and kept
it in Russia and brought it back.
Q. Do you know what happened to it?
A. When they confiscated everything, they took it. I don't know.
Q. Were there any other photographs you possessed that were taken with that
camera?
A. I don't possess anything anymore, everything was confiscated, so if I have
pictures of my children, or whatever there were, they are from Archives,
everything was there.
Q. Were there any other pictures taken from you that were taken with the same
camera?
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A. Yes.
Q. What kind?
A. I don't know if it was the same camera, I assume it was that one.
Q. Did you ever see him with any other camera?
A. No. I do believe the pictures were taken in Russia of our friends, or my
baby, or me with that same camera, but it is for experts to figure it out if it
is the same camera.
Q. And those pictures you believe the Archives have?
A. Yes. i do not remember him purchasing a new camera in the United States.
Q. This camera, do you recall whether to take pictures with this camera, you
would look down into the viewfinder or whether you would hold the camera up to
your eye and look straight ahead?
A. I just recall I think it is straight.
Q. You would put the camera up by your eye?f
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember what color the camera was?
A. I think it was black.
Q. Do you remember anything else about it?
A. Not the name; no. But again, since I am not expert with the camera, that is
what I remember, I think?
Q. As I told you when we began, the entire statement has been taken down on that
stenotype machine. Mrs. McGrath is going to transcribe the statement and it will
be typed out so that you or anybody can read it.
A. Will that be a matter of public record?
Q. When it is typed out, it will be sent, an original copy will be sent to you
and you will be asked to read everything and after you read everything, if it is
correct, if it is correctly transcribed, what you said today, you will be asked
to sigh and verify-there will be a little form which you would be asked to sign
saying that transcript is fair and accurate account of your statement. You will
be given a copy to keep of the statement.
A. OK.
Q. Then when you sign it your will send back the signed statement that it is
accurate.
Now, if it is not an accurate account, that is, if when you read it there is
something in there which is incorrect, that is something that you didn't say,
there is an error, then I will ask you to call me up. You have my phone number
and you can call me collect.
What will have to happen is that we will go back before a magistrate, just like
the gentleman who swore you in and you will have to swear to the changes.
A. OK.
Q. If you call me I will arrange this if there are any inaccuracies in the
transcript.
Now, at this point, is there anything that you would like to say at all?
A. Yes, may I ask you a question?
Q. Sure.
A. For my own curiosity, what did you try to establish, a lost camera or that
two cameras took the pictures?
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Q. No; as I stated at the very, very beginning, we have read your testimony from
the Warren Commission report and in some areas either a particular subject
matter was not discussed, or it was discussed, it was not discussed in the
detail we would have liked to have seen it discussed. It was in these areas, a
number of them, I hoped to have asked you questions to clarify and get more
information in these areas which we-
A. OK but, since you dwelled so long on the subject, what detail did you try to
establish?
Q. I wasn't trying to establish anything, simply to try to get as much
information as I could about certain points which were of interest to us, not a
question of establishing simply trying to get--
A. I don't see how many feet away would make any difference.
Q. Just trying to get as much information as I could in certain subject areas,
one was the photographs, others which came up during the course of the
interrogation.
A. I am just curious whether somebody switched.
Q. If there is nothing further, then thank you very much.
The time is now approximately 12:47 p.m. and that is the end of the statement.
A. Thank you. That was short.
(Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the hearing was concluded)
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CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER
I, Jewel E. McGrath, shortand reporter, do hereby certify that the testimony of
the witness which appears in the foregoing deposition was taken by me in
shortand and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said
deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the
action in which this deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative
or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
Jewel E. McGrath
________________
Shorthand Reporter
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C O N T E N T S
Witness Direct Cross Redirect Recross
Marina Oswald Porter 1
EXHIBITS
Title Page
----- -----
JFK Committee Exhibit 1 32
JFK Committee Exhibit 2 32
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Blank Page
August 9, 1978
Page 349
DEPOSITION
------------
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION,
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter called for examination by counsel for the
committee, pursuant ot notice, in the offices of the committee, House Annex No.
2, Third and D Streets SW., Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:30 a.m., before
Annabelle Short, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, when were
present of behalf of the respective parties:
For the committee: James Wolf, counsel; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel;
Mrs. Caryl Emanuel, administrative assistant to Mr. Wolf; Ms. Surell Brady,
staff; James McDonald, counsel; and James M. Leahy, National Archives.
For the witness: James Hamilton, counsel.
Mr. WOLF. It should be noted the time now is 9:30 and it is August 9, 1978. We
are in the offices of the House Select Committee on Assassinations in
Washington, D.C., in the office of the deputy chief counsel, Gary Cornwell.
Present at the time are Gary cornwell, James Wolf, Surell Brady, members of the
select committee staff, James Hamilton, and Marina Oswald Porter.
Mr. HAMILTON. May I make a correction to that?
Mr. WOLF. Surely.
Mr. HAMILTON. I believe Mrs. Porter's name now is Mrs. Kenneth Porter or Mrs.
Marina Porter.
Mr. WOLF. I would ask at the current time that the court reporter administer an
oath to Mrs. Porter.
(Whereupon, Marina Porter was called as a witness by the committee and, having
been first duly sworn by the notary public, was examined and testified as
follows:)
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Hamilton, I believe I have previously given you copies of the
committee's rules and the committee resolutions, is that correct?
Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. porter, you are not under a subpena for the giving of the statement, is
that correct?
A. That is right.
Q. I would ask that all your responses that you gove today be from your present
memory and not from what has been written in the
(349)
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literature since 1963. If you have any question, if you don't understand any
question I pose, I would ask that you just state that on the record and I will
try and clarify my question.
You have previously given the committee one deposition and the same procedure
will be followed with this. We will give you a copy of this deposition and ask
you to read it and verify it and then return it to us. At that time we will give
you a copy of the deposition for your permanent records. Do you understand?
A. Yes.
Q. For the record I should say that pursuant to the committee rules I have been
designated by the committee as a counsel authorized to take statements under
oath.
Mrs. Porter, what was the first time that you met Lee Harvey Oswald?
A. When?
Q. Yes.
A. It was in Minsk, Russia, in 1960-I don't remember exactly, 1961 or 1962.
Q. What were the circumstances of that meeting?
A. I met him at a dance. I was a medical school event.
Q. How did you happen to go to that dance?f
A. I was invited by a student from the medical school to attend and I was
introduced to Lee by a mutual friend.
Q. Who was the friend that introduced you?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Could his name have been Yure Mereginsky? (phonetic)
A. I could be.
Q. do you recall that name?
A. I recall the name.
Q. Who was the individual?
A. As far as i remember right now he knew Lee and he was introduced to me first
and then he introduced Lee to me.
Q. You did not know him before that dance?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember who was the person who introduced you to Yuri?
A. no, I don't.
Q. What did Yure Mereginsky (phonetic) do?
A. Well, young people met sometimes in the street and talked or invited you to
their house, yes.
Q. What types of things did you do together with him?
A. We usually talked or listened to the music or just strolled in the street or
in the park.
Q. Do you recall any discussions you had with him about what topics you talked
about?
A. Well, since Lee was an American, of course young people were very interested
in life in other foreign countries so that was usually the discussion, about how
is the life in America.
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351
Q. Was he a native of Minsk?
A. I don't know.
Q. He was a student though?
A. He was living in Minsk at the time.
Q. How did he introduce you to Lee?
A. He introduced him as Alex Oswald, a friend of his.
Q. A friend of his?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he say how he knew Lee?
A. Not at the moment of introduction.
Q. Did he later say how he knew lee?
A. I do not recall.
Q. Was Lee a close friend of his or was he a casual acquaintance?
A. Just casual.
Q. Did Lee spend a lot of time with him when you were not present that you know
of?
A. I don't know about that.
Q. Did Lee discuss him frequently?
A. His name was mentioned occasionally if he would bump into him sometime or
visit him.
Q. What would Lee saw about him when he was discussing him?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did he ever discuss with you how he became knowledgable in obtaining a visa
to get into Russia?
A. He told me that he entered Finland as a tourist and went to the Russian
Embassy and asked them for a tourist visa and they granted it and then he
decided to stay.
Q. He asked the Russian Embassy in Finland for a tourist visa?
A. That is what he told me.
Q. Did he go directly to Russia from Finland?
A. I assume he did.
Q. Have you heard that he went from Finland to London prior to going to Russia?
A. I don't think so.
Q. You never heard that before?
A. If I heard it, I don't remember right now.
Q. Lee never discussed with you staying in London at any time during his
travels?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you how he knew the procedures for somebody who was
an American to defect once they got into Russia?
A. Well, he did not discuss procedure in detail like you would like me to
answer. Like the procedure, I do not know but he said when he was staying in
Russia as a tourist they did not permit him to stay any longer so he said that
he just give up his citizenship in order to stay.
Q. Did you ask him how he decided what steps to take at that time?
A. Pardon me?
Q. Did you ask him subsequently how did he know what to do?
A. Well, not really.
Q. Did he ever talk to you about it?
A. He probably did.
Q. What did he say to you about it?
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A. Well, I guess there is lots of redtape in Russia. You just have to go visit
them and big with them and plead with them.
Q. That was to obtain Russian citizenship?
A. Yes; there are lots of official papers to fill out.
Q. If you were a tourist in Russia, would you know what department or what
office to go to to try to obtain Russian citizenship?
A. I don't know.
Q. Is that generally known?
A. I would not think so.
Q. Excuse me?
A. I don't think so. I assume that you go to the Special Ministry of Internal
Affairs or Foreign Affairs, something like that.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his trips to the American Embassy when he was
trying to defect?
A. A little bit.
Q. What did he say about them?
A. Well, I cannot tell you in detail. He had a discussion with the American
Ambassador or representative of the American Government.
Q. What did he say about his discussions with the American representative?
A. Well, he told him that he could like to stay and he said he just throwed the
passport on the table in front of them and-
Excuse me. May I confer with my counsel?
Q. Surely.
(At this point the witness conferred with counsel.)
A. After that he went to the Russian authorities and asked them for political
asylum.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. That was after he had gone to the American Embassy?
A. That is what I recall right now.
Q. Did he mention to you the names of any of the Russian officials he dealt
with?
A. Later on when I have to go through all this legal procedure to apply for my
visa he told me the name of the man that he talked with before but I forget the
name right now, but he told me that was the same man he talked to before.
Q. What was that man's position?
A. I do not remember.
Q. Do you know what office he was with?
A. No. It was very scary to go through all this, policemen standing outside.
Q. What did he say about the Soviet officials questioning him when he went to
see that Soviet official?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you ask any questions about why he wanted to stay in Russia?
A. I don't know.
Q. When he discussed going to the American Embassy, what did he say about the
attitude of the American official after he had thrown his passport down?
A. I don't recall what exactly he said.
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Q. What were the names of the officials he met there?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't remember?
A. I don't remember. I did know at the time.
Q. Did Lee ever mention being asked questions by the secret police, the KGB?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Would that surprise you if he was asked questions by them?
A. No.
Q. You would assume they would question him?
A. Well, I will assume, of course.
Q. Did Lee discuss with you his suicide atempt when he was trying to obtain
Soviet citizenship?
A. No.
Q. He never discussed that with you?
A. No.
Q. When did that first come to your attention?
A. After the assassination.
Q. Did you ever notice the scar that he had on his wrist?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ask him how he obtained it?
A. I did and he said he didn't want to talk about it.
Q. Any you didn't ask him any further questions?
A. Well, I did a few times. I was curious, but it put him in a very bad mood or
upset so I just dropped the subject.
Q. Did Lee ever tell you why he thought he was allowed to stay in the Soviet
Union?
A. If he did, I don't remember right now.
Q. Why do you think he was allowed to stay in the soviet Union?
A. I really don't know. Maybe one of their good moods. You never know with
Russians
Q. After you met Lee at the dance for the first time, what was the next occasion
that you saw him?
A. Well, it is so many years ago. I do believe he called me in the next few
days.
Q. He called you?
A. yes.
Q. Did he call you on the phone?
A. yes.
Q. How did he obtain your phone number?
A. He asked me when he took me home after the dance and I have it to him.
Q. How often did you see Lee in the 2 to 3 weeks after that first dance? Did you
meet him frequently?
A. I don't remember.
Q. What subject were discussed when you were the first starting to date him?
A. Oh, we went to the shows and we discussed friends, and I was asking him
questions about America, of course.
Q. I did not hear.
A. I was asking questions about America, how the Americans live.
Q. What type of questions would you ask about America?
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A. Well, about the schools and professions and the price of food and if it is
pretty plentiful right here.
Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that Mrs. Caryl Emanuel has just
entered the room who is na administrative assistant to myself.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. After you were dating Lee, when was the first time that he discussed the
possibility of marrying you?
A. Only a short time before we were married.
Q. Approximately how short a time was that?
A. A month and a half.
Q. What was your reaction the first time he discussed being married?
A. Pardon me?
Q. What was your reaction the first time he discussed getting married?
A. Well, I asked him, since he is American, would he have the desire or
possibility to go back to the United States and he said no, he will be living in
Russia.
Q. Is he the one who brought up the subject of marriage or did you bring it up?
A. Well, I really don't remember how things happened. It is so many years ago.
Q. At that time you were dating him quite frequently after a month's time?
A. Yes.
Q. How soon after you first discussed getting married with Lee did you in fact
get married?
A. We had to wait--I do not recall how many days or maybe a month, maybe a
week--for permission to get married and then it was granted.
Q. Did you tell anybody of your decision to marry Lee prior to your application
for marriage?
A. Of course I did. I had to ask my aunt and uncle if they object or not.
Q. What was their reaction?
A. Well, not a very pleasant one. My uncle told me I'm a big girl right now and
if that is what I want-he really was against it somewhat but he said even if he
said no I will do it anyway so I might as well have his blessings.
Q. Which uncle was that?
A. Uncle Ilya.
Q. Were you living with your uncle at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. What position did he hold?
A. Well, he was not a colonel yet. What is before that?
Mr. HAMILTON. A major.
The WITNESS A major, I guess.
Mr. HAMILTON. At least in the American Army.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. In the Soviet Army?
A. No; he was working for MVD.
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Q. And what is that?
A. Minister of Internal Affairs.
Q. What activities did they engage in?
A. As far as I know, he was an engineer by profession.
Q. Did he have an important position if that organization?
A. I assume he did.
Q. What were his responsibilities?
A. I don't know. He would never discuss his job at home.
Q. Did Lee, apart from the times he went to obtain Soviet citizenship, ever
approach the Government of any other occasions?
A. Say that again, please.
Q. Did Lee, apart from the time he applied for Soviet citizenship, ever approach
the Government on any other occasions?
A. I don't know.
Q. How would he have obtained the apartment he was living in?
A. Well, they have him a job in Minsk and sent him to work at the radio factory
and nearby it was a building where the employees of this factory were living.
Q. I think so.
Q. And ass the apartments in that building were the same size?
A. I don't know. I never visited anybody except the lady upstairs once and her
apartment was similar to ours.
Q. Was Lee's apartment larger than most others due to the fact that he was a
foreigner?
A. No; it was not larger but it was conpletely private, a kitchen and bath in
the hall.
Q. Did all the people who worked in that factory have the same type of
apartment?
A. I don't think so. I told you I have only been in one, but I assume from
conversations it all depends on the size of your family.
Q. Was it unusual for Lee to have an apartment all by himself?
A. I think so. I was not unusual in terms of a foreigner to have privileges, but
for a young man to have an apartment of his own in Russia is quite unusual.
Q. Do you think your Uncle Ilya helped you and Lee when you were trying to move
back to America to facilitate your leaving the country?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Would he have been in the position of being able to do that?
A. I don't know. He was against me leaving for America.
Q. But he had told you that he would not put himself in your way?
A. No; he didn't say that. He got angry with me and he just stayed out of it
completely except on a few occasions he told me what a foolish thing I was
doing.
Q. Did Lee own a rifle when you were living in Minsk?
A. I think so.
Q. What type of rifle was that?
A. I don't know anything about rifles.
Q. Did you ever see him use the rifle?
A. No.
Q. Where did you see the rifle?
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A. It was in the apartment and he told me that he bolonged to some kind of
hunting club at work.
Q. Was this before or after you married him?
A. After I married him.
Q. So the rifle was in the apartment?
A. It was there; yes.
Q. Where in the apartment was it kept?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Did Lee ever go hunting that you know of?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did he ever discuss hunting?
A. Well, when we were married he never went hunting but he said that he did go
once with friends.
Q. What type of animal did he hunt?
A. Probably birds.
Q. Is it difficult to obtain a rifle in Russia?
A. It is illegal to possess a weapon in Russia. You have to have a permit, you
have to be a policeman or some kind of military personnel or be a hunter.
Q. Is it difficult ot obtain a permit?
A. I don't know; I never tried.
Q. Did Lee have a permit for the gun?
A. Yes.
Q. you have seen the permit?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if he brought this rifle with him when he was returning to
America?
A. I don't know.
Q. Who packed all your belongings when you made the decision to come back to
America?
A. We both did.
Q. Was anything left behind in Russia?
A. yes, our furnishings.
Q. Who was that left with?
A. We sold it to people who were interested in buying it.
Q. Since you acquired a permit for the hun, Lee just could not leave the gun
with somebody else; could he?
A. I don't know the procedure of it, what can be done.
Q. But you don't know what Lee did with the gun?
A. No.
Q. Do you know the difference between a rifle and a shotgun?
A. No.
Q. Could you describe the gun for us that he had there?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember anything about it?
A. No.
Q. It was definitely a rifle and not, for example, a handgun?
A. Yes.
Q. It was long?
A. Yes.
Q. Approximately how long?
A. Please don't ask me these questions. I cannot describe something that I don't
have a recollection of it.
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Q. But it was a long rifle or some sort?
A. I never measured it. It was a large object.
Q. Where were you working when you first met Lee?
A. I was working at the local hospital drugstore.
Q. What was the name of the hospital you were working at?
A. I think city Hospital No. 3.
Q. What were your responsibilities at that hospital?
A. I was a pharmacist. I was preparing prescriptions for the patients.
Q. How did you come to live in Minsk?
A. Well, I finished pharmacy school in Leningrad and I was assigned to a job.
Q. Who assigned you to the job?
A. The school officials usually assigned students where to go so I had the job
in the city of Leningrad but then I have personal difficulties with my
stepfather and I felt like I was in the way so since I had relatives in Minsk, I
just bought the ticket and went there.
Q. When you went to Minsk did you already have a job lined up in Minsk?
A. No; I did not have a transfer or a job waiting for me there.
Q. Did you ask when you were working in Leningrad for them to obtain a job for
you in Minsk?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I was not certain that I could have one. So with little connections and going
from one office to another I got permission first to stay there. When you apply
for a job you have to have permission to stay and it is difficult if you don't
have one or the other. My aunt had connections.
Q. Which aunt is that?
A. It is another aunt. It is my mother's sister, Luba.
Q. Where was she living at that time?
A. She was living in Minsk with her husband in another apartment.
Q. How did you let her know you were coming?
A. Pardon me?
Q. How did you let her know you were coming? Did you phone them in advance or
write in advance?
A. No; I just appeared at the doorstep and they were shocked.
Q. And you brought all of your belongings with you?
A. I didn't have very much to bring.
Q. You didn't intend returning to Leningrad though, did you?
A. Excuse me?
Q. Did you intend returning to Leningrad?
A. If I don't find a job I had to.
Mr. WOLF. We will now take a brief break while the court reporter swears in
another witness in the adjoining room.
(Whereupon, at 10:05 a.m., a recess was taken until 10:10 a.m.)
Mr. WOLF: The time is approximately 10:10 a.m., a recess was taken until 10:10
and the deposition will resume with all persons present except Caryl Emanuel at
the present
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By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Do you know what type of engineer your uncle was?
A. He finished--just a minute, please. College of Forestry Engineering. Does
that sound right?
Q. What type of things did he do for that company?
A. No, not a company.
Q. The organization.
A. He usually worked with whatever concerned wood. Then the kids in college have
exams he usually grades their papers. He was not a teacher.
Q. Did you uncle assist you in obtaining a residence permit when you got to
Minsk?
A. Yes, he did. Since I had to live with him he had to sign the papers that he
has room for me in his apartment.
Q. Who did those papers go to?
A. I think it is like a police or militia station in the city.
Q. Did he speak to anybody about your staying there as well as signing the
papers?
A. I had to go alone. I went alone. He just signed the papers.
Q. Did he call anybody on the phone, do you know?
A. I don't know.
Q. Shortly after you met Lee, Lee was taken to the hospital; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What hospital was he taken to?
A. Just a city hospital.
Q. And that was one where both foreigners and-
A. No, no, no. No foreigners. Just a regular hospital.
Q. I am saying both foreigners and people who live there regularly would be
taken there?
A. I assume. Athere were only three or four hospitals in the city. You just go
to the one you like.
Q. Did Lee participate in any political activity when he was in Minsk?
A. What do you call political activity?
Q. Did he attend meetings where politics was discussed?
A. No.
Q. Did he listen to the radio when there were politicla discussions on?
A. Yes.
Q. What type of commentary would he make about the political discussions?
A. He usually listened to BBC and Voice of America on the radio and tried to
compare what is said on the radio and what the Russian newspaper printed.
Q. Did Lee make any attempt to join groups or organizations which were engaged
in political activity?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. When you said before that Lee sought political asylum, what exactly did you
mean by that?
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A. Just what I said. You have to file under some kind of category and I guess if
you ask for political asylum you get more protection or at least Russia-maybe
they give you a place to stay, I guess.
Q. Were you surprised when you were allowed to leave Russia?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Why were you surprised?
A. Oh, it is very unusual for a Russian citizen to leave the Soviet Union.
Q. Is that any Russian citizen?
A. Yes, unless you are a diplomat and you had permission to travel abroad.
Q. Did your uncle speak to anybody about your leaving the Soviet Union?
A. To whom do you mean?
Q. Any government officials who might have asked him about it.
A. Not that I know of.
Q. You were a member of what organizations when you were in Minsk?
A. I was more or less forced to become a member of the Komsomol organization.
That is a youth organization. Prior to becoming a party member you do have to
belong to this organization but no everybody who belongs becomes a party member.
Q. Did you want to become a Communist Party member?
A. Heavens no.
Q. How do you say you more or less forced to become a member?
A. Well, at work everybody belonged to a professional union and everybody
belonged to this. Well, it is not really pressure put on but they ask you to
fill out some application and things like that, so I filled out the application
and I was accepted, I assume. I paid the dues but I never attended the meetings.
Q. You never went to one of their meetings?
A. No.
Q. Did you remain a member of that until you left Minsk?
A. No. I got publicly discharged at one of the meetings; it was the only one I
attended when they asked me to come and accused me of not ever attending and
being a bad membe of the organization and i was not qualified.
Q. When was that?
A. That was after I was married to Lee.
Q. After you were married to Lee?
A. Yes.
Q. Was your marriage to Lee discussed at that meeting?
A. Not at that particular meeting but I felt at work kind of a cold wind, you
know. Not isolation but-I don't know how to describe it but I know that they did
not very much approve of my marriage to a foreigner.
Q. In the book the Priccilla MacMillan Johnson has written called "Marina and
Lee" you say the members warned you that Lee might be a spy.
A. It was an accusation like at the last meeting when they told me I could not
be a member any more. I was just like confidential talk and during the lunch
hour.
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Q. What was your reaction?
A. Pardon?
Q. What was your reaction when they accused Lee of being a spy?
A. Well, I just really ignored it. It kind of upset me.
Q. It upset you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you discuss the possibility of living with a spy with your uncle?
A. It seems to me in Russia everybody keeps their ears open and are afraid of
what the might say.
Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that caryl Emmanuel has just
reentered the room.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Was it common for members to be expelled from Komsomol?
A. No. Occasionally this happened when the members are-for example, when young
people misbehaved themselves like the alcoholics or they have fits or are
dishonest or things like that.
Q. On your entry visa to the United States you did to list that you were a
member of Komsomol. Why is that?
A. Lee told me that it would be difficult for me if I listed any of the --excuse
me. I did not phrase myself right.
I don't know how to put it but anyway he told me that because Americans don't
know what kind of organization it is the will probably think that maybe they
will be against it so it is better for me not to like it. Actually I was only a
member on a piece of paper. That is all.
Q. And at the meeting when you were expelled, was there a formal vote to expel
you?
A. Yes.
Q. What were the grounds listed for your expulsion?
A. I was not a desirable member.
Q. Why were you not a desirable member?
A. They said that I did not pay my dues, I didn't care for it, I am antisocial
in my behavior.
Q. Did they ask you about your marriage to Lee in that meeting?
A. No. If they did, I do not recall.
Q. Was Lee present at that meeting?
A. No.
Q. Was Lee's apartment characteristic of the apartments furnished to foreigners
living in the Soviet Union?
I did not have the experience with the apartments that foreigners occupy, so I
cannot compare.
Q. Was he also given money by the Government?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Why was that?
A. I assume that is was typical of Russians to give compensation for the foreign
resident, foreign citizen who lived there because maybe make them more
comfortable to live in Russia.
Q. Do you know whether foreigners received money from the Government other than
Lee?
A. No.
Q. Do you know of any other foreigners who did not receive money
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A. No. I didn't know many foreigners. I just knew Lee.
Q. You assumed that was common practice?
A. Yes.
Q. While in Russia did you and Lee hear President Kennedy speak over the radio?
A. Well, I heard but I don't know what it was about because I did not speak
English but Lee was listening to it and I was present in the room.
Q. Did you know who it was, who was speaking?
A. He told me; yes.
Q. What did Lee say at that time?
A. He was very proud of the new President of his country.
Q. Did Lee ever mention his experience in the Marines when you were living in
Russia?
A. Only his Japanese girl friend that he mentioned.
Q. Who was that?
A. I don't remember her name.
Q. What did he say about her?
A. That she was very nice and that she was a very good cook and that she
prepared special dishes for him, that he was pampered.
Q. Did Lee ever mention Governor Connally while you were living in Minsk?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. As far as I recall right now I think he wrote a letter to Mr. Connally asking
for help to return to the United States and when the letter arrived it was a big
large white envelope, I think, with the Connally picture on it as a stamp or
anyway the picture of Mr. Connally on the envelope.
Q. You are saying Mr. Connally responded to the letter?
A. I assume it was because the letter was written in English so I know only Lee
told me about it.
Q. And Lee told you that that was a picture of Governor Connally?
A. He said it was an advertisement because he will be running for some kind of
office.
Q. What did Lee tell you the letter said?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was Lee pleased or displeased about the letter?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss any other American officials apart from Governor
Connally and President Kennedy when you were living in Russia?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Do you know how Lee acquired the rifle that we spoke about before that he had
in Russia?
A. I do not know. I assume right now that when you become a member of this
hunting group you have a permit to go and obtain a rifle somewhere. I have no
idea whether you buy a rifle or they give it to you.
Q. Were they very expensive to buy?
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A. I have no idea.
Q. When you and Lee were living together after you were married, did you assume
that your apartment was bugged?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, even if you turn off all the electric appliances in the house, still
this meter that is inside of the apartment, the electric meter, will be running
very slowly but surely. I don't know if it has anything to do with it but we
were afraid to talk. We would whisper.
Q. Did you discuss the Lee outside of the apartment that you thought it was
bugged?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he think it was bugged as well?
A. Sometimes we even spoke loudly, "Hey, would you like to listen to all the
conversation?", something like that.
Q. What was Lee's reaction to what he thought was the bugging of the apartment?
A. Well, it was accepted. What can you do?
Q. Why did you think they were bugging your apartment, or were all the
apartments bugged, do you think?
A. I don't think all the apartments were bugged.
Q. So why were they bugging the apartment that you and Lee lived in?
A. I really don't have the answer to that question but I assume because he was a
foreigner and they didn't know much about him so they want to continue to keep
an eye on him and that was the only way to do it.
Q. Was that the usual practice in Minsk, in Russia?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you and Lee think you were under any other types of surveillance?
A. We assumed that we were.
Q. You assumed that you were.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see any evidence of it?
A. No; but I heard gossips from mutual friends that sometimes there have been
people assigned to follow somebody like a foreign tourist or something like that
and you will never know who will be watching after you.
Q. What type of materials would Lee read during this period of time?
A. When he was in Russia?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, they have some foreign magazines that you can buy at the newsstand. I
do believe it was a Life magazine then that was printed and he usually bought
that. I think there was an English newspaper. He studied the Russian language
and he read some Russian literature just for entertainment.
Q. What kinds of literature would it be?
A. Whatever was available at the house, whatever novel may be popular at this
time.
Q. Did he read about politics at this time in novels?
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A. I don't recall. Maybe historical books about Russian history.
Q. What friends of Lee's do you recall while you were there?
A. Right now none of them but if you mentioned the names I might recall.
Q. Even not specific names. Did he have many friends?
A. Well, Pavel Golovachev.
Q. Who was that?
A. When he introduced me he said he is his closest friend. He met him before he
met me. He was one of the first men that he met in Minsk and he did speak
English and it was good for him to practice talking with Lee.
Q. Was he a native of Minsk?
A. He was living there at the time. When you say native--
Q. Was he Russian?
A. He was born there.
Q. Do you know if he was born in Minsk?
A. I don't know.
Q. But he was living there at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. What other friends of Lee's did you meet?
A. One immigrant family from Argentina, Mr. and Mrs. Ziger and their two
daughters.
Q. How did Lee know them?
A. Mr. Ziger was an engineer at the same radio factory that Lee was working at.
Q. And he was from Argentina, you say?
A. He was formerly, I think, a Polish Jew and the lived in Argentina for over 20
years, I believe. They immigrated long age and their daughters were born there
and they got homesick so they asked to return to their native country. After
World War II this part of Poland became part of Russia. All their relatives were
in Poland and they were very lonely and they tried to go back to Argentina but
the were never granted a permit.
Q. Did Lee discuss politics with him?
A. Well, by the time I met Ziger, Lee was just as bitter about living in Minsk
as they were so they had lots of things in common. Of course they discussed
politics.
Q. What other friends of Lee's did you meet?
A. Well, none that I remember any more.
Q. Did you remember any Cuban students who were living in Minsk?
A. Yes; I never met them personally but you can recognize the Cubans because the
Russians are quite fair complexioned and they speak Spanish. You can see them in
the street because the were exchange students from Cuba.
Q. Did Lee have friends among the Cuban students?
A. He might have.
Q. Did he ever speak to you about them?
A. I don't recall right now but I think he met a few of them.
Q. Do you recall a Cuban student by the name of Alfred?
A. No; what was his name?
Q. Alfred.
A. That is not a Cuban name, is it?
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Q. I don't know the last name.
Did he ever express his views about the Cuban students in general terms?
A. In general terms?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, he said that it is pretty cold right here, a severe Russian winter, and
that they are homesick, they miss their country. The had been sent to this
country to study but the were not very pleased on account of it was not as free
as even in their country.
Q. Where would Lee meet these Cuban students?
A. Well, in Russia you don't have to have a special meeting place; you can just
talk to people in the park, on the street, on the bench.
Q. Were any of them working at the factory he worked at or were they just
students?
A. I think they were just students.
Q. So it would not be at the factory?
A. I don't know if any of them worked in the factory.
Q. Did Lee know a Marvin Kantor?
A. Who was he?
Q. He was an American student at that time living in Minsk.
A. Living in Minsk? No.
Q. Never heard the name?
A. No. I thought he was the only American there.
Q. May have been living in Minsk.
Do you know Muhammad Reggab?
A. Pardon me. Would you repeat the name?
Q. Reggab, R-e-g-g-a-b. First name Muhammad. He was also a student allegedly
living in Minsk at that time.
A. No.
Q. The name is familiar with you?
A. No.
Q. What hobbies did lee engage in when you were living in Minsk?
A. Mostly reading, went boating in the summertime, picnicking. That is not a
hobby, just recreation.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his work at the radio factory?
A. Yes he did, and he didn't like it. he had lots of complaints about it.
Q. What did he complain about it?
A. He thought he was better than his job.
Q. What did he say he could do about that?
A. I don't recall him saying anything but complaining.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his being in touch with the police prior to his
defection, the Russian police or the KGB, prior to his going to the American
Embassy?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee discuss with you his offer to give secrets to the Russian Government?
A. No.
Q. Have you heard that it has been alleged that he offered to gove military
secrets to the Russian Government?
A. Well, I read in the newspapers lots of speculations. How true that is I don't
know.
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Q. But he never discussed that with you?
A. No.
Q. What else did Lee tell you about his activities when he was in Japan?
A. Not much. He never talked much about his experiences in Japan. Well, he told
me once, and later on I found out it was a fib, that he was shot in some kind of
military activities he said.
Q. When did he tell you that?
A. I don't remember the day.
Q. Why did he tell you that? How did it come up?
A. I don't know. Probably just to show what a brave soldier he was.
Q. How did you find out it was a lie?
A. After he died and I read about it.
Q. You didn't know before that?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee mention any other people he knew in Japan besides that one girl you
have told us about?
A. No.
Q. Did he talk about his friends in the Marines?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss the kind of work he did in Japan with the Marines?
A. Not with me.
Q. Did Lee ever mention meeting with any Russians when he was living in Japan?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did he ever discuss Russian agents who were working in Japan?
A. no.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss the U-2 airplane with you?
A. No. Is that an American plane or Russian?
Q. Are you familiar with the U-2 which was the plane that was shot down over
Russia?
A. I heard about it at the time.
Q. You heard about it at the time.
A. Was that where the American was accused of being a spy and he was captured by
the Russians?
Q. Yes; and his name was Francis Gary Powers.
A. Yes. I don't know if it was when I was married to Lee, but I remember the
incident. Whether it come from Lee or from the newspaper I don't remember, but I
am aware of the incident.
Q. You were aware of it?
A. Yes. All the Russian citizens were talking about it.
Q. Did Lee ever talk to you about it?
A. I don't recall. Before I came to this country I thought only Americans sent
spies around the world; Russians never did things like that.
Q. Are you familiar with a letter that Lee wrote to the American embassy
requesting the return to him of his passport?
A. Well, the letters were composed in the English language. How many and what he
wrote in them I don't know, but I knew he was sending letters to the American
Embassy or to the Russian authorities to let him get out of Russia.
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Q. When was the first time he told you he wanted to get out of Russia and back
to the United States?
A. After we were married.
Q. Did Lee discuss with you the reaction of the Russian authorities of the U.S.
authorities to the letters he was sending?
A. Of course it was a big matter for both of us and up to the date that the
allowed my to leave the country, I really did not believe that it would amount
to anything.
Q. Did Lee say he had been contacted by the CIA?
A. Where?
Q. When he was in Russia. Or agents of the CIA?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss the CIA with you?
A. I never knew what the CIA was until they started asking me the questions.
Until I came to this country I never knew what the CIA was.
Q. When was the first time you became aware of what they were.
A. I do believe after the assassination.
Q. Did he ever discuss with you American spies without using the name CIA?
A. Well, it was an incident when the doctor at the Embassy who examined me and
was very kind and nice to me--
Q. What was his name?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Is that a Dr. Davidson?
A. It sounds familiar.
Well, we were living here, we were in America already, and then Lee told me that
this man was accused of being a spy so the Russians threw him out of the Soviet
Union. To me it sounded like a ridiculous accusation; a man that nice cannot be
a spy.
Q. Was that the first time Lee discussed him with you?
A. Yes.
Q. What was his reaction?
A. Russians accuse every everybody of spying against them.
Q. What did Dr. Davidson do when you met him in the Soviet Union? What were the
circumstances of your seeing him?
A. Well, he gave me a physical examination and he knew that I was very worried
and scared to leave the country and he kind of patted me on the shoulder and
said, "Don't worry, it will be a nice life for you." It was a nice reassurance,
both very human and very warm. He talked about his family.
Q. Was Lee with you during this examination?
A. No.
Q. What did he say about his family?
A. He said that his mother was of Russian descent, I think I recall that, and I
found out from him that some Russian people live in the United States which I
did not know before.
Q. Did he give you the names of anybody to contact in the United States?
A. I think he might have mentioned some names but I don't remember right now.
Q. Did you ever contact any of the people he mentioned?
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A. No.
Q. Did Lee have any contact with Dr. Davidson apart from your physical
examination?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Do you remember when you went to the American Embassy with Lee? Do you
remember that event?
A. Yes.
Q. Who did you meet at the Embassy?
A. I don't remember the name. I remember the building.
Q. Would it be either Mr. Snyder or Mr. McVicker?
A. Yes; both names sound very familiar. I do not remember the faces now.
Q. Was that the first occasion you had ever met them?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you heard Lee discussing them previously?
A. I don't remember.
Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that Miss Brady had just left the
room for a few moments.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Did Lee discuss with you his prior contact with the Embassy before you and he
went together to the Embassy?
A. No.
Q. Did he discuss the letters he had written to the Embassy?
A. Excuse me. I do not understand the question. Prior to our marriage?
Q. No; prior to the two of you going to the Embassy together.
A. Yes; I am sorry. I misunderstood you.
He went to the Embassy first.
Q. Did he then discuss with you his trip to the embassy?
A. He went to Moscow and then he called me to come over.
Q. What did he say to you when he called?
A. Just to get a few days off from work and buy a plane ticket and fly there.
Q. Q. Did he indicate that the people at the Embassy were friendly or not
friendly?
A. Well, he told me that they will be friendlier than the Russians are.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his being asked to work as an American agent or
as an American spy by any individual?
A. No; you mean in Russia?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Have any of the people sho you met in the Embassy at that time been in
contact with you since you left Russia or with Lee?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss them after you got to the United States?
A. No; except this doctor that we discussed during this incident about being a
spy.
Q. How did it come that you were examined by the doctor?
A. Pardon me?
Q. How was it arranged for you to be examined by the doctor?
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A. Well, I assumed that before you entered this country you have to have a
physical that you are healthy enough, you don't have any disease, I guess.
Q. So you were told that you had to have an examination?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't request it?
A. No.
Q. Who told you that you needed it?
A. Somebody at the Embassy.
Q. One of the people at the Embassy?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the doctor give you anything to take out of the country or did you leave
anything with the doctor?
A. No; you man a message?
Q. Yes; or any physical possession.
A. No.
Mr. WOLF. It should be noted that Miss Brady has just returned to the room.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Apart from the one time you had your physical examination, did you meet the
doctor at any other time?
A. No; whomever I met at the embassy it was only for the official visits and I
didn't know who was there or how many people.
Q. After you left Russia, where did you go?
A. Straight to America through a few foreign countries.
Q. Which countries did you stop in?
A. By train we went from Minsk, I believe-anyway through Poland to Germany to
Holland.
Q. Did you stop in Polan? Did you get off the train?
A. Oh, just for a few minutes. No, no, I don't think we stopped in Poland. yes,
we did. I am sorry. Yes, because I remember that people over there at the
station, the Polish people, they tried to exchange their money for American
dollars.
Q. Did you meet anybody particularly when you stopped?
A. No.
Q. And it was only for a few minutes?
A. As far as I recall, yes.
Q. Did the train stop in Germany?
A. I do believe they had one or two stops.
Q. Were they long or short?
A. Short.
Q. Did you meet anybody on the train who you became particularly friendly with?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee?
A. No; not that I know of.
Q. Where was the final destination of the train?
A. Amsterdam.
Q. Is that where you got off the train?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. What did you do then?
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A. We spent a day and a night in Amsterdam. I don't know whose house, a rented
house or a room or something. It was not a hotel, it was a house.
Q. Who found it?
A. I don't know. Lee made all the arrangements.
Q. When did he make the arrangements?
A. I assume that the Embassy gave him the accommodations that he can rent a room
inexpensively.
Q. When you were still in Russia?
A. I assumed that.
Q. But when you first got off the train in Amsterdam, what was the first thing
that Lee did?
A. I don't know. I guess picked up the suitcases.
Q. Did you get into a bus or a cab and go directly to an apartment or did you
walk around the city?
A. I don't remember if we took the taxi and went to this house and then walked
or whether we walked around and then went to the house. I don't remember.
Q. Was it a house or an apartment that you stayed in when you were in Amsterdam?
A. It looks like it is a boardinghouse to me right new in my memory. It was not
a motel or a hotel.
Q. It was not?
A It looks like it is a private roominghouse.
Q. Did you meet anybody at the apartment?
A. No.
Q. When Lee went downstairs was there a person at a desk?
A. There was no desk as far as I remember.
Q. No desk?
A. I don't remember. I do not speak English.
Q. Did Lee meet anybody at a desk downstairs?
A. I don't know. I was too preoccupied carrying the baby and worrying. I was
very tired.
Q. Who did you meet when you were in Amsterdam?
A. Nobody that I recall.
Q. Did you and Lee spend the entire time together?
A. Maybe it was after hours or it was a Sunday, I don't recall. All the shops
were closed so we just window-shopped a little bit.
Q. Do you remember if Lee paid for the apartment you stayed at before or after
you left Amsterdam?
A. I think the Embassy have him a loan of some money and I assume with that he
paid for the room.
Q. Did you meet the person who ran the roominghouse?
A. No; I saw some lady that brought dinner and that is all.
Q. You ate dinner downstairs in a big room?
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A. No; I think it was in the room we were renting.
Q. And they brought dinner into your room?
A. Yes.
Q. What was Lee's reaction or his attitude when he reached Amsterdam? Was he
happy to be out of Russia?
A. Yes; he said that is the free world. That was his attitude.
Q. Returning to the rifle for a moment, when you were window-shopping with Lee
in Amsterdam, for example, did you pass any stores that had guns or rifles in
the window?
A. If we passed, I never paid any attention.
Q. Would Lee ever make comments if you were walking around Minsk, when he walked
to stores in Minsk-
A. They don't have stores in Russia where they sell guns. I don't know where he
purchased them.
Q. When he was in Minsk and Amsterdam, for example, did he ever discuss his
rifle with you if you did not bring up the subject?
A. What was there to discuss?
Q. Would he talk about guns generally?
A. I don't like guns so what am I going to talk about guns? What do I know about
guns? Nothing.
Q. When you were in Minsk did you ever see ammunition, bullets in your
apartment?
A. If I have, I don't recall right now. If you have a gun, you are probably
supposed to have ammunition.
Q. Were you afraid of the gun, of guns?
A. Well, I disliked them.
Q. Would you be afraid of ammunition if it was left near the gun?
A. Well, I don't know what to expect from it. Could it explode or not be itself?
Q. But in Minsk you don't recall if you ever say any ammunition?
A. I don't recall.
Q. How much of all your possessions when you were in Minsk did Lee bring with
you on the trip to Amsterdam? Did you have to leave a lot of things in Russia?
A. We don't have very much to leave behind. We just took the simple clothing
that we brought back, som personal things, maybe a few books.
Q. Who did the packing? Did you both pack?
A. I assume we did but Lee did most of the packing.
Q. Did Lee purchase the tickets for the boat when you were in Amsterdam?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know, were those arrangements for the boat make in advance by the
embassy as well?
A. I assume it was.
Q. When you left Minsk did Lee tell you what part of America you were going to?
A. He said to Texas.
Q. Why were you going to Texas, did Lee tell you?
A. Because Lee had a brother who lived in Fort Worth.
Q. And he stated that was the reason he was going to go to Texas?
A. Yes.
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Q. On the boat over to New York do you recall if Lee was friendly with anybody
in particular?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall meeting anybody in particular?
A. The only person that I recall was the steward at the dining table. We were
assigned to a certain dining table and only one gentleman that I talked to.
Q. Did you discuss anything in particular with him?
A. The gentleman spoke a few Russian words to me like help and just how are you
and things like that and I asked through Lee how come he spoke Russian and he
said that his father was Russian and mother is from Holland and from childhood
he remembered a few phrases and that is all.
Q. Did Lee when he was discussing Texas with you tell you that he wanted to live
there permanently?
A. Well, I don't remember temporary or permanently. He was hoping to get a job
here.
Q. Did he ever discuss any other parts of the United States where he would like
to live?
A. No; he said he liked New Orleans because his aunt lived there.
Q. Had he been in New Orleans?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he tell you about New Orleans?
A. That it is a lovely city and it is a very interesting city to live in.
Q. Did he say that he had friends there?
A. No; he said he has relatives there.
Q. Relatives. And he also had relatives in Fort Worth?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he speak about friends he had in Fort Worth.
A. No.
Q. When you first got to Fort Worth did Lee introduce you to his brother?
A. Yes; they met us at the airport.
Q. And you lived with his brother for a little while?
A. Yes.
Q. Who else did Lee introduce you to when you first got to Fort Worth?
A. A few Russian immigrants.
Q. What were their names?
A. Mr. Gregory was the first one that I recall meeting.
Q. Is that Paul Gregory?
A. Yes-no, no, no. I think Paul is his son. It was the elderly Mr. Gregory. I
don't remember his name.
Q. Were these people Lee knew before he had gove to Russia?
A. I don't think so. I do believe that he went to the library to get a few
Russian books that they have in the library for me to read and somebody
mentioned Mr. Gregory's name and he got in contact with him.
Q. Who got in touch with Mr. Gregory, Lee?
A. Well, I really don't remember who contacted whom. Anyway he came home and he
told me that he met a Russian gentleman.
Q. Did Lee introduce you to any of his previous friends from Fort Worth or from
Dallas?
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A. No.
Q. Who else beside Mr. Gregory do you remember who was in the Russian community?
A. Well, through him I have been introduced to other immigrants here. I met
Galya Clark.
Q. Any others?
A. Well, Anna Miller and George de Mohrenschildt.
Q. Did you meet them at parties or did Lee bring them over to your house or what
were the occasions that you would meet these people?
A. Well, they came to our house and then we had been invited to their homes for
a day or for dinner.
Q. Apart from these people in the Russian community, were you ever invited to
anybody else's house or did you have other people over to your house who were
friends of yours?
A. I don't remember any.
Q. When Lee obtained this job did he discuss the people he worked with?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever meet anybody he worked with?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee read any books still at this time? You said that was his hobby in
Minsk.
A. Yes, he did. he went to the library quite often and would bring some books
and he would read them.
Q. Were they in English or in Russian?
A. In English.
Q. Did he make an effort for you to obtain any book to read?
A. Yes, I read every book that was in the library that was in the Russian
language.
Q. Were there many?
A. No; there were not many.
Can we have a break please?
Mr. WOLF. Sure. Any time you like.
(Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., a recess was taken until 11:28 a.m.)
Mr. WOLF. We will now go back on the record.
It is now approximately 11:30. Attorney Jim McDonald is in the room.
We also have present from the National Archives, Mr. James M. Leahy who has
brought some exhibits with him today that are in the custody of the National
Archives.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. Porter, I would like to show you five different cameras at the current
time and ask you if you recognize any of them and if so which ones.
A. I don't recognize any of them.
Q. You don't recognize any of them?
A. No.
Q. You have never seen cameras that looked like that previously?
A. Well, I am not an expert on cameral at all so I cannot say that, that I
recognize any of them.
Q. Well, have you ever used a camera similar to any of those?
A. Well, I used a camera once in my life when I took a picture of Lee but I
don't know what the camera looks like.
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Q. You don't remember what the camera looks like?
A. No.
Q. Have you any memory?
A. I have been told what button to push and that is all I recall.
Q. Did you ever take any other pictures?
A. Yes; on a Polaroid camera but I have to read the directions on how to use it
from time to time.
Q. Does a Polaroid camera looklike the ones you see before you?
A. My own is nothing like that.
Q. Nothing like that?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if you have ever seen cameras like that before, not if you have
used them but if you have ever seen them before?
A. Well, I have seen some people wear a camera like that around their neck, a
tourist.
Q. You can open that if you want to and see what it looks like.
A. No; it would not do me any gook to see it.
Q. Have you ever seen a camera like that before?
A. I would be silly to say I never saw a camera like that. I might have seen it
but I don't recall. I cannot identify any of those cameras and say that I used
them or seen them before.
Q. This camera here, does this look at all familiar to you?
A. No.
Q. Which is identified as Commission exhibit No. 750.
A. No; I don't recall.
Q. You don't recall?
A. No.
Q. This camera here which is identified as Commission exhibit No. 136, does that
look at all familiar to you?
A. No.
Q. This camera here, which is FBI exhibit D-145, does that look familiar to you?
A. No; none of those cameras look familiar.
Q. This exhibit here which is identified as FBI exhibit D-80, dows this look
familiar to you?
A. No.
Q. And this camera here which is a Minox 1 :3.5 F-15 millimeter with the serial
No. S2339303, does this look familiar to you?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see any of the cameras before you in the possession of Lee?
A. I do not recall now at all the camera we used to have. The camera could be
here but I would not recognize it at all.
Q. You just don't remember?
A. No.
Q. If I show you this camera which was Commission exhibit No. 750 and raise the
top part so you can see there is a viewfinder and ask you just to look at the
camera, would that refresh your recollection that that was the camera you
allegedly took the photographs of Lee with?
A. Well, I honestly do not remember if I look straight at the object or look
down.
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Q. But seeing the camera today you still have no memory of what the camera
looked like?
A. No; I am sorry I am unprofessional about it.
Q. Whatever your memory is, that is what we want to find out.
A. I definitely never saw that before.
Q. Which are you referring to?
A. these two little ones.
Q. the record should note that she is referring to the Minox camera which is
D-80 and the other Minox camera which is identified on the record as Minox 1
:3.5.
A. And by that I man in my possession or Lee's possession.
Q. You never saw a camera like that?
A. No.
Mr. WOLF. I would like to thank the national Archives for their cooperation in
bringing the cameras here today. We are done with them, and they may be returned
to the Archives.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Was Lee interested in photography?
A. Didn't he have a job once to do something with photography?
Q. Did he discuss it with you?
A. His job? No.
Q. When he was in Russia did he ever take pictures?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember what the camera looked like?
A. No.
Q. Were they general tourist type pictures or were they specific pictures?
A. He would take pictures of me or a view around the city with our friends.
Q. Did he have one camera or more than one?
A. I think only one. I do not recall.
Q. And the camera that he had in Russia, is that the same camera he used to take
pictures when he got to the United States?
A. I really don't remember. I assume it was the same one.
Q. Returning to your trip from Russia to Amsterdam, was Lee gone for a long
period of time by himself when you were on the train? Would he leave your
compartment or seat and talk to other people for a long period of time?
A. No.
Q. Returning for a few moments to questions about your life in Russia, did you
date other men before Lee?
A. Of course I had.
Q. Did any others propose marriage to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you consider them as serious proposals of marriage?
A. Will, it is hard to justify right now at 19 how serious you can be.
Q. Well, you decided to marry Lee within a month or a little over a month after
meeting him.
A. Yes.
Q. How did you treat the other proposals of marriage you had received?
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A. Well, I just didn't know.
Q. What primarily attracted you to Lee to marry him?
A. Well, I was in love with the man. I fell in love with the man. he was neat in
his appearance. He was quite polite. I liked his accent.
Q. And you decided to marry him despite the wished and advice of your uncle?
A. Yes.
Q. How strenuous did you uncle object?
A. Well, it was not any argument over it. I just knew he was not very happy
about that.
Q. Concerning your leaving Russia, your uncle was opposed to that as well?
A. Yes.
Q. How vocal was his opposition to your leaving Russia?
A. He was very cold toward me and his objections about me leaving the Soviet
Union didn't come directly through him all the time; mainly it was through his
wife. She tried to persuade me to stay there.
Q. And despite her protestations you decided to leave?
A. Well, Lee and my daughter were the only close family that I ever really had.
At least I felt belonging to somebody, not beign in somebody's way.
Q. Didn't you feel close to your aunt and uncle who you were living with?
A. Yes; especially my aunt.
Q. You felt especially close to your aunt and you left?
A. I knew I could not live with them forever and I had to make my own life
somehow.
Q. Did you during this time keep a diary?
A. Me?
Q. yes.
A. No; I never kept a diary.
Q. You never kept a diary. Did you keep any notes or letters that you had
written to Lee or Lee had written to you?
A. I had no reason to write letters to Lee except when I was on vacation, maybe
a postcard. We had not been away from each other that long.
Q. Did he write you any letters when you were on vacation?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you still have those letter?
A. No; I don't have anything.
Q. Did you ever get approached by anybody when you started going out with Lee
who you thought was an agent of the Soviet Government to give information about
Lee?
A. No; never.
Q. Prior to meeting Lee did anybody in the Soviet Government discuss with you
whether or not you would be interested in working for the Soviet Government?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if it was common practice or was it practice for the government
to approach people to work for them and get information on another individual?
A. you mean information?
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Q. Yes.
A. Not for a spy, no. Like wanted and desirable. In Russia you don't discuss
politics that openly and you always have to look over your shoulders and see if
somebody will squeal on you, something like that.
Q. After you and Lee left Russia did Lee ever visit any of the people he had met
over there who also left subsequently, any of the Cubans?
A. Would you please repeat the question.
Q. After you and Lee were in the United States did Lee ever visit or have
someone come to visit him, any of the people whom you had known in Russia?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever have any contact with them that you know of? Did he write letters
to any of the people?
A. Yes; he wrote to friends.
Q. In Minsk?
A. Yes.
Q. Any other people?
A. Pavel Golovachev.
Q. Did he ever have any contact with the people that Mr. Davidson had talked to
him about-Dr. Davidson's mother?
A. Not that I know about.
Q. Did he ever talk about going to visit the Cuban students or his old friends?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever talk about writing them, aside from Pavel?
A. No; I do not recall if he cooresponded with Mr. Ziger or not. I do not know.
Q. Mrs Porter, we have asked you during the previous bread to review JFK
executive session exhibit 71 which at the current time consists of photographs
Nos. 1 through 109. I would ask you-
Mr. HAMILTON. For the record, I take it when you say JFK exhibit this is an
exhibit of the JFK subcommittee and not a Commission exhibit F.
Mr. WOLF. That is correct. That is an exhibit that has been formerly introduced
in the hearing.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. I would ask you, did you have an opportunity to review that during the break
we have had?
A. Yes; I have.
Q. Mrs. Porter, could you please once again flip through the book and inform us
of any of the pictures that you recognize?
A. No. 5 picture looks familiar.
Q. Could you state, where do you recognize that gentleman from?
A. Maybe from the newspapers or I might have met him at Mr. Garrison's
investigation in New Orleans.
Q. Had you met him prior to Mr. Garrison's investigation in New Orleans?
A. No.
Q. Please take your time and carefully look at each picture.
A. I recognize No. 28.
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Q. How did you first meet the person in No. 28? Do you know who that is?
A. That is George de Mohrenschildt's wife, Jeanne.
Q. When was the first time you met Jeanne de Mohrenschildt?
A. I don't know whether I met her in Dallas or Fort Worth but that is one of the
first months that we came to this country.
No. 57, picture of Lee. no. 58 is a picture of myself. Is that Jack Ruby, No.
60?
Q. Excuse me. What number?
A. No. 60.
Q. Yes; No. 60 is a photo of Jack Ruby. What is the first time you recall seeing
that individual?
A. After Lee was shot I seen his picture on television and in the newspaper. I
do not recognize any more faces.
Q. Those are the only photos you recognize?
A. Yes.
Q. For the record it should be noted that No. 5, which Mrs. Porter identified,
was a photograph of Clay Shaw.
I also show you now, Mr. Porter, three additional photographs that will be
inserted into the photo book that we will refer to as 110, 111, and 112. I ask
you whether or not you recognize any of those individuals?
A. No; I don't.
Q. You do not.
A. No.
Q. I now show you, Mr. Porter, a composite drawing that is labeled on the bottom
as Maurice Bishop. The committee released that sketch approximately 2 weeks ago
and it has been published in several newspapers.
Mr. HAMILTON. In what context are you asking?
Mr. WOLF. In the context that it was released?
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.
Mr. WOLF. It was released in the hope that anybody that has any information
about that man might get in touch with the committee.
By Mr. WOLF;
Q. In conjunction with the sketch the three photographs were also released at
that time and that context was if anybody has any knowledge of who these
individuals are, they should get in touch with the committee.
I would ask if you recognize any of the individuals in the three photographs or
the person in the sketch?
A. No; only this picture on the television screen 1 week ago or so.
Q. One week ago?
A. that was the first time.
Q. And you had not seen it before?
A. Never.
Q. And any of the three individuals in the three photographs?
A. No.
Q. Thank you.
I now would like to show you, Mrs. Porter, six photographs and see if you can
identify these for us.
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A. This is a picture of me and my daughter June when she was a child.
I do not know where they were taken though. Do you want to number them some way.
Q. We will put numbers on the back of these and Mrs. Porter is referring to them
at this time. Picture No. 1 she has referred to as-----
A. That is me and my daughter.
Q. Do you recall when this was taken?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if people took pictures of you apart from Lee?
A. Well, I don't recall the picture taking incident, period. I don't know who
took the picture.
Q. Did Lee take pictures of you?
A. I don't know. I don't remember.
Q. You don't remember?
A. No; it could have been in New Orleans because I was expecting a baby then.
Q. These pictures we will ask you to identify. You don't remember if Lee took
any pictures of you?
A. No.
Q. Picture No. 2.
A. That is a picture of my daughter.
Q. Picture No. 3.
A. That is a picture of my daughter. Nos. 4 and 5 are pictures of my daughter as
well. No. 6 is me and my daughter.
Q. Which daughter?
A. June.
Q. Mrs. Porter, do you remember the incident when these pictures were taken?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee photograph pictures of you and your daughters at any time?
A. In this country?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes; in Dallas once, on a balcony, he took a picture of my daughter.
Q. Any other times?
A. Possibly.
Q. Do you recall now any other times?
A. Well, we took a picture once at the bus station through this thing called the
photomat where you put a quarter or a dime or whatever price in it and maybe Lee
took pictures of me during our life together; yes.
Q. Do you have any memory of these specific pictures being taken?
A. No.
Q. These pictures, for the record, were developed from negatives that were found
in the National Archives.
Do you know, have you heard the name before, Pavel Golovachev?
A. Golovachev; yes.
Q. And how do you know him?
A. I already told you before. He was one of the friends of Lee in Russia.
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Q. When you met him do you recall any specific discussions he and Lee had?
A. Most of the time they spoke in English. As I mentioned, Pavel liked to
practice his English with Lee. They were quite close friends. Whether they
discussed politics, I don't know, but just the current news.
Q. Do you know of a Sergey Bzlov?
A. No; I don't recall this name.
Q. The last name is possibly Uslov.
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever tell you that he and Pavel had discussed any type of
assassinations?
A. No.
Q. Now, when you arrived in Dallas did you ask Lee to commence learning english?
A. Excuse me.
Q. Did you ask Lee that you would like to learn english?
A. Well, I did not ask him if I liked to learn English. I knew I must and I had
to learn in order to communicate with people here.
Q. What did you do to start learning how to speak English?
A. George Bouhe, a Russian immigrant, tried to teach me English.
Q. At the current time are you a U.S. citizen?
A. No; I am not.
Q. What citizenship are you at the present time?
A. The Soviet Union.
Q. Do you have to do anything with the Government of the Soviet Union to
maintain your citizenship?
A. No.
Q. Do you have to report to the embassy at all, periodically?
A. No; every year I have to report to immigration authoritites of this country.
Q. Of our country?
A. Yes; of my address.
Q. And did that practice start as soon as you entered the United States?
A. I don't remember when it started.
Q. After you entered the United States did you have any contact with the Soviet
Embassy here in this country?
A. Just recently i did place a telephone call from my home to the Russian
Embassy. It took me 3 days to reach somebody on the phone that was willing to
discuss.
Q. The soviet Embassy in this country?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that in Washington?
A. Yes; I placed the call from my home to Washington, D.C.
Q. What was the purpose of your phone call at that time?
A. It seems to me that since the assassination I have no contact to my family,
my letters don't go through, and I am pretty sure that it is not the Americans
who are holding my letters so I want to know from the Russian Embassy to whom I
should write or can they help me to send my letters to my family and I don't
care if they have been photographed, taped, it does not matter. They suggested
that I send a telegram which I did.
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Q. How recently was that?
A. I have had no reply.
Q. How recently?
A. Two weeks ago.
Q. How do you know that none of your letters are getting through?
A. Because I talked with my sister on the phone, I do believe twice, maybe three
times, since i was in this country and she said she never received any of my
letters.
Q. Where is your sister now living?
A. In Leningrad.
Q. In 1962 did you have to go to the Soviet Embassy at that time to maintain
your Soviet citizenship?
A. No.
Q. So once you got into this country--
A. Excuse me. 1962, was I here already?
Q. Yes.
When you got to the United States did you have to go to the Soviet Embassy to
maintain your Soviet citizenship?
A. No.
Q. You never reported to the Soviet Embassy?
A. No.
Q. Did anybody from the Soviet Embassy contact you while you were living in this
country?
A. No; they have not but I think since our discussion progressed I recall I had
another contact with the Russian Embassy when I was writing the letters to go
back to them when Lee was threatened.
Q. But apart from that incident.
A. I never visited the Embassy.
Q. But apart from that incident nobody from the Soviet Embassy has ever been in
contact with you?
A. No.
Q. And you have not been in contact apart from that incident and your recent
phone calls with anybody in the Soviet Embassy?
A. No.
Q. When Lee returned with you to Dallas and Fort Worth did anybody from the U.S.
Government approach Lee about his experiences in Russia and want to talk to him
about his experiences in Russia?
A. We had some visitors and Lee told me that that was a representative of the
FBI. Of course they talked in English and he told me that the just were checking
on him, that is all.
Q. How soon after you came to Dallas was that visit?
A. Quite shortly after.
Q. How many people from the FBI came? Was it one or was it two?
A. I don't recall the first time if it was one or two men but Lee went outside
and talked with him or with them.
Q. How long did that conversation last?
A. Well, I cannot really say how many minutes.
Q. Was it short, long?
A. Thirty minutes. It was not very long.
Q. Thirty minutes?
A. It could be.
Q. What was Lee's attitude at the end of that conversation?
A. He was very upset and angry and he told me that he wanted them to leave him
alone.
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Q. Were you ever approached by anybody when you and Lee returned to Dallas to
talk about your experiences in Russia?
A. No. Once at Ruth Paine's house a man came and through her interpretation I
have been asked by this man if anybody ever approached me from Russia or any
other countries to work for them and if they do, please contact them.
Q. Who was that person who was at that house, Ruth Paine's?
A. I think it was Mr. Hosty.
Q. Approximately when was that? How shortly after you arrived in Dallas with
Lee?
A. Well, I arrived in 1962 and it was in 1963 sometime.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss any other agency of the U.S. Government aside from the
FBI?
A. No.
Q. He never mentioned the word CIA?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. When was the first time when you were living in Dallas that you saw that Lee
owned a rifle?
A. I really don't remember the day or month.
Q. No the day or month but what was the first occasion? What were the
circumstances when you saw it?
A. I don't remember.
What is the first time you remember seeing the rifle currently?
A. I believe it was in Dallas but I would not be sure. I would not swear it it.
Believe me, I tried to remember my best recollection.
Q. I am just asking now that you do remember, what was the circumstance? was it
in a closet? Was he holding it? What was the first time you currently remember
seeing the rifle, any rifle?
A. Well, the things flash in my memory right now of him going out after dard
wearing a raincoat and he told me that he was going to practice in some shooting
range. I don't mean that was the first time as I see it flashing right now.
Q. It may not be the first time but you remember one incident when he was in the
raincoat?
A. Yes.
Q. And you saw the rifle at that time?
A. I am not saying that is the first time.
Q. But you saw it at that time?
A. And down in New Orleans he was sitting in the dark on the porch.
Q. The time you saw him in the raincoat, was that before you moved to New
Orleans or after?
A. I believe it was in Dallas because it was quite hot outside. I mean it was
very silly for somebody to put a raincoat over your body in such hot weather.
Q. I was not going to rain that day?
A. No.
Q Did you see the rifle or did you ask him, "Why are you wearing a raincoat?"
A. I probably did but I do not remember the conversation.
Q. Did you ask him where he was going to go practicing?f
A. Well, he said that you can take a bus and go somewhere but I don't know
where.
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Q. Did you see the rifle itself at that time?
A. I don't remember if it had any cover to it. I don't remember.
Q. It was at night after--
A. I was after dark.
Q. After dark.
A. It was very dark but whatever time, it started getting kind of in between.
Q. Did you ask him how he could go target shooting in the dark?
A. It never occurred to me.
I have to explain, I never had any interesting rifles.
Q. You said you didn't like guns.
A. No; but I never took Lee seriously with this thing. I thought a boy playing
awith a big toy and that it would be just temporary. I never realized how
serious it was at the time.
Q. When was the first time that you say that Lee possessed a hun as opposed to a
rifle?
A. I honestly don't remember.
Q. What is the first time you remember seeing the gun?
A. Just a minute. Could that be when he asked me to take the picture of him and
he was wearing this gun or golding the rifle?
Q. He had a gun in that picture.
A. Yes; and it was ridiculous to take a picture. I was puzzling me why anybody
would want to take a picture dressed like that with all the equipment.
Q. Did you ask him?
A. Yes. We had a fuss and a fight over it.
Q. About the gun and the rifle?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. The picture was taken and it was ridiculous.
Q. Did you ask him though about the gun and the rifle and tell him that you
didn't like the guns? He knew that.
A. He knew that.
Q. What was his reaction?
A. That it was none of my business.
Q. Apart from the time Lee went ot go target shooting that you have told us
about, what other times do you remember seeing the rifle?
A. Well, like in New Orleans he would be sitting and cleaning and polishing the
silly thing.
Q. And when you saw cleaning, what was he doing to the rifle?
A. Oh, he was putting rags around and putting oil or something on it.
Q. Did he do that in Dallas as well?
A. He might have, but I do not remember it not to give you the detailed
description of it.
Q. When was the first time that Lee told you he had used the rifle apart from
the target practice?
A. I think the General Walker incident.
Q. Could you relate the details of that incident to us now?
A. Well, I really cannot describe the details but the would be quite accurate in
the testimony that I gave at the Warren Commission and if you refresh my memory
I might be able to tell you.
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Q. What happened the days before the Walder incident; did Lee act unusual at
all?
A. Well he would be sitting--he made a little kind of not an office, a little
closet that he has a chair there and maybe a desk-not a desk, improvisation of a
desk, and he would be writing something down and he told me to to bother him so
he was quite secretive about it.
Q. And that was a few days before?
A. A few days, a few weeks. I do not remember exactly the time.
Q. Was Lee restless a few days before the incident? Was he calm? Did he sleep
well?
A. I don't recall his mood.
Q. Did Lee ever talk in his sleep?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Again in the book "Marina and Lee" you said that a few days prior to the
Walker incident you recollect that he was talking in his sleep.
A. that could be true.
Q. Do you remember, would he talk in English or would he talk in Russian.
A. I don't remember the incident right now.
Q. Did Lee go to work the day that he told you he shot at General Walker?
A. I don't remember the incident right now.
Q. Did Lee go to work the day that he told you he shot at General Walker?
A. I don't remember that either. What day of the week was it?
Q. It was a Wednesday.
A. Was it Wednesday? Well, I am sorry. I simply do not remember.
Q. How did Lee first tell you about the shooting of General Walker?
A. Well, he was gone most of the night and came home very late and turned the
radio on.
Q. How did you feel that evening when he did not come home?
A. He did not come home for a long time and I do believe that I found a note
addressed to me what to do in case something happened to him and I was petrified
and didn't know what to do.
Q. When did you find the note?
A. After he went out.
Q. Was it unusual for him to be out late?
A. No; since he was leaving the house sometimes for this practicing that he
supposedly was going to.
Q. So you were not surprised that he was out that evening?
A. Well, I was surprised that he came home that late.
Q. Were you worried where he was?
A. Of course I was.
Q. Did you contact anybody?
A. No; I didn't.
Q. What did he say when he returned?
A. Well, he turned the radio on and he was very pale and he was listening to the
news, changing from station to station. I asked him what it was all about and he
said that he tried to shoot General Walder. I told him how dare you take
somebody's life and you should not do things like that, I mean you have no right
to do it. He said, see, if somebody shot Hitler at the right time you will do
justice to humanity so since I don't know anything about the man I should not
talk about it.
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Q. Did you know who General Walder was?
A. He told me he was a Fascist. That is all I know.
Q. Had you heard the name before?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever mention to you a man named Scotty?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever--
A. Just a minute. I heard this name before and I don't know if it came from Lee
or somebody that he could be working with. I think it is a little but confusing.
Scotty could be a dog. I am sorry.
Q. Did he ever mention a man who spoke with a Scottish accent?
A. Oh, you mean with a Scottish accent? No; never.
Q. Did he ever mention a man who lived with General Walker?
A. No; I thought the man lived alone after what I read later on.
Q. When Lee came back that night was he disheveled?
A. What's disheveled?
Q. Was he dirty? Were his clothes still neat?
A. Well, honestly I only remember that he was very pale and that is all I
recall.
Q. When do you recall him leaving the house that day prior to his shooting at
General Walker?
A. I don't recall if he came from work and then left or whether he left after
work. I don't remember.
Q. Was he dressed in the same clothes that you saw him previously when he
returned?
A. I just don't remember.
Q. Did he have the rifle with him when he came back?
A. No; I think he said he left it hidden somewhere and I do believe the next day
at night he went and got it. That is what I remember right now. That is the
testimony I am giving you, what I remember.
Q. That is what we want, your present recollection.
Did he tell you he had shot at him with a rifle or did he mention that he had
used a gun?
A. Well, I think it was a rifle.
Q. Did he tell you where he hid the rifle or the gun?
A. I think he might have mentioned that it was in the shrubs somewhere.
Q. Did you discuss with him whether it would be found and the police would be
looking for him?
A. It was such an unpleasant and terrifying incident that I was just trembling
all day long. I was looking through the windows; I was expecting police coming
any second.
Q. Did you suggest to Lee that he go back and get the gun or rifle or did he do
it by himself?
A. I think he did it by himself.
Q. What did he do with the gun or the rifle when he went back and got it?
A. Kept it in the house.
Q. Did you see it again?
A. Well, I never made a point of going and checking the rifle every day to see
whether is was there or not.
Q. Where in the house would he keep it?
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A. In the closet.
Q. On a shelf or was it on the floor?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Was it wrapped in anything?
A. It could be just kind of stanking in the corner.
Q. Proppoed up in the corner of the closet?
A. It could be.
Q. Was it covered? Was it wrapped in anything?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Was the closet crowded? Did it have many things in it?
A. Usually his personal belongings, his clothes, his books, whatever, and he
told me to stay out of it; that is his own private thing.
Q. This was his closet?
A. Yes.
Q. If you opened the closet, was it easy to get the rifle or did you have to
move a lot of things aside before you got it?
A. I never did it.
Q. If you opened the closet door, would you see the rifle immediately?
A. I don't remember.
Q. The photographs you took of Lee with the rifle and the pistol, do you know
where Lee developed those photos?
A. Well, didn't he work for some time with photography?
Q. You don't know where he developed the films?
A. No.
Q. Did he have any photographic supplies around the house?
A. It is so hard to dig through your memory that long back. He might have; I
don't know.
Q. When you saw the rifle that he had, was that the same rifle he had in Russia?
A. I don't remember. How can you transport a gun from one country to another
when you have to go through the inspection on the border?
Q. So you don't think he brought the gun with him?
A. I don't see how it logically or possibly could happen.
Oh, you mean the same gun. Well, he bought the rifle right here.
Q. He bought it here?
A. Yes.
Q. How did he buy the rifle here?
A. Well, I learned later afterward that he ordered through some mail.
Q. At that time did you know that he had ordered a rifle?
A. Well, since I had seen the rifle I knew he purchased it. How he purchased it
I do not know.
Q. The first time you saw it did you ask him, "Where did you get the rifle?"
A. No; but I was very upset that he spent money on such an unnecessary, stupid
thing then we barely could survive on what he was making.
Q. Did you ask him how much it cost?
A. No.
Q. Where did Lee keep his gun? The rifle was in the closet.
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A. Well, it never was on display on the wall but everybody can see it. It was
always hidden somewhere back in the closet. We did not live in one place very
long; we moved from apartment to the apartment.
Q. In the apartment where the rifle was kept in the closet, was the gun also
kept there or was it dept somewhere else?
A. I assume it was together.
Q. Did you see it in that closet?
A. Well, see, my recollection about-do you recall the gun?
Q. Yes.
A. The pictures I took showed two.
Q. It showed a rifle and a gun.
A. Yes.
Q. the question I have is just where did he keep the gun if the rifle was in the
closet?
A. I honestly do not know.
Q. When you were living with Lee at this time, did he ever take the gun out to
go target shooting with that as well as the rifle?
A. I recall only the rifle because it was quite bulky and he had to hide it
under his raincoat but I do not recall the gun at all.
Q. When he brought the rifle back after he had hid it in the bushes from General
Walker's house, what did he carry it in? He didn't just carry the rifle over his
shoulder.
A. No; he didn't, but I told you that he was wearing this raincoat.
Q. And that is what he did when he went to bring the rifle back in?
A. He was wearing the same raincoat.
Q. Do you remember that specifically? Wouldn't you think it is strange that if
it is a nice day and it is not going to rain people would ask him, "Why are you
wearing a raincoat?"
A. You have to be an idiot to do that.
Q. If you were afraid that he was going to get caught with the rifle, don't you
think he would have brought it back some wither way other than by wearing a
raincoat?f
A. I cannot speculate on that.
Q. How did Lee get to General Walker's house?
A. Well, after all this happened and got in the news media, he was laughing
about Americans being so used to cars they don't know that people can walk and
run, so I assumed that maybe he took a bus, since people can walk and run, so I
assumed that maybe he took a bus, since we didn't have a car, to a certain point
of his destination and then walked from there.
Q. Was that how Lee got to where he hid the rifle as well?
A. Well, he did not discuss the details with me and I don't know where General
Walker lived. I didn't know whereabouts.
Q. He didn't brag about how he got away?
A. Well, he bragged how quickly he could run or somebody was looking where he
was not.
Q. Did he say somebody gave him a ride away from General Walker's house, that he
went in somebody else's car?
A. No.
Q. After the incident with General Walker, did you and Lee discuss his use of
guns and shooting at people?
A. Well, we had less arguments about it because I was against it.
Q. Did you consider getting rid of the guns, the hun and the rifle?
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A. Well, what would I do with them? Where would I throw them, in the trashcan?
Throw them in the river, in the trashcan, so Lee would not have them in the
house.
Q. Who was your closest friend at that time?
A. Well, I liked all the Russian immigrants that I met here and the were close
to me be george de Mohrenschildt was the one who visited us more often than the
others and I liked his personality very much.
Q. Was he your closest friend at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you discuss--not shooting anybody, with George de Mohrenschildt, but did
you discuss the fact that you wished that Lee did not have guns around the
house?
A. Well, I do not remember if I discussed this with George.
Q. Did George know Lee had guns around the house?
A. I do not remember.
Q. Did his wife know?
A. If I gave you previous testimony or somebody else gave previous testimony,
that is the truth. Right now I do not recall whether George knew or did now
know.
Q. Which previous testimony are you referring to?
A. The Warren Commission. I told him the truth about this. I had a fresher
memory then I have now.
Q. Yes.
Whenever you testified before the Warren Commission, whatever you told them was
true?
A. Yes.
Q. Shortly after the shooting of General Walker, the attempted shootin, you and
Lee moved to New Orleans; is that correct?
A. That could be correct. Say it again.
Q. After the shooting of Gener Walker.
A. Shortly after.
Q. After that you and Lee moved to New Orleans?
A. Yes. I was very happy about this move because I thought maybe his behavaior
will change and he will be closer to the relative that he spoke so highly about.
Q. When did you first start talking with Lee about moving to New Orleans?
A. I think he approached me with the move to New Orleans because it seems to me
that he was very short of jobs around here so he wanted to try to find something
in a different city.
Q. When was the first time that you and Lee discussed moving?
A. I don't remember the day or month.
Q. Was it before the shooting of General Walder?
A. No; after.
Q. So you never discussed moving until the shooting of General Walker?
A. I think so.
Q. Did you think that it would abe easier for Lee to obtain a job in New Orleans
than in Dallas?
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A. Well, he was drifting from one job to another one in Dallas so I was hoping
that he would have more opportunities in another city.
Q. Did he discuss with you before your move any of the other opportunities he
knew about in New Orleans?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did he discuss people he knew in New Orleans?
A. He spoke about his aunt and uncle who might help to get a job for him.
Q. Did he ever discuss anybody else in New Orleans?
A. No. Besides relatives, I did not do any discussion with strangers.
Q. Did anyone ever visit you while you were still in Dallas that Lee introduced
you to as a friend or somebody he knew in New Orleans?
A. No.
Q. When you were in Russia, Lee discussed moving to both Dallas and New Orleans
you said.
A. Yes.
Q. Did he discuss at any time that he knew anybody in New Orleans?
A. Not that I remember. As a friend?
Q. As a friend?
A. Just as a relative.
Q. Just as a relative?
A. Just as a relative.
Q. Did you ever hold the rifle that Lee had when he was in Dallas?
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A. Yes; I heard of him in Russia; yes.
Q. You heard of him in Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that that was the same Mr. Nixon that you had heard of?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you tell Lee that precipitated the fight?
A. Pardon me ?
Q. What started the fight between you and Lee?
A. Well, I didn't want him to leave the house with the gun.
Q. What happened?
A. Well, he stayed home all day; he didn't go out.
Q. Did he just voluntarily stay home?
A. Well, I already told you before that everybody. asked him the same silly
question, how does a small woman lock him in the bathroom, and things like that.
I did not know. He wanted to provoke me. I just now can speculate about his
state of mind, what the reasons were for it. Maybe just to punish me.
Q. How did he get into the bathroom?
A. Well, we fought and I cannot give you the details right now. First there was
a struggle and I guess I pushed him in so somehow he went there and I held the
door for a long time, but I could not go on holding the door, so I finally
begged and pleaded with him and he said he would not go and I believed him. So
then I told him to take the clothes off. I know that he cannot go without the
clothes, so he sat and read the book then.
Q. Was he trying as hard as he could?
A. Before I said I didn't hold the gun. Well, if I asked him to give me the gun
then, for example, during the fight, I could have held it and hidden it
somewhere so he would not leave.
Q. How did he give you the gun? Was he still in the bathroom
A. Could be. It was a second floor and there were stairs. There was a little
like a platform there or a small hall. I don't know if he gave it to me or I
took it. I don't remember.
Q. Was he trying as hard as he could, do you think, to get out the bathroom?
A. Well, at the beginning he would probably have tried but, well, it was quite
loud and I was embarrassed that the neighbors that lived below would hear us
fighting and fussing.
Q. Were you fighting during this period of time before you moved to New Orleans?
Were you fighting frequently with Lee?
A. Yes; we didn't have a very peaceful life.
Q. Did he talk about going back to Russia during this period of time
A. What period of life are you talking. about, in New Orleans?
Q. No, no. Before you moved to New Orleans.
A. I don't think so.
Q. You don't recall his discussing moving back to Russia?
A. No; I remember the New Orleans period much clearer because then I had to
write those letters.
Mr. WOLF. If you like, we could take a break now for lunch because it is a
convenient breaking time.
Mr. HAMELTON. It is up to you.
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Mr. WOLF. Any time you want to take a break let us know.
The WITNESS. Could we go off the record .?.
Mr. WOLF. Yes.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. WOLF. Back on the record.
We are going to take a lunch break. At the current time it is approximately
12:40.
I would also like to state on the record that regarding the cameras that Mrs.
Porter examined previously, concerning the two Minox cameras, so there is no
confusion on the record, the Minox which was not part of the material in the
National Archives and which has serial No. 2339303 is approximately 1 1/2 inches
longer than the one which is currently in the National Archives.
At this time we will take a break for lunch.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., a recess was taken until 2: 15 p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. WOLF. We are ready to resume now. It is 2 :15 and the people present are
Mrs. Porter, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. McDonald, Mrs. Emanuel, Mr. Cornwell, and myself.
[Whereupon, Marina Porter resumed the stand and testified further as follows :]
DIRECT EXAMINATION--RESUMED
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. Porter, did Lee keep a diary at any time during his life?
A. He was doing some writing while we were living in Russia and later on it was
called as a diary. At the time I did not know what all his writings were about.
Q. When did he write that?
A. When we were living in Russia.
Q. Did he start it after you were married?
A. I don't know when he started. He started to continue what was previously
started but I saw him sitting in the evening writing something.
Q. And that was while you were in Minsk?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he continue that diary in the United States?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you know, did he write any of that diary on the boat between Amsterdam and
New York?
A. Could have been.
Q. Did you ever ask him what was in the diary when you saw him writing it?
A. Yes; I asked on occasion.
Q. What would he say?
A. His thoughts maybe.
Q. Could you read the diary?
A. No.
Q. The diary was in English or in Russian?
A. In English.
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Q. Would he write it every night when you were living together, a little bit
every night, or was it written lengthy one night and then he would not work on
it for some time and then write again some other time?
A. Well sometimes 2 or 3 days maybe in a row and then skip for a week or a few
days.
Q. Returning to the incident with Lee and General Walker, how long after Lee
shot at General Walker did he bring the rifle home?
A. As far as I recall right now I assume it was the next day.
Q. Did you see him bring it back home?
A. Well, if I saw it I don't remember right now.
Q. What was the first time after that shooting you saw the rifle that you
remember now?
A. Right now I don't remember.
Q. After he brought the rifle home, do you remember if Jeanne or George de
Mohrenschildt ever saw the rifle?
A. I cannot tell you that, not because I am hiding but because I cannot recall.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss
A. May I ask you a question?
Q. Sure.
A. Did George de Mohrenschildt ever give testimony before the Commission?
Q. Yes.
A. Don't go into details, it is none of my business.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss General Walker with you after the alleged shooting
incident?
A. Well, he didn't discuss in detail, we just had an argument over him trying to
kill the man and it does not matter what his beliefs are, I felt he has no right
to take anybody's life away. As I told you before, he just tried to persuade me
that he was not a good man, that he felt quite strongly that he was doing a
justice to the people, ired I was enough not to understand him. I didn't know
anything about it.
Q. If he felt that strongly about it, do you think he might have tried to do
something again to General Walker?
A. I am not sure of anything, at least Lee's behavior; it is unpredictable.
Q. He never discussed it with you?
A. No; you mean that he discussed a second attempt?
Q. Another attempt.
A. No; he did not.
Q. Do you think he might have participated in another attempt without telling
you about it?
A. Your guess would be just as good as mine.
Q. But given his strong feelings about General Walker, it would be possible?
A. Well, I am not in a position to answer this question because I am not a
psychiatrist, I cannot predict how one person might react even though under
anger or disliking somebody.
Q. When Lee discussed moving to New Orleans did you ask him where he would be
able to obtain a Job in New Orleans?
A. Where?
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Q. Where.
A. He mentioned that his uncle was working somewhere on the boat docks--how do
you call it, the shipyard or whatever you call it.
Q. Shipyards. Did he contact his uncle prior to in to Orleans?
A. Lee came to New Orleans first. I did not travel with him so whom he
approached and who he visited first I do not know.
Q. When he left, what did he tell you he was going to do and who did he tall you
he was going to see?
A. He said he was going to see his Aunt Lillian.
Q. Did he tell you any other individuals he would see?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how much money he took with him for that trip?
A. No; I never was aware of how much money Lee had on him.
Q. Did he say how long he would be gone for that trip?
A. Well, he went to New Orleans and he said when he found a job he will call me
up.
Q. Did he leave you money behind so you would have some support while he was
gone?
A. I don't remember.
Q. How would you be able to support yourself?
A. If he did, it was not much.
Q. If he was gone for a long time, how would you be able to support yourself if
you were not working at that time?
A. Well, I was living with .Mrs. Ruth Paine at the time so he just dumped me on
her hands.
Q. How did Lee get to New Orleans?
A. I assume he took a bus.
Q. Do you remember specifically any discussion of a car?
A. What do you mean by a discussion?
Q. A discussion that perhaps if somebody would drive him.
A. I don't remember that. Maybe Mrs. Paine took him to the bus station. Is it
possible?
Q. When Lee left for New Orleans you did not know when he would be returning?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever mention the name David Ferrie to you?
A. No.
Q. What was the first time that you heard that name mentioned?
A. Well, the name rings a bell but--David Ferrie. It was after the assassination
that I heard this name.
Q. After the assassination.
A. Maybe Mr. Garrison.
Q. Do you recognize the name AI Landry?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if Lee knew him?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you recognize the name Edward Voebel?
A. No.
Q. You don't know if Lee knew him?
A. No.
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Q. Do you recognize the name Alvin Beauboeff? I believe it is French.
A. The last name sounds Russian and I am sure I heard the name Beauboeff many
times in Russia.
Q. Do you recognize that name in conjunction with the New Orleans area?
A. No.
Q. Kerry Thornley?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss during the period of time you were en route to New
Orleans-----
A. Would you please repeat the last name?
Q. Yes; Thornley, T-h-o-r-n-l-e-y-
A. May I ask you what was the name of the boy who picked him up the last day
that he went to work, the day before the assassination?
Q. No; that is not the name.
A. That is not?
Q. No; that is somebody different. Did Lee ever discuss his Marine Corps
friends?
A. Never.
Q. Do you recognize the name Albert Cheramie?
A. No; I don't.
Q. Did he ever discuss any relatives aside from the Murrets?
A. Relatives ?
Q. New Orleans that was.
A. I forgot the name.
Q. Aunt and uncle, Murrets.
A. Well, they have a daughter and he spoke fondly of her.
Q. Did he have any cousins that he referred to in New Orleans?
A. That is what I am talking about.
Q. Just that one daughter
A. She was a cousin to him.
Q. Yes; where was she living?
A. I don't know but I saw her at Aunt Lillian's house. I don't know if she was
living with them or in her own apartment.
Q. Did he ever refer to relatives living in Mobile, Ala.?
A. Yes; we made a visit over there once to see another cousin of his supposedly
in the seminary or he was studying to be a priest.
Q. Did Lee have frequent contact with him?
A. I think he saw him a few times. I don't know how frequently.
Q. Where would he see him
A. Only one incident that I remember when we went to see him at the seminary.
Q. How did you get there?
A. I think by the bus or maybe his aunt gave us a ride or some of the the
relatives. I don't recall that. I just remember being in Mobile, Ala., and
meeting this gentlemen.
Q. Did. Lee ever discuss the Civil Air Patrol in New Orleans?
A. Civil what?
Q. Civil Air Patrol.
A. No.
Q. CAP.
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A. What is it?
Q. An organization.
A. No.
Q. While in New Orleans did Lee ever discuss General Walker?
A. With whom? With me ?
Q. With you.
A. I don't think so.
Q. Did he discuss it with other individuals?
A. We didn't have any visitors ever, practically none. If he discussed with
somebody, I would not know about it.
Q. Do you recognize the name Palmer MacBride?
A. No.
Q. Prior to your going to New Orleans did any of Lee's friends stop by your
house in Dallas?
A. Would you please state that again. Prior?
Q. Before you went to New Orleans did any of Lee's friends stop by your house in
Dallas?
A. Well, if anybody stopped by, that would be our few actual friends and the
only friends we had were the Russians.
Q. Nobody unusual stopped by?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever mention that somebody was writing a book and that he may be
mentioned in the book?
A. I don't recall that at all.
Q. Did Lee discuss during that time in New Orleans the civil rights legislation
of President Kennedy?
A. Not with me anyway. I never heard him discussing that.
Q. You never heard that. Did he ever discuss activities other groups were
engaging in concerning civil rights for black people?
A. He was involved with some Cuban. I don't know if it was pro-Castro or
anti-Castro movement that was in New Orleans if that is what you call it.
Q. Did Lee discuss with you the Cuban activities in New Orleans?
A. Yes; he did.
Q. What did he say about them?
A. Well, I really don't remember what he said about it but I knew he sympathized
with them m whatever they were doing.
Q. Well, you said there were both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in New
Orleans.
A. I said I do not recall whether they were pro-Castro or anti-Castro groups. I
knew it had something to do with Cuba, Cuban dissent.
Q. And he sympathized with what group? Do you remember the name of the group?
A. Well, when he was arrested in New Orleans, supposedly the of the group was
Fair Play for Cuba.
Q. Were there any other groups that he spoke about?
A. That is all that I can recall
Q. Did he ever mention Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi?
A. What?
Q. Keesler Air Force Base which is located in Mississippi.
A. No.
Q. He never discussed friends from the Air Force base?
A. Well, I didn't know that he had anything to do with the Air Force.
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Q. Well, they are people he may have known who were in the Air Force.
A. I don't know.
Q. How did Lee get in touch with you to tell you to come to New Orleans?
A. Well, he called. I guess he called Ruth Paine that we can come over into the
apartment.
Q. Did you speak to Lee on the phone
A. Probably.
Q. Did you ask him what he was doing in New Orleans during that time?
A. Yes. Well, that was very casual conversation between husband and wife.
Q. Did he mention anything about people he had met, things he had been doing?
A. No.
Q. Did he mention any places he had been outside of New Orleans?
A. No.
Q. Do you know, did he go straight from Dallas to New Orleans or did he make any
stops on the way?
A. Well, I would not know that for a fact. He did not tell me that he stopped
anywhere.
Q. Have you heard that he stopped places?
A. No.
Q. But he never told you any place he stopped?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever mention Morgan City, La., in particular?
A. Morgan City, no.
Q. How did Lee come to the job he acquired in New Orleans?
A. I don't -know by now. Was it a coffee company?
Q. Reilly Coffee Co.
Did he mention anybody at that company?
A. Well, no, not that I recall right now, but I think he was circling job ads in
the newspaper and applied that way.
Q. He never told you that he knew some people who helped him get the job there?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. How did Lee find the apartment where you met him at?
A. How did he find it?
Q. Yes.
A. When we moved there he had already rented the apartment.
Q. Did you like the apartment?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask him why he chose that?
A. Well, I knew why. That is all we could afford, I guess. I liked his Aunt
Lillian's house much better.
Q. He didn't tell you that anybody had referred him to this apartment or
suggested that he stay there?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee mention anybody who he had met during his stay in New Orleans who was
particularly friendly or particularly helpful to him?
A. I don't remember that really. I doubt that he mentioned it. Lee was a kind of
loner. We didn't have very many friends or visitors.
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Q. Did he discuss the French Quarter of New Orleans with you?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say about it?
A. Well he took me there once or twice. We could not afford to go to fancy
restaurants. We would just see how other people are having fun.
Q. Did he seem to know his way around that part of town fairly well?
A. Yes.
Q. When you went with him did he meet people he knew there?
A. No, we just strolled along, the three of us.
Q. Did Lee ever mention trips to Mobile, Ala., apart from the ones you told us
about the trip to the seminary?
A. By himself?
Q. By himself.
A. I don't remember right now if he did.
Q. Did you ever go on any trips with Lee outside of New Orleans?
A. I told you I went to Mobile, Ala, with him.
Q. Apart from that.
A. Would you please say it again.
Q. Apart from that trip, did you and Lee ever go on a trip together outside of
New Orleans?
A. No; it mostly was in New Orleans. We would take a bus and go somewhere.
Q. Was anyone teaching Lee how to drive during this period of time?
A. In New Orleans?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Had you ever seen him trying to drive?
A. Once but it was in front of Ruth Paine's house when we were in Dallas. He was
practicing in her car.
Q. Do you think he could have passed a driving test?
A. I don't know. I don't drive a car so I don't know.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss a trip to Baton Rouge?
A. The name of the town is familiar--not 'from the newspapers, course. I might
even have been there.
Q. Under what circumstances would you have been there?
A. I don't remember how I got there.
Q. Would this be with Lee?
A. Yes.
Q. Would this be for a day or for longer?
A. Can we take a recess?
Q. Yes.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
The Witness. It seems to me I had been in Baton Rouge but I do not recall the
circumstances, why, with whom.
By Mr. Wolf:
Q. Do you remember any trip to Gulfport, La., which is on the gulf?
A. I remember the first time seeing the Gulf of Mexico.
Q. Were you there with Lee in Gulfport?
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A. Somehow I don't see Lee in my memory. I see his aunt and a cousin. I don't
know where Lee was.
Q. How did you get to any place when you wanted to leave New Orleans if you did
not drive and Lee did not drive?
A. Well, if we had been somewhere we would have a witness because the third
person--since I did not drive and we do not have a car so it has to be
somebody's car and somebody driving.
Q. Do you recall one of Lee's cousins giving him any driving lessons when he was
in New Orleans?
A. I do not recall that but it could be this young lady cousin of his. I don't
know.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss a trip to Metairie, La., with you?
A. No. Is this near New Orleans?
Q. It is not that far. Did he ever discuss looking for work other than the
Reilly Coffee Co. where he was working?
A. Well, he said he looked for several jobs according to the newspaper ads but
that was the only one that was available at the time.
Q. Once he was at Reilly, did he discuss looking for other jobs?
A. I don't recall that he was very. happy with his job. It seemed me by then he
never was happy with any job that he got.
Q. Did he mention any of his associates at Reilly Coffee Co.?
A. Yes. He said that during the lunch period he would visit with some black
young man. I don't remember his name but they became friendly. I never saw the
man.
Q. How did he spend his typical lunch hour; did he tell you?
A. Well, he usually ate a sandwich and a coke.
Q. Did he tell you?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever tell you that he found particular people very difficult to work
with?
A. Well, when Lee had difficulties on the job it was always somebody's fault.
Q. Did he ever mention who it was?
A. Names? If he mentioned names at the time, I do not remember them right now.
Q. Are you familiar with the name John Hurt?
A. No.
Q. You never heard that?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss anybody in Raleigh, N.C.?
A. No.
Q. Are you familiar with Sam Mancuso?
A. No. I heard this name recently in the news or somewhere else, but never then.
Q. Adrian Alba?
A. No.
Q. A Thomas Bedham?
A. No.
Q. You have never heard that name?
A. No.
Q. Emmett Barbee?
A. No.
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Q. Anna Dante Marachine?
A. A beautiful name but I never heard it.
Q. Did he ever mention a Mancuso Restaurant in New Orleans?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss a building known as the Newman Building?
A. No.
Q. Or did he ever discuss the International Trade Mart?
A. No.
Q. When was the first time you were aware that Lee was engaged in Cuban
activities while he was in New Orleans?
A. Well, first he brought some kind of pamphlets in the house then he was
arrested for it and he made some kind of speech on radio or something like that,
so just little by little.
Q. What did you say when you first saw the pamphlets? Was that the first time
that you were aware of his activities?
A. Pardon me. What did you say first?
Q. What did you say to Lee when you first saw the pamphlets--
if that was the first time you knew about his Cuban activities?
A. Of course I was reheved with him that he was being such a revolutionary
minded person. At least it was more peaceful than playing with the rifle. Some
papers couldn't hurt.
Q. He was arrested for distributing the pamphlets; is that correct?
A. That is what he told me.
Q. That is the only way you found out that he was arrested?
A. Well, he didn't spend the. night at home so when he came in the morning he
told me he was m jail and I asked him what for.
Q. What did you do when he didn't come home that night?
A. Well, apparently I was waiting up for him all night; I was worried, I don't
remember exactly what I did.
Q. Did you call anybody or call the police?
A. No, I didn't call anyone because I didn't know anybody in New Orleans besides
his relatives.
Q. Did you call his relatives to find out if he was all right?
A. I don't recall doing that.
Q. Was Lee working at Reilly Coffee Co. when he was arrested?
A. I don't know. I don't remember.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss a place known as the Court of the Two Sisters in the
French Quarter?
A. No. Is that, the restaurant ? The name sounds familiar but I don't know where
I heard it. Say it again.
Q. The Court 01 the Two Sisters.
A. Well, I doubt that it came from Lee because I had been visiting, New Orleans
up until Lee died and somebody might have mentioned that name to me.
Q. Did he ever discuss the Ryder Coffee House?
A. No.
Q. Was Lee usually home with you in the evenings?
A. Usually, yes.
Q. Did he ever go out alone?
A. Yes; I suppose so.
Q. Did you ask him what he did on those times when he would go out?
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A. Well, he went to the library, he said, or just walk around the block.
Q. Would he go to the library at night?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it open in the evenings?
A. It would be open until eight or seven or something like that.
Q. What people came to visit you and Lee together in New Orleans? When you and
Lee were together, what people came to visit?
A. Not very many besides Mrs. Paine being there for a very short time.
Q. Any of the people who lived in New Orleans?
A. I think Mrs. Paine once. She knew somebody in New Orleans, a friend of hers,
and they came to visit us once, an American couple.
Q. What was the name of that couple?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Was Lee ever visited by people who he seemed to know and you might not have
known?
A. No; only once somebody rang the doorbell and he was in the house and he
answered the door and he said it was some solicitors and that was all.
Q. Did you see them there, the people who were at the door?
A. Just from a distance but now I don't even remember whether it was a man or
woman or two of them. I don't know.
Q. How long did the conversation with Lee last?
A. Not more than 5 minutes.
Q. Was Lee ever visited by Cubans at the house?
A. No.
Q. You have no memory of any Cuban individuals coming to the house?
A. No.
Q. After Lee lost the job at the Reilly Coffee Co. what did he do during the
days?
A. Well, he was preoccupied with his pamphlets again and he became very sloppy
in his appearance; very irritable.
Q. Did he stay around the house most of the day?
A. Well, sometimes he said he would go look for a job and get dressed and go out
and spend most of the day out. I don't know where he was but I assume he was
looking for a job. The next day maybe he does not go anywhere and then try
again.
Q. Was Lee ever away overnight at any time during your stay in New Orleans?
A. Only when he was arrested.
Q. That was the only time?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you and he ever travel together and stay overnight anywhere?
A. I don't remember if we stayed overnight when we went to see his cousin, I
don't recall.
Q. Lee frequently went to the library you said?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he have his own library card?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see the library card he had?
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400
A. No; but he checks the books out.
Q. Did you ever see the library card he used?
A. If I seen it, I don't remember.
Q. Did he ever discuss his attitudes about the airlines?
A. Well, he wanted to hijack a plane once and he wanted me to help him out.
Q. That was to go where?
A. To Cuba.
Q. To Cuba. Did he ever discuss which particular airline he was going to hijack
a plane of?
A. No.
Q. Did he every say anything in particular about Eastern Lines?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you the subject of homosexuality?
A. No.
Q. There were many people at that time in New Orleans who were homosexuals. Did
he ever discuss the general attitude?
A. Well, to tell you the truth, I found out many years later what it is all
about, you know.
Q. He never discussed that with you at all?
A. No.
Q. Never indicated an attitude? If you saw somebody who was apparently
homosexual, he never indicated what his attitude would be?
A. I don't know his attitude.
Q. Did you ever accompany Lee when he went to the library?
A. Excuse me.
Q. Did you ever acco. mpany Lee when he went to the library?
A. I think on one occasion.
Q. Was it close to your house?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember the name or where that library was?
A. No, I knew it was a walking distance and it was on the same side as the house
was.
Q. Are you familiar with Rosewell Thompson?
A. Who?
Q. Rosewell Thompson.
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss what kind of jobs he would be interested in if he left
the Reilly Coffee Co., the type of work he would like to have?
A. Well, he was dreaming about having an intellectual job rather than just a
plain common mechanical labor job or something like that.
Q. Did he ever discuss a job as an electrician?
A. No; he would not be qualified.
Q. Was Lee active in discussing local politics with you?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss that to your knowledge?
A. Well, I don't know how to answer this question. Something in
A. Well, maybe I was looking for the wrong thing, I don't know. local politics.
Q. Anything about the sheriff, the mayor, elections.
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A. No.
Q. Did Lee vote in elections?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did he ever discuss registration to vote?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did he ever discuss working in a hospital?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever mention Marydale Farm?
A. Say it again.
Q. Marydale Farm.
A. That is the name of a person?
Q. No; of a place.
A. No.
Q. Did he ever mention the name Louis Russell?
A. No.
Q. Are you familiar with the name Sergio Arcacha Smith?
A. I heard this name somewhere before but I don't remember where.
Q. Do you know if you heard it from Lee?
A. I doubt it.
Q. Do you think you have heard something since the assassination or prior to the
assassination?
A. I think so, after the assassination.
Q. You stated Lee discussed with you hijacking a plane to go to Cuba.
A. Yes.
Q. Did he ever discuss that with anybody else?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss his desire to go-----
A. I say no. How can I be positive? Not as far as I know of.
Q. Did he ever discuss his desire to go to Cuba with anyone else while he was in
New Orleans?
A. I would not know that.
Q. Did Lee mention the Cuban Revolutionary Council?
A. I cannot remember under such a name.
Q. It is also referred to as the initials CRC.
A. Well, that does not ring a bell either but when he went to Mexico he was
planning to go to the Cuban chancellor so revolutionary--I don't know what kind
of consul exists in Mexico.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss eating lunch while he was working at Walgren's
drugstore?
A. I thought he had his lunch on the grounds of the factory.
Q. Did he buy his lunch at the factory?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did he take lunch from home?
A. I don't recall that either.
Q. Are you familiar with the name Loran Hall?
A. No.
Q. Are you familiar with the name Lawrence Howard?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee ever mention the Carson City garage?
A. No.
Q. Are you familiar with that at all?
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A. No; where is it?
Q. It is next door to the Reilly Coffee Co.?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever go to Lee's place of work at the Reilly Coffee.
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you go there?
A. Well, I just wanted to see where he works, just to see him during the day. I
took a bus and I asked because I didn't speak English very well so I just asked
for the name and they said no such a person worked there so maybe I got into the
wrong building. So I never saw him there. I went to some building and asked to
speak with Lee and they said no person under this name worked there.
Q. Did you ask Lee about it that night?
A. Yes: and he told me I had no business to disturb him at work so, that was
that.
Q. You didn't tell him you were surprised that he was not at the company?
A. I might have.
Q. What did he respond?
A. I don't remember. I just remember he was angry with me for doing that.
Q. Were you at the Reilly Coffee Co to the best of your knowledge?
A. Well. maybe I was looking for the wrong thing, I don't know. I would not
swear to it, OK?
Q. When you were in New Orleans were you aware of people who were homosexuals?
A. No.
Q. Was that a concept that you were total unfamiliar with?
A. Well, I learned about homosexuals or what homosexuality is much later in my
life.
Q. You were not familiar with that when you were in Russia, just what the
concept is?
A. No.
Q. Thinking back on it now did Lee appear to have friends who happened to be
homosexual?
A. No.
Q. Do you think there is a possibility that he did and you just didn't know his
friends or that you did not know that they were homosexual?
A. I would not know or have seen anything unusual about the behavior pattern.
Q. When did you and Lee decide to leave New Orleans
A. When?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, he decided that he will go to Mexico---I am sorry. Would you please
repeat the question? When did we decide?
Q. To move back to Dallas and leave New Orleans?
A. He lost this job. Do you want me to try to remember the month?
Q. Well, what is the time sequence and the month if you can remember it?
A. Well, I cannot remember the month but I know he was planning to go to Mexico
and I was expecting the baby so Mrs. Paine again offered a helping hand and I
left New Orleans with her and Lee was
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left behind and he said he will follow pretty soon. He told Ruth that he will
come over later.
Q. Did he plan to go to Mexico before you made the decision to leave New
Orleans?
A. I don't recall.
Q. When he discussed hijacking the plane, at that time did you already decide to
move back to Dallas?
A. I am sorry. I do not remember when the decision was made.
Q. Did Lee tell you why he wanted to go to Mexico?
A. He was disappointed in Latin America so he wants to go and try Cuba.
Q. Why did he choose Mexico?
A. He told me he was going to take the bus.
Q. Did you ask him about how expensive it would be?
A. If I asked, he told me it was not very much. I don't know the price?
Q. Did you think he would come back to see you in Dallas after he went to
Mexico?
A. Well, to tell you the truth I did not think that I will ever see him again.
Q. How did you feel about that?
A. It was a pathetic situation.
Q. When Mrs. Paine took you back to Dallas, what is the next time you heard from
Lee?
A. I recall--how correct I am I don't know but he came back and called from the
Dallas--no. I think he took a taxi or somebody dropped him off at Paine's house.
Q. He didn't call you after them time you left New Orleans and before he
returned?
A. I don't remember.
Q. When he went to Mexico by bus did he stop anywhere along the way?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever tell you about his travels?
A. Well, he said that he did not succeed, they refused him.
Q. What was his attitude?
A. He was very disappointed.
Q. Who was "they" who refused him?
A. The consular at the Cuban Embassy.
Q. Did he mention any other embassy?
A. I would not speculate on that. It could be another embassy.
Q. Did he discuss the Russian Embassy?
A. I don't remember right now.
Q. Did he tell you anything else he did while he was in Mexico?
A. As entertainment?
Q. As entertainment or anything else he might do.
A. He discussed certain visits to certain authorities he had to see and that is
all.
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Q. Did he discuss any parties that he may have gone to?
A. No.
Q. Did he discuss any particular people at the Embassy?
A. He mentioned the names of certain persons that he saw at the Embassy but I
don't recall them.
Q. Did he return from Mexico to New Orleans?
A. I think the next time I saw him it was at Ruth Paine's house.
Q. But did he tell you what he did after he went to Mexico?
A. Well, I recall right now that he made the Mexican trip and came back to
Dallas.
Q. So he took all his belongings from New Orleans to Mexico and then went from
Mexico to Dallas?
A. No; I took the belongings.
Q. So Lee had nothing left in New Orleans?
A. Just a few personal things and clothing in one bag, that is all.
Q. So you believe Lee came directly from Mexico back to Dallas.
A. Yes.
Q. How did he get there?
A. Same bus.
Q. Is it possible that he returned to New Orleans before he came to Dallas?
A. It could be. I would not know about it or I would not remember that.
Q. Did he tell you of any places he may have been apart from Mexico on that
trip?
A. No.
Mr. WOLF. We will take a 5-minute break.
[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., a recess was taken until 3 :20 p.m.]
Mr. Wolf. We will resume. It is 3 :20 now and Mr. McDonald will be asking Mrs.
Porter a series of questions for the next period of time.
Mr. McDoNALD. Thank you.
By Mr. McDoNALD:
Q. Mrs. Porter, after you left New Orleans it was your understanding that Lee
was going to go to Mexico City.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your testimony that you did not see him again until he returned from
Mexico?
A. Yes.
Q. After your return to Dallas, after you left New Orleans in approximately
September or maybe early October, do you recall going with Lee to the Texas
State Employment Commission?
Let me amplify that a little bit. Do you recall going with Lee and with some
other people, a group of people, yourself and at the time you would have been
pregnant and perhaps Lee and some other friends or other people?
A. No; I don't recall that. You mean in Dallas?
Q. Yes.
A. No; I don't recall. I might have been, I would not deny that.
Q. It would have been a 'government-type office where Lee would have gone to
inquire about a job, where he would have sat down with either a man or a woman
at a desk and discussed his job skills.
A. I am sorry but I could not remember at all.
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Q. I will just try to see if I can refresh your memory. Do you recall ever being
m a government-type office where you waited for Lee to finish his business and
you either stood or sat. in a waiting area, a waiting room, or near the wall?
A. I am afraid not. I have to be with somebody.
Q. Was Lee's brother living in Dallas at that time?
A. No; he was living in Fort Worth.
Q. Fort Worth?
A. I would not say that that didn't happen, I just cannot recall at all.
Q. Is it possible that Lee could have stopped in Dallas before he went to
Mexico?
A. I don't see why not. I am sorry. From New Orleans to Dallas and then back?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I would not know about that. He never said anything about it.
Q. But you were not with him if he did this?
A. No; I did not see him from the time I left New Orleans and left him behind
and the next time he was in Dallas.
Q. Was Lee's brother older than Lee?
A. Yes.
Q. How much older?
A. Not very much. Maybe 3 years.
Q. Do you recall if Lee ever owned a leather jacket., a. black leather jacket,
something we call like a motorcycle jacket with little stars on the lapel?
A. No; he never had a jacket like that that I remember.
Q. Any kind of shortwaisted jacket that would be leather?
A. Not shiny leather, no.
Q. Do you recall his having at any time a jacket that. would have had little
silver stars?
A. That would be more or less military kind of style?
Q. Yes.
A. The only thing I noticed was a military raincoat that was a greenish color as
I recall.
Q. Did it have stars on it?
A. No: I think it had something like that, a lapel with a button. No stars, but
it was long.
Q. It was long.
Knowing Lee as you knew him would it be out of character for him to say to
someone else that--I will give you a hypothetical. If he had been talking to
someone, say an employment counselor, about his discharge from the Marines,
would it be out of character for him to say to that Derson, namely Lee, does not
willingly subject himself to authority? In other words, he does not like to take
orders from anybody?
A. I would not know what to say. how to answer this question. Since I did not.
speak English, I do not know what he might have said. He could be, very rude
sometimes and if that were described as the rudeness in his character, yes: I
would expect that. As far as taking orders, I knew him personally and he didn't
like to take orders.
Q. Did not like to.
A. No; but as far as toward me, just to somebody Or say to a stranger, I would
not know.
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Q. Did he speak Spanish?
A. No.
Q. Did he speak any other language other than--
A. I think he maybe knew a few words in Spanish.
Q. Do you know if Lee had ever attended the Texas State Fair?
A. Statefair?
Q. Yes.
A. I believe we went to Six Flags Over Texas, it is an amusement park.
Q. You went there with Lee?
A. Yes; did I or didn't I ? I am sorry, I don't remember that. I do not remember
ever being at the State Fair of Texas with Lee.
I am sorry. I might be confused. Sometimes the period in New Orleans and the
period in Dallas kind of get squashed together and it might have been an
amusement park or a zoo somewhere else. It could be one picture in my mind.
Q. Do you know if Lee ever went for a job interview at a lumber company in
Dallas?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know if he ever went for an interview at the Winer Lumber Co.?
A. I don't know that either.
Q. Did Lee ever wear eyeglasses?
A. No; maybe sunglasses but not for reading.
Q. You never saw him reading with glasses?
A. No; only with sunglasses.
Q. Did he ever talk to you or ever mention anything about joining a labor union;
namely, the Teamsters.
A. I don't recall anything with that name.
Q. You testified earlier that at one time in New Orleans Lee had worked for his
uncle at a dock. I think that was the testimony.
Mr. WOLF. The shipyard.
Mr. McDoNALD. The shipyard. I am sorry.
By Mr. McDoNALD:
Q. Do you know whether Lee ever drove a forklift truck that would lift boxes or
something like that in a warehouse type situation? Do you know if he had that
kind of skill to drive what is called a forklift truck?
A. I would not know. See, for example, if I gave testimony that he was working
for his uncle--now I do not recall if that is when we were married or if it was
earlier, his job. I do not just remember now but I never saw him operate any
kind of machinery or driving anything except maybe practicing on the car a few
times.
Q. You mentioned that Lee spoke a few words of Spanish. What do you mean by
that?
A. Well, you and me might know what hello would be and goodby.
Q. Do you know how he learned?
A. Well, I think Lee was kind of interested in languages. He took time to study
Russian and I would not be surprised if he was ever exposed to Spanish-speaking
people he would pick up a few words from them.
Q. Was he the kind of person that liked to brag, that liked to say things about
himself, to exaggerate?
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A. I would say so.
Q. That he would try to impress people?
A. Yes.
Q. When you were living in Dallas again after New Orleans in the fall of 1963,
do you know whether Lee had any Mexican friends, Mexican-American or Cuban?
A. I never seen them or met any of them. If he associated with Spanish-speaking
people, it is possible but I never knew about that.
Q. We are talking about a period of time from early October 1963 up to the
assassination.
A. Well, we weren't together at the time. He was living alone.
Q. On Beckley Street?
A. Yes; so I just saw him maybe once a week, the weekend, and he was lonely.
Q. Do you have any knowledge of during this time in Dallas that he ever attended
Cuban political type meetings, groups of Cubans in Dallas? Do you know whether
he ever went to those kinds of meetings?
A. Him and Michael Paine went to some kind of meeting that I know of but I would
not know what kind of meeting it was.
Q. How do you know this?
A. They went together.
Q. And it was a political meeting?
A. More or less.
Q. The kind of meeting that he went to, did Lee agree with the philosophy being
espoused by that group to your knowledge?
A. Well, what I recall right now that he went, he was kind of skeptical about
it, whether he would buy the whole package or not. Not everything.
Q. During, this period do you recall what Lee's personal views were?
A. Well, I am not a politically educated person so whenever they start to
discuss something, that is not of interest to me, I don't listen to it, I don't
get involved. I am sorry I did not answer your question.
Q. Let me just rephrase it. During, this time prior to the assassination you
said earlier that he was dissatisfied with life in the United States and wanted
to go to Cuba. Do you know if he changed his views toward Cuba after he was
refused a visa to go to Cuba? Do you know whether he changed his views to become
anti-Castro?
A. He was bitter in not being considered to go wherever he had planned. This
period everything was going bad. That is more or less normal life. He gave up
all his silly ideas and we were going to be living together as husband and wife
and raising a family and that he will keep the job. That is what I thought at
the time.
Q. But the meeting that he went to with Michael Paine --
A. I don't think it has anything to do with Cuba or any kind of Spanish-speaking
people or anything like that as far as I recall.
Q. What do you recall the nature of that meeting to be?
A. Well, to tell you the truth, I don't remember the name of the group that
Michael Paine maybe was interested in.
Q. During this period of time did Lee ever mention to you the names of any of
his friends or associates?
A. No.
Q. Does the name Leopoldo sound familiar?
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A. No.
Q. How about Angelo?
A. No. I heard the name Angela reading the newspaper articles sometime. The name
will come up but that was long after the assassination.
Q. Can you recall in, we will say, the week preceding the assassination you were
living in Irving--did you ever write a letter to Lee?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever write to him while you were in Dallas?
A. Write where to? When I was in Dallas?
Q. Yes. When you were in Irving, do you recall writing a letter or letters to
Lee addressed to him at Ruth Paine's house?
A. I doubt it.
Q. Could you at that time write in English?
A. No.
Q. Can you recall ever writing to him in Russia?
A. I don't recall but the only letters I could write would have been in Russian.
Q. And if you did you would have had to have someone address the envelope for
you in Irving.
A. I know the English alphabet because I studied French in school so I could
copy the address from the Latin alphabet.
Q. Can you recall writing a letter to him?
A. No. I don't see the purpose of my writing a letter to him because see him
once a week. What am I going to tell him? We are fine? I doubt that I did it.
Q. Did you ever hear him----
A. Unless it was a birthday card which is possible.
Q. When was his birthday?
A. October 18.
Q. October 18. Did you ever hear the name, did he ever mention to you the name
of a Cuban political group called June?
A. No; these pamphlets that he had that said "Hands Off of Cuba." it was just a
protesting phrase or the name of the organization. I do not know.
Q. I think we could say those pamphlets that he passed out in New Orleans, the
Fair Play for Cuba, at that time in New Orleans would you say his views were
pro-Castro?
A. Yes. As far as I know up to now he liked Fidel Castro very much.
Q. After he got back to Dallas, can you recall any conversations or remarks that
he might have made that would have indicated that his views had changed? I know
I asked you this before but I want to ask it again.
A. That is OK.
Beside seeing him disappointed that he was well, maybe he was a little bit
bitter. He might even--I am sorry; I would be speculating saying that he might
have made the remark that he expected more, you know.
Q. Can you recall anything specific along those lines?
A. No.
I must tell that most of his things he kept to himself because he didn't think
that I was qualified to discuss all these matters with him.
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Q. You mentioned just a minute ago about the meeting with Michael Paine and you
made a comment about Lee's not being sure that he agreed or whatever. What did
you mean by that? Could you explain that?
A. First of all they spoke English to each other and one would express one view
and the other a different view. It was not argument, more or less peaceful
discussion, but I knew it was some kind of disagreement in point of view. I
would not recall what he was for and against. Some kind of political rally. I
don't. remember what it was all about.
Q. Do you know whether it involved Cuba at all or was it anti-Kennedy?
A. No; it was not anti anybody. It was anti anybody.
Q. But it was political. You seem to be saying that it was some kind of
political meeting.
A. I am sure now that it was.
Mr. HAMILTON. I didn't understand something you said. You said anti anybody.
The WITNESS. Well, like no words were mentioned. This is anti-government,
anti-Castro. anti-Kennedy.
Mr. HAMILToN. So what you are saying, just so we will have the record clear, is
that you don't know if the meeting was anti anybody; is that correct?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.
By Mr. McDoNALD:
Q. After you left Lee in New Orleans did you ever hear from him or anyone else
that he had traveled through Dallas on the way to Mexico?
A. No.
Q. Before you left each other in New Orleans, did he give you any hint that he
might come by way of Dallas?
A. You have to go through Dallas in order to get to Irving.
Q. I mean come through Dallas to go to Mexico.
A. Oh, no, no. I never heard that.
Q. If he had in fact come through Dallas, would it be likely that he would have
called you?
A. Yes. I would not know that because I never heard him mention that he was
going through Dallas.
Q. Have you ever heard of the name Sylvia Odio?
A. No.
Q. Just in summary getting back to that Texas State Employment Commission, you
can't recall ever going with him to an employment office?
A. I do not recall at all and I would not-swear I never had been there either
but I just don't remember.
Q. Can you recall any incident where--
A. Excuse me.
Q. Yes.
A. Now I am more familiar with Dallas than I was then so if the name of the
street could ring a bell because I tried to establish the fact.
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Q. Let me see if I can get the street. I will look for that street address if I
can, but just one further question.
Do you remember any occasion where perhaps you and Lee were picked up by his
brother and perbaps his brother's wife in their car and you traveled to any kind
of office or to go shopping or to do whatever? Did the four of you ever travel
together, go anywhere together?
A. Yes; to the shopping center; Montgomery Ward.
Q. How about in Dallas?
A. And something in Dallas that I can try to bring my memory back. I see some
stairs in a building that looks official. It is not the church it is some kind
of granite or something, but I do not remember sitting anywhere on a bench
waiting for Lee.
Q. Did you stand up waiting for him?
A. Somehow I just remember the steps.
Q. But you remember going?
A. I don't remember anybody waiting in the car or how I got there; I don't know.
What period of my life are you talking about?
Q. This would have been in Dallas sometime soon after Lee got back from Mexico.
A. That means I have to travel from Irving.
Q. And it would be before he started working at the depository. In other words.
he was unemployed: he was looking for 5 job.
A. Well, I don't think so because somehow this building stays in my mind. It was
quite warm weather: it was like the summer. This could be Fort Worth just as
well instead of Dallas.
Q. Do you know while you were in New Orleans before you went back to Dallas and
Lee went to Mexico whether he studied any books on Mexico City or Cuba? Do you
know whether he was reading on those?
A. He always was reading something and I would not know what books if they were
in English. I do not recall what the names of the books were or what they were
all about.
Mr. McDoNALD. All right. I have no further questions.
Thank you.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. porter, I will continue asking the remainder of our questions.
To go back for 1 minute, you recollect to get to United States, the Embassy in
Russia loaned Lee money; is that correct?
A. What did you say?
Q. The. American Embassy in Russia, did they load Lee Money to get to the United
States?
A. yes
Q. Do you remember how much money was loaned to Lee?
A. Well, since I read about that later on, I think it was like $500 or so but I
would not be sure.
Q. Where did Lee the money to pay back the Embassy.
A. Well, every week from his paycheck he put .some aside and paid them back.
Q. Did he pay back the same amount every week to the Embassy?
A. I would not know because I never handled the money.
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Q. Would you be surprised if he paid a large sum of money back in one time to
the Embassy?
A. Yes; unless he saved it for 3 or 4 or 5 weeks.
Q. Other than that it would surprise you if he paid $350 back at once if he had
been paying small amounts previously?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any idea where he could have gotten money of that amount?
A. I would speculate that he borrowed from his brother to pay a big sum and pay
his brother back. That is the only way I can see he would
get the money.
By Mr. MCDONALD:
Q. I have one further question and that is I think this Texas State Employment
Commission was located on Industrial Boulevard in Dallas where the Industrial
Boulevard is right on the other side of the--it is across from Dealey Plaza on
the other side of the triple underpass.
A. I still didn't think it was Dallas, I think it was Fort Worth. Does the
building have steps with the middle rail in between? Some kind of rail in
between?
Q. I am not sure: I don't know.
Mr. MCDONALD. OK. Thank you. Goodby. [In Russian.]
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Returning to Dallas, Mrs. Poter, when Lee came back from Mexico City did he
move into the house with you at that time?
A. Would you say it again.
Q. When he came back from Mexico City, you had gone to live with Mrs. Paine.
A. Yes.
Q. Did Lee move in with you at that time?
A. No.
Q. Where did he stay?
A. He stayed in Dallas. He rented a room and he said he would try to save the
money that way so we can rent an apartment later on.
Q. How often would he come to visit you?
A. Once a week on the weekend.
Q. How did he get there?
A. The neighbor who worked the same place would give him a ride.
Q. And he would stay for the whole weekend with you?
A. Most of the time.
Q. Would he stay overnight on Saturday night?
A. Yes.
Q. And then return on Sunday night or on Monday morning?
A. Probably Monday morning.
Q. Do you recall that the FBI contacted you approximately 10 days before the
assassination?
A. It was quite close to the assassination but I do not remember;10 days, 14
days, 1 week.
Q. Approximately. What did they talk to you about at that time?
A. Well, Ruth was the interpreter. As I told you, they asked me if I had been in
contact to let them know.
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Q. Were you surprised that they came to you?
A. No.
Q. Why were you not surprised?
A. Because we had visits from the FBI before; at least that is what Lee told me,
that they were FBI like in Fort Worth.
Q. Was this the first visit you had had since you returned to Dallas
from New Orleans?
A. As far as I recall.
Q. Did you find it unusual that Lee did not come home the weekend of November
14?
A. We had an argument. What was the day?
Q. This is the weekend prior to the assassination. Was Lee home that weekend?
A. I wish I could remember my testimony.
I knew it. was unusual that he came just before the assassination.
Q. That was Thursday night?
A. Not the weekend.
Q. That was a Thursday night is that correct?
A. I think he missed the weekend before.
Q. Was that unusual if he missed that weekend?
A. Now I don't remember what the circumstances were, what was the reason.
Q. Did he come to visit you most weekends?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall any particular weekends that he did come to visit?
A. Except the one that you mentioned.
Q. Except that one?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you speak to Lee on the phone that weekend?
A. Well, I remember the incident when he gave me the telephone number where, he
can be reached and I called him and they said nobody by this name lived there
and I assume right now that that is the reason we had the argument over that he
was hiding his name. Maybe that is the reason he was angry with me and didn't
show up this weekend but I am apeculating now I have to read my own books.
Q. When he came on Thursday night. the night prior to the assassination. were
you surprised that he came that night?
A. Yes.
Q. He had not phoned you in advance?
A. Net that I am aware.
Q. Could you describe his attitude that night? Was he calm? Was he nervous?
A. He was quite calm and he tried to give me indications that wanted to make up
over the argument we have. I was also surprised that he come earlier than I
expected him.
Q. Earlier?
A. Earlier.
Q. Had he called you to let you know a day earlier?
A. Yes.
Q. About what time did he come?
A. Just after work.
Q. How did he get there?
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A. With this neighbor.
Q. Did he discuss President Kennedy that evening, his visit to Dallas?
A. I tried to discuss it with him. I was very enthusiastic about it, over it,
and I tried to get as much information from him as I could and he refused to
talk about it.
Q. Was that unusual?
A. Judging right now, yes.
Q. Did he usually want to discuss President Kennedy?
A. Yes.
Q. What would his usual comments about President Kennedy be?
A. Well, my impression was that he liked him very well.
Q. Did he mention Governor Connally that night?
A. No.
Q. Where were you when you first heard that President Kennedy was assassinated?
A. I was at Ruth Paine's house and she is the one who told me.
Q. What were your thoughts at that time?
A. Like everybody else's thoughts. It was shocking news.
Q. When did you first think that it might have been Lee who was involved in the
assassination?
A. When Ruth told me that the shots came from the school book depository it just
looked like, somebody cut the string of my heart. I don't know how you describe
this kind of feeling; it was very uneasy.
Q. Why would you think at that time that Lee would do it if, as you he liked
President Kennedy?
A. Well, I did not think that Lee would do it but, for instance, the thought
crossed my mind. I don't know why the thought crossed my mind. Somebody but Lee
was playing with the rifle and I can remember the incident with Walker.
Q. But General Walker was something ----
A. I believe it is not him so I went into the garage to see if the rifle was
there. I knew that he had the rifle.
Q. That is why you were worried?
A. Yes.
Q. When you say you knew he had the rifle, you mean you know he owned the rifle.
A. Yes.
Q. And did you go look if the rifle was there?
A. I cannot describe the feeling, it would just come and go.
Q. Did you look to see if the rifle was still in the house
A. I do not recall that but I mean when the police came and asked me if my
husband owned a rifle, I had to say yes and we went in the garage and the rifle
was not there. The whole life passed in front of me and from then on it was a
nightmare.
Q. Lee's attitude toward President Kennedy was certainly different than his
attitude toward General Walker, am I correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you had any prior indication of any dislike for President Kennedy on his
behalf?
A. No; that is what is so strange about the whole event.
Q. When is the first time after you had heard of the assassination that you
spoke with Lee?
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A. I believe it was in jail when he was arrested.
Q. And what did you discuss with him at that time?
A. I was afraid to discuss the matter so it was just a general husband-wife
conversation, just around the routine life about the house. He asked about the
children.
Q. Did he discuss any people who might help him out of his problems?
A. Not with me. He discussed that, him and his brother were talking over the
legal procedures of the matter, so I do believe now that he might have asked his
brother to get in touch with somebody.
Q. What was the first time that the police came to your house? That was on the
Friday?
A. When did it all happen, Friday?
Q. Friday.
A. It was not Friday then.
What did you ask me?
Q. When was the first time the police came to Mrs. Paine's house
A. Quite shortly after the assassination.
Q. Were those the Dallas police or the FBI, do you know?
A. Well, to tell you the truth, it was official people. They showed their badges
but as I recall it was the FBI or police or maybe both.
Q. What did they do?
A. Well, they asked to search the house.
Q. Did they speak to you or to Mrs. Paine or both of you?
A. They spoke--I do not even remember. I don't think they had an interpreter. so
she is the one that had to act as an interpreter. They just told me that I have
to follow them to the police station for they have some questions to ask me.
Q. Did they search the house at that time?
A. Yes; they looked around.
Q. How many police officers were there? Were there a lot, or a few, or what?
A. I don't even remember the number. Everything is so long ago.
Q. Did they stay a long time?
A. Well, one second seems like a year sometimes.
Q. I know this is difficult for you and I am just asking for the best of your
recollection.
A. OK. What was the question again?. How many people?
Q. How many and how long did they stay in the house?
A. Well, I don't think I can judge very nicely or correctly right now.
Q. Did they take anything with them at that time?
A. I do not know. They just told me to get ready and dressed. I mean I didn't
have a chance to change ray clothes. They told me to get the baby and follow
them. I don't know if it was 15 minutes or 1 whole hour.
Q. Then you went down to the police station. What happened at the police
station? Did you see Lee that day?
A. Yes; I did. I don't remember if I saw him. that day or the next day.
Q. Did they, ask you questions at the police station?
A. Yes.
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Q. Do you recall how long they kept you at the police station?
A. It seemed like forever.
Q. Were you alone?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you have an interpreter or did Mrs. Paine go with you?
A. Would you believe it? I don't recall the names of who was around me.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you when you were speaking with him the shooting of
Officer Tippett?
A. No.
Q. Was that mentioned at all?
A. No.
Q. Prior to Lee s being arrested did he ever discuss with you, are you familiar
with the name William James Lowery?
A. No.
Q. Did they ever discuss with you after he was arrested that he had ever done
undercover work? Did they say he was a person in Dallas who had been
infiltrating the Communist Party?
A. Who discussed with me?
Q. Did Lee ever discuss that with you about informants within the Communist
Party in Texas?
A. I don't recall that. Once in a while the Communist Party was mentioned in the
conversation but I do not remember when exactly, what period of our lives it
was.
Q. What would he say about it, do you remember?
A. Well, he said that, for example, the Communist Party here is not exactly
illegal but they have a very difficult time to survive and the Communist Party
in Russia is different than the Communist Party here and he was in favor of
them.
Q. The Communist Party?
A. Yes
Q. Here?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he ever discuss the Communist Party that you recall when you were in
Dallas?
A. Pardon?
Q. Did he ever discuss the Communist Party during this time in Dallas?
A. Well, this could be in Dallas and in New Orleans but it was in America.
Q. Did he ever discuss informants generally, what his feelings were about
informants?
A. No.
Q. Who did you stay with that Friday night after you were done at the police
station? Did you go back to Ruth Paine's house?
A. I think so.
Q. Were you left alone or were you kept----
A. There were so many people going in and out of the house I don't know who was
who.
Q. After Lee was shot, do you recall how you first met Ames Martin?
A. He was an employee of this hotel where the Secret Service took me to stay for
a while.
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416
Q. How come you were taken to that hotel ? Did you want to stay with Mrs. Paine?
A. I do not recall whose idea it was. After the assassination it seemed like
everything went blurred and I do not know who was making decisions for me.
Q. Did you object to the Secret Service staying with you at that time?
A. No; they were very nice to me.
Q. You liked them?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are the ones who chose that hotel to go to?
A. I would not say that because I do not know whose idea it was. I did not
choose where I go.
Excuse me. Can we have a break, please?
Mr. WOLF. Sure.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., a recess was taken until 4:20 p.m.]
Mr. WOLF. We can continue at the present time and it is approximately 4:20.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. Porter, we were discussing the Secret Service agents who were keeping
you in protective custody at that time.
A. I want to express my thanks to the American Government or whoever appointed
them to me; they were very helpful and very wonderful people.
Q. The Secret Service people?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they stay with you at your request or do you know if somebody suggested
that they stay with you?
A. I did not ask for them, because I didn't know what the procedure is supposed
to be. I think they were appointed by someone.
Q. And you had no objections to their staying with you?
A. No.
Q. And you stated that you met Mr. Martin at this hotel where the Secret Service
people took you.
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Martin was an employee at that hotel?
A. Yes; I have been told he was, I did not know for a fact.
Q. Did Mr. Martin eventually come to be your business manager or representative
in any way?
A. Yes.
Q. And in what matters was Mr. Martin going to represent you?
A. In what matters?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I had so many people around with advisers and whatever I forgot who
suggested I was supposed to have a business manager so he volunteered.
Q. Did you know if he had any experience in that field?
A. No: I didn't know about that.
Q. Did Mr. Martin ever tell you that he knew Jack Ruby?
A. No: not that I remember.
Q. Did he ever discuss .Tack Ruby with you?
A. Well, I did not speak English then so I don't know.
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417
Q. Who would be your interpreter between yourself and Mr. Martin?
A. Well, one man from the FBI did speak Russian and was interpreter during the
time the FBI was questioning me and then it was a man from the Secret Service, I
think Mr. Gupatza.
Q. And he would always be present when you spoke to Mr. Martin
A. No.
Q. You could not speak to Mr. Martin if there was no interpreter.
A. Somehow we communicated but how I really don't remember, how two people
communicate who speak two different languages.
Q. Did you speak English to him?
A. By this time I was forced to pick up a few English words.
Q. So you knew some English?
A. I would not call this some English when, to give you an example, like you
would say, "Give me an apple," you just maybe pointed to an apple or drew a
picture or more or less sign language.
Q. Did you speak to him in English at all though that you recall?
A. I don't recall.
Q. After Mr. Martin you came to be represented by a Mr. McKenzie, that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. How were you introduced to Mr. McKenzie?
A. I do believe that Lee's brother, Robert, heard of Mr. McKenzie, through whom
I don't know, and was recommended by him and he took me into his office.
Q. I see. Robert.
A. Robert Oswald.
Q. Robert is the one that took you to Mr. McKenzie's office?
A. I think so.
Q. Was this after Mr. Martin no longer represented you?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your discussions with Mr. McKenzie did you ever speak English with him
or did Robert Oswald do all the discussions with him?
A. Well, I guess I assume it was Robert who did the talking for me to my best
interests.
Q. Did you ever discuss anything with Mr. McKenzie very much?
A. I don't really recall because I think at that time I had a Russian-speaking
friend, she was Russian. Kathryn Ford.
Q. Would she accompany you?
A. I assume now that she was there, too.
Q. Do you remember?
A. No: don't.
Q. If there was a meeting between Mr. McKenzie, Robert Oswald and yourself, you
would not be able to participate in that, is that correct?
A. Robert, I recall that like I, would be in Mr. McKenzie's office and Kathryn
Ford would be present there.
Q. Mr. McKenzie ever introduce you to any of his other partners?
A. Yes: he had an associate. I think his. name was Baird--no, I am sorry. I
don't recall. I knew he was a younger gentleman.
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418
Q. Did he ever mention a Wheater White?
A. No.
Q. Is that name familiar to you?
A. No.
Q. Did Mr. McKenzie ever tell you that his law firm had done previous work for
Jack Ruby?
A. No.
Q. Did Mr. McKenzie ever discuss with you Richard Nixon?
A. No.
Q. Did you discuss with Mr. McKenzie the time Lee was going to go out and shoot
Richard Nixon?
A. Well, to tell you the truth right now I don't remember how this information
got into the Secret Service or I told him my own or somebody.
Q. Which information?
A. About the Nixon incident. I really do not recall right now how it got into
the press or knowledgeable to you and everybody else.
Q. Well, you must have---
A. I don't remember who was the first one that I told that.
Q. But you told somebody.
A. Of course I did. Nobody cooked this up.
Q. Did a Mrs. Skotnicki?
A. Skotnicki?
Q. Yes; are you familiar with her?
A. I do assume that was Kathryn Ford's name before she was married to Mr. Ford.
The name is familiar to me because her two
children---
Q. Was her husband's name Stanley?
A. I never met her husband and if I did I forgot. She was not married to Mr.
Skotnicki then.
Q. And to you recollection she was not married at that time?
A. Who? Mrs. Skotnicki?
Q. Yes.
A. It is the same person. When I met her she was Kathryn Ford. Before that she
was married to Mr. Skotnicki but I do not recall his first name.
Q. But you do not know when?
A. I did not know her when she was married to Mr. Skotnicki.
Q. Did you ever meet her husband?
A. Mr. Skotnicki?
Q. Yes.
A. I hope we are talking about the same Skotnicki.
Q. I think so. Did you ever meet him?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Well, you later---
A. Maybe after the assassination sometime.
Q. Is this the Mrs. Skotnicki, did you buy her house one time and move into it?
A. Yes.
Q. That is the one you live in?
Page 419
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A. I bought a paper from Mrs. Ford.
Q. So we are talking about the same person?
A. Yes.
Q. And you bought the house from Mrs. Ford?
A. Yes; which will be the same as previously Mrs. Skotnicki.
Q. Correct. Did you meet any of the neighbors who were in that area
A. Did I meet?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, of course I did.
Q. Did you meet living across the street I believe a Mr. Johnny Griz zaffi?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. What can you tell us about Mr. Grizzaffi?
A. Well, not much. I don't know him that well but I was grateful, he gave me a
whole can of salmon when I was expecting my son.
Q. What can you tell us about him? The way you said, "Oh, yes," you seem to have
some recollection of him.
A. Well, I don't know his persOnal traits but, you know, being in their house
and I can describe him physically. He was a family man and his business once
upon a time was next door to my husband's business so I had occasion to----
Q. That is your present husband?
A. Yes: I had occasion to see him. He owned a liquor store.
Q. Did Mr. Grizzaffi ever discuss Jack Ruby with you?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Did you ever meet any of Mr. Grizzaffi's friends?
A. No; I met his children and his wife. We were living across from each other.
Q. I am now going to ask you a series of names again to see if you know these
people or if Lee knew these people when either of you were living in Dallas at
either time.
The first name is Russell Matthews, also known as R.D. Matthews.
A. No.
Q. The next one is Irwin Weiner.
A. No.
Q. If you have heard of these names even subsequently, please tell us.
A. Oh. sure.
Q. Louis McWillie.
A. No.
Q. Joe Campisi or Sam Campisi.
A. No.
Q. Lawrence Meyers.
A. No
Q. Lenny Patrick.
A. No.
Q. Barney Baker.
A. No.
Q. Harry Hall.
A. Hall?
Q. Hall, H-a-l-l.
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420
A. I how Mrs. Hall, Leta Hall, but I don't know anybody by the name Mr. Hall.
Q. Alex Gruber.
A. I used to know a man named Alex living in Fort Worth but do not recall his
last name.
Q. What did he do?
A. I don't know what he did.
Q. How did you how him?
A. Well, when I was visiting a friend in Fort Worth he was visiting her house
and---
Q. When you were with who in Fort Worth?
A. Leta Hall. I think she goes by Elena.
Q. Eleanor?
A. The first name is familiar but I don't recall his last name.
Q. A Ralph Paul?
A. No.
Q. A Jack Todd or a James Robert Todd?
A. No.
Q. A Paul Roland Jones?
A. No.
Q. A Robert Ray McKeown?
A. No.
Q. An Andrew Armstrong?
A. No.
Q. George Senator?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever heard the name Jack Ruby prior to the time that he shot Lee?
A. No.
Q. Did Lee frequent any nightclubs or bars in Dallas at any time?
A. I don't think so. Lee didn't drink so--well, I just assumed that" he never
did because when he left the :house, for example, if he left the house and said,
"I am going to the library,!' I cannot swear that he did not ever stop at it
nightclub but knowing him as far as what kind of entertainment he would like it
is just my personal opinion that he would not go and spend his time at a
nightclub.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss the Dallas Police officers, what his attitude" toward
the Dallas Police was?
A. No.
Q. He would discuss with you the FBI, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But he never discussed the local Dallas Police?
A. No; one way or the other.
Q. One way or the other?
A. No.
Q. Did he have any friends as policemen that you knew of?
A. No.
Q. You have spoken of George de Mohrenschildt before?
A. Yes.
Q. And you considered him one of your best friends in Dallas.
A. Yes.
Q. Did he ever discuss with you work he may have done for either U.S. or foreign
intelligence services?
Page 421
421
A. Never.
Q. What did Mr. de Mohrenschildt do for a living?
A. He was a geologist by profession and I think he was working for some kind of
an oil company then.
Q. Did he ever discuss with Lee going to work for an intelligence service?
A. I would not know that. I never overheard him say that.
Q. Did he ever discuss with you intelligence activities in Russia or ask you
about them as general conversation?
A. When I knew George I did not know he was born in Russia or lived there at the
time. I thought he was of Russian descent.
Q. But he knew you came from Russia?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he just ever ask any general questions of you about intelligence
activities inside Russia?
A. No.
Q. What did George de Mohrenschildt talk about with Lee when they were
discussing President Kennedy? Do you know what his attitude toward President
Kennedy was?
A. Not really, but it was not hostile.
Q. I am sorry.
A. It was not hostile.
Q. Were you suprised to hear Mr. de Mohrenschildt had committed suicide?
A. Yes; shocked likely. Well, I did not see George de Mohrenschildt for the past
many years.
Q. What was the time before his suicide that you either talked to him or saw
him?
A. Well, it was many years before that and I stumbled over him and Jeanne one
day at some kind of--it was a Russian movie showing somewhere and the Russians
attended.
Q. Was this in Dallas or Fort Worth?
A. No; I am sorry. That was not the last time. I do believe it was the Russian
Easter and Natasha Grizzaffi was giving the party and I saw Jeanne and George
then. We didn't speak for a long time but---
Q. Have you heard anything about Mr. de Mohrenschildt's suicide
aside from what you have read in the papers?
A. No.
Q. Have you spoken to Jeanne sine the suicide.
A. No. It is hard for me to comprehend the character of a very lifeloving person
to commit suicide and I didn't see the change of his moods or personality, so it
was hard to swallow. In my mind he was a person that was not capable of doing
that.
Q. You have stated Lee's attitude toward the FBI was one of hostility; is that
correct?
A. Well, he always blamed them for losing the job.
Q. Which job was that?
A. Any job that he lost he thought that was because they were just, like he
said, snooping around and maybe the boss did not lile the idea that he was in
the Soviet Union.
Q. Would Lee ever provide information to the FBI?
A. Not that I know of.
Page 422
422
Q. You stated on one occasion you saw Lee discuss with Mr. Hosty outside the
house for at least one-half an hour information, have a discussion that lasted
at least one-half hour. What could have been discussed for that length of time
if Lee was not giving information Mr. Hosty?
A. Well, I would not know .what kind of question he might ask a person who might
be under suspicion.
Q. But to your knowledge?
A. He never discussed in detail just exactly what they talked about.
Q. To your knowledge Lee never volunteered information to the FBI?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. When did you first meet Priscilla Johnson MacMillan?
A. I think in 1964.
Q. And what were the circumstances of that meeting?
A. Well, he had lots of approaches from different writers or publishing
companies to write the 'book about and I did not want to or did I have the
rights to do anything like that and I was approached by Priscilla MacMillian and
then she was Johnson, or by Harper & Rowe and by telegrams or maybe it was a
written request and I refused. Then one day she arrived in Dallas and was on my
doorstep. I liked the person very much and never changed my opinion of her since
then.
Q. How shortly after you refused that offer did she arrive in Dallas?
A. I do not recall how many weeks or months. I did not agree right away.
Q. Were you turning down all the offers from all the other publishers during
that time?
A. It is not because of the money matter; it was just that I didn't think--well,
it was such a shameful position I was in I didn't feel that I have any right to
even discuss the things for me.
Q. What did you like about Priscilla Johnson that led you to decide to work with
her?
A. I like her physical appearance. I like the way she spoke Russian beautifully.
She told me that she was living in Russia for a few years, I assume. She was a
very pleasant person and her intelligence I was very much irapressed with.
Q. Did she ever discuss with you any work she may have done for the CIA?
A. No. I would never have believed that she did.
Q. She never discussed with you any such work
A. No.
Q. Did she ever discuss the CIA with you?
A. No. We discussed so many things during the book.
Q. Did she ever ask you whether or not lee had worked for the CIA?
A. She might have asked during the interviews. She asked so many questions that
she has to know the answer to.
Q. How soon after you met Mrs. Johnson, Mrs. MacMillan now, did you decide to
allow, her and Harper & Rowe to be the publisher?
A. Well. I do not remember how many days or 1 week formality would take but I
think she would have been more than qualified to do a good job.
Q. You were with Mrs. MacMillan in 1964 when you discovered some bus tickets
that Lee had allegedly used to go back and forth to Mexico.
Page 423
423
A. I do not remember that at all.
Q. You do not remember that?
A. No. It is not that I don't want to discuss it but it would be more confusing
for you and for me and for everybody if I start to speculate because I don't
recall how I found the tickets, period.
Q. You know that those have been found; you just don't remember how they have
been found?
A. If Mrs. MacMillan stated under oath that I am the one that showed her the
tickets, that 'is enough for me. I take her word for it, but to remember that I
have no recollection.
Q. You are aware that those have been found?
A. I forgot about them until you mentioned them right now.
Q. When was the last time you talked to Mrs. MacMillan?
A. Last night.
Q. Last night?
A. Yes.
Q. Is she a close friend of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. Concerning again the trip to Mexico, is it possible that Lee went with
somebody else to Mexico and back?
A. I don't see why not.
Q. Did Lee ever discuss going to Mexico with anybody?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever discuss a minister or a preacher?
A. No.
Q. Do you think Lee would have ever worked for a U.S. intelligence agency?
A. Well, knowing Lee as little as I know of him' and the unpredictable steps
that he would take in his life, I cannot say anything that he might do, but as a
person that I knew and then when I was working with Priscilla there was. So
little I knew of him, I 'think as secretive as he was I would be surprised if he
would take orders or be confining somebody. I doubt it. I don't know.
Q. Concerning the leaflets he distributed in New Orleans, Who paid for those
leaflets to be made?
A. I would not know. I have no idea. I thought that somebody just gave them to
him to distribute around.
Q. Did he ask you to put your name on any of the leaflets?
A. Well, he asked me to put my name on something but I didn't think it was those
leaflets.
Q. Did you read those pamphlets when you first found them?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you remember if Lee used his own name on those pamphlets?
A. I do not recall if the pamphlets had been signed or just distributed around.
Q. What name did they have on the pamphlets? Did Lee have his name on the
pamphlets?
A. I do not recall that the pamphlets have any name on them. I remember that Lee
used to sign his name different than his real name on some things but which
things they were I do not recall right now.
Q. In your conversation with Mrs. MacMillan last night did you discuss the bus
tickets at all?
Page 424
424
A. No. I forgot about them until you mentioned them a few minutes ago.
Q. And you don't remember whether they were found at this time?
A. No.
Q. Or who found them?
A. Me and Mrs. MacMillan did not discuss about what questions the committee
might ask, what to say, what not to say. The conversation was very personal.
Q. We are talking about the bus tickets. Do you remember where they were found
or who found them or anything concerning their discovery?
A. No.
Mr. WOLF. Mrs. Porter, Gary Cornwell is now going to ask you a few followup
questions.
By Mr. CORNWELL:
Q. In your conversations last night with Priscilla, did you discuss anything
about the committee's work?
A. Well, just told her that I am very scared. She said how did I like my lawyer
and I said very well. She said, "Would you describe him?
Mr. Hamilton not sure I want this in the record.
The Witness. Well, she just tried to cheer me up, you know.
By Mr. CORNWELL:
Q. Did you discuss anything about other witnesses who may have appeared before
the committee?
A. No.
Q. Nothing about the subject matter of our inquiry?
A. Priscilla never told me what she was asked here and I do not want to know. I
do not jeopardize her reputation by even asking questions even though how
curious I would be.
Q. You did find out that she had been asked questions?
A. I knew she testified, she had been called before the committee, yes.
Q. Nothing about what she had been asked or what she said?
A. No.
Q. As I understood your testimony a moment ago, you first met Priscilla back
around 1964.
A. I think so.
Q. And it was roughly in that time period that you also agreed--
A. 1964 and 1965. I don't remember exactly what month we met but we worked for
many months together and we have been in contact ever since.
Q. That is also roughly the time period in which you agreed that you and she
would work together on a book: is that correct?
A. Excuse me. I did not understand your question.
Q. Is that also the time period----
A. Are you talking about 13 years or a few months?
Q. No: I am talking about in 1964.
A. Yes.
Q. That is when you agreed that you and she would work together on a book?
A. That is correct.
Page 425
425
Q. Was there any formal agreement?
A. Yes; there was.
Q. Or contract?
A. There was a contract between Harper & Rowe and me and Priscilla.
Q. The financial terms in other words, whatever they were were they all ironed
out at that time period?
A. Yes.
Q. I am not interested in how much money you may have made from the book but I
would like to know what, if any, control you had over the final form that the
book might take as to the accuracy of it?
A. Well, I confided in Priscilla-are you talking about the financial matters?
Q. No, ma'am, just the accuracy of the book. Did you have any control over that?
A. Well, I trust Priscilla well enough or I would not start the job. The book
was not designed to make something entertainment or just to make money. It was a
therapeutic thing for me as well as I tried to explain to me or to people
somehow--not just me: I just contribute very little to the book. It was up to
Priscilla to fish out all the facts and everything and put them together some
way.
Q. So the agreement--
A. I gave her the right to use her own judgment because it was her book.
Q. That was basically the question.
A. OK.
Mr. HAMILTON. Could I ask a followup question?
Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.
Mr. HAMILTON. Did you read the manuscript before it was published?
The WITNESS. I had offered to read the manuscript.
Mr. HAMILTON. But you did not read it beforehand?
The WITNESS. No.
By Mr. CORNWELL:
Q. And following that then, after you saw the book in its final form, did you
read it in its entirety?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. With respect to the matters in the book that you have personal knowledge
about, and I take it there are some things in there you simply have no personal
knowledge about, but with respect to the things that you do, did you find
inaccuracies in the book or things that did not comport with your memory?
A. Well, as far as the facts that came from me or---
Q. Yes, ma'am.
A. That is true but some conclusion that she has to come to on her own, maybe
even analyzing my character, that was up to her to decide but the facts were not
twisted.
Q. OK, So the facts then that you have knowledge of as portrayed in the book are
accurate to the best of your memory?
A. Only the facts that concern my and Lee's life. I am not responsible for other
characters, I don't know how true that is.
Page 426
426
Q. I understand. At least the facts that concern you and Lee and that you had
personal knowledge of after reading the book seemed accurate?
A. Yes.
Q. And it would only be the conclusions or the inferences drawn from that that
might be Priscilla's and might differ from yours, is that correct?
A. Yes; that is true.
Q. Then with respect to those conclusions and inferences, what about the book
might you disagree with?
A. Well---
Q. Let me explain the reason why I ask the question.
A. It was long ago since I read the book and I am not going to read it again.
Q. The committee has a number of objectives, everything from evaluating the
performance of our own intelligence agencies to trying to understand for sure
what happened in Dealey Plaza on November 22 and of course trying to understand
Lee and his personality and his thought processes to the extent we can because
the American public has a great interest in that. The last thing is really what
I was wanting to know.
What about Lee and his personality or his possible motivations, things that you
might peculiarly have an ability to render an opinion on? Would you differ from
that book on that?
A. Well, since the person is dead and I was not a mature person or a qualified
psychiatrist to analyze his motives for doing so and so, it was a tedious job
for the Warren Commission. All the reporters and lots of curious people working
on it, you are doing a vet hard job trying to put puzzles together. Priscilla
did her best and an honest job of trying to put things in some kind of
perspective that a normal person could understand and I guess anybody can do
just that.
Q. Sure. The point is not whether--we are not trying to find fault with the
book, all we are trying to do--
A. I am not defending the book.
Q. If you have a different view on those subjects because you were one of the
closest people to Lee, that is what we would like to know.
A. Well, I would buy Priscilla's conclusions. From my own personal experience I
did not come up with anything different. Priscilla did not have the attitude to
condemn or pronounce guilty from the first page, she was just working through
the dark as well as I was and everybody else, so I would still, in my mind agree
with that conclusion more than the conspiracy theory because I do not know
anything about the other matters. I do not know anything about ballistics, you
know, to disprove that Lee didn't do it. I would like that very much but I know
so little. Do you understand me?
Q. Yes.
A. Make a perfect picture.
Q. I think so. As I understand what you are stating it is that the conclusions
that were drawn in the book, even though Priscilla drew them on her own, you
agree with them.
A. Well, She didn't just dream them up.
Page 427
427
Q. I understand, but it was her right to draw the conclusions.
A. Yes.
Q. And she of course wrote the book.
A. I did not give her the right but I respect her for doing a good job, too, and
she was very honest. Some things were not very meaningful.
Q. Your opinions on the subjects are the same as hers?
A. Yes.
Q. As set forth in the book?
A. No; not my opinions because she made some opinions from a psychology point of
view. I don't know enough about that to make an opinion.
Q. Is there any aspect of the book which you have a different opinion on?
A. Like, for example, Priscilla was in a position to analyze. Maybe somebody
will criticize her for being an immature psychiatrist but she tried to draw some
kind of picture to compare me being without parents and him being without a
father that might motivate us to be married to each other, but those traits of
character it is not up to me to say she is right or wrong. I cannot assume that
is correct.
Q. The reason I am asking the question again is we are trying to get an insight.
A. The facts were not twisted to meet somebody's theory.
Q. There are various ways to get an opinion about what Lee was all about and
what happened, and one of them is the way Priscilla went about it which was to
gather facts from a number of different areas and try to draw inferences from
them. What I want to know is from your perspective do you agree or disagree with
her?
A. Yes; I agree with her because she didn't just take my word for it or my
opinion on the matter, she compared them with somebody's statements which were
completely unknown to me and somehow the puzzle fit.
Q. You were asked this question a moment ago but let me ask you to focus on it
one more time. Lee's mother expressed the opinion that Lee may have had
intelligence ties, U.S. intelligence ties, of some sort. Can you recall any
specific conversations with Lee which shed light on the possibility one way or
the other that he may have had such ties?
A. I do not know any of those facts at all.
Q. Did he ever express either sympathy for or antipathy to any U.S. intelligence
agency apart from the FBI that you have already described?
A. Well, Mrs. Marguerita Oswald is entitled to her opinion as I am entitled
to-mine and-I would love for Lee to be innocent more than anybody else, do you
understand, but I do not know enough to make the opposite statement from what I
am giving here right now.
Q. Did he ever express to you any desire to work for any Government agency?
A. No.
Q. Incidentally, why did the book take so long to get into print from 1964 or
1965?
A. Well, it is not an easy book to write about, especially when you try to be so
accurate and not just to bluff around because it was lots of research.
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428
Q. There was no factor that caused that delay other than the process of trying
to assimilate the facts?
A. I hate to repeat myself but it is a hard message to deliver.
Q. Is that the only reason?
A. Yes; you don't try just because you have to write so many pages, a day, you
have to work hard. Priscilla had personal tragedies in her life which put her in
the mood to write. It was just a long process working at it.
Q. Is that fact that--
A. Excuse me for the interruption but when Mrs. MacMillan approached me she was
not concerned about money, or I don't know but she told me she just wants to do
a very honest job to try to explain the things why Lee did it for the American
people. Do you understand? While I did not phrase myself very clearly,. she
thought, well, I was refusing to do the book but she said at least that much I
owe to people to show a little bit of the inside of the person that is already
there. Just as if I owe this much to history, I guess.
Q. Is it anything more than a mere coincidence that the book has come out during
the time period that our committee has been working on it?
A. Well, it is just coincidence.
Q. Did you and Mrs.----
A. I think it is completely absurd how people can put two and two together.
Q. Did you and Priscilla ever discuss the timing of the publication of the hook?
A. Well, I hope this thing--she said. "Well, I still have some more work to do."
and then she said finally "either do it or--." She did have a deadline but
somehow I did not want--you don't push artists to go and paint a picture in a
hurry. I was in a position to push her but didn't want to because I wanted a
qualitative job.
Q. At the time that the book was finally sent to press did you and she discuss
the fact that this would be a good time to publish it?
A. No.
Q. Any discussion along those lines?
A. No; exactly the opposite. It was a bad time to pubIish 7 years later and she
was very apologetic about it took her so long.
Q. You told us earlier a few moments ago that you presently have no memory of
finding the materials, I believe it was in September 1964, which you cleared,
among other things, the tickets to Mexico City.
A. Yes.
Q. When did it first come to your attention that Priscilla said she was there
when, the tickets were found?
A. When this come to my attention?
Q. Yes; when did that subject matter first come to your attention?
A. The only time I think about it is when you were asking or somebody asked this
question. I didn't understand your question, I guess.
Q. I believe there was a reference to it in her book.
A. There could be but I did not come here prepared to deal with that book and
see what I am going to tell you.
Q. Is that the first occasion perhaps on which you had focused on the fact that
she said she was there when you saw it in the book?
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A. If Priscilla said that--I mean I do not recall right now but she kept the
records, whatever I told her before in our interviews and ] work and things like
that, so I am sure she has approval of it. The thing is why should she put
something in a book that I would not tell her. Who would tell her?
Q. The question was when did it first come to your attention? When did you first
note that she apparently was there?
A. I still don't understand. Who was there, Priscilla?
Q. Yes.
A. Where was she?
Q. When the materials were found.
A. Well, right now I don't recall by whom and how they were found and I never
thought about the tickets until just a few minutes ago you asked me this
question, so I cannot recall the time I found the tickets right now at the
present moment.
Q. Did you see it in her book?
A. I read the whole book but I do not remember the details right now.
Q. Did you discuss it with her upon seeing it
A. No; you mean yesterday or--
Q. At any time after you saw it in the book.
A. We discussed many episodes from the book, you know, but I cannot recall which
ones.
Q. So you don't recall ever discussing that part of the book with her on any
occasion?
A. I would not swear to it that we did not discuss it. This would be one of the
parts of the book that we did but I cannot remember right now.
Q. You told us earlier that on occasion when Lee would do something which caused
an expenditure of family funds there would be an argument over that.
A. Yes.
Q. I believe at least at one point you described that sort of situation in
connection with his purchase of the guns.
A. Yes.
Q. I understand that the family budget was sort of marginal throughout at least
1963 at the time period we have asked you most of the questions about.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall any discussion along those lines about the impact on the family
budget in connection with his distribution of the pamphlets in New Orleans?
A. You asked me a few minutes ago who paid for those pamphlets. It never
occurred to me that they had been bought by Lee.
Q. That is the reason I asked the question.
A. I would not know that. I never questioned that because I assume somebody just
gave him that to distribute.
Q. The thought was maybe I could jog your memory and there had been some
discussion that now you spent your money on another foolish thing and he gave
you a reply perhaps about who did pay for the pamphlets.
A. No.
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Q. Did he ever offer an explanation to you that someone else had bought any of
the firearms, it is not going to hurt the budget because somebody else bought
them?
A. I just freshly came from Russia and a lot of thin over there we don't pay for
indirectly. I really never questioned that because------
Q. At least he never made a statement to you to that effect?
A. No; or I never asked him about it.
Q. The committee has received some evidence that prior to going to Russia, Lee
had spent some time trying to learn the Russian language, and that maybe he was
not proficient at it, but at least at the point time at which he arrived there
he had some acquaintance with it, enough to get along. Was that a trait of his
which you observed on other occasions that when he got ready to do something he
felt was important he spent a period of time preparing for it?
A. I would say yes.
Q. Do you recall him specifically making any special pre arations for the Mexico
trip?
A. I don't recall them right now.
Going back to say that Lee was always preparing for something he not always
prepared himself, but he was quite calculating in that respect, and sometimes
quite clever. He would masquerade somehow or apparently did not know that much
of what was going on inside of his head.
Q. Do you remember him doing anything specific to prepare for the Mexico trip?
A. No, I don't.
Q. As one example, do you recall him specifically acquiring any books on Spanish
in order to be prepared to speak Spanish when he got to Mexico?
A. I would not have remembered that but it would have been possible. We have to
speak. Maybe he would have bought a dictionary but I don't recall right now. It
would not surprise me.
Mr. CORNWELL. That is all.
By Mr. McDONALD:
Q. In 1962, in December, you are living in Dallas, Tex. Christmas, whether Lee
took any trips away from Dallas?
A. OK.
Q. Do you recall during that time period in December, before
A. Well, December. In December, Christmas No I don't think he left.
Q. Do you recall whether he was away from home for any period of time overnight?
A. No.
Q. Where were you living at that time?
A. I assume in Oak Cliff.
Q. Specifically do you know whether Lee ever traveled to Florida?
A. Not that I know of, no.
How would he travel to Florida? By bus, I guess. No.
Q. Do you recall him ever saying he had been to Florida?
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Q. Do you recall during this period of time whether he discussed his interest in
Cuba?
A. No, that was not the period that we were interested in Cuba.
Q. When did he become interested in Cuba?
A. I think in New Orleans.
Q. Do you know during this period, we will say late 1962, whether he--well, your
testimony was that he had no interest in Cuba at that point.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you recall at all whether he traveled to Florida?
A. If my memory serves me right, I never heard him mention Florida or know
anything about him going to Florida.
Q. Did he ever talk about anti-Castro military operations?
A. Not during this period. If you are interested in this period of time, no, but
the New Orleans period it could be.
Q. Do you recall Lee ever telling you that he had been arrested during that
period of time?
A. During December?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. It is your best recollection that you can't recall him being away for an
extended period of time?
A. No.
Q. Would you remember that if he had been?
A. Well, let's figure out. How long does it take to get from Dallas to Florida,
I assume by the bus?
Q. By bus at least probably 2 days.
A. One way?
Q. Yes.
And 2 days back. That is 4 days. I don't remember Lee being gone for 4 days or 2
days or 1 day.
Mr. McDONALD. All right. Thank you. I have no further questions.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. Porter, do you have any notes, letters, that you have kept that you
still have from Lee? You said you have not kept a diary.
A. I never kept a diary.
Q. Do you have any other notes or letters or any other types of materials that
would be---
A. Let's make this clear. You said I kept a diary.
Q. No; I said you never kept a diary.
A. No.
Q. Do you have any other notes or material?
A. No; everything was confiscated. By any miracle if something was left, I don't
know about that.
Q. Mrs. Porter, would you be willing to make your tax returns, tours and Lee's
tax returns for the years 1969, and 1963 available to committee?
A. Would I be able to?
Q. Would you be willing to do that?
A. I can't, I was unemployed. How can I? I didn't work.
Q. But Lee at that time was employed.
A. Yes.
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432
Q. And I assume he did file tax returns that the Warren Commission obtained.
Would you be willing to make those tax returns available to the committee?
A. I don't think I have them.
Mr. HAMILTON. I think before she answers that I would like to confer with her on
that.
Mr. WoLF. Surely. Why don't I ask one other question first and then you can
confer on a different subject.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. This is a very general question. Has any information been released since
1964, for example, in the Warren Commission which operated that has changed your
mind or your attitude about whether or not Lee may have been involved in a
conspiracy and, for example, 2 or 3 years ago when the Senate released
information that our Government had been trying to assassinate Fidel Castro? A
lot of people thought that kind of information was very significant. Has any
information come out since 1964 that has changed your opinion whether or not he
was involved in that conspiracy?
A. Well. I do not read that much about the assassination but I am curious like
everybody else and I would like to find something that proved that Lee was
innocent for my personal reasons. So I do read some things but they don't lead
to anything, sometimes they even sound absurd to me. You know, there are Just so
many theories that simply-----
Q. Is it still your personal opinion that he did not have associates or was not
involved in a conspiracy?
A. That was my opinion.
Mr. WOLF. Thank you.
Why don't we go off the record for a few minutes.
Mr. HAMILTON. I want to answer the question about the tax returns on the record.
Mr. WOLF. Yes; you may confer.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., a recess was taken until 5:35 p.m.]
Mr. WOLF. We can go back on the record now and it is approximately 5:35.
I believe Mr. Hamilton would like to respond to a question we previously asked
Mrs. Porter.
Mr. HAMILTON. I will let Mrs. Porter respond. Why don't you repeat the question
you had about the income tax return?
Mr. WOLF. Sure.
By Mr. WOLF:
Q. Mrs. Porter, would you be willing to sign a release to gie the committee
access to Lee's tax returns for the years 1962 and 1963?
A. That is a better question. Yes; I have no objection whatsoever. The way you
phrased your question first, I didn't understand what you wanted me to do.
Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mrs. Porter.
Mrs. Porter. at this time we have concluded' those questions we have to ask you
at the current time. We realize obviously after taking time to examine all your
prior statements that you previously gave, that first of all you have testified
to many bodies--the Warren Commission, the
Page 433
433
Garrison trial--and have given interviews to many organizations---the FBI, the
Secret Service and other people. As I am sure you are aware, various people have
analyzed some of your statements and there are inconsistencies in some of the
statements over time, and they are inconsistent, for example, on when you first
saw the gun, or did he use aliases, or when you first knew of Lee's trip to
Mexico, and did Lee practice shooting with the rifle as well as many other
subjects that have been publicly documented.
I would ask you at the current time if you would like to make any general
statement that you wish about these inconsistencies as either, by way of
explanation or any other type of statement you would like to make concerning
these subjects or any other subjects?
At a future point in time it probably will be necessary to examine you in detail
on each of these prior statements.
The WITNESS. Well. the testimony I was giving to different people,
organizations, was given at different times so as my memory may have collapsed
at one time or maybe something came back, maybe the testimony will vary. At the
beginning. if it is possible to understand for people, I am just a human being
and I did try to protect Lee--that was my natural instinct that I followed. Some
things I did not want to talk about because I tried to protect Lee. So they can
hold this against me, there is nothing I can do about it.
I had to protect myself too. I didn't have any home to turn back to. I was not
eligible or qualified to live right here so I really was trying to save my skin,
to put it bluntly, but it was not for the reasons that I was protecting
somebody. that I was part of any crime, that is not so. That was just a very
human mistake that you make but it was not--maybe legally you call this perjury.
I don't know. But it was not because I was afraid that I might betray some
secrets that I knew in order to be punished for.
I don't know how to put this generally but I swear that I never worked for any
government of any country. I was not aware of the crime that he was planning and
I am sorry that all this happened like the rest of us suffer. So I don't think I
can add any more.
Mr. WOLF. All right.
Mrs. Porter. That concludes the questions we will have to ask you today. It will
be our responsibility to go back to our committee members and Congressmen who
are not here today and discuss with them whether or not they would like to
pursue questioning you at a future date.
The WITNESS. You mean tomorrow?
Mr. WOLF. No: it will not be tomorrow.
The WITNESS. I would like to make a request that I would prefer not testify
publicly.
Mr. WOLF. We will inform the committee of that request.
The WITNESS. I still feel leery about the reporters, the crowd that is present.
I cannot really concentrate on my answers that well.
Mr. WOLF. We understand that, Mrs. Porter. You are in the unique position, of
course, of having known Lee better than anybody else currently alive.
The WITNESS. Well. if you have to repeat the same questions. maybe somebody else
can make a statement about my answers. I would prefer that.
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Mr. WOLF. Sure.
The WITNESS. Unless you have new questions to ask.
Mr. WoLF. We will inform our Congressmen of your position and would think be
able to tell you in the very near future, probably within 2 weeks, what' the
results of that committee decision will be. If you don't testify publicly, it
may be that one of the attorneys again on the staff would either come to Dallas
or you could 'come back here to have a session like this and it would be a much
briefer session than today's was.
The WITNESS. Well, maybe legally you do have a right not to trust me. After all,
I came from a Communist country. You don't know me from Adam. My testimony does
not seem to be very consistent. Is that the words?
Mr. WOLF. Yes.
The WITNESS. Of course you have a right to doubt me but it is a very
uncomfortable position to be in that somebody would try to trust you and try to
pin the tail on the donkey--please scratch that.
Mr. WOLF. We understand, Mrs. Porter. Your testimony though today was to the
best of your ability to testify today.
The WITNESS. Yes; and every time I testify I try my best to help any committee
that tries to get this matter cleared up.
Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mrs. Porter.
Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to thank you on the record for your courtesies to
Mrs. Porter and to me.
The WITNESS. Thank you for your kindness to me, and I hope nobody holds this
against you.
Mr. WOLF. You are quite welcome. Thank you.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you very much for taking your time to come here and answer
our questions.
The WITNESS. I wish it was a more pleasurable circumstance to be on the record.
Mr. WOLF. I would like to thank Mr. Hamilton who has done this voluntarily
through the District of Columbia Bar Association.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m, the deposition was concluded.]
The Defector Study
Page 435
THE DEFECTOR STUDY
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(435)
Contents
Page 436
CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. Foreword 1-13
II. Morris and Mollie Block 14-24
III. Harold Citrynell 25-29
IV. Bruce Frederick Davis 30-34
V. Shirley Dubinsky 35-38
VI. Joseph Dutkanicz 39-49
VII. Martin Greendlinger 50-55
VIII. Nicholas Petrulli 56-64
IX. Libero Ricciardelli 65-76
X. Vladimir Sloboda 77-85
XI. Robert Webster 86-103
XII. Lee Harvey Oswald 104-149
XIII. Soviet citizenship 150-158
XIV. Propaganda use and financial arrangements 159-163
XV. Residence employment and financial arrangements 164-168
XVI. Soviet relationships and exit visas 169-174
XVII. KGB contact 175-188
Addendum : American Debriefing Practices 189-199
(436)
Foreword
Page 437
I. FOREWORD
A. BACKGROUND
(1) From a comparative analysis of 11 defectors who were similar to Lee Harvey
Oswald, the committee sought to determine what, if anything, was unusual about
Oswald's defection.
(2) To determine which individuals the committee would study, a letter was sent
to the CIA requesting the names of persons who defected to the Soviet Union
between 1958 and 1964. In response, the CIA provided a list of the names and
variations of the names of 380 Americans who were in the U.S.S.R. during that
time period.
(3) The CIA was subsequently requested to provide more information on the 380
defectors to enable the committee to select, for a detailed analysis, those most
similar to Oswald. The CIA provided a computer listing of the name. 901 file
number,* date and place of birth, and a compilation of information derived from
the 201 file, as well as citations for various other Government agency reports.
(4) From this second list of defectors, the committee eliminated those that
appeared to have (a) been born outside the United States; (b) gone to the
U.S.S.R. sometime other than the 1958-69 time period; and (c) remained outside
the United States until 1964. The committee decided to examine the files on the
remaining- 03 individuals, listed below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name Date of birth Place of birth
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amron, Irving __________________________________ United States.
Block, Mollie _______________ Nov. 6, 1912 ________ New York, N.Y.
Block, Morris _______________ Mar. 30, 1920________ Do.
Citrynell. Harold ____________ Mar. 10, 1923 _______ Do.
Davis, Bruce Frederick ______ May 4, 1936 ________ Rome, N.Y.
Dubinsky, Shirley ____________ Mar. 11, 1925 _______ New York, N.Y.
Frank, Richard Cyril ________ Aug. 22, 1922 _______ Rochester, N.Y.
Frank, Susan Heligman ________ Nov. 18. 1913 _______ New York, N.Y.
Gold, Robert _________________ Mar. 14, 1928 _______ Massachusetts.
Greendlinger, Martin _________ Mar. 25, 1932 _______ New York. N.Y.
Halperin, Maurice H __________ Mar. 3, 1906 _______ Boston Mass.
Jones, Louis Henry ___________ Mar. 17, 1934 _______ Arlington Heights, Ohio
Lawson, John Howard __________ Sept. 25, 1894 ______ New York, N.Y.
Martin, William H ___________ May 27, 1931 ________ Columbus, Ga.
Martinkus, Anthony V _________ June 15, 1911 _______ Chicago, Ill.
Meyer, Karl Henry ____________ June 30, 1937 _______ Mountain, Wis.
Mitchell, Bernon F ___________ Mar. 11, 1931 _______ San Francisco, Calif.
Parker, James Dudley _________ Feb. 21, 1926 _______ Oakland, Calif.
Petrulli. Nicholas ___________ Feb. 13, 1921 _______ Brooklyn, N.Y.
Pittman, John Orion __________ Sept. 17, 1906 ______ Atlanta, Ga.
Ricciardelli. Libero _________ June 18, 1917________ Needham, Mass.
Webster, Robert Edward _______ Oct. 23, 1928 _______ Tiffin, Ohio.
Winston, Henry _______________ Apr. 2, 1911 ________ Hattiesburg, Miss.
(5) The committee then examined the October 25, 1960, request from the State
Department to the CIA for information on 13 individuals they considered
defectors. That list included the following:
----------------
(437)
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(a) Lee Harvey Oswald.
(b) Seven individuals whose files the committee had decided to examine under the
previous criteria: Block, Mollie; Block, Morris; Davis, Bruce Frederick; Martin,
William H.; Mitchell, Bernon F.; Ricciardelli, Libero; Webster, Robert Edward.
(c) Two individuals whose names appeared on the computer listing but had been
excluded because they were not born within the United States: Dutkanicz,
Joseph--Date of birth: June 9, 1926, place of birth: Corlice, Poland; Sloboda,
Vladimir--Date of birth: January 7, 1907, place of birth: Redkomien, U.S.S.R.
(d) Three individuals who had not previously been known to the committee as
defectors: DuBois, David--Date of birth: March 9, 1925; David Graham
McConns--place of birth: Seattle, Wash.; Jones, Sergeant (FNU); Fletcher, Sgt.
Ernie.
(6) The CIA response to this State Department request is dated November 21,
1960. It included available information on the above defectors and stated:
In addition to those appearing on your list, there is included information on
Virginia Frank Coe and Maurice Hyman Halperin. While these individuals have not
renounced their American citizenship or declared themselves in any way, both are
employed by the bloc countries in which they now reside.
(7) The committee had selected Halperin from the computer listing as a defector
who fit the previously stated criteria, but had no knowledge of Coe. (8) In a
February 27, 1978, letter from the committee to the. CIA, access to all existing
201 files were requested for the following individuals:
(a) The 23 individuals from the computer listing;
(b) Dutkanicz, Sloboda, DuBois, Jones, and Fletcher (because their names
appeared on the defector list with Oswald's name); and
(c) Coe (because the CIA added his name as a possible defector)
(9) Five of the individuals were immediately dropped from this defector
analysis. The CIA could not identify Sergeant Jones without additional
identifying data, none of which could be found. DuBois and Coe were eliminated
because they defected to Communist China and did not offer any insight into
Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union. The information on Martin and Mitchell
was considered too sensitive in nature by the CIA to be provided to the
(10) The committee also requested the FBI, the Department of Defense and the
State Department to provide selected information on the 24-name defector sample.
(11) From the available information, the committee performed an analysis of
treatment provided by the Soviets to individuals during the approximate period
Oswald was there. The committee used the following criteria for its detailed
examination:
Background
Date of defection
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Defected with whom
Rejection of American citizenship
Length of time for Soviets to grant residence
Type of residence permit granted
Circumstances after defection and prior to resettlement
Propaganda statements made to Soviet press
Relationships with Soviet citizens
Place of residence in Soviet Union
Military training prior to defection
Employment in Soviet Union
Income provided
Financial aid provided
Contact with Soviet officials, especially KGB personnel
Known surveillance
Time period for Soviets to grant exit visa
Time period for United States to grant entrance visa
Time period for spouse or children to obtain exit visa
Time period for spouse or children to obtain entrance visa
(12) During this analysis, 13 individuals were eliminated for the following
reasons:
(a) Lack of substantive information: Fletcher, Ernie; Gold, Robert: Jones,
Louis; Lawson, John; Meyer, Karl; Parker, James.
(b) Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union, were on
official party business in the Soviet Union, or had resided outside the United
States for an extended period before entering the Soviet Union, making a
comparison to Oswald's situation difficult:Frank, Richard; Frank, Susan;
Halpenn, Maurice; Pittman, John; Winston, Henry.
(c) Residents in the Soviet Union for over 90 years, making a comparison to
Oswald's situation difficult: Amron, Irving; Martinkus, Anthony.
(13) The defector sample eventually compared to Lee Harvey Oswald was reduced to
11 ,individuals, 2 of whom were married:
Block, Mollie; Block, Morris; Citrynell, Harold; Davis, Bruce; Dubinsky,
Shirley; Dutkanicz, Joseph; Greendlinger, Martin; Petrulli, Nicholas;
Ricciardelli, Libero; Sloboda, Vladimir;Webster, Robert.
Morris and Mollie Block
Page 439
II. MORRIS AND MOLLIE BLOCK
(14) Morris Block attended the Sixth World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union
during 1957. (1) Immediately after the conference he traveled to Communist
China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport for misuse. (2) In
1958, he made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the Soviet Union with a falsified
passport. (3)
(15) Then, in July 1959, Morris Block arrived in Gydnia, Poland with his wife
and child. (4) After being kept in seclusion for 1 month, they were transferred
to Moscow where they were met by, a "Soviet representative." (5) The Blocks were
taken to the Leningradskaya Hotel and provided excellent accommodations while
they applied for travel visas to China. (6).Although the Soviet representatives
had reached an agreement with the Blocks to participate
in press conference, it did not take place. (7)
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440
(16) In September 1959, the Soviets suggested the Blocks accept Soviet asylum,
and later issued them Soviet internal passports for foreigners. (8) The Soviet
authorities immediately settled the Blocks in a two-room, 19 ruble-a-month
apartment in Odessa and provided them 1,000 rubles to buy furniture. (9) Morris
Block obtained a job as a mechanic in a Soviet shipyard while Mollie Block
taught in the Polytechnic Institute. (10) Their combined
income was 166 rubles per month. (11)
(17) A Ukranian newspaper published a letter by Block in December 1959, stating
his intent to live in the Soviet Union. (12) He severely criticized life in the
United States and detailed a long history of unemployment and alleged
"persecution" by the FBI after his return from China. (13) Again he denounced
the United States interview with his local newspaper in 1960. (14)
(18) Because Morris Block had difficulty with the Russian language, he was
assigned a young girl to teach him. (15) An affair resulted and Mollie Block
arrived in Moscow with her daughter in February 1960. (16) The same Soviet
official met Mrs. Block, this time taking her to the Hotel Metropole. (17) Until
June she remained there, with the Soviet Red Cross paying expenses. (18) When
her daughter hospitalized due to a nervous disorder, Mollie Block moved into a
one-room apartment and began work as a typist-translator for the Soviet
Publishing Office in Moscow. (19)
(19) In August Morris Block arrived in Moscow and requested remain there with
his family. (20) Because the Soviets insisted months later Mollie and Morris
Block returned to their previous jobs in Odessa. (21) Their daughter did not
join them until May 1961.(22)
(20) After numerous visits to the Soviet authorities, the Blocks received
permissiou to visit the American Embassy in Moscow. Mollie Block requested the
Embassy provide passports for herself, her husband, and an immigration visa for
their daughter. (24) She also requested financial aid to repatriate. (25) The
U.S. authorities were willing to aid the Blocks since their passports had
expired, but the Soviet authorities refused to grant exit visas and forced a
return to Odessa. (26) The Blocks were subsequently approached on three
occasions to renounce their U.S. citizenship and become Soviet citizens. (27)
They refused to do so. (28)
(21) The State Department asked the American Embassy on January 30, 1963, to
issue Mollie Block a passport for return to the United States only, her daughter
an alien entry visa and Morris Block an emergency certificate of identity and
registration for return to the United States only. (29) They did so. (30)
(22) Then in late February 1963, the Blocks lost their Soviet documentation.
(31) In May the Soviet. Government stated they would not reissue temporary
documents axed the Blocks would have to accept permanent registration instead.
(32) Applications for exit visas were filed during the summer months of 1963,
refused, and filed again in April 1964. (33)
(23) Morris Block became annoyed at the Soviets broadcasting propaganda through
the loudspeaker at his place of employment early 1964.(34) He disconnected it
and was severely punished by
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several young Soviet workers. (35) The Soviets would not grant permission for
the Blocks to visit the Embassy in Moscow or grant exit visas so they could
leave the Soviet Union. (36)
(24) Mollie Block provided an account of their difficulties to a cor- respondent
for the New York Times that was visiting Odessa.(37) When the article concerning
Soviet treatment of the Blocks was published, the Soviets began harassing the
Blocks. (38) The U.S. consular officials discussed the Block case with Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and then the Blocks were expelled from the U.S.S.R.(39)
Morris Block was charged with acts of hooliganism and Mollie Block was charged
with handling out anti-Soviet propaganda to foreign students at the Polytechnic
Institute.(40) They departed from the U.S.S.R.
to the United States on July 11, 1964. (41)
Harold Citrynell
Page 441
III. HAROLD CITRYNELL
(25) Harold Citrynell entered the Soviet Union with his wife and child on
February 27, 1958. (42) He crossed the Czechoslovakian border as a tourist,
intending to establish residence and become a citizen. (43)
(26) After several days in Moscow, Citrynell applied to the Office Visas and
Registration for permanent residence ,and Soviet citizenship. (44) He wrote a
statement containing 13 reasons prompting his request for Soviet citizenship,
one which may have been his inability to obtain employment in his desired
field.(45) Within a few days Citrynell was notified that he had been accepted
and that the Red Cross would take care of him and his family.(46)
(27) Citrynell was provided a one-bedroom apartment in Kharkov job in a mine
surveying instrument factory with an "above average salary for the job." (47) He
stated that while living in Kharkov, he felt that his neighbors and coworkers
had participated in planned effot to make him dislike the Soviet Union.
(28) In the autumn of 1958, Citrynell decided to return to the United States.
(49) He requested an exit visa and began writing government offices and
influential people. (50) He stated that after October 1958 his detention was
involuntary. (51)
(29) Before Citrynell's departure on June 29, 1959, the Red Cross requested he
sign a statement agreeing never to say anything derogatory about the Soviet
Union or any individual in it. (52)
Bruce Frederick Davis
Page 441
IV. BRUCE FREDERICK DAVIS
(30) After serving approximately 5 years in the U.S. Army, Bruce Frederick Davis
left his post in Germany.(53) He defected to East Germany in August 1960, and
spent a month in East Berlin before entering the Soviet Union. (54)
(31) In October 1960, two articles appeared in Izvestiva and Pravda with
statements by Davis attributing his defection to disillusionment with U.S.
foreign and military. policy.(55) Although Davis physically defected, he did not
officially denounce his American citizenship and was documented by the Soviet as
a stateless person.(56)
(32) Davis was settled in Kiev as a student at the Kiev Institute
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of National Economy.(57) He was provided a free dormitory room and a stipend of
900 old rubles a month.(58) This is three times what Soviet students receive,
but normal for a non-Soviet-bloc student. (59) In October Davis wrote a friend
of his in the Army stated he was given an outright sum of 10,000 old rubles; it
is known if this is true. (60) He was promised a free apartment if his
unauthorized travel was discontinued and his grades were improved. (61)
(33) In August 1962, Davis appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to request an
American passport.(62) He phoned the Embassy the following day and stated he
would not be completing the application as he had been arrested for his
participation m a brawl Kiev. (63) He returned to the Embassy in October 1962
and was issued a passport and entry visa into West Germany.(64) Davis, allowed
the passport and visa to expire due to a new Soviet girl friend he had met. (65)
(34) In 1963 Davis visited the Embassy on an unauthorized trip January to make
statements concerning his dissatisfaction and deliver papers from another
disgruntled U.S. citizen.(66) In May he made another trip to renew his passport
and reapply for a West German visa.(67) Davis was returned to military control
in July 1963.(68)
Shirley Dubinsky
Page 442
V. SHIRLEY DUBINSKY
(35) Shirley Dubinsky wrote several letters from East Berlin to Soviet Premier
Khrushchev denouncing her American citizenship and requesting Soviet citizenship
in October 1961.(69) On December 95, 1962, she arrived in Moscow after
purchasing a 3-day tour from a travel agency in Switzerland. (70) She refused to
leave the Soviet Union when her visa had expired. (71)
(36) The American Embassy in Moscow was informed by the Hotel Metropole that an
American guest there, Dubinsky, was acting "queer?' (72) She was committed to a
mental hospital on January 5, 1963, with $100 in her possession. (73) The
diagnosis was "schizophrenic break."(74)Soviet psychiatrists advised that
Dubinsky was unable to travel and extended treatment was necessary. (75) The
American Embassy informed the State Department of the situation. (76)
(37) It was reported that Dubinsky had visited the offices of Department of
Visas and Registration, apparently to obtain Soviet citizenship. (77) When she
attempted to visit the offices of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin she was
turned over to Intourist. (78)
(38) A repatriation loan, in the form of a plane ticket to New York, was awarded
to Shirley Dubinsky, and she returned to the United States on Febru- ary 1,
1963.(79)
Joseph Dutkanicz
Page 442
VI. JOSEPH DUTKANICZ
(39) Joseph Dutkanicz informed the American Embassy that in 1958 while he was
stationed in Germany with the U.S. Army, he was approached by KGB officers and,
because of threats and inducements, was recruited.(80) His wife stated that he
often spoke of fleeing to the
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Soviet Union during 1959.(81) The Soviets recommended that Dutkanicz defect in
May 1960 and a Western bloc investigation for security reasons prompted him to
do so.(82) Two weeks prior to his scheduled return to the United States in June
1960, Dutkanicz took his wife and three children on a trip.(83) They visited
Czechoslovakian Embassy in Vienna, then, passing through Czechoslovakia, were
escorted to the Ukraine, Soviet Union. (84) After being driven to L'vov, the
family was settled in first-class accommodations, with KGB assistance.(85)
(40) Tass announced the Dutkanicz family had sought assistance in July 1960.
(86) Articles began appearing that gave autobiographical statements on the
history and motivation for defection in anti-American terms. (87) Later an
article by Dutkanicz was published that indicated he was living in L'vov with
his family and contained anti-Hitler and anti-U.S. propaganda. (88) Two radio
broadcasts were made in Moscow also.(89)
(41) Dutkanicz stated he never applied for or requested Soviet citizenship.(90)
A private bill bestowing citizenship on him, Supreme Soviet decree No. 135/3,
was enacted in March 1960, before he defected.(91) September 1060, a Soviet
passport was delivered to him.(92) His wife was documented as a foreigner upon
request and his children as Soviet citizens.(93)
(42) Dutkanicz was given employment as a technician in a TV factory for an
undisclosed salary and his wife taught English conversation lessons for 10
rubles a month. (94)
(43) Although they moved into an apartment in 1061, the daily contact by Russian
agents that Dutkanicz's wife described during their first 6 months, did not
end.(95) During a March 6, 1967, visit to the American Embassy she stated that
the secret police (KGB) were in constant contact with her husband, telephoning
daily, and that 1960 were watching them closely."(96)
(44) The American Embassy received a letter from Dutkanicz's wife, Mary, on
September 14, 1961, requesting a visa to visit her sick mother in the United
States.(97) It stated she thought her husband was only visiting the Soviet Union
at the time of his defection and that her passport had been taken from her.(98)
She appeared at the Embassy on December 5, 1961, for a passport, stating her
mother had died.(99) Mary was sent back to L'vov.(101)
(45) An application to the Red Cross was filed in February or March 1962 for a
loan of 500 rubles to be used for a trip to Moscow.(102) The request is denied
"although the so-called Soviet Red Cross had given large sums of money to other
defectors who were American born and had no KGB connection."(103)
(46) During Mary Dutkanicz's visa processing visits to the Embassy, she revealed
that her husband was thoroughly disillusioned and wanted to return to the United
States regardless of any charges.(104) She explained that her husband was
encouraged by the fact he had received an undesirable discharge from the Army,
not dishonorable.(105)
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(47) Dutkanicz requested the Embassy to aid his children and himself in
returning to the United States on March 22, 1962 (the day after his wife
departed to the United States).(106) The FBI and CIA did not want Dutkanicz
brought back on their account, but on August 15, 1962, the State Department
advised the Embassy to issue him a passport.(107) The file reflected that the
Embassy could not reach Dutkanicz on the phone prior to November 22, 1963. (108)
(48) Dutkanicz's children, ages 11, 9, and 8, stated that on July 25, 1963. they
were taken from their home and placed in boarding schools (the 11-year-old had
been in school previously).(109) They were allowed to see their father once and
he had cried, saying that. "they" wanted to do something to his nervous system
to make him an idiot. (110)
(49) Mary Dutkanicz was informed that her husband had been found in a drunken
state, placed in the hospital in L'vov and died in November 1963.(111) The U.S.
consul was informed in March 1964, that the three children would be allowed to
leave the Soviet Union.(112) The children were to be documented as Soviet
citizens for the departure, but were to travel on U.S. passports after crossing
Soviet borders.(113) In May 1964, the children joined Mary Dut-
kanicz in the United States. (114)
Martin Greendlinger
Page 444
VII. MARTIN GREENDLINGER
(50) A mathematician at New York University, Martin Greendlinger attended the
World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957. (115) He met Yelena Ivanovna
Pyatnitskaya, nee Kapustina, a student at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute. (116)
(51) Greendlinger returned to the Soviet Union in April 1958, and within a month
had married Yelena. (117) He had been encouraged to believe her passport and
Soviet exit visa would be issued in 3 to 4 months by OVIR. (118) Greendlinger
meant to bring his wife, her daughter by a previous marriage, and possibly a
child of their own marriage to the United States. (119)
(52) In July 1959 Greendlinger left his home in Borisoglebsk and returned to the
United States alone.(12O) After a year, the Soviet authorities had issued his
wife an exit visa to depart from the U.S.S.R.(121) The U.S. Embassy, however,
refused to issue an entrance visa due to her membership in Komsomol after 1947
and in trade union after 1951. (122)
(53) Greendlinger applied to the State Department for his wife's entry visa in
August 1960.(123) In September he received a U.S. passport to visit his wife and
child for a month and was awarded National Science Foundation fellowship for 1
year.(124)
(54) It was December 1960 before Greendlinger returned to Moscow.(125) He and
his wife spoke to American Embassy personnel about acquiring an entrance visa.
(126) The Embassy stated his wife could not receive an entrance visa to the
United States because there could be no waiver of section 243(g) of the
act.(127) The CIA file on Greendlinger states:
This apparently involved Komsomol membership, although the Soviet wives of
Parker and Oswald--q.v.--had many more drawbacks and were let in. (128)
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445
(55) When Greendlinger applied for visas at the British Embassy he was told that
his wife would be issued a visa if he could get a job in England and guarantee
support. (129) He settled in Ostankine, a suburb of Moscow, and worked as a
mathematician. (130) Finally, the National Science Foundation approved his
studying math at Manchester, England. (131) No further information is known.
(132)
Nicholas Petrulli
Page 445
VIII. NICHOLAS PETRULLI
(56) An American laborer, Nicholas Petrulli purchased an organized tour to
Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. for $965.(133) He entered the Soviet Union at
Vyborg on August 10, 1959, using a regular 7-day tourist visa issued in
Washington the previous month. The tour passed through Leningrad en route to
Moscow where it was to remain until August 18. (134) Petrulli did not show up at
the train station to depart from Moscow. (135) He canceled his ship reservations
through an Intourist guide and remained in the Ukraine Ho-
tel.(136)
(57) Petrulli spoke to several Americans in the hotel restaurant the following
week about his decision to remain in the Soviet Union.(137) He had no
communistic sympathies or ideological leaning toward the U.S.S.R. and had no
grievances against the United States. (138) Petrulli believed there was a good
opportunity to obtain employment in the Soviet Union, although he did not know
the language, people, or country. (139)
(58) A resident American correspondent encouraged Petrulli to tell the Embassy
in Moscow about his intention to defect. (14O) On August 28, 1959, Petrulli was
interviewed for 2 hours by an Embassy official, Snyder.(141) The correspondent
was present when Petrulli explained his reasons for staying and how he had
learned the procedure for remaining from the hotel manager and Intourist guide.
(142) He stated no one had induced or influenced him. (143) Petrulli stated that
upon the guide's advice, he had drafted a letter to the Supreme Soviet
requesting Soviet citizenship, but had not sent it yet. (144) He stated be had
informed the intourist guide he was virtually out of
money.(145) He did, however, have possession of ship and plane tickets for his
return to the United States. (146) Petrulli was given the name of a Catholic
priest in Moscow he subsequently spoke to who warned about possible
exploitation, and so forth.(147)
(59) The following day Petrulli sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet.(148) He
told the Embassy it contained five points as specified by the Intourist guide:
(1) date and place of birth; (9,) names and addresses of relatives; (3) property
and bank accounts (none); (4) skills, education, and work record; and (5) moral
and ideological reasons for wanting Soviet citizenship. (149) Petrulli would not
relate what he had written for No. 5 or if it was derogatory to the United
States. (150)
(60) Petrulli visited the American Embassy on September. 9, 1959, turned in his
passport, stated he had sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet and asked to
renounce his U.S. citizenship. (151) Snyder explained the irrevocabi]ity of
renunciation and told Petrulli to return in the afternoon. (152) He did so and
Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. (153)
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446
(61) Several people were told by Petrulli that he felt "morally and economically
at home in the Soviet Union," that they were trying to do things right, that
people were not in a hurry and not nervous wrecks.(154) He said he had many jobs
in the United States and he was not happy there; he liked the Soviet Union
better.(155)
(62) Petrulli visited the American Embassy. again on September 8, 1959 and asked
for a written statement of his citizenship status for the Soviet authorities.
(156) When told that the Embassy would inform him as soon as the State
Department informed them, Petrulli began requesting information on visa
requirements to the U.S.(157) The Soviet authorities had not responded to his
letters on job requests and Petrulli felt he was getting the run-around.(158)
His hotel was being paid for by the Soviets but he was without money, friends or
the ability to communicate with Russians.(159). Petrulli left the
Embassy and told an American correspondent he just wanted to go home. (160)
(63) On September 14, 1959, a Soviet official informed Petrulli he should have
applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington for citizenship. (161) The manager
of the Ukraina Hotel told him he had 2 days to vacate the premises.(162) Both
men told him he had to leave the Soviet Union and needed some type of traveling
document from the American Embassy. (163)
(64) The next day Petrulli was back at the Embassy.(164) It is unknown if he
applied for a passport during this visit, but a September 19, 1959, newspaper
article stated that the State Department had declared Petrulli legally
incompetent and returned his U.S. citizenship. (165) He was given a one-way
passport to the United States and returned to his home m New York on September
22, 1959. (166)
Libero Ricciardelli
Page 446
IX. LIBERO RICCIARDELLI
(65) Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his family to a socialistic
system of government might straighten out domestic problems and guarantee his
children's future well-being. (167) In 1958 he visited the Soviet Embassy in
Washington. D.C., and asked to visit Soviet Russia.(168) Ricciardelli obtained
Soviet visas to tour Moscow for six days with his wife and three children, and
did so in February 1959.(169)
(66) When his Intourist guide learned that he wanted to defect, she
recommended that Ricciardelli visit the visa department, Intourist Service
Bureau. (170) He did so and was informed that he must depart on the expiration
date on his visa.(171) Ricciardelli did not depart and was not pressured to do
so. (172) He continued to visit the visa department and wrote the President of
the RSFSR as was recommended to him by Intourist. (173)
(67) Financial aid was requested by Ricciardelli because he had $500 and 6 days
of meal tickets on him.(174) The director of the Soviet Union Red Crescent or
Red Cross and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with
Ricciardelli and discouraged remaining in the Soviet Union. (175) An
investigation concerning Ricciardelli's application for a visa at the Soviet
Embassy in the United States was begun.(176)
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68) Riccardelli contracted influenza, which developed into rheumatic fever and
was placed in a hospatal for 3 weeks.(177) While there, he was visited by
representatives of the Red Cross and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who announced
he could remain in the Soviet Union and the Red Cross would be responsible for
him.(178) They helped Ricardelli fill out forms, and the Soviet in charge of
Intouristat the hotel arranged for aid from the International Red Cross.(179)
(69) After Ricciardelli returned from the hospital, he was questioned from 7
p.m. to 7 a.m. by a journalist from "Izvestia" and presumably a Red Cross
Representative(180) Ricciardelli signed a statement that dealt with having
conditions in the United States as compared to the Soviet Union and information
that would protect the Soviets from allegations he was being held against his
will.(181) These articles later appeared in "Pravda" and "Izvestia."(182) When
Ricciardelli could understand enough Russian to read the articles he did so and
felt they, were slanted, self-serving statements condemning life in the United
States. (183)
(70) Although Ricciardelli applied for Soviet citizenship, his wife refused to
do so. (184) Subsequent to this application for citizenship, the director of the
Red Cross in Moscow and a reprentative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
arranged for a move to a climate more suitable to Ricciardelli's health (185) He
had requested a home Kiev or L'vov.(186)
(71) In July 1959. Ricciardelli arrived in Kiev and was presented with an
Internal Russian Passport, indicating he was a Soviet citizen.(187) No oath of
allegiance was taken and Ricciardelli did not give up his U.S. passport and did
not feel as if he had given up his U.S. citizenship. (188) The Soviets
considered all his children Soviet citizens although his wife refused to accept
the passport offered to her. (189)
(72) Ricciardelli sketched ideas for new tools and machines as mechanical
engineer for the Main Operation for Building Construction. (190) He was required
to join a trade union but refused to vote or give speeches at the meeting when
asked.(191)
(73) With his salary of 150 new rubles, Ricciardelli rented a thirdfloor walkup
apartment consisting of four rooms and a bath. (192) As rent was only seven to
nine rubles a month, there was a]so money for a TV and radio. (193) For 2 rubles
a month, Ricciardelli kept a phone in his apartment, though it took him 2 years
to get it installed. (194) Ricciardelli traveled on five or six trips to Moscow
from Kiev and went on a vacation to Gagua, Cavcasas on the Black Sea. (195)
(74) There were few visitors to the Ricciardelli apartment, and those that came
believed it was wired for sound. (196)
(75) In the summer of 1960, Ricciardelli visited the Czechoslovakian Embassy in
Moscow and applied for visas.(197) After his children had received an education,
Ricciardelli felt it would be easier to return to the United States from
Czechoslovakia than the Soviet Union. (198) Two years later when the entrance
visas were granted, the Soviets refused to grant exit visas. (199)
(76) Ricciardelli's domestic problems had increased by August 1962 and he
decided his wife should return to her parents' home in Illinois
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448
and he would return to his parents' home with the three children. (200)
Ricciardelli applied for a renewed U.S. passport and was told his citizen- ship
was terminated when he accepted Soviet citizenship. (201) On March 27, 1963, his
wife left the Soviet Union for the United States after filling out an
application to have him granted a permanent resident visa as the husband of a
U.S. citizen. (202) Ricciardelli applied as an alien to return to the United
States on a permanent resident visa. (203) The U.S. Embassy granted the visa in
June 1963, and after 14-day delay over whether his oldest daughter was a Soviet
citizen he and his children flew to New York. (204)
Vladimir Sloboda
Page 448
X. VLADIMIR SLOBODA
(77) Vladimir Sloboda became a naturalized citizen of the United States on
August 14, 1958, and was assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group, U.S.
Army, with duty station at Frankfurt, Germany. (205)
(78) August 1960, Sloboda defected into East Germany, requesting Soviet asylum.
(206) Although his wife said he was extremely worried about gambling debts, his
201 file, maintained by the CIA reflects that "emotional state and fact of Army
countermeasures caused by arrest of 154 MID agents recently" are probably
responsible for defection. (207) Sloboda later explained he had been blackmailed
and framed into defecting. (208)
(79) Immediately after Sloboda's defection, he was utilized by the Soviets for
propaganda purposes.(209) In an August interview on Moscow TV, Sloboda based his
defection on the expressed views that the United States was a warmonger with spy
activity in Germany.(210) The September issue of Golos Roding repeated this as
did other articles and various press releases (211) According to one of the
later articles Sloboda was given Soviet citizenship in August 1960, the month he
defected. (212)
(80) Sloboda's British wife requested that the Soviet consul in London arrange
transportation for herself and three children to the Soviet Union. (213) Travel
arrangements were made to Leningrad and all expenses, such as shipment of
furniture and transportation tickets were paid for by the Soviets.(214) A
Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) resettlement officer made arrangements for
travel from Leningrad to L'vov.(215).When she and the children joined Sloboda on
November 19, 1960, he was already having doubts about his defection(216)
(81) Soviet authorities provided Sloboda with approximately 300 rubles a month
and a three-room flat in L'vov for his parents, with and children. (217)
(82) In early 1962 Sloboda's wife requested an exit visa from the L'vov
authorities.(218) She called the American. Embassy and informed them that both
she and her husband were desperate to return to the United States. (219) In
March she received an exit visa and passport, (220) Sloboda and his wife then
visited the British Embassy discuss bringing her Son and daughter out of the
Soviet Union with her. (221)Sloboda explained to the Embassy that he was afraid
to visit
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449
the American Embassy. (222) He stated that his wife and oldest and youngest
children had been issued Soviet internal passports for foreigners. (223) He
stated his other child was a U.S. citizen with an expired passport. (224)
(83) Sloboda's wife took the youngest child to England, leaving the
eldest at the International Boarding School and the other son at day
school.(225) On her departure she was given 50 rubles to purchase present for
her mother. (226)
(84) The British Embassy sent a representative to visit Sloboda in August 19612.
(227) They learned that "he had been subjected to fairly frequent questioning by
the KGB in L'vov since he visited the embassy in Moscow." (228) (85) In March
1963, Sloboda's wife sent him a telegram stating she was returning to the Soviet
Union so the eldest sons should not be sent. (229)
Robert Webster
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XI. ROBERT WEBSTER
(86) Robert E. Webster, an employee of the Rand Development Co., made several
trips to the Soviet Union in order to prepare for the 1959 U.S. exhibition in
Moscow. (230) While there for 7 weeks, beginning in May 1959, Webster steadily
dated the hostess employed at the Hotel Ukraine's tourist restaurant. (231) She
worked there during the period correspondents accompanying Vice President
Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R. resided there, and was suspected of being a KGB
agent. (232) Webster informed his girlfriend he wished to divorce his wife in
the United States and return to the Soviet Union to marry her. (233)
(87) Webster first revealed his desire to defect on July 11, 1959. He approached
the two Soviet officials in charge of arrangements for the exhibi- tion at the
fairgrounds and requested information concerning the procedures for a U.S.
citizen to remain in the U.S.S.R. (235) Webster was told to call one of the
officials in their Solkolniki Park office and a meeting was set up.(236)
(88) A few days later, the English-speaking official Webster had met previously,
escorted him to a private room in a restaurant. (237) A represen- tative of the
Soviet Government, questioned him about his desire to remain in the Soviet
Union.(238) The representative was also interested in whether Webster had told
other Americans of his interest to defect and instructed him not to. (239) While
intoxicated with vodka Webster was told to write a letter to the Supreme Soviet
requesting to remain as a Soviet citizen. (240) He did so and was given a
biographic data sheet to take with him and fill out.(241)
(89) Subsequently when Webster submitted the data sheet, he stated that his
dissatisfaction with the United States was due to the tendency of American
employers to hire a man and then fire him when he had learned the job. (242)
This reason was not acceptable because Webster had not personally experienced
this. (243) He rewrote the form to state that in the United States, Government
controlled big business.(244) He also wrote that he wished to work, marry, have
children, earn a degree and learn the Russian language in the Soviet Union.(245)
Although he stated he wished to cooperate in every way with the Soviet Union,
the Soviet authorities tried to dissuade Webster from
defecting.(246)
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(90) In the last of July or early August, Webster attended what described as a
serious, no drinking meeting held in a private restaurant room at the Metropole
Hotel.(247) Webster told two Soviet chemists he could help them make the Rand
spray gun he had demonstrated at the U.S. Exhibition.(248) On September 9 he was
told he had been accepted by the Soviets. (249) Although he had requested to
work in Moscow, Webster was informed he would be sent to Leningrad. (250 )
(91) The following day the Soviet officials registered Webster at the Bucharist
Hotel, and instructed him not to leave.(254) He was given 1,000 old rubles and
asked to write a note to a Rand employee requesting the money be left for him at
the hotel because he was on a tour of Russia. (252)
(92) There was a short party for Webster on September 11. (253) He was
immediately flown to Leningrad with an interpreter and met by an Intourist
representative.(254) He applied for work at the Leningrad Scientific Research
Institute, Polymerized Plastics and lived in the Baltiskaya Hotel for a month.
(255) He was allowed to call his girlfriend and she was allowed to visit and
make plans for a vacation. (256)
(93) On October 17, 1959 Webster was staying in Moscow.(257) He artended a
meeting at the central office, visas and registrar, ion (OVIR) with the original
Soviet representative he had contact with, an unknown Soviet, H.J. Rand. his
assistant George H. Bookbinder and Richard E. Snyder of the U.S. Embassy. (258)
Webster stated he was free to speak, and told Snyder when he had applied for
Soviet citizenship, he had been granted a Soviet passport on September 21,
1959.(259) He filled out a form entitled "Affidavit for Expatriated Person" and
wrote his resignation to Rand Development Corp. (260)
(94) Webster later explained he had no Soviet documentation at the time, having
in his possession an American passport which he never sent to Snyder as
requested.(261) Webster stated the Soviets had instructed him to say his reasons
for defecting were political. (262)
(95) Webster's girlfriend joined him the following day and both went on a month
vacation at the Suitland Sanitarium in Sochi. (263) They returned to Leningrad
and began work at the institute, where his girlfriend was employed as an
assistant and translator. (264) Webster received 280 rubles per month and a
semiannual bonus of 50 to 60 rubles. (265) He lived with his girlfriend in a new
apartment building and had three rooms with a bath. (266)
(96) After writing a summary of his life, listing his relatives and where they
worked, submitting pictures of himself and undergoing medical examination,
Webster was granted a Soviet internal passport.(267) In December 1959 or January
1960, he turned over his American passport and obtained the Soviet passport at
the OVIR office in Leningrad. (268)
(97) On January 27, 1960, a letter was delivered to Webster from his
father.(269) It contained news of his mother's nervous breakdown and word that
his father had assumed financial support of Webster's children. (270) At that
point, Webster decided to return to the United States.(271)
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451
(98) A note in Webster's file stated that on April 6, 1969, he was to give a
speech on the United States, although there was no indication whether he, in
fact, did make the address. (272)
(99) The original Soviet representative in Moscow arranged for Webster and his
girlfriend to visit there for the May Day celebration.(273) Webster entered the
U.S. Embassy unchallenged, due to his American clothing.(274) He informed John
McVicker that he wished to return to the United States. (275) He was told to
apply for a Soviet exit visa. (276)
(100) Webster requested two notarized invitations for his return to the United
States, to be made by his father, copies to be sent to the American Embassy.
(277) His girl friend helped him fill out the application for a Soviet exit visa
and gave her consent, which was required. (278)
(101) Webster's girlfriend gave birth to Svetlana Robertovna Webster in August
1960.(279) The child was immediately adopted by Webster and reistered. (280)
During the majority of the time after this. Svetlana's Russian grandmother also
lived in the Webster apartment.(281) Webster was assigned a new translator at
the Institute.(282)
(102) Two months after submitting his application for a Soviet exit visa,
Webster was turned down and told he could not reapply for 1 year. (283) Soviet
officials visited him from Moscow, inquiring why he was unhappy and suggesting
that he send for his family from the United States.(284) One year later he
reapplied, and in February 1962. Webster was granted a Soviet exit visa.(285)
(103) In March 1962, the American Embassy gave Webster instructions on how to
obtain an American entrance visa.(286) His father sent him a plane ticket for
his passage home, and Webster quit his job (287) It was May before Webster
actually surrender his internal Soviet passport for his exit visa. (288) Webster
arrived in the United States as an alien under the Russian quota on May 20,
1962. (289) He had never intended to aid his girlfriend in leaving the Soviet
Union. (290)
Lee Harvey Oswald
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XII. LEE HARVEY OSWALD
(104) In comparing Oswald's defection to the other 11 individuals in this study,
certain points must be taken into consideration. The Warren Commission requested
through the State Department that the Soviet Government provide "any further
available information concerning the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his
residence from 1959 to 1962 in the Soviet Union, in particular, copies of any
official records concerning him." (291) In May 1964 the Soviet
Union provided approximately 15 documents concerning the sojourn employment and
medical history of Oswald while in their country. (292) The documents also dealt
with the departure of Oswald and his wife from the U.S.S.R. (293)
(105) No documents appear to be from the KGB or make mention of Oswald's being
debriefed by it. (294)There are some dates, times, and facts in the documents
that differ from Oswald's statements. (295)
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The signatures of most of the Soviet officials are illegible. (296) The
authenticity of these documents could not be established, but they must be taken
into consideration. It was the only case in this study in which the Soviet Union
added to the existing body of information.
(106) The committee also had available to it statements and a diary that
handwriting experts determined were written by Lee Harvey Oswald. (297) The
diary covered the period Oswald was in the Soviet Union. (298). The committee
found all of Oswald's writings concerning his life in the Soviet Union to be
generally credible. To a great extent, they parallel the documents provided by
the Soviet Union on Oswald in 1964; that is, that he was in the Soviet Union
during the time period stated; that he attempted suicide; that he worked at
radio plant in Minsk; that he met and married a Russian woman; that he was
originally issued a residence visa for stateless persons and then a residence
visa for foreigners; that he obtained exit visas for himself and his family, and
left the Soviet Union. (299)
(107) The committee tried to determine the credibility of both the Soviet
documents and Oswald's writings, and in doing so endeavored to obtain any
additional information. Witnesses before the committee stated that the Soviet
Government would have additional information on Oswald from its surveillance of
him. (300) Through the State Department. the committee requested the Soviet
Union to provide any documentation on Oswald they might possess. (301) The
Soviet was requested to allow the interviewing of the Soviet citizens Oswald
mentions throughout his diary.(392) The State Department was informed by Soviet
officials that no additional information was available and Soviet citizens could
not be interviewed.
(108) Thus, information that the committee has collected and used concerning
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union for this study, is only partially complete.
(109) Lee Harvey Oswald was issued an entry visa to the Soviet Union by the
U.S.S.R. consul in Helsinki, Finland, on October 14, 1959. (303) Stamps on
Oswald's passport show he entered Finland October 10 and left on October 15.
(304)
(110) On October 16, Oswald arrived in Moscow after crossing the border from
Finland at Vyborg. (305) He was escorted to the Hotel Berlin by an Intourist
representative who met him at his train. (306) There, he registered as a student
on a 5-day luxury tourist ticket and met his Intourist guide Rimma Shirikova.
(307)
(111) Oswald wrote in the October 16 entry of his diary, referring to Rimma:
I explain to her I wish to apply for Rus.* citizenship. She is flabbergassed but
aggrees to help. She checks with her boss, main office Intour, than helps me add
a letter to Sup. Soviet asking for citizenship, meanwhile boss telephones
passport & visa office and notifies them about me. (308)
Rimma insisted they continue sightseeing the following day and asked Oswald
himself and his reasons for defecting. (309) Oswald believed his explanation
concerning his Communist beliefs makes Rimma uneasy. (310)
-------------------
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(112) On October 20 Oswald was told by Rimma that the Passport & Visa Department
had requested to see him.(311) Oswald wrote in the October 21 entry of his
diary:
Meeting with a single official, balding stout, black suit, fairly good English,
asks what do I want? I say Soviet citizenship, he ask why I give vague answers
about "Great Soviet Union" He tells me "U.S.S.R. only great in literature wants
me to go back home"l am stunned I reiterate he says he shall check and let me
know weather my visa will be (extended it exipires today). (312)
Oswald wrote that at 6 p.m. a police official informs him he must leave the
Soviet Union in 2 hours. (313) At 7 p.m. he decided to commit suicide and wrote
"when Rimma comes at S p.m. to find me dead, it will be a great shock." (314)
Oswald stated that about 8 p.m. Rimma found him unconscious and he was taken to
the hospital in an ambulance for stitches. (315)
(113) The Ministry of Health records supplied, reflect that Oswald was admitted
to "Botkin Hospital at 16:00 (4 p.m.) on October 21, 1959 upon request at 15h.
19."(316) He received an examination in the admission's department at 4:30 p.m.
where a skin wound was found on the lower third of the left forearm. (317)
Oswald was given four stitches and an aseptic bandage for the iramediate wound
and kept in a psvchosomatic department"for observation. (318) The report stated
that 'Oswald's mind was c]ear his perception was correct and he inflicted the
injury upon himself in order to postpone his departure from the Soviet Union.
(319) Oswald was transferred to the somatic department on October 23. (320)
(114) Oswald's hospital records stated that ha was visited by the head of the
Service Bureau and daily by an interpreter.(321) His place of employment was
listed "K-4-19-80 Service Bureau. Radio technician," which was the only other
mention of the Service Bureau. (322)
(115) The authenticity of the hospital records can in no way be determined. One
indication that they may not be valid documents was the April 25, 1953 date that
appeared at the bottom of Oswald's blood analysis. (323)
(116) Oswald wrote in his diary that while in the hospital he was visited daily
by Rimma and on October 23 by Rosa Agafonova, from the hotel tourist office.
(324)
(117) Oswald's diary and the hospital reports reflected he was discharged from
the hospital on October 28. (325) He wrote in the diary that Rimma chauffeured
him from the hospital to the Hotel Berlin where he picked up his clothes and
money, $100, and moved to the Hotel Metropole.(326) Oswald stated he Was invited
to visit with Ludmilla Dimitrova, Inturist office head and Rosa. (327)
(118) Oswald also wrote that on October 28 he visited the pass and registration
office with Rimma. (328) He stated there were four known officials that asked
questions about the last official he had met with and his desires for the
future.(329) Oswald requested Soviet citizenship again and provided his
discharge papers from the Marine Corps as identification.(330) Oswald described
this meeting in discouraging manner. (331)
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(119) On October 31, Oswald visited the American Embassy in Moscow.(332) Consul
at the Embassy, Richard Snyder, informed the committee that he had no
information concerning Oswald before he walked into the Embassy. (333) Snyder
said:
He handed me a handwritten statement which stated, in effect, that he renounced
his American citizenship. I used the pretext that the Embassy was not officially
open that day and, therefore, I was not in a position to prepare the required
form to go through with the renunciation and invited him to come back on the
first business day of the Embassy if he so wished. I retained his passport at
that time.(334)
Snyder recalled that Oswald had made some comment that "he had worked, or
advised, or something to that effect, what I would try to tell him and that he
didn't want to waste his time or mine."(335) Snyder was told by Oswald that he
had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he intended to give
information he possessed to the Soviets. (336)
(120) Oswald wrote in his diary that when he returned from the Embassy he was
contacted by two American reporters in Moscow, named Goldstein and Mosby. (337)
Although he did not grant interviews to either, he answered a few questions for
Mosby. (338)
(121) Alice Mosby wrote an article, dateline November 14, containing Oswald's
statements to her.(339) It said that imperialism and lack of money while a child
were Oswald's main reasons for saving $1,600 and coming to the Soviet
Union.(340) "He had announced on October 31 that he renounced his U.S.
citizenship and was seeking Soviet citizenship for purely political
reasons."(341) Oswald was denied the Soviet citizenship he had requested but was
allowed to live freely in Russia. (342)
(122) Among Oswald's belongings was a handwritten account of his "interview
November 14 with Miss Mosby."(343) Oswald wrote that Mosby agreed to let him see
the story before it was sent out. (344) He explained to her the political
reasons he went to the Soviet Union and applied for citizenship and how he
developed those political beliefs.(345) 'Oswald made no comment about his
present situation in the Soviet Union.
(123) In Oswald's diary he stated that during December he stayed in the hotel
studying Russian, seeing no one except Rimma, who called the ministry for him.
(347) She had told the hotel he would be receiving a great deal of money from
the United States so he paid no bills that month. (348) Oswald recorded that he
only had $28 left. The passport office had met with Oswald again and he wrote
that the same questions were answered by three new officials.(350)
(124) Oswald's application to the Visa and Registration Office, Interior
Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council for the issuance of
an identity bore the date December 29, 1959. (351)
(125) Oswald wrote that the passport office issued him a Soviet document "for
those without citizenship on January 4" '352 He stated he was told that he would
be sent to Minsk and that the Red Cross would provide him with money. (353)
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455
(126) The Soviet document that bore a January 5, 1960, date was Oswald's receipt
stating that the legal status of a person without citizenship has been explained
to him, and his receipt for an identity card Series P No. 31179 issued by
OVIRMoscow City Executive Committee on January 4, 1960, with expiration date
January 4, 1961. (354)
(127) Oswald wrote that January 5 he was given 5,000 rubles by the Red Cross,
2,200 of which paid the hotel bill and 150 of which purchased the train ticket
to Minsk. (355)
(128) In the January 7 entry, Oswald described being met at the train station in
Minsk by two Red Cross workers, then proceeding to the where he met two
Intourist representatives. (356)
(129) An application and autobiographical sketch written by Oswald in connection
with his employment at the radio factory in Minsk bore the date January 11,
1960.(357) Oswald also received the signature of the doctor and trainer in
safety and fire precautions of the Minsk radio plant. (358) On January 13, he
was hired in the experimental shop at the radio factory as a checker. (359)
Oswald stated that he received 700 rubles a month from his job and another 700
rubles a month from the Soviet Red Cross. (360) He wrote "therefore every month
I make 1400 R, about the same as a director of the
factory." (361)
(130) In a March 16 entry Oswald wrote: "I received a small flat one-room
kitchen-bath near the factory (8 min. walk) with splendid view from 2 balconies
of the river. Almost rent free (60 Rub. a month) it a Russian dream." (362)
(131) On January 4 1961. Oswald wrote that he was called into the passport
office and asked if he wanted Soviet citizenship. He said no, but requested his
residential passport be extended. (363) A document provided by the Soviet
Government reflected that an identity card a person without citizenship, Series
P No. 311479, belonging to Lee Harvey Oswald, was entered from January 4, 1961
to January 1962.(364)
(132) Another document provided by the Soviets was a certificate from the Minsk
Radio Plant, Administration of Electrotechnical and Instrument Manufacturing
Industry. Council of the National Economy, U.S.S.R., bearing dates January 1,
1960, and July 15, 1961, that Lee Harvey Oswald was employed as an assembler
there. (365)
(133) The American Embassy received an undated letter from Oswald on February
13. 1961. (366) He stated that he had not received a reply to a December 1960
letter he had written to the Embassy, so he was writing again. (367) Oswald
requested that his American passport be returned and suggested that some
agreement be reached concerning any legal action proceeding against him so he
could return to the United States. (368) He stated:"They have at no time
insisted that I take Russian Citizenship?' (369) "I am living here with
nonpermanent-type papers for a foreigner."(370) The return address listed
on the envelope was Ulitsa Kalinina, House 4 Apartment 24, Minsk; and Oswald
said he could not leave without permission. (371)
(134) In a letter dated February 28, 1961, Snyder requested that Oswald appear
in person at the Embassy to determine his citizenship status.(372) Snyder
explained that the December 1960 letter, which Oswald had mentioned, was never
received. (373)
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456
(135) Oswald wrote the Embassy again in March 1961. He stated he could leave
Minsk without permission and would find it inconvenient to visit Moscow for an
interview.(374) He requested that preliminary inquiries be sent in questionnaire
form. (375)
(136) Oswald artended a trade dance in Minsk on March 17 and described meeting
Marina N. Prusakova. (376) Records provided by Ministry of Health. U.S.S.R.,
reflected that on March 30 Oswald was admitted to a clinical hospital--ear,
nose, and throat division. (377) According to these records, he was discharged
on April 11, 1961, and he wrote in his diary that he proposed to Marina 4 days
later.
(137) The date on a certificate of marriage for Marina and Lee Oswald from the
Minsk Civil Registrar Office of Leninsky District is April 30, 1961.(379) The
entry in Oswald's diary concerning his marriage also bears this date. (380)
(138) In a letter dated May 1961. Oswald informed the Embassy he had married a
Russian-born woman who would travel to the, United States with him. (381) He
wrote that a marriage stamp was placed on his present passport for an individual
without citizenship.(382) Oswald said, "I am asking not only for the right to
return to the United States, but also for full guarantees that I shall not under
any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case "(383)
(139) The July 8 entry in Oswald's diary described an airplane trip
to Moscow for his first interview at the Embassy since his attempt to denounce
American citizenship.(384) Oswald stated that he took no oath, affirmation, or
allegiance of any kind nor was he required to sign any kind of papers in
connection with his employment. (385) He denied being a member of the factory
trade union or ever having been asked to join. (386) Oswald gave his earnings as
90 new rubles per month.(387) This contradicted an earlier entry in his diary
that he made the equivalent of 70 new rubles as a salary and 70 new rubles
supplement per month. (388)
(140) Oswald denied making statements of an exploitable nature concerning his
original decision to reside in the Soviet Union. (389) He remembered being
interviewed in his room at the Metropole Hotel by a reporter from Radio Moscow
concerning his impressions of Moscow as an American tourist. (390) He stated he
had never been asked to make any statements for radio, press or audiences since
his arrival. (391) This contradicts his first comment and what he wrote in
January 13--March 16, 1960 entries in his diary. "I meet many young Rus-
sian workers my own age. * * * All wish to know about me even offer to hold a
mass meeting so I can say. I refuse politely." (392)
(141) When asked if he had provided information he had acquired, as a radar
operator in the Marine Corps, Oswald stated "that he was never in fact subjected
to any questioning or briefing by the Soviet authorities concerning his life or
experiences prior to entering the Soviet Union and had never provided
information to any Soviet organ." (393)
(142) Oswald stated he never applied for Soviet citizenship. (394) His original
application was for permission to remain in the Soviet Union and a temporary
extension of his tourist visa pending the outcome of his request. (395) Oswald
stated he had addressed this
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457
application and mailed it to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet although it appeared to
have been delivered to the central office of the Moscow OVIR. (396) Apparently
this was the basis of a notification Oswald stated he received 3 days later that
permission had been granted for him to remain in the Soviet Union. (397)
Subsequently he was issued a "stateless" internal passport. (398)
(143) The Embassy returned his passport to him after it was amended to be valid
only for direct return to the United States. (399) The passport expiration date
was September 10, 1961, but Oswald needed the passport to apply for exit visas
immediately in Minsk. Oswald wrote "July 9 received passport. Call Marina to
Moscow also" (401) Oswald wrote after he and Marina returned to Minsk on July
14, that meetings to persuade Marina not to go to the United States began. (402)
Her visit to the Embassy was known. (403)
(145) The 20 or so papers, birth certificates, affidavits, photos, and so forth
needed to apply for exit visas were turned in by Oswald between July 15 and
August 20. (404) He writes in the diary that "they say it will be 3 1/2 months
before we know whether (sic) they'll let us go or not. (405) The date on
Oswald's application to the OVIR Militia Department, Minsk City Executive
Committee for the issuance of an exit visa from the U.S.S.R. is July 15, 1961.
(406)
(146) The application Marina had to sign to give permission for her husband to
leave the Soviet Union bears a July 19 date. According to Marina's visa
application she requests an exit visa to join him on his departure from the
Soviet Union, August 21, 1961.
(147) The personnel department chief and plant director where Oswald worked,
issued a report to the Minsk City Militia Department in December 1961. (409) It
stated that Oswald:
(1) Takes no part in the social life of the shop and keeps very much to himself.
(2) Reacts in an oversensitive manner to remarks from the foreman.
(3) Is careless in his work.
(4) Does not perform satisfactory as a regulator, and
(5) Does not display the initiative for increasing his skills as a regulator.
(410)
(148) Oswald wrote in his diary that on Christmas Day 1961 Marina was told at
the passport and visa office that she and Oswald were granted exit visas from
the Soviet Union. (411) Oswald's application to the Minsk Militia Department for
the extension of his identity card bore it January 4, 1962, date. (412) He
wrote in his diary he was granted a residence document for foreigners. (413)
Identity card for an alien series AA No. 5-19666, received by Lee Harvey Oswald
was issued January 4 and was valid until July 2, 1963: (414)
(149) On February 15 Oswald wrote ,that, June Lee Oswald was born. (415) His
diary stated-that Marina formally quit her job March 24 and he received a letter
stating her entrance visa to the United States had been approved the following
day. (416)
Soviet Citizenship
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XIII. SOVIET CITIZENSHIP
(150) Lee Harvey Oswald was not a Soviet citizen during his residence in the
Soviet Union. He requested Soviet citizenship by mail on October 16, 1959. On
October 21, a Soviet official interviewed Oswald and tried to dissuade him from
defecting to the Soviet Union. Later that night a police officer told him he
would have to leave the Soviet Union within 2 hours.
(151) Oswald immediately attempted to commit suicide. His hospital records
reflected it was done in an effort to postpone his departure. After a week in
the hospital, Oswald applied at the pass and registration office for ,Soviet
citizenship. Three days later he orally denounced his American citizenship at
,the Embassy. Although he did so in order to convince the Soviets to grant him
citizenship, he was granted a residence visa for foreigners without citizenship.
Oswald received this visa on January 4, 1960, 2 1/2 months after his original
application. Oswald told American reporters in November that the Soviets would
allow him to stay. The January 4 date appears in Oswald's diary and on the
residence document provided by Soviet authorities.
(152) One year later the residence visa was extended after Oswald refused the
Soviet citizenship offered to him. When he wrote to the U.S. Embassy in February
1961 he stated the Soviets had not insisted on his acceptance of citizenship.
Oswald wrote that he had "nonpermanent type papers" for a foreigner. In January
1960. the Embassy had reissued Oswald's American passport and the Soviets issued
him a residence visa for foreigners.
ANALYSIS
(153) Oswald was not the only American who had difficulty obtaining citizenship
while residing in the Soviet Union. Ricciardelli repeatedly requested
citizenship from the Visa Department of the Intourist Service Bureau. He was
told that he would have to leave the Soviet Union on the expiration date that
appeared on his visa. Ricciardelli did not depart and was told he would be
allowed to remain only after being hospitalized for rheumatic fever. A Soviet
passport was given to Ricciardelli 7 months after he requested it. Although his
wife refused a Soviet passport his children were considered Soviet citizens.
(154) Webster waited 2 months for acceptance by the Soviets. He received Soviet
citizenship only after altering his stated reason for defection and assuring the
Russians he could manufacture the Rand spray gun he was exhibiting in the Soviet
Union.
(155) Soviet authorities did not grant citizenship to Dubinsky or Petrulli, both
of whom left the country. Davis was documented as "stateless person" and allowed
to reside in the Soviet Union.
(156) Sloboda waited 1 month to be granted Soviet citizenship, did his oldest
and youngest child. His wife and middle child were issued internal passports for
foreigners.
(157) The Soviets offered citizenship to the Blocks, but they received internal
passports for foreigners. After a number of years in the Soviet
Union the Blocks were pressed to accept Soviet citizenship, which they would not
do.
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(158) In the case of Dutkanicz, the Supreme Soviet, by special decree, granted
him citizenship 1 month prior to his defection.
Propaganda Use and Financial Arrangements
Page 459
XIV. PROPAGANDA USE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
(159) Richard Snyder, the American consul at the Embassy in Moscow was asked
about the Soviet use of defectors for propaganda. He said:
I think that if there is a usual pattern--and, again, this is difficult to use
words like 'usual' because there are never two cases alike in this sort of
thing---but if there is a usual pattern, it is that there is some exploitation
of the defector Soviet public media, usually after the details of his defection
have been settled, particularly the detail as to whether the Soviet Union
desires to have him. Up to that point, publicity in the Soviet Press probably is
not to be expected.
He testified that in the Oswald case, there was no known Soviet press or
propaganda (418) Marina Oswald's testimony before the Warren Commission was to
the contrary. She said that "Lee took part in radio broadcasts, propaganda in
favor of the Soviet Union, which he felt helped him to stay in the Soviet Union.
(419)
(160) Oswald wrote in his diary he had been asked to give a speech, which he did
not do. He also informed the American Embassy in Moscow that he had made several
statements to Lev Sefyayev on his impressions of Moscow as a tourist. The
committee found no information that any statements made by Lee Harvey Oswald
were used for Soviet propaganda purposes.
(161) The committee also found no information that the Soviets had used
Citrynell, Dubinsky, Greendlinger, Petrulli, or Webster for propaganda purposes.
There was no apparent correlation between Soviet citizenship being granted to an
individual and subsequent propaganda exploitation as suggested by Snyder.
Dubinsky and Petrulli were not granted any type of residence visa and remained
the Soviet Union only a short time. Citrynell and Webster became
Soviet citizens with relatively little difficulty. There was no information
available on Greendlinger's circumstances. Absence of data does not necessarily
mean the Soviets made no propaganda use of these five individuals or Oswald.
(162) Three of the defectors that had anti-American propaganda statements
published--Ricciardelli, Slobode, and Dutkanicz--were Soviet citizens. Two other
defectors whose anti-American statements received Soviet press, the Blocks, had
residence visas for foreigners. They were, however, frequently pressured to
accept Soviet citizenship. Davis was the only defector documented. as a
"stateless person," as was Oswald, who had anti-American statements published
for propaganda purposes.
(163) Two defectors made the type of propaganda statements during radio
broadcasts that Marina Oswald Porter describes Oswald as making. Both these
defectors, Slobode and Dutkanicz, had contact with the KGB while stationed in
West Germany with the U.S. Army. They were still serving in the Army when they
entered the U.S.S.R.
Residence, Employment, and Financial Arrangements
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XV. RESIDENCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
(164) All the individuals within this study, including Oswald, who received
permission to remain in the Soviet Union, were assigned reside in cities within
the western portion of the country. Oswald was asigned employment, as were the
others, with the exception of who was a student at the Kiev Institute. Slobode
also received rubles a month, although his employment is unknown.
(165) Income comparison was difficult as the number of household members varied
over time. Income of additional household members, an important variable, was
usually known. The devaluation of the ruble in 1960 confused amounts in some
cases. (420)
(166) Salary was known for Oswald and five other defectors. Financial aid
received from organizations like the Soviet Red Cross was also known in most of
these cases. Oswald received the lowest salary among the defectors in this
study. 70 new rubles. Davis, a single male attending the Kiev Institute,
received the salary closest to that made by Oswald. He was paid 90 new rubles
and lived in a free dorm room. Oswald, however, was the only individual known to
receive a monthly stipend in addition to his salary. He wrote that each month he
received the equivalent of 70 new rubles, technically from the Red Cross. It
was, in fact, probably arranged for by the M.V.D. (421) This would bring
Oswald's monthly income to 140 new rubles. The Blocks and Ricciardellis made
close to this amount, but had families to support in addition to themselves.
Sloboda and Webster both received over 250 new rub]es a month.
(167) The defectors also received occasional financial aid. The amount varied
greatly from the 10,000 rubles (presumably old rubles, equaling 1,000 new
rubles) that Davis wrote a friend he had received and 50 rubles given to
SIoboda's wife to buy a present. Oswald received the equivalent of 500 new
rubles to pay hotel and transportation bills to Minsk. No defector received
payments above 100 new rubles except Oswald and Davis. The CIA 201 file on Davis
states that because sum Davis wrote he had received was so fantastically high it
was perhaps a mistake.
(168) Although Oswald received more aid than most of the other in dividuals
studied, it is possible that it supplemented the low salary he received. Oswald
wrote "it was really payment for my denunciation of the United States in Moscow
* * * As soon as I * * * started negotiations with the American Embassy in
Moscow for my return to the United States my Red Cross allotment was cut off?'
(423)
Soviet Relations and Exit Visas
Page 460
XVI. SOVIET RELATIONS AND EXIT VISAS
(169) Two American citizens married Soviet citizens while residing in the
U.S.S.R. Oswald had been in the Soviet Union 18 1/2 months when he married
Marina N. Prusakova. Two months prior to the marriage, Oswald wrote the American
Embassy concerning an agreement that might be made for his return to the United
States. A month the marriage he informed the Embassy his wife would be returning
to the United States with him. Marina applied for an exit visa to leave the
Soviet Union and waited 4 months for it to be granted. Oswald, who
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had applied for a Soviet exit visa approximately 1 1/2 months earlier than
Marina, learned his had been granted with Marina's. He had waited 5 1/2 months
for an exit visa.
(170) Greendlinger's second trip to Moscow in April 1958 resulted Iris marriage
to Yelena Ivanovaa Pyatnitskaya within the month. He had been encouraged to
believe her passport and Soviet exit visa would be issued in 3 to 4 months by
OVIR. After a year, the Soviet authorities issued his wife an exit visa to
depart the Soviet Union. The U.S. Embassy refused to issue her an entrance visa
due to her membership in Komsomol and a trade union. Because Greendlinger left
the Soviet Union in July 1959, it took, at most, 16 months for the Soviets to
grant Greendlinger an exit visa. His wife's Soviet exit visa took approximately
12 months to obtain.
(171) Webster did not marry the woman with whom he lived in the Soviet Union and
did not try to arrange for her departure from the U.S.S.R. He applied for a
Soviet exit visa for, himself and, after a 2-month wait, was refused and told he
could reapply in a year. Webster waited the year and reapplied for an exit visa.
The Soviet authorities granted it, and Webster departed for the United States
after 14 months.
(172) Others living in the Soviet. Union were also refused immediate issuance of
exit visas. The Blocks had their requests denied or not acted upon for at least
12 months until they were expelled for acts of hooliganism and handing out
anti-Soviet propaganda. Citrynell reported he was detained in the Soviet Union
involuntarily for 8 months.
(173) It may be assumed Mary Dutkanicz obtained an exit visa because she was
allowed out of the Soviet Union on March 22, 1962. Her husband made immediate
efforts for his children and himself to depart also. Sixteen months later his
children were taken from their home. They spoke to their father once and learned
his fears that the Soviets would render him an idiot. Three months after the
children's removal, Dutkanicz was reported as dead to Iris wife. The children
were allowed to depart from the Soviet Union 6 months after the reported death,
or 25 months after their mother had left.
(174) In this analysis, only one Soviet exit visa was granted in a shorter time
period than was Oswald's. Sloboda's wife received an exit visa within 3 months
of application. Nevertheless, this was the only case in which the visa was an
exit-reentry visa, and application procedures may have been different. Reasons
for Oswald's short wait obtaining an exit visa are unknown.
KGB Contact
Page 461
XVII. KGB CONTACT
(175) During Oswald's efforts to regain his American passport, he was questioned
by Embassy personnel about his activities in the Soviet Union. He was not candid
in all of his responses. This places into doubt Oswald's statement that he had
never been subjected to any questioning of briefing by Soviet authorities
concerning his life prior to entering the, Soviet Union and that he had never
provided information to any Soviet organ. Oswald had previously informed the
Embassy that he would provide "information he learned as a radar operator in the
Marines.
Page 462
462
(176) Other questions are raised about Oswald's. state. ment by an October 17,
1959, entry in his diary that his Intourist guide "asks me about myself and my
reason for doing this. The committee was informed by KGB officers who had
defected from the Soviet Union that Intourist guides were frequently used by the
KGB as agents or sources of information. Oswald's diary reflects he saw a great
deal of his Intourist guide.
(177) Oswald's diary also described various meetings with Soviet officials to
discuss his desire to reside in the Soviet Union. He met with at least five
representatives of the pass and registration or visa department. Later Oswald
had a meeting with the Soviet Red Cross, and he is met in Minsk by two other Red
Cross employees and two Intourist representatives. Oswald wrote in his diary
that he kept contact with one of the Intourist representatives for 3% months,
and 6 months after that, she attended his 21st birthday party.
(178) Oswald's diary also contained entries concerning his associates. (424)
Marina told the FBI that:
She believes he was observed and perhaps his neighbors and associates were
questioned concerning his beliefs and his activities * * * there is a
possibility that there will be speculators and espionage agents among tourists
and immigrants in Russia * * * for this reason * * * tourists and immigrants are
investigated to a degree in Russia." (425) Marina also informed the FBI that she
knew Oswald's contacts and knew of no contact by Russian intelligence or
government agencies. (426) Marina did not believe Oswald had been given any
assignment to perform, either in Russia or the United States. (427)
(179) The committee requested permission of the Soviet Embassy to conduct
interviews of the Soviet citizens that were reported by Oswald to have had
contact with him. (428) This permission was refused, as was the committee's
request for additional Soviet documents concerning Oswald's surveillance. The
committee had no other available means to determine possible connections between
the described individuals and the KGB.
(180) The committee interviewed Webster concerning any contact he may have had
with the KGB while in the Soviet Union. (429)
Webster said the KGB had never contacted him, that there was no reason for them
to do so, as the government officials that had aided him in his defection had
his entire story. (430) He stated he had never been questioned relative to
intelligence matters. (431)
(181) File reviews revealed that Mrs. Block thought they would have been of
interest to the KGB while in the Soviet Union, but that they had no knowing
contact with them. (432) She said that the Soviet representative who resettled
them asked a lot of questions. (433) She recalled his inquiries about how an
illegal U.S. passport, or one, with false identity, could be obtained. (434).
(182) The committee found that Ricciardelli had contact with a representative
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Red Cross. It was the Red Cross
that relocated him to Kiev. He stated that visitors to his apartment believed it
to be bugged. File reviews produced no, information concerning KGB contact with
either Ricciardelli or Citrynell.
Page 463
463
Citrynell was known to have had contact with the Office of Visa and Registration
and the Red Cross. The only defector requested not to make degoratory comments
about the Soviet Union after leaving was Citrynel. He was asked for a signed
statement concerning this by the Red Cross.
(183) Apparently, Dubinsky and Pertrulli never met with any Soviet authorities
other than thier Intourist guides. They were refused citizenship or any type of
Soviet residence visa and remain in the Soviet Union only for a short period.
Dubinsky's treatment may characterize Soviet treatment of foreigners they
consider mentally unbalanced.
(184) The committee found Dubinsky and Sloboda had contact with the KGB before
and after their defection to the Soviet Union. Dutkanicz was recruited in a bar
in West Germany by the KGB. Upon his defection, his family was resettled in
L'vov with KGB assistance. The KGB watched over Dutkanicz closely and kept in
daily telephone contact with him.
(185) Sloboda, a reported KGB agent before defection, was subjected to frequent
questioning by the KGB. His wife, however, reported the only Russian
Intelligence Service officer she knew was the resettlement officer.
(186) In reviewing the circumstance concerning KGB contact with these 12
defectors, it could be concluded that only those having had contact with the KGB
prior to their defection, had contact with Soviet intelligence afterward. This
conclusion, however, would be in direct conflict with the testimony before the
committee of experts in Soviet intelligence and officers who defected from the
KGB.
(187) The committee received testimony that: (1) Americans entering the Soviet
Union were of intelligence interest to the KGB; (2) Americans offering to defect
to the Soviet Union were rare and paid particular attention to by the KGB; (3)
in any case similar to that of Lee Harvey Oswald, the defector would have been
debriefed for intelligence information.(435)
(188) In the cases of these defectors, representatives from the Soviet Red
Cross, Intourist, the Office of Visa and Registration, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the KGB fulfill overlapping roles. In addition, KGB officers use the
employees of the various other agencies as agents to gather information. It is
probable that KGB officers misrepresent their employment while debriefing
unknowledgeable defectors. It is also possible that the defectors misrepresented
any contact they may have with foreign intelligence agencies, thus files might
not accurately reflect experiences in the Soviet Union. Consequently, contact
between the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald cannot be ruled out. In most cases, the
files reviewed in. the FBI and CIA did not in fact contain indications of
debriefing of, the defectors by either agency in the United States. Thus, most
in individuals were never asked if the KGB had made
contact with them during their stay in the Soviet Union.
Addendum: America Debriefing Practices
Page 463
ADDENDUM: AMERICA DEBRIEFING PRACTICES
(189) The committee conducted a review of defectors files in order to determine
whether defectors other than Oswald were routinely debriefed upon their return
to the United States. The committee
Page 464
464
requested that the CIA provide a list of persons traveling to the Soviet Union
during the period from 1958 to 1963, including both visitors and those persons
considered by the agency to be defectors. (436) In response, the CIA provided a
computer listing of 380 individuals entitled "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have
Defected to the U.S.S.R. Between 1958-1963."(437)
The Agency stated that this listing represented U.S. persons including some
non-U.S. citizens who owed some measure of allegiance the United States, who
either had defected or had shown some intention of defecting to the U.S.S.R.
within the requested time period. (438)
(190) As this list was compiled from a more detaled computer program on American
defectors, a more detailed description concerning these individuals was
requested and provided in an expanded version of the original list. This machine
listing included the following information where relevant or available for each
individual: name, date, and place of birth, 201 file number, arrival in Soviet
Union, departure from Soviet Union, employment in Soviet Union, most
current address, and other miscellaneous information compiled from the
individual's 201 file and citations for/or other agency documents regarding this
individual.
(191) The committee compiled a list of persons who appeared from the information
available in the Agency's expanded list, to be U.S. citizens born in the United
States, who defected or attempted to defect to the Soviet Union between the
years of 1958 and 1963 and who returned to the United States within the same
period of time. In addition, the committee included individuals from an October
State Department request for information from the CIA regarding these persons
whom they considered to be defectors to the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc
countries. (439)
(192) The committee requested files or '29 individuals who fit the
above-described criteria and the CIA provided files on 28 individuals on whom
they maintained records. These 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing
Domestic Contact Division files regarding these persons. The committee's files
review revealed that, in the case of six of the individuals, there was no
indication that they ever returned to the United States.(440)In some of these
cases, the files contained a report from a source who observed or spoke with the
subject and then reported the contact to the CIA, but there was no indication of
direct contact with any of these persons on the part of the CIA.
(193) In regard to the other 9:29 defectors, the file review showed there is no
record of CIA contact with 18 of them. Again, four of these files contain
reports by sources who advised the Agency of their contact. Included in this
group are Joseph Dutkanicz and Morris and Mollie Block. (441) One file regarding
a former military person, Bruce Frederick Davis, contained a report of a
debriefing.
(194) The circumstances of the CIA's contact with the four remaining defectors
differed in each case. The file of Irving Amron reflected that he had actually
been living in the U.S.S.R. since 1933 and returned to the United States in
1962. He was debriefed in 1964 by a CIA officer after applying for employment in
response to a newspaper advertisement. (443) Another returning defector, Harold
Citrynell,
Page 465
465
was unwittingly interviewed by a CIA officer abroad upon the official's
departure from the Soviet Union enroute to the United States.
(444) While Citrynell's file indicated that the Agency considered it desirable
that a full and controlled debriefing by the CIA and FBI be conducted and CIA
wrote to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in
Citrynell's 201 file nor in any DCD documents that suggested further contact on
the part of the CIA. (445)
(195) More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other two defectors.
Robert E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Rand Development Corp., whose
defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 was highly publicized, returned to the
United States in June of 1962 (446) Weber had been employed by the Soviet Union
at the Leningrad Scientific Institute of Polytechnic Plastics.(447) Shortly
after his return to the United States, Webster was debriefed in home, territory
by CIA's representatives in conjunction with representatives from the Air Force.
(448) It was decided that a more extensive debriefing was order and Webster was
sub-equently brought to the Washington, D.C. area where he was debriefed for a
period of 2 weeks. (449) The debriefing reports included a chronology of
Webster's life and the CIA's assessment of him as well as a large body of
information regarding life in the Soviet Union, Webster's work there, and
biographic information on persons he had met during his residence there.(450)
(196) Likewise, Libero Ricciardelli who had lived in the Soviet Union for nearly
4 years was contacted for purposes of debriefing soon after his return to the
United States in late June of 1963.(451) His initial debriefing included such
subjects as the motivation to defect to the U.S.S.R. as well as activities
engaged in during his Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev, and general
aspects of life such as residence controls and costs. (452) While the CIA
believed it was infeasible to debrief Ricciardelli more thoroughly due to his
current status of attempting to regain U.S. citizenship, the Agency expressed an
interest in eliciting more information on such topics as cost of living medical
care, consumer goods, highways, transportation, and restrictions upon travel
within Kiev. (453)
(197) It becomes clear from the review of files on these defectors that
debriefing of defectors by the CIA was, in fact, somewhat of random occurrence.
Nonetheless, the instances in which the Agency did choose to debrief returning
American defectors, the Agency appeared to be interested in topics of general
interest regarding life in certain areas of the Soviet Union. In this regard,
the persons who were debriefed were similar to Oswald in that they defected and
returned within the same general time period and each spent his time in the
Soviet Union in areas of interest to the CIA.
(198) It appears from an examination of all available materials that Lee Harvey
Oswald was not interviewed by the CIA following his return to the United States
from the Soviet Union. Although, persons branch of the Soviet Russian division
expressed an interest in interviewing Oswald they never followed up on this
interest. There was also no indication that the Office of Operations interviewed
Oswald.
(199) While the CIA did conduct interviews of some tourists who visited the
Soviet Union during the period 1959-63 as well as some American citizens who
defected to the Soviet Union and then returned
Page 466
466
to the United States; there was no standard policy to interview all persons in
either category. Thus, the fact that Oswald was not interviewed was more the
rule than the exception according to procedures followed by the CIA at that
point in time.
Submitted by:
JOHANNA SMITH,
Researcher.
References
Page 466
REFERENCES
(1) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency, (JFK Doc. No. 014951).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Morris and
Mollie Block (JFK Doe. No. 014935) (hereinafter FBI notes, Block).
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) See ref. 1. See also footnote 4, FBI notes, Block.
(9) See ref. l.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15)See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) See ref. 1.
(25) Ibid.
(26) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) See ref. 1.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid.
(34) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid; See also ref. 1.
(40) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
(41) See ref. 1.
(42) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. 014952).
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid; see also Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file
on Harold Citrynell (JFK Doc. No. 014936) (hereinafter FBI notes, Citrynell).
(48) See ref. 42.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
Page 467
467
(53) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No.14995)
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Ibid.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Ibid.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid.
(68) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Bruce
Frederick Davis (JFK Doc. No. 014937).
(69) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Shirley
Dubinsky (JFK Doc. No. 014938) (hereinafter FBI notes, Dubinsky ).
(70) Ibid.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Ibid.
(73) Ibid.
(74) Ibid.
(75) Ibid.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.
(80) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014954).
(81) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Joseph
Dutkanicz (JFK Doc. No. 014939) (hereinafter FBI notes, Dutkanicz).
(82) See ref. 80.
(83) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
(84) Ibid.
(85) Ibid.
(86) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Ibid.
(89) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
(90) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Ibid.
(94) Ibid; see also ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
(95) Ibid.
(96) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
(97) Ibid.
(98) Ibid.
(99) Ibid.
(100) Ibid.
(101) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
(102) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Ibid.
(106) Ibid.
(107) Ibid.
(108) Ibid.
(109) Ibid.
(110) Ibid.
(111) Ibid; see also ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz:
(112) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
(113) Ibid.
Page 468
468
(114) Ibid.
(115) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doe. 014957).
(116) Ibid.
(117) Ibid; see also Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file
on Martin Greendlinger (JFK Doc. No. 014942) (hereinafter FBI notes.
Greendlinger).
(418) See ref. 110, CIA notes.
(119) Ibid; see also ref. 117, FBI notes, Greendlinger.
(120) See ref. 115, CIA notes.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Ibid.
(126) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Ibid.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Ibid.
(132) Ibid; see also ref. 117, FBI notes, Greendlinger.
(133) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014963).
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid.
(136) Ibid.
(137) Ibid.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Ibid.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Ibid.
(143) Ibid.
(144) Ibid.
(145) Ibid.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Ibid.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Ibid.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Ibid.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid.
(155) Ibid.
(156) Ibid.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Ibid.
(159) Ibid.
(160) Ibid.
(161) Ibid.
(162) Ibid.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Ibid.
(165) Ibid.
(166) Ibid.
(167) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Libero
Ricciardelli (JFK Doc. No. 014948) (hereinafter FBI notes, Ricciardelli).
(168) Ibid
(169) Ibid.; see also Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc.
No. 014965).
(170) See ref. 169, CIA notes.
(171) Ibid.
(172) Ibid.
(173) Ibid.
(174) Ibid.; see also ref. 167, FBI notes, Ricciardelli.
(175) See ref. 169, CIA notes.
Page 469
469
(176) Ibid.
(177) Ibid.; see also ref. 167, FBI notes, Riccardelli.
(178) Ibid.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Ibid.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Ibid.
(183) Ibid.
(184) Ibid.; see also ref. 169, CIA notes.
(185) Ibid.
(186) Ibid. ref. 167, FBI notes, Ricciardelli.
(187) Ibid.
(188) Ibid.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Ibid.
(191) Ibid.
(192) Ibid.
(193) Ibid.
(194) Ibid.
(195) Ibid.
(196) Ibid.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Ibid.
(199) Ibid.
(200) Ibid.
(201) Ibid.
(202) Ibid.
(203) Ibid.
(204) Ibid.
(205) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014966).
(206) Ibid.
(207) Ibid.
(208) Ibid.
(209) Ibid.
(210) Ibid.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Ibid.
(213) Ibid.
(214) Ibid.
(215) Ibid.
(216) Ibid.
(217) Ibid.
(218) Ibid.
(219) Ibid.
(220) Ibid.
(221) Ibid.
(222) Ibid.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Ibid.
(225) Ibid.
(226) Ibid.
(227) Ibid.
(228) Ibid.
(229) Ibid.
(230) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doe. No. 014967).
(231) Ibid.
(232) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency Domestic Contact Division
file (JFK Doe. No. 014967).
(233) See Ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
(234) Ibid.
(235) Ibid.
(236) Ibid.
(237) Ibid.
(238) Ibid.
(239) Ibid.
(240) Ibid.
Page 470
470
(241) Ibid
(242) Ibid.
(243) Ibid.
(244) Ibid.
(245) Ibid.
(246) Ibid.
(247) Ibid.
(248) Ibid.
(249) Ibid.
(250) Ibid.
(251) Ibid.
(252) Ibid.
(253) Ibid.
(254) Ibid.
(255) Ibid.
(256) Ibid.
(257) Ibid.
(258) Ibid.
(259) Ibid.
(260) Ibid.
(261) Ibid.
(262) Ibid.
(263) Ibid.
(264) Ibid.
(265) Ibid;see also ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division,
file on Webster.
(266) See ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
(267) Ibid.
(268) Ibid.
(269) Ibid.
(270) Ibid.
(271) Ibid.
(272) See ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file on
Webster.
(273) See ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
(274) Ibid.
(275) Ibid.
(276) Ibid.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Ibid.
(279) Ibid.
(280) Ibid.
(281) Ibid.
(282) Ibid.
(283) Ibid.
(284) Ibid.
(285) Ibid.
(286) Ibid.
(287) Ibid.
(288) Ibid.
(289) Ibid.; see also ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division,
file on Webster.
(290) See ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file
Webster.
(291) Commission exhibit 984 Hearings before the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1969), vol. XVIII, p. 402 (hereinafter Warren report volume).
(292) Commission exhibit 984, Warren report vol. XVIII, pp.404-405
(293) Ibid.
(294) Id. at pp. 406-479.
(295) Ibid.
(296) Ibid.
(297) Commission exhibit 3096, Warren report., vol XXVI, p. 706.
(298) FOIA Doc. No. 13-1 for review August 1976 Commission ,exhibit 24. Warren
report, vol. XVI, pp. 94-105 (JFK Doc. No. 014933) (hereinafter Oswald Diary)
page numbers refer to FOIA No. 13-1 (JFK Doc. No. 014933). not Warren Commission
volumes)
Page 471
471
(299) Ibid; see also ref. 2, Commission exhibit 985, Warren report hearing, vol.
XVIII, pp. 404-409
(300) Deposition of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, May 30, 1978, Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014724) pp 23-26; see also Brady notes, interview
of X (JFK Doc. No. 015001); see also Brady notes, interview of Y (JFK Doc. no.
105000).
(301) Outside contact report (with Vladillen M. Vasev and Idar I. Zavrazhov),
June 1, 1978, House Select Committe on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008873).
(302) Ibid.
(303) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 419.
(304) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 162-163.
(305) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVII, pp, 408-409.
(306) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 1.
(307) Ibid.
(308) Ibid.
(309) Ibid.
(310) Ibid.
(311) Ibid.
(312) Id. at pp. 1-2.
(313) Id. at p.2.
(314) Ibid.
(315) Ibid.
(316) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Commission, vol. XVIII, P. 466.
(317) Ibid.
(318) Id. at pp. 464, 470.
(319) Id. at pp. 470-471.
(320) Id. at pp. 461-465, 473.
(321) Id. at pp. 465, 472.
(322) Id. at p. 461.
(323) Id. at p. 462.
(324) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary. pp. 2-3.
(325) Ibid., pp. 3-4; see also Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, XVIII, p.
461.
(326) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p- 3.
(327) Ibid.
(328) Id. at p. 4.
(329) Ibid.
(330) Ibid.
(331) Ibid.
(332) Ibid.
(333) Deposition of Richard E Snyder June 9, 1978 House Select Committee on
Assassinations, P- 18 (JFK Doc. No. 009264 ).
(334) Id. at pp. 18-19.
(335) Id. at p. 53
(336) Staff interview of Richard E Snyder June 14, 1978 House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Doc. No. 007488).
(337) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 5.
(338) Ibid.
(339) Commission exhibit 2716, Warren Report, vol. XXVI, p. 90
(340) Ibid.
(341) Ibid.
(342) Ibid.
(343) Commission exhibit 2717, Warren Report, vol. XXVI, p.91; also ref. 298,
Oswald Diary, p. 21.
(344) Ibid.
(345) Ibid.
(346) Ibid.
(347) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 6.
(348) Ibid.
(349) Ibid.
(350) Id. at pp. 6-7.
(351) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report vol XVIII PP. 404"408-409" (352) See
ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 7.
(353) Ibid.
(354) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, P. 414.
(355)See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 7.
(356) Id. at pp. 7-8
(357) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, P.424-427
Page 472
472
(358) Id. at pp. 428-429.
(359) Id. at p. 433.
(360) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary, pp. 8--9.
(361) Id. at p. 9.
(362) Ibid.
(363) Id. at p. 12.
(364) Commission exhibit 985. Warren Report. vol. XVIII, pp. 415-416.
(365) Id. at p. 430.
(366) Commission exhibit 932. Warren Report. vol. XVIII. p. 133.
(367) Ibid.
(368) Ibid.
(369) Ibid.
(370) Ibid.
(371) Ibid.
(372) Commission exhibit 933. Warren Report, vol. XVIII. p. 135.
(373) Ibid.
(374) Commission exhibit 940, Warren Report. vol. XVIII, p. 151.
(375) Ibid.
(376) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 13.
(377) Commission exhibit 985. Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 450.
(378) Ibid., see also ref. 298. Oswald Diary, p. 13.
(379) Commission exhibit 986. Warren Report, vol. XVIII. pp. 529-530.
(380) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary. pp. 13-14.
(381) Commission exhibit. 936. Warren Report, vol XVIII. p.142
(382) Ibid.
(383) Ibid.
(384) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 14-15.
(385) Commission exhibit 935, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 237.
(386) Ibid.
(387) Ibid.
(388) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary. pp. 8-9.
(389) Commission exhibit 935. Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 137
(390) Id. at p. 138.
(391) Id. at p. 137.
(392) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary, p. 8.
(393) Commission exhibit 935. Warren Report, vol. XVIII. p. 138.
(394) Id. at p. 137.
(395) Ibid.
(396) Ibid.
(397) Ibid.
(398) Ibid.
(399) Id. at p. 138.
(400) Ibid.
(401) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 15.
(402) Ibid.
(403) Ibid.
(404) Ibid.
(405) Ibid.
(406) Commission exhibit 985. Warren Report, vol. XVIII. pp. 437-439.
(407) Id. at p. 442.
(408) Id. at p. 444.
(409) Id. at p. 433.
(410) Ibid.
(411) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary. p. 16.
(412) Commission exhibit 985. Warren Report, vol. XVIII. pp. 419-420.
(413) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary. pp. 16-17.
(414) Commission exhibit 985. Warren Report. vol. XVIII. p. 423.
(415) See ref. 298. Oswald Diary. p. 17.
(416) Id. at p. 18.
(417) Warren Report. vol. V.p. 274.
(418) Id. at p. 278.
(419) Id. at p. 617
(421) Osgood Caruthers "Soviet to Issue New Ruble and Put Worth at $1.11," New
York Times, November 15, 1960, p. 1, see also,"Harby Schwartz, "Soviet Hints
Rich Cut Ruble Boards," New York Times, October 23, 1960, p. 25; see also Max
Frankel, "Soviet Will Revalue Ruble: Income Tax to End by '65," New York Times,
May 6, 1960. p. 1 (JFK Doc, No. 015002)
Page 473
473
(421) Commission exhibit 25, Warren Report, vol. XVI. p. 121.
(422) See footnote 53, CIH notes.
(423) Commission exhibit 25, Warren Report, vol. XVI, p. 121.
(424) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 8-14, 16, 19-20.
(425) Commission exhibit 1403, Warren Report, vol. XVII, p. 774.
(426) Commission exhibit 1401, Warren Report, vol. XXII, p. 754.
(427) Ibid.
(428) Outside contact report (with Vladillen Mr. Vasev and Ikar I. Zavrazhnov)
June 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008873)
(429) Staff interview of Robert E. Webster, Mar. 16, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Doc. No. 014999).
(430) Ibid.
(431) Ibid.
(432) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
(433) Ibid.
(434) Ibid.
(435) Deposition of David E. Murphy, Aug. 9. 1978, House Select Committee
Assassinations, pp. 14-15, 16-18 (JFK Doc. No. 014723); see also executive
session testimony, DC SB, Nov. 16, 1978, bearing before Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 2-1-25; see also testimony of John Limond Hart, Sept. 15,
1978, hearing before the Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress 2d
Session. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. vol. III, p.
526-27: see also notes, staff interview of May 19, 1978 (JFK Doc. No. 015001);
see staff interview of Nosenko, May 30. 1978 (JFK Doc. No. 015003).
(436) Letter from House Select Committee on Assassinations to CIA, Jan. 6, 1978.
(437) Attachment to CIA memorandum Jan. 27, 1978.
(438) Ibid.
(439) Letter from Hugh S. Cumming to Richard M. Bissell. Oct. 25, 1960.
(440) Among the six defectors who did not return to the United States were
Martin and Mitchell.
(441) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014954).
(442) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014952).
(443) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(444) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014952).
(445) Ibid.
(446) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014967).
(447) Ibid.
(448) Ibid.
(449) Ibid.
(450) Ibid.
(451) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK
Doc. No. 014965).
(452) Ibid.
(453) Ibid.
Page 474
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(BLANK PAGE)
Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenk
Page 475
475
OSWALD IN THE SOVIET UNION:
AN INVESTIGATION OF YURI NOSENKO
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(475)
Contents
Page 476
CONTENTS
Page
I. Excerpts of Testimony of Yarl Nosenko before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, June 20, 1978 ...................................
477
II. Statement of Yuri Nosenko made to House Select Committee on
Assassinations, August 7, 1978 ........................................ 525
III. Excerpts of Deposition of Bruce Solie before House Select Committee on
Assassinations, June 1, 1978 .......................................... 529
IV. Excerpts of Deposition of David Murphy before House Select
Committee on Assassinations, August 9, 1978
........................................ 531
V. Excerpts of Deposition of James C. Michaels, July 27. 1978, and
Alekso Poptanich, August 11, 1978, before the House Select Committee
on Assassinations
......................................................................... 535
VI. Letters of Central Intelllgence Agency of September 1. 1978, and Federal
Bureau of Investigation of January 8, 1978 ............................. 541
VII. Testimony of the Deputy Chief S.B: Division before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, November 16,1978 .......................... 571
(476)
Introduction
Page 477
477
INTRODUCTION
A hearing held before the committee on September 15, 1978, considered aspects of
the information that Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB defector, had relative to Lee
Harvey Oswald. It also considered the performance of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in handling Nosenko and his
information. These materials supplement that hearing.
Excerpts of Testimony of Yuri Nosenko, June 20, 1978
Page 477
I. EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY OF YURI NOSENKO BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 20, 1978
The initial phase of the committee's investigation of Yuri Nosenko focused
primarily on a file review. Only by carefully reading and analyzing the
voluminous Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency files
on Nosenko could it begin to evaluate Nosenko's information on Oswald and
understand the complex series of events of the last 14 ears, during which
Nosenko went from being a virtual prisoner, kept in solitary confinement, to a
CIA consultant.
Once the files were read, the investigation moved into a different phase that
consisted of the questioning of many of the individuals who had been involved
with Nosenko over the years. They included Richard Helms, past director of the
CIA, CIA division and deputy division chiefs, interrogators and polygraph
operators. Former KGB officers were also interviewed, and most importantly, the
committee spent hours questioning. Nosenko himself.
The first individuals interviewed by the committee were two former KGB officers.
They provided the committee with background and operational material about the
KGB. They explained its internal structure, its goals and the functions of
various sections. They were questioned extensively about KGB techniques and
procedures. From them, the committee received information concerning such
relevant topics as the KGB attitude toward American defectors, KGB recruitment
of foreigners, KGB control over those entering and exiting the country and KGB
debriefing and surveillance techniques.
There were two factors, however, that significantly limited the value of the
information supplied to the committee by these ex-KGB officers: (I) Neither had
been assigned to the same KGB directorate as Nosenko, and (2) one of them had
information about the KGB that was outdated.
It was after speaking to these two men that the committee began interviewing
Yuri Nosenko. Nosenko was cooperative during these
sessions and spoke at length about his life, his defection, the treatment he
received from the CIA and about Lee Harvey Oswald. Nosenko was interviewed by
the committee on three different occasions. The first two sessions lasted all
day and the third was approximately
(477)
Page 478
478
2 hours, during the course of which he gave the committee sworn deposition.
Then, on June 19 and 20, 1978, Nosenko was questioned at an executive session of
the committee. Questions and answers from the second day of that executive
session follow:
EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY OF YURI NOSENKO BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, June 20, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. You have testified before this committee that the KGB did not allow
Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he was uninteresting. You have testified the
KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and
that you decided he was not interesting without speaking to him.
Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. 1959.
Mr. KLEIN. In 1959, approximately how many Americans wanted to defect to the
Soviet Union or requested permission to defect?
Mr. NOSENKO. There was a defector, I remember, one of the employees, one of the
workers, who was helping to organize the American exhibition in Moscow, Mr.
Webster.
Mr. KLEIN. Without giving particular names, how many Americans would you say
asked permission to defect in 1959?
What would the number
Mr. NOSENKO. These two were known to me Oswald and Webster.
Mr. KLEIN. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best estimate as to how many
Americans asked permission to de. feet to the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. AS far as I heard, there I think was one only.
Mr. KLEIN. One other, meaning three altogether.
Mr. NOSENKO. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I know.
Mr. KLEIN. Three?
Mr. NOSENKO. Three.
Mr. KLEIN. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned down because he was
uninteresting?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know any other defector who was ever turned down because he
was uninteresting?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves, how many Americans
are defected. It is a very rare occasion and KGB prefers defection when they are
planning, they want, these types of defectors, they like and invite those people
who can give them certain information which is valuable.
Mr. KLEIN, Do you recall telling this committee yesterday that up until 1960 the
Seventh Department was recruiting left and right ?
Mr. NOSENKO. Absolutely right.
Mr. KLEIN. And that you recruited an individual who was---
Mr. NOSENKO. I simply had given example of this recruitment which took place up
to 1960. When Seventh Department was recruiting and giving to the Intelligence
Service, First Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will be
for them valuable or not.
Mr. KLEIN. And that KGB officers were getting bonus and promotions when they
recruited people?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right,
Mr. KLEIN. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when he asked to defect, you
turned him down without even speaking to him, to find out ff he had any
information; is that right?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in 1959, a very big amount of
them in 1959, very interesting, much, much more interesting--professors and
teachers--and another individual--we had quite a few recruitments, and Oswald
was nothing on this base, on this foundation.
Mr. KLEIN. Would the KGB have any interest in an American student?
Mr. NOSENKO. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in students, but
particularly those students who are studying the Russian language, Russian
history, Russian economy.
Mr. KLEIN. And would they have any interest in an American who had strong
anti-American views and who was a professed Marxist? Would they have any
interest in that kind of person?
Page 479
479
Mr. NOSENKO. Here we are conting to a very interesting and sensitive question.
From mid-1950, by the order of Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union,
KGB was prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of members of the
Communist Party of the West.
Mr. KLEIN. I am not asking about a member of the Communist Party.
Mr. NOSENKO. Your question is, and if he is some type of Marxist here, the
question may be he is possibly a member of the Communist Party, and to check it
for KGB very difficult if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his
country.
Mr. KLEIN. Would they ask him if he is a member of the Communist Party?
Would they check it?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; they would not ask him.
Mr. KLEIN. They wouldn't ask him?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the
military and worked with radar equipment?
Mr. NOSENKO. It depends. If he was corporal, private, is no big interest. If he
was officer, maybe they would be interested.
Mr. KLEIN. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they
would want to know what his rank was?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir, it is not enough because they had sources.
Mr. KLEIN. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone
who served as a radar operator on an air base where U-2's took off and landed?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir, it would be very interested.
Mr. KLEIN. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was a student, who
was a professed Marxist, who had--
Mr. NOSENKO. Students? I never heard that he was a student.
Mr. KLEIN. [continuing]. Who had been a radar operator and had worked on a base
from which U-2 airplanes took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting
enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this
information?
Mr. NOSENKO. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know that he
had any connection with U-2 flights. That is one thing.
And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by Mr. Epstein in the
book, it is a little bit from the air taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that
how important for KGB to know about such base that base. We knew it in the
fifties when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, 1951, 1952. We knew every
base and in Japan, at this Atsugi base, and we knew what kind of airplanes had
been. We didn't know about U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when
Oswald applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know a word
about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.
Mr. KLEIN. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of information about that
when he wanted to defect, is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Mr. KLEIN. And you told us that one reason that no one was working on Oswald was
because all of your people were concentrating on the American exhibition in
1959, is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. Not only American exhibition, there were other tourists
and among them were interesting targets, very interesting targets.
Mr. KLEIN. You told us yesterday that things didn't--
Mr. NOSENKO. I can explain you why, because an American exhibition in Moscow was
by the information which KGB had, I don't know how much it's right, how much
it's wrong, but it was suspected quite a number of people from American
intelligence community who were working on American Exhibition in Moscow, and
when the work is going on against such targets, it is not one officer, it is a
big amount of people involved on each case, because it is very serious target.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this document be marked for
identification and shown to the witness.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection.
[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-2 for identification.]
Page 480
480
JFK EXHIBIT F-2
COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985--Continued
Page 481
481
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 482
482
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 483
483
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 484
484
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 485
485
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 486
486
JFK EXHIBIT F-2 cont.
Page 487
487
MR. KLEIN. Looking at this document--
MR. NOSENKO. Right
Chairman STOKES. Did counsel want to identify for the record how the document
has been marked?
MS. BERNING. JFK F-2.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at this document, does it say on the top "Visa and
Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City
Council"?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. do you recognize that type of document?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes. It is from Department of Giving Visas and Registrations, which
is working under auspices of Diretorate of Internal Affairs of Moscow City.
Mr. KLEIN. And does this appear to be an authentic document, an authentic copy
of the document?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at No. 8, does it say what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the
Soviet Union for the first time?
Mr. NOSENKO. October 1959.
Mr. KLEIN. October what?
Mr. NOSENKO. October 16, 1959.
Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection.
Would the clerk indicate for the record?
Ms. BERNING. JFK F-3, Mr. Chairman.
[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-3 for identification.]
Page 488
488
JFK EXHIBIT F-3
Page 489
489
JFK EXHIBIT F-3 cont.
Page 490
490
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the newspaper article dipping, on the right-hand side,
with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet Jammed at Close," do you see that?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. And what is the date of that story?
Mr. NOSENKO. The date is September 4.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware of the fact that the American Exhibition ended on
September 4, more than a month before Oswald came to the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when Americans who were working
for this exhibition left Moscow.
Mr. KLEIN. I will ask you another question.
Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to normal once the fair ended,
did you say yes?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; till they were leave in the Soviet Union. No. They are the same
targets OK, you are right, it is closed September 4, but does it change the
importance of these people against whom the KGB was working. They were still in
Moscow.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did things in your department
get back to normal once the fair ended, and do you recall saying yes?
Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all the people involved in
work on American Exhibition, Americans when they left, and they were staying
quite a long time after it was dosed. It was closed for visits far Soviet
citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.
Mr. KLEIN. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey Oswald was allowed to
stay in ,the Soviet Union after he said that he was going to kill himself if
they sent him home. You told us that he slashed his wrist and two psychiatrists
examined ,him and both found ,him mentally unstable.
Mr. NOSENKO Right.
Mr. KLEIN. What was the point of having two psychiatrists examine him?
Mr. NOSENKO. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision,
concerning this person. Two independent.
Mr. KLEIN. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is
that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr.
Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB
and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill
himself it will be reaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the
starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.
Mr. KLEIN. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.
Mr. KLEIN. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of
Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. NOSENKO. It is a very sensitive question. He can Jump out of car. If he
decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he
might jump out of the car or do something like that?
Mr. NOSENKO. Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any
such action.
Mr. KLEIN. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?
Mr. NOSENKO. NO; they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein;
they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo,
not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist
Party.
Mr. KLEIN. Going by the facts as you have told them to the Committe--
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, Sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?
Mr. NOSENKO. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given
information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the
Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the chairman was surely asked; he told
his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.
Mr. NOSENKO. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is
an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?
Mr. NOSENKO. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.
Page 491
491
Mr. KLEIN. Instead they elected to allow him to stay indefinitely in the Soviet
Union and they have to worry about him every single day, what an unstable
American would do, is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet Government allowed.
Mr. KLEIN. The facts as you have testified to them are that the KGB allowed this
mentally unstable person to stay in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live
and work In a radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable
individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally unstable individual
was allowed to join a hunting club where he had access to a gun.
Can you think of any other cases in all the time you worked in the KGB where
mentally unstable person was treated in this manner?
Mr. NOSENKO. I told you I do not know any other cases of mentally unstable,
excluding one code clerk, American, was also mentally ill; he was delivered in
Soviet Union. I heard it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him.
And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing a number of
questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does it mean, KGB allow him to
marry?
Mr. Klein, In the Soviet Union there is by decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet
U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner
can marry a Soviet citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any
way try not to give, not make it possible, but this is in cases when the person
who is marrying a foreigner worked in some sensitive place, let's say, in
missiles, rocket industry production, was in process of any place of his working
seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try to put different type
of fences. But it is unlawful. In accordance with Soviet law, marriage is
allowed; he doesn't need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And
his wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive from the point
of view of Soviet security.
Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is ravIng mad; it is mentally
unstable.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified that not only was Oswald not spoken to when. he first
said he wanted to defect but even after the decision was made to allow him to
remain in the Soviet Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that
correct?
Mr. KLEIN. You also testified to the extensive resources that were devoted to
put physical and technical surveillance on Oswald. You told us the men involved
the time involved, the facilities involved?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you find great contradiction--
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. In the fact that, on the one hand, you put all these
resources into followIng Oswald around, trying to see who he talked to and what
he did and, on the other hand, you didn't even have a person go and talk to and
say, "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."
Is there any contradiction?
Mr. NOSENKO. Even In the United States, yes, sure, for you, for me just now
American citizens, yes, sure, but there, no.
Mr. KLEIN. They don't talk to people there?
Mr. NOSENKO. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I don't see any contradiction
there. Anyone, any foreigner who will be staying, even if this defector not on
his own, but, let's say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be
watched and on him will be put this same type of work that was put on Oswald,
not less.
Mr. KLEIN. You talk about their society being different than ours. It is unusual
that they allow an American to defect and live there without ever questioning
him, to ask him if he is an intelligence agent?
Mr. NOSENKO. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he was intelligence agent,
what he will tell them that he was sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why
to scare him? Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He wal show by
his behavior, by his action.
Mr. KLEIN. They purposely don't speak to him; is that your testimony?
Mr. NOSENKO. In this case they didn't speak to him because he didn't present
interest for the KGB and because he was mentally unstable.
Page 492
492
Mr. KLEIN. You testified that you read the reports of two psychiatrists who
examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the hospital after he cut his wrist, is that
correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. You said both found him mentally unstable?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. You told us in great detail how the decision was made to have these
psychiatrists examine him.
I would ask that this document be marked for identification.
Chairman STOKES. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on
the document.
Ms. BERNING. It will be JFK No. F-4.
[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-4 for identification.
]
Page 493
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4
Page 494
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 495
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 496
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 497
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 498
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 499
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 500
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 501
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 502
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 504
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 505
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JFK EXHIBIT F-4 cont.
Page 506
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Mr. KLEIN. Have you ever seen that document before?
Mr. NOSENKO. NO, sir. I haven't seen it.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the Soviet Government provided certain documents
to the Warren Commission in 1964?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that document in front of you----
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. [continuing]. Is that a hospital record?
Mr. NOSENKO. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.
Mr. KLEIN. And whose hospital record? Does it have a name on it?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.
Mr. KLEIN. Whose name is it?
Mr. NOSENKO. Lee Harvey Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. Does it say what date he was admitted?
Mr. NOSENKO. Discharged, admitted 23d, discharged 28th.
Mr. KLEIN. What year is that?
Mr. NOSENKO. October of 1969.
Mr. KLEIN. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis, why he was in the
hospital?
Mr. NOSENKO. Incised wound of one-third of the left forearm.
Mr. KLEIN. And that date, October of 1959, is that when Oswald first came to the
Soviet Union and cut his wrist?
Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not remember.
Mr. KLEIN. You have in front of you the other document which tells number
8--what date he came to the Soviet Union. Is that still there?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir. This is admittance to the hospital and dischargement.
Mr. KlEIN. Number 8?
Mr. NOSENKO. Arrival, October 16.
Mr. KLEIN. And the date on the hospital admittance is what date?
Mr. NOSENKO. Twenty-third of October.
Mr. KLEIN. And would you turn to the hospital admittance form, the one I just
gave you, to the third page, please?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you see where it says "History of Present Illness"?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; I don't see.
Mr. KLEIN. On the third page?
Mr. NOSENKO. I have the third page.
Mr. KLEIN. It has number 6 on the top of the page, but it's the third page on
the document.
Mr. NOSENKO. Oh, number 6, History of Present Illness. Yes; Just a second.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you glance through that and would you tell us if that is the
hospital report from when Lee Harvey Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to the
Botkin Hospital?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the
right-hand side.
Do you see that page?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. The next to the last page.
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom,
"Psychiatric Department" underlined?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you read what is said under that?
Mr. NOSENKO. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or
deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire
to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient
is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in
Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief Physicians, Dr.
Kornika. The patient is transferred to the seventh ward."
Mr. KLEIN. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?
Mr. NOSENKO. Here I do not see.
Mr. KLEIN. Does that report indicate that he was normal?
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Mr. NOSENKO. Here I do not see what I have seen- But this you receive from the
Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was file,
you are wrong, Mr. Klein.
Mr. KLEIN. And that document, according to you, is that not authentic copy?
Mr. NOSENKO. KGB can prepare you any document. Take the material, or ask the
doctors who are cooperating with KGB and they will prepare you any document.
Mr. KLEIN. I am not asking you what they can do. Are you testifying that this
document is not authentic, it is not the document?
Mr. NOSENKO. This document never was in the file of the KGB.
Mr. KLEIN. So
Mr. NOSENKO. This I testify.
Mr. KLEIN. [continuing]. It is your testimony that the KGB sent us a phony
document?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified before this committee that there was periodic physical
surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out
in Minsk?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. And you testified in detail about that, and you told us how the
physical surveillance consisted of following Oswald for a month or month and a
half at a time, and there were a number of people that would be involved, is
that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. It was a big operation?
Mr. NOSENKO. Big operation? No; it's not a big operation.
Mr. KLEIN. There were a number of people involved, weren't there?
Mr. NOSENKO. It is not a big operation. It is routine. In KGB it is a routine,
nothing serious. It's not an operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an
operation.
Mr. KLEIN. And have you ever stated that the only coverage of Oswald during his
stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry
of neighbors and associates and review of his mail? Have you' ever stated that
was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?
Mr. NOSENKO. I stated before, and I stated it to you yesterday, and I state now,
that the order was given, and I have seen it--to cover him by surveillance
periodical, to cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places he
is working, control over his correspondence and control of his telephone
conversations.
Mr. KLEIN. My question is, have you ever stated that the only coverage was
checking at his places of employment and his neighbors and associates, and not
say anything about periodic, physical surveillance?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I Cannot tell you what I stated. I was for quite a big period
of time, quite a few years, interrogated, by hours, and in different types of
conditions, including hostile conditions.
Mr. KLEIN. That was by the CIA?
Mr. NOSENKO. Where they asked questions in such form which later my answer will
be interpreted in any way, however they want to interrogate us.
Mr. KLEIN. That was by CIA?
Mr. NOSENKO. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I cannot remember dates.
You must understand, it's hundreds of interrogations, hundreds.
Mr. KLEIN. This period that you are telling us about, you were questioned by the
CIA during that period, is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; sure.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you questioned during that period by FBI?
Mr. NOSENKO. I questioned by FBI in February; yes.
Mr. KLEIN. At this time I would ask that this document be marked for
identification and shown to the witness.
Chairman STOKEs. The clerk will indicate for the record the number appearing on
the document.
Ms. BERNING. Exhibit JFK F-5.
[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-5 for Identification.]
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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JFK EXHIBIT F-5 cont.
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Mr. KLEIN. These hostile interrogations you just alluded to, did they lead you
state other than the truth to these interrogators?
Mr. NOSENKO. I was answering the questions which were put to me.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever not tell the truth?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; I was telling the truth.
Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention--
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Just a moment. Before you, you have a Federal Bureau of Investigation
report; is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention to page 29 of that report.
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. The last paragraph, beginning with "Nosenko stated"--it's
under-lined. Would you please read that paragraph to us.
Mr. NOSENKO. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction from the KGB Moscow, no
active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior
approval from KGB in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever
requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined that the only
coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks of his
places of employment, inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his
mail."
Mr. KLEIN. Did you make that statement?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?
Mr. KLEIN. Does that statement say anything about physical surveillance?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; it didn't.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you forget to tell them about the physical surveillance?
Mr. NOSENKO. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put; I do not know.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich and Gheesling on March 3
and 4, 1964?
Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date; no. I remember I was
speaking with agents from FBI.
Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke to them did you recall that they spoke to you at that
time, March 3 and 4, about Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. NOSENKO. I told you, they were speaking with me about Oswald, but cannot
tell you the date when.
Mr. KLEIN. Was it in March 1964?
Mr. NOSENKO. They were speaking with me--February and the beginning of March of
1964.
Mr. KLEIN. And did they tape the conversations?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; they were taping all conversations.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the agents make notes when you were talking?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Did they ever show you those notes?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the statements you were making to them were going
to be written down into a report?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the report?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; the only one which was sent to the Warren Commission, this I
have seen.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the report would be put in your file?
Mr. NOSENKO. Must be.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that report would be shown to a committee such as this
investigating the assassination?
Mr. NOSENKO. I didn't that it would be created, the committee, because it was
1964.
Mr. KLEIN. You didn't know that?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; did you know that this committee--in 1964--will be existing in
1978, 1977?
Mr. KLEIN. And were you telling them the truth when you told them that the only
coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and not telling them about the
physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?
Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald: it
was ordered, passive type of work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered
not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment,
this is passive.
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Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approachments,
recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical
surveillance which you told this committee about yesterday?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe
I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe I didn't mention but I was
telling them about surveillance.
Mr. KLEIN. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything
you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. If they would have asked you "Was there physical suaveillance?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes' I will answer yes, it was.
Mr. KLEIN [continuing] You would have answered yes?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. You also testified before this committee that in accord with the
orders from Moscow that there was technical surveillance, and you told us in
detail about how they tapped his phone and recorded it and made copies of it and
gave it to a certain person.
Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same paragraph, does that say
anything about the technical surveillance that you told us about?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you forget?
Mr. NOSENKO. But, if you ask even an agent of FBI, I doubt it, no. In KGB
control of correspondence, control of telephone it's not big deal. It's giving
order to control a telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of
Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate, and not speaking to
receive a warrant from the judge. Control of correspondence can be signed,
permission to put control over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of
Section even.
Do you understand what I want to tell you, it is absolutely considered, KGB,
nothing important.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it a big deal to check periodically at someone's place of
employment and talk to their neighbors ? Is that a big deal?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Mr. KLEIN. But you told them about that, didn't you?
Mr. NOSENKO. I tried simply to describe them what kind of, not to take ac
tive-what does it mean, passive type of coverage of the target?
Mr. KLEIN. If they would have asked you was there any technical surveillance,
then would you have told them?
Mr. NOSENKO. I would have said they were told, even word for word, in this
document said not the technical surveillance. They have a certain terminology.
Let's say surveillance, it's called to lead the measurement N/N, and to control
telephone to lead the measurement M.
Mr. KLEIN. If they would have said, "Was there any technical surveillance of
Oswald?" would you have said "yes"?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.
Mr. KLEIN. You also testified to this committee that the KGB would have had to
have known about Marina Oswald, you said, by the end of the month they would
have a batch of papers?
Mr. NOSENKO. You told me, if she had seen him, you something mentioned, 15, 13.
Mr. KLEIN. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would have had to pick her
up?
Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when he was seeing her or
not. You said assume that he had met her 16 and 13, and it 'became known to KGB
through surveillance. I said by the end of month that at least something will
have on her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where she
work.
Mr. KLEIN. They would know that through the surveillance on Oswald?
Mr. NOSENKO. The fact will be known through surveillance; then through other
outfits of KGB they will find whatever possible on her.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the
following answer:
"Question: Why wouldn't she-- referring to Marina--have been investigated when
she first met Oswald?
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"Answer. They did not know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for
marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."
Were you ever asked that question and did you give that answer?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and answers.
Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, please,
and shown to the witness.
Chairman STOKES. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on
the document.
Ms. BERNING. JKF F-6.
[The document referred to was marked as JKF exhibit No.F-6 for identification.]
[Document is retained in appropriate files]
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that document, have you ever seen it before?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. You have never seen that before?
Mr. NOSENKO. I never have seen it before.
Mr. KLEIN. And is that a report that days on the cover, "Memorandum for the
Record; Subject: Followup Report on the Oswald Case; Source: [cryptonym
deleted]." Was [cryptonym deleted] your code name at one time?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not know.
Mr. KLEIN. "Date Of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it say that on the cover?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. And turning to the very last page, page 18"---
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Does it say, "James Michaels"?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. "SR/CI/KGB"?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever hear of a man named James Michaels?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, I do not know a man James Michaels.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall speaking to a man named James Michaels?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last
question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?
Mr. NOSENKO. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when She first met
Oswald?"
"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage.
There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."
Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever--
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I gave
this answer.
Mr. KLEIN. Was that the truth?
Mr. NOSENKO. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better
ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what
type of interrogations were going on.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke about Oswald?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Was this question relating to Oswald?
Mr. NOSENKO. I was answering what I could.
Mr. KLEIN. Is that the truth, that they didn't--
Mr. NOSENKO. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see, again, why wouldn't she
have been investigated. Here must be question was in this form. The
investigation, not the checkup of her, but, let's say, invitation for
conversation, something of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on
both parts, that would be mine and interrogator.
Mr. KLEIN. It is an inaccurate transcript?
Mr. NOSENKO. I consider many, many things are inaccurate.
Mr. KLEIN. Is that transcribed accurately?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not know, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. That answer, do you think it is transcribed accurately, that that's
your answer?
Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I can only explain one thing. Let's say there was
KGB found out that he had an acquaintance, Marina Prusakova. They were not
married. They didn't know--they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first
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will be investigation. Checkup in archives of DBB of Byelorussia, and on the
basis whatever kind of material on her will be found. Let's say, if she was ever
on trial by militia, under arrest. If militia had any material, they can expand
further. They can also send checkup in the pace of her--one, it's one order, to
give us the picture of the character of the target, check on him in place of his
living, in one order.
But more, further investigation, the true investigation--this is called
checkup--will be studied and they will start when they see something, let's say,
suspicious in behavior of Oswald and this his connection.
In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going to marry, sure,
they will be more, farther investigation, thorough investigation; but before it
will only be checkup. From this point of view I was answering this question.
Mr. KLEIN. Let me make it simple.
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. If the question was asked exactly as it appears here, "Why wouldn't
she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?" would this be your
answer? Is that a correct answer as it appears here?
Mr. NOSENKO. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember.
Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen--
Mr. KLEIN. Was this true? This says, "There was no surveillance on Oswald to
show that he knew her"--is that right or wrong?
Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I answered, yes. It is right. It is written here.
Mr. KLEIN. You remember answering that?
Mr. NOSENKO. No.
Mr. KLEIN. How do you know you answered that?
Mr. NOSENKO. You are giving me official document.
Mr. KLEIN. You have no recollection of answering this?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not have any recollection of interrogations.
Mr. KLEIN. If you answered that, were you telling the truth?
Mr. NOSENKO. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This is how I answered question.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified to this committee that the DGB decided to have Lee
Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists. You told us about how it was
decided, who decided it, where it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald
to be mentally unstable?
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. Have you ever been asked the following questions and given the
following answers:
"Question. Did the KGB make a psychological assessment of Oswald?
"Answer. No; nothing, but at the hospital it was also said he was not quite
normal The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he is not normal.
"Question. Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?
"Answer. I don't think so. There was no report like this?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; I told that there was opinion of psychiatrists that he was
mentally unstable.
Mr. KLEIN. Is what I read to you correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or wrong. I am answering
you what I know.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever make a statement like that?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember statements for 5 years, interrogation.
Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention to the Michaels Report.
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Page 7.
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you read for us the first and second questions and answers,
please.
Mr. NOSENKO. Did the KGB make psychological assessment of Oswald?"
"No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The
hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he was not normal, mentally
unstable."
Mr. KLEIN. Please keep reading.
Mr. NOSENKO. "Did the hospital authonties conduct any psychological testing?" "I
don't think so. There was no report like this.
"What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality, what kind of man did
they think he was?"
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"KGB thought he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he is
not normal, that he should leave the country."
Mr. KLEIN. Did you say anything in there about two psychiatrists examining
Oswald and about reading their reports which said he was mentally unstable? Did
you say anything about that there?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them; but I would like you to
find out the conditions in which interrogations were done, how it was done, by
what procedures, when two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names-they
never announced me names-one playing part of bad guy and other good guy, and it
starting slapping then, not physically but I mean, psychologically and in
conversation, turning question upside down, however they would like, then this
leave, another one will start in softer way.
Mr. KLEIN. When did this--
Mr. NOSENKO. And I would not trust any of their documents in those periods of
time. Up to 1967 when we started from the beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie.
That is the one thing. Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in 1964. I
didn't understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr....[Y] knew
Russian language and Mr....[Y] was asking me only questions concerning my
biography and this type of question, but nonoperative questions.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questiions and
giving the answers that you just read to us?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their
questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with
them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was
laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I
would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."
Mr. KLEIN. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do
these give responsive answers?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not trust this document repared by people in those years.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and
answers?
Mr. NOSENKO. My opinion--I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified--
Mr. NOSENKO. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of
interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I
know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and
everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.
Mr. KLEIN. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did
it begin?
Mr. NOSENKO. Arrested me April 4, 1964, started interrogate me in 2 days. They
interrupted--I don't know--interrogate a month, two, made break; then again,
then again period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to 24
hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.
Mr. KLEIN. And this was all after April 4, 1964?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
That is why I will not take as a document anything what concerns interrogations
in hostile, absolutely hostile, situation.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified in detail yesterday about the cable which you saw which
was sent from Mexico city to the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you
testified that you actually read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in
Mexico City and he wanted permission for a visa to come to the Soviet union.
Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for us in detail, how long
it was?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald went to Minsk, the next
time you heard of him was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how
Mexico City advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge resulted
from an oral inquiry of your department by M. I. Turalin.
Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of
Oswald's application?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember. I am telling you what I have seen, cable, what
was told through Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of
Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department.
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Mr. KLEIN. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI report in front of you.
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not have it.
[Pause.]
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. On the top of page 30, read for us the underlined section on the top,
beginning "The next time"--
Mr. NOSENKO. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with
Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa.
Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application.
His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by Turalin,
Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign Countries, First Chief
Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir
Alexseev, Chief of Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect
to Oswald. Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they recommended
that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied. Nosenko couldn't recall when
Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with visa application."
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?
Mr. NOSENKO. Must be I said it, it's here in document.
Mr. KLEIN. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised
Moscow of subject's application. Did you say that?
Mr. NOSENKO. Must be; I said this in this way.
Mr. KLEIN. And did you tell us that not only did you know how they advised them
by cable but that you read the cable?
Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I recollection.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you tell them the truth?
Mr. NOSENKO. I was trying to tell what I remembered.
Mr. KLEIN. And this FBI report which you just read from, would you look back on
the first page and would you tell us the date of that report?
Mr. NOSENKO. March 5, 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4, 1964?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. That was before any hostile interrogations began, Is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And at that time you said that you did not know anything about the
cable, is that right?
Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.
Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what psychological turmoil
a person passing who defected, do you understand that it is necessary time, time
to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will
be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who
helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified to us that you didn't know who wrote the summary of
Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to
read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedoseyev and Matveev, F-e-d-o-s-e-y-e-v
and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the
file and wrote a second "spravka," which you told us was a summary?
Mr. NOSENKO. Summary.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever tell anybody that?
Mr. NOSENKO. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedoseyev--
Fedoseyev was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat
what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedoseyev
who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh
Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief
of First American Department. His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not
alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov
ordered and Fedoseyev giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who
of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedoseyev and Matveev were
participated in the preparation of documents. They are responsible for First
American Department.
Mr. KLEIN. So you have an idea of who would have written, is that correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. American Department, no doubts that this two will be participating
or correcting.
Mr. KLEIN. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember reading the summary.
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Mr. KLEIN. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection of reading it?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; I haven't seen summary.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you positive that you didn't see that summary?
Mr. NOSENKO. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you positive you didn't see the summary written by the First
Department after they took the file away?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember seeing. As I told you, I haven't seen it.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified that Oswald was considered normal prior to the time he
cut his wrist, and even told us that you were surprised, you had no indication
he would do something like that.
Were you ever asked the following question, and did you give the following
answer:
"Question. In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from cases of
other American defectors?
"Answer. The main difference is that he was not to be allowed to stay. He was
considered to be not normal."
Mr. NOSENKO. This is what cases I know, who were staying.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal, referring to the
period before he tried to commit suicide?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's not right because we
didn't know that he was normal or not normal. Up until the moment of he cut his
wrist we started to suspect.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, if you would have said it, would it have been correct?
Mr. NOSENKO. No; it would not be correct, because he cannot be considered
abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he cut the wrist.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified to this committee that you were present at a meeting
with the Chief of the Seventh Department Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin;
at that meeting, it was decided that Oswald should not be given permission to
defect. You told us where the meeting took place, told us who was there.
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the Seventh Department at
that time?
Mr. NOSENKO. Krupnov appeared a little later.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of your evaluation of
Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through Intourist interpreter
that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and
that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa?
Did you ever tell anybody that?
Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it was wrong, not right,
because Krupnov started participation only in this case when Oswald was allowed
to stay. In the moment when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union when he went in
hospital, Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department- He very soon appeared
later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was wrong.
Mr. KLEIN. Directing your attention to the FBI report in front of you, I would
like to draw your attention to page 28.
Mr. NOSENKO. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. Beginning with the underlined section beginning with the first "On
the basis" in the second paragraph, would you read this?
Mr. NOSENKO. " Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this information, con- cluded
that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared
somewhat abnormal.
Mr. KLEIN. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis of"--
Mr. NOSENKO. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald, he instructed
Krupnov to advise Oswald through the Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be
permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart
at the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a permanent
resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States"
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember' saying this. It can be that simply
misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not transcription from the tape. It is,
I will say a summary, and I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not
right because Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.
Mr. KLEIN. Also it says-----
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Mr. NOSENKO. It was participation of Rastrusin.
Mr. KLEIN. Also is it correct when it says in there that you made the decision
and---
Mr. NOSENKO. No; I couldn't make decision, being Deputy Chief of Section.
Mr. KLEIN Does it say anything there--
Mr. NOSENKO. I could say in my opinion; yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Does it say anything there about a meeting to determine what to do,
or does it say that on basis of your evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?
Mr. NOSENKO. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov appeared later. This
period, what we are discussing here, was Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be
done on my own, being Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even
being Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it must be on the
level of Chief of Department.
Mr. KLEIN. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?
Mr. NOSENKO. It is incorrect, and Krupnov--I do not remember.
Mr. KLEIN. You told us, when I questioned you about the fact that you didn't
tell the FBI that there was physical surveillance, the last question I asked
you, if they would have asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you
have told them, and you said yes?
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; sure. I will say.
Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the
following answer:
"Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to Minsk, and you answered
"No; there was none"?
Mr. NOSENKO. It was not right, because it was order given and he was under
periodical surveillance.
Mr. KLEIN. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA document in front of you,
"Memorandum for the Record."
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not have it.
Mr. KLEIN. The Michaels report. I draw your attention to page 9.
Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you read the first question and the first answer?
Mr. NOSENKO. "Was he physically surveilled ?"
"No; there was none."
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever give that answer to that question?
Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember; it's not right, the answer.
Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this tape, which is marked "3 July '64, Reel No.
66," be deemed marked for identification.
Chairman STOKES. Indicate for the record the marking.
Ms. BERNMO. JFK F-7.
[The item referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-7 for identification.]
[Material referred to is retained in appropriate files.]
Chairman STOKES. We will recess for about 5 minutes.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Chairman STOKES. The committee is back in session.
During the recess the witness made a request of the Chair that he be permitted
to make a brief statement prior to counsel for ,the committee resuming
interrogation.
The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize the witness at this time
for such statement as he would like to make.
Mr. NOSENKO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the United States in 1964, 12th
of February. I felt something was going wrong because the attitude on the part
of the officers from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by a
number of remarks, their behavior Besides, I was in a psychological process.
It's a very big thing, when you are coming to live in a new country. I felt the
country where I was born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological
basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very serious thing.
A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on checkup for the doctor,
and this checkup turned to be arrest. Arrested was in very rude form, nobody
beat me physically, no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person,
of human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was smoking from 14 years
old, never quitted. I was rejected to smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read
thing. I was sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and that
is all.
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525
I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because how I tried not to
think about food. I was thinking about food because all the time I want to eat.
I was receiving very small amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind
of attic; it was hot, no air-conditioning, cannot breathe; windows--no windows,
closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week, to take showers once a week.
From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions were inhuman,
conditions in this place; and later transferred in another place, which is now I
know where it was, the second place . . . [U.S. Government property outside
the Washington area] where certain house and the same very, very Spartan
conditions; 3 1/2 years. Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs
and sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know, and don't
want to know.
What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally, without due process of
law, without--in violation of Constitution, which was found by the Rockefeller
Commission. It wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who was
over 3 years in extremely Spartan conditions.
Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me an hour to sleep.
Interrogations were in very hostile manner. Simply, what I would say were
rejected. How long I will be, why it is without due process, no warrants; "You
will be eternally, 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why I
consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns this period of time
are illegal, and I am not recognizing them and don't want to see them. And I am
asking you not to ask questions based on this interrogations, including trying
to play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult to return
back. I passed through hell. I started new life in 1969 only because I was true
defector. I never raised this question with correspondents. I never went in
press, because I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't want to
hurt the country.
I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA. I didn't consider the
whole CIA was responsible. Were responsible several people, for this. Thank God
they are not working there anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I
would be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only the
agencies, the intelligence service of the United States, I will hurt the
interests of the United States. Who would like to defect, reading in what
conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.
Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started humane relations
with me, which was started at the end of 1967. I still was under arrest but I
was transferred from the extremely Spartan conditions, and with me started to
work Mr. Bruce Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases,
through everything. People who were talking with me before were coming with what
they were told, how to approach to me, how to treat me. They have come with made
opinion, before whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it is all
unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done by anyone in CIA up
until the end of 1967.
Chairman STOKES. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?
Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.
[Note: The committee granted Mr. Nosenko's request and the questioning did not
continue.]
Statement of Yuri Nosenko, August 7, 1978
Page 525
II. STATEMENT OF YURI NOSENKO MADE TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
AUGUST 7, 1978
In accordance with a request of the staff of the committee (House Select
Committee on Assassinations), I make the following statement describing the
conditions of my imprisonment from April 1964 till the end of 1967.
On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical checkup and a test on a lie detector
somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical checkup and after that I
was taken in another room for the test on a lie detector.
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526
After finishing the test an officer of CIA, John, has come in the room and
talked with a technician. John started to shout that I was a phoney
and immediately several guards entered in the room. The guards ordered me to
stand by. the wall, to undress and checked me. After that I was taken upstairs
in an attic room. The room bad a metal bed attached to the floor in the center
of this room. Nobody told me anything how long I would be there or what would
happen to me. After several days two officers of CIA, John and Frank, started
interrogations. I tried to cooperate and even in evening hours was writing for
them whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating
me about a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then
they stopped to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room
till the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965.
The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once in a
week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and a
toothpaste and food given to me was very poor (I did not have enough to eat and
was hungry all the time). I had no contact with anybody to talk, I could not
read, I could not smoke, and I even could not have fresh air or to see anything
from this room (the only window was screened and boarded).
The only door of the room had a metal screen and outside in a corridor two
guards were watching me day and night. The only furniture in the room was a
single bed and a light bulb. The room was very, very hot in a summertime.
In the end of 1964 there were started again interrogations by several different
officers. The first day they. kept me under 24 hours interrogation. All
interrogations were done in a hostile manner. At the end of all those
interrogations when I was told that it was the last one and asked what I wanted
to be relayed to higher ups I said that I was a true defector and being under
arrest about 386 days I wanted to be put on trial if I was found guilty or
released. I also asked how long it would continue. I was told that I would be
there 3,860 days and even more.
This evening I was taken by guards blindfolded and handcuffed in a car and
delivered to an airport and put in a plane. I was taken to another location
where I was put into a concrete room with bars on a door. In the room was a
single steel bed and a mattress (no pillow, no sheet, and no blanket). During
winter it was very cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after
some time. Except 1 day of interrogation and 1 day of a test on a lie detector I
have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor (guards were not allowed to
talk with me).
After my constant complaining that I needed fresh air--at the end of 1966 I was
taken almost everyday for 30 minutes exercise to a small area attached to this
cell. The area was surrounded by a chain link fence and by a second fence that I
could not see through. The only thing I could see was the sky. Being in this
cell I was watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass the time a
couple of times I was making from threads chess set. And every time when I
finished those sets immediately guards were entering in my cell and taking them
from me. I was desperately wanting to read and once when I was
given a toothpaste I found in a toothpaste box a piece of paper with
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527
description of components of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it (under
blanket) but guards notice it and again it was taken from me. Conditions in both
(first and second) locations were analogical.
I was there till November [sic October] of 1967. Then I again was transferred
blindfolded and handcuffed to another location. In this new place I had a room
with much better conditions. And Mr. Bruce Solie (CIA officer) started
questioning me every day (excluding Sundays) touching all questions concerning
my biography, carrier in the KGB and all cases of the KGB known to me. I was
imprisoned for the whole 5 years. And I started my life in the USA in April of
1969.
August 7, 1978.
NOSENKO, Y.I.
Excerpts of Deposition of Bruce Solie, June 1, 1978
Page 527
III. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF BRUCE SOLIE BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 1, 1978
INTRODUCTION
During the period that the committee was speaking with Nosenko, it was also
taking depositions from various officials and former ficials of the Central
Intelligence Agency. One of the first to be questioned was the security officer
who conducted the CIA investigation that determined in 1968 that Nosenko was a
bona fide defector. This officer was deposed by the committee on June 1, 1978.
Part of the questioning concerned the extent of his investigation into the
statements Nosenko made about Oswald and his conclusions about the truth of
those statements. Significant sections of that deposition follow:
EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION OF BRUCE SOLIE BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 1, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. Prior to 1967 Nosenko had been questioned about Oswald. Did you read
any transcripts of his answers relating to Oswald?
Mr. SOLIE. I did not see all of that. The interviews concerning Oswald, I
believe, were partly done by the FBI and partly done by, particularly after
April I think, were done by SR. I have seen parts of it. I may have seen more of
it in 1967-68.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever compare the different transcripts relating to Oswald,
what Nosenko said to the FBI as opposed to what he said in July 1964, as opposed
to what he said in April of 1964? Did you ever do that?
Mr. SOLIE. No. In the first place, there wouldn't be any transcripts of the FBI
anyway.
Mr. KLEIN. Well the statements. The FBI had statements.
Did you ever compare that, compare that with what--
Mr. SOLIE. No, not word by word or line by line, no.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, did you speak to Nosenko about Oswald?
Mr. SOLIE. No. Well, all I have, you have there. I did a Writeup on it. I didn't
see that it seriously conflicted with what we had.
Mr. KLEIN. This writeup that you are referring to is a three-page writeup, the
first page beginning with the word O-s-v-a-l-d, underlined.
Is that the writeup that you are referring to?
Mr. SOLIE. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And how did it come about that Nosenko provided this information?
Did you ask him for it?
Mr. SOLIE, The transcript will reflect I asked him to prepare it in his own
words on a previous day, a day or two before.
Mr. KLEIN. You asked him to prepare what in his own words?
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I know that the document says something, but I want for the record for you to
state what you asked him rather than referring to the document.
Mr. SOLIE Why don't I use the record.
Mr. KLEIN. Sure.
Mr. SOLIE. The record reflects on January 3, 1968, I asked Nosenko to give me an
account of everything he did in the Oswald investigation.
Mr. KLEIN. And is that three-page--
Mr. SOLIE. The memo was prepared in his handwritten form and what you have here
is a typed copy of the handwritten memo.
Mr. KLEIN. And did you ever question him about what he wrote?
Mr. SOLIE. No, because I had no reason to disbelieve him.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever compare what he wrote to what he had said in earlier
interrogations by either the FBI or by the CIA?
Mr. SOLIE. All of this information was provided to the FBI. They would be in a
much better position for that judgment than I would be. The information was
available to the FBI.
Mr. KLEIN. I understand that they had it, so they could have compared it if they
wanted to, but did you ever compare it?
Mr. SOLIE. I did not have all the information on the Oswald investigation. That
was an FBI investigation.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, was it available to you if you had asked the FBI for their
reports of what Oswald had said to them?
Mr. SOLIE. It might, under certain circumstances, but in this case here, as far
as our office was concerned, the Oswald matter was an FBI matter.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the Oswald matter have any relevance to the bona fides of
Nosenko?
Mr. SOLIE. A factor to be considered.
Mr. KLEIN. So then to that extent wouldn't it be a CIA matter, too?
Mr. SOLIE. I fail to see what you are driving at. You are assuming that Nosenko
was dispatched.
Mr. KLEIN. No; that is not correct. My purpose is simply to determine to what
extent the Oswald aspect of what Nosenko said was investigated. I have no
assumption whatsoever about him being dispatched.
Mr. SOLIE. That he has no more information from what had been obtained from him
in various interviews in 1964, and had been furnished to the Bureau.
Mr. KLEIN. That is precisely my question, when you made your judgment in 1967,
did you compare what he was saying in 1967 to what he said in 1964? Did you know
what he said in 1964?
Mr. SOLIE. There was no conflict as far as I was aware of.
Mr. KLEIN. That was my question.
Mr. SOLIE. As far as I am aware of.
Now, again, the Oswald investigation, I don't know the extent of it. This only
concerns one little aspect of Oswald's life.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all the statements made
by Nosenko about Lee Harvey Oswald beginning 1962 or 1964, whenever he was
first--well, actually not 1962, in 1964, up to the statement which he wrote out
for you in 1968? Is that when this statement was written?
Mr. SOLIE. I think about the first of January.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all prior statements with
this statement?
Mr. SOLIE. No; I wouldn't say all prior, no.
Mr. KLEIN. After Nosenko wrote this account of his contact with Oswald and his
knowledge of Oswald, was he questioned by you about what he had written?
Mr. SOLIE. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Was he questioned by anybody, to your knowledge?
Mr. SOLIE. I don't recall whether at a later date the FBI may have touched on
Oswald with him. It is possible, but that would have been at a later date.
Mr. KLEIN. For your report, your 1968 report, he was not questioned.
Mr. SOLIE. Yes.
* * * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Do you believe that Nosenko has told the truth in what he said
relating to Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. SOLIE. YES; I have no reason to disbelieve him. Again, I am commenting on my
specific knowledge. I have not discussed this matter with him. I imagine the
committee has discussed this in detail with him. I imagine---
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Mr. KLEIN. Considering the fact that you haven't discussed it with Nosenko,
would it be fair to say, and if not, correct me, would it be fair to say that
you, your belief in Nosenko's credibility as to what he says about Oswald is
really based in your belief of his credibllity in all the other aspects which
you did check out, as opposed to specific knowledge of the Oswald part of the
case?
Mr. SOLIE. It has a certain relationship, not necessarily--it is not necessarily
conclusive, but if the person tells you the truth about--and you can prove it on
this, this, this, and this, and you have this one you can't quite prove because
it is not provable, it would have an effect on your opinion. Then you should
look to see are there any holes.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, I am really giving you the converse of this. Does the fact that
you know or believe that he is telling the truth on A, B, C, and D, did that
more or less lead you to say that you believe he is telling the truth about
Oswald because you really were not able to check out the Oswald aspect of this
case?
Mr. SOLIE. No; I wouldn't quite say that. There were other cases you couldn't
quite check out. You have got to believe it or you don't believe it.
Mr. KLEIN. Then if that wasn't it, what specifically leads you to believe that
he was telling the truth when he told you his account of Oswald?
Mr. SOLIE. Well, to make me think otherwise, I have got to see some evidence or
someone to show me that he is not telling the truth. You have to have some
contrary information.
And I have seen no contrary information.
Mr. KLEIN. So you start off with a presumption that he is telling the truth, and
that has to be rebutted to some extent in order to question his statement on
Oswald.
Mr. SOLIE. Well, your opinion of something is, you know, an opinion is an
opinion. Some things are provable and some things are not provable.
Mr. KLEIN. I am not trying to get into a word game. What I am really saying is
he has got three pages that he has written out and given to you.
Mr. SOLIE. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. And you have told me that you believe what he says, and I am trying
to understand specifically what you base your belief on, that these three pages
are correct.
Mr. SOLIE. I didn't have a part in the Oswald investigation. I did not talk to
Nosenko in 1964 concerning the Oswald case or any other case. It is regrettable
that this whole situation arises and in 1967 we are trying to resolve something
that should have been resolved in 1964. So Oswald was gone over and over and
over in 1964 by the FBI and by SR. I see nothing that says it wasn't true. What
am I supposed to do, go over this again point by point by point?
Is there anything I have a reason to disbelieve his statement?
Mr. KLEIN. But when you say it was gone over in 1964, the people who were
conducting the interrogations for the CIA in 1964 did not believe that Nosenko
was credible, is that correct?
Mr. SOLIE. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. So as far as the CIA was concerned nobody had ever said that Nosenko
was credible when he talked about Oswald.
So my question to you is, you can't base your belief that Nosenko was credible
when he talks about Oswald on what the CIA had done.
Mr. SOLIE. And the FBI. The FBI talked to him, too.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you saying that you based your belief in his credibility about
Oswald on the FBI, what they found?
Mr. SOLIE. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Let me make it simpler. I am trying to make clear my question. When I
read your lengthy report, in many areas you go into long discussions as to why
you have accepted a particular claim by Nosenko, why you have accepted he was a
KGB officer, why you have accepted he is who he says he is, and why you have
accepted that he served in a particular department he says he served.
And you gave specifics. You checked the things out. My question is, on what do
you base your belief that he is telling the truth about Oswald; because I have
read no specifics in the report or anywhere else explaining that?
Mr. SOLIE. Well, tell me what is there that is checkable?
Mr. KLEIN. I am not saying that there is. I am asking you if there was anything
that was checked out, or if there was anything that was done at all to determine
whether he was credible when he spoke about Oswald?
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530
Mr. SOLIE. Well, this is one of the factors I had to consider in connection with
the entire case. I have accepted it, and I will continue to accept it until
someone can show me some contrary evidence, not opinion.
Mr. KLEIN. One of the things that Nosenko states is that the KGB never
personally interviewed Oswald. They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald stated
he wanted to defect, and they didn't interview Oswald when they decided to
allow him to stay in Russia and sent him to Minsk.
In your opinion, based on your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your knowledge of
the Oswald case, based on your knowledge of KGB procedures and techniques, do
you find Nosenko credible when he says they never interviewed Oswald?
Mr. SOLIE. The question of what is meant by interview, a formal interview,
taking him down to the local KGB headquarters, if that is what is mean---
Mr. KLEIN. What I am referring to is a KGB officer speaking face to face with
Oswald, maybe not identifying himself as a KGB officer, but speaking to him
under whatever identity he chooses, Nosenko says that never happened. My
question to you is, do you find this credible?
Mr. SOLIE. Speaking to the best of his knowledge, I will have to--I will accept
it.
Mr. KLEIN. Why would you accept that?
Mr. SOLIE. Because it could happen.
Now, that wouldn't say that the KGB didn't have a large book on him.
Mr. KLEIN. Was any work ever done to check out the feasibility of statements
such as this ? For example, checking to see what the experiences of other
defectors were, whether they ever were debriefed by KGB officers? Was that ever
done, to your knowledge?
Mr. SOLIE. No; not unless the individual had been interviewed for some other
reason, but not to check against the Oswald case because the Oswald
investigation was an FBI investigation.
Now, whether there have been some who were in Russia in a proximate period of
time and had been interviewed, it is very possible. You would almost have to
confine yourself to a proximate period of time because the international
situation changed from year to year. So the comparison should be within the
approximate period of time.
Mr. KLEIN. Nosenko was given how many lie detecter tests, to your knowledge?
Mr. SOLIE. Three.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you consider any or all of these tests to have been valid?
Mr. SOLIE. I consider the last test to be a completely valid test; that is, the
1968 test. I would prefer that you be in actual discussion concerning the
polygraph techniques with someone else from our office because I am not an
operator.
Mr. KLEIN. I understand that, and I will only confine myself to questions
relating to how you incorporated the lie detector information into your report.
The first two tests you do not consider them to be valid, is that correct?
Mr. SOLIE. I consider them not only to not be valid, to be completely invalid.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor aspect of
the investigation into Nosenko's bona fides?
Mr. SOLIE. No.
Mr. KLEIN. How would you characterize the Oswald aspect?
Mr. SOLIE. It was an important part to be considered.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that it received the full consideration and the time and
effort to investigate it, the Lee Harvey Oswald aspect?
Mr. SOLIE. There was a tremendous amount of investigation done in 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. If it were to be proven that Nosenko was not truthful in his
relation, in what he said about Lee Harvey Oswald, would that be significant as
to the question of whether Nosenko was bona fide?
Mr. SOLIE. It would be something I would have to consider.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think it Is possible that he could be lying about Oswald and
still be bona fide?
Mr. SOLIE. I do not consider that he was lying about Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. I'm sorry?
Mr. SOLIE. I do not consider it.
Mr. KLEIN. If it were proven that he was lying about Oswald, do you think that
that would change your opinion as to whether he was bona fide?
Mr. SOLIE. It sure would.
Excerpts of Deposition of David Murphy, August 9, 1978
Page 531
531
IV. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978
INTRODUCTION
Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to
be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall
responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964-67, when
Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about
the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned
Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the
Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the
Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.
EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was
he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly
sure of the legal--I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts,
he was in the custody of the IC.
Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary
responsibility for Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. The Soviet Russian Division.
Mr. KLEIN. Of which you were the Chief?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?
Mr. MURPHY. Beginning in 1968.
Mr. KLEIN. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary
responsibility for Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the
spring of 1967.
Mr. KLEIN. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that
time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet
Russia Division to another division?
Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of
1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which
Solie was a member.
Mr. KLEIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary
responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he
was kept, what he was asked?
Mr. MURPHY. I was responsible for the case.
Mr. MURPHY. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the
Division.
Mr. KLEIN. But they would report to you?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment
received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is
that correct?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.
Mr. MURPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under
consideration changed and Nosenko was not, permitted to evade questions or to
decide when he would or would not want to respond.
Mr. KLEIN. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as
conditions and how it was changed?
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Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko
to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we wanted to
discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit
still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which
made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And, the most important
aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with
inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.
Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?
Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart.
Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual
interogation sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed, at
that time?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by
people from the Soviet Russia Division?
Mr. MURPHY. That is right.
Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated
chosen?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. subject areas? This is a guess, this is
a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people
thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that.
In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By
that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the
truth or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard
on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations
relating to possession of information in the hands of the interrogators which
then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.
One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other
breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially
a factor of the tactics of the debriefing.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were
determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire
to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence
agency ? In other words, knowledge of the operation.
Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end
of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of
what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense,
and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it
made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data
he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct,
and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it,
the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was
not considered acceptable.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about
Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February
or March.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?
Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back
and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of
interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by
them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair.
There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that It would be possible for the
Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active
U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think,
that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it
seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.
I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on
or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of
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533
the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand
that Nosenko was--much of what he said was true.
Mr. KLEIN. You are talking about other areas?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much
relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one
coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and
all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in
Nosenko's statements about Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, that they just--this is part of the first one--no contact was
ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact.
The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person.
Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to Jay
Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the
American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.
Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough.
It seemed to me to be strange.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed
Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union nobody tried to find out what he
knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they
decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some
kind of a Western security agent or working for the CIA?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, they would be two different points The first point clearly
involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background
and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of
view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did
the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators
handling operational traffic involving U-2's.
Mr. KLEIN. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB
knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of
that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from
which the U-2's took off and landed?
Mr. MURPHY. I think it would be strange.
My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of
your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no
indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there
is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that
would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close
order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a
radar operator or that he be known to have been a--they would talk to him about
his military affiliation just as we would.
I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the
Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very,
very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is
that they will not ascribe to the Soviet the same elemental competence that we
have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in
the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to
a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in
a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have
you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy,
that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I
guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or
many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an
atmosphere of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is
important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.
Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over you
trouble with Nosenko's statements almost 30 years, is that what is giving about
Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. And other things.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned
like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?
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Mr. MURPHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that
the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case,
were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence
officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who
felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.
Mr. KLEIN. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it
be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you
have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for
questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. Probaby not.
Mr. KLEIN. Why would that have been?
Mr. MURPHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally interesting
aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred abroad and
involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in
the Soviet Union.
Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who would
question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?
Mr. MURPHY. [CIA employee], chief of the group.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his
interrogators?
Mr. MURPHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good, the
fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA
interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the
first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go
back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to
expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a
lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in
depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had
available and there were a variety of criteria.
Mr. KLEIN. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is
our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter
had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's
background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person
would be used that you can tell us?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he
was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I
wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of
us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.
Mr. KLEIN. Two points.--
Mr. MURPHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was levelheaded,
extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He
was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then
has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.
Mr. KLEIN. But wouldn't
Mr. MURPHY. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying, he
knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I
don't know.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I
told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other
than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they
would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least
given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew
about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?
Mr. MURPHY. I would certainly think so.
Mr. KLEIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a
week ago when we spoke. to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the
knowledge is gained from that, that since I have not seen the typed up
deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my
recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation
experience, and my question is would that be---
Mr. MURPHY. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people,
relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of
interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA
debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either
abroad,
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535
might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't
squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced
interrogators.
Mr. KLEIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a
number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English,
there was no Russian.
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major
operation in the Bureau in 1964?
Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.
Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be
used to interrogate him?
Mr. MURPHY. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean
[CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain
why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on
Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing
that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that
area at that time.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?
Mr. MURPHY. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. KLEIN. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about
whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?
Mr. MURPHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various
things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to
talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who
handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use
these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they
all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.
Mr. KLEIN. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those
years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to
tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?
Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in
April?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. MURPHY. It indicated he was lying on several key points.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?
Mr. MURPHY. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in 1966?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. MURPHY. Same thing.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?
Mr. MURPHY. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the
same operator who gave him the test in 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. That is correct.
Excerpts of Deposition of James C. Michaels and Alekso Poptanich, August 11,
1978
Page 535
V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11,
1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In a further effort clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his
statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his present testimony, the
committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the
1964 interviews. These agents were
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536
questioned to determine if Nosenko was drugged, whether he was able to
understand the questions, and what was the general atmosphere that prevailed
during the interviews. Portions of those depositions follow:
EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION oF JAMES C. MICHAELS BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, JULY 27, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. Are you an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I am.
Mr. KLEIN. How long have you been employed there?
Mr. MICHAELS. Since January 1956.
Mr. KLEIN. I would like to direct your atention to July of 1964. At that time
you were employed by the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I was.
Mr. KLEIN. At that time did you have occasion to speak to Yuri Nosenko?
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I did.
Mr. KLEIN. What was the nature of the conversations that you had with Mr.
Nosenko?
Mr. MICHAELS. I was one of the officers who was assigned to debrief Nosenko on
his career in the KGB.
Mr. KLEIN. How many officers were assigned to the debriefing?
Mr. MICHAELS. At that time it was mostly two of us.
Mr. KLEIN. When did you first begin the debriefing of Mr. Nosenko?
Mr. MICHAELS. I don't know the exact date. That it was in April or May of 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. At the time you began debriefing him was he already in what we would
call solitary confinement or hostile interrogations?
Mr. MICHAELS. At that time I would say that he was in confinement. The nature of
the talks with him at that time was more debriefings than interrogation.
Certainly there was interrogation involved in the debriefing but it was not a
hostile interrogation.
Mr. KLEIN. What division were you in at the time you began speaking to Mr.
Nosenko? What division of the CIA, that is?
Mr. MICHAELS. I was in what was then called the Soviet Russian Division.
Mr. KLEIN. Who was the Chief of that Division?
Mr. MICHAELS. The Chief of the Division at that time was Mr. David E. Murphy.
Mr. KLEIN. How long had you been in that Division at that time?
Mr. MICHAELS. I had been in that division in headquarters for slightly over 1
year.
Mr. KLEIN. Prior to your interviews with Mr. Nosenko had you debriefed any other
KGB defectors?
Mr. MICHAELS. I do not believe that I had debriefed any KGB defectors prior to
that time.
Mr. KLEIN. Prior to the interview with Nosenko had you been involved in any
investigations of any KGB defectors? Investigations into their bonafides?
Mr. MICHAELS. I don't recall that I was involved in any investigation of KGB
defectors. I had been involved in the investigation of one East European officer
defector.
Mr. KLEIN. At the time that you began debriefing Mr. Nosenko would it be fair to
consider you at that time an expert on the KGB?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; I don't think so.
Mr. KLEIN. At the time when you began debriefing Mr. Nosenko had you read files
or done any research in order to increase your knowledge about Lee Harvey
Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. I cannot specifically recall having read any files pertaining to
Lee Harvey Oswald. Certainly I had read and heard a lot about him in the
newspapers, television, and radio. I may have had the opportunity to read some
previous debriefings of Nosenko concerning Oswald but I am not sure of that.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you at any time read any FBI interviews with Nosenko pertaining
to Oswald prior to your interviews with Nosenko?
Mr. MICHAELS. I am not sure. I may have.
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Mr. KLEIN. Concerning the physical appearance, at any time did he appear to have
been beaten when you were debriefing him or during that period?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; I never saw him at any time that he appeared to have been
beaten.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever complain to you or state to you that he had been
physically abused in any manner?
Mr. MICHAELS. To the best of my recollection, no.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he always appear to understand what you would say to him during
your sessions with him?
Mr. MICHAELS. Essentially he understood quite well. If he did not understand not
understood.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he speak coherently during those sessions?
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; very much so.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to describe him as cooperative during those
sessions.
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; it would.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever appear to be drugged during any of the sessions you had
with him?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; he did not.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever complain of being drugged?
Mr. MICHAELS. I don't believe he ever complained to me about ever having been
drugged.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any knowledge of his complaining to anybody else about
being drugged?
Mr. MICHAELS. Well, I have heard recent comments.
Mr. KLEIN. I mean at the time did anything occur which led you to believe that
he was telling the officials at that point that he was being drugged, back in
1964?
Mr. MICHAELS. My recollection is that he had explained or stated that he thought
he was being drugged in some fashion on some occasions but I can't recall that
this ever happened as early as the period around July 1964 when I was talking to
him about Oswald. It may have been sometime later. But as I say, I have no
recollection that he ever raised this directly to me.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, he never raised it with anybody until after the
questioning relating to Oswald in July 1964?
Mr. MICHAELS. I could not say that precisely because I do not recall it
precisely.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, was he drugged at any time while you were speaking
to him?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; he was not. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever exhibit any what we might call symptoms of being drugged
when you were debriefing him?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; he never exhibited any symptoms that I would relate to his
having been drugged.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you believe that he was hostile to you while you were debriefing
him?
Mr. MICHAELS. To me personally?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes.
Mr. MICHAELS. No; I don't think he was hostile to me.
Mr. KLEIN. Did he always answer questions that you asked him to the best of his
ability, so far as you could tell?
Mr. MICHAELS. I don't recall that he ever refused to answer any question. He
would certainly, on some occasions, indicate that he had no knowledge of the
matter about which I was questioning him, but where he claimed to have knowledge
it was his normal practice to answer readily and rather completely.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. You have seen two question-and-answer transcripts here today. One
dated July 3, 1964, and one dated July 27, 1964. To the best of your
recollection, did you have any other question-and-answer sessions with Mr.
Nosenko on the subject of Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. To the best of my recollection, the report that we looked at of
the interview of July 3, 1964, was the first substantive discussion or
debriefing that I had with Nosenko concerning Oswald. I recall the instance of
the interview of July 27, 1964, which was the subject of the second report we
Page 538
538
reviewed. I could not say with certainty that I did not discuss Oswald with
Nosenko on other occasions. I do not, however, recall specifically any other
detailed or in-depth interviews with him on that topic.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that to the best of your recollection, July
1964, that period of time, was the only time that you discussed Oswald with
Nosenko, say July, August, somewhere in that area?
Mr. MICHAELS. That is the only time that I recall this type of detailed
discussion with him. It is possible that on future occasions when we were
together that I could have been given followup questions, specific questions, to
ask him or that mention of Oswald may have come into discussion of some other
topic.
Mr. KLEIN. But you have no recollection of any other long debriefing sessions
about Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; I do not.
Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, was there any follow up investigation done based
on what Nosenko told you about Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. I am not aware of any particular followup investigations that were
conducted on the basis of my debriefing of Nosenko on Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. You stated that Nosenko's physical and mental condition appeared
constant throughout your debriefings. To the best of your recollection, would
the description that you have given earlier in the statement about his physical
and mental conditions hold true for these two July sessions which dealt with the
subject of Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; definitely.
Mr. KLEIN. You do not recall him at any time appearing drugged when he spoke
about Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. No; not at all.
Mr. KLEIN. To the best of your recollection, he was cooperative and friendly
when he spoke about Oswald?
Mr. MICHAELS. He was quite alert and responsive.
Mr. KLEIN. Did Nosenko know that you were from the CIA when you spoke with him?
Mr. MICHAELS. I am sure he did.
EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF ALEKSO POPTANICH BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS, AUGUST 11, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. Are you currently a special agent for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. How long have you worked for the Bureau?
Mr. POPTANICH. About 27 years.
Mr. KLEIN. I would like to draw your attention to 1964. Were you working with
the Bureau at that time?
Mr. POPTANICH. That is right.
Mr. KLEIN. And what was your job, the division that you were in at that time?
Mr. POPTANICH. Foreign. Counterintelligence, the Soviet area.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you speak fluent Russian?
Mr. POPTANICH. I speak Russian. Fluency is marred to a degree.
Mr. KLEIN. And again, drawing your attention to 1964, did you have occasion, in
early 1964, to interview Yuri Nosenko?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you recall approximately when you first began interviewing Mr.
Nosenko?
Mr. POPTANICH. Well, probably it was sometime in February 1964. Probably early
February sometime.
Mr. KLEIN. And for how long a period did you interview him?
Mr. POPTANICH. Off the top of my head, a couple of months, that is all.
Mr. KLEIN. Approximately how many times would you say you met with him?
Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think we went out there, off the top of my head, twice a
week. If you figure about 8 weeks, about 16 times, maybe. I can't say that for
sure.
Mr. KLEIN. When you say you went out there, what are you referring to?
Mr. POPTANICH. Went to the safe house.
Mr. KLEIN. And at that time that you interviewed him was he under the custody of
the Central Intelligence Agency?
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539
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes, custody or control, however you want to put it.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you have a particular team of people who would take part in your
interviews?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes. There was myself, Maurice A. Taylor, and then there was
Donald E. Walter, and I think at a later date Walter dropped out and Tom
Mendenhal helped out. He is retired. So is Taylor.
Mr. KLEIN. And approximately how long would each session with Nosenko last?
Mr. POPTANICH. I think about 2 hours.
Mr. KLEIN. And were they conducted in English or Russian?
Mr. POPTANICH. That depends. Some were in English, some were in Russian and
sometimes portions in English and sometimes portions were in Russian.
Mr. KLEIN. And were you able to fully understand what he was saying during these
sessions?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes. I think that he made sure that I translated. If I had any
problems with the translation he made sure I was corrected because he understood
enough English and we only interviewed him in Russian when he was irritated,
that is, fully.
Mr. KLEIN. And by the same token, was it your belief that he understood
everything that you were saying or that anybody from our team was saying?
Mr. POPTANICH. Oh, yes, because if there were any questions about his
understanding of English, he would ask me in Russian. There was no question
about being misunderstood.
Mr. KLEIN. There was full comprehension on both sides?
Mr. POPTANICH. Right.
Mr. KLEIN. Did there come a time when you spoke to Nosenko about Lee Harvey
Oswald.
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you recall approximately when that was?
Mr. POPTANICH. The only way I can recall is by the date of this memo, which is
February 28.
Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that these two memos, the first dated February 28, 1964,
and signed by Mr. Taylor, Mr. Walter, and Mr. Poptanich; the second dated March
5, 1964, signed by Mr. Poptanich and Mr. Gheesling--I should say, their names
are typed on these reports, they are not actually signed. I would ask these be
marked for identification.
[The above for referred to memos were marked as JFK exhibits 1 and 2 for the
record.]
Mr. KLEIN. We have marked these exhibits 1 and 2, August 11, 1978, for this
hearing Looking at these two reports, sir, do you recognize them?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. What are they?
Mr. POPTANICH. Well, they are 302's which report our interviews with Nosenko on
February 26 and 27, 1964, and March 3, 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. To the best of your knowledge, are those interviews that you had with
Nosenko about Oswald?
Mr. POPTANICH. To the best of my knowledge; yes. I would say that we probably
went out there and interviewed him on the 26th the first time and then went back
on the 27th and got the information which verified it all, and then on March 3,
Mary Gheesling, who was at headquarters at the time, got together with me and we
went out and reinterviewed him.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever have an opportunity to see the finished report before you
actually made it an official report?
Mr. POPTANICH. I think that he had. In order to eliminate any questions as far
as accuracy, I think he saw a lot of stuff. Exactly what he saw or what things
we took him, but I think anything of importance was gone over with him and
discussed with him time and time again to make sure we had it accurate.
Mr. KLEIN. Is there any doubt in your mind that the two reports you have in
front of you, JFK exhibits 1 and 2 of this date, are accurate reports of what
Nosenko told you during those interviews?
Mr. POPTANICH. If these are the reports which were taken out of the file, the
original copies of the original which we had typed and dictated on these
particular dates, as far as I am concerned.
Page 540
540
Mr. KLEIN. As you look through them is there any reason for you to believe that
those are not accurate copies of your own reports?
Mr. POPTANICH. No.
Mr. KLEIN. Why don't you look through them?
Mr. POPTANICH. I am not going to be able to remember what he told me 14 years
ago.
Mr. KLEIN. On their face---
Mr. POPTANICH. On their face they look like they are accurated reproductions of
the 302 we used to take and dictate on.
On the 28th this appears to be basically the one. These were apparently taken
from the same report. This looks like all the same material.
Mr. KLEIN. The record should reflect that in the last few minutes you have had
an opportunity to look through the two reports which are marked for
identification.
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. So after having an opportunity to look at those reports they do
appear to be your records, and it is your belief that these reports are accurate
descriptions of what Nosenko told you about Oswald?
Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke with Nosenko, was there any question in your mind as
to whether one might be under some kind of drugs at the time you spoke to him,
not self-administered. I am talking about drugs administered, say, by the
Central Intelligence Agency in order to get him to tell the truth?
Mr. POPTANICH. No; I couldn't answer that, I don't know.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you see any indication that that was the case?
Mr. POPTANICH. No; he seemed to be himself on all occasions.
* * * * * * *
Mr. KLEIN. Did you have any problems with his statement that the Soviet KGB was
essentially uninterested in an American defector who, as it turns out, could
have given them information pertaining to his work as a radar operator at an air
base from which U-2's took off and landed?
Mr. POPTANICH. Not really. They had a good intelligence network and all his
information was dated. It would be probably useless to them except for
propaganda purposes. If he is plenty unstable or if he had a problem where they
felt they couldn't control him or anything, they probably would never
touch him with a 10-foot pole. We wouldn't do it either.
Mr. KLEIN. When you say plenty unstable, you are referring to the fact Nosenko
told you they believed Oswald was plenty unstable?
Mr. POPANICH. Yes, that is my recollection.
Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the top of page 28, on the March 5, 1964 report, just that
first paragraph underlined. Is that what you are referring to, the reference
there to the fact Nosenko believed he was abnormal and they just weren't
interested in him as a result of that?
Mr. POPTANICH. Certainly, if the information he had was dated. A lot of
intelligence is dated and of interest today, tomorrow in ain't worth a damn.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you essentially believe from whatever knowledge you had, maybe
just your experience as an intelligence officer, what Nosenko had to say about
Oswald?
Mr. POPTANICH. I accepted it at face value. He gave it to us. We had no reason
to not believe him and I accepted it at face value. If I was predisposed to have
my own conclusions and I would say to myself I don't think they would have done
this or I think the Soviets would have reacted in a different manner, then I
wouldn't beleive him, and I think this is the wrong premise to start with when
you are interviewing somebody like this. You have to start with the basic
premise you accept the information and then you go out and you verify it or
disprove it, and that is what we did with almost all the information we got
Nosenko.
Page 541
541
Mr. KLEIN. These reports are quite detailed. Nosenko gives names of other
officers and there is a lot of information in here about Oswald. Is it your
recollection that Nosenko had a good memory of the entire Oswald case at the
time you spoke to him?
Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think all these guys who come out have good memories,
such as yours when you leave this job here you will remember a lot of these
things for years to come because you are deeply involved in daily events and
these things become ingrained to you. I think this is the same thing with these
intelligence officers. They come over here and they talk to us and they have
excellent memories, especially those who were predisposed to defect and they
build a memory because they want to remember these things.
Now, in Nosenko's case, if he worked with it, I am sure he would remember it, or
anybody had talked to him about it, because it was that important, because these
intelligence officers sit around and they discuss these things and discuss them
over drinks and get half drunk, and that is where you get a lot of your
information.
Mr. KLEIN. Along that line, do you recollect that he did have a very good memory
of the facts in these reports?
Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think he had a good memory, yes. He had a good memory on
a lot of things.
Letters of CIA September 1, 1978 and FBI January 8, 1979
Page 541
VI. LETTERS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1978, AND FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF JANUARY 8, 1979
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to resolve questions that remained on the official positions of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Nosenko
and the nature of the investigations into the Oswald aspect of the Nosenko case,
the committee submitted questions to both the CIA and the FBI. The questions and
the answers follows:
Page 542
542
LETTER OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1978
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Washington, D.C. 20505
Office of Legislative Counsel
1 September 1978
Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel & Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Blakey:
Forwarded herewith are answers to the interrogatories received at close of
business on 28 August 1978.
Sincerely
S. D. Breckinridge [signature]
S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Attachment
JFK Exhibit F-537
Page 543
543
Question #1
Enumerate the name of any drug given to Nosenko and the date it was administered
-- including those given for "therapeutic" purposes -- from January 1964 to
1968.
Drug Date Administered
Zactrin August 24, 25, 1965
Tetracycline August 24 thru 29, 1965
Thorazine August 30, 1965
Donnatal August 30, 31, 1965
Donnatal September 27, 1965
Tetracycline December 17, 1965
Tetracycline May 31 thru June 6, 1967
Antihistamine September 26, 1965
Cough Syrup September 26, 1965
Page 544
544
Question #2
Describe in detail Nosenko's living conditions from April 4, 1964 through 1968.
The description should include, but not be limited to the following:
a. where he lived
b. the degree to which his movements were restricted
c. his contact with other people
d. his access to radio, television and reading materials such as newspapers and
books
e. the degree to which his actions were "observed"
f. restrictions with regard to his food intake
Answer:
Nosenko was confined at a secure location in the Washington Metropolitan area
from 4 April 1964-13 August 1965. From 14 August 1965-27 October 1967, he was
confined at an installation on U.S. Government property outside the Washington
area. From 28 October 1967-December 1968, Nosenko lived at three secure
locations in the Washington Metropolitan area. His movement was completely
restricted from April 1964-October 1967. From October 1967-December 1968,
particularly after December 1967, there was a gradual relaxation in the control
of Nosenko, although during this period he did not have freedom of movement. By
the latter
Page 545
545
part of December 1968, controls had been relaxed to the point that he was
accompanied to restaurants, movie theaters, and other public locations. His
contact with other people was limited to Agency personnel only from April
1964-December 1968. Nosenko did not have access to TV, radio or newspapers from
April 1964-October 1967. He was provided with a limited number of books to read
from April 1964-November 1965 and from May 1967-October 1967. His reading
privileges were suspended from November 1965-May 1967. From October
1967-December 1968, he was provided with an increasing quantity of books and
other reading materials. Materials were screened to preclude exposure to current
events until mid-1968. In August 1968, Nosenko was given a TV set.
Nosenko was under constant visual observation from April 1964-October 1967.
Commencing in October 1967, though Nosenko remained in protective custody,
actual visual observation was relaxed. From April 1964-October 1967, Nosenko
received a regular diet of three meals a day. Periodically, during this time,
his diet was modified to the extent that his portions of food were modest and
restricted. After October 1967, Nosenko received a regular diet. From April
1964-October 1967, he was under regular medical observation.
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546
Question #3
Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements with the Central
Intelligence Agency. Include:
a. the dates and nature of his employment
b. the services rendered by Nosenko
c. itemized accounting of all compensation received by Nosenko
d. an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing
Nosenko's employment and compensation arragements with the CIA.
Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised $50,000 for
previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification, in 1962, of a particular
espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future services. Mr.
Richard Helms approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although no effort was
made to fulfill the promise until some five years after Nosenko's defection, the
original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment arrangement and
other monetary remunerations.
Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an
arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment as an independent contractor
effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at
a rate of $16,500 a year. As of 1978, he is receiving $35,327 a year (see
attached annual compensation table for years 1969-1978).
Page 547
547
In addition to regular, yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years
1964-1969 in November 1972, in the amount of $25,000 a year less income tax. The
total amount paid was $87,052. He also received, in varying increments from
March 1964-July 1973, amounts totalling $50,000 to aid in his resettlement on
the private economy (see attached table for breakdown). The total resettlement
figure, in effect, satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay
Nosenko $50,000 for previous cooperation.
In 1978 Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise
relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was
compensated in the amount of $28,500, representing the difference between the
$25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1
March 1969- 1 March 1975.
Since 1969, the Agency has contributed to Nosenko's hospitalization insurance
premiums. The Agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and
dental expenses.
To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor, with the
compensation provision being periodically amended. His work for the Agency
includes consultation with both the Agency and the FBI on certain matters of
current interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel
Page 548
548
both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he is also consulted by various
elements of the Agency on current Soviet developments and requirements. He has
been and continues to be used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence
courses the Agency, the FBI, Air Force OSI, and others.
Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any role in authorizing
NoSenko's employment and compensation arrangements with the CIA.
Page 549
549
ANNUAL COMPENSATION TABLE
Effective 1 March 1969 - $16,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1970 - $18,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1971 - $19,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1972 - $21,000 a year
Effective 1 March 1973 - $22,250 a year
Effective 1 March 1974 - $23,750 a year
Effective 1 March 1975 - $25,250 a year
Effective 1 March 1976 - $26,513 a year
Effective 1 October 1976 - $28,105 a year
Effective 1 March 1977 - $33,000 a year
Effective 1 October 1977 - $35,327 a year
1978 - $35,327 a year
RESETTLEMENT FEE TABLE
March 1964 - $2,000
April-May 1969 - $8,000 (furniture and auto)
June 1970 - $25,000 ($20,000 for down payment on house; $5,000 for additional
furniture, moving expenses, and other costs incidental to the purchase of new
home]
July 1975 - $15,000 (balance of resettlement figure promised]
Page 550
550
4. On what dates and for how long was Nosenko questioned by the CIA about Lee
Harvey Oswald--from 1964 to present?
Mr. Nosenko was questioned by CIA about Lee Harvey Oswald on 23 January 1964 and
30 January 1964 in Geneva and on 3 July 1964, 27 July 1964 and 29 July 1964 in
the Washington area. The first four debriefings comprised the entire working
sessions on the respective days; the fifth debriefing occupied the better part
of the day, but not the whole day. In addition, Mr. Nosenko was further
debriefed on 3 and 6 January 1968.
5. When Nosenko was questioned by the CIA about Lee Harvey Oswald, who did the
questioning?
Nosenko was questioned about Lee Harvey Oswald by CIA staff officers with broad
experience in Soviet counterintelligence matters, in general, and the KGB, in
particular.
6. What background, if any, did the interrogator have in interrogations? What
knowledge did the interrogator have with respect to Oswald's background?
CIA does not have a separate professional category of interrogator, although it
does have activities in which interrogation techniques are employed. CIA
operations officers are experienced in questioning and debriefing intelligence
sources, and the personnel involved in this questioning were intelligence
officers with a background in Soviet and counterintelligence affairs.
Page 551
551
7. On the dates that Nosenko was questioned about Oswald does there now exist or
did there ever exist:
a. a tape of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers
b. a transcript of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers,
c. a summary of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers?
a. All five debriefings of Mr. Nosenko, concerning Lee Harvey Oswald, were
taped. These tapes were furnished HSCA representatives on 9 and 12 June 1978.
b. We have been able to locate only a few documents that may be described as
transcripts. There are, however, detailed memoranda of the debriefings.
c. Summaries of the questions and answers were made and retained.
8. What criteria, if any, was used to determine:
a. what subjects to question Nosenko about
b. how much time to devote to each subject
a. The subjects of the questions that were put to Nosenko were based on the
needs and requirements of the intelligence community at that time.
b. Enough time was devoted to the debriefing so that each subject was adequately
covered.
Page 552
552
9. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in the
assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides-- did the CIA
attach during the years 1964-1968 to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?
Of course, Mr. -Nosenko's status as a bona fide defector related to the
credibility of what he said. And this would bear on the credibility of what he
said about Oswald. Whether he was a bona fide defector was the subject of
serious reservations during the Warren Commission inquiry. His statements to the
effect that Oswald was not a KGB agent were reported by Mr. Helms to Chief
Justice Warren, but with the caveat that his bona fides not only had not been
established but were suspect. It is our understanding that the Warren Commission
decided, on the basis of the stated reservations, not to factor Mr. Nosenko's
information into its findings.
CIA did question Mr. Nosenko at great length over an extended period of time. It
was unable to resolve satisfactorily the question of his bona fides until well
after the Warren Commission had completed its work. From the beginning, it was
obvious that if Mr. Nosenko was telling the truth, what he stated about Oswald
and the KGB tended to negate the likelihood of Oswald being involved with the
USSR, as a KGB agent, in the assassination of President Kennedy. Because of the
doubts entertained by CIA about Mr. Nosenko, this information was not acceptable
for use in that respect by the Warren Commission.
Page 553
553
10. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in the
assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides -- does the CIA
attach today to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?
With the acceptance of Mr. Nosenko's bona fides, we believe that the statements
he made about Oswald were made in good faith.
11. If the answer to question 9 is different from the response to question 10,
when did the change occur and why?
This question is not applicable to the preceding questions and answers.
12. What was the CIA's position from 1964.to 1968 on the question of whether
Nosenko is bonafide?
13. What is the CIA's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is
bonafide?
The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed position on Mr. Nosenko
until late 1968. Various persons within CIA entertained serious doubts about his
bona fides, believing in fact that he was a dispatched agent. Had the Agency, as
distinguished from those employees, so concluded he could simply have been
turned back. The final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector, a
judgment that has been reinforced convincingly by 14 years accumulated evidence.
Page 554
554
14. If the answer to question 12 is different from the response to question 13,
when did the change occur and why?
This question is not applicable to the preceding questions and answers.
15. What was the CIA's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Nosenko was telling
the truth in the statement he made to the CIA about Oswald?
See answers to questions 9, 10, 12 and 13.
16. What is the CIA's position today as to whether Nosenko was telling the truth
in the statements he made to the CIA about Oswald?
See answer to question 10.
17. If the answer to question 15 is different from the response to question 16,
when did the change occur and why?
See previous answers.
Question # 18
Why were three polygraph tests given to Nosenko?
Answer:
All of the polygraph examinations of Mr. Nosenko had the same ultimate purpose,
i.e., to contribute to the resolution of the question of his bona fides.
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555
Question # 19
What is the CIA's position with regard to the validity of each of the three
polygraph tests administered to Nosenko?
Answer:
The Agency's position in regard to each test is as follows:
Test #1 (April 1964) - This test is regarded as invalid or inconclusive due to
the instructions given to the polygraph operator prior to the test. According to
the report the examiner was instructed, "that the polygraph interview was part
of an overall plan to help break (Nosenko) regardless of whether (Nosenko)passed
his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his
polygraph interview he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview."
Test #2 (October 1966) - This test is considered invalid or inconclusive because
the conditions and circumstances under which it was administered are considered
to have precluded an accurate appraisal of the results.
Test #3 (August 1968) - This test is considered to be a valid test.
Page 556
556
Question #20
Why was Nosenko asked numerous questions pertaining to Oswald on his 1966
polygraph test and only asked two questions about Oswald on his 1968 test?
Answer:
The primary purpose of the 1968 polygraph test was to assist in the resolution
of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides. Although the 1968 test included only two
questions explicitly relating to Oswald, it also included other questions aimed
at determining whether or not Nosenko had any secret mission from the KGB, or
whether anyone in the KGB was aware of his intention to defect. If Nosenko was
not a dispatched agent, he was a bona fide defector. If he was a bona fide
defector, he did not have the mission of concealing some connection between
Oswald and the KGB. In point of fact, establishment of his bona fides served to
reinforce what he had to say about Oswald--even if some of his beliefs may have
not been precise in all respects.
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Question #21
Who authorized Bruce Solie to reinvestigate Nosenko's bona fides?
Question #22
Why was Nosenko's bona fides reinvestigated in 1968?
It is incorrect to say that Nosenko's bona fides were reinvestigated in 1968. As
of 1967 the Agency had not adopted an official position on this question and his
bona fides were still under review, as they had been since 1962. In 1967, the
DCI, Richard Helms, authorized an independent review of the question of
Nosenko's bona fides in an effort to resolve this longstanding issue and
selected Bruce Solie to be the officer responsible for this independent review.
Page 558
558
23. Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating
Nosenko's statements about Oswald? If neither had primary responsibility, was
there any division of responsibility?
While the FBI had primary responsibility for investigations into the
assassination of President Kennedy, the traditional division of responsibilities
would apply without additional formal arrangements. CIA had primary
responsibility for establishment of Mr. Nosenko's bona fides as a defector, and
for the investigation of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters
abroad. The FBI was responsible for the investigation of domestic intelligence
and counterintelligence matters and those matters relating to internal security
and law enforcement.
Neither agency had the capability for conducting investigations in the USSR, by
way of checking Mr. Nosenko's statements. He could be questioned -- as he was by
representatives of both organizations.
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559
24. What communication, if any, existed between the FBI and CIA with respect to
evaluating and/or investigating Nosenko' s statements about Oswald?
a. A review of CIA's Nosenko/Oswald file reveals that on 6 March 1964 the FBI
Director sent a memorandum to the Director of Central intelligence in which the
former requested that the Bureau be furnished any information in your possession
which would tend to corroborate or disprove Nosenko's information concerning Lee
Harvey Oswald". Attached to the FBI memorandum were copies of two memoranda, one
dated 25 February 1964 and the other dated 4 March 1964. Both memoranda were
captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald."
b. On 28 April 1964, the Agency responded by CI dissemination CSCI-3/780,996 to
the Bureau's request. According to this dissemination, Agency files "contain the
following information from Mr. Nosenko on Oswald which may amplify or contradict
the information forwarded in reference."
c. A copy of CSCI-3/780,996 is attached- This document appears to be the only
one between CIA and the FBI dealing with the evaluation and investigation of the
validity of Mr. Nosenko's statements on Lee Harvey Oswald. (A copy of
CSC1-,3/780,996 was released as document number 498 in response to a request
submitted to the Agency under the Freedom of Information Act.)
Page 560
560
28 April 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT : Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO, Espionage-Russia
1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 March 1964, subject as above,
file (S) 65-68530, in which you requested information which would tend to
corroborate or disprove NOSENKO'S information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD. Our
files contain the following information from NOSENKO on OSWALD which may amplify
or contradict the information forwarded in reference;
a. (1) Source was queried on the OSWALD affair on 23 January 1964. Source
reported that his own Department was involved directly with OSWALD because
OSWALD came to the USSR as a tourist in 1959. He had not come to special Soviet
attention in any way until Source's Department received a report that OSWALD had
asked to become a Soviet citizen. It was implied that Source himself examined
OSWALD's request. The KGB decided to look in OSWALD's case to see if there was
any operational interest, which part of the KGB might have use for him and what
was behind the request. It was decided that OSWALD was of no interest whatsoever
so the KGB recommended that he merely go home to the U.S. as a returning tourist
and there go through the formalities with the Soviet Embassy of requesting to
become a Soviet citizen. OSWALD then made the dramatic gesture of suicide when
he received this response. He had been supposed to go on a trip with other
tourists but failed to show up for the group. At his hotel it was found that his
key had not been turned in at the desk, so it was presumed that he was still in
his room. The Soviets sent to the room, knocked and got no answer so finally
they broke the door down and found OSWALD lying there bleeding to death. Source
himself was not present at this phase of the operation but merely read a report
of it.
Page 561
561
- 2 -
(2) Now worried about the possibility that OSWALD would do this again if refused
asylum, the Soviets decided to give him a temporary residence permit although
they had no intention of giving him Soviet citizenship. We asked why he had been
sent to Minsk and Source replied that this was merely by chance. They had not
wanted OSWALD to stay in Moscow and Minsk was chosen arbitrarily.
(3) Asked about Marina OSWALD, Source said that she was not a confirmed
Communist and had been thrown out of the Komosomol for not paying her dues. She
had no higher thoughts than to live a good life, have better dresses and such
things. She was a stupid woman and had no interest in improving herself. "From
the Soviet point of view she already had anti-Soviet characteristics. She was
not too smart anyway and not an educated person."
(4) Finally OSWALD got tired of living in Minsk and wanted to go back to the
U.S. He had married Marina and wanted to take her with him. The Soviets decided
to let them go and used Marina's uncle to talk to them and persuade OSWALD not
to spread anti-Soviet propaganda after his departure. The uncle pointed out that
the Soviet Government had allowed OSWALD to live here, that he had married here
and the Government was going ot let his wife leave with him, etc.
(5) Asked why the Government had allowed Marina to leave, Source replied that
this was perfectly natural She was legally married and expressed her desire to
leave with her husband. Under Soviet law there is no question but what she would
be allowed to leave.
(6) The thrust of Source's account was that neither OSWALD nor his wife had any
time been of any interest whatsoever to Soviet authorities, that there had not
ever been thought given to recruiting either of them as agents and that, in
fact, the Soviets were glad to get rid of them both.
b. (1) During an interview on 30 January 1964, Source commented that "doctors
examined (OSWALD)," and "there were no indications that he was completely a
psycho." During an ensuing discussion of the possible involvement of the Soviet
government in the assassination of President Kennedy, Source stated, "no matter
how i may hate anyone, but I cannot speak against my convictions and since I
know this case I could unhesitatingly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union
cannot be tied into this (assassination) in any way." He continued that the KGB
was frightened of
Page 562
562
-3-
OSWALD, and would not have discussed such a matter with him. When the
possibility of recruiting OSWALD was brought up, the decision was "absolutely
not." The only involvement permitted was to arrange for Marina PRUSAKOV's uncle
in the MVD (Col. Ilya PRUSAKOV) to ask OSWALD not to spread anti-Soviet
propaganda in the US in view of the fact that he had been allowed to stay in the
USSR and was being allowed to leave. Source commented that he was aware that the
KGB had no subsequent interest in OSWALD because after the assassination of the
President, Source had to make a complete investigation and even sent several KGB
staff personnel to Minsk to investigate on the spot, "not trusting official
papers."
(2) When speaking of OSWALD's request to return to the USSR, Source remarked
that OSWALD "went to Mexico to apply for persission to go to the USSR. Our
people asked Moscow and we said absolutely not because he is completely
undesirable--there was no interest in him whatsoever."
(3) Asked his opinion on Cuban involvement in the assassination, Source stated
that he had no information on this subject, but he did not believe that the
Cuban government was involved. He gave as a reason that if any word of such
involvement had leaked out, Cuba would have been crushed by the US.
2. This agency has no information which would specifically corroborate or
disprove NOSENKO's statements regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.
3. The information in paragraph 1.a. above is based on notes taken during the
first half of the first meeting with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964. The early
portion of the tapes of this meeting could not be recovered because of the level
of external noise. The information in paragraph 1.b. is taken from transcripts
of subsequent meetings. In addition, just after his defection NOSENKO discussed
the OSWALD case on several occasions without adding anything to the information
contained in your Bureau's 4 March 1964 report.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:
(signed: James Angleton)
JAMES ANGLETON
Page 563
563
LETTER OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF JANUARY 8, 1978
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU Of INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C 20533
January 8, 1979
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)
This responds in full to a December 18, 1978, letter to the Attorney General
signed by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, which asked that
the FBI declassify, in toto, a Secret, September 14, 1978, response made to 16
interrogatories pertaining to Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko which were propounded by
the Committee in its letter of September 5, 1978.
Declassification of the September 14, 1978, response required coordination with
the Office of Legislative Counsel, CIA, which interposed no objection to
declassifying certain portions of that. response.
The Committee's attention is invited to the fact that CIA did suggest, with
regard to the response to interrogatory number "8", that the FBI "... may wish
to correct the dates on which the FBI did not have direct access to Mr. Nosenko,
to read 3 April 1964 until 8 December, 1968."
For the convenience of the Committee, the following declassified, verbatim
reiteration of the September 14, 1978, response is provided.
Page 564
564
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
This responds in full to the following enumerated interrogatories submitted for
consideration in a letter, dated September 5, 1978, to the Attorney General and
signed by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.
"1. On what dates and for how Iong was Nosenko questioned by the FBI about Lee
Harvey Oswald-- from 1964 to present?"
The files of the PBI indicate that Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko was interviewed
regarding Oswald and/or the assassination of President John P. Kennedy on
February 26 and 27, 1964, and on March 3, 4 and 6, 1964. The FBI files do not
record the specific duration in whole or in part as to topical discussions, of
those five interviews; however, summary communications indicate the February 27,
1964 interview was conducted on the afternoon of that date and the March 4, 1964
discussion of Oswald occurred at the outset of an afternoon interview on that
date.
"2. When Nosenko was questioned by the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, who did the
questioning?"
The FBI interviews of Nosenko, during which he was questioned about Oswald
and/or the assassination of President Kennedy, were conducted by Special Agents
(SAs) Alekso Poptanich, Maurice A. Taylor and Donald B. Walter on February 26
and 27, 1954; by SAs Poptanich and W. Marvin Gheesling on March 3 and 4, 1964;
and by SAs. Poptanich, Taylor and Walter on March 6, 1964.
--2--
Page 565
565
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
"3. What background if any, did the interrogator have in interrogations? What
knowledge did the interrogator have with respect to Oswald's background?"
There are no retrievable FBI statistics upon which to base a quantification of
the interrogatory experiences of the SA personnel who interviewed Nosenko on the
five pertinent occasions. Suffice it to say, the techniques of cooperative and
hostile interrogations are integral aspects of the training and almost daily
duties-of SA personnel. In that regard, it is noted that during the February and
March, 1954 interviews SA Poptanich had almost 13 years of SA experience; SA
Taylor had over 31 years of SA experience; SA Walter had completed almost 17
years of SA experience; and SA Gheesling had over 13 years of SA experience.
Further, their respective personnel files disclose the following:
SA Poptanich was then fluent in the Russian language (Nosenko's native tongue).
The Annual Report of Performance Rating, dated March 31, 1962, noted that SA
Poptanich, during the previous twelve months, had participated in the
interrogation of a Soviet defector and his knowledge of the Russian language and
mores of the Russian people proved most helpful relative thereto.
SA Taylor, on September 11, 1962, received an incentive award in recognition of
the superior fashion his responsibilities were discharged over an extended
period of time. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Washington Field
Office, in submitting a recommendation for the incentive award, commented that
SA Taylor had demonstrated exceptional ability in the interrogation and
debriefing of three Soviet defectors, all of whom were intelligence officers. SA
Taylor's Performance Rating for the period April 1, 1963--March 31, 1954, noted
he was recognized as the finest interrogator on the Soviet espionage squad in
the Washington Field Office, which accounted for his assignments to interview
Soviet defectors.
--3--
Page 566
566
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
SA Walter was the recipient of a personal letter of commendation, dated October
3, 1963, from the Director, FBI, for his superior work in the handling of a very
sensitive, complicated, fast moving, and highly publicized espionage case.
Previously (on November 7, 1954), he had received a meritorius salary increase
for his outstanding work on another espionage case, successful interrogation
being the key aspect of that investigation.
SA Gheesling, at the time of the pertinent Nosenko interviews, served as a
Supervisor at FBI Headquarters and had considerable experience in espionage,
intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. SA Gheesling supervised the
field investigation of Oswald (from the latter's return to the United States on
June 13, 1952 until September, 1962, and from November 22, 1953 through
mid-1964). He was assigned exclusively to supervisory responsibilities relative
to the assassination of President Kennedy.
While the specific knowledge of Oswald"s background, possessed by these SAs at
the time of the Nosenko interviews, can be answered only by the gas themselves,
SA Gheesling's prior assignment to supervision of the Oswald investigation would
tend to indicate that he, at least, was quite knowledgeable of data contained in
FBI files concerning Oswald.
"4. On the dates that Nosenko was questioned about Oswald, does there now exist
or did there ever exist:
a. a tape of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers;
b. a transcript of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers,
c. a summary of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers?"
As noted in FBI memorandum dated June 19, 1978, captioned as above, and which
was prepared in response to HSCA letter, dated June 13, 1978, to the Attorney
General, FBI records searches have not located any extant tape recordings
-- 4 --
Page 567
567
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
or verbatim transcripts of PBI interviews with Nosenko that concerned Oswald
and/or the assassination of President Kennedy. A document has been located which
indicates that FBI personnel did record the February 26 and 27, 1964, interviews
of Nosenko, among others. Since no recordings or transcripts have been located,
it can be assumed that the recordings were used by the interviewing SAs to check
the accuracy of their notes prior to dictating the results of the interviews. It
is further assumed that, upon verifying the accuracy of summary reportings of
the interviews, the recordings were disposed of since they had served the
purpose for which they were made, although no record of such disposition can be
found. Summary reportings of the five pertinent interviews are extant, and were
delivered to the HSCA on March 21, 1978.
"5. What criteria, if any, was used to determine:
a. what subjects to question Nosenko about;
b. how much time to devote to each subject?"
FBI files do not contain a specific enumeration of criteria used to determine
the particular subjects Nosenko was to be questioned about nor the amount of
time to be devoted to each subject in the questioning.
"6. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in the
assassination as well as to the issue of Nesenko's bonafides (sic) did the FBI
attach during the years 1964-1968 to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?
The FBI, during the years 1954-1958, considered Nosenko's statements about
Oswald to be very significant elements of his initial reportings, the veracity
of which had to be assessed in relation to the totality of information furnished
by him. The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about Oswald, depending upon a
subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the most
authoritative information available indicative of a lack of Soviet governmental
involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.
--5--
Page 568
568
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
"7. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in file
assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides (sic)--does the FBI
attach today to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"
The FBI does not perceive any significant evidence of foreign involvement in the
assassination of President Kennedy, nor does the FBI perceive any credible
evidence that Nosenko's defection was a Soviet ploy to mask Soviet governmental
involvement in the assassination. Therefore, the FBI is satisfied that Nosenko
reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them.
"8. If the answer to question 6 is different from the response to question 7,
when did the change occur and why?"
The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 until April 3, 1969,
and therefore was not in a position to make an objective assessment of his bona
fides nor of the veracity of information furnished by him. Thus, information
provided by him, in early 1964, was accepted at face value and qualified in
terms of the source and the conditions under which it was received. On October
1, 1968, the FBI advised the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that, based upon
a review of material provided by CIA, the PBI found no substantial basis to
conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; however, the FBI did not
reach any overall, definitive conclusions regarding his bona fides because of a
lack of access to Nosenko and all collateral information pertinent to such an
assessment. Effective May 11, 1977, the CIA and FBI concurred that Nosenko was a
bona fide defector, based upon an assessment of the totality of information
furnished by him.
"9. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on the question of whether
Nosenko is bonafide (sic)?"
-- 6 --
Page 569
569
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
The FBI, from 1964 to 1968, characterized Nosenko as a Soviet defector whose
bona fides had not been established.
"10. What is the FBI's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is
bonafide(sic)?"
The FBI currently characterizes Nosenko as a former Soviet Committee for State
Security (KGB) officer who has furnished reliable information in the past, and
considers Nosenko to be a bona fide Soviet defector.
"11. If the answer to question 9 is different from the response to question 10,
when did the change occur and why?"
The answer to question 8 is considered responsive to question 11.
"12. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Nosenko was
telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?"
The FBI did not take a position, from 1964 to 1968, on whether Nosenko was
telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald. The
statements were accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and
the conditions under which they were received.
"13. What is the FBI's position today as to whether Nosenko was telling the
truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?"
The FBI is satisfied that Nosenko truthfully reported the facts about Oswald as
he knew them.
"14. If the answer to question 12 is different from the response to question 13,
when did the change occur and why?"
--7--
Page 570
570
House Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives (HSCA)
As indicated in the responses to questions 7 and 8, the FBI, as of October 1,
1968, found no substantial basis to conclude Nosenko was not a bona fide
defector; as of May 11, 1977, accepted a CIA assessment that Nosenko was a bona
fide defector; and has not perceived any significant evidence, from 1964 to
date, that Nosenko reported other than the facts about Oswald as he knew them.
"15. Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating
Nosenko's statements about Oswald? If neither had primary responsibility was
there any division of responsibility?"
The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about
Oswald that pertained to his (Oswald's) activities in the United States,
including the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary
responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities
abroad.
"16. What communication, if any existed between the FBI and CIA with respect to
evaluating and/or investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"
The FBI forwarded a letter, dated March 6, 1964, from the Director, FBI, to the
Director, CIA, enclosing memoranda dated February 28, 1964, and March 4, 1954,
captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which summarized the results of FBI interviews of
Nosenko regarding Oswald on February 26 and 27, 1954, and March 3 and 4, 1964.
The results of a CIA interview of Nosenko on January 23, 1954, regarding Oswald
were furnished to the FBI in a letter from the CIA dated April 28, 1964. These
particular pieces of correspondence, while not setting forth any specific
requests or investigative leads, were furnished for purposes of evaluation.
Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI
Headquarters files or is not being furnished pursuant to the Memorandum of
Understanding.
-- 8 --
Testimony of the Deputy Chief, S. B. Division, November 16, 1978
Page 571
571
VII. TESTIMONY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF, S.B. DIVISION BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, NOVEMBER 16, 1978
INTRODUCTION
At the committee's public hearings, two former officials of the were questioned
about the Agency's handling of the Nosenko matter. One, former CIA Director
Richard Helms, was also questioned by the committee in an executive session.
Helms was a particularly significant witness because he was involved in most of
the important decisions made with regard to Nosenko. Basically, Helms testified
before the committee that the investigation of what Nosenko said about Oswald
was a thankless job, that the CIA did its best to resolve the issue and that, as
far as he is concerned, the issue remains unresolved.
The other former CIA official to appear was Mr. John Hart. Hart, the author of a
1976 internal CIA report on the Nosenko controversy and its effects on the CIA,
appeared as a result of the committee's invitation to the CIA to send a
representative to respond to the committee's staff report. A copy of the staff
report had been provided to the Agency prior to the date of the hearings. Mr.
Hart spoke for 1 1/2 hours, during which he hardly ever mentioned Lee Harvey
Oswald. When asked by the committee to respond to the staff report, he responded
that he had nothing to say on the subject, since he was not competent in that
area. On further questioning, he did state that the CIA "failed miserably"in its
investigation of Nosenko and in its duty to determine Nosenko's credibility with
respect to Oswald. He also told the committee that he personally would advise
the committee to ignore anything that Nosenko told the committee about Oswald,
although he stressed that there was no bad faith on Nosenko's part.
In response to Mr. Hart's testimony, a former official of the CIA who had been
in a supervisory position during the Nosenko investigation wrote a letter to the
committee and then appeared before the committee in executive session. This
official disputed Mr. Hart's evaluation of the CIA's investigation of Nosenko
and asserted that the CIA did competent job.
Page 572
572
(blank page)
Page 573
EXECUTIVE SESSION
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1978
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in room 2359, Rayburn
House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer [chairman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Present:Representatives Preyer, Dodd, Fithian, and Thone.
Mr. PREYER. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The clerk,
Ms. Berning, is asked to call the names of those authorized to sit on this
committee.
Ms. BERNING. You, Mr. Chairman; Mrs. Burke; Mr. Thone; Mr. Dodd; and Mr. Fithian
will be substituting for Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. PREYEER Thank you.
At this time the Chair will entertain a motion to close the meeting.
Mr. DODD. I would so move, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer to the
rollcall.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Thone.
[No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Mrs. Burke.
[No response.]
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Aye.
Ms. BERNING. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Our witness today, the Deputy Chief, S.B. Division, Mr. D.C., served
as the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the CIA in 1962, at the time
of Mr. Nosenko's first contact with the agency in Geneva, Switzerland, and since
that time, has assisted in further interrogations of Mr. Nosenko.
I understand you have a prepared statement that you propose to read to the
committee and that statement includes a letter dated October 11, 1978, to Mr.
Blakey, the chief counsel of the committee. Is it correct that you would like
that letter to be made a part of the record?
Mr. D.C. If you would, please.
Mr. PREYER. But you propose to read the first part of your statement.
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
(573)
Page 574
574
Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the letter dated October 11, 1978, will be made
part of the record.
[The letter referred to above follows:]
OCTOBER 11, 1978.
Mr. G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief Counsel and Director, Select Committee on Assassinations, House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. BLAKEY: I have read the transcript of the testimony of the CIA's Mr.
John L. Hart, before your Committee on September 15, 1978.
As the former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Bloc Division, so prominently and
so disparagingly featured in that testimony, I may be able to help the Committee
to judge CIA's investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union,
as reported by Yuri Nosenko.
Specifically, I can correct certain misleading impressions left by Mr. Hart. I
would call to your attention at least twenty errors, fifteen misleading
statements, and ten important omissions In his testimony, many of them pertinent
to your task and, together, distorting the entire picture.
Having been publicly dishonored by unfounded statements before your Committee, I
ask for the courtesy of an opportunity to come before the Committee, Publicly if
you are to hold more public hearings, to answer not only for myself but also for
the Central Intelligence Agency, which has misrepresented its own performance.
I mention below a few of the points of error and distortion, leaving many others
to be discussed in person with the Committee. My comments refer to the line
numbers in the draft transcript of Mr. Hart's testimony, and are keyed to the
Committee's twofold purpose as you defined it: of evaluating the performance of
the Agency and of weighing the credibility of Mr. Nosenko.
For clarity I have subdivided these as follows:
(1) Effectiveness of CIA's performance:
(a) in getting the facts about Oswald from Nosenko,
(b) in investigating these facts.
(2) Credibility:
(a) of Mr. Nosenko's statements about Oswald,
(b) of Mr. Nosenko as a source.
After discussing briefly each of these points, I will make, below a few general
comments on the CIA testimony, and will address myself to the matter of
Nosenko's treatment.
CIA's Performance in Getting the Facts From Nosenko
The committee staff report describes accurately the CIA's performance in this
particular aspect of its responsibility. Referring to the Agency's questioning
of Nosenko on July 3 and July 27, 1964, it says on page 7 that the CIA's
questions "were detailed and specific about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The
questions were chronological and an attempt was made to touch all aspects of
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Moreover, CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of
his own remarks so he could add anything more he knew or correct any errors.
(Staff report, pages 8-9.)
Mr. Hart's confusing testimony had the effects of changing the committee's
appraisal. Not only giving the Agency a "zero" rating on all aspects of this
case, he stated flatly that "There was no effort being made to get at more
information he might have." (lines 2848-9) He thus led Mr. Fithian to suggest
that the CIA' had not even taken "the logical first step" of getting Nosenko's
information (3622-8) and led the Chairman to conclude that no investigation of
Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made. (4095-8) In this Mr. Hart
concurred. (4100)
In fact CIA got from Nosenko all he had to say about Oswald. CIA's reports
contain no less than those of the FBI, who questioned Nosenko as long as they
thought they needed to. Your committee seems to have been satisfied that in its
21 to 24 hours with Nosenko it, too, had got everything he had to say. That
added only one new fact, about the KGB's voluminous surveillance reports on
Oswald, which contradicted Nosenko's earlier reports and, as the staff report
notes, in turn contradicted another aspect of Nosenko's story: that the KGB
didn't watch Oswald enough to learn of his courtship of Marina.
Page 575
575
One wonders, therefore, whether Mr. Hart would give your committee a similar
"dismal" or "zero" rating.
In fact, of course, there was nothing more to be got from Nosenko. If there had
been, CIA would have gone doggedly after it, just as the FBI and your committee
would have. Your staff report said that Nosenko "recited" the same story in each
of his three sessions with the committee. The word is apt: Nosenko had "recited"
that story before, to CIA and FBI, each of whom questioned him carefully and
systematically about it.
It is difficult for them to accept the new judgement that CIA's performance on
this aspect deserved a "zero."It could only be a result of confusion engendered
by Mr. Hart.
CIA's Performance in Investigating Nosenko's Reports on Oswald
By alleging general prejudice and misunderstanding on the part of CIA personnel
handling this case, Mr. Hart confused the Committee on the specific question of
CIA's investigation of Nosenko's information.
When Mr. Fithian asked specifically whether the CIA had made any attempt to
verify Nosenko's information on Oswald's KGB contacts, Mr. Hart replied yes, but
then interjected an irrelevant statement about a "climate" of "sick think"; his
aim was presumably to leave the impression that even if another KGB man had
confirmed Nosenko's statements ou Oswald, these dismal CIA people wouldn't have
believed him. (3666) Later Mr. Hart backed off even this degree of approbation,
hinting that maybe, after all. CIA didn't investigate at all: "No such file
(showing investigation via other defectors) came to my attention." (4177) But
Mr. Hart knew very well that no other defectors knew about Oswald's connections
with the KGB.*
The truth lies in the Warren Commission report cited in lines 4146-9, that CIA
just didn't have other sources in the KGB or elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. in a
position to check Nosenko's story. This is not quite the same thing as saying as
the chairman did, that "we now know that the CIA did not investigate what
Nosenko did tell them about Oswald in Russia." (4166) The confusion stems from
Mr. Hart's testimony.
If CIA's failure to have on tap another spy in the KGB who knew about the Oswald
case constitutes "dismal" performance, then that should be so stated. The record
as it stands at least in the transcript, casts an unjustified slur on CIA's
performance in this particular aspect of its task.
By the way, the coincidence that the CIA bad even one KGB source on Oswald in
Russia is worth the committee's notice. Of the many thousands of KGB people
throughout the world, CIA had secret relations with onlY one, and this one
turned, out to have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once, but
on two separate occasions: When Oswald came to Russia in 1959 and again after
the assassination when the Kremlin leadership caused a definitive review of the
whole KGB file on Oswald?** How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus
unbelievably lucky to be able to contribute to the Warren Commission at all. (In
view of other suspicions of Nosenko, the key word in that last sentence is
"unbelievably.")
Credibility of Nosenko's Statements About Oswald
The committee's staff report ably pointed out the contradictions between
Nosenko's various statements. Mr. Hart admitted under Mr. Dodd's insistent
pressure, that Nosenko's testimony about Oswald was "implauseable"and even
"incredible" (3431, 4353, 4396) He went so far as to recommend that it be
disregarded. (3426, 3438, 3467)
However, Mr. Hart exhorted you to believe in the rest of Nosenko's reporting and
to believe in Mr. Nosenko's good faith. (2656, 3252-78, 3348-55) In other words,
he assured you that Nosenko's incredible and unusable testimony about Oswald did
not come as a message from the KGB but only from the confused mind of CIA's
advisor. Therefore, Mr. Hart would have you disregard it rather read it in
reverse.
____________________________________
Page 576
576
To support this recommendation Mr. Hart said: "I cannot off hand remember any
statements which he has been proven to have made which were statements of real
substance other than the contradictions which have been adduced today on the Lee
Harvey Oswald matter, which have been proven to be incorrect."(3253-8)
But the Committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter. Even so, the
committee detected no less than four or five contradictions. Could this, by
extraordinary coincidence, be the only such case?
When it confronted Nosenko with his contradictions, the Committee encountered
the range of Nosenko's excuses and evasions even before the CIA sent Mr. Hart to
make these same excuses for Nosenko. Nosenko told the Committee that he'd been
misunderstood, that he didn't understand English, that he'd been under stress,
drugged, or hallucinating. He would evade the question, saying you shouldn't ask
him what he'd said before, but should ask about the conditions he'd been kept
in. Mr. Hart's testimony must then have resounded like an echo in the Committee
room.
Nosenko even told the Committee staff that he couldn't remember what he had said
before. The oddity of this will not have escaped the Committee's notice. It
shouldn't matter what he'd said before; he was supposedly talking of things he'd
lived through: the KGB files he'd seen, the officers he'd worked with. If these
were real experiences he need only recall them and his reports would, all by
themselves, come out more or less the same way each time (within normal or
abnormal limits of memory, and personality quirks, of which we are all almost as
aware as Mr. Hart). As the Committee learned, Nosenko's reports did not come out
straight, so Nosenko resorted to this bizarre excuse-which makes
the story appear more learned than experienced.
Nonetheless the CIA asks the Committee to take its word that this is the only
time such things happened, the only such testimony by Nosenko that need be
disregarded. But this is particularly difficult to accept on such an important
matter. The Oswald affair, after all, was exciting worldwide interest, and at
the time of the KGB's file review, Nosenko was already a willing secret
collaborator of the CIA. One might expect his powers of retention to work
unusually well here. Yet it is precisely on this matter than CIA tells you that
Nosenko was uniquely fuzzy.
What the CIA did not tell the Committee, what was hidden behind Mr. Hart's
"offhand" inability to remember other such bad performances by
Nosenko-the-man-of-good-faith, was that this performance was in no way unusual.
It was simply the way Nosenko reacted whenever he was interrogated in detail on
important matters. Not only the contraditions, not only the changes in the
story, but the excuses and evasions as well: all were standard Nosenko. This
brings us to the next subject.
Credibility of Nosenko as a Source
This is clearly important to the Committee, which must decide whether Nosenko's
contradictory testimony on Oswald was an aberration, as the CIA pleaded, or a
message from the KGB.
Here are a few of the errors in the CIA testimony which might affect your
decision:
(1) Mr. Hart said, after having reviewed every detail of the case for six months
with the aid of four asistants, "I see no reason to think that he has ever told
an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during those
times when he was under the influence of alcohol he exaggerated." (3352)
Comment: Ten years removed from the case, I can still remember at least twenty
clear cases of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity about the career which gave
him authority to tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters
within his claimed area of responsibility, for which there is innocent
explanation.
Never, before this testimony by Mr. Hart, was drinking adduced as an excuse for
Nosenko's false reporting. He had no alcohol in his detention, during which he
was questioned, as Mr. Hart reminds us, for 292 days. And not by the wildest
excess of faith or credulity can all of the contradictions and compromising
circurestances of the Nosenko case (none of which, oddly enough, did Mr. Hart
mention) be attributed to Nosenko's faulty memory, which Mr. Hart seemed at such
pains to establish.
Page 577
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(2) Mr. Hart said that the suspicions of Nosenko arose from the paranoid
imaginings and jealousy of a previous defector, whom he calls "X". Mr. Hart told
you that "Mr. X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive view of
Nosenko and from that point on, the treatment of Mr. Nosenko was never, until
1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said. (2404--29, 2488-91)
Comments:
(a) It was not X's theories which caused my initial suspicion of Nosenko In
1962. It was the overlap of Nosenko's reports (at first glance entirely
convincing and important) with those given six months earlier by X. Alone,
Nosenko looked good (as Mr. Hart said, 2375-9, 2397-8); seen alongside X, whose
reporting had not previously seen, Nosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters
which overlapped were serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of
(not a general allegation, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested on lines 2419--21
). There were at least a dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still
remember at least eight. Nosenko's information tended to negate or deflect leads
by X.
(b) Later, our suspicions of Nosenko were deepened by concrete matters, not
paranoid suppositions, and many of these lay outside Nosenko's own story and
hence not explicable by his boasting, drinking, or whatnot.
(c) Mr. Hart said that X was masterminding the examinations in many ways."
(2457) In fact X played no role at all in our "examinations" although he
submitted a few questions and comments from time to time. The testimony of CIA
on this point is inexplicable; its falsity must have been evident in the files
Mr. Hart's team perused.
(d) It is simply not true that "the treatment of Nosenko was not devoted to
learning what Mr. Nosenko said." In the Oswald matter alone the Committee has
the record of careful, systematic questionings in January and July 1964. Similar
care was devoted to his other information. The results fill some of those forty
file drawers to which Mr. Hart referred.
(3) Mr. Hart stated, "Quantitatively and qualitatively, the information given by
Mr. X was much smaller than that given by Nosenko." (2470)
Comments:
This breathtaking misstatement hides the fact that Mr. X, paranoid or not,
provided in the first months after his defection information which led to the
final uncovering of Kim Philby, to the detection of several important
penetrations of Western. European governments, proof (not allegation) of
penetration at the most sensitive level of... [allied service] and pointers to
serious penetrations of the U.S. Government.
Mr. X gave, before Nosenko, the current organization and methods of the KGB, and
it was Mr. X who first revealed both of the two KGB operations which Mr. Hart
adduced as proof of Nosenko's good faith. (See (4) and (5) below. )
To be charitable to Mr. Hart, he admitted to the Committee (2434) that he is
"not an expert on Mr. X's ease." His testimony, however, suggests that he has
not read the references to X in the Nosenko files.
(4) Mr. Hart stated, "Mr. Nosenko was responsible for the discovery of a system
of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which had hitherto been
suspected but nobody had enough information on it to actually detect it."
(2328-32)
Comments:
(a) Mr. X had given approximate locations of some of the microphones months
earlier. Neither he nor Nosenko knew precise locations, but both knew the mikes
were there and both could indicate some specific offices where they could be
found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart describes, would have
been done, and the microphone "system" found, without Nosenko's information.
(b) Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement (2350-3) the KGB would "throw away"
already-compromised information to build up a source. Mr. Hart simply hid from
you the fact that this information was already compromised when Nosenko
delivered it.
(c) These microphones were all in the "old wing" of the Embassy. Nosenko also
said, and carefully explained why, no microphones were installed in the new
wing." Mr. Edward Jay Epstein, in his book Legend, says that 134 microphones
were later found there. I think this can be checked, via the State Department.
It would seem to have been CIA's responsibility to tell you about this, once
they had raised the subject of microphones to support Nosenko's bona fides.
Page 578
578
(5) Mr. Hart said, "A very high level KGB penetration in a very sensitive
position in a Western European government was, on the basis of Mr. Nosenko's
lead, arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. There is no reason to believe
that the Soviets would have given this information away." (2354-62)
Comments: Mr. Hart was presumably referring to a man we can here
"Y", although I do not entirely understand his reticence, for this case is very
well known to the public.
Mr. Hart bas made two misstatements here:
(a) Y's reports to the KGB were known to Mr. X, and the ease had thus been
exposed to the West six months before Nosenko reported to CIA. The KGB,
recognizing this, cut off contact with Y immediately after X's defection. Y's
eventual uncovering was inevitable, even though X had not known his name.
Nosenko added one item of information which permitted Y to be caught sooner, and
that is all.
(b) Therefore, contrary to the CIA testimony, there is a "reason to believe that
the Soviets would have given this information away." The reason--that Y was
already compromised--was perfectly clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team
studied.
(6) Mr. Hart told you that Mr. X had confirmed Nosenko's claimed positions in
the KGB. (2431)
Comment: Mr. X said, on the contrary, that he had personally visited the
American Embassy section of the KGB during the period 1960-61 when Nosenko
claimed to have been its deputy chief. X knew definitely that Nosenko was not
serving there.
(7) Mr. Hart said that DC/SB "had built up a picture which was based on a good
deal of historical research about a plot against the West." (4809)
Comment: Like point (2) above, this is part of CIA's effort to belittle the case
against Nosenko. My "picture" of Nosenko's role as a KGB provocateur was based
on concrete factors, which as I have said above cannot be explained by Nosenko's
personality flaws or memory. It was not based on "historical research," as Mr.
Hart knew very well--although it is, in fact, supported by a long history of
Soviet actions of this sort.
At this point a word may be in order about Mr. Hart's contemptuous reference to
"historical research." As I mentioned above, Nosenko's information in 1962
overlapped and deflected leads given shortly before by X, concerning spies in
the U.S. Government. Now, a KGB paper of this period, perhaps what Mr. Hart
would call a historical document, described the need for disinformation
(deception) in KGB counterintelligence work. It stated that just catching
American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with new ones.
Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are essential. And
among the purposes of such operations as I recall the words of the document, the
first one mentioned is "to negate and discredit authentic information the enemy
has obtained." I believe that Nosenko's mission in 1962 involved just that:
covering and protecting KGB sources threatened by X's defection. Does this sound
like a "horrendons plot" conjured up hyparannoids? It is a straightforward
counterespionage technique, perfectly understandable to laymen. But Mr. Hart's
purpose was not enlightenment but ridicule.
The last of the four or five purposes the secret KGB document listed (purposes
of connterintelligence disinformation operations) was "to penetrate deeper into
the enemy service." By taking on Mr. Nosenko as a counselor, the CIA may have
helped the KGB achieve this goal, as well as the first one.
What conclusions can be drawn from these and similar errors in the CIA
testimony?
I would submit that despite these efforts to deride and dismiss the arguments
again Nosenko, there is, as Mr. Helms testified, a solid case against Nosenko,
of which the implications are very serious. The country is not well served by
Mr. Hart's superficial and offhand dismissal of that case.
For if Nosenko is a KGB plant, as I am convinced he is, there can be no doubt
that Nosenko's recited story about Oswald In the USSR Is a message from the KGB.
That message says, in exaggerated and implausible form that Oswald had nothing
whatever to do with the KGB, not questioned for his military intelligence, not
even screened as a possible CIA plant. Even Mr. Hart finds it incredible and
recommends that you disregard it. But his reasons are flawed and can you afford
to disregard it? By sending out such a message, the KGB exposes the fact that it
has something to hide. As Mr. Helms told you, that something may be the fact
that Oswald was an agent of the KGB.
Page 579
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The Form and Tone of the CIA Testimony
It is against this grave background that I will comment on the general tenor of
the CIA testimony.
The Committee and the public must have been struck dumb by the spectacle of a
government agency falling over itself to cast mud on its own performance of
duty.
When Mr. Dodd asked Mr. Hart if CIA had "failed in its responsibility
miserably," Mr. Hart replied, in a classic of government advocacy,
"Congressman,... I would go further than that." (3188)
Mr. Hart's testimony--one-sided, intemperate, distorted--was carefully
structured to influence rather than inform the Committee.
Mr. Hart went to special pains to force your thinking into a certain framework.
He began his testimony defensively, citing all the factors which might have
caused this defector to bear false witness: stresses, bad memory, drunkenness,
he traumas of defection (shared, by the way, by all defectors), and even the
"unreality of his situation." (2634) And then on to the revelations of
mistreatment, which you are to accept as dismissing all evidence against
Nosenko. "It is with (these mitigating factors) in mind that we have to approach
everything that happened from 1962" (2498-9), plus of course the sheer bumbling
incompetence of Nosenko's handling.
On the one hand CIA attacked with venom its own past performance, and on the
other hand adopted an almost beseeching tone in defending a Soviet KGB person
who, by CIA's own admission, had rendered invalid testimony about the assassin
of an American preident.
"You should believe these statements of Mr. Nosenko," Mr. Hart said.(3252)
"Anything that he has said has been said in good faith."(3350) "I am only asking
you to believe that he made (his statements) in good faith."(3275) "I am hoping
that once these misunderstandings are explained, that may of the problems...
which the staff has had with the questions and answers from Mr. Nosenko, and
also allegations concerning him, will be cleared up and go away."(2124-31)
Confronted by Mr. Dodd with the specific contradictions which made Nosenko's
story unacceptable, Mr. Hart fell back on declarations of faith (3426, 3349)
In the heat of his defense of Nosenko and his attack on Nosenko's questioners,
Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of 1962 (alleged drunkenness) with
those of the confinement, leading Mr. Dodd to lay with importance on Nosenko's
drinking. (3243-4) He goth over to Mr. Dodd the idea that hallucinations
"probably" (3241) influenced Nosenko's performance under interrogation (by a
subtle turn of phrase, lines 2870-73)---while knowing that hallucinations were
never a factor in the question-and answer sessions. Nothing that the CIA medical
officer concluded that Nosenko had feigned his hallucinations (in periods of
isolation) Mr. Hart could not restrain a knee-jerk defense, "but that was simply
one medical officer's opinion." (2864) And finally, by spending his testimony on
the handling of Nosenko, and the mistreatment, he succeeded in skirting all the
facts of the case which are, after all, your concern.
Mr. Hart's emotional closing message (4883) with its catchy word "abomination,"
epitomizes his whole testimony.
That testimony shows none of the detachment of a self-styled "historian" proud
of his high standards of scholarship. (4106) I sounds more like a man pleading a
flimsy cause, urgently trying to make a point.
He left with the Committee, and the public, a picture of a small group of
irresponsible half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots,
failing even to ask questions, much less to check out the answers, while hiding
their vile misconduct and illegal thoughts from a duped leadership.
Since these impressions provide the background for Mr. Hart's description of the
handling of Nosenko, they may be worth a closer look.
He created at least three impressions about the handling of the Nosenko case:
(1) That it was the work of an isolated group of irresponsible people
Specifically, Mr. Hart repeated that it was a "small group of people . . . a
very limited group" (2509) handling the case on the basis of a "belief" held
closely by "a very small trusted group." (2518) He gets over strongly the
impression that Mr. Helms was not properly informed. (4619, 3996-4019, 4632)
Contrary to Mr. Hart's testimony, every step was discussed with all elements
concerned; suggestions were solicited, decisions were worked out in
consultation. The leadership did not lose control or confidence.
Page 580
580
If indeed the group concerned with the suspicions of Nosenko remained "very
small" it was because if Nosenko was a KGB plant, there was a KGB spy within
CIA. This is not the sort of thing one wants to spread widely.
(2) That it was the work of incompetents
Mr. Hart succeeded in getting over to the Committee and the public an image of
gross incompetence on the part of Nosenko's handlers. He led Mr. Dodd, for
example, to ask if any of "these characters" are "still kicking around the
agency, or have they been fired?" (4282) and to suggest that even if there had
been a KGB conspiracy, we would not have been competent to detect it. (4199)
Mr. Hart got over this impression of incompetence in three ways:
(a) By repeating general intemperately derogatory judgments and labels: He
called the handling of "the entire case"(3189)--including the competent parts
noted above--"zero", "miserable," "dismal," "counterproductive," and so forth,
and hinted that the handlers were prone to wild fancies and illegal conduct.
(b) By withholding facts: Certain information Mr. Hart knew and failed to
mention might have caused the Committee to wonder whether, after all, there
might be more to this than the simplistic picture Mr. Hart drew. For example, he
did not tell Mr. Dodd the following about "these characters":
(1) That the people managing this complex case were senior officers with perhaps
the most experience within the entire Agency in handling Soviet Bloc
counterespionage matters.
(2) That neither C/SB nor DC/SB tended to see shadows where they weren't. In our
many dealings with Soviet Bloc intelligence officers as defectors or
agents-in-place, we had, before Nosenko, never judged any of them to be KGB
plants. If anything, I have been reproached for trusting them too far, as more
than one defector will probably be willing to testify.
(3) That in our service in positions of responsibility before, during, and after
this affair, our performance was rated as superior, as CIA personnel records
will confirm. If memory serves, even Mr. Hart judged my performance (and
probably C/SB's) after this case as "outstanding." I was decorated for my
service.
(c) By giving you false and misleading information: Here are at least four
examples:
(1) Mr. Hart told the Committee the outright untruth that the work of C/SB and
DC/SB " on this case had been discredited and had caused them to be transferred
out of Headquarters to foreign assignments" (2529) We can produce witnesses, if
necessary, to prove that this is false. Any "discrediting" came later, by Mr.
Hart and others. We had asked, long in advance, for our particular assignments
and got them when the posts came open in the course of events, both of us after
long headquarters tours of duty.
(2) Mr. Hart introduced a red herring about my Russian-language competence,
which so misled Mr. Fithian that he spoke, without rebuttal by Hart, about an
"English speaking person trying to take notes and writing down what this major
potential defector was saying and then transcribing them and giving them to the
Agency, right down through the interrogation." (3648-52) He led Mr. Dodd, too,
to think there were "no verbatim accounts of some of the interrogations but
rather notes taken by people who didn't have a very good knowledge of Russian."
(3245-7) Hart could have saved a lot of time and confusion by reminding you of
the simple truth that a Russian speaker was present at every meeting except the
initial contact. In fact, there never was, after that initial contact, any
problem of language, Russian or English, I concur with the FBI officer cited in
the Committee's Staff Report, page 37: "There was no question about being
misunderstood."
(3) Mr. Hart stated falsely that discrepancies in the transcripts were "very
important in the history of this case because (they) gave rise to charge within
the Agency that Nosenko was not what he purported to be". (2296-2302) I know of
no lasting misunderstandings and none at all that importantly affected our
judgment of Nosenko's bona fides. And why would the transcripts be important
after January 1964, when Nosenko himself was on hand to be questioned?
(4) By introducing the question of discrepancies in the transcripts Hart misled
you in two other ways:
He attributed them to my language deficiency when in fact the transcripts were
made by a native Russian speaker who had participated in
Page 581
581
the meetings! How could I know there were errors in the transcripts?
He told you that another defector found 150 discrepancies in the transcripts-but
did not mention that it was I who brought that defector into the case, and
caused him to review the tapes and transcripts! Mr. Hart falsely hinted that I
chose to ignore the detector's findings.
By way of footnote to this theme, the Committee might be interested to learn
that the "very thorough, very conscientious" defector cited by Hart in
connection with the transcripts, who is indeed thorough and of high professional
integrity and unique expertise on Soviet intelligence matters, reviewed the
whole Nosenko case and was convinced that Nosenko was a sent KGB provocateur and
had not held the positions in the KGB which he claimed. Mr. Hart seems to have
forgotten to mention this.
(3) That the case against Nodenko is nothing more than a paranoid notion: This
theme runs clearly through Mr. Hart's testimony. I have already discussed
certain aspects of it.
Mr. Hart incorrectly attributed the whole "misunderstanding" to grandiose
fantasies of Mr. X. In discrediting X he mixes, in the Committee's mind, a
theory about the Sino-Soviet split, a "plot" mastermined "by something called
the KGB disinformation directorate," and the role in this imaginary plot of
"penetrations at high levels within intelligence services" of the West, a plot
in the continuing process of "exaggeration and elaboration." (2410-27)
Taken one by one in a somewhat calmer frame of reference, these points may merit
the Committee's attention.
The Disinformation Directorate exists. Every defector from the KGB, including
Nosenko, has confirmed this, and it has been steadily increased in size and
importance within the KGB over the past decades. It offers a framework for the
centralization and exploitation of just such compromise and innocuous
information as Nosenko has provided to Western intelligence. It is active and
CIA knows it. So why does a CIA spokesman try to present it as part of a
paranoid fantasy?
Penetration of American Intelligence was suggested by specific leads given by
Mr. X, which were .deflected by specific leads given shortly thereafter by Mr.
Nosenko. Mr. Hart is quite right to say that penetration is part of the problem.
He gives false testimony if he denies these leads and says that we are dealing
only with a theory or with general allegations.
Mr. Hart implies that all the doubts about Mr. Nosenko can be dispelled by the
factors Mr. Hart cited: bad memory, drunkenness, misunderstanding, bad handling.
and the rest. In fact, the defense of Mr. Nosenko uses these factors one by one
to cover and explain away each of hundreds of specific points of doubt such as
had never arisen in any of the scores of defections of Soviet Bloc intelligence
officers before Nosenko. I have tried repeatedly to build a coherent picture of
the entirety of Mr. Nosenko's story, and the circumstances surrounding it, using
these excuses. Not only do they fail to explain the most important points, but
they tend to contradict each other. Perhaps Mr. Hart's people have never gone
through this exercise.
Here, in short, is Mr. Hart's message. The whole case against Nosenko is a about
a "so-called plot" and is "sheer nonsense." (3920-1) The evidence against
Nosenko is "supposed evidence."
The CIA's Handling of Nosenko
This leads to the subject of Nosenko's treatment, especially his confinement.
For if Mr. Hart succeeds in dismissing and deriding the case against Nosenko and
all its implications, he robs the detention of its context and purpose, and
trulymakes it, as Mr. Dodd put it, "outrageous." (3421)
At the risk of repetition I remind you that:
(1) There is a carefully documented body of evidence, not "supposed evidence",
against Nosenko, beyond any explanations of bad memory or misunderstandings. It
is not juridical proof, but it was taken very seriously by the Agency's
professional leadership, who were neither fools nor paranoids.
(2) Among the implications underlying the very real possibility that Nosenko was
planted on CIA by the KGB are these two:
(a) That Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB agent.
(b) That there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the United States
Government.
Page 582
582
Here are certain facts that Mr. Hart has hidden or distorted by the manner of
his testimony:
(1) Nosenko's treatment for the first two months after his defection was
precisely the same as that given any important defector.
(2) During that period Nosenko had ample opportunity to product information, or
to act in a manner, which might reduce or dissolve doubts about him.
(3) During this period Nosenko, unlike genuine defectors, resisted any serious
questioning. It was not that he was "drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart put it;
he was unusually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject. and
invented excuses not to talk, even about isolated points of detail. It became
clear that if he were to be questioned at all, some discipline had to be
applied.
(4) Reasons to suspect Nosenko (not paranoid notions) were growing and the
potential implications to American security were becoming clearer. It was our
duty to clarify this matter. Anything less would have been, in truth, the sort
of dereliction of duty of which Mr. Hart falsely accuses us today.
Please bear in mind that I find this case (not its handling) just as
"abominable" as Mr. Hart does. Its implications are ugly. It imposed immense and
unpleasant tasks upon us, and strains upon the Agency which are all too visible
today in your Committee's hearing. The case has served me ill, professionally
and personally. But it was there; it would not go away. The burden fell upon me
and I did my duty.
In doing it I was not let down at any time by the Agency leadership. They
understood what had to be done and why, and they took the necessary desisions to
make it possible.
And so Nosenko was detained.
---If there were reasonable grounds to suspect that he was a KGB plant, his
detention was (1) necessary, (2) effective, and (3) a partial success, for it
got Nosenko's story and his ignorance pure and unsullied by outside coaching,
and this told us much about what lay behind.
---If the case against Nosenko was "sheer nonsense," then the detention was not
justified.
Here is how Mr. Hart described the decision: "The next step, since the
interrogations conducted by the CIA, which as I say were designed not to
ascertain information so much as they were to pin on Nosenko the label of a KGB
agent acting to deceive us, since nothing had been proved in the friendly
confinement, the people running the operation determined that the next step
would be . . . a much more spartan confinement . . . and a so-called hostile
interrogation." (2682-90)
This misstates the case. Those early debriefing sessions were not designed to
pin any label on Nosenko. (It is true that they did nothing to assuage our
doubts and that during the same period we were learning things outside which
tended rather to reinforce them.) If the results had been more promising we
might have worked gradually around, in the questioning, to the points of doubt,
and might thus have avoided any need of confinement.
The detention of Nosenko was designed initially to give us an opportunity to
confront him with certain contradictions in his story. This would alert him to
our suspicions and if he were still free he might, we thought, either redefect
to the Soviet Union or "go public," either way removing our chances to get the
data we needed to asssess the truth behind his story of Lee Harvey Oswald and
other serious matters.
Our aim was, as Mr. Hart said, to get a confession: either of KGB sponsorship,
or of white lies which could, finally, form some believable pattern.
The results of this and subsequent hostile interrogations surprised us. Nosenko
was unable to clarify andy single point of doubt. Brought up against his own
contradictions and our independedt information, he admitted that there could be
no innocent explanation (not even forgetfulness) or he would remain silent, or
he would come up with a new story, only to change that, too, later. He did
confess some lies, but they tended to contradict each other, not offer an
innocent explanation for the oddities in his story. In fact, the hostile
interrogation reinforced and intensified our suspicions.
After this series of confrontations, we had an opportunity, finally, to do
something which would normally have been done first, with any cooperative
defector: conduct a systematic debriefing, which he had resisted before his
detention. We could, as Mr. Hart put it, "ascertain information."
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Nosenko was cooperative. He even told his questioners that they were right to
have thus removed him from the temptations of drink and women, and to have
forced him to work seriously.
And so began months of systematic questioning under neutral, non-hostile,
circumstances. Practically the full range of his knowledge was covered. An
example is the questioning on the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald in July, 1964,
which the Committee's Staff Report called "detailed and specific." As the report
states, "an attempt was made to touch all aspects." On each subject Nosenko was
given an opportunity, as on the Oswald matter, to review the report and correct
or amplify it. He was not drunk, not mistreated not hallucinating, and there was
never the slightest problem of understanding. (We should not confuse, as did Mr.
Hart's testimony, the circumstances of one meeting in 1962 (alleged drunkenness)
with the conditions of confinement, nor hostile with non-hostile questioning.)
Simultaneously we were meticulously checking files and investigating outside,
concerning every aspect of Nosenko's activities and reports. The results fill
many of those file drawers of which Mr. Hart spoke.
What we learned suggested, uniformly, that Nosenko's stories about his greet and
personal activities in the KGB were not true. To deride these findings, to
dismiss them as preconceptions, is to misrepresent facts clear from the files.
We found that the KGB operations Nosenko had reported, for example, were already
known or had lost any value they had had to the KGB. This is not true of the
reporting of any previous defector. That Mr. Hart, so eager to convince you of
Nosenko's good faith, could cite as evidence only cases which had been uncovered
by an earlier defector, gives you an idea. Two other KGB spies, an ex-U.S. Army
NCO and the well-known case of Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson (the Orly
courier-vault penetration), both of which Nosenko truly revealed for the first
time, were useless: the NCO had never had access to secrets nor truly
cooperated, Johnson had lost his access to the vault and was being publicly
exposed by a neurotic wife. Such was the pattern, in addition to Nosenko's
deflection of at least six specific leads given earlier by the KGB defector X.
Fact piled upon fact, creating a conviction on the part of every officer working
on this operation that Nosenko was a KGB plant. Each had his own viewpoint; none
was paranoid.
We conducted two more hostile interrogations, always increasing our knowledge,
never relieving any suspicions, getting steadily closer to the truth, perhaps.
But we got no confession.
All of this took time, and Nosenko stayed in confinement. As to the conditions
of his detention, Mr. Hart has given many details. They do not seem directly
relevant to the Committee's mission, for contrary to Mr. Hart's thesis, they did
not materially influence Nosenko's reporting one way or the other, nor the
question of Nosenko's bona fides. They cannot truthfully be adduced to dismiss
the case against Nosenko. On the contrary these details, in Hart's testimony,
tended to confuse the central problem before you: Nosenko's credibility and what
lies behind his message to America concerning the KGB's relations with Lee
Harvey Oswald.
However, if the detention could be dealt with as a separate and distinct topic,
I am prepared to answer any questions I can on the subject. The original
justification for detaining Nosenko had been that he was in the United States
under parole and it was the Agency's duty to prevent his harming the security of
the United States. This could not last indefinitely. At the end efforts
described above, we were still without the "proof" a confession would provide.
We had only professional, not juridical, evidence.
Finally our time ran out and a decision had to be made about what to do about
Nosenko.
The Question of "Disposal"
Here the extent of CIA's irrational involvement with Nosenko becomes blatant.
Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my friends who watched on TV) selected
items from some penciled jottings in my handwriting which left with you the
impression that I had contemplated or considered (even "suggested" as more than
one newspaperman understood him) such measures as liquidation, drugging, or
confinement in mental institutions.
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I state unequivocally, and will do so under oath, on behalf of myself and anyone
I ever knew in or out of the Central Intelligence Agency, that:
(1) No such measures were ever seriously considered.
(2) No such measures were ever studied.
(What "loony bin"? How "make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I
know of none now and never did, nor did I ever try to find out if such exist.
The whole subject of "liquidation was tabu in the CIA for reasons with which I
wholeheartedly agreed then and still do.)
(3) No such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in intimate
personal conversations.
(4) No such measures were ever proposed at any level of the Agency.
I do not remember making any such notes. However, I can imagine how I might
have. Responsible as I was for this "abominable" case, I was called upon to help
find the best way to release Nosenko---without a confession but sure that he was
an enemy agent. In an effort to find something meriting serious consideration, I
suppose that I jotted down, one day, every theoretically conceivable action.
Some of them might have been mentioned in one form or another by others; I doubt
they all sprang from my mind. (I cannot even guess what "points one through
four" might have been, the ones Mr. Hart declined to read because they were
"unimportant." I guess that means they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that
the notes were penciled reveals that they were intended to be transient; the
fact that "liquidation" was included reveals that they were theoretical; and
their loose, undignified language reveals that they were, entirely personal, for
my fleeting use only. In fact, none of these courses of action could have been
morally acceptable to me, much less conceivable as a practical suggestion to
higher authority.
Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in
the files. (4270) Although he recognized their purely personal nature, that they
were not addressed nor intended for any other person, nor had any practical
intent, he chose to bring them to show-and-tell to the Committee and the
American public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his
evident intent to deride and destroy any opposition to Nosenko? Could he have
done it for reasons of personal spite? Whatever the answer, the cost seems too
high: he was discrediting his own Agency for a matter without substance.
I cannot remember any concrete proposal for "disposal" being made during my
tenure. (You understand, of course, that "disposal" is merely professional
jargon for ending a relationship.) The course the Agency eventually adopted
seems, in retrospect, the only practical one. I think the Agency did well to
rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to pasture.
However, I cannot understand why they then employed him as an advisor, as a
teacher of their staff trainees in counterintelligence. The concrete suspicions
of Nosenko have never been resolved, and because they are well rounded, they
never will "be cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may
frivolously dismiss them, as they have done before your Committee, but the
doubts are still there and it is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel
to this individual.
Conclusion
Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious performance. One wonders what could drive a
government agency into the position of:
---trying to discredit and bury under a pile of irrelevancies the reasons to
suspect that the Soviet Union sent to America a provocateur to mislead us about
the assassin of President Kennedy:
---pleading irrationally and misleadingly in favor of a KGB man about whom
serious doubts persist;
---misrepresenting, invidiously, its own print actions:
---denigrating publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own
officers;
---dredging up unsubstantial personal notes, left carelessly in a highly secret
file folder, to falsely suggest in public the planning by its own people of the
vilest forms of misconduct.
As the Congress is conspicuously aware, the veil of secrecy can hide
irresponsibility and incompetence. But behind that veil the CIA used to maintain
unusually high standards of honor and decency and responsibility, and did a
pretty competent job, often in the face of impossible demands. The decline of
these qualities
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is laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony to the Agency's discredit, to my own
dismay, and to the detriment of future recruitment of good men, who will not
want to make carreeres in an environment without integrity.
The agency need not have gone so far. After all, Nosenko's bona fides had been
officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its highest level to
have "besmirched the Agency's escutcheon." Not only have said this much, and no
more.
That Admiral Turner's personal emissary went so much further suggests that the
Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its position. Perhaps it fears
that the Committee, wondering about this detector's strange reporting and
unconstrained by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, "But the emperor
has no clothes on!" This might explain the spray of mud, to cloud your view.
The above, I repeat, is but a preliminary statement, and is by no means all I
have to say on these subjects.
You can reach me at the address and phone number on the first page.* I presume,
if I am permitted to appear before your Committee, that my travel expenses will
be covered by the Committee.
Yours truly,
D.C.
Mr. PREYER,. Mr. D.C., after you are sworn, you will be recognized to read your
statement. I might suggest, after you are sworn, Mr. D.C., and before you read
your statement, that you might, for the record, give us your present occupation
and your present residence so that we have that basic information.
Will you stand at this time and be sworn.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. D.C. I do.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. D.C. I recognize you at this time.
TESTIMONY OF D.C., FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC DIVISION, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. D.C. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to make a few
introductory remarks to introduce myself as the chairman has requested.
I was born in Annapolis, Md., 1925; served in World War II for 3 years in the
U.S. Marine Corps; attended Princeton University, University of California, and
the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where I received a doctorate of political
science. I served in the CIA from 1950 on and specialized there in Soviet and
satellite operations I had worked personally at one time or another with most of
the important operations involving these areas over that generation.
In 1962, I became head of the section responsible for counterintelligence
against the Soviet intelligence services; and in 1965 or 1966, I was deputy
chief of the Soviet Russia Division.
When it was amalgamated with the satellite countries, in 1966--I believe perhaps
1965, I became deputy chief of that amalgamated division.
In 1967, I went to Europe as a station chief in (major city) where I retired in
1972 on the Agency early retirement program, entirely, and
------------------------------
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I repeat entirely, on my own volition. I mention that because these matters of
performance and separation of service have been raised in this committee.
I also would note for the record that my performance, which I wouldn't otherwise
mention, was consistently rated as outstanding, and at the end of it I received
an Agency decoration. Since then I have been a private consultant based in
Brussels where I represent American and European companies who don't have formal
representation Europe, in the field of avionics and chemicals, principally.
Now I proceed to my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.
I have come before your committee to reply to the testimony of Mr. John L. Hart,
who represented the Central Intelligence Agency here on September 15, a
testimony which misled you and misused me.
As the former deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of CIA and directly
responsible for the case of the KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko, from 1962 to 1967, I
can reply more accurately to your questions and can bring you a better
understanding of this matter.
For one thing, I won't have to rely as did Mr. Hart on archeological digs into
those 40 file drawers of information. Mr. Hart's 6-month expedition obviously
faile to understand what they dug up, and their leader was highly selective in
what he chose to exhibit here. For another, I will not disqualify myself, as he
did, from talking,
about Lee Harvey Oswald, one of the most important aspects of the Norenko case,
nor about the case of the earlier defector here called "X'" which is a critical
factor in understanding Nosenko.
CIA's selection of Mr. Hart to study the Nosenko case, and late to present it to
you, came to me as a great surprise and mystery. He seemed to bring few
qualifications to the study of the most sophisticated Soviet counterintelligence
operations of our generation. As far as I know, he never handled a single Soviet
intelligence officer, and spent his career, as he told you, remote from Soviet
operations, in wars and jungles, as he put it. As a result, he was able to tick
off 60 years of Soviet deception as a kind of paranod fantasy, to make temptuous
remarks about "historical research about a plot against the West,"and to use the
revealing phrase, "I don't happen to be able to share this type of thing"---
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt long enough to suggest we turn off
[the witness'] microphone. I think we can hear him well enough.
Mr. PREYER The fidelity of hat is a little too high. It tends to muffle your
voice. You may continue.
Mr. D.C. But this type of thing" is what the Nosenko case is all about.
Mr. Hart did not mention, and perhaps never studied, a number of
related cases bearing importantly on the question of Nosenko credibility. From
his testimony you would never guess at the existence off cases apart from but
related to the Nosenko case. Mr. Hart apparently did not bother to talk with
many of the best-qualified officers on these cases during his 6 months of
research. When he came to me in 1976 he had not even read the basic papers of
the case and instead of talking substance he asked about an irrelevant phrase
from an 8-year-old dispatch I had written--a phrase he later brought up with
you, the
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bit about "devastating consequences," in distorted form and out of context.
His testimony here seems not designed to enlighten your committee, but to
subject Nosenko's critics--Mr. Hart's former colleagues-to vilification and
ridicule. He left with the committee a picture of a small group of irresponsible
half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots, rafting even
to ask questions, neglecting to check on what was said, and all the time hiding
their vile misconduct and illegal thoughts from a duped leadership.
Mr. Hart told you a lot about Nosenko's mistreatment but very little about
Nosenko's credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald. He called on you to make an
act of faith, as the CIA seems to have done, in the good will and truth of a
Soviet KGB man who had rendered false and incredible testimony about the
assassin of an American President. I quote:"You should believe these statements
of Mr. Nosenko," Mr. Hart said, "anything he has said has been said in good
faith." Then, avoiding the subject of Oswald, he led you into a maze of
irrelevant detail about Nosenko's problems and CIA's earlier misunderstanding
and mistreatment of this defector. By spattering mud on Nosenko's earlier
handling, and particularly on me, Mr. Hart threw up a cloud which threatens to
impede your attempts to get at the answer to the true question before you. And I
ask you here to focus on that question, instead of the irrelevancies.
That question, of course, is how and why a senior KGB defector, directly
responsible for important aspects of Lee Harvey. Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet
Union, could deliver testimony to this committee which even the CIA's
representative called "implausible" and "incredible."
Mr. Hart even said that if he were in your position, he would simply disregard
what Mr. Nosenko said about Lee Harvey Oswald. He seems to have done just that,
himself. But Mr. Helms rightly labeled that a copout, and it is not clear to me
how Mr. Hart thought you could or would just pretend that the question isn't
there.
Of course, you can't. For today you are in the same position I was in back in
1964, trying to make sense of Nosenko's reports. You are investigating and
evaluating Nosenko's reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald. I did not think, in my
time, that I could just shrug off Nosenko's bizarre story of Oswald with some
irrelevant and half-hearted explanation, as Mr. Hart did here, and slide off
into some other subject.
Mr. Hart did not explain what he thought you should believe or how this
"incredible" testimony is compatible with the claim that Nosenko has, by and
large, told nothing but the truth since 1962.
He said Nosenko's testimony to you was a unique aberration; I
quote:
I cannot offhand remember any statements which (Nosenko) has been proven
to have made which were statements of real substance other than the
contradictions which have been adduced today on the Lee Harvey Oswald matter,
which have been proven to be incorrect.
But the committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter, and even so, the
committee detected at least six or seven contradictions from one telling to
another. Could this, by coincidence, be the only
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such case? (I can tell you the answer is no; on the contrary, this was typical
Nosenko whenever he was pinned down on details.)
While extolling Nosenko's truthfulness, Mr. Hart spent a surprising amount of
time giving you reasons why Nosenko might have lied or seemed to lie, such as
drunken exaggeration, confusion, emotional stresses, hallucinations, and the
impact of mistreatment. But that wasn't helpful to you, for none of these things
had anything to do with Nosenko's story about Oswald. After all, Nosenko told
the CIA and FBI his story about Oswald before any mistreatmeat, and he told it
to your committee after any mistreatment, and no one thought he was drunk at any
one of those times.
So I will go back to the question here and see if I can help you find an answer.
There has to be some way to explain how this direct participant in the events
delivered incredible testimony about them. There must be some explanation for
the differences in Nosenko's story at different times he told it, for his
excuses and evasions when confronted with these differences, and for his final
refusal to talk any more about them with your committee.
As we seek an answer to these questions, I ask you to keep three
things in mind:
First, that at the time he reviewed Oswald's file for the Nosenko was already a
willing secret collaborator of the CIA. Therefore, he must have been alert. when
dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the United States and to
his own country.
Second, that Nosenko told us of some of these events only 10 weeks after they
happened, so there wasn't time for them to become dim in his memory.
Third, that no one has suggested that Nosenko is mentally unfit. Mr. Hart
brought in the Wechsler test and other psychological details merely to show
Nosenko's relative strengths and weaknesses, not to prove him a mental basket
case. On the contrary, Nosenko claims to have risen fast in the KGB, and he is
regarded by his current employers as "an intelligent human being" who "reasons
well?' I am quoting Mr. Hart, of course, who also called your attention to
Nosenko's powers of "logical thought; and his high score in "power of abstract
thinking."
Aside from the irrelevant details about Nosenko's stresses under mistreatmeat,
and drunkenness, I found two things in Mr. Hart's testimony which might bear on
the Oswald story. First and foremost, he spoke about compartmentation, bringing
his own experience show how a person in any organization working on the
principle of "need to know" might not be aware of everything going on even in
his own operations. Now, I suppose Mr. Hart intended this as a contribution to
Mr. Nosenko's defense; certainly Mr. Nosenko had never mentioned it. The trouble
is, it doesn't apply to this story. Nosenko had said repeatedly, to CIA and FBI
and recently swore under oath to this committee, that he was right there on the
inside of any "compartment." He personally reviewed the application of Oswald to
stay in the U.S.S.R. in 1959 and he personally participated in the
recommendation that the KGB should not let Oswald stay the country and in the
decision not to notify the KGB sections which might normally be interested in
debriefing a man like Oswald. Nosenko
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knew that the KGB leadership decided that they "didn't want to be involved" with
Oswald-not to question him at all, not even to screen him as a possible enemy
plant. Nosenko personally participated in the refusal of Oswald's visa request
from Mexico not long before the assassination of President Kennedy. And after
the assassination, Nosenko himself was told to review Oswald's KGB file; and did
so. He has insisted that if anyone in the KGB ever talked to Oswald, Nosenko
would know about it. So "compartmentation" explains nothing. Nosenko's story
rests essentially on his personal involvement and authority.
The second and last possible explanation which we can find in Mr. Hart's
testimony is Nosenko's odd memory, which Mr. Hart took such pains to establish.
After all, Nosenko seems to have changed details of seven or eight aspects of
the story at one time or another. The trouble with this is, it doesn't touch the
heart of the story, the truly incredible part, Nosenko didn't forget whether or
not the KGB questioned Oswald; he remembers sharply and consistently--and
insists, whatever other changes he makes in his story--that Oswald was never
questioned by the KGB. He knows that and remembers it, for he participated
directly in the decision not to.
Now that was all Mr. Hart offered. But I think we should try every conceivable
explanation. Here are a couple I can think of. Maybe Nosenko was merely
boasting, exaggerating, building things bit, especially his personal role.
Maybe, for example, he only overheard some KGB officers talking, didn't hear it
right, and then passed on an incorrect story to us as-his experience, to make
himself look important in our eyes. Maybe, under this interpretation, he
honestly thinks his story is true.
Another explanation, going a bit further, might be that he invented the whole
story. Perhaps, convinced that the U.S.S.R. wouldn't get involed in the
assassination of an American President (which is what we all tend to think), he
invented this story as a contribution to American peace of mind and to
internationally amity.
Both of these explanations run into trouble. Nosenko, while in detention, had
plenty of time and incentive to back off a mere exaggeration, and did, in fact,
admit a few minor lies. But about this story is adamant. Just recently Mr. Hart
tried to get Nosenko to come off it, but even in the current climate of good
will and trust, Nosenko refused. And remember, too, that Nosenko volunteered to
testify to his incredible tale before the Warren Commission, and he swore to it
under oath before you committee.
And there are other problems, too. If we begin to play with the idea of
fabrication we will have to ask just what parts of the story were invented: Did
Nosenko also invent the high KGB job which gave him "knowledge" of the Oswald
case ?
Anyway, CIA wouldn't accept this line of speculation. They insist
that Nosenko always talks in good faith, even if his Oswald story isn't
believable. They surely wouldn't want you to think they had hired a fabricator
as their adviser and teacher.
And there is yet another obstacle to this line of thought, and not least
important. We must not forget that the Soviet Government itself has confirmed
Nosenko's authority to tell the whole story about
43-792--79 38
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Oswald. In Mr. Edward Jay Epstein's book "Legend" he reports that an attache of
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, named Agu, told him that Nosenko is the person
who knows most about Oswald in Russia, even more than the people in Minsk
whom-Epstein applied vainly to go see.
No; I think we can all agree: Mr. Hart, myself, your committee, Mr. Agu, and Mr.
Nosenko: Nosenko was neither exaggerating nor inventing nor forgetting nor was
he compartmented away from the essential facts of the story.
So what is left to explain this incredible testimony? I can think of
only two explanations.
Maybe Nosenko's story is true, after all. Let's overlook for a moment the fact
that everyone (except Mr. Nosenko) believes the contrary, including Mr. Hart and
today's CIA, including Mr. Helms, Soviet specialists, and ex-KGB veterans in the
West. Let's also overlook the way Nosenko contradicted himself on points of
detail from one telling to another. Let's focus only on tile essential elements
of the story, the ones which remain constant. There are two: First, that the KGB
never questioned Oswald, and second, that the KGB never found out that Oswald
had information to offer them about interesting U.S. military matters.
Here was this young American, Lee Harvey Oswald, just out of the Marine Corps,
already inside the U.S.S.R. and going to great lengths to stay there and become
a citizen. The KGB never bothered to talk to him, not even once; not even to get
an idea whether he might be a CIA plant (and although even Nosenko once said; I
think, that the KGB feared he might be).
Can this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've heard about rigid Soviet
security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines, and
about how dangerous it is in the U.S.S.R. for someone to take a risky decision
(like failing to screen an applicant for permanent residence in the U.S.S.R)?
Of course not. Let me give you one small case history which illustrates how
wrong Nosenko's story is. This is an actual event which shows how the real KGB,
in the real U.S.S.R., reacts to situations like this. It was told by a former
KGB man named Kaarlo Tuomi and can be found on page 286 of John Barron's book,
"KGB." The story concerns (and from here on I quote) "a young Finnish couple who
illegally crossed the Soviet border in 1953. The couple walked into a militia
station and requested Soviet citizenship, but the KGB jailed them. Continuous
questioning during the next 11 months indicated only that the couple believed
Communist propaganda and sincerely sought to enjoy the life it promised.
Nevertheless the KGB consigned them to an exile camp for suspects in Kirov
province. Because Tuomi spoke Finnish, the KGB sent him into the camp as a
'prisoner' with instructions to become friends with the couple. Hardened as he
was to privation, he was still aghast at what he saw in the camp. Whole
families, subsisted in 5 by 8 wooden stalls or cells in communal barracks.
Each morning, at 6, trucks hauled all the men away to peat bogs where they
labored until dark. Small children, Tuomi observed, regularly died of ordinary
maladies because of inadequate medical care.
"Worse still. the-camp inmates, who had committed no crime, had no idea when, if
ever, they might be released. After only 3 days Tuomi
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persuaded himself that the forlorn Finns were concealing nothing, and he
signaled the camp administrator to remove him. 'That place is just hell? he
later told Seretim, his KGB supervisor. 'Those people are living like slaves? 'I
understand,' Seretim said, 'but don't get so excited.
There's nothing you or I can do about it.' That's the end of the quotation.
So on the one hand we have a young ex-marine, Lee Harvey Oswald, from the United
States; on the other hand we have a simple Finnish family. Both say they want to
live in Russia. The Finns are questioned for 11 months by the KGB, then
consigned indefinitely to a hellish camp for suspects. The American is not even
talked to once by the KGB. The Finns' experience fits all we know about the true
Soviet Union, from Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and many others, unanimously.
Oswald's experience, as Nosenko tells it, cannot have happened.
The second main point of Nosenko's story about Oswald was that the KGB did not
find out that Oswald had information to offer about interesting military
matters. Nosenko specifically told your committee this. To demonstrate its
falsity, I need only quote from page 262 of the Warren Commission report,
concerning Oswald's interview with the American Consul Snyder in Moscow on
October 31, 1959, when Oswald declared that he wished to renounce his U.S.
citizenship. I quote:
Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine
Corps, intimating that he might know of something of special interest, and that
he had informed a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information
concerning the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed.
Nosenko didn't mention this. Apparently he didn't know it.
So I think we can safely agree with Mr. Hart that Nosenko's story about Oswald
is not credible, not true.
Up to this point we've tried five explanations and still haven't found any
acceptable one for Nosenko's story, its contradictions, or his evasive manner
when confronted with these contradictions. But because you have to find an
explanation, just as I had to in 1964, I will propose here the only other
explanation I can think of--one which might explain all the facts before us,
including Nosenko's performance before this committee.
This sixth explanation is, of course, that Nosenko's story, in its essence, is a
message from the Soviet leadership, carried to the United
States by a KGB-contro]led agent provocateur who had already established a
clandestine relationship of trust with CIA for other purposes a year earlier.
The core of the Soviet message is simple: That the KGB, or Soviet Intelligence,
had nothing to do with President Kennedy's assassin, nothing at all.
Why they might have sent such a crude message, why they selected this channel to
send it, and what truth may lie behind the story given to us, can only be
guessed at. If you like, I am prepared to go into such speculation. But even
without the answers to these questions, this, sixth explanation would make it
clear why Nosenko adhered so rigidly to his story. However incredible we might
find a message from the Soviet leadership, learned and recited by Nosenko, we
would find it difficult to get him to back off it: Discipline is discipline,
especially in the KGB.
Now, I'm ready to believe that Nosenko may have genuinely forgotten some details
of this learned story. I can also accept that, on his own,
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he may have embroidered on it and got caught when he forgot his own embroidery;
this seems to fit the facts we have, including Mr. Hart's description of Mr.
Nosenko's memory. This could explain Nosenko's differing descriptions of the KGB
file, and his accounts of whether there was or wasn't careful surveillance of
Oswald which would detect his relations with Marina, and his change of name of
the KGB officer who worked with him on the Oswald case--that sort of detail. It
would also explain why he told your committee repeatedly that he didn't remember
what he'd said previously. This wouldn't have mattered if he'd really lived
through the experiences he described; his stories of them at different times
should come out straight all by themselves. When, in fact, they didn't, Nosenko
resorted to this strange statement, which made his story appear more memorized
than experienced.
I recognize that this is an unpleasant and troubling supposition, a hot potato
indeed. But please remember that before coming to it, we had dismissed all the
other explanations possible. So we cannot simply. slide over this as easily as
CIA does. It is a serious possibility, not a sick fantasy. In fact, it is hard
to avoid.
What is more, Nosenko's story of Oswald is only one of scores of things that
Nosenko said which make him appear to be a KGB plant. If the Oswald story were
alone, as Mr. Hart said it was, a strange aberration in an otherwise normal
performance, perhaps one could just shrug and forget it. It is not. We got the
same evasions, contradictions, excuses, whenever we pinned Nosenko down, the way
you did on the Oswald story. Those other matters, while not of direct concern to
this committee, included Nosenko's accounts of his career, of his travels, of
the way he learned the various items of information he reported, and even
accounts of his private life. More important, there were things outside his own
reporting and his own performance, which could not
explained away by any part of CIA's litany of excuses for Nosenko (which so
strangely resemble Nosenko's own). All of those irregularities point to the same
conclusion: That Nosenko was sent by the KGB to deceive us. That is, they point
to the same conclusion as our sixth possible, explanation of Nosenko's story
about Oswald.
The CIA's manner of dealing with those points of doubt about, Nosenko's good
faith (at least since 1967) has been to take them one by one, each out of
context of the others, and dismiss them with a variety of excuses, or
rationalizations: confusion, drunkenness, language problems, denial that he ever
said it, bad memory, exaggeration, boasting, hundreds of coincidences. With any
other defector, a small fraction of this number of things would have caused and
perpetuated the gravest doubts. For the KGB does send false defectors to the
West, and has been doing so for 60 years. And the doubts about this one defector
were persuasive to the CIA leadership of an earlier time.
Today, a later CIA leadership chooses to dismiss them. If they only pretended to
do so, to justify the release and rehabilitation of Nosenko,
that would be understandable. But they must really believe in Nosenko,
for they are using him in current counterintelligence work and exposing their
clandestine officers to him, and bringing him into their secret premises to help
train their counterintelligence personnel.
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They go much further to demonstrate the depth of their commitment to Nosenko.
They vilify their earlier colleagues who disapproved of him. The intensity of
Mr. Hart's attack on him and the fact that it was done in public, must have
surprised you, as it did others with whom I've spoken over the past weeks. As
Nosenko's principal opponent, I am made out in public as a miserable incompetent
and given credit, falsely, for murderous thoughts, illegal designs, torture, and
malfeasance.
The CIA had to go far out to invent these charges, which are not true. Mr. Hart
had to bend facts, invent others, and gloss over a lot more, in order to cover
me with mud.
In fact, I have detected no less than 30 errors in his testimony, 20 other
misleading statements, and 10 major omissions. They seem aimed to destroy the
opposition to Nosenko, and they have the effect of misleading your committee on
the significance of Nosenko's testimony about Oswald.
I will cite only a few of these points here. Others are to be found in my letter
to this committee dated October 11, 1978, which I introduce as an annex to my
testimony. I can, of course, go into further detail if you wish. But I discuss
below some of the points most relevant to your appraisal of Mr. Nosenko's
credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald.
First, Mr. Hart misled you badly on the question of Nosenko's general
credibility. It was stunning to hear him say, after reviewing every detail of
the case for 6 months with the aid of four assistants (I quote) "I see no
reason"--here I repeat, "I see no reason"---"to think that (Nosenko) has ever
told an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during
those times when he was under the influence of alcohol he exaggerated." Even 10
years away from this case, I can remember at least 20 clear cases of Nosenko's
untruths about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to
tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters within his claimed
area of responsibility, for which there is no innocent explanation.
Excuse me just a moment and off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. PREYER. Back on the record.
Mr. D.C. The "influence of alcohol" cannot be much of a factor, for as Mr. Hart
reminds us, Nosenko was questioned for 292 days while in detention--when he had
no alcohol at all. But Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of the 1962
meetings (alleged drunkenness) with those of confinement, leading Congressman
Dodd to lay importance on Nosenko's drinking. He even got over to Mr. Dodd, by a
subtle turn of phrase, the idea that hallucinations "probably" influenced
Nosenko's performance under interrogation. Yet Mr. Hart must have known that
hallucinations were never a factor in the question-and-answer sessions.
Then, too, Mr. Hart misstated the early roots of our suspicions of Nosenko. Mr.
Hart said that they arose from the paranoid imaginings and jealousy of a
previous defector, whom he calls "X." Mr. Hart told you, and I quote, that "Mr.
X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive views of Nosenko and from
that point on, the treatment
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of Mr. Nosenko was never, until 1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko
said." This is not true, as a document in the files, which I wrote in 1962, will
make clear. It was not "X's" theories which caused my initial suspicion of
Nosenko in 1962. It was the overlap of Nosenko's reports--at first glance
entirely convincing and important--with those given 6 months earlier by "X?'
Alone, Nosenko looked good to me, as Mr. Hart said; seen alongside "X," whose
reporting I had not seen before coming to headquarters after the 1962 meetings
with Nosenko, Nosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters which overlapped were
serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of CIA--not a
general allegation, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested. There were at least a
dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still remember at least eight.
Nosenko's information tended to negate or deflect leads from "X."
And this brings me to Mr. Hart's efforts to make you think that the suspicions
of Nosenko were based on foolish fancies about "horrendous plots." Let me try to
restore the balance here. A KGB paper of this period described the need for
disinformation (deception) in KGB counterintelligence work. It stated that just
catching American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with
new ones. Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are
essential. And among their purposes was "to negate and discredit authentic
information which the enemy has obtained." There is some reason to believe that
Nosenko was on just such a mission in 1962: To cover and protect KGB sources
threatened hy "X's" defection. Does
this-sound like a "horrendous plot" conjured up by paranoids? It is known
counterespionage technique, perfectly understandable to laymen. But as I have
said, Mr. Hart's purpose was not-enlightenment, but ridicule.
To prove Mr. Nosenko's credibility, Mr. Hart made a breathtaking misstatement
about the defector "X": Quantitatively and qualitatively," said Mr. Hart, "the
information given by Mr. 'X' was much smaller than that given by Nosenko." Could
Mr. Hart really have meant that? Mr. "X," paranoid or not provided in the first
months after his defection information which led to the final uncovering of Kim
Philby; to the first detection of several imporant penetrations of Western
European governments; proof (not general allegations) of penetration at the
heart of... [allied service]: and pointers to serious
penetrations of the United States Government. Before Nosenko. "X" uncovered the
current organization and methods of the KGB, and very large numbers of its
personnel active in its foreign operations.
And listen to this: It was Mr. "X" who first revealed both of the two KGB
operations which Mr. Hart adduced as of Nosenko's good faith! They concerned
microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow and a penetration of one of our
NATO allies.
As for the microphones, Mr. Hart stated that "Mr. Nosenko was responsible for
the discovery of the system of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
which had hitherto been suspected but nobody enough information on it to
actually detect it." But Mr. "X" had given approximate locations of some of the
microphones 6 months earlier. Like Nosenko, he did not know the precise
locations,
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but he knew the mikes were there and could indicate some specific offices where
they could be found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart mentioned,
would have been done, and the microphone "system" found, without Nosenko's
information. Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement the KGB would "throw away"
already-compromised information to build up a source of theirs. Mr. Hart simply
hid from you the fact that this information was already compromised
when Nosenko delivered it.
Mr. Hart's other proof of Nosenko's credibility was as follows: Mr. Hart said,
"A very high level KGB penetration in a very sensitive position in a Western
European government was, on the basis of Mr. Nosenko's lead, arrested, tried,
and convicted of espionage. There no reason to believe, that the Soviets would
have given this information away." End of quote. Now, Mr. Hart was presumably
referring to a man we can here call "Y" although his case is very well known to
the public. Did Mr. Hart really not how, or did he choose to hide from you, the
fact that "Y's;' reports to the KGB were known to
Mr. "X," the earlier defector? The KGB, knowing this, cut off contact with "Y"
immediately after "X's" defection. "Y's" uncovering was therefore inevitable
even though "X" had not known "Y's"' name. Nosenko added one item of information
which permitted "Y" to be caught sooner; that is all. How, then, could Mr. Hart
have said "there is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this
information away"? The reason, that "Y" was already compromised, was perfectly
clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team studied.
Mr. Hart also told you that Mr. "X" had confirmed Nosenko's claimed positions in
the KGB. This is not true. Mr. "X" said, on the contrary, that he had personally
visited the American Embassy section of the KGB during the 1960-61 period when
Nosenko claims to have been its deputy chief, and knew definitely that Nosenko
was not serving there.
So these are some of the matters affecting Nosenko's general credibility which
may be important to you when you assess the meaning of Nosenko's incredible
testimony on Oswald.
Now, Mr. Hart also distorted the CIA's performance in getting the facts about
Oswald from Nosenko. Your committee staff report had it right, before Mr. Hart
came forth. Referring to the Agency's questioning of Nosenko on July 3 and 27,
1964, the report says that the CIA's questions "were detailed and specific about
Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The questions were chronological and an attempt
was made to touch all aspects of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Close
quote. Moreover, the CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of his own remarks so he
could add any more he knew, or correct any errors. This is from
your staff report, pages 7-9.
But then came Mr. Hart with his sweeping denunciations of CIA's miserable and
"dismal" and "zero" performance, and stating flatly that "there was no effort
being made to get at more information (Nosenko) might have." Mr. Hart thus led
Congressman Fithian to suggest that the CIA had not even taken "the logical
first step" of getting Nosenko's information and led the chairman to conclude
that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made.
In this Mr. Hart concurred.
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In truth, of course, there was nothing more to be got from Nosenko, unless it
would be later changes of earlier details, as happened when your committee
questioned Nosenko. If there had been more, we would have gone doggedly after
it, of course. We were not the incompetents Mr. Hart made us out to be. Your
staff report said that Nosenko "recited"' the same story in each of his three
sessions with the committee. The word is apt: Nosenko had "recited" that story
before, to the CIA. and FBI, each of which questioned him systematically about
it. So why did Mr. Hart give his own Agency a "zero" on all phases of the
handling of Nosenko? Surely he was seeking to fling mud, not to give
serious answers to serious questions. His effect was confusion.
Mr. Hart also suggested to you that CIA just didn't investigate the
validity of what Nosenko had said about Oswald. That is equally false. What
else, for example, was the purpose of our subjecting Nosenko to hostile
interrogation and subjecting his information to meticulous investigation
whenever we could? Those 40 file drawers are full of the results.
But, of course, we were not able to check inside the U.S.S.R., as the
Warren Commission noted. We didn't have other sources in the KGB who were
connected with this Oswald case. But think how lucky we were to have even one
inside source on Oswald inside the KGB. Of the many thousands of KGB men around
the world, CIA had secret relations with only one, and this one turned out to
have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once but on three
seperate occasions-When Oswald came to Russia in 1959; when he applied for a
visa from Mexico to return to Russia; and again after the assassination when the
Kremlin leadership caused a definitive review of the whole KGB file on Oswald.
How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus unbelievably lucky to be able
to contribute to the Warren report. In view of other suspicions of Nosenko the
keyword in that last, sentence is "unbelievably."
Gentlemen, I hesitate before replying publicly to Mr. Hart's' false charges, for
a number of reasons:
For one thing, I found it hard to imagine myself in the position of defending
myself against the CIA before the Congress. My record should have been ample
protection against that.
Then, too, I'm comfortable in the knowledge that my honor and integrity,
although torn to shreds by the CIA before this committee and the public, remain
intact with those who know the truth.
And of course, my embarrassment, my public dishonor, count for little compared
with the reputation of a Government agency which must uphold an image of
integrity. To call public attention to the way the CIA misinformed you might
cause it embarrassment. I do not want to harm the CIA, which has enough real
enemies.
For without the CIA, who would remain to oppose the relentless work of
subversion and deception and penetration being directed abroad by the KGB
against our country? Who would oppose that arrogant and brutal instrument of
repression in the secret, dark places where it works?
Finally, it was this thought, of the KGB, which decided me to come before you.
Some of the mud the CIA spattered on me might have clouded your view of the
KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald, as
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given to you by Yuri Nosenko of the KGB. The flying mud may have screened
important aspects of the case. By wiping some of it away I thought I might help
you to restore what seemed to me clear presentation of the facts in your
committee staff report--written before Mr. Hart's testimony.
What I seek is to let the facts carry the day, to wipe them clean again for your
inspection. You need not accept either the beseechings of Mr. Hart, or any
counterargument from me. But my hope is that you will not let the facts get
obscured by emotional distortions, or irrelevancies.
Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement continues now with a series of remarks on a
series of issues of interest to the committee, which is the detention of Mr.
Nosenko. I have already mentioned to you that I think it irrelevant to your
concerns, but since it was a matter of considerable concern to you and of
interest to the public, I have prepared a few pages here which I can either read
or use in response to a few questions you may have.
Mr. PREYER. Let me suggest that you read them.
Mr. D.C. Thank you, sir.
The detention of Nosenko has been described in sensationalist terms by Mr. Hart
and, as he clearly intended, has caused some outrage on the part of the
committee. I want to deal with it because the committee has been led to consider
it, not because it is truly pertinent to your concerns. Mr. Hart and Mr. Nosenko
use it, falsely, as an excuse for discrepancies in Nosenko's reporting. But this
is a distraction filling, Mr. Hart's testimony in place of discussion of Lee
Harvey Oswald.
Mr Hart's bias must have been evident to all. He expressed his personal view
that the treatment of Nosenko was "absolutely unacceptable" and he introduced
terms like "bank vault" to imply inhuman treatment. He led Mr. Sawyer to talk of
a "torture vault" and "partial starvation" and gave the idea that Nosenko was
subjected to unbearable heat, or left suddering in the wintry cold. He portrayed
the conditions in terms leading committee members to use words like "shocking"
and "horrible." Yet at the same time Mr. Hart was de-
scribing himself as "historian" bound by known fact. In fact, he misled you
about almost every aspect of the detention.
Had he in fact bothered to collect facts from all concerned, you would have
gotten a quite different and more rational point of view, one which deserved at
least, some respect, if for no other reasons than that it, prevailed within Mr.
Hart's 'own organization for 3 years. In fact one overriding flaw in Mr Hart's
version of these "horrible" matters is that the Agency leadership--serious and
responsible people--had approved Nosenko's detention and at least the broad
outlines of his treatment. Mr. Hart's way around this was to suggest that Mr.
Helms was not aware of what was going on. Mr. Helms has belied that and indeed
has called into question some of the impressions conveved by Hart to the
committee concerning Nosenko's treatment. I participated in most of the
discussions about the detention and remember the circumstances pretty well. Let
me propose to you the explanation I would have given you had I been the Agency's
representative. What I knew may be more valid than what Hart has selected from
Agency records and colored in sensatonalist hues.
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In the first place, let me remind you of the reasons for the detention. Mr.
Helms described a few of them, but Mr. Hart did not give you the picture at all.
This is important, for if Mr. Hart succeeds in dismissing and deriding the case
against Nosenko and all its implications, he robs the detention of its context
and purpose, and truly makes it, as Mr. Dodd put it, "outrageous." Here is why
Nosenko was confined:
First, during the initial period of freedom after his defection, when his
handling was identical to, that of any normal defector, Nosenko resisted any
serious questioning. It was not that he was "drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart
put it; he was usually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject,
and invented excuses not to talk.
Second, his conduct and lack of discipline threatened embarrassment to the
Agency during his parole in the United States. Remember, he had not been
formally admitted to this country.
Third, there was a documented body of evidence, not "supposed evidence"--that's
a quote from Mr. Hart beyond any explanations of bad memory or
misunderstandings, which made it likely that Nosenko had been sent by the KGB to
mislead us. It was not juridicial proof, but it was taken very seriously by the
Agency's professional leadership, who were neither fools nor paranoids.
Fourth, the implications underlying this very real possibility were too serious
to ignore. Among them were these two: That Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB
agent, and that there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the U.S.
Government.
Fifth, if we were to confront Nosenko with the contradictions and doubts while
he was still free, he would be able to take steps to evade further questioning
indefinitely.
Sixth, there was a special urgency to get at the truth of Nosenko's reports
about Lee Harvey Oswald because of the time limits imposed on the Warren
Commission.
The legal basis for the detention has been explained to you by Mr. Helms. It
had, as we understood clearly at the time, the approval of the Department of
Justice and other Government agencies. We did not think we were doing anything
illegal, at least not util the time had stretched out beyond reasonable limits,
at which time we began to prepare for his release. Nosenko himself didn't seem
to consider it "illegal" at the time, it doubtless seemed a logical
intensification of the severity of the screening process which he knew he had to
go through. He did not complain of violation of any constitutional rights nor
ask for a lawyer. An innocent man might have protested and resisted, but Nosenko
was engaged in a contest, and knew that
he was failing to convince us--as indeed he freely admitted (he said he was
"looking bad" even to himself, but had no way to explain the contradictions,
ignorances, and errors). He complained about cold and heat, but not, as far as I
remember, about the fact of detention and interrogation.
There were two basic requirements for the detention: That it be secure and that
Nosenko not be able to communicate with the outside--with the KGB or with
unwitting helpers. Therefore, we needed a separate, isolated house in a rural or
thinly populated area, as far as possible from other houses, with discreet
access for the comings and goings which an interrogation would require. The
Office of Security
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found a place, but as I remember it was not easy and the rent was high.
The actual conditions of detention within the house were not designed to cause
him discomfort-or, for that matter, comfort either. They were to be healthy and
clean. He was never touched or threatened and he always knew he wouldn't be; he
could always resist a line questioning by simply clamming up, with a shrug;
there was nothing we could do about it.
Nosenko complained about the heat in summer. His window was blocked, not to
cause him discomfort but to avoid contact with the outside. A top-floor room was
chosen in preference to a basement because it would be dry and healthy, while
the basement would be damp. When it became stuffy, Nosenko rightly complained
and as remember, an effort was made to improve the situation; I think a blower
was installed to keep the air moving, but perhaps this can be checked in the
files.
I don't remember any complaint about cold in the winter. If there had been, I
cannot imagine why he would not have been given extra blankets, and I do not
believe the complaint is justified.
His diet was planned always in consultation with a medical doctor. To accuse the
Agency of trying to subject him to "partial starvation" is unjust; to imply that
Nosenko's handlers wanted to, but a medical doctor "intervened" (as Mr. Hart
said) is to distort the facts. The doctor was consulted in advance, at every
phase of the detention, and checked Nosenko regularly. I can't remember the time
period, but I think it was weekly. It might have been every 2 weeks. The diet
was made more or less austere depending on the situation at any given phase of
the interrogation, but it was always a healthy one.
The time frame has been much distorted here. We did not foresee a long
detention--as both Mr. Helms and Mr. Hart have said. The first step, and perhaps
the only one which required detention, was to be the confrontation, the hostile
interrogation. I do not remember how long we thought it would last; perhaps
somewhere between 2 weeks and 2 months. From then on the detention became
extended, phase by phase.
First, the hostile interrogation. The results surprised us. Before we
suspected Nosenko might be a plant: afterward, we had come to think moreover
that he might never have been a true KGB officer and that he surely had not held
certain of the positions in the KGB which he claimed. (This view was reinforced
in later questionings.)
At the conclusion of the hostile interrogation, in which Nosenko himself
admitted that he "looked bad,' even to himself, Nosenko was entirely willing to
submit to a systematic debriefing. He said that we had been right to separate
him from drink and women and make him work seriously. He did not complain then
of the conditions of detention.
So began the second phase, a systematic questioning of the sort which
we would have done with any normal defector under conditions of freedom. Nosenko
ate quite good food, got books to read, and cooperated without complaint (except
when it got too hot).
The third phase was a second hostile interrogation using the new information
derived from his questioning and from outside investigations in the meantime. It
deepened our suspicions, gave us more insight into what might lie behind him,
and produced some confessions of
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minor lies--which did not remove the doubts, for the new version contradicted
other things he had said. But he did not confess to Soviet control. During this
period his diet was made more Spartan, and he was not given reading material.
Nothing was harmful to Nosenko, however. You have only to listen to his
complaints (lack of reading material, and other diversions, being about the
worse) to realize that this was not "torture" whatever Nosenko's advantage in
making it appear so.
After the second hostile interrogation--I don't remember the date; I believe it
was late 1965 excuse me, late 1964--Nosenko was moved to the second holding
area. This we can call the fourth phase.
Much has been made of CIA's constructing a house to hold Nosenko. But the true
explanation is far less lurid than Mr. Hart would make it seem. A new safehouse
was needed because time erodes the security of any safe area, it was time to
move. There was no thought about how much longer the detention had to last;
Nosenko was still in the United States on parole to the CIA; we would not, under
any circumstances, have certified to the immigration authorities that we
considered him a bona fide immigrant. On the contrary, we had a mass of reasons
to believe that he was a KGB agent sent to harm the interests of this country.
So what could we do about him? The first thing, in view of the serious
implications underlying this suspicion, was to clarify the doubts to the best of
our ability. And at that point we still thought there were ways to learn more,
enough to justify continuing the effort.
Suitable rural houses near Washington were, of course, hard to find, expensive
to rent, and involved leases for minimum period, security hazards, and the
threat that breaches of security might make us move again and again. And such
holdings areas required a large guard force.
So the Office of Security considered it not only safer and better for our
purposes, but also cheaper, to build a place on Government-owned land, than to
lease a new house, pay the guards, make the alterations, et cetera, for a period
we could not control.
As to the design of that house. Mr. Hart invented the term "bank vault," which
is a catchy phrase but a purposeful misrepresentation, a misrepresentation of
his own Agency's motives. The facts were, these. The house was to be separate,
but to hold down costs it should be as small as possible. There were certain
minimum requirements: an interview room, a room for Nosenko, and a room for the
guard or guards. It should require as few guards as possible. It should have an
openair exercise area, but not such as to let him see where he was. And as in
the earlier safehouse, he should not be able to communicate with the outside,
hence no windows. To prevent tunneling, his room should be of stronger
construction. Now, to go from these last two criteria, as Mr. Hart did, and say
that "in addition to the vault, which surrounded it," is to misstate the truth.
The house was designed by the Office of Security, which was responsible for all
the physical aspects of holding Nosenko. At no time any representative of the
Office of Security express any dissatisfaction with the manner of Nosenko's
handling, nor disagreement with the suspicions of Nosenko which underlay the
detention.
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It has been said that Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement and unoccupied,
with a special view to influencing him to confess. In fact, there was no
alternative to solitary confinement (could we have found him a companion) and it
was physically impossible to arrange to question him constantly. One day of
interrogation requires at least a day and perhaps more of report writing, and a
day or more of investigation, and later sessions take time to prepare. And for
almost all the people involved, there were other responsibilities, other tasks;
the work went on even outside the Nosenko-case. How Mr. Hart could
imagine that the Agency leadership (professionals with experience interrogation)
thought Nosenko was under constant questioning is comprehensible to me. Mr. Hart
says we interrogated Nosenko for days out of 1,277. That makes about 1 day in 4,
if you let us off for weekends, and that sounds about right and normal. If I
once wrote that the time between questionings would make Nosenko ponder, then I
was rationalizing inevitable gaps, not planning an unbearable isolation for the
man.
The detention had positive results. We got, as we never could have otherwise the
bulk of what Nosenko had to report, pure and free of any outside coaching. We
were able to detect just how ignorant he was, and in just what areas. We could
probe the limits of his knowledge, and they were rigid, even in connection with
things he had claimed to have lived through. (Much like his recited story of Lee
Harvey Oswald.) We were able to apply test questions to refine or test our
hypotheses, in the absence of a confession. But, limited by morality and the
law, we were not able to get a confession. In retrospect, with the benefit of
hindsight, I suppose that we would have done just as well to give him better
food, more book, music, a big bed, games, and occasional informal conversations.
But that was not clear at the time.
But we could hardly, in good conscience under our responsibility under the
parole, sponsor him for U.S. immigration. It took a whitewash and pretended
belief in his tales to accomplish that.
Now I want to address myself to the question of disposal.
Here the extent of CIA's irrational involvement with Nosenko becomes blatant.
Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my friends who watched on TV) selected
items from some penciled jottings in my handwriting which left with you the
impression that I had contemplated or considered (even suggested as more than
one newspaperman understood him) such measures as liquidation, drugging, or
confinement in mental institutions.
I state unequivocally, under oath, that:
First, no such measures were ever seriously considered.
Second, no such measures were ever studied.
(What "loony bin"? How "make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I
know of none now and never did, nor did I ever try to find out if such exist.
The whole subject of "liquidation" was taboo in the CIA for reasons with which I
wholeheartedly agreed then and still do.)
Third, no such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in
intimate personal conversations.
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Fourth, no such measures were ever proposed at any level of the Agency.
Of course, Mr. Helms, when he testified before you, hadn't heard of those
penciled notes; neither had anyone else.
I do not remember making any such notes. And I have had much time to try to
remember. However. I can imagine how I might have. Responsible as I was for this
"abominable" case, I was called upon to help find the best way to release
Nosenko without a confession but sure that he was an enemy agent. In an effort
to find something meriting serious consideration, I suppose that I jotted down,
one day, every theoretically conceivable action. Some of them might have been
mentioned in one form or another by others; I doubt they all sprang from my
mind. (I cannot even guess what "points 1 through 4" might have been, the ones
Mr. Hart declined to read because they were "unimportant." I guess that means
they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that the notes were penciled reveals
that they were intended to be transient; the fact that "liquidation" was
included reveals that they were theoretical: and their loose, undignified
language reveals that they were entirely personal for my fleeting use only. In
fact, none of these courses of action could have been morally acceptable to me
nor conceivable as a practical suggestion to higher authority.
Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in
the files. Although he recognized their purely personal nature, that they were
not addressed nor intended for any other person, nor had any practical intent,
he chose to bring them to show and tell to the committee and to the American
public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his evident
intent to deride and destroy any opposition to Nosenko? Could he have done it
for reasons of personal spite? Whatever the answer, the cost seems too high: He
was discrediting his own Agency for a matter without
substance.
I cannot remember any concrete proposal for "disposal" being made during my
tenure. You understand, of course, that "disposal" is merely professional jargon
for ending a relationship which began with "acquisition." Those are two words
that go together, being "acquisition" and "disposal." The course the Agency
eventually adopted seems, in retrospect, the only practical one. I think the
Agency did well to rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to
pasture.
However, I cannot understand why they then employed him as an adviser, as a
teacher of their staff trainees in counterintelligence. The concrete suspicions
of Nosenko have never been resolved, and because they are well rounded, they
never will "be cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may
frivolously dismiss them, as they have done before your committee, but the
doubts are still there and it is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel
to this individual.
In conclusion, Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious performance. One wonders what
could drive a Government agency into the position of: Trying to discredit and
bury under a pile of irrelevancies the reasons to suspect that the Soviet Union
sent to America a provocateur to mislead us about the assassin of President
Kennedy; pleading irrationally and misleadingly in favor of a KGB man about whom
serious
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doubts persist; misrepresenting, invidiously, its own prior action; denigrating
publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own officers; and
dredging up unsubstantial personal notes, left carelessly in a highly secret
file folder, to falsely; suggest in public the planning by its own people of the
vilest forms of misconduct. As the Congress is conspicuously aware, the veil of
secrecy can hide irresponsibility and incompetence. But behind that veil the CIA
used to maintain unusually high standards of honor and decency and
responsibility, and did a pretty competent job, often in the face of impossible
demands. The decline of these qualities is laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony--to
the Agency's discredit, to my own dismay, and to the detriment of future
recruitment of good men, who will not want to make careers in an environment
without integrity. The Agency need not have gone so far. After all, Nosenko's
bona fides had been officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its
highest level to have besmirched the Agency's escutcheon. Not only are they out
of the way, but everything possible is being done to see that no one challenges
Nosenko or his ilk, ever again. The Agency need only have said this much, and no
more.
That Admiral Turner's personal emissary went so much further suggests that the
Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its. position. Perhaps it fears
that this committee, wondering about this defector's strange reporting and
unconstrained by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, "But the emperor
has no clothes!" This might explain the spray of mud, to cloud your view.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. My
only regard is that I have not had the opportunity to answer publicly charges
that have been made in public. And I should also like to point out in closing
that in making this presentation and in responding to your questions today I may
be limited by the fact that the Agency lias denied me access to certain
documents which I requested be made available. With that in mind, I will be
happy to address any questions you may have.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. D.C.
Mr. Fithian, Mr. Klein will be recognized for questioning. Would you prefer to
ask questions before Mr. Klein?
Mr. FITHIAN. No.
Mr. PREYER. I recognize Mr. Klein at this time.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. D.C., you referred in your testimony to the memo that was
provided to this committee by Mr. Hart. The actual memo was not provided; a
typewritten copy of that account was provided, JFK F-427. I will ask the clerk
to show you a copy of that document.
Mr. Chairman, that has already been previously marked into evidence in previous
hearings.
In looking at that document, do you recognize the words as being your own?
Mr. D.C. No; as I said in my testimony, I can't remember any such document.
However, I wish to point out that I also said it is not at all inconceivable to
me that such a document existed, and I did write it.
Mr. KLEIN. Some of the questions I will be directing to you refer to the letter;
I believe that is also being put into the record. it is JFK exhibit F-136.
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You have testified that you were directly responsible for the case of the KGB
defector Yuri Nosenko from 1961 to 1962; is that correct?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Was learning what Nosenko knew of Lee Harvey Oswald a major objective
of the CIA during those years?
Mr. D.C. This question has arisen in some of the previous questions have read.
There may be some question about the word "major."
I would like to say the question of Lee Harvey Oswald was major indeed in our
thoughts. We had in our custody the only witness to Oswald's life in the Soviet
Union. So it was certainly important.
The information which Nosenko gave about Oswald was so circumscribed, so rigid
that we took it, we questioned him as you know, and got to what we thought were
the limits of his knowledge. It was not expanded to anything he really lived
through. It was there. We thought we had it. We questioned him in Geneva., I
think twice. It is in the record. We talked to him here about it. The Bureau had
him then afterward. In the conditions of detention it was part of the systematic
questioning to which I referred in my testimony. It was dealt with seriously.
But I don't believe we had much hope of getting any deeper into it. We thought,
Mr. Klein, that we had what Nosenko had to say about Oswald. Now whether that's
giving it proper importance, it was--well, of course it was important, but we
didn't keep going back day after day for 1,000 days to keep asking him, can you
think anything more about it?
The answer is yes, it's important; no, we didn't pound on it incessantly as
perhaps a major or important subject might be pounded on. But I say even now,
having read excerpts of your talks with him and having seen one or two things
change, I would say, perhaps we would have made changes in the story.
Mr. KLEIN. Was determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald,
was that a major objective?
Mr. D.C. Yes; it was.
And did you believe at that time that if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, that
that could have immense implications?
Mr. D.C. Yes; but the lying about Oswald was, in this sense, parallel to the
lying about several other things, a lot of other things.
As you saw, when I took this one case, the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, and took
it through our or my thought processes, if you like, I couldn't find any logical
or any illogical explanation for why he said what he said about Oswald.
So, of course, finding out why he was saying it or whether he was telling the
truth was of immense importance. As you see, independent of all the other
Aspects of Nosenko's bona fides, we could come to a point of extreme doubt of
his bona fides solely on the basis of the Oswald case.
Mr. KLEIN. Now, you quoted from our own report about the detail and specificity
of the July 3 and July 27 interrogations of Nosenko, when he was asked about
Oswald in the Soviet Union.
Do you know of any other sessions when Nosenko was questioned specifically in
detail about Oswald and Oswald's--about Oswald in the Soviet Union?
Mr. D.C. I don't know. I can't remember. I cannot remember. I do know that in
our office we spent--now, in my office st this time, Mr.
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Chairman, I would like to point out, as I mentioned in my opening remarks about
my career, that during the period from 1960. to about 1965 I was in charge of
counterintelligence within the Soviet bloc--Soviet Russian Division.
We were the operational element probably most closely involved with the Soviet
intelligence aspects of what would come out in the Oswald case, along with the
counterintelligence staff, as you know.
We did---because we had sources, defectors and experts at our behest--we did
dig. We thought, well, what can we supply, how can we shed some light on this
thing. This was on everybody's mind, and it was extremely important to us.
I remember, for example, the passing out of questions to certain defectors who
were working with us from the KGB predecessor organization, and their
information, their questions, their comments, were brought into us and to the
best of my knowledge were made available to the Warren Commission.
This is not Nosenko, you remember. This is other sources about Oswald.
There were a number of questions which Mr. Epstein got and published in his book
as an appendix, through the Freedom of Information Act, which came from my
section. He calls it 44 questions, but the way it is organized in the book it is
a lot more than 44 questions because each one is a group of questions.
Now, we passed that to the C1 staff, which was our channel find liaison to the
Bureau, and it was passed to the Bureau, and there was a big back and forth
about whether they would or wouldn't service these questions in their dealings
with Nosenko.
They were quite detailed questions, as they had to do with Soviet procedures
primarily. Those questions were, I gather, never serviced by the Bureau.
I can only say in retrospect--and here my memory fails me slightly--that by
giving them in through channels to be put to Nosenko, somehow we dropped them
because I don't believe that in the conditions of detention, I don't think those
so-called 44 questions were put to Nosenko.
When I look back on it, that is something that I would have to answer did we do
absolutely everything, I think it would have been extremely interesting, and I
don't quite understand if we didn't why we didn't.
Mr. KLEIN. I lost one point you were making. You said you gave them to the
Bureau and the Bureau did not ask the questions, Bureau meaning----
Mr. D.C. The FBI.
Mr. KLEIN. Didn't the CIA have custody of Nosenko at all times?
Mr. D.C. No. As has been said, custody is not the word here. Responsibility for
the questioning of Nosenko on Lee Harvey Oswald was very firmly in the hands of
the FBI. Believe me, we were extremely conscious of this and if my memory is
right, I believe we were enjoined at the time not to question him.
Certainly there was no doubt that by giving him the body, the man, Nosenko, into
the hands of the FBI for as long as they wanted--I am talking now about
conditions of liberty, of course, in this period, immediately after his
defection--that the United States--the appropriate
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U.S. organization for the inquiry into Nosenko's knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald,
our duty was accomplished.
We had given him, and it was the Bureau's job. They did their questioning.
You know, I don't know to this day exactly what they asked him.
I learned more from your staff report than I had known before.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that the Agency was constrained from asking
Nosenko questions about Oswald's activities in Russia because the FBI had
primary jurisdiction in this?
Mr. D.C. Yes; I think so.
Mr. KLEIN. Even Oswald's activities abroad?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes. That was the only thing that Nosenko could bring to the FBI.
That was all Nosenko had, is Oswald in Russia.
Mr. KLEIN. That was the full extent of Nosenko's testimony?
Mr. D.C. Yes; he was allegedly a KGB officer who had dealt with the case within
the KGB. Of course, this was all he had to offer. The fact that this was
handed--the Bureau had this authority, or this responsibility, it was perfectly
clear to us at the time.
Mr. KLEIN. How was this matter made known to you, that the FBI
would do all questioning--would be responsible for questioning Nosenko about
Oswald's activities in Russia? How was that made known to you?
Mr. D.C. I don't remember. It must have been a result of normal interagency
liaison, although nothing was really very normal about anything having to do
with the President's assassination.
I would suggest that the best person to answer that question would be someone on
the counterintelligence staff which controlled directly our liaison with the
FBI.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask at this time to have----
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Klein, may I interrupt just a minute here.
I would like to ask a question on this, and if I ask it later it will be as
disjointed as can be.
If the FBI had responsibility for the questioning of Oswald, which I believe you
just said----
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. FITHIAN [continuing]. How then could you testify earlier, as I believe I
understood you to testify. that the questions you asked and the answers you
received from Oswald--from Nosenko about Oswald, I think you said the Oswald
case alone disproved Nosenko's bona fides.
Mr. D.C. I didn't say disproved. I said it was a factor in testing of bona
fides. I don't think I said disproved because the word "prove" is a tricky one
in this case.
Mr. FITHIAN: That is not the burden of my question. The burden of my question is
if there was this clear jurisdictional division, are you saying, or aren't you
saying that the CIA did or did not question Oswald--question Nosenko intensely
or otherwise about Oswald.
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes; I would be glad to review what I said about that.
During the period when we were dealing. with Mr. Nosenko in Geneva, we--this was
an active hot operational matter, there was no question of FBI at all--we were
face to face with a man who was the jargon of the Agency, was an agent in
place-Nosenko before his
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defection, who was meeting us under clandestine circumstances in Geneva. He was
telling us about Lee Harvey Oswald.
We, of course, took that and got it as straight and as thoroughly as we could
under those circumstances.
After he defected and came to the United States, it was, through the channels
that Mr. Klein is interested in--it was made clear that the F. BI,. as the
primary investigative agency on the President's assassination, would manage the
further and detailed questioning of Nosenko in the United States on his
knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald. Later, after the detention--as I mentioned, we
tried to get some sort of admissions from Nosenko by the act of hostile
interrogation. Those as far as I remember--there were no questions involved in
there because there were no contradictions about Oswald, and I don't think that
was part of our hostile interrogation.
But subsequent to the hostile interrogation, as I say, we were able for the
first time because this man had resisted it earlier, we were able to ask him the
kinds of questions we would have asked him had he been free any normal defector.
We got to the questions and back to the questions of Lee Harvey Oswald in the
course of that systematic debriefing. That, I think, will explain the dates, Mr.
Klein, that are in your report, which I didn't know, I don't remember. They were
July 3 and 27.
Again, I learned from the report or I was reminded by the report that the
detention and the hostile interrogation began in early April. As I remember it,
the systematic questioning continued through the summer, and as a part of the
questioning, not with any expectation that there was more to come, that we would
have to contribute about Oswald, but because we wanted to do everything we could
to get his full story before the Warren Commission closed its doors, we did ask
him about these matters.
The result was--
Mr. FITHIAN. Even though at that time you did not have--the FBI still had
jurisdiction?
Mr. D.C. The question wasn't--in fact, Mr. Fithian, the question was no longer,
I think we didn't feel any constraint during this period of detention. There was
nothing preventing us from talking to Nosenko about Oswald.
The only thing that may have inhibited us was the conviction that he had no more
to say about it. Certainly I think the comparison of what we got in Geneva, and
the rather systematic questioning in July, there wasn't any more substance to
it.
He was making certain statements, and those statements were either true or not
true. But, they were certainly very limited. I think we could list the number of
facts he gave us about the Oswald case, and they would not be a very long list.
They have to do with how he heard about it and what he heard about Oswald's
attempt at suicide, about Oswald's psychological assessment they did or did not
do in the KGB, or in a Soviet hospital, on Oswald. These facts lined up have not
changed and they have not increased by subsequent questionings. And I think by
the time we were talking about, while Nosenko was in detention and we could have
asked him as many questions as we
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wanted to, I think our feeling was that we had his story. And I think subsequent
events have borne that out.
The only thing I regret, as I say is that those 44 questions which we had passed
to the FBI, I don't think we should have felt any inhibition about asking
Nosenko those at that time. I don't think anybody should have any inhibitions
about asking Mr Nosenko those questions today.
So hope that answers your question.
Mr. FITHIAN. I was just unclear----
Mr. D.C. While he was in detention, we didn't feel strongly constrained. There
was not much. thought--the Bureau was always--the FBI was always aware that if
they wanted to talk to Mr. Nosenko again that they could have him at any time
they wanted. There was no question of keeping him away from the FBI. With the
FBI's knowledge of this case the FBI's interest in this case, he was always
there. If they wanted to come to the CIA and say, "Look, you are
custodians of Mr. Nosenko. We would like to talked to him," they would have
talked to him again.
Mr. FITHIAN. The reason I raised the question was I inferred from your response
to Mr. Klein you somehow felt ruled out jurisdictionally, because that was the
FBI's province.
Mr. D.C. I would say prior to the detention, yes.
Mr. FITHIAN. Only for one time frame.
Mr. D.C. Yes. I think from the time of his defection, or the time of his arrival
in the United States until the detention. And as I say, the detention was
designed to do a hostile interrogation, not to question him systematically. In
fact, the hostile interrogation was a confused and confusing operation which
didn't succeed, but it was strictly; focused on contradictions in his story. And
as I state, there were few enough, if any, contradictions visible within his
story of Oswald that there was nothing there we could hook onto and use with any
impact.
Mr. FITHIAN, Thank you.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that whether it be very early or later on that
the CIA- did make every effort to get all the information from Mr. Nosenko that
it could get and to find the truth--all the information from Nosenko about
Oswald that it could get, and to determine whether that information was true or
not?
Mr. D.C. There are two questions, I think. I separated them in my letter. The
question did we get all the information. And then you said--
Mr. KLEIN. You attempted to get all the information from Nosenko about Oswald.
You can take that one first.
Mr. D.C. OK. It would be very easy, and I would in good conscience say yes. But
over these past weeks I have had a lot of time to think about it, what did we
know, what could we have done. And the only thing that sticks in my mind right
now that would have been perhaps useful for the record was to ask him those
questions which our experts knowing internal Soviet procedures, had dredged up
about--which were not all to do with Oswald, and they had nothing to do with his
knowledge of Oswald. They had to do with Oswald's own story, has to do with his
meeting with Marrina, his permission to marry
Marrina, his exit of Marrina from the Soviet Union, all of these things
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that have to do with Soviet internal procedures, where we consider ourselves
particularly well informed, because we had access to some former KGB people who
knew these procedures.
By the way, they have said, they said at that time--well, their reaction to the
story was quite violent. I understand that you have talked to some defectors on
this subject.
But the reaction of the KGB men to the Oswald and Marina story, and most
particularly to Nosenko's story about the failure to talk to him, and the ease
with which he married this lady and so forth, they believed that this is not
possible as given. Strongly they believe that.
Mr. KLEIN. I think my question sort of got lost. But is it your testimony that
at some point the CIA did try to get all the information that they could from
Nosenko that he knew about Oswald?
Mr. D.C. About Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald, yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And at some point did the CIA try to do its best, do whatever was
possible to determine whether the information Nosenko gave about Oswald was
true?
Mr. D.C. I would say our efforts in this respect would be on two planes. One is
to check out the facts, and those facts, as I think Mr. Helms told you here, can
only be found within the files of the KGB. And second, to find out whether
Nosenko as such is telling a true story. In other words, is his story--is all of
his story true, and therefore is his story of Oswald potentially true. And in
that latter respect, I would say we mad a heroic but unsuccessful effort. l say
unsuccessful, because we didn't prove it.
As I told you today--I hope I got over to you the fact that I am convinced that
the story cannot be true.
But that was the result of a long and strenuous effort.
So my answer to your second question is yes, indeed.
Mr. KLEIN. It is a]so your testimony that prior to the hostile inter- rogations,
the CIA did not concentrate on the Oswald question because the FBI had primary
responsibility for that issue; even though it dealt with Oswald's activities in
Russia.
Mr. D.C. Correct.
Mr. KLEIN: Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time I read into the record
page 7 from a document received from the FBI which is responses to questions
that this committee posed to the FBI. I cannot put, the entire document into
evidence because portions of it are secret. But the portion I propose to read is
unclassified.
The question posed to the FBI by this committee was:
Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating
Nosenko's statements about Oswald. If neither had primary responsibility, was
there any division of responsibility?
The answer; and I am quoting:
The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about
Oswald that pertained to his, Oswald's, activities in the United States, cluding
the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary responsibility for
investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities abroad.
Mr. D.C. I find that absolutely incomprehensible, because Nosenko could not
conceivably have known anything about Oswald's activities in the United States.
The FBI would have had nothing to talk to him about.
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Mr. KLEIN. In effect, what this document would seem to say is that for
everything that Nosenko knew about Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA had primary
responsibility of finding it out and investigating it.
Mr. D.C. Absolutely, that is what that document says to me; yes. Because it
couldn't possibly have been the agreement between the FBI and CIA at that time
because, as I say, there is no use talking to a Moscow-based internal security
officer of the KGB about a man, a former Marine of the United States, who came
to the United States--who had lived in the United States before he came to
Russia, came back to the United States after he lived in Russia, and at some
point along the way killed the President of the United States. How in the world
would this man have had anything to say on the subject? In fact, he would have
shrugged and said, "No, I don't know anything about it."
Mr. KLEIN. So we draw the conclusion from this that the CIA was of the opinion
that the FBI had responsibility in this area and at the same time the FBI was of
the opinion that the CIA had the primary responsibility in this area?
Mr. D.C. Certainly not. The FBI talked to this man for days. They could have
terminated their so-called responsibility in 5 minutes had they thought that we
were responsible, the CIA was responsible for talking to him about everything to
do with Oswald in Russia.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, you are disputing that statement; is that right?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes. And I have a feeling that there is some misunderstanding
there. I can't believe that anybody said that seriously.
I have no memory of any such thing being said at the time because--perhaps they
meant, you know--it couldn't mean that they felt that the FBI had--no, they were
talking about Oswald, not about Nosenko. No, I cannot understand it.
Mr. KLEIN. So, you dispute that.
Mr. D.C. Oh, of course.
Mr. KLEIN. Well.
Mr. D.C. But I suspect it is a misunderstanding, rather than a misstatement.
Mr. KLEIN. You testified earlier that you did not recall any other sessions
where Nosenko was asked detailed specific questions about Oswald in Russia,
other than the July 3 and July 97 statements, which were mentioned in our
report; is that correct?
Mr. D.C. That is correct. One reason I think perhaps you have the whole picture
is that there were pretty careful records kept. In response to your questions to
the agency, or--I am sure you had got all of the pertinent files, and had there
been anything else, it would have been clearly indicated.
Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record we have read those files, and we how of
no others.
Do you have any recollection of how long these two sessions were in time?
Mr. D.C. You mean the July session?
Mr. KLEIN. July 3 and July
Mr. D.C. No. I take it that information crime from a document. Did it give any
indication of the time? Because---
Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record
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Mr. D. C. Well, then, there must be a way to know.
Mr. KLEIN. How many hours, as an experienced security officer, considering what
you have told us was of importance to this question of Oswald--how many hours do
you think that the agency should have devoted to questioning Nosenko about
Oswald?
Mr. D.C. I would give you a practical answer to that question. When you are
faced with a man who is telling you a limited number of facts, which have a very
clear limit, you can ask him the questions, and can write down the answers, and
you can ask him the same questions or related questions all day long.
But I think that we felt that we had touched his limits, and we didn't just feel
it, we experienced it, and that had we talked more and more and more we wouldn't
have gotten anywhere. Therefore, I cannot guess how many hours one should spend
asking the same questions.
I would add, by way of comment to your question, that had he lived through the
experience as he said, we could have talked with him for days. Because you have
a situation where a case officer named Rostrusin or Krupnov, if this man walks
up, and they talk about it, and then they go out and have a drink, or they live
through these experiences, that Oswald had been in a hotel, and that there was
this Soviet Intourist woman who was in touch with him, what exactly is her
relationships with both KGB and what did she think about this guy, and did you
talk to her and when--these are things which would go on and on
and on had there been a genuine contact?
But the one thing I have noticed is that your complete information about Oswald
and ourselves or the FBI's run to a few pages, never more. You can't expand it.
You reached the limit. Therefore, My answer to your question is I can't guess
how long you can spend on this man, but I don't think it is any longer than we
did spend.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that 5 or 6 hours would be adequate for this
issue?
Mr. D.C. I am sorry. That is a very difficult question to answer.
Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record that the committee has heard the tapes
of these two sessions and they lasted, combined, approximately 5 or 6 hours.
That is where the figure comes from.
Mr. D.C. I don't know. You are talking about a matter of hours--was it 6 hours
or 12 hours or even 30 hours. Perhaps there could have been more.
Mr. KLEIN. Now, are you familiar with the person who questioned Oswald on July
30 July 27?
Mr. D.C. No, I can't 'remember who it was. If you tell me his name, I am sure I
would remember. But--it was presumably a member of my division, or my section, I
would say--at that time the counter-intelligence section of the Soviet division.
Mr. KLEIN. My only hesitation is---
Mr. D.C. It doesn't matter.
Mr. KLEIN. [continuing]. Is the security aspect.
Mr. D.C. Unless you want to ask me about some document. Excuse me for my
question.
Mr. KLEIN. What I do want to ask you is do you think if you have Nosenko, as he
is speaking about Oswald, and you said it was an
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important issue, that the person who questioned Nosenko about Oswald should be
somebody who is experienced in KGB--questioning KGB defectors.
Mr. D.C. I don't know. You have people available for questioning, and their
manner of questioning is more or less detailed, and more or less competent.,
depending on their training, and depending on their personal inclinations or
capacities.
Everybody has to get his experience somewhere. I think many officers I have
known have done brilliant and complete interrogations without any prior
experience.
No; l don't think it is necessarily relevant to be systematic about this. There
was an implication in one of the reports I read that this man had not carefully
studied the matter of Oswald before asking the questions of Nosenko. I think
probably more could have been done there.
Mr. KLEIN. When you say that everyone has to get their experience somewhere, do
you think this situation would have been a proper place to give somebody
experience in questioning a KGB defector, talking about Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. D.C. Yes; I think it would--in other words, it is not grotesque, it is not
unheard of to have a competent person--I am sure that the man who was sent--as I
say, I don't remember who it was--I am sure he was not an incompetent.
When we are talking about questioning anybody about anything, we are talking
about a personal capability, personal professional competence, rather than
experience, let's say, with a Soviet defector, or with anybody else. He could go
down and question a businessman about his business.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, to question a businessman, say, about his business, do you
think that he would have been very familiar in the facets of the business--and
my question is, would the person who questioned Nosenko about Oswald, would you
expect that that person should be very familiar with the facts of Oswald's life
and especially everything we knew about Oswald in Russia?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And this committee, as is stated in the report questioned, took a
deposition from the particicular agent who was to question Nosenko about Oswald,
and was the only agent who performed that questioning on July 3 and July -27,
and he stated that his knowledge of Oswald came from the media, what he had read
as all of us look at the newspapers and hear on television.
Do you think that is a satisfactory way to investigate what Nosenko knew about
Oswald?
Mr. D.C. The word "satisfactory" is a difficult one.
Mr. KLEIN. Adequate.
Mr. D.C. Certainly not maximum. Certainly not desirable. No; I would be inclined
to think that it was not--it was certainly not maximum.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that had the person who questioned Nosenko been very
familiar with all aspects of Oswald, and experienced in KGB, and spent more than
5 or 6 hours questioning Nosenko about Oswald, and perhaps the CIA would have
come up with more
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relevant information in determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about
Oswald?
Mr. D.C. No.
Mr. KLEIN. You state in your report that the chairman of this committee, due to
Mr. Hart's confusing testimony----
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Klein, are you departing that particular line of questioning
now?
Mr. KLEIN. I am going to come back to it. But you certainly can ask question
now.
Mr. FITHIAN. I have had the feeling, subjective, today that perhaps, hearing
your testimony and what else we have found out, that it would be fair to
characterize your major interest in Nosenko as not being Oswald either because
you touched the limits of his knowledge, information, or for whatever
reason--and that it would be fair to say that your real interest in Nosenko, as
an individual, was the potential penetration of American Government, potential
penetration of your own agency, determining whether he was sent here to mislead
your agency, sent here to undermine Mr. X, whatever.
In other words, the intelligence operations that he might be able to lead you to
were of a great deal more interest to you than Oswald. Isn't that fair to say?
Mr. D.C. No, no, it isn't, Mr. Fithian.
I would like to correct some of the impressions given in this field by Mr. Hart,
among others.
During the period of Nosenko's clandestine meetings with us before his
defection, and during the period of his questioning under conditions of freedom
in the United States, he was treated--and his information was gone at--precisely
as would any other defector.
The most important information he had to offer was got at, priorities were
established, he was questioned on everything he knew including Oswald. During
the period of confinements, he was also questioned on everything he knew
including Oswald.
Now, if the case as a whole seems to bear this counterintelligence flavor, I
would like to say that is probably determined by the fact that Mr. Nosenko was
an internal security officer of the KGB. lie was questioned early on, both in
Geneva and here, on los knowledge of anything to do with Soviet politics, Soviet
personalities, on the economic or internal relationships with the leadership,
any type of policy information that he could give from his knowledge, as a KGB
officer.
These are things which some KGB officers have had knowledge of. In other words,
we don't write them off. They are not nearly as valuable as sources of
intelligence are; for example, officers of the Soviet Army or * * * [others].
But nonetheless, they are not necessarily zero, especially having to do with
political information. I would say we made every effort to get what this man had
on other things, that we were not just slanting our questions in order to
determine whether he was a plant.
However, during that questioning we continually found reason to suspect that he
was a plant, but that was not our purpose as it has been stated to this
committee.
Our purpose was to get what he knew. He didn't know much. That is a fact. That
isn't our preconception, as Mr. Hart--
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Mr. FITHIAN. You mean he didn't know much about any area?
Mr. D.C. No, sir. Well, what do you mean by any area?
Mr. FITHIAN. The areas you questioned him on.
Mr. D.C. The areas I mentioned, on Soviet politics, economics and so on, he knew
effectively nothing. He had nothing that was of any intelligence value.
Mr. FITHIAN. Well, I had some other questions, but that would kind of lead us
far astray.
Mr. KLEIN. I don't have a whole lot more.
You stated in your letter that the chairman of the committee, due to the
confusing testimony of Mr. Hart, was led to state that no investigation of
Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko have been made.
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And that, that was incorrect?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you tell us specifically what the CIA did to investigate what
Nosenko said about Oswald in Russia?
Mr. D.C. The context of that statement, by the way, as is put in my letter, has
to do with the getting--it is in the paragraph of that letter which talks about
getting the information from, even though we are talking about investigation.
This is as I read the transcript. It may not be correct. It may have meant
indeed the investigation of the information which had been gotten.
Mr. KLEIN. Right. Distinguishing taking a statement from investigation, using
investigation in that way, would you tell us what specifically was done to
investigate this case.
Mr. D.C. Yes, with pleasure.
First of all, the best way to investigate it is to check parallel sources of
information. In this case, the only parallel source of information which could
tell us, confirm or deny whether Lee Harvey Oswald had or had not been
questioned by the KGB, or had or had not had any relations with the KGB, or some
of the other things Nosenko said, could only come from the KGB, or Inturist, or
from some of the personalities in contact with Nosenko in Russia. We had no such
sources.
Second, we would probably go into--I am not sure what the technical term here
is--we would consult experts. We would take Nosenko's information and see
whether it made sense in terms of the knowledge, our knowledge of the Soviet
Union. That would not be a reference merely to files. That would be the
questioning of all available sources on this subject. That is the point I made,
that we did go back to every one of our defectors, not only on Nosenko's story,
but on Oswald's story, directly.
That would be about all--except finally the attempt to determine how valid that
information was in terms of the man's total credibility, which means
investigation under interrogation.
Mr. KLEIN. Now, consultmg of experts--you told us that although you spoke to
some defectors, that they never used the questions, is that right?
Mr. D.C. No, no, no. They made reports. They made comments and reports about
internal Soviet procedures which bore on the Oswald story. Oh, yes, they did
that. They made reports.
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Mr. KLEIN. So, since, as you say, you could. not go to the KGB, the only
investigation that the CIA did in thin matter was to consult other defectors
about procedures in the KGB?
Mr. D.C. Other defectors, other knowledge available to the American intelligence
community.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, what specifically?
Mr. D.C. Excuse me?
Mr. KLEIN. I say other than defectors, who else did you specifically to, to
investigate.
Mr. D.C. Talk to? Oh, let me think. Talk to. May I ask you to be very precise in
your question as to what aspects of the story you might be talking about? Is it
Nosenko's story of Oswald? Because if it is, it has to do with the procedures of
admission to the Soviet Union, the series of events that occurred to Oswald in
the Soviet Union, the suicide, and things of that sort.
Mr. KLEIN. And you are saying that you investigated this--these statements by
Nosenko how, by speaking to---
Mr. D.C. Well, who would know about, let's say, procedures for the admission of
people into the Soviet Union. Who would know about--the main source, the most
valued source we have ever had on things from this very closed society, where
these regulations and these procedures are in no sense open to the public, the
best source We have had, of course, is defectors and that is over a large number
of years--many years.
The result has been we have accumulated this information, and have turned out
general reports and kept them up-to-date on what certain Soviet procedures are.
Those would be consulted. In other words, written reports, background
information. Surely we checked that.
Mr. KLEIN. So in general you checked the reports that had been accumulated over
the years, but not specifically written for this case.
Mr. D.C. And then questioned people specifically about this case, those sources
we had.
Mr. KLEIN. Who did you question, without saying a name--if you questioned
defectors, how many?
Mr. D.C. Defectors.
Mr. KLEIN. How many did you question?
Mr. D.C. Certainly a minimum of three, and as many perhaps as, I would guess--my
memory really isn't sure because I wasn't as closely aware of some of these
other things--I would imagine that we sought or got reports from more than those
three, the three that I know of. How many more, I don't remember.
Mr. KLEIN. And were their records and files of what these--all the people that
you questioned, are those records all made, of what they said when asked
specifically to comment on this case?
Mr. D.C. I don't know that, Mr. Klein. I don't know.
Mr. KLEIN. And other than the number of defectors, at least three, anybody else
that you questioned, or did you do anything else to investigate what Nosenko
said about Oswald?
Mr. D.C. The word investigation is bothering me a little. I don't know what you
mean. If you mean to look into it, to verify it by whatever information we had
about Russia, what other sources are available?
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You have overt information, and you have information which has come from covert
sources.
Mr. KLEIN. What I am saying is--I am not stating at this time there are other
possibilities. I am just asking what--is that the extent of what you did to
investigate it?
Mr. D.C. We are talking about Nosenko's story, which is Oswald in Russia.
Mr. KLEIN. Yes.
Mr. D.C. What you do to investigate that in the United States is go
down to the neighborhood and you go talk to people. But we had no such access to
people inside the Soviet Union. There was a tremendous limit to our ability to
investigate this information.
Therefore if these outsiders, talking about procedures, or what would or,
wouldn't be done normally, sounds like a somewhat inadequate means of
investigation, it was the only one at our disposal.
Mr. KLEIN. As I say, your statement is that there was investigation I am just
trying to ascertain---
Mr D.C. I mentioned investigation on those three grounds, the third of those
grounds being the attempt by interrogation to get at the veracity of Nosenko in
general, and Nosenko as a source on Oswald.
Mr. KLEIN. And we have already discussed the extent of the questioning of
Nosenko on the Oswald matter. That was those two sessions.
Mr. D.C. The questioning of Nosenko on the Oswald matter was limited to those
two sessions, I believe, because you have told me so--plus the session is in
Geneva.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recollect in Geneva that you spoke in detail with Nosenko
about Oswald?
Mr. D.C. The words "in detail" are hard to say because the conditions of a
clandestine meeting are never satisfactory. You cannot sit down and be
systematic because you don't have that much time. There are other things we
talked about.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever question Marina Oswald about what happened in Russia
when she was with Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was giving you?
Mr. D.C. To my knowledge the CIA had no access whatsoever to Marina Oswald, and
I have no knowledge of any CIA contact with her at any time.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever ask the FBI to question her specifically about the
issues you were interested in?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Is there a written request for that?
Mr. D.C. I would suspect so; yes.
Mr. KLEIN. And did you get any answer back?
Mr. D.C. No.
Mr. KLEIN. The FBI----
Mr. D.C. No; I don't believe that we would have asked them to ask her something
to tell us because this would have been a violation of what the FBI concidered
its charter in this case.
Mr. KLEIN. So you did you didn't ask them.
Mr. D.C. We would give them questions to ask her. We would request them or
suggest to them that they ask Marina certain questions. That, yes, but not with
the idea of reporting back to us because we wouldn't have any right to do that.
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Mr. KLEIN. You wouldn't have any right to have the FBI give you their reports on
Marina Oswald?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes; we would have a right to ask them to give the reports. But we
didn't say why don't you ask this. This is essentially why we are doing it. We
gave them a request for information and said will you go ask these questions.
That is the history of the famous 44 questions I spoke about a moment ago.
Mr. KLEIN. Weren't you interested in the answers to compare it to what Nosenko
was telling questions.
Mr. D.C. Yes, indeed. But--the answers to---
Mr. KLEIN. That Marina gave the FBI, to compare it to what Nosenko told you what
happened?
Mr. D.C. We would have been very happy to have answers from Marina, and asked
these questions. But we could not operate through the FBI to do this. I think
this is a thing that has come up in previous testimony. I think we were
constrained, that the Bureau felt very strongly it was their responsibility.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever make any attempt to study files you had on other people
who had defected Americans who had defected to the Soviet Union, and check what
happened to them, and compare them to Oswald's?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes; and the people who were doing that the way, I want to stress
here that the agency component primarily responsible--I told you about our
wholehearted effort and tremendous interest in this. But the agency component
handling the agency's requirements on Lee Harvey Oswald were in fact the
counterintelligence staff. They indeed did look into the experience of other
defectors.
Mr. KLEIN. Were their reports made on this?
Mr. D.C. I don't know.
Mr. KLEIN. I should say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that our committee has
seen these files, but has never seen any reports indicating, that any kind of
study was made to compare these people to Oswald.
Were the results of these studies put in the final report that you people--that
the Soviet Russia division published in I believe February of 1977?
Mr. D.C. No. The Soviet Russia--may I speak about that report? The report, the
so-called final Soviet Russia, division report has also been misrepresented
here. What was being done in the so-called 1,000 page report, or whatever one
chooses to call it, was to make sense out of an incredible mass of material.
It had gotten to the point, there were so many interrelated cases, so much
detail connected with Nosenko, that somebody new coming into the case could
probably no longer master it. What I sought to do was to get each and every
aspect of the case written up, what Nosenko had said, what investigations had
been made of it, perhaps even comments on it, or further things to be done on
it.
That I don't remember--the exact format. But I do know the first two things were
there, what Nosenko had said and what our investigation independent knowledge
showed. This was put together with the idea of being a reference of easy access,
not as a final report
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Now, exactly what was finally said in it when it got into its eventual
form, the so-called 400-page report, I don't know because wasn't there, and I
had certainly not originally intended that compilation had to be a final report.
It has certainly been treated as such, and has been described as such here.
Perhaps there were passages in it which had the kind of conclusions which I saw
quoted--Nosenko was not this, and was not that, and was trying to deceive, and
things of that sort.
Perhaps they appeared even in that 1,000 page report. But frankly, that wasn't
its original intent, and I don't remember their being in there.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you specifically remember a report where there was a study of all
American defectors to the Soviet Union and a comparison?
Mr. D.C. No; but I can assure you that the person to ask on that would be the
counterintelligence staff. That was their responsibility.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any kind of effort to get hold of documents, letters,
diary written by Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was telling you about
Oswald?
Mr. D.C. No, no.
Mr. KLEIN. When I asked you earlier about whether if you thought that a more
experienced person questioned Nosenko, somebody who knew more about Oswald did
the questioning, and whether there were longer sessions, whether that might have
helped to get more information and get to the truth in this matter, you said
that you didn't think it would help. And in your letter to us, you told us that
you felt the Agency learned about Nosenko and what this committee learned and
said that shows that the Agency did a good job.
Mr. D.C. Did an adequate job. I didn't say did a good job.
Mr. KLEIN. An adequate job.
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Did the FBI have the same access to Nosenko that the CIA had?
Mr. D.C. Yes. As I remember, I think he was delivered to them.
I think they probably questioned him--I am not 100 percent sure of this, but I
seem to remember that they questioned him on their own premises. In other words,
I think he was out of our custody.
the period he was being talked to by the FBI. It is conceivable that I am wrong
and that the FBI people came to the house in which Nosenko was living and talked
to him there. But I have some-----
Mr. KLEIN. I believe the record will reflect that was the case.
Mr. D.C. I'm sorry. I don't remember.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall the FBI having any access to Nosenko after April 4,
1964?
Mr. D.C. No. Nor do I remember their asking for such access.
Mr. KLEIN. So they only were able to question Nosenko for approximately 2 months
in 1964; is that right?
Mr. D.C. Correct.
Mr. KLEIN. And you stated in your letter that they questioned him----
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Mr. D.C. Wait a minute. Excuse me. You said were able to interrogate him only
during 2 months?
Mr. KLEIN. They had 2 months---
Mr. D.C. You used the words "were able" They were able to talk to him more if he
asked for it. I said that earlier today.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, you are saying they could have spoken to him after April 4,
1964?
Mr. D.C. Yes. It is certainly my understanding.
Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, again I would like to read from the report given to us
by the FBI, from page 5. This particular section was read into the record at our
earlier hearings. I would like to read it again.
The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 until April 3 of
1969, and therefore was not in a position to make an objective assessment his
bona fides nor of the veracity of information furnished by him. Thus information
provided by him in early 1964 was accepted at face value and qualified in terms
of the source and the conditions under which it was received.
Does that indicate to you that the FBI felt that they could have interviewed him
any time they wanted after April 4, 1964?
Mr. D.C. Yes. The phrase in there was they had, as I understood it--they had no
access to him during that period. They didn't suggest, I think, by that
phraseology that they were denied it. I know of no case in which the FBI asked
for access to Nosenko or that anything was said to the Bureau that suggested to
them that they could not have access to him during his period of detention.
Mr. KLEIN. And you also compared the findings of the CIA with the findings of
this committee. Do you think the fact that this committee spoke to Nosenko 14
years later might have put the committee at a disadvantage versus the position
the CIA was in in 1964?
Mr. D.C Normally I would say of course. In this case, I see no sign of it.
Mr. KLEIN. You don't think that the committee had any disadvantage---
Mr. D.C. No. I say I don t see any sign of it in the result. On the contrary, I
think you got everything and perhaps a bit more. As to whether the 14 years make
a disadvantage in this case or not, I would say normally of course it would.
Everybody's memory fades, especially of experienced events.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that the absence of the investigative and
intelligence resources that the CIA had available in 1964 the absence of that
for this committee might have also made it more difficult for this committee to
conduct its investigation?
Mr. D.C. The absence of what--excuse me?
Mr. KLEIN. The investigative and intelligence resources that the CIA has
available, and had available in 1964, that that might have---
Mr. D.C. As I pointed out to you, there were no investigative resources that you
would consider serious ones inside the Soviet Union.
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Mr. KLEIN. You don't think that the CIA had any advantage over this committee as
far as sources available to them?
Mr. D.C. I don't know what your limitations were, Mr. Klein. I would think that
the type of sources that I have described would have been made available to your
committee had you asked them. In other words, defectors, available background
information on the Soviet Union and so forth. I don't think that--well, I don't
how what other assets you are talking about or what other capabilities.
Mr. KLEIN. You state in your letter that the committee came up with only one
fact.
Mr. D.C. Well, I was talking there about the----
Mr. KLEIN. Surveillance.
Mr. D.C. The surveillance.
Mr. KLEIN. You are aware that the committee came up with numerous
inconsistencies in Nosenko's statements?
Mr. D.C. I Certainly am. And I found them extremely well presented.
Mr. KLEIN. In the time the CIA had to question Nosenko, can you specifically
tell us inconsistencies or untruths that the CIA pinned him to?
Mr. D.C. In the details of the case?
Mr. KLEIN. Yes.
Mr. D.C. The answer is probably no. I don't--and the answer is certainly no, I
do not remember any. But as to whether there were or not, I don't remember.
Mr. KLEIN. In the files that I have read I can state that I have not
found any. And my question to you is if the Agency did an adequate job, then how
is it that 14 years later this committee found inconsistencies, when the Agency
never found any at the time?
Mr. D.C. Well, some of those were changes in the story in the interim, aren't
they?
Mr. KLEIN. That is correct. But they came about from questioning, from checking
prior statements, questioning a number of times about the facts, 25, 30 hours.
Mr, D.C. Yes, prior statements.
Mr. KLEIN. My question basically is did the Agency put the time and resources
into this so that if there were inconsistencies that could
have been found in 1964 they would have been found?
Mr. D.C. I am not sure that these inconsistencies did exist at that time. And
certainly I am not sure that a questioning of him at that time would have
produced these inconsistencies. I have no way of knowing that.
Mr. KLEIN. I am not necessarily referring to these particular inconsistencies.
What I am suggesting is that if inconsistencies develop in
questioning of somebody now, would it be a fair statement that adequate
questioning in 1964, although maybe not developing these same inconsistencies,
would have probably developed other inconsistencies which could have been
investigated and could have been the basis for even further questioning.
Mr. D.C. I think that is unknowable. I don't know.
Mr. FITHIAN. On that point, if I may add, Mr. Klein--your own professional
judgment is that Nosenko is lying about his knowledge
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of Oswald in Russia, or that he is intentionally misrepresenting what he knows
to be factual about the KGB treatment of Oswald.
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. FITHIAN. I mean those are the only two possibilities.
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
Mr. FITHIAN. And that was your conclusion at that time.
Mr. D.C. The conclusion--
Mr. FITHIAN. Let me just ask you. You never would have put your stamp of
approval on Nosenko's bona fides, is that correct?
Mr. D.C. No one would put a stamp of approval on somebody's bona fides except as
the result of a careful and considerable period of investigation; that is any
defector.
Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that.
Mr. D.C. And in his case it is suggested and has been suggested to this
committee that conclusions were drawn prior to his--first of all prior to his
reappearance in 1964, in other words, after the 1962 meeting, and subsequently
during that period, before he was incarcerated, if that is the word. The fact is
that at all times in our discussion, regardless of what might--well, let me
start again. That at all times we left the door open to him, for him to prove
his bona fides. The key period in this, in my opinion, was in that period of
freedom, after his defection, where he was treated like anyone else, and we
tried to go down and talk to him and so forth. And there were points or
questions in our minds which we tried to approach with him during that period.
I would say that we went to the meetings in 1964 with a doubt in the back of our
minds. But in no way planning to handle the meetings in a different way than
would have been. Quite a lot was made by Mr. Hart. about, the duplicity with
which we talked about the settlement arrangements that would be made with Mr.
Nosenko when he came to the United States. This has been the subject of some
controversy since.
My memory tells me that we were not and could not have been authorized to
exercise duplicity as such. We were offering him the type of settlement, which
we would have offered to that man had he established his bona fides. It was not
duplicity as such.
Now, if you say at the same time that follow who is promising these things is
also the author of this paper over here which says that we don't trust him, or
that there are some odd things here which duplicity? Because the door was always
open for the establishment of his bona fides.
And as for the first hostile interrogation, when we confronted him with these
contradictions, I would say to you that we probably suspected that he would not
be able to clear up these things. But we didn't do it. And there might
conceivably have been some innocent explanation of both contradictions in his
own story or oddities, all the things that Mr. Hart or others have mentioned,
that there was some--he was perhaps a pathological liar or that he was boasting
or he had a very strange memory a whole lot of things could have come up.
But what we had done in the meantime is to do a lot of investigation on the
side, not only about Oswald, and that we presented this
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outside information to him, asked him questions about it, and found that he was
inexplicably unable to answer the questions.
At what point has one concluded that this man--in other words, dismissed him as
a source? I don't think we ever did. I don't think we talked to him about Oswald
until much later, during the period we are talking about here. I don't think any
less effort was made than would have been made with a serious defector. There
were certainly more troubles in getting details from him than from other
defectors, but I think our posture, face-to-face to him, probably was not much
different than it would have been had we not had the suspicions in the
background. It's the word "conclusions" that bothers me. It's the conclusion
what he might have said had we not had these preconceptions, as Mr. Hart put it.
Mr. FITHIAN. I was trying to get at a follow up to Mr. Klein's questions. Mainly
inconsistencies occurred because stories didn't match and so on, but I was
trying to ascertain whether or not in your judgment since you did not believe
him, you had reason at that time either because of inconsistencies or lies or
whatever you judged them to to disbelieve his. rendition of the Oswald story in
Russia.
Mr. D.C. To the degree we had a suspicion of him at all, the answer is yes; we
had that much reason to disbelieve what he said about Oswald in Russia. Plus the
fact the story he was telling about Oswald in Russia was absolutely unacceptable
to us alone as a story, for all the reasons we have already discussed. It was an
incredible story and Mr. Hart and others have stressed that and every Soviets
defector has stressed this.
Mr. PREYER. I have to be at a meeting over at the Capitol at 12:45 p.m. If you
want to continue some questioning, could you come back? I suggest if it's
agreeable with everyone that we recess until 2 o'clock today in this room and we
can post a notice on the door if we have to go to another room.
The committee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11 :40 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to resume at 2 p.m.]
Afternoon Session
Mr. PREYER. The committee will resume its sitting.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Klein to complete his questions.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be exceedingly brief, with only one
question.
Mr. D. C. To your knowledge is there any documentation, reports memos, that
fully describe the efforts made by the CIA in 1964:, 1965, 1966, 1967, to
investigate what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?
Mr. D.C. No; and I would say as of 1966, or 1967, when I cut off, my best guess
is that such a document doesn't exist. I don't remember marking one and I am not
quite certain what the reason for making one would be.
Mr. KLEIN. Is it normal procedure that during the course of the investigation
you wouldn't document the course of the investigation?
Mr. D.C. You would document everything you do, but you certainly need not go
back and describe everything you did or every thing you do, but you certainly
need not go back and describe everything you did or everything you propose to
do. I don't know who such a document would be directed to,
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for example. If one were reporting progress of an investigation there would be
reports of what was done and what not. But this was one aspect of one larger
investigation and I can't remember any document being made up on the subject.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Judge.
My first question is less specific. We'll have more specific ones later.
But I have always been puzzled since Mr. Hart appeared before us as to why the
Director would accept a man who would testify in such a way as to create
smashing anti-CIA headlines out of that testimony and that goes beyond what you
said this morning as to his own personal knowledge or credentials for making
such testimony. Can you shed any light on that at all?
Mr. D.C. It goes without saying, I have thought about this a lot. I think the
dates of the Director's takeover of the agency may have something to do with it.
He came in from outside, very much outside, and he was faced with what to him
was probably repulsive or abominable state of affairs and he turns to what was
then the recognized expert, the man who had just before his takeover of the
agency conducted this study. I have not seen it; I understand it's bulky and
have no doubt as to its conclusion. But I would say from the Director's point of
view, this man might appear to be the expert even though he was already retired
at the time he did the 1976 study.
Mr. FITHIAN. Going back to Mr. Hart's testimony on page 114 of our record, he
says to this committee explaining how he would proceed, he says:
Therefore, what I have before me are a series of notes which were finished about
8 o'clock last night based on guidance which I got at that time from Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA.
Mr. D.C. I am mystified and have been asked the question and have asked others
the question and no one I know in the Agency during my time or since has come up
with any sensible explanation.
Mr. FITHIAN. Your assessment or judgment as to why Mr. Hart was selected then
stems from and concurs with what Mr. Hart is saying a little later in his
testimony when he says since Admiral Turner has become Director of Central
Intelligence he has been quite concerned about this case and he specifically
requested I come back to the Agency from which I retired in 1972 and give
presentations to agents on the nature of the case.
Now my question is this, since the Nosenko case became a celebrated one long
before this committee became interested or long before we even knew he existed,
was Mr. Hart's operation such that he would be the logical person within the
Agency or immediately retired from the Agency to make the kind of presentations
to "senior officials or agents in the case" that we might have expected?
Mr. D.C. No, sir, he was not.
Mr. FITHIAN. May I reiterate in the record at this point what Mr. Dodd so ably
did during the questioning that day, and that is to say that kind of testimony
didn't in any way square with what this committee had requested of the Agency.
We had submitted to the Agency a very detailed list of questions or concerns we
had, Mr. Klein can
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amplify that, of all our concerns. Then they were sent over to the Agency for a
representative to discuss these matters. I might state, in no way did the
Department comply with the request. It's worse than I thought in this sense. We
were very surprised that day that the subject of Oswald was not discussed after
some 30 or 40 minutes of testimony and then all the. questions and even the
statement that, he was not qualified to comment on Oswald, which happens to be
the only thing this committee was primarily interested in. So I make that
comment at this point in the record. Now, let me turn to your specific testimony
Mr. DC and ask you to refer to page 10 of your testimony.
Prior to asking a question as to this particular page, let me ask a couple of
background questions: As a professional in this field, I believe I read into
your statement here that it is highly unlikely perhaps totally improbable, that
someone with Oswald's particular background would have been able to move in, do
the things he did in the Soviet Union and move out without being questioned by
the KGB.
Mr. D.C. That is absolutely my thought I would say it's absolutely unthinkable
and it's unthinkable for the Soviet defectors I know, it's unthinkable for
anyone who knows the automatic procedures of the Soviet Union, there is no way
he could have evaded this action.
One described to me that the KGB. as it would face an American swimming into
their sea, it would be like a pool of piranhas, insofar as one could make a
statement as dogmatic and final as that. I would say it can't have happened as
described.
Mr. FITHIAN. Well, then, when Mr. Nosenko told you, told you the Agency that
story, that would have been as early as Geneva?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. FITHIAN. Just prima facie, doesn't this raise questions on the part of the
Agency as to credibility of this man at all? I mean even at the very outset, the
first or second contact you had with him in Geneva?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. FITHIAN. Now, staying with the Geneva scene for just a minute, this is a
digression, but I was appalled at statement made to us where along the way Mr.
Chairman as to the techniques of questioning Nosenko in Geneva, that the CIA
non-Russian language person doing the recording and--l have forgotten all the
details. I would like some amplification, because I occasionally vote on budgets
around here.
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir. A slight correction of dates and the manner in which I
entered into this case.
I was in fact stationed in ... [West Europe], not in headquarters in the Soviet
Division at the time this case broke. Therefore, I came into it, if you like, as
the Soviet operations expert in that area learning of Russian to the point where
I occasionally served as a lowlevel translator for the Ambassador or interproter
in some of his contacts with the Soviet Embassy, I was most definitely never
fluent or competent in the language. But on the other hand, this shouldn't keep
one from operating against the Soviet Union.
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The contact made by a member of a Soviet delegation to that area, in this
instance a disarmament conference in Geneva, he says "I want a contact with
American intelligence, so somebody had to do that. It was quite clear I was the
person to contact and I did.
In the course of the first meeting with him, both English and Russian were
spoken. I told the man from the outset that I would appreciate his speaking
clearly and relatively slowly and I would like to break into English whenever
possible, and we tried to reach a language of understanding. At times either
from excitement, impatience or whatever, he expressed himself over a
considerable number of sentences, fast, in Russian where my understanding of it
was imperfect.
Now, I think at this late date, I told you this at a much earlier date, but very
early along our questioning of the man and of our writing reports on him, we
were aware of those points where he had said something and I had failed to
understand simply because there were taped recordings of these meetings.
During the second meeting--it possibly could have been the third but I think it
was the second there was present in the room a native-speaking Russian officer
to accompany me in my dealings with this man.
Although I came into it as a member of the ***[an overseas] component of the
Agency, I was already known as particularly competent and experienced in this
field, so it was considered as I think Mr. Helms said in 1964, it was considered
a good face for the Agency, a competent qualified face for this extremely
valuable source.
But from the second meeting on--even in the first meeting, there were a few
misunderstandings which consisted. I believe, of my talking notes on certain
things he said about his background. The military school which he attended was
cited in your testimony and there were one or two other minor things having to
do with the manner of his father's death. I made a mistake, I heard it wrong.
So, in my initial report to headquarters there were mistakes. But at least for
most of that first meeting I had no doubt there was good understanding and for
all subsequent meetings, there was a total understanding.
To take misunderstandings which may have appeared in the first cable and first
meeting on insignificant matters and extend them into a judgement as to the
manner in which this source was handled from beginning to end is confusing, it
misleads you and is unnecessary and has no relevancy at all.
I want to say the so-called drunkenness, the heartfelt statement of Mr. Nosenko
to Mr. Hart, "Hohn, I was snookered," he wasn't snookered, he probably had a lot
of booze , but he was entirely lucid at all times. There was never a time when
communications were broken because of the influence of alcohol.
Therefore, I suggest that element of language misunderstanding that you are
speaking of and the element of drinking was artificially introduced as an
explanation and excuse for other irregularities in Mr. Nosenko's reporting.
Mr FITHIAN. Are you then saying that Nosenko used his drinking to make up or
cover up or disguise the fact he did not know answers to certain questions or
the account of that erroneous?
Page 626
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Mr. D.C. Yes; later when confronted with that in Geneva in 1962, he simply said,
" I was drunk" or " I did not say that," or "There was a misunderstanding."
In one case, Mr. Fithian, a very important case, he described in 1962, his
participation in an operation involving an American of which we had a record. In
1964, he denied any knowledge of that operation at all. It wasn't a question,
was not the transcript at all which entered into this confrontation, we brought
back a tape. This tape was loud voice." And he hears his voice loud and clear,
giving details of the knowledge of having spoken to it a year and a half
earlier. It's my premise that drunkenness doesn't give you second sight.
Mr. FITHIAN. I think Nosenko used the term as to Oswald being an understanding
target. Mr. Epstein in his book perhaps makes a little too much of Oswald's
potential knowledge of the U-2. Am I off base on that?
Mr. D.C. I think not. It makes a good story. It's logical but after all this is
something which escaped American attention. I have had an American friend who
has come to me since then and said, "You can't expect me to believe the security
review of Oswald failed to pick up the fact he knew about the U-2, and I think
it's the sort of thing that would have slipped by in any instance. He was at a
Marine radar unit tracked it. Possibly certain things as to speed and altitude
might have come to Oswald's attention.
For example, Mr. Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union would have been a part
of naval intelligence to see what he about knew or didn't know; and I have a
hunch the most conscientious investigation you could make about that man might
not bring up the fact that his service in that radar shack was in any way
related to a highly secret operation which was documented in totally different
ways.
I do agree with you that it's unlikely that the U-2 was the special information
that Nosenko---excuse me, that Oswald told Snyder. There has been a lot of
speculation as to the information of special interest he had. It may be he
realized there was a special operation and this was the special thing he had to
offer to the Soviets, but it's certainly not provable.
Mr. FITHIAN. One of the central questions which may go unanswered, but I would
appreciate your best guess, I am not sure from your testimony whether you
believe that Nosenko came to the United States, became available as a
defector---I conclude you believe him to be a plant. I am not sure as to what
your real belief is as to why he might have become the plant. Some very wrapped
up in the assassination would have us believe this was of such tremendous
potential disturbing nature for Soviet-American relations that even if Oswald
didn't have that much of a role to play with the KGB, they would defuse anything
that had to do with Oswald before they sent him over here. Therefore, it might
be worthwhile to send someone of Nosenko's caliber.
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The other possibility is the one I think you alluded to, that is they believed
the kind of information agent X was giving was of such potential damaging
nature, that they should muddy the water and send a plant calling attention to
what he was testifying to.
You call it on page 14, a "crude message?' I take it from that you have no
definitive information. But I would like to know what your guess is.
Mr. D.C. It would be a pleasure to say.
It seems to be difficult for Mr. Hart or for anybody coming into this case to
make distinctions, and one of the big distinctions is between his contact in
Geneva in 1962 and his recontacts in coming out in 1964 saying he was going to
defect.
In 1962, he made it absolutely clear to us that he would never defect,
under no circumstances. He had his family, he liked living in the Soviet Union,
but he had certain undefined objections to the Soviet regime. I was reminded in
Mr. Hart's testimony, I think that he needed some money urgently and therefore
he was coming to us. He not only said he wouldn't defect but he wouldn't accept
contact with us inside the Soviet Union. However, he would see us whenever he
came out on official duty on Soviet delegations abroad.
In January of 1964 he came out and stupefied us with this statement that now he
wants to defect. I can assure you my first question was, "Why? Didn't you tell
us you never would?"
His answers were extremely vague "Well, I think they may suspect me. I have
decided to make a new life." I asked, "How about your family? He said well, he
had decided to start anew and they would be all right.
Now, I detect in that a tremendous change of course. Therefore, I would like to
answer your question as to what he might have been about in 1962 and 1964.
In 1962 I say in my letter and testimony he was deflecting information given 6
months before by defector X. This was clear. There were such connections; there
was an astonishing overlap have dealt with many Soviet-bloc intelligence
officers and, of course, many would know two or three doing the same thing. But
the degree his information coincided to certain information given to us by X was
simply not unacceptable but It was noteworthy.
I would guess on that basis, Mr. Fithian, that the purpose in 1962 was that this
man was sent out to do a perfectly understandable counterespionage technique.
The question has been asked why the tremendous change between 1962 and 1964. His
reasons make no sense. They are not convincing. So what is it in the Soviet mind
that would cause a man to physically send a man out when they said they never
would.
By way of footnote, I would like to say I mentioned in my testimony the insight
we got into this man is that he hadn't in fact held the positions he said he had
held. Not only was he not real KGB officer. The reason we have what we have in
this tremendous volume of information as that we have that detention and we were
able to take it. We had him sitting--he tried to avoid him sitting down, but
once we had him sitting down, we could see he did not know about the operations
of his colleagues, he did not know about his main target, he did not, know those
things.
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But still in 1962, had he come out to see us in Copenhagen, New York, or Buenos
Aires, he could have seen us omy for an hour here or there under tense
circumstances where there would be no chance to get into details under the
controlled conditions I am speaking of.
Therefore I think the Soviets had good thing going had they left the man where
he was. But as a defector they were running a big risk. This is not going away
from your question, because it involves decision to do this, to change the
course. This is all assuming your category we are speculating that he is a KGB
plant.
Something made them want us to have him in hand as a defector. One of the
possibilities could be the event which happened interim the assassination of
President Kennedy, and therefore he was as you say, used for this message
because he may have been the only valid, controlled, and trusted secret contact
to CIA.
The Soviets have shown a proclivity to use tricky methods like this to give us
messages through clandestine means going directly to the President, escaping
suspicious desk officers. But it's possible they looked for a way to get a
message of their innocence as to President Kennedy's assassination. If it was
the best available channel I can see the non-KGB or let us say a member of the
Soviet leadership, like Mr. Khrushchev himself, may have said do it, and the
professional might have said, yes, but the fellow might run into trouble, and
the reply would be yes but do it.
This is again in the realm of speculution.
I only know of one other--by way of background--I only know of one potential
explanation of this man coming out to see us in short stretches or the man
putting himself into our hands as a defector.
That has to do with an unrelated matter. It is very difficult--it is even more
speculative than is related to the Kennedy assassination. In other words, I am
not at all sure that, the other speculation is any more valid than what I have
just said.
So, I would say that in groping for an explanation on the basis of the
hypothesis that he is a sent KGB agent, one of the two things, one of the only
two that. I can think of is that he was sent to give a message to the Warren
Commission.
Mr. FITHIAN. In that 1962 interview, is there any, reference made to Nosenko's
alleged role in recruiting American tourist?
Mr. D.C. Yes. He said that at that time he had made his career from 1955 until
19--until the end of 1959 in the tourist department, and he spoke about it at
that time. In 1962 he had just gone back after 2-year period in the section
working against the American Embassy in Moscow, he had gone back to that
section, working against tourists, with a promotion.
So, needless to say he did talk about operations against tourist.
Mr. FITHIAN. Was there in that interview, in 1962 anything which tends to
support his later claims of his position within the KGB?
Mr. D.C. Prior to his contact with us in 1962, he claims to have made a
brilliant career as an English-speaking case officer, an operations officer, a
man who gets out in the field, a tough guy, as he used to call himself.
He told of certain things he had done. We checked them out. It goes without
saying we were fairly meticulous about that. We found only
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two operations in which he physically appeared at all prior to 1962, that we
could confirm.
In other words, we were getting from him the statement of where he was, and then
we were goning back to what we knew about those operations, or else going out
and interviewing the people involved. One was as a member of a team of about
three, three people in the compromise of a tourist on homosexual grounds in
1956.
The other was a junior officer, a companion of an identified officer, senior
officer, of the tourist department of the KGB in meeting with an agent of theirs
whom the bureau had interviewed. That agent's testimony--I will say he was a
person--this person's testimony showed that Nosenko appeared exclusively as a
junior member of the team. He had never appeared alone.
The other man, who was an identified officer of the section, of the tourist
directed section, did all the questioning and all the control of the meetings as
testified by the agent.
Now, one of the interesting things about that particular case is the
meetings with Nosenko playing a junior role continued well into 1960, at a time
when Mr. Nosenko said later that he had shifted into the section working against
the American Embassy in Moscow.
Mr. FITHIAN. And held an important position in it.
Mr. D.C. The deputy chief of it.
Mr. FITHIAN. And you are saying that according to Soviet structure, that would
be highly improbable?
Mr. D.C. Very. I can't imagine why the deputy chief of a section busy working
against the American Embassy should accompany a senior tourist department
officer in meeting an agent who, while admittedly American, a resident--from
time to time a resident in Moscow--but primarily directed to tourist-oriented
operations, why he should continue in that capacity.
If we were the senior case officer and had a special relationship with the man
he would be acceptable, quite, no reason why not.
They might feel no one else could do it as well, and maybe this man had some
potential to talk about members of the American Embassy.
I believe by the way that that is the way that Nosenko explained it
when we asked him about this.
He knew people in the Embassy, but, that doesn't really check with the story as
given by the man himself when interviewed by the FBI.
Mr. FITHIAN. Do you have any information on the treatment of Nosenko's family in
Russia after his defection?
Mr. D.C. There was a story, as unlikely as the story I mentioned in my
testimony, of Mr. Epstein's being told by an official member of the Soviet
Embassy in Washington that Nosenko is the best qualified man in the United
States, the best qualified man in the world really to talk about Oswald in
Russia.
That other story has to do--let me see--with the approach by a of the family of
Yuri Nosenko, Colonel Nosenko, I believe is one of the many people who referred
to Nosenko as a colonel, having left his family behind, and how this would turn
into--there would be a divorce, and these children were left behind.
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He offered, by way of illustration of this heartrending article a picture of two
daughters I think as I remember-- think we got hold of them-on a boat in a lake
somewhere, I suppose in Moscow.
In other words, here was a Soviet official coming and saying here is the family.
In other words, they were talking about the family. For the first time in our
experience, after a defection, the wife and mother of the defector came to the
American Embassy to plead with the Embassy to, I don't think we do know, give
their son back or something, I don't know. There had been at that time no
precedent. I believe since then there have been one or two similar cases where
the family has done this, but I can assure you that no family of any defector is
going to be free to go to the American Embassy in Moscow, unless the KGB wants
it that way.
So, I find the whole family business, from what we know about the family after
the defection, very strange.
As to their faith, I don't think we do know. At least not at the time I left the
operation, I don't think we had any really firm information about whether they
had suffered or whether they just had gone ahead with a divorce. I am told, by
the way, by some sources, that if a man defects, he becomes automatically an
enemy of the state and a divorce is granted automatically.
I was told unofficially somewhere in between, after I had left the case, that,
if memory serves me, that a divorce had gone through in Soviet Union.
Now, how that is known, I have no idea. Perhaps through Nosenko; perhaps he was
notified in some way.
Mr. FITHIAN. I wanted to turn to what seems to me to be kind of a curious
situation. I refer to the questions that you say you submitted to the FBI.
Just glancing over them, there seems to be several questions in which the CIA
would have just been vitally interested in--how the KGB works against American
tourists, for example, any techniques, any process, any procedure or whatever.
I don't know, Mr. Klein, I have not reviewed the interviews of the 23d and the
27th--I have not had them available to me, so I may just be covering ground that
you have already covered.
If that is so, Judge, we could save this time.
But in the second question listed, the second set of questions that you gave to
the FBI, among others in that section was, "Describe the routine handling
procedure of U.S. tourists to the Soviet Union. Was Oswald's trip handled any
differently?
You alluded earlier this morning to the fact that you were always trying to
update your files on procedures. It seems to me that you had potential, at
least, a superb opportunity, a person who had worked in this sensitive area,
right in the area of one of the important procedures as far as we would be
concerned, and that is safeguarding American tourists from being somehow enticed
away to become defectors and so on.
Am I to believe that you submitted these to the FBI, the FBI did or did not use
them, you are not sure, and then subsequently you never really returned to this?
Mr. D.C. No. I don't know how it got included in the questions for the FBI for
Nosenko because it invo]ves the handling of tourist
Page 631
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We did a very, very systematic debriefing of Mr. Nosenko on the subject of the
KGB's handling of American and other tourists in the Soviet Union. I must say
that if I had to list the information which is valuable, that would be at the
top of the list.
He had that. He gave it well. We got it out, and we put it into forms which
would serve the purposes that you just mentioned, Mr. Fithian.
We circulated widely not only to those elements of the U.S. Government, and even
to the American public--I think a version was put out into the public domain.
But to foreign liaison services, to our allies who themselves could draw value
from knowing the techniques of the KGB control and actions against foreign
tourists in the U.S.S.R.
Yes, indeed, we did that. Why it appears there, I don't know.
Mr. FITHIAN. Another is a question which seems logical enough. If you worked so
hard at trying to establish Nosenko's authenticity, it would be likely that they
would work equally hard on establishing whether Oswald was bona fide or not.
Mr. D.C. Much, much harder.
Mr. FITHIAN. Did you ever ask Nosenko?
Mr. D.C. Of course.
Mr. FITHIAN. Those questions?
Mr. D.C. I can only say the answer is of course. I don't know what the record
shows, but there is no doubt that we at some point showed some--perhaps it was
in the house--but we must have indicated to Mr. Nosenko our disbelief in this
disinterest on the part of the KGB.
I don't know what the record shows on that, but it was blatant. We were aware of
it at the time. It seems almost unthinkable to me that we didn't confront
Nosenko with it and ask for an explanation.
By the way, I would think that this is one of the many times when he, I won't
say clams up, but when he stubbornly opposes the line of questioning by simply
repeating what he said before; that is, that it is uninteresting,
uninteresting--at which a standard--I am not sure this happened, I am saying
this is the way it would have gone--we would have said, "Well, that doesn't
answer the question."
This was an American young exmarine coming into your country. He would say, he
is unstable. I am sure this was his line of defense against this type of
question--that this man was considered personally unstable, and
uninteresting--those words are used over and over again. I believe, in the
reports.
I think Mr. Klein knows the reports better than I do at this point. But he
emphasized that the act of suicide, or attempted suicide, in the first place,
showed that the man was unstable, and after that the man was unstable, and after
that the psychiatric examinations which either were or were not done more or
less confirmed this. To believe Mr. Nosenko, this suspended all their
Procedures.
But that the question was asked to him, how is this possible I have no doubt. It
must have been.
Mr. FITHIAN. Do you happen to know, just from your own knowledge of Russian
operations, whether a person judged unstable, an American who wanted to defect
and so on, would have been permitted under Russian law or procedures to marry a
Russian citizen?
Mr. D.C. I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know.
Page 632
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Mr. FITHIAN. Do you have any information at all on Marina and any relationship
that she had to the KGB in any way, shape or form?
Mr. D.C. None whatsoever. On the contrary, he said she was an interesting girl
with no character, nothing. I remember this response about Marina.
Mr. FITHIAN. You mean that is Nosenko's?
Mr. D.C. Nosenko's response, as I remember. I am surely not having a failure of
memory here, but I know that he must have addressed himself, and that we must
have asked him about Marina.
His reaction, I know, I remember his statement that she was of no interest. I
think it may have been in connection with why did they let her go. Well, she was
of no value, no interest, it didn't matter, dumb girl, something of that sort.
Mr. FITHIAN. let me suspend at the moment. I may not have any more quetions. I
thought I had one or two more as I walked back over, Judge.
Mr. PREYER. Well, I will ask a few, and maybe it will refresh your recollection.
When you first brought Nosenko to this country, there was a free period, as you
described it, in which he was treated like any other defector.
Some of the recent news stories, some of the treatment is quite free indeed, I
notice.
But you indicated that he resisted normal questioning during the free period.
That resistance was more in terms of simply evading your questions? He was not
physically trying to evade you?
Mr. D.C. No, no, no, no. It was in terms of evading the questions.
Mr. PREYER. But you felt he wasn't responding the way a normal defector during
that free period might respond, in the openness with which he would answer
questions?
Mr. D.C. Absolutely.
Mr. PREYER. Then you went into a period of controlled questioning. He was the
first confined to a safe house, I gather, somewhere in the general area here.
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. When was he no longer allowed to use alcohol? Or was there ever any
period in which he was never allowed to use alcohol?
Mr. D.C. I would say the entire period of detention. There was never any
question of his having any alcohol from April 4 onward.
Mr. PREYER. So as soon as he went from the free period of questioning to the
safe house, controlled period, all alcohol was barred from that time on?
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. On the question of hallucinations, I think you indicated that he did
not suffer from any hallucinations from alcohol. Did he ever have any periods in
which he hallucinated, to your knowledge?
Mr. D.C. This is a debated question. You may remember-in the periods when he was
alone, not being questioned, he sometimes spoke to himself, and he would tell
his guards that, "I see something." That is as I remember the form the
hallucinations took.
We were both concerned and interested in it. The doctor went to him. He
maintained he was hallucinating. This was, I believe, a very
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limited period. It has been made out as if this took place during periods when
he was in face-to-face contact with someone in answering questions.
It isn't true. It was strictly noted by the guards and Nosenko himself saying
this to them. The doctor, who is a trained psychiatrist, his opinion was that
these hallucinations were feigned. I am certainly not qualified to say whether
they were or not.
So, the answer to your question is I don't know whether he was actually
hallucinating or not. I do know that it had nothing whatsoever at any time to do
with the question sessions. It had no impact on his answers to any questions
that he was ever asked.
Mr. PREYER. Well, once controlled questioning began, you have described it as
somewhat spartan conditions. I think you have helped restor some balance to this
nature of that question and confinement.
Now, you mentioned on the diet, your comments on that I gather was that that
there was a deliberate effort to put him on a lean diet, but that was checked
with a doctor.
Mr. D.C. Yes. sir.
Mr. PREYER. At regular intervals?
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. How often did you see Nosenko yourself once he got into a controlled
period of questioning?
Mr. D.C. Frequently, during the first period of hostile interrogation. I believe
that is all. I participated from the wings in subsequent questioning, but not
directly face-to-face with Nosenko.
Mr. PREYER. During the first period, the safe house period, would you see him
once a week or once a month?
Mr. D.C. Oh, no. I spoke about the hostile interrogation. That was daily. That
was for the period it lasted. I actually can't remember whether that was a
matter of 1 or 9 weeks. it wasn't long. It was a very short period.
Then I saw him very frequently indeed at the other side of the table.
Mr. PREYER. Well, when he went into what has been described as the bank vault
period of questioning, was that the period when you did not see him very often?
Mr. D.C. Well, yes; I did not see him during the bank vault period at all. I did
not see him after the first hostile interrogation. I did not see him
face-to-face even in the first holding area.
In other words, during this summer questioning, the questioning that followed
the hostile interrogation, and during the second hostile interrogation I did not
see him. I saw him no more after the month of April 1964.
Mr. PREYER. Well, under whose direct control was he at that time, after you no
longer saw him face-to-face?
Mr. D.C. Mine. Your question was whether I saw him face-to-face.
Mr. PREYER. Yes.
Mr. D.C. But direct control I would say, in the sense of responsibility for the
interrogation and for the handling of the case----
Mr. PREYER. There are all people in your division who were seeing him and
questioning him daily.
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. What relation is Mr. Angleton to you division?
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Mr. D.C. They are entirely separate. Mr. Angleton's counterintelligence staff
has a staff role as against an operational or executive. The Soviet division was
the organization within the Agency specifically operating against the U.S.S.R.
and the satellites.
We would run the cases, handle the defectors, plan and carry out
sometimes through people who were not members of the Soviet division, of course,
in the stations abroad.
Mr. PREYER. Did Mr. Angleton ever see him face-to-face during the period?
Mr. D.C. No sir. Mr. Angleton's role was as the overall agency, the seat of
Agency expertise in counterintelligence in general. He kept an eye on these
things, and he would have an advisory role.
In this particular case, his role was conditioned by the fact that staff was
managing the earlier defector, X.
Mr. PREYER. Were you aware of the two he detector tests that were given to him?
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. Was it two or three?
Mr. D.C. I think three.
Mr. PREYER. Three?
Mr. D.C. Yes, sir. Indeed, I was aware of them.
Mr. PREYER. Is it accurate that they were given to him with the understanding
that he would be told he failed the test whether he did not?
Mr. D.C. After the test, yes. That is true. The first test given, at the time of
his confinement, but before he was told he was going to be confined, he was
simply taken and given the test.
Now, .Mr. Hart has said that there was already an extraneous element added, that
somebody, instead of putting on the normal three controls of palm moisture and
blood pressure and heart beat, that an additional thing, something to increase
his tension, was put on him to allegedly be capable of measuring brain waves.
I don't remember that. It is possible. If he has the record that it done, fine,
but I thought that the first lie detector test was given straight, and there was
indeed, sir, the intent to tell him that he had failed it, as the means of
opening the hostile interrogation, which would confront him with all the
collected contradictions in his story and trhe data from outside his story which
indicated that he wasn't what he said he was.
Mr. PREYER. You mentioned some where in your testimony about the word "disposal"
being political jargon, CIA jargon Disposal does not necessarily mean
liquidation.
I remember some years ago, Mr. Helms saying that not only would there be no
assassination, murder, liquidation, any kind of this action which has been in
the jargon called executive action, not only would there not be any, but there
would not be any discussions or proposals, it would not be a subject fit for
human ears within the agency.
I have lived my time in the agency under that belief. Like many other officers
of the agency were surprised when the publicity came out
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about someone had contemplated, one or two or three of these political
assassinations, they were counter to what I thought was the very specific,
explicit policy of the agency.
It was unthinkable that anyone could therefore have thought of disposal in those
terms.
Mr. PREYER. Well, the question of disposal in the sense of resolving
this issue in some ways must have certainly occurred from--at increasingly
frequent intervals, I would think--where you have a man in this controlled
custody for some 5 years and where it became, was beginning to become clear that
you were not going to get much one way or the other from him.
Which gets back to the question of what you referred to as the duped leadership,
and the idea that a small handfull of you were aware of this, were aware of his
treatment, but that no one else was really very aware of what was going on.
Would you make periodic reports to somebody from time to time of the progress or
lack of progress that was being made?
Mr. D.C. Oh, yes, yes; indeed.
First of all, who knew about it is the first thing--the small group we are
talking about consisted of everyone on that particular case, that operation,
everyone responsible. In other words, for the interrogation of Nosenko and the
investigation of his leads, and the use of his information for whatever purpose
within our agency, which meant primarily certain elements of the Soviet
division, Soviet bloc division.
It involved the counterintelligence staff, as I mentioned, because of their
advisory function in counterintelligence matters. In that case it meant the chef
of staff and those members that he delegated to be aware of this, and there were
several.
It meant the Office of the Chief of the Clandestine Services, known then as the
Deputy Director for Plans, and since changed to the Deputy Director for
Operations, I believe, the DDO, his office and the assistant DDO office, DDP at
that time--the assistant DDP's office, and those members of that office who
needed to cope with the paper.
On upward to the office of the, I guess--my dates may be a little fuzzy--but I
think the then-Deputy Director of the agency, then-Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. Helms.
It goes without saying if we are sending the doctor out to check him next week,
or if we are planning to interrogate him on a certain subject, or if we are
talking about making---giving him or not giving him books to read, or things
like that, that we would never go to Mr. Helms about that.
But if we were planning an interrogation session on a certain subject, or
planning something that was substantive or if a certain amount of time had
passed, and it was just time to check in, Mr. Helms was always available, as I
think he has testified.
He was always available. Surely, as I read what he said, I think what he said
was a very accurate reflection of what was really going on. In other words, he
got some of it, but by no means all of it.
He wouldn't have known that the man was hot or cold. If the man had been--if
that had been a matter of policy, to make the man hot or cold, he most surely
would have known about it. But the various little
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aspects of this holding certainly would not have been brought to his attention
routinely. They would have been brought to the attention of whoever was
concerned.
There was a lot of consultation in advance. There was a lot of periodic
consultation--staff meetings, I suppose you would call it--on the subject. As
you say, sir. there was increasing concern as time went on because I felt that
Mr. Helms was always aware, (a) that what we were doing was legal but (b) that
it became more and more sensitive as time went on and this couldn't go on
indefinitely.
He was as interested as he could be because he understood the implications
behind this operation, which were immenense, and they went way beyond Mr.
Nosenko. They went to several other operations, several other * * * people who
were in touch with us in one way or another.
The implications underlying it clearly pointed at serious matters. Not, only
that, Mr. Oswald may have been a Soviet agent, but also that there would be
penetration in the U.S. Government.
It followed logically as an implication of the fact that Nosenko could have been
sent---and by the way, could have told us a false story about Iris career. I
think that is a very menacing little piece of information because if he can lie
to us about a key job during a key period, it would suggest to me that, the KGB
knows that we are unable to check on this, which I find disturbing.
Mr. PREYER. Well, you categorically deny, then, any implication that this was
the treatment that Nosenko, and was known to noly a handfull, five or six people
in the agency, and the they were deliberately--I think this is at least an
implication from the testimony--deliberately hiding it from the upper echelon of
the CIA for fear that the planted agent might get wind of it.
Mr. D.C. I certainly do categorically deny that. There was--it is fiction.
Within the agency, it always works on the need to know, and some operations are
dept tighter than others. But a defector in our hand, unfortunately by the very
nature of things, can't be very tightly held.
The number of people who knew about the case and generally about what was going
on were--was appropriate. I would say there were in our division alone, there
must have been five or six people directly talking to Nosenko. Plus those that
were supporting them at the desk, plus the leadership of the division, plus all
these elements of the counterintelligence staff.
We are talking about a multiple of the five or six you are speaking of. It was
done as any such operation would be dine in the agency.
In other words, all who had any responsibility would know about it. All who had
any responsibility for athat particular line of work.
Mr. PREYER. AThis question might be an invasion of privacy. If you don't want to
answer it, don't answer it. I am just curious as to your general political
views--whether you are a liberal or conservative. I ask that because knowing
some of your relatives, and knowing their views, they are hardly what would be
known as hard line conservatives.
There has been some implication that this group controlling Nosenko was a very
hard line group. I don't know whether you want to comment on what your political
views are.
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Mr. D.C. Oh, yes, I would welcome that. Insofar as the tradition, family and
otherwise, it certainly has been liberal indeed.
My line of work has kept me apart from active political life in the United
States, so I haven't identified myself in any way. But, I would certainly
consider myself very strongly middle of the road.
Then we came to the whole question of being anti-Soviet or not. To say that I am
hard line anti-Soviet, anti-KGB, anti--well, that is enough--Soviet and KGB I
most assuredly am. I think--I make remarks here which I think even looking at
them now seem fairly firm about what the KGB is up to in terms of deception and
subversion.
I have been exposed to the people who are doing it for a very long time, and
none of them has ever given any other view of what the KGB is up to. That is
just as much 1978 as 1962 or 1958 or 1952, before the death of Stalin. Nothing
has changed the basic thrust of the KGB s work against this country.
I found it tremendously rewarding is a career to be able to focus on what was
very clearly the enemy of our country-- outside enemy of our country--rather
than some of these Third World things which have caused such, well, really
confusion in the motivation of some of the men that have had to-work with them.
I consider not that I would have been--l might have shared some of these
feelings, and I might have taken--might have fallen on either side of the fence
in those operations where we were supporting a government or a political party
in certain Third World areas.
I don't know how I would have felt about it because I didn't have to. So, I
consider myself more lucky than anything else to have avoided that. But
certainly the group who were exposed to KGB officers day in and day out, whether
as adversaries or as defectors, are extremely anti-Soviet.
I believe, by the way, that that permits me to be in American political terms a
liberal.
Mr. PREYER. Yes, I think Mr. Moynihan and Ben Wattenberg and a number of people
of that sort would agree with you on that. Did you ever talk to Mr. Epstein?
Mr. D.C. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. About his book?
Mr. D.C. Yes. Mr. Epstein has made that clear publicly and I think there are
certain things in the book which make that clear, too.
Mr. Epstein got from other the basic outlines of the Nosenko story, and then
made an approach to me, and I of course refused to talk to him.
Later he came back, a few months later, and with a long letter telling me some
of the things he knew, which were things which I would never have thought could
have gotten into the public domain. At which point I did accept to see him and
he, without my saying a word, exposed exactly what he had and what he was doing
and showed me what he was going to write, which was in its broad lines the
general story of the Nosenko case and in its details full of confusion and
inaccuracies.
So, the primary help that I gave to Mr. Epstein on that book was to insure that
at least the errors were not in there, and that this book,
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which was going to be the first time that the Nosenko story, was going to become
public, that at least there would not be egregious errors. There are some errors
of emphasis which Mr. Fithian has pointed out which I happen to agree with. But
that is entirely Mr. Epstein's buisness, how he chooses to interpret what he
hears.
Several of the things are wrong, and I gather they have even been accepted by
the CIA. For example, Mr. Epstein insisted that there was some sort of a
cleansing, of purposeful cleansing of the Soviet operations of the CIA, and
people like myself and the chief of the Soviet division were got rid of.
I explained to him at the time, I said I didn't think that should into his book
because that was incorrect. I told him how I had my assignment abroad, and how I
justified my leaving my headquaters position.
I happen to know the way in which the chief of the division got his
overseas assignment. It had nothing to do with any such plot. I think in
retrospect that we would have both done better to stay here and be purged, if
purging was in the mill In fact, it did, our assignments abroad did occur in the
normal course of events. Mr. Epstein put it different.
There are two or three things like that, interpretations which I most assuredly
don't share. But the facts that Mr. Epstein has in the book are generally
accurate.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you.
Mr. Fithian?
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. D.C. do you think that the CIA did all it could to cooperate with the Warren
Commission?
Mr. D.C. Yes, I do, because--my exposure to it was by the way a minor one. I
think--I know on one of these occasions---it hasn't emerged in the record, and
perhaps it will, but I thought I had actually gone over once with Mr. Helms to
the Commission.
It was at a time when Mr. Helms was making a statement--when Mr. Helms was
telling--I think it is one of these things that has come out in all this
testimony. My exposure to it was practically nil. I don't know, but the
impression I get is that every effort within the agency, in every corner of the
agency was to dig out everything we could that could possibly help the Warren
Commission in its job. I am absolutely convinced of that. But I do stress that I
am not in a position to judge because it was the counterintelligence staff that
centralized the activity and all. But I know that our people dug, and dug, and
dug.
For example, in my section at the time, an officer went--we thought what can we
do, how can we use the files of the CIA to contribute in any way. We decided to
have a look at the photograph file of the agency, which is a rather extensive
thing and see just what Minsk looked like, and what we could see, the places
that were in Oswald's life, in Oswald's background.
It was a member of my section who dredged up, out of files of the CIA, a tourist
picture which showed Oswald in front of I believe the opera house. It was one of
those columned buildings. There was a tourist group and there was Oswald.
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This fellow came up to me and said, look, I have been looking through pictures
of Minsk and doesn't this look funny to you and showed me this picture, and that
was him.
That document, of course, is a part of the Warren Commission report. In other
words, we were doing everything we could think of to do to help the. Warren
Commission. Absolutely good faith.
Mr. FITHIAN. I am curious. At the very outset Mr, Nosenko appears to be a
fraud--that is pretty harsh, but I will let it stand. Assuming that was your
interpretation, assuming you didn't get anything to persuade you that you were
wrong, isn't 5 years a long investment in somebody that you thought was a fraud?
Mr. D.C. What do you mean by investment, Mr. Fithian?
Mr. FITHIAN. Time, money, resources, commitment.
Mr. D.C. No, sir, for what that meant, that case is potentially the most
important and the most interesting operation possible, because as I say the
implications underlying it--had we been able to prove, which we never were--we
were certainly able to give operational indications and enough to draw--
operational conclusions at least as a basis for further activity or
investigations. But we were not able to prove that this man was a sent KGB
agent.
Had we proved it, all of those implications would have come to the surface and
would have .been investigated, and I think the security of the United States
would have been the better for it So I don't think this investment was too
great.
By 5 years, you are presumably---
Mr. FITHIAN. Is that longer than you worked with any other defector?
Mr. D.C. Well, it is absolutely unique in the sense that there was no other
defector that we gave either that much attention to or that type of attention
to.
Mr. FITHIAN. But you concluded, didn't you, that he really wasn't a very
important person in the KGB?
Mr. D.C. I conclude that he may never have served properly within the KGB. That
he was sent by the KGB to pose as a KGB agent there is no doubt. He is not a
fabricator; he is not somebody who pretends to be just on his own. He had
detailed knowledge of KGB operations, which he claimed to have been part of his
knowledge as an officer.
Mr. FITHIAN. Is he the only person in your whole span that falls in that
category?
Mr. D.C. No, sir.
Mr. FITHIAN. That is, he was sent by the KGB?
Mr. D.C. No, sir he is not.
Mr. FITHIAN. Well, then I kind of repeat, if that is your conclusion, and if you
thought him designed to mislead you to start with, you still don't think that
much investment of time and resources and so forth is---
Mr. D.C. No, very much not so.
If you know the man or you can make the operational assumption that the man is
being sent against you, as we just have for purposes 1 1962-67.
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of this discussion, you can read it in reverse and find out what really lies
behind this mission of the KGB.
Those indications are very, very interesting. They are as good as a
look inside the KGB files.
By the way, I won't digress here for very long, but I do want to give you an
example to illustrate my answer.
Mr. D.C. In the invasion of Normandy, 1944, there was a large, tremendous
investment in deception by which the Germans were led to believe the main thrust
of the invasion would fall on the Pas de Calais region instead of Normandy.
Under General Patton an invasion unit was set up. All the radio communications
which would accompany an army group was set up in trying to fool the Germans in
making them think there was a group there. There were landing craft much too far
away to participate in the Normandy invasion. The result was the Germans were
fooled and when the invasion struck in Normandy, I believe it was the 17 German
army groups were held at Pas de Calais because the Germans believed the Normandy
invasion was a diversion. They held the force there and as you know, the landing
was nip and tuck for 4 days. Had that German force in the north been able to be
present at the landing beaches, it's possible the invasion would have failed.
The problem is, had the deception been known to the Germans as deception, it
would have told them that first of all, the 1st U.S. Army group doesn't exist,
and second, that the diversion was toward the Pas de Calais to the north and
there was only one other place for the invasion, and that was Normandy.
In other words, the perception of the allied deception would have been a
spectacular piece of intelligence for the Germans. I don't necessarily want to
put this thing on the. same scale as Normandy, but it has all the same effect.
If a perception is perceived it can be turned against the deceiver, and that is,
in my opinion, what we did so long as we made the operating assumption Nosenko
was sent. In other words, I do believe it was a valuable expenditure of time.
Mr. FITHIAN. You think the mistake to depart from that interpretation was a
serious one?
Mr. D.C. Very. More important in terms of lost opportunities than the things I
speak about in my prepsred testimony about the exposure of personnel to him. I
think it's bad enough to bring him onto the premises and let him talk to
counterintelligence trainees. I think it a very bad mistake to let him talk to
our foreign liaison officials with out informing them there is a body of
evidence suggesting he is no good. I don't know exactly what they are doing, but
in Mr. Helm's testimony I found an indication, a statement that he was of value
to current counterintelligence investigations. It suggests to me that current
information, current activities are being exposed to him. I think that is a
mistake.
Mr. FITHIAN. You say in your letter to the committee, in a paragraph you say. if
Nosenko is a KGB plant there can be no doubt that Nosenko's recited story about
Oswald and the U.S.S.R. is a message from the KGB. Then you say by sending out
such a message, the KGB exposes the fact it has something to hide.
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As Mr. Helms told you, that something may be the fact that Oswald may be an
agent of the KGB.
Do you have an opinion, and if so will you provide the basis for your opinion on
two things: (1) The likelihood of that; and (2) I am struck by the use of the
word "fact"--that conveys to me a very strong impression.
Mr. D.C. That was probably not the very best word I could have chosen. It was
meant to be softened by the verb, which was "may"---- one of these messages
"may" have been the fact that. It was not meant it was a statement of fact. It
Just follows--perhaps I can put that more felicitously by saying it would hide
the possibility--instead of saying the operation would hide the fact, say the
message hides the possibility that this man is or could have been a Soviet
agent. By a "Soviet agent" I don't mean a Soviet assassination agent I mean
something quite different.
Mr. FITHIAN. I was just asked by Congressman Dodd's staff to follow up on this
whether or not you would rule out the possibility that even though the KGB had
nothing to do with the assassination that they would spend this kind of energy
or effort personally to convince us they had nothing to do with it.
Mr. D.C. I think it entirely conceivable. If you accept the hypothesis, the
supposition, the speculation that in fact they had something to hide and that
something might have been perhaps he had a code name, perhaps he was a sleeper
agent, they obviously couldn't expect as much from him coming back to the United
States with a Soviet wife, they couldn't expect him to be elected President, but
at the same time, they may have said, "We will get in touch with you in time of
war," or they may have recruited him by saying, "We will get in touch with you
by the following procedures." This is pure speculation.
But then if he is on their rolls as a sleeper agent or for wartime sabotage or
something of that sort, they would be absolutely shocked to hear their man had
taken it upon himself to kill the American President. I would think their
reaction could very well be of the sort you suggest. They might indeed change
the mission of another man of another operation in order to get this message
over to us that they really had nothing to do with it.
The only thing I am quite sure of, I don't want to tell you what I think is
behind us, because I really don't know, but I am quite sure of one thing, and
that is that it's not true. That's all it's not true; they didn't speak to him,
that the KGB didn't speak to Oswald in the Soviet Union, and the KGB it is not
true.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know I only have two more
questions.
Mr. Hart says rather flat out that there was a direct conflict between the two
agencies as to interpretation of whether or not Nosenko was bona fide. He
indicates the FBI thought Nosenko was bona fide when he arrived and that the CIA
assumed he was a plant when he arrived. Is that accurate?
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Mr. D.C. Again, I don't like the word "assumed "but changing that word "assumed"
to "suspected" I would certainly say yes.
Now I don't know the FBI part of it, either. They had no basis to make such a
judgement and they had no stake in it, as far as I can tell. They had a source
coming here who had told them about a few Americans who had been recruited as
tourists in the Soviet Union. He had a good knowledge as to how the Soviet Union
recruited tourists who have been useful to the FBI. But they didn't get into as
many fields as we did because Nosenko was a Moskow-based officer.
Mr. FITHIAN. One other question. Is it totally unreasonable to speculate that
the Agency might be in the process of leading Nosenko on at this point using him
even now to pass false information along to the Soviets?
Mr. D.C. May I ask your third word there, I think you said "totally"----
Mr. FITHIAN. "Totally unreasonable."
Mr. D.C Totally excluded, no, it's not totally excluded because I don't know. I
have not been in the Agency and such people within the Agency who have talked
with him make me believe it's not so.
Mr. FITHIAN. I was trying to look for other alternatives for the Agency to
bristle so intensely as to send over Mr. Hart and sort of throw up the
smokescreen and get the Agency in the worst possible light as far as the
newspapers are concerned. The who scenario is so totally unthinkable that I am
puzzled.
Mr. D. C. The only thing I can say is if they were working on the basis of a
hypothesis or knowledge which is most concretely and specifically represeinted
by myself, it would seem to me not terribly unreasonable to let me know that
instead of doing what they did to me here.
Therefore, all my instincts tell me that isn't it al all.
Mr. FITHIAN. On page 39 of your testimony I would like for you to look at that
again. This is my last point, Mr. Chairman.
Down at the last full paragraph, which starts with "However," skipping the first
part and dropping down to "Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may frivolously dismiss
them as they have dine before your committee but the doubts are still there and
it's irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual."
The doubts you refer to are the doubts about Nosenko's authenticity.
I guess my question is, do you want to close out the record standing by the
statement?
Mr. D. C. I would be happy because of the emotions involved in the word to
retract the word "frivolously." Quite happy. But I suppose it has come through
my testimony and what I have said in answer to your questions that I find the
use of this man, the positive use of this man vis-a-vis innocents, such as
trainees, terribly bothersome.
Page 643
643
I know--I don't think--I know that the people who are exposed to Nosenko in
counterintelligence training are not told--they know there was doubt, but they
are being specifically told, as Admiral Turner pointed out in a memo and as Mr.
Hart has indicated here, was the work of halfwits. If this man is a Soviet agent
and has a mission for the KGB in this country, it's a poor way to have some
young man begin Iris career, to be exposed to him.
Mr. FITHIAN. In an irresponsible way? I am getting to the tremendous charge
involved in this paragraph.
Mr. D.C. I appreciate your concern about that and of course to the contrary I
think you are being--Mr. Fithian, and may I ask you for word, because I think
you have offered me an opportunity to withdraw my word from the testimony and
I'm certainly not going to say no. Knowing now exactly what I meant by that can
you think of--perhaps "I think it wrong to expose"---perhaps that should be the
phraseology there.
Mr. FITHIAN. I hate to put words in your mouth, but Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner
may dismiss them. To say "frivolously dismiss them" might do the admiral
injustice here. Maybe Mr. Hart's statement before the committee may well
constitute, you know, frivolous treatment or something; I was pretty provoked by
it myself.
Then the second, that it's irresponsible---it's an error to expose.
Mr. D.C. I very, definitely will withdraw the word "irresponsible."
Mr. FITHIAN. That is in my reading such a terribly serious charge against the
director--
Mr. D.C. I accept your comment with appreciation.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further comments. I would like to say this:
I enormously appreciate your witness' time and patience with us in this matter.
I think it has been just to me, as an individual Member of the House, just
tremendously helpful, perhaps one of the better days I have had on the
committee.
Mr. D.C. Thank you.
Mr. PREYER. I might just ask one more question which might be more a comment.
You raise the question of what the explanation of Mr. Hart's testimony was, Mr.
Fithian, that where we seem to get a minimum amount of information about Lee
Harvey Oswald, which is what we were after, and a maximum amount as to Mr.
Nosenko's bona fide in a wide intelligence sense, would one explanation be,
could it be it was simply the CIA's answer to Mr. Epstein's book, which was
current at the time, very much in the news, and in that book, you are left with
the thought there is a mole in the CIA?
If you accept Mr. Epstein's thinking, they may have thought it worth a little
bad publicity temporarily if it would kill the idea there was a possible mole in
the CIA?
Mr. D. C. I would say no one I have talked to has had that reaction to what Mr.
Hart did. But on the contrary they are aghast and confused by it. I don't think
it laid anything to rest. Now, it could very well have been the motive. I have
even looked at the motive of their, in a sense, punishing me for having helped
Mr. Epstein. I have used the analogy of somebody using a blow on the head,
shoots himself in the foot. I don't believe they have helped their cause very
much by this sort of reaction.
Page 644
644
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Klein, do you have any further questions?
Mr. KLEIN. No; I don't, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Mr. D. C., when a witness has concluded his testimony under our
rules, he is entitled to make a statement for 5 minutes on any subject that may
have come up that he wishes to clarify or anything further he wishes to say. If
there is anything further you wish to add at this point, we will recognize you
for 5 minutes for that purpose.
Mr. D. C. Well, Mr. Fithian has made a kind remark and I would like to
reciprocate, not as a reciprocation but from the beginning of your work, I got
hold of both Mr. Hart's testimony and the staff's work and was deeply impressed
with the quality of the work of the committee. I have today been treated with
immense courtesy and interest and knowing full well at your regular schedule, at
a time when you are pressed with some other things, not the least being the King
matter, I am awed, impressed, and deeply appreciative that you should have given
me the time.
As you know, I wanted to come and answer those charges, but I also wanted to
make some points which I felt important which I do think are pertinent to your
mission.
Nevertheless, whether they are or not, you have received me with great courtesty
and I appreciate it enormously.
Mr. PREYER. Your testimony has been helpful and your testimony can add to our
knowledge in this area. We appreciate your being here.
If there is nothing further, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the
call of the Chair.]
Page 645
645
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken,
do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony was taken, do hereby certify
that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to
the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to
typewriting by me; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given
by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any
of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further
that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the
parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
action.
Notary Public in and for
the District of Columbia
My Commission expires
November 14, 1980
The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy Alphabetical Bibliography
Page 646
646
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:
ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Suzanne Cavanagh
Analyst in American National Government
Government Division
and
Sherry Shapiro
Bibliographer in Government and American Law
Library Services Division
March 28, 1979
Page 647
647
This comprehensive bibliography consists of every relevant book citation that
could be found in the Library's card catalog and Books in Print. Periodical
literature was identified (and selectively included) from the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature; Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.);
International Social Science and Humanities Index; America: History and Life;
Social Science Citation Index; Magazine Index; Psychology Abstract,;
Sociological Abstracts; Comprehensive Dissertation Abstracts; and the CRS's
Bibliographic Citation File. Some of the noted periodical sources are from
computerized, on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.
Other sources referred to in compiling the bibliography were: The Kennedy
Assassination and the Warren Report; Selected References, by Richard Malow which
is a CRS multilith report, GGR-119, published Sept. 23, 1966 (6 p.); American
Political Assassinations; A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 related to
the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, [in
pamphlet form] compiled by the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, with a
forward by Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1973,
28 p. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963; A Chronological List of References,
[in pamphlet form] by the Bibliography and Reference Correspondence Section of
the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1964, 68 p. and also, under the same
title, a supplement [in monograph form] of, principally, monographs, by William
J. Studer which was published by the Library of Congress in 1964 (25 p.); and
the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Moves to Reopen the
Investigation, by Donald A. Baskerville which appears in the Library of Congress
Information Bulletin of December 3, 1976. (6 p., 752-757).
Credit is due the following people who assisted in the compilation of this
bibliography: Sarah Collins, Nancy Fitch, Karen Keesling, Steve Langone, and
Daniel Strickland. Jeffrey C. Griffith in CRS's Information Systems Section was
instrumental in the retrieval of citations from on-line data bases external to
the Library of Congress.
Credit is due Robert Amorosi, Linda Bailey, Martha Schweitzer, Cheryl Scott,
Lillie Thompson, and Sandra Wallace for the secretarial production of the
bibliography.
Page 648
648
The Library of Congress
Congressional Research Service
Washington, D.C. 20540
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:
AN ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Accused. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 27-28.
AP2.T37, v. 82
2. Acoca, Miguel, and Robert Brown. The Bayo-Pawley affair--a
plot to destroy JFK and invade Cuba. Soldier of fortune,
spring 1976: 12-22, 60-61. [Not in L.C. collection]
3. The Actual voices and events of four days that shocked the world,
Nov. 22, 23, 24, 25, 1963; the complete story. (Phonodisc.)
Colpix Records, CP 2500, 1964. R65-1928
4. Adams, Perry, and Fred T. Newcomb. Murder from within. Santa
Barbara, Cal., Probe, 1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44
5. Adler, Bill, comp. The weight of the evidence, the Warren report
and its critics, edited by Jay David. New York, Meredith
Press, 1968. 303 p. E842.9.A68
6. After the tragedy. Tablet, v. 217, Nov. 30, 1963: 1181-1182.
[Not in L.C. collection]
7. Aftermath of the Warren report. Broadcasting, v. 67, Oct. 5, 1964:
50. TK6540.B85, v. 67
8. Again the assassination. Newsweek, v. 68, Aug. 15, 1966: 30-33.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
9. Age, Phillip. Inside the company--CIA diary. New York, Stonehill
Publishing Co., 1975. 639 p. JK468.I6.A75 1975b
lO. Agony relived; second installment of the death of a President
Time, v. 89, Jan. 27, 1967: 58. AP2.T37, v. 89
12. All the elements. Newsweek, v. 73, Mar. 10, 1969: 364.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
Page 649
649
13. An almanac of Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination
of John F. Kennedy; the crime of silence. Austin, Tex.,
Research Publications, 1968. 22 p. E842.9.A7
14. Alsop, Stewart. Johnson takes over. Saturday evening post,
v. 237, Feb. 15, 1964: 17-23. AP2.N2, v. 197
15. American Broadcasting Company. November 22, 1963. (Phonodisc.)
New York, 1963. Matrix no. ABC-JFK A-D.
R64-106
16. American condition. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: 425.
AP2.N2, v. 197
17. Amrine, Michael. This awesome challenge. New York, Putnam, 1964.
283 p. E846 .A6
18. Andronov, Iona. On the trail of a President's killer. New times
(Moscow), v. 1, Jan. 1977: 27-30; v. 2, Jan. 1977: 26-30; v. 3
Jan. 1977: 27-30. D839.N483 1977
19. Another assassination attempt by Lee Oswald? U.S. news and world
report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 8. JK1.U65, v. 55
20. Anniversary of an assassination. Reconstructionist, v. 30,
Nov. 27, 1964: 6. DS133.R4, v. 30
21. Ansbacher, Heinz, Rowena R. Ansbacher, David Shiverick, and
Kathleen Shiverick. Lee Harvey Oswald: an Adlerian inter-
pretation. Psychoanalytic review, v. 53, fall 1966:
55-68. BFI.PS, v. 53
22. Anson, Robert Sam. The greatest cover-up of all. New times
(New York), v. 4, Apr. 18, 1975: 16-29.
E169.12.N45, v. 4
23. ----- Jack, Judy, Sam and Johnny...and Frank, Fidel, Edgar...
New times (New York), v. 6, Jan. 23, 1976: 21-23, 27-30,
32-33. EI69.I2.N45, v. 6
24. Anson, Robert Sam. The man who never was. New times (New York),
v. 5, Sept. 19, 1975: 14-16, 21-25. EI69.I2.N45, v. 5
25. ---- They've killed the President: the search for the murderers
of John F. Kennedy. New York, Bantam Books, 1975. 408 p.
E842.9.A74
Page 650
650
26. Any number can play: question of whether the assassination was
the work of one man. Newsweek, v. 68, Nov. 7, 1966: 37-38.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
27. Appelbaum, Stephen A. The Kennedy assassination. Psychoanalytic
review, v. 53, fall 1966: 69-80. BF1.PS, v. 53
28. Are there new leads? Newsweek, v, 89, Apr. 11, 1977: 32-33.
AP2.N6772 v. 89
29. Arnoni, M.S. Garrison and Warren, anything in common? Minority
of one, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 11-12. AP2.M55985, v. 9
30. As the book appears: a close look at the facts; concerning The
death of a President by W. Manchester. U.S. news and world
report, v. 62, Jan. 23, 1967: 50-52. JK1.U65, v. 62
31. As Warren inquiry starts; latest on the assassination. U.S.
news and world report v. 55, Dec. 30, 1963: 28-30.
JK1.U65, v. 55
32. Asbell, B. 10 years later: a legacy of torment haunts those
closest to the JFK assassination. Today's health, v. 51,
Oct. 1973: 56-60, 62-63, 65. RA421.T6, v. 51
33. Ascoli, M. Interim reflections. Reporter, v. 31, Oct. 22, 1964:
12. D839.R385, v. 31
34. Ashman, Charles. The CIA-mafia link. New York, Manor Books,
Inc., 1975. Registration no. A679827
Copyright Office
35. Assassination. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 5, 1954: 32-40,
45-52, 57-60, 62-64. AP2.N6772, v. 64
36. The Assassination: a nonentity for history. Time, v. 89,
Jan. 13, 1967: 16-17. AP2.T37, v. 89
37. Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: how the
President was shot. U.S. news and world report, v. 55,
Dec. 9, 1963: 68-71. JK1.U65, v. 55
38. Assassination-behind moves to reopen JFK case. U.S. news and
world report, v. 78, Jan. 2, 1975: 30-33.
JK1.U65, v. 78
Page 651
651
39. Assassination gives impetus to Dodd's gun bill. Advertising
age. v. 34, Dec. 2, 1963: 1-2. HF5801.A276, v. 34
40. Assassination: now a suicide talks. Time, v. 109, Apr. 11, 1977:
20. AP2.T37, v. 109
41. Assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Motion Picture) Thorne Films,
1971. E8842.9
42. The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Coverage of
Soviet newspapers, Nov. 22-28, 1963] Current digest of
the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 11, 1963: 3-15.
D839.C87, v. 15
43. The Assassination of President Kennedy. East Europe, v. 13, Jan.
1964: 25-26. DRI.N363, v. 13
44. Assassination of President' Kennedy; with report by T.H. White.
Life, v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 22-23. AP2.L547, v. 55
45. Assassination syndrome fits Lee Oswald. Science, v. 90, Sept. 24,
1966: 229. Q1.S35, v. 90
46. The Assassination: the reporter's story; what was seen and read;
television, newspapers, magazines; journalism's role: unre-
solved issues. Columbia journalism review, v. 11, winter
1964: 5-31. PN4700.C64, v. 11
47. Assassination: the trail to a verdict; with report by G.R. Ford.
Life, v. 57, Oct. 2, 1964: 40-50B. AP2.L547, v. 57
48. The Assassination: the Warren report. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 5,
1964: 32-40, 45-52, 57-60, 63-64. AP2.N6772, v. 64
49. Associated Press. The torch is passed; the Associated Press
story of the death of a President. [New York] 1963. 99 p.
E842.9.A85
50. Attorney for Oswald. Time, v. 83, Mar. 6, 1964: 47.
AP2.T37, v. 83
51. Autopsy. Time, v. 82, Dec. 27, 1963: 18.
AP2.T37, v. 82
Page 652
652
52. Autry, James A. The Garrison investigation: how and why it began.
New Orleans,-v. 1, Apr. 1967: 8, 50-51.
F399.NS, v. 1
53. Awful interval. Newsweek, v. 63, Jan. 6, 1964: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
54. Aynesworth, .Hugh. JFK conspiracy: J. Garrison's investigation of
a plot to kill J.F. Kennedy. Newsweek, v. 69, May 15, 1967:
36, 38, 40. AP2.N6772, v. 69
55. Back, Kurt, and Judith Saravay. From bright ideas to social research:
the studies of the Kennedy assassination. Public opinion
quarterly, v. 31, sumner 1967: 253-264.
HM261.A1.P8, v. 31
56. Back of the secrecy in the assassination probe. U.S. news and
world report, v. 56, Feb. 24, 1964: 52.
JK1.U65, v. 56
57. Back to Dallas; theories of J. Thompson and J. Connally. Time,
v. 90, Nov. 24, 1967: 54-55. AP2.T37, v. 90
58. Bagdikian, B.H. Assassin. Dec. 14, 1963: 22-27.
Saturday evening post, v. 236,
AP2.S2, v. 236
59. Baker, Dean C. The assassination of President Kennedy; a study of
the press coverage. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Dept.
of Journalism [1965] 45 p. E842.9.B3
60. Banned in Moscow: Warren Commission report. Newsweek, v. 68,
Sept. 12, 1966: 40. AP2.N6772, v. 68
61. Banta, Thomas J. The Kennedy assassination: early thoughts
and emotions. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964:
216-224. HM1261.A1.PS, v. 28
62. Baskerville, Donald A., comp. The assassination of President
John F. Kennedy: moves to reopen the investigation; a selected
list of references. Library of Congress information bulletin,
v. 35, Dec. 3, 1976: 752-757. Z733.V57.I6, v. 35
63. Bedford, Subille. Verdict on Jack Ruby. Life, v. 53, Mar. 27,
1963: 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 79. AP2.L547, v. 53
Page 653
653
64. Behind the move to reopen JFK case. U.S. news and world report,
v. 79, Sept. 15, 1975: 21. 3KI.U65, v. 79
65. Belin, David W. Truth was my only goal. Texas observer, v. 63,
Aug. 13, 1971: 13-15. F381.T368, v. 63
66. Belin, David W. Nov. 22, 1963; you are the jury. New York,
Quadrangle, 1973. 521 p. E842.9.B44
67. ---- They've killed the President. National review,
v. 28, Feb. 6, 1976: 81-85, 88-90. AP2.N3545, v. 28
68. Belli, Melvin M., and M.C. Carroll. Dallas justice; the real
story of Jack Ruby and his trial. New York, McKay
[1964] 298 p. KF224.R8.B44
69. Berendt, John. If they've found another assassin, let them
name names and produce their evidence. Esquire, v. 68,
Aug. 1967: 80-82. AP2.E845, v. 68
70. Berkeley, Edmund C. The assassination of President Kennedy:
the pattern of coup d'etat and public deception. Computers
and automation, v. 20, Nov. 1971: 24-26, 29-30, 48.
TJ212.C58, v. 20
71. Berkeley, Edmund C., and Richard E. Sprague. The attempted
framing of Jim Garrison. Computers and automation, v. 22,
Dec. 1973: 23-29. TJ212.C58, v. 22
72. Bernert, Phillippe, and Camille Gilles. The Frenchman who was
to kill Kennedy. Computers and automation, v. 22, Jan.
1973: 37-40. TJ212.C58, v. 22
73. Bethell, Tom. Earl Warren: on the mob's payroll? Washington
monthly, v. 8, Mar. 1976: 35-46. E838.W37, v. 8
74. ---- Was Sirhan Sirhan on the grassy knoll. Washington
monthly, v. 7, Mar. 1975: 31-39. E838.W37, v. 7
75. Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission.
Time, v. 83, Feb. 14, 1964: 16-20. AP2.T37, v. 83
76. Bickel, Alexander M. CBS on the Warren report. New republic,
v. 157, July 15, 1967: 29-30. AP2.N624, v. 157
Page 654
654
77. Bickel, Alexander M. Failure of the Warren report. Commentary,
v.43, Apr. 1967: 23-26. DS1O1.C63, v.43
78. ---- Leo Sauvage and the Warren Commission. New leader,
v.49, Nov. 21, 1966: 19-21. HXI.N37, v. 49
79. ---- Reexamining the Warren report. New republic, v. 156,
Jan. 7, 1967: 25-28. AP2.N624, v. 156
80. ---- Return to Dallas. New republic, v. 157, Dec. 23,
1967: AP2.N624, v. 157
81. Big sale; exclusive photos for Life. Newsweek, v. 63, Mar. 2,
1964: 80. AP2.N6772, v. 63
82. Billet, Owen A. Suicide related to the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy. Suicide and life threatening behavior,
v. 7, spring 1977: 40-44. RC574.L54, v. 7
83. Bishop, James Alonzo. The day Kennedy was shot. New York,
Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 713 p. E842.9.B5
84. ---- Day in the life of President Kennedy. New York, Random
House [1964] 108 p. E842.B5
85. ---- The end of Camelot. Ladies home journal, v. 90,
Nov. 1973: 77. AP2.L135, v. 90
86. Biskind, Peter. The FBI's secret soldiers. New times (New York),
v. 6, Jan. 9, 1976: 18, 21-25. E169.12.N45, v. 6
87. Bloom tells his public relations role in Ruby case. Editor
and publisher, v. 96, Feb. 1, 1964: 58. PN4700.E4, v. 96
88. Bloomgarden Henry S. The gun: a biography of the gun that
killed John F. Kennedy. New York, Grossman Publishers,
1975. 152 p. HV8059.B55 1975
89. Blumberg, Rae Lesser, Samuel A. Mueller, Suzanne E. Rochelean,
and Joyce A. Sween [Northwestern Assassination Research
Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President
John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a prelim-
inary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University,
c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
Page 655
655
90. Blumenthal, Sid, and R.D. Rosen. The politics of conspiracy,
the conspiracy of politics. Computers and people, v. 24,
Apr. 1975: 24-26, 31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
91. Blumenthal, Sid, and Harvey Yazijian, eds. Government by gunplay:
assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today.
New York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p.
E842.9 .G65
92. Boeth, R., and others. JFK: what the FBI found. Newsweek, v.90,
Dec. 19, 1977: 28. AP2.N6772, v. 90
93. Bonjean, Charles H., Richard 3. Hill, and Harry W. Hartin.
Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class.
Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37.
[Not in L.C. collection]
94. Bonnet, Judy Whitson. Investigation of a homicide; the murder
of John F. Kennedy. Anderson, S.C., Droke House, 1969.
367 p. E842.9. B6
95. Bonsal, Philip. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. Foreign
affairs, v. 45, Jan. 1967: 260-276. D410.F6, v. 45
96. Bonyentre, P., and others. Opening the JFK file: FBI file.
Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35.
AP2 .N6772, v. 90
97. Bourbon street rococo; J. Garrison's investigation. Time,
v. 89, Hat. 3, 1967: 26. AP2.T37, v. 89
98. Bowset, Hallowell. The perils of hasty history. Saturday
review, v. 49, Dec. 31, 1966: 14. AP2.S273, v. 49
99. Braden, Tom. What's wrong with the CIA. Saturday review,
v. 2, Apr. 5, 1975: 14-18. AP2.S273, v. 2
100. Branch, Taylor, and George Crile, III. Kennedy vendetta.
Harper's, v. 251, Aug. 1975: 49-63. AP2.H3, v. 251
101. Brave little woman, M. Oswald before Warren's investigating
commission. Newsweek, v. 63, Feb. 17, 1964: 17.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
102. Breig, Joe. Assassination of a people. Ave Maria, v. 98,
Dec. 14, 1963: 10. AP2.A9, v. 98
Page 656
656
103. ---- President Kennedy's death: why? Ave Maria, v. 99,
Jan. 11, 1964: 9. AP2.Ag, v. 99
104. Brener, Milton E. The Garrison case; a study in the abuse of
power. 1st ed. New York, C.N. Potter [1969] 278 p.
E842.9.B7 1969
105. Breslin, J. Death in emergency no. one: Parkland Memorial
Hospital. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963:
30-31. AP2.S2, v. 236
106. Bringuier, Carlos. Red Friday, Nov. 22nd, 1963. Chicago,
Hallberg [1969] 174 p. E842.9.B74
107. Brienberg, Mordecai. Riddle of Dallas. Spectator, v. 212,
Mar. 6, 1964: 305-306. AP4.S7, v. 212
108. Brigham, Robert. Russia: no, no, this cannot be true. Life,
v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 129-130. AP2.L547, v. 55
109. Brogan, Denis W. Death in Dallas. Myths after Kennedy.
Encounter (Great Britain), v. 23, no. 135, 1964: 20-26.
[Not in L.C. collection]
110. Brooks, Steward M. Our murdered Presidents: the medical story.
New York, Fredrick Fell, Inc., 1966. 234 p.
RD96.3.B7
111. Broyles, William. The man who saw too much. Texas monthly,
v. 4, Mar. 1976: 86, 88-89, 114-122. F381.T84, v. 4
112. Buchanan, Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York, Putnam
[1964] 207 p. E842.9.B9 1964
113. Buckley, W.F., Jr. Do they really hate to hate? National
review, v. 15, Dec. 31, 1963: 559. AP2.N3545, v. 15
114. Butler, Ed. The great assassin puzzle. The Westwood village
square, v. 1, no. 2, 1968: 21-28; no. 1, 1969: 26-27, 37-41.
[Not in L.C. collection]
115. Butterfield, Roger. Assassination: some serious exceptions
to the Warren report. Harper's, v. 233, Oct. 1966: 122,
124-126.
AP2.H3, v. 233
Page 657
657
116. Cadden, Vivian, and Gerald Caplan. Lessons in bravery. McCalls,
v. 95, Sept. 1968: 12, 85, 115. TT500.M2, V. 95
117. Callaban, Dr. John W. Did Jack Ruby kill the wrong man?
Argosy, v. 365, Sept. 1967: 29, 96-101. AP2.A7, v. 365
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129. Chapman, Gil. Was Oswald alone? San Diego, Ca., Publishers
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147 ---- What the Warren report omits: vital documents. Nation,
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149. Cohen, Jerry, and Nicholas C. Chriss. New Orleans: Act One.
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151. Collective guilt in the U.S.? Take a look at the world: with
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152. Collective or individual guilt. U.S. news and world report,
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154. Compendium of curious coincidences; parallels in the lives
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155. Condon, R. Manchurian candidate in Dallas. Nation, v. 197,
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157. Cook, Fred J. Irregulars take the field. Nation, v. 213,
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159. ---- Warren Commission report: testimony of the eyewitnesses.
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160. ---- Warren report and the irreconcilables: theories of
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161. Cooke, Alistair. After the President's assassination.
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164. Cottrell, John. Assassination. The world stood still.
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166. Covering big Jim. Newsweek, v. 73, Mar. 17, 1969: 105.
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172. Curtains for the DA; physicians examine photographs and X-rays.
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175. ---- The flight of CE399: evidence of conspiracy by R.B.
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176. D.A. wins a round; Jim Garrison's investigation. Time, v. 89,
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177. Dahlin, Robert. Fresh wave of JFK assassination titles suggest
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179. Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28,
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180. Dallas rejoiner. Nation, v. 198, May 25, 1964: 519.
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181. Dallas revisited. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18-19.
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183. Daniel, P. Assessing the blame in the President's death: excerpts
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184. David, Jay, ed. The weight of the evidence; the Warren report
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185. Day JFK died; excerpts from The day Kennedy was shot, by Jim
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186. The Day Kennedy died. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 20-26.
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187. Deadly iteration. Time, v. 93, Hat. 7, 1969: 22-23.
AP2.T37, V. 93
188. Death in Dallas. Reader's digest, v. 84, Jan. 1964: 39-44.
AP2.R255, v. 84
189. Death of a modern. Spectator, v. 211, Nov. 29, 1963: 681.
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190. Death of a President. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 6, 1963: 299-301.
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191. Death of a President; excerpt from the introduction to annual
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192. Death of a President: the established facts. Atlantic monthly
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193. Death of a President: told in direct testimony; excerpts.
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JK1.U65, v. 57
194. Death of President Kennedy: statements by Sir Robert Menzies and
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195. Decade of unanswered questions. Ramparts, v. 12, Dec. 1973:
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196. Dee, Jay. Lee Oswald did not kill President Kennedy alone.
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197. Deep and growing doubts questioning the verdict of the Warren
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198. Defiant defendant. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24, 1969: 33.
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199. Deighton, Len. Michael Rand. and Howard Loxton. comps. The Assass-
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200. Dellinger. David. Editorial: the Warren report . . . ? Liberation,
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204. Dempsey, David. Warren report in mass production. Saturday review.
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207. Diehl, William F., Jr. The press: its actions and reactions.
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209. Different look at Dallas. U.S. news and world report, v. 56,
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215. Dreifus, Claudia. Who stole John Kennedy's brains and other
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234. Epstein, Edward Jay. Counterplot. New York, Viking Press, 1969.
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235. ---- Final chapter in the assassination controversy. New
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236. ---- Garrison. New Yorker, v. 44, July 13, 1968: 35-40, 42,
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238. Epstein, Edward Jay. Legend: the secret world of Lee Harvey Oswald.
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245. Fairlie, H. No conspiracy but perhaps two assassins. New
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248. Fateful two hours without a President: excerpts from testimonies.
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JK1.U65.U61
249. FBI story on JFK's death: with report by H. Gorey. Time, v. 110,
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250. Fein, Arnold L. JFK in Dallas: the Warren report and its critics.
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252. ----- Oswald and the FBI. Nation, v. 198, Jan. 27, 1964:
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253. Feldman, Jacob 3., and Paul B. Sheatsley. The assassination of
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254. Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. Jim Garrison, District Attorney,
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255 ---- A legacy of suspicion. Esquire, v. 80, Nov. 1973:
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256. Fensterwald, Bernard, and George O'Toole. The CIA and the man
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258. 50,000 word leak: testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission.
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259. Files of evidence connected with the investigation of the
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260. Fine, William M., ed. That day with God. New York, McGraw-Hill,
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264. Fleming, D.F. Foreword: postscript. Annals of the American
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266. Ford, Gerald R., and John Stiles. Portrait of an assassin.
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267. Foreign countries, too, mourn first citizen of the world. U.S.
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268. Foreign power: same goals, sterner style. Business week, no. 1787,
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269. Forkosch, Morris D. Presidential murder: constitutionality of
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270. Four days. Television, v. 21, Jan. 1964: 27-33.
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271. Four days in November (Motion Picture). Wolper Productions,
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273. Fox, Sylvan. The hidden evidence about President Kennedy's
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274. ---- The unanswered questions about President Kennedy's
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286. Gales, Robert Robinson. The assassination of the President:
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287. Gallup [Poll] Inc. (American Institute of Public Opinion). Were
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288. Gans, Herbert J. Why was Kennedy killed. Trans-action, v. 5,
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289. Gareth, Jenkins. Who shot President Kennedy--or fact and fable
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290. Garrison, Jim. A heritage of stone. New York, Putnam, [ 1970]
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291. ----- New Orleans evidence; excerpts from statements. Reporter,
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307. Ginsparg, Sylvia L., and Alice E. Moriarty. Reactions of young
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317. Gordon, William E. The assassination of President Kennedy.
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326. Grosvenor, Melville Bell. The last full measure. National geo-
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328. Guidry, Vernon A., Jr. Coverup in slaying of JFK. Washington
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329. Gun, Nerin E. Red roses from Texas. London, Frederick Muller,
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330. Habe, Hans. The wounded land: journey through a divided America.
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332. Hale, Hazel, and Thomas Henry Irwin. A bibliography of books, news-
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333. Haley, J. Eretts. A Texan looks at Lyndon: a study in illegitimate
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335. ----- Playboy's history of organized crime, part XI: attack on
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336. ---- Playboy's history of organized crime presents part XII:
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343. ----- A year of progress with a sorrowful close. Columbia,
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344. Bartogs, Renatus, and Lucy Freeman. The two assassins. New York,
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345. Hastings, Michael. Lee Harvey Oswald: a far mean streak of
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347. The Hatred that consumes...address by Chief Justice E.G. Warren
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348. Have we learned our lessons? Christian century, v. 80, Dec. 18,
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349. Havemann, Ernest. Defendant Ruby will meet the ghost of a long
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350. He gave his life; a newspaper's account of the assassination of a
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351. Be was my brother: excerpts from Lee (R. L. Oswald and others).
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HV6278.H38
353. Henderson, Bruce E. 1:33. 1st ed. New York, Cowles, 1968.
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354. Hepburn, James. Farewell America. Vaduz, Frontiers, 1968. 418 p.
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356. Here's what the Warren report will show. U.S. news and world
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362. History or headlines? Nev Orleans investigation. Newsweek, v. 69,
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375. How America felt. Newsweek, v. 63, Hat. 16, 1964: 33.
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376. How could it happen? New republic, v. 149, Dec. 7, 1963: 6.
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378. How sorrowful had: world reactions. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963:
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384. I just heard some shots: three shots. Editor and publisher,
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386. Imitators: post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide.
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389. Inquest on Dallas: the right to bear arms. Tablet, v. 218,
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390. International outlook. Business week, no. 1787,
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393. Itek Corporation. Life-Itek Kennedy assassination film
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394. Izakow, Boria. The Dallas investigation. New times (Moscow),
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396. JFK assassination; Justice Department publishes a report by
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400. JFK death: a new investigation but... U.S. news and world
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435. Jumping the gun; premature disclosures. Newsweek, v.
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436. Kaiser, Robert Blair. The JFK assassination: why Congress should
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450. Kennedy assassination--communist version. Communist affairs,
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456. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The real CIA. New York, MacMillan,
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458. Kirkwood, James. American grotesque; an account of the Clay Shaw-
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459. Kliman, Gilbert W., and Martha Wolfenstein. Children and the
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460. Knebel, Fletcher. After the shots: the ordeal. of Lyndon Johnson.
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461. ---- New wave of doubt; concerning Inquest by E.J. Epstein.
Look, v. 30, July 12, 1966: 60-72. AP2.L79, v. 30
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462. Knight, Janet H., ed. Three assassinations: the deaths of John
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464. Kopkind, Andrew. Kennedy mystery reopened. New statesman. v. 72,
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468. ---- The legend of John F. Kennedy. American hook collector,
v. 22, no. 1, 1971: 25. Z99O.A5, v. 22
469. Kurland, Gerald. The assassination of John F. Kennedy. Charlottes-
ville, N.Y., SamHar Press, 1973. 31 p. E842.9.K87
Page 688
688
470. LBJ on the assassination. Newsweek, v. 75, May 11, 1970:
41. AP2.N6772, v. 75
471. Labor: union rally to Johnson. Business week, no. 1787,
Nov. 30, 1963: 46, 48. BF5001.B828
472. Lane, Mark. A citizen's dissent: Mark Lane replies. New
York, Holt, Reinhardt, and Winston [1968] 290 p.
E842.9.L29
473. ---- The man in the doorway. Film comment, v. 4, fall/
winter 1967: 20-21. PNI993.F438, v. 4
474. ----, ed. The Oswald case; Mark Lane's testimony to the
Warren Commission. Phonodisc. Broodside BR501, 1964.
R64-1333
475. ---- Oswald innocent? A lawyer's brief. National guardian
weekly, Dec. 19, 1963. Microfilm
05144AP
476. ---- Playboy interview: Mark Lane. Playboy, v. 14, Feb.
1967: 41-42, 44-64, 66-68. AP2.P69, v. 14
477. ---- Rush to judgment. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston [1966] 478 p. E842.9.L3
478. ---- The Warren report: a first glance. Minority of one,
v. 6, Nov. 1964: 6-8. AP2.M55985, v. 6
479. ---- Who killed Kennedy? CBS is wrong. True magazine,
v. 48, Dec. 1967: 34-36. AP2.T76127, v. 48
480. Lane, Mark, and Donald Freed. Executive action. New York,
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No. 2348
Rare book collection
481. Lane says JFK death is still unsolved murder. Publishers
weekly, v. 190, Aug. 22, 1966: 58. ZI219.P98, v. 190
482. Langer, E. Kennedy's assassination: study organized by social
scientists. Science, v. 142, Dec. 13, 1963: 1446-1447.
Q1535, v. 142
Page 689
689
483. Lardner, George Jr. Congress and the assassinations: the
curious politics of the House inquiry into the murders
of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Saturday review, v. 4, Feb. 19, 1977: 14-18.
AP2.S273, v. 4
484. Lasky, Victor. JFK, the man and the myth. New York,
MacMillan Co. [1963] 653 p. E842.L3
485. Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren Report.
U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1, 1964: 43-44.
JK1.U65, v. 56
486. Latin letter: Haiti. Latin America political report
(London), v. 11, May 1977: 131. HC121.L27, v. 11
487. Lattimer, John K. Factors in the death of President
Kennedy. Journal of the American Medical Association,
v. 198, Oct. 24, 1966: 327, 332-333. RI5.A48, v. 198
488. Lattimer, John K. Similarities in fatal wounds of John
Wilkes Booth and Lee Harvey Oswald. Journal of medicine,
v. 66, July 3, 1966: 1782-1794. R11.J73, v. 66
489. Law unto himself. Newsweek, v. 71, Jan. 8, 1968: 25-26.
AP2.N6772, v. 71
490. Lawrence, D. Incredible tragedy. U.S. news and world
report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 104. JK1.U65, v. 55
491. Lawrence, Lincoln [pseud.] Were we controlled. New Hyde
Park, N.Y., University Books [1967] 173 p.
E842.9.L36
492. Leaf, Jesse James. The war inside the CIA. Genesis, Dec. 5,
1975: 22'24, 40, 44. AP2.G33
493. Lee Oswald's widow tells her story; summary of testimony by
Marina Oswald. U.S. news and world report, v. 56,
Feb. 17, 1964: 19. JK1.U65, v. 56
494. Lesher, S. and S. Fraker. Back to square one. Newsweek,
v. 88, Dec. 6, 1976: 32, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 88
Page 690
690
495. Leslie, Warren. Dallas, public and private: aspects of an
American city. New York, Grossman Publishers [1964]
238 p. F394.02L4
496. Levin, Bernard. The bell tolls in Dallas. Listener, v. 70,
Dec. 5, 1963: 914. AP4.L4165, v. 70
497. Levy, Sheldon G. Bow population subgroups differed in
knowledge of six assassinations. Journalism quarterly,
v. 46, winter, 1969: 685-698. KIO.U27, v. 46
498. Lewis, Richard Warren. Flashy lawyer for Oswald's killer.
Saturday evening post, v. 237, Feb. 8, 1964: 28-30.
AP2.S2, v. 237
499. ---The scavengers and critics of the Warren report;
the endless paradox. New York, Delacorte Press [1967]
188 p.
500. Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures
and text on the most shocking event of our time, includ-
ing his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago.
Time, Inc. [1963] AP2 .L547
501. Lillard, Richard C. Confrontation and innovation on the
campus: and eventful decade for western universities.
American west, v. 11, no. 1, 1974: 10-17, 62-64.
F591.A4, v. 11
502. Lincoln, Evelyn. Kennedy and Johnson. New York, Rinehart
and Winston [1968] 207 p. E842.I.L47
503. Lindsay, 3- 3-, and P. Goldman. Dallas: new questions and
answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38.
AP2.N6772, v. 85
504. Lineberry, William. The lingering plot. Foreign opinion and
the assassination. New leader, v. 47, Apr. 27, 1964:
21-22. HXI.N37, v.47
505 Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion. Newsweek, v. 63,
Jan. 6, 1964: 19. AP2.N6772, v. 63
Page 691
691
506. Linn, Edward. The untold story of Jack Ruby. Saturday
evening post, v. 237, July 25, 1964: 24-26, 28, 33,
36-37, 40, 48-49. AP2.S2, v. 237
507. Logan, Andy. JFK: the stained-glass image. American Heri-
tage, v. 18, Oct. 1967: 4-7, 75-78. E171.E43, v. 18
508. Love, Ruth Leeds. Television and the Kennedy assassination.
New society, v. 8, Oct. 13, 1966: 567-571.
H1.N47, v. 8
509. Lowenstein, Allard. The Kennedy killings. Argosy, v. 383,
Feb. 1976: 28-33, 86. AP2.AT, v. 383
510. Lowther, William. The evidence be damned. (Who killed JFK?)
Macleans, v. 90, Dec. 26, 1977: 35-36.
AP5.M2, v. 90
511. Loxton, Howard, Len Deighton, and Michael Rand, comp. The
assination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967]
E842.R32
Rare book collection
512. Lynd, S., and J. Minnis. Seeds of doubt: some questions
about the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21,
1963: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
Page 692
692
513. McBernie, William S. What was behind Lee Harvey Oswald? Norfolk,
Va., McBernie Publications Association [N.D.]
[Not in L.C. collection]
514. McCarry, Charles. The tears of autumn. New York, Saturday Review
Press, 1974. 276 p. PZ4.MI2265Te
515. MacCloskey, Monro. The American intelligence co--unity. New York,
Rosen Press, Inc., 1967. 190 p. 3K468.I6.M28
516. McDade, Thomas M. The assassination industry: a tentative check-
list of publications on the murder of John F. Kennedy.
American book collector, v. 18, no. 10, 1968: 8-14.
Z99O.A5, v. 18
517. Macdonald, D. Our baby. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 25, 1964:
30. AP2.N624, v. 150
518. ----- A critique of the Warren report. Esquire, v. 63, Mar. 1965:
59-63, 127-138. AP2.E845, v. 63
519. McDonald, Hugh C. Appointment in Dallas: the final solution
to the assassination of JFK. New York, The Hugh McDonald
Publishing Corporation, 1975. 211 p. E842.9.M23
520. MacDonald, Neil. The assassination of President Kennedy. The
'Oswald window'. People and the pursuit of truth, May 1975:
7. [Not in L.C. collection]
521. ----- Confidential and secret documents of the Warren Commission
deposited in the U.S. Archives. Computers and automation,
v. 19, Nov. 1970: 44-47. TJ212.C58, v. 19
522. McGill, Ralph E. Speaking out: hate knows no direction. Saturday
evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 8, 10.
AP2.S2, v. 236
523. McGrory, Mary. After great pain; a formal feeling. America,
v. 109, Dec. 14, 1963: 764. BX801.A5, v. 109
Page 693
693
524. McKinley, James. Cries of conspiracy. Playboy, v. 23, Hay 1976:
122-127, 130, 132, 200-208. AP2. P69, v. 23
525. ---- The end of Camelot. Playboy, v. 23, Apr. 1976: 125,
127-130, 142, 193, 196, 198-200, 202-204, 206, 208.
AP2.P69, v. 23
526. McMillan, Priscilla Johnson. Marina and Lee. New York, Harper
and Row, c1977. 527 p. CT275.0737.M32 1977
527. ----- Why Oswald really killed Kennedy: part 2. Ladies home
journal, v. 94, Nov. 1977: 122-143. AP2.L135, v. 94
528. MacParlane, Ian Colin A. The assassination of John F. Kennedy:
a new review. Koogons, Vic., I.C.A. MacParlane, 1974. 60 p.
E842.9.M25
Rare book collection
529. ---- Proof of conspiracy in the assassination of President
Kennedy. Melbourne, Book Distributors, 1975. 160 p.
E842.9.M26
Rare book collection
530. Mader, Julius. Who's who in the CIA. Berlin, West Germany,
Hader, 1968. 604 p. JK468.I6.M323
531. Maddox, Henry. The plot according to Garrison. New Orleans,
v. 1, July 1967: 18-19, 52-53. F379.N5, v. 1
532. Hallowe, Hike. Who killed Kennedy? The Philadelphia connection.
Philadelphia magazine, v. 68, Sept. 1977: 135-142, 230-239.
AP2.A2.P45, v. 68
533. Halone, William Scott. The secret life of Jack Ruby. New times
(New York), v. 10, Jan. 23, 1978: 46-51.EI69.I2.N45, v. 10
534. Man who killed Oswald. Time, v. 82, Dec. 6, 1963: 34-35.
AP2.T37, v. 82
Page 694
694
535. The Man who loved Kennedy. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18.
AP2 .T37, v. 93
536. Man who wanted to kill Nixon. Time, v. 83, June 19, 1964: 21.
AP2 .T37, v. 83
537. Manchester, William. Then. New York times magazine, Nov. 4,
132-136. AP2.N6573
538. Manchester, William R. November 25, 1963. The death of a President
November 20. New York, Harper's, 1967. 710 p.
E842.9 .M28
539. Handel, P. End to nagging rumors: the six critical seconds.
Life. v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 527. AP2.L547, v. 55
540. Mannes, M. Long vigil. Reporter, v. 29, Dec. 19, 1963: 15-17.
D839.R385, v. 29
541. Marchetti, Victor, and John D. Harks. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.16.M37
542. Marcus, Raymond. The bastard bullet; a search for legitimacy
of Commission exhibit 399. Los Angeles, Randall Publications,
1966. 77 p. E842.9.M34
543. Mardi Gras season. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 73, 1969: 34.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
544. Marketing shoppers flock back to resume buying. Business week,
no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 80-90. HR5001.B89
545. Marks, John. A Kafka story, but its true. Playboy, v. 22, Aug.
1975: 59. AP2 .P69, v. 22
546. Marks, John D., and Victor Marchetti. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.16.M37
Page 695
695
567. Marks, Stanley J. American dream; American nightmare. Los Angeles
Bureau of International Affairs, 1971. [Hot in L.C. collection]
568. Coup d'etat: November 22, 1963; the conspiracies that
murdered President John F. Kennedy, the Rev. Martin Luther
King, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Los Angeles, Bureau
of International Affairs, 1970. 201 p. ES42.9.M348
549. ---- Murder most foul. The conspiracy that murdered President
Kennedy: 975 questions and answers. Los Angelea, Bureau of
International Affairs, 1967. 149 p. E842.9.M35
550. ---- Two days of infamy: November 22, 1963 and September 28,
1964. [1st U.S. ed. Los Angeles, Bureau of International
Affairs] 1969. 178 p. E842.9.M353 1969
551. Watch what we do, not what we say. Los Angeles, Bureau
of International Affairs, 1971. [Not in L.C. collection]
552. Marshall, Eliot. Aftermath; how the survivors feel now. New
republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 68-51.AP2.N624, v. 173
553. Martin, Harry W., Charles M. Bonjean, and Richard J. Hill. Reactions
to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest
Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37.
[Not in L.C. collection]
554. Martin, William 0. Welcome to the Lee Harvey Oswald Memorial
Library and Research Institute, Marguerite C. Oswald,
director. Esquire, v. 79, Jan. 1973: 142-143, 160.
AP2.E845, v. 79
555. Martyred President and nation's journey. Reconstructionist, v. 29,
Dec. 13, 1963: 3. DS133.R4, v. 29
556. Marxist marine. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 27.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
Page 696
696
557. Matter of reasonable doubt. Life, v. 61, Nov. 25, 1966: 38-48B,
AP2.L547, v. 61
558. Matthews, James P. Four dark days in history: Nov. 22-25, 1963.
Los Angeles, the author, c1963. 68 p. E842.9.F6
Rare book collection
559. Maxfield, Marietta, and Dan Wise. The day Kennedy died. San
Antonio, Naylor Co., 1964. 137 p. E842.9.W5
560. Mayer, Milton. November 22, 1963. Dec. 1964: 21-25. Progressive
magazine, v. 28, AP2.P8655, v. 28
561. Mayes, Stanley. What they are saying. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28,
1963: 868. AP4.L4165, v. 70
562. Mayo, John B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is dead; the
story of John F. Kennedy's assassination as covered by radio
and TV. [1st ed.] New York, Exposition Press [1967] 157 p.
E842.9.M37
563. Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories after the fact; the Warren Commission,
the authorities, and the report. New York, Vintage Books
[1976, c1967] 477 p. E842.9.M36 1976
[Not in L.C. collection]
564. ---- After the battle, the book. Minority of one, v. 9,
June 1967: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 9
565. ---- The curious testimony of Mr. Given. Texas observer, v. 63,
August 1971: 11-12. F381.T368, v. 63
566. ---- How well did the 'non-driver' Oswald drive? Minority
of one, v. 8, Sept. 1966: 19-21. AP2.M55985, v. 8
567. ---- Johnnies-come-lately to Dealey Plaza. Texas observer,
v. 62, July 24, 1970: 11-13. F381.T368, v. 62
568. ---- Notes for a new investigation. Esquire, v. 66, Dec. 1966:
211, 335. AP2 .E845, v. 66
Page 697
697
569. Meagher, Sylvia. On closing the doors, not opening them; or the
limit of the Warren investigation. Minority of one,
v. 8, July-Aug. 1966: 29-32. AP2.M55985, v. 8
570. ----Oswald and the State Department. Minority of one,
v. 8, Oct. 1966: 22-27.
AP2.M55985, v. 8
571. ---- Post-assassination credibility chasm. Minority of one, v. 9, Mar.
1967: 21-22. AP2.M55985, v. 9
572. ---- A psychiatrist's retroactive 'clairvoyance'. Minority
one, v. 8, June 1966: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 8
573. ---- Subject index to the Warren report and hearings and exhibits.
New York, Scarecrow Press, 1966. 150 p. E842.9.M4
574 ---- Three assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, 1968: 13-16.
Sept. 1968: 13-16. AP2.55985, v. 10
575. ---- Two assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, June 1968:
9-10. AP2.M55985, v. 10
576. ---- Wheels with deals: how the Kennedy investigation was
organized. Minority of one, v. 10, July-Aug. 1968: 23-27.
AP2.M55985, v. 10
577. Mendelson, Harold. Broadcast vs. personal sources of information
in emergent public crises: the Presidential assassination.
Journal of broadcasting, v. 8, spring 1964: 147-156.
PN1991.J6, v. 8
578. Meunier, Robert F. Shadows of doubt: the Warren Commission cover-
up. Hicksville, N.Y., Exposition Press, c1976. 165 p.
E842.9.M45
579. Meyer, Karl E. The triumph of Caliban. New leader, v. 47, Oct. 12,
1964: 4-6. HX1.N37, v. 47
Page 698
698
580. Miller, Tom. The assassination please almanac. Chicago, Regnery,
Co., c1977. 284 p. E842.9.M53 1977
581. Mills, Andrew. Who killed Kennedy? The Warren report is right.
True magazine, v. 48, Dec. 1967: 32, 72, 75-77.
AP2.T76127, v. 48
582. Minnis, J., and S. Lynd. Needs of doubt: some questions about.
the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Vet. 21, 1963:
14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
583. Missing link: photos and X-rays of autopsy. Newsweek, v. 72
Nov. 14, 1968: 30-31. AP2.N6772, v. 72
584. Mitgang, Herbert. New inquiry is needed: questions concerning
the assassination. New York times magazine, Dec. 25, 1966:
14. AP2.N6573
585. Model, F. Peter. The assassinationist business--an investigation
of the investigators. Oui, v. 5, Feb. 1976: 17-18, 123-124.
AP2.063, v. 5
586. ---- Killing the Kennedy's: the case for conspiracy. Argosy,
v. 382, July 1975: 34-41, 64-66. AP2.A7, v. 382
587. Moment of tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2,
1963: 6. JK1.U65, v. 55
588. Montgomery, K. Crystal ball: condensation from gift of prophecy.
Reader's digest, v. 86, July 1965: 235-242.
AP2.R255, v. 86
589. More on the Kennedy assassination charges, concerning Jim Garrison's
TV broadcast. U.S. news and world report, v. 62, June 12,
1967: 55-56. JK1.U65, v. 62
590. More than a man in the dock. Time, v. 93, Feb. 14, 1969: 26-29.
AP2.T37, v. 93
Page 699
699
591. More than one man. America, v. 109, Dec. 7, 1963: 722.
BX801.A5, v. 109
592. Moriarty, Alice E., and Sylvia Ginsparg. Reactions of young people
to the Kennedy assassination: the significance of
characteristic patterns of individual responses. Menninger
Clinic bulletin, v. 33, no. 5, 1969: 295-309. RC321.M4, v. 33
593. Morin, Relman. Assassination: the death of President John F.
Kennedy. New York, New American Library, 1968. 191 p.
E842.9.M6
594. Morris, Wright. One day. let ed. New York, Atheneurn, 1965.
433 p. PZ3.M8346 On
595. Morrow, Robert. Betrayal: a reconstruction of certain clandestine
events from the Bay of Pigs to the assassination of John F.
Kennedy. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co.. 1976. 229 p.
E842.9.N44
596. Mosk, Richard M. The Warren Commission and the legal process.
Case and comment magazine, v. 72, May-June 1967: 13-20.
Law
597. Mueller, Samuel A., Suzanne E. Rocheleau, Joyce A. Sween, and
Ram Lesser Blumberg [Northwestern Assassination Research
Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F.
Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report.
[Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v.
(various pagings) E842.9.N67
598. Muggeridge, Malcolm. New Kennedy theory. Nov. 18, 1966: 735.
New statesman, v. 72,
AP4.N64, v. 72
599. Murphy, Charles J.V. Assassination plot that failed. Time,
v. 105, June 30, 1975: 28. AP2.T37, v. 105
600. Murray, Norbert. Legacy of an assassination. New York, Pro
Peoples Press, 1964. 479 p. E841.M8
601. Mystery makers; J. Sparrow's evaluation of the Warren Commission
report and its critics. Time, v. 90, Dec. 22, 1967: 21.
AP2 .T37, v. 90
602. Mythmakers; mysterious deaths of people involved in case. Time,
v. 88, Nov. 11, 1966: 33-34. AP2.T37, v. 88
Page 700
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603. Hash, George, and Patricia Hash. v. 47, Oct. 12, 1964: 6-9.
The other witnesses. New leader,
HXI.N37, v. 47
604. A Nation grieves. Interracial review, v. 36, Dec. 1963: 232.
E185.5.16, v. 36
605. National Broadcasting Company. Seven hours and thirty minutes,
as broadcast on the NBC television network by NBC news. New
York, Random House. 1966. 152 p. E842.9.N35
606. New assassination theory: theory of 3. Thompson. Newsweek, v. 70,
Nov. 27, 1967: 29-30, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 70
607. New clue in attempt to shoot General Walker. U.S. news and world
report, v. 56, Jan. 13, 1964: 10. JK1.U65, v. 56
608. New conflict over assassination. U.S. news and world report,
61, Dec. 5, 1966: 6, 8. JK1.U65, V. 61
609. New JFK evidence unearthed. Guardian, v. 28, Nov. 26, 1975: 7.
AP8.G78, v. 28
610. New light on the assassination: a secret agent's story. U.S.
news and world report, v. 56, June 1964: 38-39.
JK1.U65, v. 56
611. New light on second assassin theory. U.S. news and world report,
v. 62, May 29, 1967: 14. JK1 .U65, v. 62
612. New York times runs 48 pages of report. Editor and publisher,
v. 97, Oct. 3, 1964: 61. PN4700.E4, v. 97
613. Newcomb, Fred T., and Perry Adams. Murder from within. Santa
Barbara, Calif., Probe, c1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44
614. Newman, Albert H. The assassination of John F. Kennedy: the
reasons why. New York, C.N. Potter, 1970. 622 p.
E842.9.N46 1970
Page 701
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615. Nichols, John. President Kennedy's adrenals. Journal of the
American Medical Association, v. 201, July 10, 1967: 129-130.
R15.A48, v. 201
616. Nierenberg, Harry H. Ego disturbance following a national trauma.
Psychoanalytic review, v. 55, no. 1, 1968: 128-134.
BFl.PS, v. 55
617. Nightmare revisited; reenactment for Warren Commission. Newsweek,
v. 63, June 8, 1964: 48. AP2.N6772, v. 63
618. Nobile, Phillip and Ron Rosenbaum. The curious aftermath of JFK's
best and brightest affair. New times (New York), v. 8,
July 9, 1976: 22-34. E169.I2.N45, v. 8
619. Norden, Eric. Jim Garrison: a candid conversation with the
embattled district attorney of New Orleans. Playboy, v. 14,
Oct. 1967: 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74,
156-163, 165-168, 170-172, 174-176, 178.
AP2.P69, v. 14
620. Notes and comment. New Yorker, v. 39, Dec. 7, 1963: 45.
AP2.N6763, v. 39
621. November 22, 1963, Dallas: photos by nine bystanders. Life,
v. 63, Nov. 25, 1967: 87-97. AP2.L547, v. 63
622. Now the trumpet summons again...Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30,
1963: 21-23. HF5001.B89
623. Now the U.S. gets JFK autopsy photos. U.S. news and world report,
v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 81. JK1.U65, v. 61
624. Noyes, Peter. Legacy of doubt. New York, Pinnacle Books, 1973.
249 p. E842.9.N69
Page 702
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625. O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The life and death of Kennedy. New statesman,
v. 71, Jan. 14, 1966: 50-51. AP4.N64, v. 71
626. ---- No one else but him. New statesman, v. 73, Sept. 30,
1966: 479-481. AP4.N64, v. 73
627. ---- Veto by assassination? Minority of one, v. 9, Dec.
1967: 16-18. AP2.M55985, v. 9
628. Odd company. Time, v. 89, Mar. 10, 1967: 24. AP2.T37, v. 89
629. Oglesby, Carl. The yankee and cowboy war: conspiracies from
Dallas to Watergate. Mission, Kan., Sheed Andrews and
McMeel, c1976. 355 p. E842.9.034
631. ---- The official doubters. Texas observer, v. 62, Feb. 6,
1970: 9-11. F381.T368, v. 62
632. Olson, Don, and Ralph Turner. Photographic evidence and the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Journal of
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RA1OO1.A57, v. 16
633. Oltmans, Willem. New mysteries in Kennedy assassination? Atlas
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API.A83, v. 24
634. On the far right: the assassination. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 27,
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635. On the trail of the rogue. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Dec.
1976: 74. AP2.S2, v. 248
636. Opening the JFK file. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35.
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637. Often, Karen, and Paul Peterson. Kennedy assassination: case
study in dynamics of political socialization. Journal of
politics, v. 29, May 1967: 388-404. JA1.36, v. 29
638. Orth, Maureen. Memoirs of a CIA psychologist. New York times
magazine, June 25, 1976: 18-24. AP2.N6575
639. Osborn, Kenneth. The CIA scalpel cut deep.
1975: 58. Playboy, v. 22, Aug. AP2.P69, v. 22
640. Osterburg, James W. The Warren Commission: report and hearing.
Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 261-271.
RA1OO1.A57, v. 11
641. Oswald, Lee Harvey. Lee Oswald's letters to his mother. Esquire,
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AP2.N6772, v. 69
816. Smiling through. Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 27, 1969: 27-28.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
817. Smirnova, L. I was hired to assassinate him. New times (Moscow)
no. 46, Nov. 1972: 27. EI69.I2.N45
818. Smith, Eliot Fremont. Who killed Kennedy? Oswald did. The
Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 8, 1975: 57-58.
microfilm
819. Smith, L. Dealey plaza. Holiday, v. 46, Nov. 1969: 78-79.
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820. Smith, R.H. Thinking the unthinkable: the Warren Commission
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821. Smith, R.P., and Cyril Wecht. The medical evidence in the assassin-
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822. Smith, Sandy. From a governor and a D.A. an offer of resignation.
Life, v. 63, Sept. 29, 1967: 34-36. AP2.L547, v. 63
823. Smith, William Rochelle. Assassination by consensus: the story
behind the Kennedy assassination. Washington, L'Avant Garde
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824. ---- A hog story from the aftermire of the Kennedy assassination.
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E842.9.S62
825. Snider, Arthur J. Assassination, a new medical opinion. Science
digest, v. 61, Feb. 1967: 35-36. Q1.S383, v. 61
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AP2.PS, v. 186
827. Solved: mystery of the missing frames. Newsweek, v. 69, Feb. 6,
1967: 17. AP2.N6772, v. 69
828. Something of a shambles. Time, v. 89, June 30, 1967: 42.
AP2.T37, v. 89
829. Soviet press comment following Kennedy's death. Current digest
of the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 18, 1963: 3-7.
D839.C87, v. 15
830. Sparrow, John Hanbury Anges. After the assassination: a positive
appraisal of the Warren report. New York, Chilmark Press,
1967. 77 p. E842.9.S65
831. ---- Making mysteries about Oswald. Atlas, v. 9, Mar. 1965:
173-174. API.A83, v. 9
Page 720
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832. Spitzer, Stephen P. Mass media va. personal sources of information
about the presidential assassination: a comparison of six
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833. Spitzer, Stephen P., and Norman K. Denzin. Levels of knowledge
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834. Sprague, Richard E. The American news media and the assassination
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835. ---- The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: in the plans
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836. ---- The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: the applica-
tion of computers to the photographic evidence. Computers
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TJ212.C58 v. 19
837. ---- The assassination of President Kennedy--declassification of
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838. ---- The framing of Lee Harvey Oswald. Computers and automation,
v. 22, Oct. 19/3: 21-24, 34-36. TJ212.C58, v. 22
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TJ212.C58, v. 24
840. Stafford, Jean. The strange world of Marguerite Oswald. McCall's,
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842. Stephens, Eve. The assassin. [1st Amer. ed.] New York, Cowar-
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844. Stewart, Charles J. Catholic and Jewish pulpit reaction to the
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845. ---- The pulpit in time of crisis: 1865 and 1963. Speech mono-
graphs, v. 32, Nov. 1965: 427-434. PN4077.S6, v. 32
846. Stiles, John, and Gerald R. Ford. Portrait of an assassin. New
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847. Stolley, Richard B. What happened next; film of John Kennedy's
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AP2.E845
848. Stop the press. Front page coverage of the Kennedy assassinations
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849. Strange world of Lee Oswald: more light on the assassination.
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850. Summers, Anthony. The Kennedy assassination: why doubts persist.
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1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
852. Syme, Anthony V. The assassins. London, Melbourne [etc.] Horwitz,
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870. Text of summary of Warren Commission report. CQ weekly,
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875. Thompson, Josiah. The cross fire that killed President Kennedy:
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assination. [New York] B. Geis Associates, distributed by
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Z8462.8.T45 1968b ed. San Antonio, Tx., [c19681 40 p.
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892. Truth vs. death; views of C. Roberts. Time, v. 89, Mar. 17, 1967:
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895. Turner, Ralph F., and Don Olson. Photographic evidence and the
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896. Turner, W., and D. Welsh. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7,
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898. ---- The inquest. Ramparts, v. 5, June 1967: 17-29.
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899. ---- Press vs. Garrison. Ramparts, v. 6, Sept. 1967: 8, 10, 12.
AP2.R19, v. 6
900. ---- Some disturbing parallels: assassinations of M.L. King and
J.F. Kennedy. Ramparts, v. 6, June 29, 1968: 33-46.
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902. TV sees it now, for seventy hours. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30,
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904. Ultimate assassination book: a story to make your eyes roll. New
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908. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Pro-
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909. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Authorizing the Select
Committee on Assassinations or any subcommittee thereof to
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arising out of subpoenas, orders immunizing witnesses and
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1977. 3 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report
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911. ---- Creating a select committee to conduct an investigation and
study of the circumstances surrounding the death of John F.
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any others the select committee shall determine; report to
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1976. 2 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no.
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912. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the judiciary..Preserving
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Report No. 813) E842.9.A52
913. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee
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915. ---- Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 14 p.
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the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of
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18 p. 94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1781)
917. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving
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Off., 1965. 4 p. (89th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Report no.
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918. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The
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106 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. Senate. Report no.
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919. U.S. John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-1963: a chronological list of
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921. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. The
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924. ---- Investigation of the assassination of President John F.
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925. ---- The official Warren Commission report on the assassination
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report, v. 57, Oct. 12, 1964: 58-62. JK1.U65, v. 57
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936. Verdict in New Orleans. Nation, v. 208, Mar. 17, 1969: 324.
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Page 732
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951. Warren report; paperback editions were produced at record-breaking
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958. Weberman, Alan, and Michael Canfield. Coup d'etat in America: the
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961. ---- Pathologist's view of JFK autopsy: an unsolved case. Modern
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964. ---- Oswald in New Orleans; case of conspiracy with the CIA.
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965. ---- Post mortera: JFK assassination cover-up smashed. Frederick,
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966. ---- Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy. Frederick, Hd.,
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967. ---- Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy. [Frederick, Hd.,
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968. ---- Post-mortem III; secrets of the Kennedy autopsy. Frederick,
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969. ---- The report on the Warren report; or, the six wise men of
Industan. n.p. [1965] 188 p. E842.9.W4 1965a
970. ---- Whitewash: the report on the Warren report. [Hyattstown,
Md., 1966, c1965] 224 p. E842.9.W4 1966ab
971. Weisberg, Harold, and Jim Lesser. Whitewash IV: top secret JFK
assassination transcript. Frederick, Md., Weisberg [1974]
224 p. E842.9.W415
972. Welsh, D., and W. Turner. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7,
Jan. 25, 1969: 61-71. AP2.R19, v. 7
973. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc. November 22, dialogue in
Dallas. (Phonodisc). New York, [1964]. Matrix no. N-WBC
2692-2693. R64-2438
974. Whalen, R.J. Kennedy assassination. Saturday evening post, v. 240,
Jan. 14, 1967: 19-25. AP2.S2, v. 240
975. What conspiracy? Testimony of Perry Russo. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24,
1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73.
976. What Garrison proved. New republic, v. 160, Mar. 15, 1969: 9.
AP2.N624, v. 160
Page 734
734
977. What they saw that dreadful day in Dallas; testimony and evidence
published. Newsweek, v. 64, Dee. 7, 1964: 28-30, 35-36,
38, 40, 42. AP2.N6772, v. 64
978. What's your source?; premature publication of Journal-American of
Ruby's testimony before Warren. Newsweek, v. 64, Aug. 31,
1964: 68-69. AP2.N6772, v. 64
979. Wheeler, Keith. Cursed gun, the track of C2766. Life, v. 59, Aug.
27, 1965: 62-65. AP2 .L547, v. 59
980. When Kennedy died. Newsweek, v. 64, Sept. 14, 1964: 61.
AP2.N6772, v. 64
981. Where the shots came from. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 28, 1963: 7.
AP2.N624, v. 149
982. White, Stephen. Should we believe the Warren report? New York,
MacMillan, [1968] 309 p. E842.9.W46
983. White, Theodore H. Assassination inquiry: slow, careful. U.S.
news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 27, 1964: 49.
JK1.U65, v. 56
984. ---- For President Kennedy: an epilogue. Look, v. 55, Dec. 6,
1963: 158-159. AP2.L79, v. 55
985. Who killed JFK? Skeptic, no. 9, Sept.-Oct. 1975: whole issue.
D1.S485, 1975
986. Who killed JFK? Just one assassin. Time, v. 106, Nov. 24, 1975:
32-34, 37-38. AP2.T37, v. 106
987. Who killed Kennedy? Fact, v. 3, Nov.-Dec. 1966: 3-17.
AP2.F142, v. 3
988. Who killed Kennedy? National review, v. 20, July 2, 1968: 642.
AP2.N3545, v. 20
989. Who killed President Kennedy: soviet condolences. New times
(Moscow), no. 48, Dec. 4, 1963: 5-7. D839.N483
Page 735
735
990. Who was to blame? Economist, v. 209, Dec. 7, 1963: 1022.
HG11.E2, v. 209
991. Why a plot was feared when Kennedy was shot. U.S. news and world
report, v. 56, Jan. 6, 1964: 7. JK1.U65, v. 56
992. Why has file no. 3106 not be publicized? Human events, v. 26,
Dec. 17, 1966: 805. D41O.H8, v. 26
993. Why is the Assassinations Committee killing itself?; anatomy of a
murder inquest. Rolling stone, no. 184, Apr. 7, 1977:
42-45. MLI.R65
994. Why the JFK case is coming back to life. U.S. news and world report,
v. 82, Jan. 17, 1977: 28-30. JK1.U65, v. 82
995. Wickey, John, and Eli Saltz. Resolutions of the liberal dilemma
in the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of per-
sonality, v. 33, Dec. 1965: 636-648. BFI.J66, v. 33
996. Willis, Gary. Ten years after. Playboy, v. 20, Nov. 1973: 169,212.
AP2.P69, v. 20
997. Willis, Gary, and Ovid Demaris. Disposal of Jack Ruby. Esquire,
V. 67, June 1967: 131-135, 172-174, 176-178, 180-182,
184. APP2.E845, v. 67
998. ---- Jack Ruby. [New York] How American Library, [1968] 266 p.
E842.9.W47
999. Wilson, Richard. What happened to the Kennedy program. Look,
v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 117-118, 120, 122. AP2.L79, v. 28
1000. Wire services appeal FBI denial of refund. Editor and publisher,
v. 111, Feb. 25, 1978: 17. PN4700.E4, v. 111
1001. Wise, Dan, and Marietta Maxfield. The day Kennedy died. San
Antonio, Tx., Naylor Co. [1964] 137 p.
E842.9.W5
1002. Wise, David. It will be many years... Good housekeeping, v. 158,
Feb. 1964: 90-91, 150. TXI.G7, v. 158
1003. ---- Secret evidence on the Kennedy assassination. Saturday
evening post, v. 241, Apr. 6, 1968: 70-73.
AP2.S2, v. 241
Page 736
736
1004. Wise, David, and Thomas Ross. The espionage establishment. New
York, Random House [1957] 308 p. UB270.W56
1005. ---- The espionage establishment. London, Cape, 1968, 308 p.
UB270.W56 1969
1006. ..... The invisible government. New York, Random House, 1964.
375 p. JK468.16 .W5
1007. Wolfenstein, Martha, and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and the
death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York,
Doubleday, 1966. 256 p. BF723.D3.W6
1008. ---- Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary
studies. Gloucester, Haas., P. Smith, 1969 [c1965] 288 p.
BF723.D3W6
1009. The World and the White House. New statesman, v. 66, Nov. 29, 1963:
765. AP4.N64, v. 66
1010. World listened and watched: radio-TV meet greatest challenge in
wake of JFK tragedy... Broadcasting, v. 65, Dec. 2, 1963:
36-61. TK6540.B85, v. 65
1011. World mourns in doubt, fear, hope. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963:
56-58. AP2.N6772, v. 62
1012. World weeps and waits. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963:
30-31. HF5001.B89
1013. Worthington, Peter. The limelight: why Jack Ruby's first trial
couldn't happen here. Maclean's, v. 77, Apr. 18, 1964:
3-4. AP5.M2, v. 77
1014. Wrone, David R. The assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: an
annotated bibliography. Wisconsin magazine of history, v. 56,
no. 1, 1972: 21-36. F576.W7, v. 56
1015. WQMR (Radio station). Four dark days in November [Phonodisc.
Washington, Connie B. Gay Broadcasting Corp., 1964] Matrix no.
PB 1495-1496. R64-927
Page 737
737
1016. X marks the spot. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 27-28.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
1017. Yarborough, Ralph. Sensory perception. Newsweek, v. 69, Jan. 16,
1967: 6. AP2.N6772, v. 69
1018. Yazijian, Harvey, and Sid Blumenthal, eds. Government by gunplay:
assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today. New
York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p. E842.9.665
1019. You all know me. I'm Jack Ruby. Esquire, v. 67, May 1967: 79-87,
153-164. AP2.E845, v. 67
1020. Young, Roger. The investigation: where it stands today. New
Orleans, v. 1, July 1967: 16-17, 54-59. F379.N5, v. 1
1021. Zwart, Jacques. Invitation to hairsplitting; a hypercritical
investigation into the true function of the Warren Commission
and the true nature of the Warren report. Amsterdam, Paris.
[1970] 40 p. E842.9.Z9
Page 738
738
INDEX
Assassinations ...... 11, 27, 35, 36, 41-44, 46, 55, 58-59, 82,
102, 137-138, 153, 164, 205, 214, 219, 242, 283, 307,
322, 352, 366, 392, 459, 462, 497, 516, 571, 574-575, 577,
580, 582, 584-585, 600, 606, 608, 621, 627, 630, 634,
650-652, 669, 671, 688, 692, 701, 721, 729'730, 734,
752-754, 763-764, 781, 789, 792, 797, 808, 817, 823-825,
832, 839, 841, 843, 846, 852, 871, 890, 900,
931, 973, 977, 1015
Castro, Fidel ..... 95, 182, 429, 745
CIA ..... 9, 34, 99, 121, 136, 218, 256, 310, 398, 456, 492,
530, 541, 546, 638-639, 655, 693, 746, 748, 759, 787, 854,
937, 958, 964
Connally, John ..... 57, 125
Conspiracy ..... 12, 18, 22, 24-26, 28, 54, 57, 69-72, 90-91, 107,
112, 114, 119, 130-131, 145, 174, 177, 196, 212, 215,
225, 234, 235, 237, 245, 255, 263, 273-275, 278, 280, 282,
287, 289, 308, 309, 324-325, 338, 340, 344, 366, 414, 437,
440, 455, 462, 472, 477, 481, 504, 512, 524-525, 527, 529,
548-551, 586, 591, 599, 610-611, 613, 629, 649, 681-682,
690, 696, 705, 716, 728, 739, 741, 743, 756, 762, 775,
780, 791, 796, 800, 842, 855, 864, 872, 875, 904, 941,
960, 963-965, 975, 981, 985-991, 1018
Cuba .....95, 365, 414, 595, 656, 783-784, 788
Cuban Exiles ..... 2
FBI .....86, 92, 96, 249, 252, 305, 401, 406, 710, 854, 913,
937, 955, 1000
Garrison Investigation ..... 13, 29, 52, 54, 97, 104, 124, 134, 144,
149, 166, 176, 207, 217, 236, 254, 263, 290-295, 362,
411, 416, 458, 531, 589, 619, 680, 685, 722, 727, 811,
813, 815, 859, 862, 874, 897, 899, 936, 940, 976, 1020
Grassy Knoll ..... 74
House Select Committee on Assassinations ..... 331, 371, 483, 908-911,
914-916, 993
Johnson, Lyndon B ...... 14, 248, 257, 268, 333, 413, 415, 426,
460, 470-471, 502
Page 739
739
Kennedy, John F. (Pres.) ..... 37-38, 41, 49, 51,
83-85, 92, 94, 96, 103, 105-106, 108-109, 120, 125,
161-162, 169-172, 185-186, 188-194, 199, 206, 211, 223, 227,
231-232, 241, 247, 257, 259, 271-272, 286, 288-289, 297-299,
302, 315, 316-317, 324, 328, 332, 338, 342, 350, 353, 369,
372, 381, 391, 393-397, 399-400, 402-407, 412, 418, 424,
427-428, 434, 436, 440, 449-453, 462-464, 467-469, 482, 484,
487, 500, 502, 507, 510-511, 516, 519-520, 527-529, 532,
535, 538-539, 548, 555, 559, 562, 576, 593, 595, 598,
614-615, 618, 623, 625, 632, 633, 636-637, 657-658, 666-667,
670, 672, 678, 686, 714, 715, 725, 731, 758, 760-61, 778,
793, 807, 821, 834-37, 847-48, 850-51, 860, 863, 866, 869,
873, 876, 879-880, 884-85, 888, 891, 895, 906, 912,
917-922, 935, 959, 961-962, 966-968, 971, 974, 980, 984,
994-995, 999, 1001, 1003, 1014
Kennedy, Robert ..... 257, 297, 462, 548, 715
Miscellaneous ..... 4, 8, 10, 20, 30, 33, 40, 80-81, 98, 100,
110, 111, 116, 118, 122, 133, 140, 143, 150, 154-157, 163,
167, 178-181, 183, 187, 195, 198, 209-210, 213, 216, 222,
224, 226, 229, 233, 239, 243, 246, 260, 264-265, 269,
276-277, 284-285, 296, 306, 312, 318-319, 321, 323, 326,
329, 331, 339, 341, 346, 348, 354-355, 357, 360-361,
363-364, 368, 370, 374, 377, 380, 383, 384-386, 388-389,
409-410, 422-423, 430-433, 439, 441-442, 444, 446, 454,
457-458, 465, 476, 479-480, 486, 489-491, 494-496,
501, 503, 508-509, 514-515, 517, 522-523, 536-537, 540,
543-545, 547, 552, 557-558, 560-561, 564-565, 567-568, 572,
579, 583, 587, 588, 590, 594, 602-603, 605, 607, 609, 620,
622, 624, 626, 628, 631, 635, 659, 662-664, 666, 668,
673-674, 677, 679, 683-684, 687, 689, 691, 694, 697, 704,
709, 718, 720, 723, 733, 735-736, 742, 744, 747, 750-751,
765-767, 776-777, 779, 782, 790, 794, 795, 798-799, 802-803,
809, 812, 816, 819, 822, 827-828, 833, 840, 856, 858, 865,
867-868, 878, 883, 892, 894, 896, 898, 902,
903, 905, 932, 934, 942, 972, 992, 996, 1002, 1004-1006,
1009, 1010, 1016-1017
Organized Crime ..... 23, 34, 73, 334-336, 787,937
Oswald, Lee Harvey ..... 1, 19, 21, 37, 45, 50, 88, 127, 129,
148, 165, 196, 228, 238, 252, 256, 266, 281, 320, 327,
345, 351, 367, 408, 419-421, 425, 445, 447, 474-475, 488,
493, 513, 526, 527, 554, 566, 570, 641-648, 653-654,
675-676, 698, 702-703, 713, 722, 726, 769-772, 806, 814,
818, 826, 831, 838, 849, 877, 882, 886, 933, 964
Page 740
740
Public Reaction to Kennedy Assassination ..... 3, 6, 15-17, 32, 39,
49, 53, 61, 82, 89, 93, 113, 123, 132, 135, 151-152,
208, 253, 267, 270, 283, 307, 321'322, 330, 343, 350,
358-359, 375-376, 378, 382, 390, 459, 466, 505, 553, 556,
592, 597, 604, 616, 665, 706-708, 724, 804-805, 810, 829,
844-845, 1007-1008, 1011-1012
Ruby, Jack ..... 63, 68, 87, 117, 126, 128, 202-203, 220, 258,
300, 301, 303, 349, 438, 443, 447, 498, 506, 533-534, 660,
695, 699, 700, 712, 737-738, 901, 954, 978, 997-998, 1013,
1019
Single Bullet Theory ..... 175, 373, 755, 979
Texas School Book Depository ..... 244, 473
Warren Commission ..... 31, 56, 65-66, 73, 75, 101,142, 173, 258,
279, 304, 311, 313-314, 337, 347, 356, 373, 387, 426,
477, 493, 521, 542, 563, 569, 578, 596, 601, 617, 640,
732, 749, 768, 773, 774, 785-786, 820, 857, 861, 887, 893,
907, 923-924, 929, 943, 944, 948-949, 953, 956-957, 983,
1021
Warren Report ..... 5, 7, 29, 47-48, 60, 65-66, 76-79, 115, 139,
141, 146-147, 158-160, 168, 184, 197, 200-201, 204, 221,
230, 240, 250, 261-262, 379, 417, 435, 448, 478, 485, 499,
518, 573, 581, 612, 661, 711, 717, 719, 740, 757, 801,
830, 853, 870, 881, 889, 921, 925-928, 930, 938-939,
945-947, 950-952, 969-970, 982
The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Chronological Bibliography
Page 741
741
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:
A CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Suzanne Cavanagh
Analyst in American National Government
Government Division
and
Sherry Shapiro
Bibliographer in Government and American Law
Library Services Division
March 28, 1979
Foreword
Page 742
742
FOREWORD
This comprehensive bibliography consists of every relevant book citation that
could be found in the Library's card catalog and Books in Print. Periodical
literature was identified (and selectively included) from the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature; Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.);
International Social Science and Humanities Index; America: History and Life;
Social Science Citation Index; Magazine Index; Psychology Abstracts;
Sociological Abstracts; Comprehensive Dissertation Abstracts; and the CRS's
Bibliographic Citation File. Some of the noted periodical sources are from
computerized, on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.
Other sources referred to in compiling the bibliography were: The Kennedy
Assassination and the Warren Report; Selected References, by Richard Malow which
is a CRS multilith report, GGR-119, published Sept. 23, 1966 (6 p.); American
Political Assassinations; A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 related to
the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, [in
pamphlet form] compiled by the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, with a
forward by Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1973,
28 p. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963; A Chronological List of References,
[in pamphlet form] by the Bibliography and Reference Correspondence Section of
the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1964, 68 p. and also, under the same
title, a supplement [in monograph form] of, principally, monographs, by William
J. Studer which was published by the Library of Congress in 1964 (25 p.); and
the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Moves to Reopen the
Investigation, by Donald A. Baskerville which appears in the Library of Congress
Information Bulletin of December 3, 1976. (6 p., 752-757).
Credit is due the following people who assisted in the compilation of this
bibliography: Sarah Collins, Nancy Fitch, Karen Keesling, Steve Langone, and
Daniel Strickland. Jeffrey C. Griffith in CRS's Information Systems Section was
instrumental in the retrieval of citations from on-line data bases external to
the Library of Congress.
Credit is due Robert Amorosi, Linda Bailey, Martha Schweitzer, Cheryl Scott,
Lillie Thompson, and Sandra Wallace for the secretarial production of the
bibliography.
Contents
Page 743
743
CRS - ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Foreword.................................................... i
1963........................................................ 1
1964.........................................................7
1965........................................................16
1966........................................................19
1967........................................................24
1968........................................................31
1969........................................................34
1970........................................................36
1971........................................................37
1972........................................................38
1973........................................................39
1974........................................................40
1975........................................................42
1976........................................................46
1977........................................................50
1978........................................................52
1963
Page 744
744
CRS - 1
1963:
Accused. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 27-28.
AP2.T37, v. 82
After the tragedy. Tablet, v. 217, Nov. 30, 1963: 1181-1182.
[Not in L.C. collection]
American Broadcasting Company. November 22, 1963. (Phonodisc.)
New York, 1963. Matrix no. ABC-JFK A-D.
R64-106
American condition. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: 425.
AP2.N2, v. 197
Another assassination attempt by Lee Oswald? U.S. news and world
report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 8. JK1.U65, v. 55
As Warren inquiry starts; latest on the assassination. U.S.
news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 30, 1963: 28-30.
JK1.U65, v. 55
Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: how the
President was shot. U.S. news and world report, v. 55,
Dec. 9, 1963: 68-71. JK1.U65, v. 55
Assassination gives impetus to Dodd's gun bill. Advertising
age, v. 34, Dec. 2, 1963: 1-2. HF5801.A276, v. 34
The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Coverage of
Soviet newspapers, Nov. 22-28, 1963] Current digest of
the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 11, 1963: 3-13.
D839. C87, v. 15
Assassination of President Kennedy; with report by T.H. White.
Life, v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 22-32. AP2.L547, v. 55
Associated Press. The torch is passed; the Associated Press
story of the death of a President. [New York] 1963.99 p.
E842.9. A85
Autopsy. Time, v. 82, Dec. 27, 1963: 18. AP2.T37, v. 82
Bagdikian, B.H. Assassin. Saturday evening post, v. 236,
Dec. 14, 1963: 22-27. AP2.S2, v. 236
Bedford, Subille. Verdict on Jack Ruby. Life, v. 53, Mar. 27,
1963: 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 79. AP2.L547, v. 53
Breig, Joe. Assassination of a people. Ave Maria, v. 98,
Dec. 14, 1963: 10. AP2.A9, v. 98
Breslin, J. Death in emergency no. one: Parkland Memorial
Hospital. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963:
30-31. AP2.S2, v. 236
Brigham, Robert. Russia: no, no, this cannot be true. Life,
v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 129-130. AP2.L547, v. 55
Buckley, W.F., Jr. Do they really hate to hate? National
review, v. 15, Dec. 31, 1963: 559. AP2.N3545, v. 15
Cameron, J. Humane and sane. Commonwealth, v. 79, Dec. 13,
1963: 338-339. AP2. C6897, v. 79
Carney, Frederick S. Crisis of conscience in Dallas: Soul-
searching vs. new faith in Dallas. Thoughts on the day of
Christianity and crisis, v. 23, Dec. 23, 1963: 235-241.
BR1.C6417, v. 23
Cartwright, H.L. Justice and Oswald. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21,
1963: inside cover. AP2.N2, v. 197
Page 745
745
CRS - 2
And a Child's yellow flowers. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 2. 1963:
36-37. AP2.N6772. v. 62
A Chronology of tragedy. Time and tide. v. 44. Nov. 28.
963: 7-9. AP4.T445. v. 44
Ciardi, John. November 22. 1963. Saturday review. v. 46.
Dec. 7. 1963: 16. 18. Z1219.S25. v. 46
----- Of chaos and courage. Saturday review. Dec. 28. 1963:
25. Z1219.S25. v. 46
Collective guilt in the U.S.? Take a look at the world.' with
excerpts from address by Thruston B. Morton. U.S.
news and world report. v. 55. Dec. 1963: 72-74.
JK1.U65. v. 55
Collective or individual guilt. U.S.. news and world report.
Dec. 1963: 10. JK1.U65. v. 55
Condon, R. Manchurian candidate in Dallas. Nation, v. 197.
Dec. 28. 1963: 449-451. AP2.N2. v. 197
Cooke, Allstair. After the President's assassination.
Listener. v. 70. Dec. 5. 1963: 907-908. AP4.L4165. v. 70
-----Death of the young warrior. Listener. v. 70. Nov. 28.
1963: 863-864. AP4.L4165. v. 70
Covering the tragedy: news tragedy. Time. v.
Nov. 29. 1963: 84. AP2.T37. v. 82
Crawford. Kenneth. The enemies he made. Newsweek. v. 62.
Dec. 2. 1963: 35. AP2.N6672. v. 62
Daniel. 3. When Castro heard the news. New republic. v. 149.
Dec. 7. 1963: 7-9. AP2.N624. v. 149
Daniel. P. Assessing the blame in the President's death: excerpts
from addresses. U. S. news and world report. v. 55. Dec. 14.
1963: 73. JK1.U65. v. 55
The Day Kennedy died. Newsweek. v. 62, Dec. 2. 1963: 20-26.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Death of a modern. Spectator. v. 211. Nov. 29. 1963: 681.
AP4.ST. v. 211
Death of a President. Commonweal. v. 79. Dec. 6. 1963: 299-301.
AP2.C6897. v. 79
Death of President Kennedy: statements by Sir Robert Menzies and
Sir Garfield Barwick on 23rd November. Current notes on
international affairs. Nov. 1963: 3&-39.
[Not in L.C. collection]
Dudman. R. Commentary of an eyewitness. New republic. v. 149
Dec. 21, 1963: 18. AP2.N624. v.
Dulles. Allen. The craft of intelligence. New York. Harper and Row.
Publishers. 1963. 277 p. UB270.D8
Economics: a shock. then recovery. Business week. no. 1787.
Nov. 30. 1963: 92-93. HF5001.B89
Eisenhower, D.D. When the highest office changes hands. Saturday
evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963:15. AP2.S2, v. 236
End and a beginning. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
Page 746
746
CRS - 3
Files of evidence connected with the investigation of the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy; 21 vols. in
2 reels micro-film. Washington. Microcard Editions. 1963-64.
E842.9F47
Foreign countries. too. mourn first citizen of the world. U.S.
news and world report. v. 55. Dec. 2. 1963: 48-49.
JK1.U65. v. 55
Foreign power: same goals. sterner style. Business week. no. 1787.
Nov. 30. 1963: 31-32. HF5001.B89
From friend and foe in America: sense of shock and dismay at
the despicable act. statements. U.S. new and world report.
v. 55. Dec. 2. 1963: 49. JK1.U65. v. 55
Gilman. R. Facts of mortality. Commonweal. v. 79. Dec. 17. 1963:
337-338. AP2.C6897. v. 79
The Government still lives. Time. v. B2. Nov. 29. 1963: 21-32.
AP2.T37. v. 82
Hart. Luke E. The death of President Kennedy. Columbia. v. 43.
Dec. 1963: 3. AP2.C67. v. 43
The Hatred that consumes...address by Chief Justice E.G. Warren
on the assassination of the President. Hadassah magazine,
Dec. 1963: 32. DS141.A2.H3
[Not in L.C. collection]
Have we learned our lessons? Christian century. v. 80. Dec. 18.
1963: 1567-1568. BR1.C45. v.
He gave his life; a newspaper's account of the assassination of a
President and the two weeks that followed. Nashville Tennessean.
[1963?] Unpaged. E842.9. N3
Hercher. W.W. Thousand well-wishers. and one assassin. U.S.
news and world report. v. 55. Dec. 2. 1963: 34-35.
JK1. U65. v. 55
History's jury. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 16. 1963: 25-27.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
How could it happen? New republic. v. 149. Dec. 7. 1963: 6.
AP2.N624. v. 149
How JFK died. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 30. 1963: 55.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
How sorrowful bad: world reactions. Time. v. 82. Nov. 29. 1963:
38-39. AP2.T37. v. 82
Hughes. Emmet John. Echo in the silence. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 2.
1963: 52. AP2.N6772. v.
I just heard some shots: three shots. Editor and publisher.
v. 96. Nov. 30. 1963: 14-15.67. PN4700.E4. v. 96
Imitators: post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide.
Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 23. 1063: 27. AP2.N6772. v. 62
In the nation's interest; commission to investigate the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. America.
v. 109. Dec. 21. 1963: 789. BX801.A5. v. 109
International outlook. Business week. no. 1787.
Page 747
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JFK could lose. Look. v. 27. Dec. 17. 1963: 94.96. 99.
101-102. AP2.679. v. 27
Joesten. Joachim. They call it intelligence: spies and spy techniques
since World War II. London. Abelard-Schuman [1963]
314 p. UB270.J6
Johnson names commission to probe assassination. CQ
weekly report. v. 21. Dec. 6. 1963: 2212-2213.
JK1.5.C665. v. 21
Kennedy assassination--communist version. Communist affairs.
v. 1. Nov.-Dec. 1963: 3-6. HXI.C717. v.l
Labor: Union rally to Johnson. Business Week. no. 1787.
Nov. 30. 1963: 46.48. HF5001.B828
Lane. Mark. Oswald innocent? A lawyer's brief. National guardian
weekly. Dec. 19. 1963. Microfilm
05144AP
Langer. E. Kennedy's assassination: study organized by social
scientists. Science. v. 142. Dec. 13. 1963: 1446-1447.
Q1535. v. 142
Lasky. Victor. JFK. [he man and the myth. New York.
653 p. E842.L3
Lawrence. D. Incredible tragedy. U.S. news and world
report. v. 55. Dec. 2. 1963: 104. JK1.U65. v. 55
Levin. Bernard. The bell tolls in Dallas. Listener. v. 70.
Dec. 3. 1963: 914. AP4.L4165. v. 70
Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures
and text on the most shocking event of our time. includ-
ing his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago.
Time. Inc. [1963] AP2.L547
Lynd. S., and J. ][innis. Seeds of doubt: some questions
about the assassination. New republic. v. 149. Dec. 21.
1963: 14-17. AP2. N624. v. 149
McGill. Ralph E. Speaking out: hate knows no direction. Saturday
evening post. v. 236. Dec. 14. 1963: 8. 10.
AP2.S2. v. 236
McGrory. Mary. After great pain; a formal feeling. America.
v. 109. Dec. 14. 1963: 764. BX801.A5. v. 109
Man who killed Oswald. Time. v. 32. Dec. 6. 1963: 34-35.
AP2.T37. v. 82
Mandel, P. End to nagging rumors: the six critical seconds.
Life. v. 55. Dec. 6. 1963: 527. AP2.L547. v. 55
Mannes. M. Long vigil. Reporter. v. 29. Dec. 19. 1963: 15-17.
D839.R385. v. 29
Marketing shoppers flock back to resume buying. Business week.
no. 1787. Nov. 30. 1963: 80-90. HR5001.B89
Martyred President and nation's journey. Reconstructionist. v. 29.
Dec. 13. 1963: 3. DS133.R4. v. 29
Marxist marine. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 2. 1963: 27.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Matthews, James P. Four dark days in history: Nov. 22-25, 1963.
Los Angeles, the author, c1963. 68 p. E842.9.F6
Rare book collection
Page 748
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Hayes, Stanley. What they are saying. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28,
1963: 868. AP4.L4165, v. 70
Minnis, J., and S. Lynd. Seeds of doubt: some questions about
the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dee. 21, 1963:
24-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
Moment of tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2,
1963: 6. JK1.U65, v. 55
More than one man. America, v. 109, Dec. 7, 1963: 722.
BX801.AS, v. 109
A Nation grieves. Interracial review, v. 36, Dec. 1963: 232.
E185.5.16. v. 36
Notes and comment. New Yorker. v. 39. Dec. 7. 1963:
AP2.N6763. v. 39
the trumpet summons again... Business week. no. 1787. Nov. 30.
1963: 21-23. HF5001.B89
On the far right: the assassination. Commonweal. v. 79. Dec. 27.
1963: 384-385. AP2. C6897. v. 79
Oswald and the weight of evidence. Newsweek. v. 62. Dee. 9. 1963:
36. 41-42. AP2.N6772. v. 62
Oswald killing discussed. Science news letter, v. 84, Dee. 7,
1963: 355. QI.S76, v. 84
Other guns. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 15.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
Pacis. Vicente A. Hate campaign did it. Weekly graphic. v. 30.
Dec. 25. 1963: 2. 3. 98. AP8. GT. v. 30
Panter-Downee. Hollie. Letter from London. New Yorker. v. 39.
Dec. 7. 1963: 196-198. AP2.N6763. v. 39
Paris: le coup de Dallas. New Statesman. V. 66. Dec. 6. 1963:
817. AP4.N64. v. 66
Phelan. James. The vice man cometh. Saturday evening post. v. 236.
June 8. 1963: 67-71. AP2.S2. v. 236
Pity of it. Jewish frontier. v. 30. Dec. 1963: 3.
D8149.324. v. 30
Portrait of a psychopath. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 16. 1963: 83-84.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
President assassinated by a gunman in Dallas. Illustrated London
news. v. 243. Nov. 30. 1963: 887-889. AP4.I3. v. 243
Priceless role. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 16. 1963: 56.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Public relations firm sets press rules for Ruby's trial. Editor
and publisher. v. 96. Dec. 28. 1963: 9. PN4700.E4. v. 96
A Quiet and sad day. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 30. 1963: 34.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Radio-TV barred from Ruby trial. Broadcasting. v. 65. Dec. 23.
1963: 56. TK6540.B85. v. 65
Reaction in the South. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 16. 1963: 27.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Reaction to killings. Science news letter. v. 84. Dec. 7. 1963:
358. Q1.S76. v. 84
Reaction to the assassination; excerpts from reports to Christian
century's news correspondents. Christian century. v. 80.
Dec. 25. 1963: 1618-1619. BR1. C45. v. 80
Page 749
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CRS - 6
Report from the FBI. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 23. 1963: 19-20.
AP2.N6772. v. 62
Royster. V. No time for collective guilt. U.S. news and world
report. v. 55. Dec. 9. 1963: 72 JK1.U65. v. 55
Sad and solemn duty; commission to investigate the assassination
of J. Kennedy. Time. v. 87. Dec. 13. 1963: 26-27.
AP2.T37. v. 87
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A eulogy: John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dee. 14, 1963: 32-32A.
AP2. S2. v. 236
Senseless tragedy. Saturday evening post. v. 236. Dec. 14.
1963: 19. AP2.S2. v. 236
Seventy-two hours and what they can teach us. Life. v. 55.
Dec. 6. 1963: 4. AP2.L547. v. 55
Shame of Dallas. Saturday review. v. 46. Dec. 28. 1963: 26.
AP2.S273. v. 46
Shayon. Robert Lewis. The relevant question. Saturday review.
v. 46. Dec. 14. 1963: 23. Z1219.S25. v. 46
Shock. then recovery: impact of the assassination of Pres. Kennedy.
opinions of U.S. economists. Business week. no. 1787. Nov. 30.
1963: 92-93. HF5001.B89
The Shot that changed our future. Time and tide. Nov. 28. 1963: 4.
[Not in L.C. collection]
Soviet press coment following Kennedy's death. Current digest
of the Soviet press. v. 15. Dec. 18. 1963: 3-7.
D839.C87. v. 15
Strange world of Lee Oswald: more light on the assassination.
U.S. news and world report. v. 55. Dec. 16. 1963: 60-62.
Teamsters: limit of devotion. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 16. 1963:
75-76. AP2.N6772. v. 62
Tebbel. John. JFK: the magazines and peace. Saturday review.
v. 46. Dec. 14. 1963: 56-57. AP2.$273. v. 46
Temple. Wayne C. Two martyrs. Lincoln herald. v. 65. winter 1963:
165. E457.-M887. v. 65
Thompson. T. Assassin: the man held and killed for murder. Life.
v. 55. Nov. 29. 1963: 37-39. AP2.L547. v. 55
Tobin. R.L. If you can keep your head when all about you:
television and news magazine coverage of the Kennedy assassin-
ation story. Saturday review. v. 46. Dec. 14. 1963: 53-54.
AP2.S273. v. 46
Tragic end of John F. Kennedy. U.S. news and world report. v. 55.
Dec. 2. 1963: 31-33. JK1.U65. v. 55
Turnbull. J.W. Note from Texas. Commonweal. v. 79. Dec. 13. 1963:
337. AP2. C6897.v. 79
TV sees it now. for seventy hours. Business week. no. 1787. Nov. 30.
1963: 34. HF5001.B89
The Actual voices and events of four days that shocked the world.
Nov. 22.23.24. 25. 1963; the complete story. (Phonodisc.)
Colpix Records. CP 2500. 1964. R65-1928
Warren Commission. Nation. v. 197. Dec. 28. 1963: 445.
AP2.N2. v. 197
Page 750
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Where the shots came from. New republic. v. 149. Dec. 28. 1963: 7.
AP2.N624. v. 149
----For President Kennedy: an epilogue. Look. v. 55. Dec. 6.
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Who killed President Kennedy: soviet condolences. New times
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Who was to blame? Economist. v. 209. Dec. 7. 1963: 1022.
HG11.E2. v. 209
The World and the White House. New statesman. v. 66. Nov. 29. 1963:
765. AP4.N64. v. 66
World listened and watched: radio-TV meet greatest challenge in
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World mourns in doubt, fear. hope. Newsweek. v. 62. Dec. 9. 1963:
56-58. AP2.N6772. v. 62
World weeps and waits. Business week. no. 1787, Nov. 30. 1963:
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X marks the spot. Newsweek. v. 62. Dee. 16. 1963: 27-28.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
1964
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1964:
Aftermath of the Warren report. Broadcasting, v. 67, Oct. 5, 1964:
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Ahler, James G., and Joseph B. Tamney. Some functions of religious
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HN51.AT, v. 25
Alsop, Stewart. Johnson takes over. Saturday evening post,
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Amrine. Michael. This awesome challenge. New York. Putnam. 1964.
283 p. E846.A6
Anniversary of an assassination. Reconstructionist. v. 30.
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Ascoli. M. Interim reflections. Reporter. v. 31. Oct. 22. 1964:
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Assassination. Newsweek. v. 64. Oct. 5. 1964: 32-40.
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The Assassination of President Kennedy. East Europe. v. 13. Jan.
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The Assassination: the reporter's story; what was seen and read;
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Assassination: the trail to a verdict; with report by G.R. Ford.
Life. v. 57. Oct. 2. 1964: 40-50B. AP2.L547. v. 57
The Assassination: the Warren report. Newsweek. v. 64. Oct. 5.
1964: 32-40. 45-52. 57-60. 63-64. AP2.N6772. v. 64
Attorney for Oswald. Time. v. 83. Mar. 6. 1964: 47.
AP2.T37. v. 83
Awful interval. Newsweek. v. 63. Jan. 6. 1964: 19-20.
AP2.N6772. v. 63
Back of the secrecy in the assassination probe. U.S. news and
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JK1.U65. v. 56
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Banta. Thomas J. The Kennedy assassination: early thoughts
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Belli. Melvin M. and M.C. Carroll. Dallas Justice; the real
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[1964] 298 p. KF224.Rg.344
Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission.
Time. v. 33. Feb. 14. 1964: 16-20. AP2.T37. v. 83
Big sale; exclusive photos for Life. Newsweek. v. 63. Mar. 2.
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Bisnop. James Alonzo. Day in the life of President Kennedy. New
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Bloom tells his public relations role in Ruby case. Editor
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Brave little woman. M. Oswald before Warren's investigating
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Breig. Joe. President Kennedy's death: why? Ave Maria. v. 99.
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Buchanan. Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York. Putnam
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Carr. Attorney General (Texas) Waggoner. Texas supplemental report
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E84 2. 9. T45
Clifford. G. Warren Report: a new boost for the Kennedy
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Counsel for Oswald. U.S. news and world report. v. 48. "or. 9.
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Crawford, K. Warren impeachars. Newsweek, v. 64
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Dallas rejoiner. Nation, v. 193, May 25, 1964: 519.
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Death in Dallas. Reader's digest, v. ,84, Jan. 1964: 39-44.
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Death of a President: told in direct testimony; excerpts. U.S.
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Dempsey, David. Warren report in mass production. Saturday review,
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Denson, R.B. Destiny in Dallas: on the scene story in pictures.
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Dies. Martin. Assassination and the aftermath. American opinion.
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Different look at Dallas. U.S. news and world report, v. 56,
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Donovan, Robert J. The assassins. New York, Popular Library,
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Drury. Michael, ed. Since that day in Dallas. McCalls,
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Dunning, John L. The Kennedy assassination as viewed by communist
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Ellis, William Scott. The Warren report. Jubilee, v. 12, Dec. 1964:
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Eye on that window. Newsweek. v. 63. June 22. 1964: 32.
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Feldman, Jacob J., and Paul B. Sheatsley. The assassination of
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50,000 word leak: testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission.
Time, v. 84, Aug. 28, 1964: 40. AP2.T37. v. 84
Five publishers issue Warren panel's report. Publisher's weekly.
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Fixx, J.F. As others see us: concerning Warren Commission
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Fleming, D.F. Foreword: postscript. Annals of the American
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Four days in November (Motion Picture). Wolper Productions.
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Four days; the historical record of the death of President Kennedy.
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Magazine. New York. American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964.
Friends of Lee Oswald. National review. v. 16. Mar. 10. 1964:
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From Washington straight. National review. v. 16. Apr. 21.
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Gales. Robert Robinson. The assassination of the President:
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Gellner. John. Who killed John Kennedy? Saturday night. v. 79.
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Getshenson. Alvin. Kennedy and big business. Beverly Hills.-
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Gordon. William E. The assassination of President Kennedy.
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Greenberg. Bradley S. The diffusion of news of the Kennedy assass-
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Grosvenor. Melville Bell. The last full measure. National geo-
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Grove. L. Did press pressure kill Oswald? U.S. news and world
report. v. 56. Apr. 6. 1964: 78-79. JK1.U65. v. 56
Gun. Nerin E. Red roses from Texas. London. Frederick Muller.
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Habe. Hans. The wounded land: journey through a divided America.
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E847.H3
Harris, T. George. Memo about a Dallas citizen. Look. v. 28. Aug. 11.
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Hart. Luke E. A year of progress with a sorrowful close. Columbia.
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Hatred knows no logic. Saturday evening post. v. 237. Jan. 4, 1964:
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Havemann. Ernest. Defendant Ruby will meet the ghost of a long
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AP2.L547. v. 56
Here's what the Warren report will show. U.S. news and world
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Hessel. D. To heal the wounds. Christian century. v. 81. Jan. 1
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History or hysteria? Trevor-Roper article in London's Sunday
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AP2.N6772. v. 64
How America felt. Newsweek. v. 63. Mar. 16, 1964: 33.
AP2. N6772. v. 63
How to read the Warren report. National review. v. 16. Oct. 16.
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Hyannisport revisited. Look. v. 28, Nov. 1964: 37-45.
AP2.L79. v. 28
If it all happened again. Editor and publisher, v. 97,
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Inquest on Dallas: the right to bear arms. Tablet, v. 218,
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JFK memorial issue. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 122.
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JFK: the murder and the myths. Time, v. 83, June 12, 1964:
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JFK's murder: sowers of doubt. Newsweek, v. 63, Apr. 6, 1964:
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Jackson, Donald. The evolution of an assassination. Life,
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Joesten, Joachim. Oswald: assassin or fall guy? New York,
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John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: the
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Johnson, Priscilla. Oswald in Moscow. Harper's magazine,
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Jones, W. November in Dallas. Library Journal, v. 89, Jan. 1,
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Jumping the gun; premature disclosures. Newsweek, v. 64,
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Kavanaugh, J. A visit to the grave. Catholic digest, v. 28,
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Kempton, Murray. Boy, don't you know I'm a camera? New republic,
v. 150, Feb. 29, 1964: 7.AP2. N624, v. 150
-----Looking back on the anniversary. Spectator, v. 213,
Dec. 4, 1964: 778-779. AP4.ST, v. 213
-----Oswald, may we have some facts, please. New republic,
-----Warren report: a case for the prosecution. New republic,
v. 151, Oct. 10, 1964: 13-17. AP2.N624, v. 151
Kennedy alive in hospital. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10,
1964: 229. Q1.S76, v. 86
Killing still mystery. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964:
230. Q1.S76, v. 86
Knebel, Fletcher. After the shots: the ordeal of Lyndon Johnson.
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Krupp, G.R. Day the President died; its meaning and impact.
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Lane, Mark, ed. The Oswald case; Mark Lane's testimony to the
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-----The Warren report: a first glance. Minority of one,
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Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren Report.
U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1, 1964: 43-44.
JK1.U65, v. 56
Lee Oswald's widow tells her story; summary of testimony by
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Leslie, Warren. Dallas, public and private: aspects of an
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238 p. F394.02L4
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Lewis, Richard Warren. Flashy lawyer for Oswald's killer.
Saturday evening post, v. 237, Feb. 8, 1964: 28-30.
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Lineberry, William. The lingering plot. Foreign opinion and
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Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion. Newsweek, v. 53,
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Linn, Edward. The untold story of Jack Ruby. Saturday
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Macdonald, D. Our baby. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 25, 1964:
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Man who wanted to kill Nixon. Time, v. 83, June 19, 1964: 21.
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----- The witnesses; the highlights of bearings before the Warren
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Izakow. Boria. Echo of Dallas. New times (Moscow), no. 51,
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Jones. Penn. Forgive my grief. Midlothian. Texas.
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Kempton, Murray. Ruby. Oswald. and the State. Spectator. v. 217. Oct. 21e
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Kennedy assassination; question of a second investigation. New
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Kerby, Phil. The assassination: a new inquiry appears warranted.
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Doubleday. 1966. 256 p. BF723. DJ.W6
Knebel, Fletcher. New wave of doubt; concerning Inquest by N.J. Epstein.
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Meagher, Sylvia. How well did the 'non-driver' Oswald drive? Minority
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V. 8, July-Aug. 1966: 29-32. AP2.M55985, v. 8
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New York. Scarecrow Press. 1966. 150 p. ES42.9.M4
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Now the U.S. gets JFK autopsy photos. U.S. news and world report,
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O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The life and death of Kennedy. New statesman,
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Osterburg, James W. The Warren Co=mission: report and hearing.
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Plastrik. Stanley. The Oswald case should be reopened. Dissent,
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Popkin. Richard H. The second Oswald. New York. Avon Books. 1966. 174 p.
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Primer of assassination theories. Esquire. v. 66. Dec. 1966:
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Russell. Francis. Doubts about Dallas. National review. v.
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HX1.N37, v. 49
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Wainwright, L. Warren report ia not enough; voices speaking in
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1967
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Agony relived; second installment of the death of a President.
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Bourbon street rococo; 3. Garrison's investigation.
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Graham, 3. 3. Acquittal for Oswald: concerning the movie Rush
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----- Where death delights; the story of Dr. Milton Helpern
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RAl025.H4.H6
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Kempton, Murray. The disposable Jack Ruby. Spectator. v. 218. Jan. 13.
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Kennedy assassination: something rotten... Saturday evening
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MacCloskey. Monro. The American intelligence community. New York.
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Mayo. John B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is dead; the
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Mosk, Richard M. The Warren Commission and the legal process.
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New assassination theory: theory of 3. Thompson. Newsweek. v. 70,
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Popkin. Richard H. Garrison's case. New York review of books.
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Rajski. Raymond B., comp. A nation grieved: the Kennedy assassin-
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Revere. Guy. Jack Ruby: the Mafia's man in Dallas. Saga, v. 33.
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Roberts. Gens. The case of Jim Garrison and Lee Oswald. New
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Satgray. Judith. and Kurt Back. From bright ideas to social research:
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----- The inquest. Ramparts, v. 5. June 1967: 17-29.
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----- Press va. Garrison. Ramparts. v. 6, Sept. 1967: 8, 10, 12.
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----- Final chapter in the assassination controversy. New
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The Fateful trip to Texas: the assassination of a President.
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1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
Thompson. T. In Texas a policeman and an assassin are laid to rest too.
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Garrison, Jim. A heritage of stone. New York. Putnam.
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Goranoff. Kyrill. Why did you kill your president? Berlin. N.P.,
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Belin, David W. Truth was my only goal. Texas observer.
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Cook. Fred 3. Irregulars take the field. Nation. v. 213.
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Knight. Janet M. ed. Three assassinations: the deaths of John
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Gareth. Jenkins. Who shot President Kennedy--or fact end fable
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Sagatelyan. Mikhail. Dallas: who. how. why?--Part I. Computers
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mation. v. 21. Apr. 1972: 37-43. TJ212.C58. v. 21
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Smirnova. L. I was hired to assassinate him. New times (Moscow).
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Wecht, Cyril H. pathologist's view of JFK autopsy: un-
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Asbell, B. 10 years later: a legacy of torment haunts those
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Belin, David W. Nov. 22, 1963; you are the jury. New York,
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framing of Jim Garrison. Computers and automation, v. 22,
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Bernert, Phillippe, and Camille Gilles. The Frenchman who was
to kill Kennedy. Computers and automation, v. 22, Jan.
1973: 37-40. TJ212.C58, v. 22
Bishop, James Alonzo. The end of Camelot. Ladies home journal, v. 90,
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Clinch, Nancy Gager. The Kennedy neurosis - a psychological
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Committee to Investigate Assassinations. American political
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Dimona, Joseph. Last man at Arlington. New york, Arthur Fields
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141, 143, 265. AP2.E845, v. 80
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Kirkpatrick, Lyrenan B., Jr. The U.S. intelligence community: foreign
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E842.9.N69
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Prouty, L. Fletcher. The secret team: the CIA end its allies in control of
the United States and the world. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.
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RC574.L54. v. 3
Scott, Peter Dale. From Dallas to Watergate: the longest cover-up.
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AP2. R19. v. 12
Sprague. Richard E. The American news media and the assassination
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----- The framing of Lee Harvey Oswald. Computers and automation.
v. 22. Oct. 1973: 21-24. 34-36. T3212.C58. v. 22
Stolley. Richard B. What happened next; film of John Kennedy's
assassination. Esquire. v. 80. Nov. 1973: 134-135. 262-263.
AP2.E845. v. 80
Tackwood. Louis E. The glass house tapes. New York. Avon Books.
1973 284 p. HV8148.L552C65 1973
U.S. National Archives. Inventory of the records of the President's
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HV8138.158
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Adams. Perry. and Fred T. Newcomb. Harder from within. Santa
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Condon, Richard. Winter kills. New York, Daily Press, 1974.
304 p. PZ4.C746Wi
Dryer, Ivan. The framing of Jim Garrison. Pt. 3. Computers
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Evans, Medford. Fit to kill; the Presidency and political assass-
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43, 45, 47-48. AP2.04732, v. 17
Hammer. Richard. Playboy's history of organized crime. part XI: attack on
a hoodlum empire. Playboy. v. 21. June 1974: 133-136. 173-
175, 178-185. AP2.P69, v. 21
----- Playboy's history Of organized crime presents part XII:
the American nightmare. Playboy. v. 21, July 1974: 123-126.
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Hinckle. Warren. III. If you have a lemon, make lemonade. New York.
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Hougan, Jim. Surfeit of spies. Harper's, v. 249, Dec. 1974:
51-54, 58, 63-64, 66-67. AP2.H3, v. 249
Joesten, Joachim. Gerald Ford: coverup artist par excellence: how he
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Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief vol. 4. Midlothian, Texas: the
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McCarry, Charles. The tears of autumn. New York. Saturday Reveiw
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Marchetti, Victor. and John D. Harks. The CIA and the cult of
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JK468.I6.M37
Marks, John D., and Victor Harchetti. The CIA and the cult of
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JK468.16.N37
Newcomb, Fred T., and Perry Adams. Hutder from within. Santa
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----- The greatest coverup. Genesis, Oct. 1974: 25-28.
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Agee, Philip. Inside the company--CIA diary. New York, Stonehill
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E169.12.N45. v. 4
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Braden. Tom. What's wrong with the CIA. Saturday review.
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Canfield, Michael, and Allan Weberman. Coup d'etat in America:
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Goulden, Joseph C. Gun barrel politics. Washingtonian, v. 10,
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Irwin, Thomas Henry, and Hazel Hale. A bibliography of books,
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O'Toole, George. The assassination probe. Saturday evening
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O'Toole, George. and Bernard Fensterwald. The CIA end the man
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Scaduto, Tony. Blood money scandal: President Ford's assassination
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Anson, Robert Sam. Jack, Judy, Sam, and Johnny...and Frank. Fidel. Edgar...
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AP2.P69, v. 23
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[Not in L.C. collection]
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Page 792
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Dec. 19, 1977: 28. AP2.N6772, v. 90
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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rule Authorizing the Select
Committee on Assassinations or any subcommittee thereof to
make applications to courts; and to bring and defend lawsuits
arising out of subpoenas. orders immunizing witnesses and compel-
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and the failure to testify or produce evidence; report to accom-
pany H. Res. 760. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977.
3 p. (956h Congress.. 1st session. House. Report no. 95-606)
----- Creating a Select Committee on Assassinations; report to
accompany H. Keg. 222. [Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.]
1977. 3 p. (95th Congress. , 1st session. House. Report no. 95-3)
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March 9...23, 1977. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977.
60 p. KF27.5.A8 1977
----- Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 14 p.
(95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-119)
Why is the Assassinations Committee killing itself?; anatomy of a
murder inquest. Rolling stone, no. 184. Apr. 7. 1977: 42-45.
ML1. R65
Why the JFK case is coming back to life. U.S. news and world report,
v. 82, Jan. 17, 1977: 28-30. JK1.U65, v. 82
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1978
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E862.9. E63
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EI69.I2.N45, v. 10
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(New York), v. 10, Jan. 23, 1978: 46-51. EI69.I2.N45, v. 10
Sidey, Hugh. Jackie Onassis' memory fragments on tape. Time,
vol. 111, Apr. 24, 1978: 30. AP2.T37, v. 111
Summers, Anthony. The Kennedy assassination: why doubts persist.
Atlas world review, v. 25, July 1978: 20-22.
AP1. A83, v. 25
Ultimate assassination book: a story to make your eyes roll. New
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E169.12.N45, v. 10
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v. 111, Feb. 25, 1978: 17. PN4700.E4, v. 111
Report
Union Calendar No. 962
95th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - House Report No. 95-1828, Part 2
REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
MARCH 29, 1979.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-112 0 WASHINGTON: 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 052-071-00590-1
Page ii
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut
District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan
California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the
Assassination of Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr. John F Kennedy
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman
HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE
FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE
STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER
LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio
STAFF
G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
GARY T. CORNWELL, Deputy Chief Counsel
PETER G. BEESON, Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel
(II)
Letter of Transmittal
Page iii
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C., March 29, 1979.
Hon. EDMUND L. HENSHAW, JR.,
Clerk of the House,
U. S. Capitol, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. HENSHAW: On behalf of the Select Committee on Assassinations, and
pursuant to the mandate of House Resolutions 222 and 433, 95th Congress, and
House Resolution 49, 96th Congress, I am filing for presentation to the House of
Representatives the enclosed Final Report with Additional and Dissenting Views
of the Committee.
This supplements the Summary of Findings and Recommendations filed on January 2,
1979 (H.R. Rept. No. 95-1828, 95th Congress, 2d session (1979)).
Sincerely,
LOUIS STOKES, Chairman.
III
Contents
Page v
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of findings and recommendations . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
History of the committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nature and scope of the investigation . . . 10
Structure of the investigation . . . . . . . . . . . 18
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy . . . . . . 21
Introduction: The Kennedy Presidency in perspective 21
Presidential assassinations in the United States . 21
A new President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Foreign affairs: A fragile peace . . 25
The Cuban threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Combatting Communist in Latin America 27
The arms race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The missile crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Pledge to defend Europe . . . . . . . . . . 28
Cold war thaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Growing involvement in Vietnam. . . . 29
Detente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
At home: A troubled land . . . . . . . . 30
Civil rights progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Economic policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Government reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
War on organized crime. . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Opposition from the far right . . . . . . 34
November 1963: A trip to Texas . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F.
Kennedy. The second and third shots he fired struck the
President. The third shot he fired killed the President . 41
1. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired
from behind him . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
(a) Reliance on scientific analysis . 42
(1) The medical evidence . 42
(2) Reaction times and alinement . 44
(3) Neutron activation analysis . 45
(4) Photographic evidence . 45
(5) Acoustical evidence and blur analysis .. 46
2. The shots that struck President Kennedy from behind
were fired from the sixth floor window of the south-
east corner of the Texas School Book Depository
building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
(a) Scientific analysis . . . . . . . . . . 47
(1) Trajectory analysis . 48
(2) Photographic evidence . 49
(b) Witness testimony . . . . . . . . . 49
(c) Firearms evidence . . . . . . . . . 50
(d) Summary of the evidence . . . . 51
3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle that was used to
fire the shots from the sixth floor window of the
southeast corner of the Texas School Book Deposi-
tory building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
(a) Biography of Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . 52
(b) The committee's approach . . 54
(1) Handwriting analysis . 54
(2) The backyard photographs . 54
V
Page vi
VI
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations---Continued
A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots--Continued
Page
4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination,
had access to and was present on the sixth floor of
the Texas School Book Depository building . . 56
(a) Testimony of book depository employees . 57
(b) Physical evidence of Oswald's presence 57
(c) Oswald's whereabouts . 57
(1) Lovelady or Oswald? . 58
(2) Witness testimony . 58
5. Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the
conclusion that he assassinated President Kennedy . 59
(a) The Tippit murder. . . 59
(b) Oswald: A capacity for violence? . 60
(c) The motive . . . . . . . . 61
B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability
that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy.
Other scientific evidence does not preclude the possibility
of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence
negates some specific conspiracy allegations . 65
(a) Warren Commission analysis of a tape . 65
(b) Dallas Police Department recordings .. 66
(1) Analysis by Bolt Beranek and Newman .. 66
(2) Weiss-Aschkenasy analysis . 72
(3) Search for a motorcycle . 75
(c) Other evidence with respect to the shots 79
(d) Witness testimony on the shots . 87
(1) Analysis of the reliability of witness testimony . 90
(e) Certain conspiracy allegations . 91
(f) Summary of the evidence . 93
C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail-
able to it, that President John F. Kennedy was probably
assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee
was unable to identify the other gunmen or the extent of
the conspiracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
1. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence
available to it, that the Soviet Government was
not involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
(a) United States-Soviet relations .. 99
(b) The Warren Commission investigation . 99
(c) The committee s investigation . 99
(1) Oswald in the U.S.S.R 100
(2) Treatment of defectors by the Soviet Government 100
(3) Yuri Nosenko 101
(4) Opinions of other defectors 102
(5) Marina Oswald . 102
(6) Response of the Soviet Government 103
(d) Summary of the evidence . 103
2. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence
available to it, that the Cuban Government was
not involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
(a) United States-Cuban relations . 104
(1) Bay of Pigs 105
(2) Cuban missile crisis . 105
(b) Earlier investigations of Cuban complicity . 106
(1) The Warren Commission investigation . 107
(2) The U.S. Senate investigation . 107
(3) The CIA's response to the Senate. 108
Page vii
VII
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations---Continued
C. The Committee Continued
2. The Committee Continued
Page
(c) The committee's analysis of the CIA task
force report . . . . 109
(1) AMLASH . 111
(2) CIA-Mafia plots . 114
(3) Summary of the evidence . 117
(d) Cubana Airlines flight allegation . 117
(e) Gilberto Policarpo Lopez allegation . 118
(f) Other allegations . . . . . . . . . . 121
(g) The committee's trip to Cuba. 126
(h) Deficiencies of the 1963-64 investigation 127
(i) Summary of the findings . . . . 129
3. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence
available to it, that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as
groups, were not involved in the assassination of
President Kennedy, but that the available evidence
does not preclude the possibility that individual
members may have been involved . 129
(a) The anti-Castro Cuban perspective . 130
(1) The missile crisis and its aftermath ........... 132
(2) Attitude of anti-Castro Cubans to-
ward Kennedy . 132
(b) The committee investigation . 133
(1) Homer S. Echevarria . 133
(2) Antonio Veciana Blanch . 135
(3) Silvia Odio . 137
(c) Oswald and anti-Castro Cubans . 139
(1) Oswald in New Orleans . 140
(2) Oswald in Clinton, La 142
(3) David Ferrie . 143
(4) 544 Camp Street 143
(5) A committee analysis of Oswald in
New Orleans . . . 145
(6) Summary of the evidence 146
4. The committee believes on the basis of the evidence
available to it, that the national syndicate of orga-
nized crime, as a group, was not involved in the
assassination of President Kennedy, but that the
available evidence does not preclude the possibility
that individual members may have been involved 147
(a) The Warren Commission investigation 148
(b) The committee investigation . 149
(1) Ruby and organized crime 149
(2) Ruby and the Dallas Police De-
partment . . . . . . . 156
(3) Other evidence relating to Ruby 158
(4) Involvement of organized crime . 159
(5) Analysis of the 1963-64 investigation . 168
(6) Carlos Marcello . 169
(7) Santos Trafficante . 172
(8) James R. Hoffa . 176
(c) Summary and analysis of the evidence 179
5. The Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and Central Intelligence Agency were not involved
in the assassination of President Kennedy . 181
(a) The Secret Service . 181
(1) Connally testimony . 182
(2) Choice of the mororcade route . 182
(3) Allegation a Secret Service agent was
on the grassy knoll . 183
(4) Conclusion . 184
Page viii
VIII
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations--Continued
C. The committee--Continued
5. The Secret Service, FBI--Continued
Page
(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation 185
(1) Early rumors that Oswald was an in-
formant . . . . . . . . 185
(2) The Hosty entry in Oswald's address book . 186
(3) FBI contacts with Oswald (Fort Worth, 1962) 190
(4) FBI contacts with Oswald (New Orleans, 1963) 191
(5) FBI contacts with Oswald (Dallas, 963) 194
(6) The destruction of Oswald's note 195
(7) Conclusion . 196
(c) The Central Intelligence Agency . 196
(1) CIA personnel in the Soviet Russia
Division . . . . . . . 198
(2) CIA personnel abroad . 198
(3) Oswald's CIA file . 200
(4) Why the delay in opening Oswald's
201 file? . . . . . . . . 200
(5) Why was he carried as Lee Henry
Oswald in his 201 file? . 202
(6) The meaning of "AG" under
"Other identification" in Oswald's
201 file . . . . . . . . . 202
(7) Why was Oswald's 201 file restricted? 203
(8) Were 37 documents missing from
Oswald's 201 file? . 203
(9) Did the CIA maintain a dual filing
system on Oswald? 204
(10) Did Oswald ever participate in a
CIA counterintelligence project? . 205
(11) Did the CIA ever debrief Oswald?. 207
(12) The Justice Department's failure to
prosecute Oswald . 209
(13) Oswald's trip to Russia via Hel-
sinki and his ability to obtain a
visa in 2 days . . . 211
(14) Oswald's contact with Americans
in the Soviet Union . 213
(15) Alleged intelligence contacts after
Oswald returned from Russia 217
(16) Alleged intelligence implications of
Oswald's military service 219
(17) Oswald's military intelligence file . 221
(18) The Oswald photograph in Office of
Naval intelligence files . 224
(19) Oswald in Mexico City . 225
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . 225
D. Agencies and departments of the U.S. Government performed
with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of
their duties. President John F. Kennedy did not receive
adequate protection. A thorough and reliable investigation
into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the as-
sassination was conducted. The investigation into the
possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inade-
quate. The conclusions of the investigations were arrived
at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too
definitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
1. The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of
its duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Page ix
IX
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations--Continued
D. Agencies and departments--Continued
1. The Secret Service Continued
Page
(a) The Secret Service possessed information
that was not properly analyzed, investi-
gated or used by the Secret Service in con-
nection with the President's trip to Dallas;
in addition, Secret Service agents in the
motorcade were inadequately prepared to
protect the President from a sniper . 228
(1) The committee approach 228
(2) Significant threats in 1963 . 230
(3) Inspection of the motorcade route 233
(4) Performance at the time of the assas-
sination . . . . . . . 234
(b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to
investigate the assassination was termi-
nated when the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation assumed primary investigative
responsibility . . . 236
2. The Department of Justice failed to exercise initia-
tive in supervising and directing the investigation
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the as-
sassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed with
varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of
its duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
(a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation ade-
quately investigated Lee Harvey Oswald
prior to the assassination and properly eval-
uated the evidence it possessed to assess his
potential to endanger the public safety in a
national emergency . 239
(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation con-
ducted a thorough and professional investi-
gation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey
Oswald for the assassination . 239
(c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed
to investigate adequately the possibility
of a conspiracy to assassinate the President . 239
(d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was
deficient in its sharing of information with
other agencies and departments . 239
(1) History of the FBI . 239
(2) The FBI investigation . 241
4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its
collection and sharing of information both prior
to and subsequent to the assassination . 246
(a) Establishment of the CIA . 246
(b) Rockefeller Commission investigation of
CIA activities . . . 248
(c) The committee investigation . 248
(1) CIA preassassination performance--
Oswald in Mexico City . 248
(2) The CIA and the Warren Commission 252
(3) Post-Warren report CIA investigation 255
5. The Warren Commission performed with varying
degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its
duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
(a) The Warren Commission conducted a thor-
ough and professional investigation into the
responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the
assassination . . . 256
Page x
X
I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations Continued
D. Agencies and departments Continued
5. The Warren Commission--Continued
Page
(b) The Warren Commission failed to investigate
adequately the possibility of a conspiracy
to assassinate the President. This deficiency
was attributable in part to the failure of the
Commission to receive all the relevant
information that was in the possession of
other agencies and departments of the
Government . . . . 256
(c) The Warren Commission arrived at its con-
clusions, based on the evidence available
to it, in good faith . 256
(d) The Warren Commission presented the con-
clusions in its report in a fashion that was
too definitive . . . . 256
II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina-
tion of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr . . . . . . . 263
Introduction: The civil rights movement and Dr. King . 263
A history of civil rights violence . 263
Equality in education--the 20th century objective . 265
A new leader emerges . . . . . . . . . 266
A philosophy of nonviolence . . . 268
1960: The year of the sit-ins . . . . . . 268
1963: A year of triumph and despair . 270
The road to Memphis . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
The last moments: Memphis, Tenn. April 4, 1968 . 282
A. James Earl Ray fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
The shot killed Dr. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
(a) Biography of James Earl Ray . . . . . . . . . 287
(b) The committee's investigation . . 288
1. Dr. King was killed by one shot fired from in front of
him . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
2. The shot that killed Dr. King was fired from the bath-
room window at the rear of a roominghouse at
422 1/2 South Main Street, Memphis, Tenn . 290
3. James Earl Ray purchased the rifle that was used to
shoot Dr. King and transported it from Birmingham,
Ala. to Memphis, Tenn.,-where he rented a room at
422 1/2 South Main Street, and moments after the
assassination, he dropped it near 424 South Main
Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
4. It is highly probable that James Earl Ray stalked Dr.
King for a period immediately preceding the
assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
5. James Earl Ray fled the scene of the crime immediately
after the assassination . . . . . . . . . . . 299
6. James Earl Ray's alibi for the time of the assassination,
his story of Raoul, and other allegedly exculpatory
evidence are not worthy of belief . 303
(a) Ray's alibi . . . . . . . . . 303
(b) Ray's "Raoul" story . 305
(1) Conflicting descriptions of Raoul 305
(2) Absence of witnesses to corroborate
Raoul's existence . 305
(c) Preassassination transactions . 306
(1) The rifle purchase . 307
(2) Fingerprints on the rifle . 308
(3) Rental of room 5-B at Bessie
Brewer's roominghouse 309
(4) The binocular purchase . 310
(d) Grace Walden Stephens . 310
Page xi
XI
II. Findings of the Select-Committee on Assassinations.--Continued
A. James Earl Ray fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
The shot killed Dr. King-Continued
Page
7. James Earl Ray knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily pleaded guilty to the first degree murder of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr . . . . . . . . 315
(a) Irreconcilable conflicts of interest of Foreman
and Hanes . . . . . 318
(b) Foreman's failure to investigate the case . 319
(c) Coercion by Foreman and the Federal Gov-
ernment . . . . . . . . 321
(d) Ray's belief a guilty plea would not preclude
a new trial . . . . . . 323
B. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial
evidence available to it, that there is a likelihood that
James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. as a result of a conspiracy . . . . . . . 325
1. The FBI investigation . . . . . . . 325
2. The committee investigation . 326
(a) Transactional analysis 326
(b) Ray's associates examined . 326
3. Investigation of Ray's motive . 327
(a) Ray's racial attitudes examined . 327
(b) Ego gratification as a motive . 330
(c) The prospect of financial reward . 331
(d) Conclusion on motive . 333
4. General indications of conspiracy . 333
(a) Transactions as evidence of associations . 334
5. The brothers, John and Jerry Ray . 336
(a) Evidence of Ray's contact with his brothers,
1967-68 . . . . . . . . 337
(b) Missouri State Penitentiary escape . 339
(c) The Alton bank robbery 342
(1) Bank robbery modus operandi
analysis . . . . . . . . 348
(d) A brother was Raoul . 350
(e) The brothers and the rifle purchase .. 354
(f) Motive with respect to John and Jerry Ray .. 358
6. Evidence of a conspiracy in St. Louis . 359
(a) The Byers allegation . 360
(b) The backgrounds of Kauffmann and
Sutherland . . . . . . 364
(c) Connectives to James Earl Ray . 366
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available
to it, that no private organizations or individuals, other than
those discussed under section B, were involved in the assas-
sination of Dr. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
1. Rightwing extremist organizations . 375
(a) The Minutemen . . . . 375
(b) Klan organizations . 377
(c) J.B. Stoner . . . . . . . . . 381
(d) William Hugh Morris 382
2. Conspiracy allegations: Memphis . 383
(a) Citizen's band radio broadcast . 383
(b) John McFerren . . . . 385
3. Conspiracy allegations: New Orleans . . . . . 387
(a) William Sartor . . . . . 387
(b) Raul Esquivel . . . . . . . 389
(c) Reynard Rochon . . 390
(d) Herman Thompson . 390
(e) Jules Ricco Kimble . 392
(f) Randy Rosenson . . . 393
Page xii
XII
II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations--Continued
C. The committee believes, etc.--Continued
Page
4. Conspiracy allegations: Atlanta . . 394
(a) Edna Matthews Lancaster . 394
(b) Claude and Leon Powell . 394
(c) Robert Byron Watson . 395
5. Conspiracy allegations: Birmingham . 396
(a) Morris Davis . . . . . . . . 396
(b) Walter Maddox . . . . 398
6. Conspiracy allegations: Louisville . 399
(a) Clifton Baird . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
(b) Charles Lee Bell . . . . . 400
7. Conspiracy allegations: St. Louis . 401
(a) Delano Elmer Walker . . 401
8. Conspiracy allegations: Miami . 402
(a) William Somersett . . 402
9. Conspiracy allegations: Texas . 404
(a) Otis Moore . . . . . . . . 404
10. Conspiracy allegations: New York . 404
(a) Myron Billett . . . . . . 404
D. No Federal, State or local government agency was involved in
the assassination of Dr. King: . . . . . . . . 407
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation . 407
(a) The Lorraine Motel issue . 409
(b) The inciting of violence by informants issue . 411
(c) The FBI foreknowledge issue . 413
(d) The FBI assistance for Ray issue . 414
(e) FBI surveillance files in the National Archives . 415
2. Memphis Police Department . . . . 416
(a) Withdrawal of the security detail . 417
(b) The removal of Detective Reddirt . 418
(c) The transfer of two Black firemen . 423
(d) The postassassination performance of the
Memphis police . 424
3. Missouri State Penitentiary . . . 428
E. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation performed with varying degrees of competency and
legality in the fulfillment of their duties . 431
1. The Department of Justice failed to supervise ade-
quately the Domestic Intelligence Division of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Domestic
Intelligence Division's COINTELPRO campaign
against Dr. King, grossly abused and exceeded its
legal authority and failed to consider the possibility
that actions threatening bodily harm to Dr. King
might be encouraged by the program . . . . . 431
(a) Security investigation and COINTELPRO . 432
(1) Hoover's dislike for Dr. King . 434
(2) Electronic surveillance of Dr. King . 436
(3) Manipulation of the media . 437
(4) Analysis of the impact of the FBI-
inspired editorial . 439
2. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation performed a thorough investigation
into the responsibility of James Earl Ray for the
assassination of Dr. King, and conducted a thorough
fugitive investigation, but failed to investigate ade-
quately the possibility of conspiracy in the assassi-
nation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation mani-
fested a lack of concern for constitutional rights in
the manner in which it conducted parts of the
investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
(a) The FBI chain of command . 442
Page xiii
XIII
II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations--Continued
E. The Department of Justice, etc. -Continued
2. The Department of Justice, etc.-Continued
Page
(b) The fugitive investigation . 443
(1) James Earl Ray identified . 445
(2) Surveillance of Ray family con-
sidered . . . . . . . . . 446
(3) Ray arrested in London . 449
(c) The conspiracy investigation . 449
(1) The method . 450
(2) The focus . 453
(d) Investigative excesses . 456
(e) Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . 459
III. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations . 461
A. Legislative recommendations on issues involving the pro-
hibition, prevention and prosecution of assassinations and
federally cognizable homicides . . . . . 464
(a) Prohibition and prevention . . . 464
(b) Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
B. Administrative recommendations to the executive . 473
C. General recommendations for congressional investigations . 475
D. Recommendations for further investigation . 480
IV. Separate Remarks, Views and Dissent of Members of the Com-
mittee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Separate remarks of Christopher J. Dodd . 483
Separate views of Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar . 491
Dissent of Robert W. Edgar . . . . . . 494
Dissent of Harold S. Sawyer . . . . . . . 503
Appendix I: Staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations . 513
Appendix II: Consultants to the Select Committee on Assassinations . 516
Appendix III: Contractors for the Select Committee on Assassinations . 519
Appendix IV: Statistical data and expenditures . 520
Appendix V: Affirmative action program . . . . . . 533
Appendix VI: Enabling resolutions . . . . . . . . . 534
Appendix VII: Index for the investigation of the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
A. Public hearings of the committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
B. Exhibit. s--John F. Kennedy public hearings . 574
C. Supplemental exhibits--John F. Kennedy public hearings . 583
D. Appendices to the John F. Kennedy public hearings . 583
Appendix VIII: Index for the investigation of the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
A. Public hearings of the committee . . . . . . . . . . . 584
B. Exhibits--Martin Luther King, Jr. public hearings . 585
C. Appendices to the Martin Luther King, Jr. public hearings . 592
Appendix IX: Index for the public hearings of the Committee on Legislative
and Administrative Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
References for the:
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
I. Report on the investigation of the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
II. Report on the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 644
III. Recommendations of the committee . . . 683
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
Page 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. FINDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY IN DALLAS, TEX., NOVEMBER 22, 1963
A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F. Kennedy. The second
and third shots he fired struck the President. The third shot he fired killed
the President.
1. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from behind him.
2. The shots that struck President Kennedy from behind him were fired from the
sixth floor window of the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository
building.
3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle. that was used to fire the shots from the
sixth floor window of the southeast comer of the Texas School Book Depository
building.
4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination, had access to and was
present on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building.
5. Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the conclusion that he
assassinated President Kennedy.
B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that two gunmen
fired at President John F. Kennedy. Other scientific evidence does not preclude
the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence
negates some specific conspiracy allegations.
C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that
President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy.
The committee is unable to identify the other gunman or the extent of the
conspiracy.
1. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that
the Soviet Government was not involved in the
assassination of President Kennedy.
2. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that
the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
3. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that
anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination of
President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the
possibility that individual members may have been involved.
4. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that
the national syndicate of organized crime, as a group, was not involved in the
assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not
preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved.
(1)
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2
5. The Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence
Agency were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
D. Agencies and departments of the U.S. Government performed with varying
degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties. President John F.
Kennedy did not receive adequate protection. A thorough and reliable
investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy was conducted. The investigation into the
possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inadequate. The conclusions
of the investigations were arrived at in good faith, but presented in a fashion
that was too definitive.
1. The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of in duties.
(a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed,
investigated or used by the Secret Service in connection with the President's
trip to Dallas; in addition, Secret Service agents in the motorcade were
inadequately prepared to protect the President from a sniper.
(b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination
was terminated when the Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed primary
investigative responsibility.
2. The Department of Justice failed to exercise initiative in supervising and
directing the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the
assassination.
3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed with varying degrees of
competency in the fulfillment of its duties.
(a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation adequately investigated Lee Harvey
Oswald prior to the assassination and properly evaluated the evidence it
possessed to assess his potential to endanger the public safety in a national
emergency.
(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough and professional
investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the
assassination.
(c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to investigate adequately the
possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President.
(d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of
information with other agencies and departments.
4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its collection and sharing
of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination.
5. The Warren Commission performed with varying degrees of competency in the
fulfillment of its duties.
(a) The Warren Commission conducted a thorough and professional investigation
into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination.
(b) The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a
conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in
part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information
that
Page 3
3
was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government.
(c) The Warren Commission arrived at its conclusions, based on the evidence
available to it, in good faith.
(d) The Warren Commission presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion
that was too definitive.
II. FINDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF
DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. IN MEMPHIS, TENN. APRIL 4, 1968
A. James Earl Ray fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The shot killed
Dr. King.
1. Dr. King was killed by one rifle shot fired from in front of him.
2. The shot that killed Dr. King was fired from the bathroom window at the rear
of a roominghouse at 422 1/2 South Main Street, Memphis, Tenn.
3. James Earl Ray purchased the rifle that was used to shoot Dr. King and
transported it from Birmingham, Ala. to Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room
at 422 1/2 South Main Street, and moments after the assassination, he dropped it
near 424 South Main Street.
4. It is highly probable that James Earl Ray stalked Dr. King for a period
immediately preceding the assassination.
5. James Earl Ray fled the scene of the crime immediately after the
assassination.
6. James Earl Ray's alibi for the time of the assassination, his story of
"Raoul", and other allegedly exculpatory evidence are not worthy of belief.
7. James Earl Ray knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty to
the first degree murder of Dr. King.
B. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence available
to it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin
Luther King as a result of a conspiracy.
C. The committee believed on the basis of the evidence available to it, that no
private organizations or individuals, other than those discussed under section
B, were involved in the assassination of Dr. King.
D. No Federal, State or local government agency was involved in the
assassination of Dr. King.
E. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation performed
with varying degrees of competency and legality in the fulfillment of their
duties.
1. The Department of Justice failed to supervise adequately the Domestic
Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Domestic Intelligence Division's
COINTELPRO campaign against Dr. King, grossly abused and exceeded its legal
authority and failed to consider the possibility that actions threatening bodily
harm to Dr. King might be encouraged by the program.
2. The Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation performed a
thorough investigation into the responsibility of
Page 4
4
James Earl Ray for the assassination of Dr. King, and conducted a thorough
fugitive investigation, but failed to investigate adequately the possibility of
conspiracy in the assassination. The Federal Bureau of Investigation manifested
a lack of concern for constitutional rights in the manner in which it conducted
parts of the investigation.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
I. Legislative recommendations on issues involving the prohibition, preventation
and prosecution of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides
A. Prohibition and prevention--
1. The Judiciary Committee should process for early consideration by the House
legislation that would make the assassination of a Chief of State of any
country, or his political equivalent, a Federal offense, if the offender is an
American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen, or if the offender
can be located in the United States.
2. The Judiciary Committee should process for early consideration by the House
comprehensive legislation that would codify, revise and reform the Federal law
of homicide, paying special attention to assassinations. The Judiciary Committee
should give appropriate attention to the related offenses of conspiracy,
attempt, assault and kidnaping in the context of assassinations. Such
legislation should be processed independently of the general proposals for the
codification, revision or reform of the Federal criminal law. The committee
should address the following issues in considering the legislation:
(a) Distinguishing between those persons who should receive the protection of
Federal law because of the official positions they occupy and those persons who
should receive protection of Federal law only in the performance of their
official duties,
(b) Extending the protection of Federal law to persons who occupy high judicial
and executive positions, including Justices of the Supreme Court and Cabinet
officers,
(c) The applicability of these laws to private individuals the exercise of
constitutional rights,
(d) The penalty to be provided for homicide and the related offenses, including
the applicability and the constitutionality of the death Penalty,
(e) The basis for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction, including domestic and
extraterritorial reach,
(f) The preemption of State jurisdiction without the necessity of any action on
the part of the Attorney General where the President is assassinated,
(g) The circumstances under which Federal jurisdiction should preempt State
jurisdiction in other cases,
(h) The power of Federal investigative agencies to require autopsies to be
performed,
(i) The ability of Federal investigative agencies to secure the assistance of
other Federal or State agencies, including the military, other laws
notwithstanding,
Page 5
5
(j) The authority to offer rewards to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime,
(k) A requirement of forfeiture of the instrumentalities of the crime,
(l) The condemnation of personal or other effects of historical interest,
(m) The advisability of providing, consistent with the first amendment, legal
trust devices to hold for the benefit of victims, their families, or the general
treasury, the profits realized from books, movie rights, or public appearances
by the perpetrator of the crime, and
(n) The applicability of threat and physical zone of protection legislation to
persons under the physical protection of Federal investigative or law
enforcement agencies.
3. The appropriate committees of the House should process for early
consideration by the House charter legislation for the Central Intelligence
Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The committees should address the
following issues in considering the charter legislation:
(a) The proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the intelligence
and investigative agencies of the United States,
(b) The relationship between the domestic intelligence functions and the
interference with the exercise of individual constitutional rights,
(c) The delineation of proper law enforcement functions and techniques
including: (i) The use of informants and electronic surveillance, (ii)
guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance to
gather intelligence on, or investigate, groups that may be exercising first
amendment freedoms, and (iii) the proper response of intelligence or
investigative agencies where information is developed that an informant has
committed a crime,
(d) Guidelines to consider the circumstances, if any, when an investigative
agency or a component of that agency should be disqualified from taking an
active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety growing
out of a particular intelligence or investigative action,
(e) Definitions of the legislative scope and extent of "sources and methods" and
the "informant privilege" as a rationale for the executive branch withholding
information in response to congressional or judicial process or other demand for
information,
(f) Institutionalizing efforts to coordinate the gathering, sharing, and
analysis of intelligence information,
(g) Insuring those agencies that primarily gather intelligence perform their
function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in
physical protection, and
(h) Implementing mechanisms that would permit inter-agency tasking of particular
functions.
B. Prosecution--
1. The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provisions of law
dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy
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6
trial as it applies to both the investigation and prosecution of federally
cognizable homicides.
2. The Judiciary Committee should examine recently passed special prosecutor
legislation to determine if its provisions should be modified to extend them to
Presidential assassinations and the circumstances, if any, under which they
should be applicable to other federally cognizable homicides.
II. Administrative recommendations to the Executive
The Department of Justice should reexamine its contingency plans for the
handling of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides in light of the
record and findings of the committee. Such an examination should consider the
following issues:
A. Insuring that its, response takes full advantage of inter- and intra-agency
task forces and the strike force approach to investigations and prosecutions,
B. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of the advances of science
and technology, and determining when it should secure independent panels of
scientists to review or perform necessary scientific tasks, or secure qualified
independent forensic pathologists to perform a forensic autopsy,
C. Insuring that its fair trial/free press guidelines consistent with an alleged
offender's right to a fair trial, allow information about the facts and
circumstances surrounding an assassination promptly be made public, and promptly
be corrected when erroneous information is mistakenly released, and
D. Entering at the current time into negotiations with representatives of the
media to secure voluntary agreements providing that photographs, audio tapes,
television tapes, and related matters, made in and around the site of
assassinations, be made available to the Government by consent immediately
following an assassination.
III. General recommendations for congressional investigations
A. The appropriate committees of the House should consider amending the rules of
the House to provide for a right to appointive counsel in investigative hearings
where a witness is unable to provide counsel from private funds.
B. The appropriate committees of the House should examine the rules of the House
governing the conduct of counsel in legislative and investigative hearings and
consider delineating guidelines for professional conduct and ethics, including
guidelines to deal with conflicts of interest in the representation of multiple
witnesses before a committee.
C. The Judiciary Committee should examine the adequacy of Federal law as it
provides for the production of Federal and State prisoners before legislative or
investigative committees under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
D. The appropriate committees of the House should examine and clarify the
applicability to congressional subpenas of recently enacted legislative
restrictions on access to records and other documents.
E. The appropriate committees of the House should consider legislation that
would authorize the establishment of a legislative counsel to conduct litigation
on behalf of committees of the House incident to
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7
the investigative or legislative activities and confer jurisdiction on the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia to hear such lawsuits.
F. The appropriate committees of the House should consider if rule 11 of the
House should be amended, so as to restrict the current access by all Members of
the House to the classified information in the possession of any committee.
IV. Recommendations for further investigation
A. The Department of Justice should contract for the examination of a film taken
by Charles L. Bronson to determine its significance if any, to the assassination
of President Kennedy.
B. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the
Department of Justice and the National Science Foundation should make a study of
the theory and application of the principles of acoustics to forensic questions,
using the materials available in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
as a case study.
C. The Department of Justice should review the committee's findings and report
in the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., and after completion of the recommended investigation enumerated in
sections A and B, analyze whether further official investigation is warranted in
either case. The Department of Justice should report its analyses to the
Judiciary Committee.
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(blank page)
Introduction
Page 9
INTRODUCTION*
History of the Committee
Page 9
History of the Committee
The House Select Committee on Assassinations was established in September 1976
by House Resolution 1540, 94th Congress, 2d Session. The resolution authorized a
12-member select committee to conduct a full and complete investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the deaths of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. The committee was constituted for the four remaining months of
the 94th Congress, and it was mandated to report the results of its
investigation to the House of Representatives as soon as practicable.
House Resolution 1540 had been introduced a year prior to its passage. It was a
refinement of several similar resolutions sponsored by some 135 Members of the
94th Congress. Substantial impetus for the creation of a select committee to
investigate these assassinations was derived from revelations in the report of
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, dated April 1976 and released in June 1976. The Senate
select committee reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had withheld from
the Warren Commission, during its investigation of the assassination of
President Kennedy, information about plots by the Government of the United
States against Fidel Castro of Cuba; and that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had conducted a counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) against
Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
The House Select Committee on Assassinations created by House Resolution 1540
officially expired as the 94th Congress ended its term on January 3, 1977.
On January 4, 1977, a unanimous consent request was introduced to consider House
Resolution 9, a resolution to reconstitute the committee. An objection was
heard, however, and House Resolution 9 was not brought to an immediate vote on
the floor of the House. It was instead referred to the Rules Committee, which
began hearings on it on January 25, 1977. House Resolution 9, as amended, was
favorably reported by the Rules Committee as House Resolution 222 on February 1,
1977.
The creation of a congressional committee to investigate assassinations, as well
as issues concerning the nature and cost of the proposed investigations, created
considerable controversy. House Resolution proposed to constitute the committee
for only an additional 2 months, to the end of March 1977, so that these issues
could be more closely examined. On February 2, 1977, House Resolution 222 was
considered
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(9)
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by the House of Representatives as the Committee of the Whole, so that
amendments could be offered from the floor and Members given an opportunity to
express objections. House Resolution 222 authorized and directed the committee
to:
* * * conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances
surrounding the assassination and death of Martin Luther King, Jr., and of any
other persons the select committee shall determine might be related to either
death in order to ascertain (1) whether the existing laws of the United States,
including but not limited to laws relating to the safety and protection of the
President of the United States, assassinations of the President of United
States, deprivation of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as well
as the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments of
the U.S. Government, are adequate, either in their provisions or in the manner
of their enforcement; and (2) whether there was full disclosure and sharing of
information and evidence among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government
during the course of all prior investigations into those deaths; and whether any
evidence or information which was not in the possession of any agency or
department of the U.S. Government investigating either death would have been of
assistance to that agency or department, and why such information was not
provided to or collected by the appropriate agency or department; and shall make
recommendations to the House, if the select committee deems it appropriate, for
the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation.
House Resolution 222 was passed by the House on February 2, 1977.
On March 8, 1977, Representative Louis Stokes of Ohio was named chairman of the
committee to replace the previous chairman who had resigned. Two subcommittees
were created--a subcommittee on the assassination of President Kennedy, with
Representative Richardson Preyer of North Carolina as its chairman, and a
subcommittee on the assassination of Dr. King, with Walter E. Fauntroy, Delegate
of the District of Columbia, as its chairman. The staff was divided into two
task forces designated to assist each of the subcommittees.
On March 30, 1977, the House approved House Resolution 433 which constituted the
committee until January 3, 1979, the duration of the 95th Congress.
In June 1977, G. Robert Blakey was appointed chief counsel and staff director to
replace the former chief counsel who had resigned on March 30, 1977.
The committee established a program that consisted of three primary
activities-the investigation, public presentation of evidence and preparation of
the final report.
Nature and Scope of the Investigation
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Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The committee identified four main issues to be investigated to fulfill its
mandate set forth in House Resolution 222. First, who was or
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were the assassin(s) of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.? Second, did the assassin(s) have any aid or assistance either before or
after the assassination(s). Third, did the agencies and departments of the U.S.
Government adequately perform their duties and functions in (a) collecting and
sharing information prior to the assassination; (b) protecting John F. Kennedy
and Martin Luther King, Jr. and (c) conducting investigations into each
assassination and coordinating the results of those investigations? Fourth,
given the evidence the committee uncovered, are the amendment of existing
legislation or the enactment of new legislation appropriate?
The necessity for the committee to explore each of these issues, as well as the
manner in which they could be investigated, was carefully considered by the
committee because the committee was acutely aware of the potential risks and
dangers inherent in a congressional committee addressing aspects of these
issues. The issues that posed particular risks and dangers were the committee's
investigation of who the assassin(s) was or were, and if the assassin(s) had
help before or after the assassination. Necessarily, the committee's inquiry
into these issues would entail an examination of the conduct of individuals.
Further, the conduct to be examined might also be found to be criminal in a
judicial proceeding, and might well carry with it, in the minds of the general
public, the severest moral disapprobation because of the nature of the crimes
committed. Possible injury of the reputation of potential "subjects" or
"targets" of the investigation was, therefore, a significant danger or risk
clearly recognized by the committee.
The committee also recognized other risks and dangers inherent in the special
character of its investigation. For example, associates of a "target" might have
to be investigated fully. The associate may not have engaged in any activity
connected with the assassination, but disclosure of the facts of the
investigation alone might carry with it an invasion of privacy of the associate.
The risk and danger were also considered by the committee.
The committee recognized that, unlike a criminal trial in a court, no matter how
definitively the committee's findings were presented in its report, no legal
sanctions such as fine or imprisonment could be imposed as a direct result of
its investigation. Nevertheless, the danger of injury to reputation and invasion
of privacy of the individuals the committee had investigated required that the
committee responsibly assess precisely how its investigation would be conducted
and its results disclosed.
Many of the potential risks and dangers from Congress undertaking an
investigation into conduct that is also criminal primarily arise because of the
nature and scope of a congressional investigation and the procedures a
congressional committee employs to conduct an investigation. The procedures that
Congress uses are dramatically different than those employed when individual
conduct is examined by either the executive or judicial branches of Government.
The manner in which the investigations differ should be understood by each
person reading this report and should be considered by Congress in deciding when
an investigation of this character is appropriate in the future.
The primary determinant of the character or scope of any governmental
investigation is dependent upon which branch of Government is responsible for
conducting it. Each of the three branches of
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government--legislative, executive, and judicial--is granted differing powers
and privileges by the Constitution. These powers and privileges differ to
reflect the differing societal goals and values intended to be achieved by the
functioning of each branch. Accordingly, the nature and scope of a congressional
investigation are determined by the powers and privileges granted to Congress by
the Constitution.
The Constitution assigns to Congress the power and responsibility for
legislating in particular areas. Although the Constitution does not expressly
grant Congress the power to investigate, it had been recognized by the Supreme
Court that "the power of inquiry--with process to enforce it--is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." (1) The Supreme Court
recognized that for Congress wisely or effectively to legislate required that it
have access to information and be able to compel the production of the
information before it. Consequently, it has long been recognized that the
failure of a citizen to respond to a subpena to testify at it congressional
hearing can result in fine and imprisonment, if the witness is convicted in
court of contempt of Congress. Similarly, a witness who appears before a
congressional committee may be found guilty of contempt if he refuses to testify
or respond to particular questions. The limits on congressional power to compel
testimony that can constitute a defense for a witness in any contempt trial are
few.
A fundamental defense is that the investigation is not in an area in which
Congress can constitutionally legislate. This defense, however, is, as a
practical matter, very limited, as Congress can enact legislation in many areas.
Further, even the ability of Congress to legislate concerning particular
activity has expanded over time. For example, under current Supreme Court
rulings, American society today is such that an activity would probably be
construed as affecting interstate commerce where it might not have been so
construed in the less complex economic markets of the early 1800's. As such, the
authority of Congress to legislate and investigate has grown. That an
investigation must be in an area in which Congress can legislate is, therefore,
not a substantial restriction on the scope of Congress to investigate.1
Perhaps the most significant limitation on the scope of a congressional
investigation is that the questions propounded to the witness must be pertinent
to the investigation. Yet that concept is not readily capable of precise
definition, and, most importantly. its application to a set of facts is not
ultimately resolved while the witness is before the committee. These two factors
also shape congressional hearings. For example, before the committee pertinent
questions about motive of a suspected "target" might include, in the Kennedy
investigation, attitudes about American policy toward the Cuban Government, or,
in the King investigation, questions concerning attitudes on racial relations.
Even questions about conduct occurring after the assassination might be
considered pertinent if the answers to them might be used to demonstrate similar
conduct prior to the assassination or to illuminate personal character traits,
including trustworthiness or
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propensity to violence. Accordingly, pertinency in the context of a
congressional hearing is an elastic concept that, when exploring a subject as
broad as the assassination of two of the Nation's leaders, is not in fact very
restrictive on the scope of the investigation.
Even when a question is propounded that the witness believes not pertinent,
there is substantial pressure on the witness to answer the question. The witness
may object to the question and ask the Chair to rule on the objection. Pursuant
to the rules of the House, the chairman of the committee is the person
responsible for ruling on a witness' objection to a question. Should the Chair
sustain the objection, the witness does not have to answer the question. Should
the chairman overrule the objection and direct the witness to answer, the
witness faces a difficult choice. The witness may. of course, decide to answer
the question. If he refuses to answer the question, however, he runs the risk of
being prosecuted in a court for criminal contempt. In any prosecution, the
witness will be able to raise the defense that he refused to answer the question
because it was not pertinent to the inquiry. If he prevails, he will be found
not guilty. If his defense is rejected, he will be found guilty and face fine
and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the contempt trial may come months or longer
after the witness refusal to testify before the committee. The witness does not
get an opportunity at the time of his appearance before the committee to have a
judicial ruling on the merits for his refusal to answer. Accordingly, witnesses
are under substantial pressure at the hearing to answer questions; they are
naturally reluctant to risk fine and imprisonment at a later date. The
pertinency objection, therefore, is also a restriction on the scope of a
congressional investigation that may be of limited impact.
The procedures of a congressional hearing also affected the committee's
assessment of the risks and dangers inherent in its addressing all four issues
it had tentatively identified. The procedures of a congressional hearing are
fundamentally different than those in a judicial context. A few clear examples
are sufficient to demonstrate the differences. First, there is no impartial
judge presiding over the congressional proceeding. An objection that a committee
member's question is impertinent is in fact ruled upon by the chairman of the
committee. Second, a "target" in a congressional hearing may be compelled by a
grant of immunity to testify despite his claim of the fifth amendment. In a
trial, a defendant. may not, be compelled to take the stand and testify. Third,
there are no constraints on what committee members may say publicly prior to the
appearance of a "target" of an investigation before a hearing; a prosecutor in a
criminal case is constrained by law to refrain from public comment prior to the
commencement of a trial. Fourth, unlike a defendant in a trial, a witness before
a committee has no right to object to the admissibility of evidence. Hearsay,
for example, is freely admissible in a congressional hearing, and witnesses may
be questioned on the basis of secondhand statements. Fifth, in the case of a
witness who is a "subject" or "target" of a congressional investigation, the
witness, unlike in a trial, has no absolute right to:
---Cross-examine witnesses who have testified against him;
---Have particular witnesses whom he desires to be subpenaed to appear before
the committee; or even
---Make a statement in his own behalf.
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Sixth, and just as important, the right of a witness before a committee to be
accompanied by an attorney, and the role of the attorney, are radically
different in a congressional hearing than in a judicial trial. Unlike a trial, a
witness ,before a congressional committee has no constitutional right to have an
attorney with him. The rules of the House do grant a witness the right to have
an attorney present, but it is a right conferred by the House and not the
Constitution; the scope of the right is defined by the House and not by judicial
authority. The rule provides that witnesses can be accompanied by counsel only
"for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights."
The committee recognized that by modifying its own procedures, it could
ameliorate some of the effect of the inherent dangers congressional procedures
might entail in the context of the special character of its inquiry.
Consequently, comment outside of the committee's hearings was severely
restricted by the committee rules. The committee also provided in its rules that
it would provide counsel for a witness who was financially or otherwise unable
to afford counsel; it allowed counsel to submit questions to the committee to be
asked of his or her client; and it allowed a witness or counsel time at the
conclusion of his testimony to make any statement to explain or amplify the
witness' testimony, or the opportunity to supplement the record. In addition, in
its hearings, the committee followed the practice of having the chairman of the
committee relinquish the Chair temporarily when he wished to ask a substantial
number of questions. 2
Nevertheless, distinctions between a congressional hearing and a trial remain,
and they cannot be eliminated without remaking the legislative function in the
image of judicial power. The outcome of a congressional hearing differs
radically from that of a trial. A congressional committee votes on its findings,
but, as witnessed in this report, there is no requirement for unanimity. Simple
majority vote suffices to issue a report of conclusions.
In addition, a congressional hearing need not, in its finding of facts for the
purpose of legislation, establish facts beyond a reasonable doubt. A committee
may base its legislation on facts it finds as probable, or even likely.
Consequently, a "target" may not obtain the vindication of his claims of
innocence that would be associated with a judicial verdict in his favor.
Suspicion about the "target" may linger, and the most dangerous injury to
reputation may, in fact, stem from lingering suspicion.
The differences in the nature and purpose of a congressional committee hearing
and a judicial trial are apparent--they exist because each proceeding is
designed to achieve differing societal goals. Some of the dangers considered by
the committee arise when a congressional hearing investigating conduct that is
criminal is mistaken for or confused with a criminal trial adjudicating whether
a person committed criminal acts. Others may be inherent in a congressional
hearing. It can be forcefully argued that when evidence of conduct that maybe
termed criminal is introduced before a congressional committee, but in the end
falls short of a clear and convincing or similar high standard
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of persuasion, the responsible course would be to refrain from making the
evidence public to protect the reputation of the person involved. Similarly, the
committee considered whether it should disclose information relevant to its
investigation out of concern for the privacy rights of individuals who were not
"targets" of the investigation.
The committee evaluated each of the four issues it had identified for
examination in fulfillment of its mandate in light of the perceived risks and
dangers to the reputations and rights of privacy of persons investigated, risks
and dangers arising from the character of a congressional investigation. The
committee determined that a complete analysis of all four, and public disclosure
of that analysis were necessary to fulfill its legislative responsibilities
under the Constitution. In addition, the committee determined that a complete
analysis of all four, and public disclosure of that analysis, were necessary to
fulfill its constitutional duty of in forming the public.
The fourth issue the committee identified--whether the amendment of existing
legislation or the enactment of new legislation is appropriate is, of course,
the essence of the legislative function. In order to fulfill this
responsibility, the committee had to have an independent and objective analysis
of the facts that surrounded each assassination, as well as the prior
investigations into the assassinations. The committee realized that to address
satisfactorily the fourth issue required, in essence, a complete analysis of the
other three issues. To consider intelligently issues related to, for example,
Presidential protection and deprivation of civil rights, it was necessary that
the committee determine the facts in President Kennedy's and Dr. King's
assassinations, and the earlier investigations of those assassinations.
Further, it was important to the committee that it was investigating areas in
which there had been prior legislation. Statutes had assigned numerous duties to
agencies and departments of the Federal Government. For example, the Secret
Service had responsibility for protecting President Kennedy, and the FBI
conducted the investigation into the assassination of Dr. King on the basis of
its being a possible conspiracy to violate Dr. King's civil rights, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The responsibility of the House to oversee the performance
of particular agencies and departments of the executive branch is of paramount
importance in insuring efficient, responsive and constitutional government. As
Woodrow Wilson observed: "Quite as important as legislating is vigilant
oversight of administration." (2) An assessment of the performance of agencies
such as the CIA, Secret Service, and FBI was consequently considered essential
by the committee. A careful and complete investigation into the third issue the
committee had identified--the performance of the agencies--was necessary to
fulfill the committee's responsibilities for oversight of the administration and
the determination of the adequacy of existing laws.
To address satisfactorily the performance of the agencies, however, the
committee required an independent determination of the facts in each
assassination. For example, it would be irresponsible for the committee to
criticize the manner in which the FBI conducted its investigation and the
conclusions it reached without the committee having made an independent
determination of what it believed to be the facts. Accordingly, it was necessary
for the committee to explore the first
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and second issues it identified--who the assassin(s) of President Kennedy and
Dr. King was (were), and if there was a conspiracy in either case--so that the
committee could effectively perform its oversight responsibilities in evaluating
the performance of the executive. As discussed, a resolution of these issues was
also necessary to determine whether the amendment of existing legislation or the
enactment of new legislation was appropriate.
Despite the acknowledged risks and dangers to the reputation or privacy of some
individuals, the committee believed that a complete analysis and disclosure of
all the issues it had identified was necessary to fulfill its legislative
mandate. There was an equally important reason, the committee believed, for
public disclosure of the facts bearing on these issues. The committee had an
obligation pursuant to its informing function under the Constitution to make
public to the American people the facts about each of these assassinations and
to respond to public concern about the performance of Government agencies and
departments.
The House of Representatives recognized that these two assassinations had been
of extraordinary concern to the American people when it debated and authorized
the creation of this committee. The American people clearly disbelieved the
conclusions that had been the official position of the U.S. Government. Despite
the official position of the Government that Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl
Ray were lone assassins, a Gallup Poll indicated that 80 percent of the American
people believed Lee Harvey Oswald had help and 70 percent believed James Earl
Ray had help. This public disbelief in the conclusions of the official
governmental investigations was a substantial factor in the creation of the
committee. (3)
The public concern, however, was far more significant than mere doubt about the
official conclusions of the investigations. Such doubt extended to far more
serious allegations concerning the agencies and departments of the Government.
These allegations ranged from intentional coverup of known coconspirators to
actual governmental complicity in the assassinations. Such allegations called
into question the very integrity of the governmental structure. The committee
did not believe it would suffice to respond to public concern simply by issuing
a finding on the question of agency and department complicity in the
assassination. No finding would receive public acceptance if supporting facts
were not presented, in fact, it would most likely increase suspicion of
governmental involvement in the assassinations if the finding as simply that
agencies and departments were not involved. The committee had a responsibility
to state who it believed had participated in each assassination, and what the
factual basis was for that conclusion.
To respond to public concern about the assassinations and the performance of the
executive agencies and departments, the committee believed its informing and
legislative functions required an independent determination and public
disclosure of the facts.
Woodrow Wilson wrote about the informing function of Congress:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every
affair of Government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the
eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.
Unless
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Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the
disposition of the administrative agents of the Government, the country must be
helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize
these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain
in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most
important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of
Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. (4)
The Supreme Court has similarly stated that it "does not doubt the importance of
informing the public about the business of Congress." 3
The committee's independent analysis of all four issues, and its informing the
public of that analysis, will allow each American to make an intelligent
judgment on the validity of allegations concerning the performance of agencies
and departments of the executive branch, as well as enable people to assess the
committee s own performance. It is essential not only that persons be able to
judge the performance of the executive agencies, but that they be able to judge
this committee's performance as well. Such is the very essence of representative
democracy.
The committee determined, therefore, that, despite the potential dangers and
risks inherent in its analysis of some of the issues it had identified to
fulfill its mandate, an analysis and the public disclosure of all of the facts
relating to the four issues was necessary to fulfill its legislating functions
under the Constitution. Further, the committee determined that an analysis and
disclosure of the facts relating to each issue was also necessary to fulfill its
constitutional informing responsibilities.
The committee's findings in this report are stated so as to be faithful and
accurate to the facts as found by the majority of the committee. The committee
found each fact in this report with no goal or standard except the committee's
commitment to ascertain the truth to the best of its ability. The committee
hopes that each person who reads this report appreciates the nature of a
congressional investigation, and that any potential dangers or harms from a
misunderstanding of the
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committee's work will therefore be minimized. The committee also hopes that the
Congress and other committees will carefully consider in the future the nature
and scope of congressional investigations in deciding what issues to
investigate, how they will be investigated, and in what manner the results of
the investigations should be disclosed.
Structure of the Investigation
Page 18
Structure of the Investigation
The investigation was broken into an exploratory phase and a concentrated
factfinding phase. During the exploratory phase, primarily prior to December 31,
1977, the committee undertook to master the critical literature that had been
written on the issues. The exploratory phase was also used for the purpose of
deciding what specific subjects were worthy of further investigation, taking
into account such factors as the passage of time since the assassinations were
committed. Many issues were scrutinized and given due consideration, but not
every possible lead nor every allegation that has been raised concerning these
assassinations was investigated by the committee. The committee recognized it
had finite time span and limited resources. 4 The committee established
priorities among the issues and investigated those which it deemed to be most
apt to resolve significant issues of public concern.
The concentrated phase of the investigation spanned the period from January to
July 1978. It was based on a detailed investigative plan that entailed a
step-by-step process of factfinding. The plans were designed to address the
first three questions the committee identified to fulfill its legislative
mandate: Who assassinated President Kennedy and Dr. King? Was there a conspiracy
in either case? How well did the Federal agencies perform? The plans were also
structured to account for the natural interrelationships among the three
questions.
The committee was acutely aware of the need for strict security precautions as
the investigation proceeded. This was necessary not only because of the
classified nature of the material the committee reviewed, but also because the
effectiveness of the committee's investigation could have been undermined by
premature disclosure of information. Further, the committee recognized that
unverified information concerning a person that was prematurely disclosed might
unjustly injure the reputation of that person. Accordingly, the committee
adopted stringent security procedures, requiring each member of the staff to
receive top-secret clearance. As an accommodation to the committee, the FBI
conducted background investigations, which were reviewed by the CIA. After
consultation with the FBI and CIA, the committee made its own determination on
each clearance.
At the same time that the committee was undertaking to assure the integrity of
its security system, it was making arrangements with Federal
agencies--principally the FBI and CIA--for the review of their materials, many
of which were classified. Memoranda of understanding between the committee and
the agencies were signed. They established a procedure for how the materials
would be handled. The
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CIA agreement was of particular importance since it provided for access to
classified information by members of the committee and its staff on a completely
unsanitized basis. No "sources or methods" information would be removed from any
material given to the committee. Access on such a basis was unprecedented by any
congressional committee.
As it undertook its investigation, the committee was fully aware that the
evidence of events that occurred 10 and 15 years in the past would be of varying
degrees of quality. The committee recognized that there were three general
categories of evidence. First, there was the evidence that would be developed by
the scientific projects such as autopsy, ballistics, handwriting, fingerprint,
photographic and acoustical analysis. Second, there was documentation that
existed in the form of governmental agency files. Third, there was the current
recollection of the event by witnesses.
The committee believed that the evidence of potentially the greatest reliability
was generally that of science Government files were of substantial value in
pursuing some areas of the investigation, but were of limited use in others
because of the particular issue the committee was pursuing or the nature of the
file. Finally, the committee recognized that witness testimony was sharply
qualified by problems of human perception and memory, as well as bias or motive
to lie.
The committee also found that the nature of the evidence for the two
assassinations was markedly different. For example, there was a relative
abundance of scientific evidence in the Kennedy assassination, as compared with
the King assassination. Field investigation by the committee staff consequently
assumed a somewhat greater significance in the King case than in the Kennedy
case.
The committee subjected the work of the FBI, Secret Service, CIA and other
agencies to critical scrutiny. If the investigations conducted in 1963-64 and
1968 were determined to be honest, thorough and competent, the results of those
investigations could be used to corroborate and to advance the independent work
of the committee with greater confidence in the resolution of issues. But the
converse was just as true. If the original investigation was found to be
deficient, its conclusions were evaluated accordingly and considered by the
committee as having little evidentiary value.
During the next phase of the committee's work--public presentation of the
evidence--it held 36 days of public evidentiary hearings from August through
December 1978. as well as 2 days of public policy hearings in December. This
phase was designed to present in public essential evidence on key issues in each
investigation. It was also designed to explore the public policy questions
raised by the assassinations.
In its public hearings, the committee received evidence on the issues it had
identified to fulfill its legislative mandate. It heard evidence on (1) the
facts and circumstances surrounding the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King
and the connections, if any, between those facts and circumstances and the
accused assassins. Led Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray; (2) the question of
whether there was a conspiracy in either case: and (3) the performances of the
various Federal agencies-- the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Warren Commission, and
others.
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In its policy meetings in December, the committee heard the testimony of the
directors or deputy directors of the FBI, CIA and Secret Service, and the Deputy
Attorney General, representing the Department of Justice. These policy hearings
explored the appropriateness of the amendment of existing legislation or the
enactment of new legislation in light of the evidence that had been received by
the committee.
The final phase of the committee's work included the preparation of this report,
which presents the committee's analysis and synthesis of the evidence the
committee obtained on all four issues the committee deemed necessary to fulfill
its mandate. The committee issues this report to fulfill its legislative and
informing responsibilities under the Constitution.
President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. each embodied aspects
of the best characteristics of the American spirit. They sought to elicit from
every American attitudes and actions that would make our society achieve its
great potential. The committee has attempted, therefore, to conduct its
investigations into the assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. King, and
present the results of those investigations, in a thorough and dignified manner
in keeping with the memory of these two great leaders.
Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassination of
President JFK
Page 21
I. FINDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY IN DALLAS, TEX., NOVEMBER 22, 1963
Introduction: The Kennedy Presidency in Perspective
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INTRODUCTION: THE KENNEDY PRESIDENCY IN PERSPECTIVE
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States, was shot to
death on November 22, 1963, while riding in a motorcade in Dallas, Tex. Kennedy
had represented for many the dawn of a new era of hope. In his account of the
Kennedy administration, "A Thousand Days," historian and Kennedy staff member
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote:
* * * [T]here can be no doubt that Kennedy's magic was not alone that of wealth
and power and good looks, or even of these things joined to intelligence and
will. It was, more than this, the hope that he could redeem American politics by
releasing American life from its various bondages to orthodoxy. (1)
When the young President died, much of the world grieved. West Berlin Mayor
Willy Brandt's words reflected the sense of loss:"A flame went out for all those
who had hoped for a just peace and a better world." (2) A stunned nation felt
deeply the loss of a promising leader. The assassination, wrote historian
Christopher Lasch, "helped to dispel the illusion that the United States was
somehow exempt from history, a nation uniquely favored and destined * * * to be
spared the turmoil and conflict which had always characterized the politics of
other countries." (3)
Presidential Assassinations in the United States
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PRESIDENTIAL ASSASSINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (4)
John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the fourth victim of Presidential assassination,
preceded by Abraham Lincoln in 1865, James A. Garfield in 1881, and William
McKinley in 1901.
The first Presidential assassination occurred within 1 week of the end of the
Civil War. President Lincoln was shot, by John Wilkes Booth on April 14, 1865,
while watching a British comedy, "Our American Cousin," at Ford's Theater in
Washington, D.C. He died the following morning. Booth, an actor and Confederate
sympathizer, fled Washington immediately after the crime. He reportedly was
trapped in a burning barn by Federal troops on April 26, 1865, where he died of
a gunshot wound to the head.
A military commission established to try persons accused of complicity in the
assassination of President Lincoln found that the murder was part of a
conspiracy to kill Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State
William H. Seward. Having lost
(21)
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heart, George A. Atzerodt did not attack Johnson as planned, but Seward was
seriously wounded by Lewis Payne, a former Confederate soldier. As a result of
the investigation by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the. U.S. Army,
several defendants were accused of conspiring with Confederate President
Jefferson Davis and a group of Confederate Commissioners in Canada to murder
Lincoln. The accused were Confederate courier John T. Surratt, his mother, Mary
E. Surratt, David Herold, a half-wit Confederate sympathizer, and Confederate
veterans Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin. Edward Spangler, a stagehand at
Ford's Theater, and Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, a physician who set the leg Booth
injured in his escape from the theater, were accused of aiding the assassin's
escape. Mrs. Surratt, Herold,Payne, and Atzerodt were found guilty and hanged on
July 19, 1865. Three others received life sentences. John Surratt initially fled
to Canada and then to Italy, where he joined the Papal Zouaves in Rome under an
assumed name. He was captured in November 1866 and returned to the United States
to stand trial on charges of complicity in the assassination. He was freed when
the trial ended with a hung jury.
Several conspiracy theories emerged after the Lincoln assassination. Surratt's
flight to Italy, coupled with the fact that many of Booth's co-conspirators were
Roman Catholic, stirred the anti-Catholic sentiments of the "Know-Nothing
Movement", which charged that the assassination was part of a Papist plot.
Although the military commission ultimately dismissed the contention that the
conspirators were in league with Jacob Thompson, head of the Confederate
Commission to Canada, under the supervision of Confederate President Jefferson
Davis, that theory also persisted. Another contention was advanced by those who
opposed the execution of Mrs. Surratt. Suspicious of those in charge of her
arrest and prosecution, they believed that Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton was
the real mastermind of the assassination.
In 1866 and 1867, the House of Representatives authorized two separate
investigations into the death of President Lincoln. (5) Neither finally laid to
rest the suspicions around the death of President Lincoln.
President James A. Garfield was shot in the back by Charles J. Guiteau on July
2, 1881, in Washington, D.C. Guiteau, a religious fanatic and would-be
officeholder, had been denied access to the White House after he had asked to be
appointed U.S. Ambassador to Austria. When Garfield appointed James A. Blaine as
Secretary of State, an incensed Guiteau apparently believed that the President
had betrayed a faction of the Republican Party.
In the ensuing murder trial, there was no suggestion that the defendant was
involved in any conspiracy. Guiteau maintained that he had acted as an agent of
God in a political emergency and therefore was not guilty of wrongdoing. Despite
a history of mental illness in Guiteau's family, the insanity defense presented
by his counsel failed. Giteau was declared sane, found guilty and hanged before
a large crowd. Contrary to events following the Lincoln assassination, no
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theories of possible conspiracy surfaced in the wake of Garfield's slaying.
While attending the Pan-American Exposition at Buffalo, N.Y., on September 6,
1901, President William McKinley was shot. He died 8 days later, the victim of
assassin Leon F. Czolgosz, a factory worker and anarchist. Although an anarchist
group had published a warning about Czolgosz 5 days before McKinley was shot and
Czolgosz insisted he had acted alone, many believed that the assassination was
the result of an anarchist plot Czolgosz refused to testify at his own trial
which was held 4 days after McKinley's funeral. After 34 minutes of
deliberation, the jury found him guilty of murder. Czolgosz did not appeal the
verdict, and he was executed in the electric chair.
McKinley's assassination came after a wave of anarchist terrorism in Europe.
Between 1894 and 1900, anarchist assassins had killed M.F. Sadi Carnot,
President of France; Elizabeth, Empress of Austria; and Humbert I, King Of
Italy. Following McKinley's death vigilantes in the United States attacked
anarchist communities. Anarchist leaders such as Emma Goldman were arrested.
Responding to a plea by the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, Congress passed a
series of restrictive measures that limited the activities of anarchists and
added alien anarchists to the list of excluded immigrants. Despite a spate of
frenzied charges of an anarchist conspiracy, no plot was ever proven, and the
theories appeared to collapse shortly after the execution of Czolgosz.
Three Presidents who preceded John F. Kennedy were the targets of attempted
assassinations. On January 30, 1835, Richard Lawrence tried to kill President
Andrew Jackson on the steps of the U.S. Capitol, but both pistols he carried
misfired, and Jackson was not injured. Following the attempt, some of Jackson's
supporters charged a Whig conspiracy, but this allegation was never
substantiated. Lawrence was found not guilty by reason of insanity and spent the
rest of his life in mental institutions.
On February 15, 1933, in Miami, Fla., President-elect. Franklin D. Roosevelt was
fired upon by Guiseppe Zangara, an unemployed Italian immigrant bricklayer.
Zangara missed Roosevelt, but mortally wounded Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak.
Zangara was tried, found guilty of murder and executed. No conspiracy was
charged in the shooting.
Two Puerto Rican nationalists attacked Blair House, the temporary residence of
President Harry S. Truman in Washington, D.C., on November 1, 1950, with the
apparent intention of assassinating the President. A White House guard and one
of the nationalists, Griselio Torresola, were killed in the ensuing gun battle.
The surviving nationalist, Oscar Collazo, explained that the action against
Truman had been sparked by news of a revolt in Puerto Rico. He believed the
assassination would call the attention of the American people to the appalling
economic conditions in his country. The two would-be assassins were acting in
league with P. Albuzio Campos, president of the Nationalist Party of Puerto
Rico. Truman was not harmed during the assault. Collazo was tried and sentenced
to death, but President Truman commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.
A New President
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A NEW PRESIDENT
In an era when the United States was confronted with intractable, often
dangerous, international and domestic issues, the. Kennedy administration was
inevitably surrounded by controversy as it made .policies to deal with the
problems it faced. Although a popular President, John F. Kennedy was reviled by
some, an enmity inextricably related to his policies. The possibility of nuclear
holocaust overshadowed the administration's reshaping of cold war foreign policy
as it grappled with Cuba, Berlin, Laos, Vietnam, relations in the Third World
and Western Europe, and U.S. military strength. At home, an emerging Black
protest movement, persistent unemployment, poverty and urban blight,
governmental disorganization, congressional resistance to the President's New
Frontier program, and the menace of organized crime were among the problems
Kennedy faced. He relied on the counsel of some of the foremost thinkers of his
age, as he pursued new approaches in leading the country.
In the summer of 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy won the Democratic Party's
nomination for President. In his acceptance speech, he emphasized the challenges
of the 1960's and declared that "we stand today on the edge of a 'New
Frontier'," a phrase that later became attached to his program. Two days before
his election in November, Kennedy pledged, "I am not promising action in the
first 100 days alone. I am promising you 1,000 days of exacting Presidential
leadership." With the slogan "Let's get this country moving again," he pledged
to combat unemployment, the sluggish economy, what he called a missile gap, and
the Communist government in Havana. Kennedy defeated the Republican candidate,
Richard M. Nixon, by a slim margin of 118,450 out of nearly 69 million votes
cast. He was the first Roman Catholic and, at age 43, the youngest man ever
elected President.
On a cold January morning in 1961, the new President stood before the Nation
that elected him and voiced these memorable words:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill that we shall pay any
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe,
to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
No words could have portrayed more aptly the determination of John F. Kennedy as
he assumed office as the spokesman for "a new generation of Americans." His
mettle yet to be tested, an articulate, confident new President confronted the
issues that put him in conflict with forces at home and abroad.
Despite his narrow election victory, Kennedy's popularity was high at the time
he took office. The Gallup Poll showed a 69 percent favorable rating. During his
term, that popularity fluctuated, and, in the autumn of 1963. it appeared to be
in decline. It was concern over that slump and the implications for the 1964
Presidential contest that led, in large part, to Kennedy's decision to make the
ill-fated Texas trap in November 1963.
Foreign Affairs: A Fragile Peace
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS: A FRAGILE PEACE
The cold war was President Kennedy's foremost concern, as the United States and
the Soviet Union stood poised to obliterate each other or to coexist. Kennedy,
who emphasized the need for a strong military during his campaign, tacked an
additional $4 billion to the defense budget approved by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower. To demonstrate that the United States would not retreat from its
treaty commitments, his military buildup was the largest in the peacetime
history of the country. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower
had relied almost exclusively on a rigid foreign policy based on nuclear power
and military pacts. Rejecting "massive retaliation" with nuclear arms, Kennedy
urged the strengthening of conventional forces and emphasized the need for a
flexible, diversified military that would counter the threat posed by Communist
guerrilla armies. Nonetheless, he was committed to negotiation and steadfastly
pursued a. nuclear arms limitation treaty, despite Soviet threats in Cuba,
Berlin, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Some critics were confused by his call
for a strong military while pursuing a nuclear treaty, but Kennedy saw military
preparedness as the foundation for achieving peaceful solutions.
Kennedy's first move in United States-Soviet relations was to reply to Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev's January 1961 congratulatory note:
We are ready and anxious to cooperate with all who are prepared to join in
genuine dedication to the assurance of a peaceful and more fruitful life for
mankind.
The Cuban threat
With Premier Fidel Castro's increasing ties to the Soviet Union, Communist Cuba,
just 90 miles from the United States, became an early focal point of Kennedy
administration concern. In February 1961, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Andrei
Gromyko visited Cuba to arrange large-scale economic and military assistance.
The United
States ended formal diplomatic contacts with Cuba shortly after Gromyko's trip.
Soon after taking office, Kennedy learned that since the spring of 1960, the
U.S. Government had been training a guerrilla force of antiCastro Cuban exiles
in Florida and Guatemala-with the ultimate objective of invading Cuba and
overthrowing Castro. Kennedy sanctioned the training and reluctantly allowed the
invasion to proceed, but he limited U.S. participation and support.
On April 17, 1961, a force of anti-Castro Cuban refugees attempted to establish
a-beachhead in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The United States had grossly
underestimated the popular support for the Castro regime. An anticipated
internal uprising never occurred, and Castro's forces defeated the invaders
within a few days. President Kennedy accepted "sole responsibility" for the
debacle when the United States could no longer disavow its role in the iII-fated
expedition. Privately, however, he blamed the CIA and reportedly vowed to
"splinter the agency into a thousand pieces."
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The Cuban Revolutionary Council, a group of anti-Castro exiles that was to have
become the provisional government after Castro's overthrow, was particularly
bitter about the Bay of Pigs. Its principal leaders Antonio Maceo, Justo
Carillo, Carlos Heria, Antonio de Varona, Manuel Ray and Jose Miro Cardona--had
formed the Council with the CIA's sanction and had been promised recognition by
the U.S. Government. They were outraged by the failure of the United States to
support the invasion force. At a meeting with President Kennedy shortly after
the invasion, the angry leaders blamed his military advisors for the defeat, but
Kennedy replied that he alone was responsible. On the other hand, Kennedy
attempted to reassure them, promising that the United States was committed to
returning Cuban refugees to their homeland.
A stunning setback for the new administration, the Bay of Pigs defeat resulted
in worldwide criticism of the United States, both its role in the invasion and
for its reluctance to back the refugees with sufficient force to allow the
expedition to succeed. It also gave Khrushchev the occasion to lecture the new
President on international morality and raised questions about Kennedy as a
coolheaded leader. While anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States believed
they had been betrayed by Kennedy and accused him of being a weak leader who was
soft on communist, the administration was criticized from the left as a
reactionary return to barbarism.
Kennedy traveled to Europe in June and met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev for 12
hours in Vienna, Austria. Nuclear testing, disarmament, and Berlin were
discussed, but the leaders reached no agreement. Khrushchev threatened to end
four-power control of Berlin by signing a treaty with East Germany that would
give it control over access routes to West Berlin. In late June, he told the
allies to get out of the city by the end of the year, charging that the air
corridors were being used to import spies and saboteurs into East Germany.
On his return to the United States, Kennedy said:
I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that the security of Western Europe, and
therefore our own security, are deeply involved in our presence and our access
rights to West Berlin; that those rights are based on law and not on sufferance;
and that we are determined to maintain those rights at any risk and thus meet
our obligation to the people of West Berlin, and their right to choose their own
future.
Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's threat with a call for 217,000 more men in
uniform. He ordered the draft doubled, tripled if neces sary, and requested
authority to activate Reserve and National Guard units. With the Soviet
determination to eliminate West Berlin and the U.S. commitment to preserve it,
the prospect of a third world war was greater than ever. The crisis intensified
with the August 1961construction of a wall that prevented eastern European
refugees from entering West Berlin. The United States responded by sending
troops and tanks to West Berlin. Western rights remained intact, and the crisis
subsided with Khrushchev's decision in late 1961 not to sign a treaty with East
Germany. U.S. armored units in Berlin were pulled back in January 1962.
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Combating communist in Latin America
Meanwhile, to encourage progressive democracy in the underdeveloped world, the
administration embarked on programs of assistance. Peace Corps volunteers
brought technical and educational expertise to emerging areas. Promising to
"transform the American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas
and efforts," Kennedy deter mined to wipe out the seedbed of communist in Latin
America and contain Communist Cuba by raising the living standards with his
Alliance for Progress. He proposed that the Latin American Republics join the
United States in a 10-year plan for developing the Americas to satisfy the basic
needs of housing, employment, land, health care, and education, thus relieving
the economic distress that made the countries vulnerable to Castro-style
revolutions. Formed in August 1961, the Alliance for Progress received the
enthusiastic support of many Latin Americans, which was evident in the acclaim
for Kennedy when he visited Colombia and Venezuela in 1961 and Mexico in 1962.
At the Inter-American Conference in January 1962, he said, "I think communist
has been isolated in this hemisphere and I think the hemi sphere can move toward
progress."
The arms race
An escalating arms race and the harmful effects of radioactive contamination
from nuclear tests deeply troubled the Kennedy administration. Despite an
earlier promise by Khrushchev to join the United States in a no-test policy, the
Soviets resumed nuclear tests on August 30, 1961, and exploded 50 devices that
fall. Kennedy urged Khrushchev to join with the United States and Great Britain
in an agreement banning atmospheric tests. When the Soviet Premier refused,
Kennedy ordered resumption of underground tests. In March 1962, after studying
Soviet advances, Kennedy reluctantly renewed atmospheric tests with a series of
blasts over Christmas Island in the central Pacific. He told a writer it was his
fate to "take arms against a sea of troubles and, by opposing, end them."
The missile crisis
Acting on his pledge to defend the Western Hemisphere if it was threatened by
Soviet aggression, Kennedy faced the greatest crisis of his brief Presidency in
Cuba in October' 1962. It was the closest the world had ever come to nuclear
war. On October 16, aerial reconnaissance photographs of Cuba appeared to show
installation of offensive nuclear missiles. This initial discovery was verified,
and on October 20, Kennedy returned abruptly to Washington from a political trip
to Chicago on the pretext of a sudden cold. On Monday, October 22, he revealed
that the United States had discovered from aerial photographs that the Soviet
Union had deployed ballistic missiles and Ilyushin-28 bombers in Cuba. He
announced that he had ordered an air-sea quarantine on all offensive weapons
bound for Cuba and promised more drastic action if the missiles and bombers were
not removed. President Kennedy grimly stated that the United States would
intercept any Soviet vessel with arms and that the United States would retaliate
if the Soviets attacked any nation in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Armed
Forces were at combat readiness on "maximum alert." After a tense 6 days,
Khrushchev announced his decision
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to dismantle and withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba in return for Kennedy's
agreement not to invade Cuba and to lift the blockadeKennedy received widespread
international support during the, missile crisis and was later credited with
having achieved a turning point in the cold war favorable to the West.
Among anti-Castro Cuban exiles and some rightwing factionis in this country,
however, there was outrage over Kennedy's decision. Despite his reassurance that
the Cubans would be returned to their homeland, he had promised not to invade
Cuba. Militant rightwing extremists argued that the United States should have
invaded Cuba, removed the Russians and their arms, and toppled Castro.
On December 29, 1962, President Kennedy greeted over 1,000 Cubans who had been
captured at the Bay of Pigs and ransomed from Castro's jails by the United
States. In a ceremony at the Orange Bowl in Miami, he accepted the brigade's
invasion flag and addressed in their concerns about the future. The President
declared, "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a
free Cuba.
Southeast Asia
Abandoning the Eisenhower administration's mistrust of neutral nations, Kennedy
pursued a cautious approach in Laos where Communists had captured many of the
northern provinces in 1961. In July 1962, the United States was able to get all
parties in Laos to agree to a tripartite coalition government and withdrawal of
all foreign troops.
In South Vietnam, however, the administration decided to take a stand against
Communist inspired "wars of liberation." U.S. involvement dated back to 1956,
when the Eisenhower administration backed the decision of the South Vietnamese
Government to postpone elections there because Communist victory appeared
imminent. The United States was pledged to support the pro-American regime of
Ngo Dinh Diem in the fear that if one Southeast Asian nation fell to the
Communists, others would soon follow. Kennedy continued that policy, although
with growing reluctance by 1963.
In 1961, Viet Cong guerrillas backed by Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam attacked
South Vietnamese troops, murdered officials, and placed the Diem regime in
jeopardy. Kennedy responded initially by sending more than 4,000 military
advisers to South Vietnam and, over the following months, U.S. participation
grew steadily. In his move away from the "all or nothing" nuclear arsenal
strategy of the 1950's, Kennedy emphasized a varied military capability to meet
the jungle warfare tactics of the enemy in countries such as Vietnam. He also
directed economic aid to Southeast Asia to meet the Communist threat there. In
November 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that the United
States was winning the war in south Vietnam.
When the Chinese invaded northern India in 1962, Kennedy authorized an airlift
of arms to halt the Chinese Communist advance.
Pledge to defend Europe
To some critics, Kennedy's foreign policy, combining military bluster with
negotiation, appeared vacillating and self-defeating. Their misgivings seemed to
be confirmed by actions of some traditional allies of the United States.
President Charles de Gaulle of France, for example, insisted on a defense
capability independent of the United
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States and refused to sign any nuclear arms limitation treaty, thus threatening
the cohesiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition,
Kennedy's acceptance of the principle of neutrality, manifested by the Laos
agreement, was criticized by some who believed countries were either American
friends or enemies.
Kennedy reasserted his pledge to defend Western Europe during a trip there in
June 1963. "The United States will risk its cities to defend yours," he assured
the West Germans, who feared a pullout of U.S. troops. In a speech to an
enthusiastic West Berlin crowd, Kennedy described himself as a "Berliner,"
saying that "all free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin."
Cold war thaw
Uneasiness over Cuba continued in 1963. The Soviet presence was symbolized by an
attack of a Cuban Air Force MIG fighter on an American shrimp boat in March
1963. Some 17,000 Russian troops still occupied the island nation, and 500
antiaircraft missiles plus a large supply of other Soviet armaments were
emplaced there.
Yet, with Kennedy's foreign policy emphasis on gradual progress, a thaw in the
cold war was perceptible. In a major policy address on June 10, 1963, at
American University in Washington, D.C., Kennedy proposed a "strategy of peace"
to lead the United States and Soviet Union out of the "vicious and dangerous
cycles" of the cold war.
Let us focus on a peace based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on
a gradual evolution of human institutions.
He announced that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would
begin work on a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests.
A major accomplishment of the Kennedy administration, the nuclear test ban
treaty, was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and ratified by the U.S. Senate
in September. This limited treaty, prohibiting atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons, represented the first limitation of arms expansion since the beginning
of the cold war in 1945. The administration had hoped, however, for a more
comprehensive agreement. Underground testing was not covered because of Soviet
resistance to onsite inspection, and China and France refused to sign the
treaty.
Although praised by many as a step toward peace, the treaty had its detractors.
Air Force Gen. Thomas D. White described it. as "next to unilateral
disarmament." while scientist Edward Teller called for resumption of atmospheric
testing to maintain American nuclear supremacy.
In October, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to
refrain from using nuclear weapons in outer space.
Growing involvement in Vietnam
The Vietnam conflict intensified and U.S. involvement expanded steadily,
although Kennedy refused to make any major increases in support. By October
1963, the United States had 16,000 troops in South Vietnam. As U.S. helicopters
flew combat support missions and U.S. planes strafed enemy lines, U.S. advisers
radically altered life there with the strategic hamlet resettlement program, an
effort to concen-
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trate the population in various areas. Some Americans criticized this
involvement in support of the Diem dictatorship. At the insistence of his
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the Roman Catholic Diem had instituted a number of
repressive measures against the country's Buddhists, who made up 70 percent of
the population. His troops attacked pagodas, and Buddhists were jailed. The
self-immolation of protesting Buddhist monks dramatically called into question
the American role in Vietnam.
By threatening withdrawal of economic support, the United States sought to
persuade the Diem government to change its brutal policies. Diem resisted,
denying that the Buddhists were being persecuted and charging that in fact they
were aiding the Communists by demanding a change of government. U.S. advisers
warned that Diem's unpopular regime imperiled the battle against the Viet Cong.
On November 1, 1963, Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed in a military coup.
The United States quickly recognized the new government.
Detente
Kennedy's willingness to negotiate with the Russians, combined with a
Sino-Soviet split, cased East-West tension and sparked optimism about the
prospects for world peace. Other moves indicating Soviet-American detente and
peaceful coexistence included installation of a "hot line" emergency telephone
system from Washington to Moscow in the summer of 1963, approval of the sale of
4 million tons of surplus wheat to the Soviet Union, and initiation of cultural
exchange programs. Kennedy also made overtures to Castro concerning
normalization of relations, a move that enraged anti-Castro exiles in the United
States. His steps away from dangerous nuclear diplomacy were praised by many,
but some doubted that Kennedy's policy would contain communist and insure the
strength of the United States.
At Home: A Troubled Land
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AT HOME: A TROUBLED LAND
President Kennedy's New Frontier domestic program was not readily accepted. The
administration's relations with Congress, domi nated as it was by a conservative
bloc of Republicans and southern Democrats, were difficult. Kennedy's major
proposals--aid to education, medical care for the elderly and the creation of a
Department of Urban Affairs--were rejected. Although measures were adopted to
increase Federal aid to depressed areas, to increase and expand the minimum
wage, and to increase social security benefits, the administration failed to
persuade Congress to enact the widespread social legislation it sought.
Civil rights progress
The administration's most dramatic accomplishments were in the area of civil
rights, though the President did not live to see the passage of the
comprehensive legislation he proposed, the most far-reaching since
Reconstruction. Kennedy appointed Blacks to high administration posts and to
Federal judgeships. He gave Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy his sanction for
vigorous enforcement of civil
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rights laws to extend voting rights, end segregation and fight racial
discrimination. Attorney General Kennedy expanded the Civil Rights Division of
the Department of Justice, and President Kennedy issued a strongly worded
Executive order against discrimination in employment that established a
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity headed by Vice President Johnson.
Kennedy's civil rights program, however, increasingly alienated southerners and
conservatives.
Violence erupted soon after Kennedy took office. In May 1961, the Congress of
Racial Equality staged a series of freedom rides in Alabama in an effort to
integrate buses and terminals. One bus was burned by a mob in Anniston, Ala. An
angry segregationist crowd attacked demonstrators in Montgomery, Ala., and
several persons were injured. Attorney General Kennedy ordered several hundred
U.S. marshals to Montgomery to protect the demonstrators. National Guardsmen
with fixed bayonets scattered a mob that tried to overwhelm the marshals, who
were protecting a mass meeting at a Black church where civil rights leader
Martin Luther King, Jr., was speaking.
Sparked by the vicious treatment of the nonviolent demonstrators, protests
continued in Mississippi. The Attorney General petitioned the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and in September 1961, the ICC adopted rules banning
segregation on interstate buses and in terminals.
Trouble exploded again in 1962 when James Meredith, a 29-year-old Black Air
Force veteran, gained admission to the all-white University of Mississippi.
Meredith had been refused admission, despite Federal court orders requiring that
he be enrolled. The Kennedy administration supported an effort to force
compliance by the State, but Governor Ross Barnett was equally determined to
defy the orders. In his fourth attempt to enroll at the university, Meredith
arrived in Oxford on September 30, escorted by 300 U.S. marshals. He was met by
a mob of 2,500 students and segregationist extremists who howled,
"Two-four-one-three, we hate Kennedy." The hecklers attacked the marshals with
bricks and bottles. The marshals responded with tear gas. A bloody night-long
riot that. left two dead and scores injured quelled only after Federal troops
had been dispatched by President Kennedy. Meredith registered the next day and
began classes with the protection of marshals, who remained with him until his
graduation in August 1963.
Urging the need for legislation in a February 28, 1963, address to Congress on
civil rights, President Kennedy attacked the scourge, of racial discrimination:
Race discrimination hampers our economic growth by preventing the maximum
development and utilization of our manpower. It hampers our world leadership by
contradicting at home the message we preach abroad. It mars the atmosphere of a
united and classless society in which this Nation rose to greatness. It
increases the costs of public welfare, crime, delinquency and disorder. Above
all, it is wrong. Therefore, let it be clear, in our own hearts and minds, that
it is not merely because of the economic waste of discrimination, that we are
committed to achieving true equality of opportunity. The basic reason is because
it is right.
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Although the administration's civil rights policies generated the dogged
opposition of segregationists in the South, Black leaders criticized the
President for not pursuing change even more forcefully. Dr. King said:
This administration has outstepped all previous ones in the breadth of its civil
rights activity. Yet the movement, instead of breaking out into the open plains
of progress, remains con stricted and confirmed. A sweeping revolutionary force
is pressed into a narrow tunnel. (7)
Blacks continued demonstrations for equal rights in the spring of 1963. In April
and May, Dr. King led an attack on what he called "the most segregated city in
the United States," Birmingham, Ala. Demonstrators were met by police dogs,
electric cattle prods and fire hoses. The brutal response to the nonviolent
protestors led to worldwide outrage. Black leaders and Birmingham community
leaders ultimately reached a compromise agreement to integrate public
facilities. Birmingham became a rallying cry for the civil rights movement
across the Nation. Over 700 demonstrations swept the South that summer, and
northern public opinion increasingly supported the protestors.
In June 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace, in defiance of a Federal court
order, stood on the steps of the University of Alabama to prevent the admission
of two Black students. Wallace bowed, however, to National Guard troops that had
been federalized by the President. The Black students entered the university. In
the same month, Medgar Evers, the NAACP field secretary for Mississippi was shot
to death in front of his home in Jackson, Miss.
The turbulence sparked President Kennedy's special message to Congress in June
1963, in which he asked the legislators to help end "rancor, violence, disunity
and national shame" by pushing what was described as the most sweeping civil
rights legislation since Reconstruction. The bill would, among other things
guarantee access to public accommodations and the right to vote. "We are
confronted primarily with the moral issue," Kennedy said. He warned that Federal
inaction would mean continued racial strife, declaring, "The fires of
frustration and discord will burn in every city, North and South, where legal
remedies are not at hand."
On August 28, 1963, an interracial group of more than 200,000 persons joined
"The March for Jobs and Freedom" in Washington, D.C., to urge the Congress to
pass the comprehensive civil rights legislation the Kennedy administration
envisioned. Violence shattered the hopeful mood in the wake of the Washington
march when a bomb exploded on September 17 at the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Ala. during a Sunday School session. Four young Black
girls were killed and 23 other persons were injured. Despite the national
unrest, Congress did not rush to pass the civil rights bill.
Economic policies
Kennedy's Keynesian, New Deal economic policies brought him into conflict with
business. For example, he advocated deficit spending at a time of economic
growth in an attempt to overcome persistent high
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unemployment. He also proposed costly welfare programs to improve the plight of
the Nation's poor and issued voluntary wage-price guidelines that he was
determined to enforce.
As the Kennedy administration grappled with thorny economic issues--persistent
unemployment, recession--a steel price hike set the stage for the most dramatic
economic crisis of Kennedy's term. In March 1962, the administration persuaded
the United Steel Workers Union to accept a contract he called "noninflationary"
in the belief that such an agreement would ameliorate the recession by
preventing a rise in prices. A few days later, however, the U.S. Steel Corp.
announced an increase of 3.5 percent, or $6 per ton, and most other steel
companies followed suit. Kennedy commented, "My father always told me all
businessmen are sons-of-bitches, but I never believed it until now." (8) In the
3 days that followed the increase, four antitrust investigations of the steel
industry were initiated, a bill to roll back the price increase was considered,
wage and price controls were discussed and the Department of Defense began to
divert purchases away from U.S. Steel. Kennedy denounced the increase as "wholly
unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of the public interest.," and said the
steel industry had shown its "utter contempt for their fellow citizens." U.S.
Steel finally rescinded the price increase when several other steel companies
said they would hold the price line. Despite the President's assurance after the
steel crisis subsided that "this administration harbors no ill will against any
individual, any industry, corporation, or segment of the American economy,"
business leaders complained about Government interference and hostility.
Government reform
Kennedy was also concerned about the autonomy of Federal agencies and
reorganization of the Federal bureaucracy. He saw a need for greater control
over the Central Intelligence Agency after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Its
independent role in the Southeast Asian conflict and in Cuba particularly
troubled him. The CIA's budget was twice that of the State Department, its staff
had doubled in the 1950's, and, it was said by its critics, in some Embassies it
had more personnel than the State Department. Kennedy replaced Director Allen
Dulles with John McCone, cut the Agency's budget, and assigned Robert Kennedy as
Agency watchdog.
Kennedy's relations with Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar
Hoover were cool. In an attempt to bridle the independent Hoover, the
administration insisted that the facts reflect the law that the FBI was under
the Department of Justice and that the Department was led by the Attorney
General. Attorney General Robert Kennedy also compelled a reluctant Hoover to
investigate civil rights and organized crime cases.
War on organized crime
The Kennedy administration made an unprecedented effort to fight the insidious
menace of organized crime. The President had first encountered the problem when
he became a member of the Senate Select Committee on Labor Racketeering. Robert
Kennedy was chief counsel of the committee, and later, as Attorney General, he
became the President's surrogate in a campaign against the underworld.
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34
Dramatic developments in the war on organized crime had occurred Just before
Kennedy came to the White House. A roundup of hoodlums in Apalachin, N.Y., in
1957, followed by an abortive prosecution of many of the leaders, demonstrated
the impotence of Federal enforcement. The Senate testimony of Mafia member
Joseph Valachi in 1963 became the catalyst for a renewed effort to strengthen
Federal criminal laws that could be used to control the threat of organized
crime.
The zeal of the Kennedy brothers signified the roughest period for organized
crime in Department of Justice history. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote
in "Robert Kennedy and His Times" that, as a result of the Attorney General's
pressure, "the national Government took on organized crime as it had never done
before." (9) Schlesinger observed:
In New York, Robert. Morgenthau, the Federal attorney, successfully prosecuted
one syndicate leader after another. The Patriarca gang in Rhode Island and the
De Cavalcante gang in New Jersey were smashed. Convictions of racketeers by the
Organized Crime Section and the Tax Division steadily increased--96 in 1961, 101
in 1960, 373 in 1963. So long as John Kennedy sat in the White HoUse, giving his
Attorney General absolute backing, the underworld knew that the heat was on.
(10)
The Attorney General focused on targets he had become acquainted with as counsel
for the Rackets Committee. He was particularly concerned about the alliance of
the top labor leaders and racketeers as personified by Teamster President James
R. Hoffa. Schlesinger wrote that "the pursuit of Hoffa was an aspect of the war
against organized crime." (11) He added:
The relations between the Teamsters and the syndicates continued to grow. The
FBI electronic microphone, planted from 1961 to 1964 in the office of Anthony
Giacalone, a Detroit hood, revealed Hoffa's deep if wary involvement with the
local mob. For national purposes a meeting place was the Rancho La Costa Country
Club near San Clemente, Calif., built with $27 million in loans from the
Teamsters pension fund; its proprietor, Morris B. Dalitz, had emerged from the
Detroit [sic. Cleveland] underworld to become a Las Vegas and Havana gambling
figure. Here the Teamsters and the mob golfed and drank together. Here they no
doubt reflected that, as long as John Kennedy was President, Robert Kennedy
would be unassailable. (12)
As with the Civil Rights Division, Robert Kennedy expanded the Organized Crime
Division at Justice. As a result of information collected by the FBI syndicate
operations were seriously disrupted in some cases, and leading organized crime
figures were concerned about the future.
Opposition from the far right
As the policies of the Kennedy administration broke new ground, political
extremists in the United States seemed increasingly willing
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to resort to violence to achieve their goals. In an address at the University of
Washington in Seattle on November 16, 1961, President Kennedy discussed the age
of extremism: two groups of frustrated citizens, one urging surrender and the
other urging war. He said:
It is a curious fact that each of these extreme opposites resembles the other.
Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement or war, suicide or
surrender, humiliation or holocaust, to be either Red or dead.
The radical right condemned Kennedy for his "big Government" policies, as well
as his concern with social welfare and civil rights progress. The
ultraconservative John Birch Society, Christian AntiCommunist Crusade led by
Fred C. Schwarz, and the Christian Crusade led by Rev. Billy James Hargis
attracted an anti-Kennedy following. The right wing was incensed by Kennedy's
transfer of Gen. Edwin A. Walker from his command in West Germany to Hawaii for
distributing right-wing literature to his troops. The paramilitary Minutemen
condemned the administration as "soft on communist" and adopted guerrilla
warfare tactics to prepare for the fight against the Communist foe. At the other
extreme, the left labeled Kennedy a reactionary disappointment, a tool of the
"power elite."
President Kennedy saw the danger of a politically polarized society and spoke
against extremist solutions, urging reason in an ordered society. In the text of
the speech he had planned to deliver in Dallas on November 22, 1963, he wrote:
Today * * * voices are heard in the land--voices preaching doctrines wholly
unrelated to reality, wholly unsuited to the sixties, doctrines which apparently
assume that words will suffice without weapons, that vituperation is as good as
victory and that peace is a sign of weakness.
November 1963: A Trip to Texas
Page 35
NOVEMBER 1963: A TRIP TO TEXAS (13)
At the beginning, John F. Kennedy had been an extremely popular President. His
ratings, ironically, were highest in the aftermath of the April 1961 Bay of Pigs
invasion, when he received a remarkable 83 percent approval rating in the Gallup
Poll. But by the fall of 1963, he had slipped to 59 percent, and he became
concerned about the political implications. In October, Newsweek magazine
reported that the civil rights issue alone had cost Kennedy 3.5 million votes,
adding that no Democrat in the White House had ever been so disliked in the
South. In Georgia, the marquee of a movie theater showing PT 109 read, "See how
the Japs almost got Kennedy" (14)
An inveterate traveler, Kennedy interspersed his diplomatic missions abroad with
trips around the country. He made 83 trips in 1963. In June he visited Germany,
Ireland and Italy; later in the summer he toured the western United
States--North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Washington, Utah, Oregon, Nevada and
California--to gain support for his legislative program.
Not only did Kennedy enjoy traveling, but he almost recklessly resisted the
protective measures the Secret Service urged him to adopt. He would not allow
blaring sirens, and only once--in Chicago in November 1963--did he permit his
limousine to be flanked by motor-
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36
cycle police officers. He told the special agent in charge of the White House
detail that he did not want agents to ride on the rear of his car.
Kennedy was philosophical about danger. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, "A
Thousand Days," Kennedy believed assassination was a risk inherent in a
democratic society. In 1953, Schlesinger recounted, then-Senator Kennedy read
his favorite poem to his new bride, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy. It was "I have a
Rendezvous with Death," by Alan Seeger. (15)
It may be he shall take my hand
And lead me into his dark land
And close my eyes and quench my breath ...
But I've a rendezvous with Death
At midnight in some flaming town,
When Spring trips north again this year,
And I to my pledged word am true,
I shall not fail that rendezvous.
During the November 1963 Texas trip he told a special White House assistant:
* * * if anybody really wanted to shoot the President * * * it was not a very
difficult job-all one had to do was get on a high building someday with a
telescopic rifle, and there was nothing anybody could do to defend against such
an attempt.
Kennedy had decided to visit the South to bolster his image in that region. He
chose to visit Florida because it had voted Republican in 1960, and Texas
because it only had been saved by Lyndon Johnson by an extremely slim margin.
According to Texas Governor John B. Connally, Kennedy first mentioned a
political trip to Texas in the summer of 1962 when Connally, a former Secretary
of the Navy, was running for Governor. Kennedy broached the idea to Connally
again the following summer.
Despite some obvious political reasons for a Texas visit, some members of
Kennedy's staff opposed it because the State was not favorably disposed to the
President. From 1961 to 1960, the Secret Service had received 34 threats on the
President's life from Texas. Political embarrassment seemed a certainty. The
decision to travel to Dallas was even more puzzling. Many perceived Dallas as a
violent, hysterical center of right-wing fanaticism. There, in 1960, then-Texas
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson had been heckled and spat upon. In October 1963, just
a month before the President's scheduled visit, Ambassador to the United Nations
Adlai Stevenson was jeered, hit with a placard and spat upon. Byron Skelton, the
National Democratic Committeeman from Texas, wrote Attorney General Robert
Kennedy about his concern for President Kennedy's safety and urged him to
dissuade his brother from going to Texas.
There are several probable explanations for the decision to visit Dallas.
Kennedy was to visit four other cities--San Antonio, Houston, Austin and Fort
Worth--and it was feared that ignoring Dallas would harm his image in Texas.
Kennedy also was anxious to win
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37
over business, and Dallas was the place to address business leaders in Texas. As
a result of his economic policies, particularly the rollback of steel prices,
Kennedy believed he was perceived as hostile to business. Before the November
Texas trip, he shared his concern with Governor Connally:
If these people are silly enough to think that I am going to dismantle this free
enterprise system, they are crazy.
All the other trips that summer and fall, including the visit to Florida, had
been successful. In his testimony before this committee, Governor Connally
explained that he believed that Texas was a State crucial to a Kennedy victory
in 1964, and contended that Kennedy came to Texas for two reasons: to raise
money and to enhance his own political prospects in Texas.
Word of the trip to Texas first appeared in the Dallas papers on September 13,
and Kennedy's itinerary for Texas was announced by Governor Connally on November
1. the President was scheduled to address a luncheon of business leaders at the
Trade Mart in Dallas on November 22. He decided to travel into the city in a
motorcade that was to follow the normal Dallas parade route. Kennedy liked
motorcades, for they afforded an opportunity to get close to the people, and he
made a special point of arranging one in Dallas because he believe it would be
his one chance that day to greet workers and minorities. The final motorcade
route through Dealey Plaza in downtown Dallas was selected on November 15.
In 1963, the Secret Service had indentified six categories of persons who posed
a threat to the President: right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, Cubans,
Puerto Ricans, Black militants, and a miscellaneous category that included
mental patients. It indentified two cities as particularly threatening--Miami
and Chicago. Dallas was considered a potential source of political
embarrassment. Prior to the trip to Dallas, the Secret Service had not uncovered
any serious threats there, and no extensive investigation was conducted in the
city.
Beginning a week before the trip, defamatory posters and leaflets excoriating
the President appeared throughout Dallas. Some carried Kennedy's picture with
the caption, "Wanted for Treason: This Man Is Wanted for Treasonous Activities
Against the United States." It was suggested the President's Dallas parade route
should not be published, but at the urging of Kennedy's staff, it appeared in
the Dallas newspapers on the November 18 and 19.
The President and Mrs. Kennedy traveled to Texas on November 21. That day,
Kennedy visited San Antonio and Houston, where he was warmly greeted by
enthusiastic crowds. He flew to Fort Worth that evening.
One of the President's first act on the morning of November 22 was to call the
woman who had arranged the accommodations that he and the First Lady occupied at
Fort Worth's Texas Hotel. She had hung the walls with original paintings by
modern masters such as Vincent Van Gogh and Claude Monet, and the special effort
of the citizens of Fort Worth greatly impressed the Kennedys. That rainy
morning, the President addressed the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce. The speech
was well received and, as Governor Connally recounted, it was
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38
laced with fun. Later in the morning, after a query from Dallas, the President
said that if the weather was clear, he did not want the protective bubble used
on the Presidential limousine.
The President and his entourage took off for Dallas at approximately 11:20 a.m.
While the Presidential plane, Air Force One, was airborne, the President looked
out the window and remarked to Governor with a smile, "Our luck is holding. It
looks as if we'll get, sunshine." A clear sky, brilliant sunshine. 68-degree
temperature--a marvelous autumn day--provided the backdrop for the Presidenl
Mrs. Kennedy as they arrived at Love Field in Dallas. The First Lady was
presented with a bouquet of roses, and the couple attended a reception held in
their honor at the airport by the community leaders of Dallas. After grating
them, the President moved to shake hands with the enthusiastic crowd which
according to some estimates, may have numbered 4,000 persons. For a few minutes,
the President and the First Lady walked along the security barrier, greeting
people. Then they joined Governor and Mrs. Connally in the Presidential
limousine. Two Secret Service agents, one the driver, sat in front. The
President and his wife sat in the rear seat, with the President on the right, in
keeping with military protocol, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Governor Connally sat on a jump seat directly in front of the President, with
his back to Kennedy, and Mrs. Connally occupied the left jump seat. Two cars
with members of the Dallas Police Department, including Chief Jesse Curry, and
Secret Service agents, preceded the Presidential limousine. Behind a followup
car carried Secret Service agents and members of the White House staff. To the
rear of that car, the Vice President and Mrs. Johnson and Senator Ralph
Yarborough rode in another limousine. Next came the Vice President's followup
car, and then a long line of limousines, trucks and various vehicles containing
Members of Congress and other dignitaries, photographers, the President's
physician, and members of the White House staff and the press.
The motorcade left Love Field at about 11:50 p.m. Governor Connally recalled he
was worried not about violence but about the possibility that some incident
might occur that would embarrass the President and disrupt the atmosphere of
confidence that had been building throughout the trip. That morning a hostile
full-page advertisement, sponsored by the "America-thinking Citizens of Dallas."
had appeared in the pages of the Dallas Morning News 11 charged. among other
things, that Kennedy had ignored the Constitution. scrapped the Monroe Doctrine
in favor of the "Spirit of Moscow." and had been "soft on Communists,
fellow-travelers, and ultra-leftists in America." The Governor was apprehensive
that there might be unfriendly demonstrations during the motorcade or that the
crowd's mood would be indifferent or even sullen.
The Governor's concern subsided as the motorcade passed through the outskirts of
Dallas and neared the center of the city. The crowds grew larger and they were
unmistakably friendly. with people smiling, waving, and calling the President's
name. In Connally's words,
The further we got toward town, the denser became the crowds, and when we got
down on Main Street, the crowds were extremely thick. They were pushed off of
curbs; they were out in the street, and they were backed all the way up
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39
against the walls of the buildings. They were just as thick as they could be. I
don't know how many. But, there were at least a quarter of a million people on
the parade route that day and everywhere the reception was good.
Governor Connally noticed that Mrs. Kennedy, who had appeared apprehensive the
previous day, was more relaxed and enjoyed the Dallas crowd. The only hostile
act he remembered was a heckler with a placard that read "Kennedy Go Home." The
President noticed the sign, and asked Governor and Mrs. Connally if they had
seen it. Connally said, "Yes, but we were hoping you didn't."
"Well, I saw it. Don't you imagine he's a nice fellow?" Kennedy asked.
The Governor said, "Yes, I imagine he's a nice fellow?"
Connally's fear of an embarrassing incident seemed to be unfounded. He recalled:
The crowds were larger than I had anticipated. They were more enthusiastic than
I could ever have hoped for.
This enthusiasm was apparent in a number of incidents. A little girl held up a
sign with the request, "President Kennedy, will you shake hands with me?" The
President noticed the sign, had the car stopped and shook hands with the little
girl. The car was mobbed by an admiring crowd that was only separated from the
Presidential limousine by Secret Service agents. At another stop, as the
motorcade approached downtown Dallas, the President caught sight of a Roman
Catholic nun with a group of schoolchildren. He stopped and spoke with the
group. Several times enthusiastic onlookers broke away from the curbside throng
and attempted to reach the limousine. Secret Service agents cleared the admirers
from the street.
The crowds grew thicker as the Presidential parade approached downtown. The
motorcade followed the traditional Dallas parade route into the downtown
business district, turning onto Main Street, which brought it through the center
of the Dallas commercial district. It moved westward along Main toward Dealey
Plaza. People crowded the sidewalks, surged into the street and waved from
office building windows. The motorcade tunneled through the throng. The Governor
later remarked that the business community, the group Kennedy sought to impress,
would have to be affected by this remarkable reception. Connally said "* * * the
trip had been absolutely wonderful, and we were heaving a sigh of relief because
once we got through the motorcade at Dallas and through the Dallas luncheon,
then everything else was pretty much routine."
President Kennedy was clearly delighted by his Dallas welcome. At the corner of
Main and Houston, the motorcade made a sharp 90-degree turn to the right and
headed north for one block, toward the Texas School Book Depository. As the
limousine approached Houston and Elm, Mrs. Connally, elated by the reception,
said, "Mr. President, you can't say Dallas doesn't love you." "That's obvious,"
the President replied.
At Elm Street, the limousine made a hairpin turn to the left and headed west,
passing the book depository.
At about 12:30 p.m., as the President waved to the crowds, shots rang out.
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Mrs. Connally heard a noise, turned to her right, and saw the President clutch
his neck with both hands, then slump down in the seat. Governor Connally
immediately thought the noise was a rifle shot. He turned from his
straight-backed jump seat in an attempt to catch sight of the President because
he feared an assassination attempt. The Governor described the scene:
I never looked, I never made the full turn. About the time I turned back where I
was facing more or less straight ahead, the way the car was moving, I was hit. I
was knocked over, just doubled over by the force of the bullet. It went in my
back and came out my chest about 2 inches below and to the left of my right
nipple. The force of the bullet drove my body over almost double, and when I
looked, immediately I could see I was drenched with blood. So, I knew I had been
badly hit and I more or less straightened up. At about this time, Nellie [Mrs.
Connally] reached over and pulled me down into her lap.
I was in her lap facing forward when another shot was fired * * * I did not hear
the shot that hit me. I wasn't conscious of it. I am sure I heard it, but I was
not conscious of it at all. I heard another shot. I heard it hit. It hit with a
very pronounced impact * * * it made a very, very strong sound.
Immediately, I could see blood and brain tissue all over the interior of the car
and all over our clothes. We were both covered with brain tissue, and there were
pieces of brain tissue as big as your little finger * * *
* * * * * * *
When I was hit, or shortly before I was hit--no, I guess it was after I was
hit--I said first, just almost in despair, I said, "no no, no," just thinking
how tragic it was that we had gone through this 24 hours, it had all been so
wonderful and so beautifully executed.
The President had been so marvelously received and then here, at the last
moment, this great tragedy. I just said, "no, no, no, no," Then I said right
after I was hit, I said, "My God, they are going to kill us all."
Mrs. Connally initially thought the Governor was dead as he fell into her lap.
She did not look back after her husband was hit, but heard Mrs. Kennedy say.
"They have shot my husband." After one shot, Mrs. Connally recalled. the
President's wife said, "They have killed my husband. I have his brains in my
hand."
Roy Kellerman, the Secret. Service agent in the right front seat, said, "Let's
get out of here fast." Bill Geer. the driver, accelerated tremendously. "So we
pulled out of the motorcade," Mrs. Connally recalled, "and we must have been a
horrible sight flying down the freeway with those dying men in our arms."
She added, "There was no screaming in that horrible car. It was just a silent,
terrible drive."
The wounded President and Governor were rushed to Parkland Hospital.
At 1 p.m., the 35th President of the United States was pronounced dead, 1,037
days after his term had begun.
Lee Harvey Oswald Fired Three Shots At President John F. Kennedy
Page 41
A. LEE HARVEY OSWALD FIRED THREE SHOTS AT PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY; THE SECOND
AND THIRD SHOTS HE FIRED STRUCK THE PRESIDENT; THE THIRD SHOT HE FIRED KILLED
THE PRESIDENT
1. PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS STRUCK BY TWO RIFLE SHOTS FIRED FROM BEHIND HIM
The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Warren
Commission) concluded that President Kennedy was struck by two bullets that were
fired from above and behind him.(1) According to the Commission, one bullet hit
the President near the base of the back of the neck, slightly to the right of
the spine, and exited from the front of the neck. The other entered the right
rear of the President's head and exited from the right side of the head, causing
a large wound. (2)
The Commission based its findings primarily upon the testimony of the doctors
who had treated the President at Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas and the
doctors who performed the autopsy on the President at the Naval Medical Center
in Bethesda, Md. (3)
In forming this conclusion, neither the members of the Warren Commission, nor
its staff, nor the doctors who had performed the autopsy, took advantage of the
X-rays and photographs of the President that were taken during the course of the
autopsy. (4) The reason for the failure of the Warren Commission to examine
these primary materials is that there was a commitment to make public all
evidence examined by the Commission. (5) The Commission was concerned that
publication of the autopsy X-rays and photographs would be an invasion of the
privacy of the Kennedy family. (6) The Commission's decision to rely solely on
the testimony of the doctors precluded the possibility that the Commission might
make use of a review of the autopsy evidence by independent medical experts to
determine if they concurred with the findings of the doctors at Parkland and
Bethesda.
A determination of the number and location of the President's wounds was
critical to resolving the question of whether there was more than one assassin.
The secrecy that surrounded the autopsy proceedings, therefore, has led to
considerable skepticism toward the Commission's findings. Concern has been
expressed that authorities were less than candid, since the Navy doctor in
charge of the autopsy conducted at Bethesda Naval Hospital destroyed his notes,
and the Warren Commission decided to forego an opportunity to view the X-rays
and photographs or to permit anyone else to inspect them.
The skepticism has been reinforced by a film taken of the Presidential motorcade
at the moment of the assassination by an amateur movie photographer, Abraham
Zapruder. In the Zapruder film, the President's head is apparently thrown
backward as the front right side of the skull appears to explode, suggesting to
critics of the Warren Commission's findings that the President was struck by a
bullet that entered the front of the head. (7) Such a bullet, it has been
argued, was fired
(41)
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42
by a gunman positioned on the grassy knoll, a park-like area to the right and to
the front of where the moving limousine was located at the instant of the fatal
shot. (8)
Since the Warren Commission completed its investigation, two other Government
panels have subjected the X-rays and photographs taken during the autopsy on
President Kennedy to examination by independent medical experts. A team of
forensic pathologists appointed by Attorney general Ramsey Clark in 1968,(9) and
a panel retained by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States
(Rockefeller Commission) in 1975,(10) reached the same basic conclusion: the
President was struck by two bullets from behind. But neither panel published the
X-rays and photographs, nor did either explain the basis of its conclusions in a
public hearing. Consequently, neither panel was able to relieve significantly
doubts that have persisted over the years about the nature and location of the
President's wounds.
(a) Reliance on scientific analysis
The committee believed from the beginning of its investigation that the most
reliable evidence upon which it could base determinations as to what happened in
Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, was an analysis of hard scientific data.
Accordingly, the committee contracted with leaking independent experts in the
fields of forensic pathology, ballistics, photography, acoustics, neutron
activation analysis and other disciplines. The reports submitted by these
experts were fully considered by the committee in formulating its findings.
(1) The medical evidence.--The committee's forensic pathology panel was composed
of nine members, eight of whom were chief medical examiners in major local
jurisdictions in the United States.(11) As a group, they had been responsible
for more than 100,000 autopsies, (12) an accumulation of experience the
committee deemed invaluable in the evaluation of the medical evidence--including
the autopsy X-rays and photographs--to determine the cause of death of the
President and the nature and location of his wounds. The panel was also asked to
recommend guidelines in the event of a future assassination of a President or
other high Federal official.(13)
The committee also employed experts to authenticate the autopsy materials.
Neither the Clark Panel nor the Rockefeller Commission undertook to determine if
the X-rays and photographs were, in fact, authentic. The committee, in light of
the numerous issues that had arisen over the years with respect to autopsy
X-rays and photographs, believed authentication to be a crucial step in the
investigation.(14)
The authentication of the autopsy X-rays and photographs was accomplished by the
committee with the assistance of its photographic evidence panel as well as
forensic dentists, forensic anthropologists and radiologists working for the
committee. (15) Two questions were put to these experts:
Could the photographs and X-rays stored in the National Archives be positively
identified as being of President Kennedy?
Was there any evidence that any of these photographs or X-rays had been altered
in any manner?
To determine if the photographs of the autopsy subject were in fact of the
President, forensic anthropologists compared the autopsy
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43
photographs with ante-mortem pictures of the President. This comparison was done
on the basis of both metric and morphological features. The metric analysis
relied upon a series of facial measurements taken from the photographs, while
the morphological analysis was focused on consistency of physical features,
particularly those that could be considered distinctive (shape of the nose,
patterns of facial lines, et cetera). Once unique characteristics were
identified, posterior and anterior autopsy photographs were compared to verify
that they, in fact, depicted the same person.
The anthropologists studied the autopsy X-rays in conjunction with premortem
X-rays of the President. A sufficient number of unique anatomic characteristics
were present in X-rays taken before and after the President's death to conclude
that the autopsy X-rays were of President Kennedy. This conclusion was
consistent with the findings of a forensic dentist employed by the committee.
(16) Since many of the X-rays taken during the course of the autopsy included
the President's teeth, it was possible to determine, using the President's
dental records, that the X-rays were of the President.
Once the forensic dentist and anthropologists had determined that the autopsy
photographs and X-rays were of the President, photographic scientists and
radiologists examined the original autopsy photographs, negatives,
transparencies, and X-rays for signs of alteration. They concluded there was no
evidence of the photographic or radiographic materials having been altered.(17)
Consequently, the committee determined that the autopsy X-rays and photographs
were a valid basis for the conclusions of the committee's forensic pathology
panel.
While the examination of the autopsy X-rays and photographs was the principal
basis of its analysis, the forensic pathology panel also had access to all
relevant witness testimony. In addition, all tests and evidence analyses
requested by the panel were performed. (18) It was only after considering all of
this evidence that the panel reached its conclusions.
The forensic pathology panel concluded that President Kennedy was struck by two,
and only two, bullets, each of which entered from the rear. 1 The panel further
concluded that the President was struck by one bullet that entered in the upper
right of the back and exited from the front of the throat, and one bullet that
entered in the right rear of the head near the cowlick area and exited from the
right side of the head, toward the front. This second bullet caused a massive
wound to the President's head upon exit. There is no medical evidence that the
President was struck by a bullet entering the front of the head,(19) and the
possibility that a bullet could have struck the President and yet left no
evidence is extremely remote. Because this conclusion appears to be inconsistent
with the backward motion of the President's head in the Zapruder film, the
committee consulted a wound ballistics expert to determine what relationship, if
any, exists between the direction from which a bullet strikes the head and
subse-
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44
quent head movement. (20) The expert concluded that nerve damage from a bullet
entering the President's head could have caused his back muscles to tighten
which, in turn, could have caused his head to move toward the rear.(21) He
demonstrated the phenomenon in a filmed experiment which involved the shooting
of goats. (22) Thus, tile committee determined that the rearward movement of the
President's head would not be fundamentally inconsistent with a bullet striking
from the rear.(23)
The forensic pathology panel determined that Governor Connally was struck by a
bullet from the rear, one that entered just below the right armpit and exited
below the right nipple of the chest. It then shattered the radius bone of the
Governor's right wrist and caused a superficial wound to the left thigh. (24)
Based on its examination of the nature and alinement of the Governor's wounds,
the panel concluded that they were all caused by a single bullet that came from
the rear. It concluded further that, having caused the Governor's wounds, the
bullet was dislodged from his left thigh.
The panel determined that the nature of the wounds of President Kennedy and
Governor Connally was consistent with the possibility that one bullet entered
the upper right back of President Kennedy and, after emerging from the front of
the neck, caused all of the Governor's wounds. (25) A factor that influenced the
panel significantly was the ovoid shape of the wound in the Governor's back,
indicating that the bullet had begun to tumble or yaw before entering.(26) An
ovoid wound is characteristic of one caused by a bullet that has passed through
or glanced off an intervening object. (27) Based on the evidence available to
it, the panel concluded that a single bullet passing through both President
Kennedy and Governor Connally would support a fundamental conclusion that the
President was struck by two, and only two, bullets, each fired from behind. (28)
Thus, the forensic pathology panel's conclusions were consistent with the
so-called single bullet theory advanced by the Warren Commission. (29)
(2) Reaction times and alinement.--The hypothesis that both the President and
the Governor were struck by a single bullet had originally been based on the
Warren Commission's examination of the Zapruder film and test firings of the
assassination rifle. The time between the observable reactions of the President
and of the Governor was too short to have allowed, according to the Commission's
test firings, two shots to have been fired from the same rifle.(30) FBI marksmen
who test fired the rifle for the Commission employed the telescopic sight on the
rifle, and the minimum firing time between shots was approximately 2.25 to 2.3
seconds.(31) The time between the observable reactions of the President and the
Governor, according to the Commission, was less than two seconds. 2
The Commission determined that its hypothesis that the same bullet struck both
the President and the Governor was supported by visual observations of the
relative alinement of the two men in the limousine, by a trajectory analysis and
by wound ballistics tests. The Commis-
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45
sion said, however, that a determination of which shot hit the Governor was "not
necessary to any essential findings."(32)
(3) Neutron activation analysis.--In addition to the conclusions reached by the
committee's forensic pathology panel, the single bullet theory was substantiated
by the findings of a neutron activation analysis performed for the
committee.(33) The bullet alleged to have caused the injuries to the Governor
and the President was found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital.(34) Numerous
critics have alleged that this bullet, labeled "pristine" because it appeared to
have been only slightly damaged, could not have caused the injuries to both the
Governor (particularly his shattered wrist) and the President. Some have even
suggested the possibility that the bullet wounded neither Connally nor Kennedy,
that it was planted on the stretcher. (35) Neutron activation analysis, however,
established that it was highly likely that the injuries to the Governor's wrist
were caused by the bullet found on the stretcher in Parkland Hospital. (36)
Further, the committee's wound ballistics expert concluded that the bullet found
on the stretcher--Warren Commission exhibit 399 (CE 399)--is of a type that
could have caused the wounds to President Kennedy and Governor Connally without
showing any more deformity than it does.(37)
In determining whether the deformity of CE 399 was consistent with its having
passed through both the President and Governor, the committee considered the
fact that it is a relatively long, stable, fully jacketed bullet, typical of
ammunition often used by the military. Such ammunition tends to pass through
body tissue more easily than soft nose hunting bullets. (38) Committee
consultants with knowledge in forensic pathology and wound ballistics concluded
that it would not have been unusual for such a fully jacketed bullet to have
passed through the President and the Governor and to have been only minimally
deformed. (39)
The neutron activation analysis further supported the single bullet theory by
indicating that there was evidence of only two bullets among the fragments
recovered from the limousine and its occupants.(40) The consultant who conducted
the analysis concluded that it was "highly likely" that CE 399 and the fragments
removed from Governor Connally's wrist were from one bullet; that one of the two
fragments recovered from the floor of the limousine and the fragment removed
from the President's brain during the autopsy were from a second bullet. (41) 3
Neutron activation analysis showed no evidence of a third bullet among those
fragments large enough to be tested.
(4) Photographic evidence.--The committee also considered photographic evidence
in its analysis of the shots. The Zapruder film, the only continuous
chronological visual record of the assassination, is the best available
photographic evidence of the number and timing of the shots that struck the
occupants of the Presidential limousine.
The committee's panel of photographic experts examined specially enhanced and
stabilized versions of the Zapruder film for two purposes: (1) to try to draw
conclusions about the timing of the shots from visual reactions of the victims;
and (2) to determine whether
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46
the alignment of the President and the Governor was consistent with the single
bullet theory. The panel also examined still photographs.
Several conclusions with respect to the validity of the single-bulle theory were
reached.(42) The panel concluded there is clear photographic evidence that two
shots, spaced approximately 6 seconds apart, struck the occupants of the
limousine. By Zapruder frame 207 when President Kennedy is seen going behind a
sign that obstructed Zapruder's view, he appears to be reacting to a severe
external stimulus. This reaction is first indicated in the vicinity of frame 200
of the Zapruder film. The President's right hand freezes in the midst of a
waving motion, followed by a rapid leftward movement of his head. (43) There is,
therefore, photographic evidence of a shot strikin the President by this time.
Governor Connally shows no indication of distress before he disappears behind
the sign at Zapruder frame 207, but as he emerges from behind the sign after
frame 222, he seems to be reacting to some severe external stimulus. (44) By
frame 226, when all of the limousine occupants have reappeared in Zapruder's
field of view, the panel found indictions in observable physical attitude and
changes of facial expression to indicate that both the President and the
Governor were reacting to their wounds. The President's reactions are
obvious--he leans forward and clutches his throat. The, Governor displays a
pronounced rigid posture and change in facial expression. 4(45) To study the
relative alinement of the President and Governor Connelly within the limousine,
the photographic panel paid particular attention to the Zapruder frames just,
before the President and the Governor were obstructed, by the sign, employing a
stereoscopic (depth) analysis of frames 187 and 193 and still photographs taken
at about the same time from the south side of Elm Street. The panel found that
the alinement of the President and the Governor during this period was
consistent with the single bullet hypothesis.(46)
The photographic evidence panel determined, further, that the explosive effect
of the second shot to strike, President Kennedy, the fatal head shot is depicted
in Zapruder frame 313. By frame 313, the President's head is seen exploding,
leading the panel to conclude that the actual moment of impact was approximately
frame 312. (47)
(5) Acoustical evidence and blur analysis.--The committee performed two other
scientific tests that addressed the question of the direction and timing of the
bullets that struck the President. First, it contracted with acoustical
consultants for an analysis of a tape recording of a radio transmission made at
the time of the assassination. The experts decided there were four shots on the
recording. (48) The first, second and fourth came from the Texas School Book
Depository behind the President, the third came from the grassy knoll to the
right front of the President. Taking the shot to the President's head at frame
312 as the last of the four shots, and thus as a possible base point, 5 it was
possible to correlate the other sounds identified as probable gunfire with the
Zapruder film.(49) Since the acoustical
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47
consultants concluded that the two earliest shots came from the depository, the
shots (or at least their shock waves) would have reached the limousine at
between frames 157 and 161 and frames 188 and 191. When coupled with the
photographic evidence showing a reaction by President Kennedy beginning in the
vicinity of frame 200, it appeared that he was first struck by a bullet at
approximately frame 190.6
Second, the photographic evidence panel also studied the blurs on the Zapruder
film that were caused by Zapruder's panning errors, that is, the effect of a
lack of smooth motion as Zapruder moved from left to right with his camera. This
was done in an effort to determine whether the blurs resulted from Zapruder's
possible reaction to the sound of gunshots. (50) This analysis indicated that
blurs occurring at frames 189-197 and 312-334 may reasonably be attributed to
Zapruder's startle reactions to gunshots. The time interval of the shots
associated with these blurs was determined to be approximately 6 to 7 seconds.
The possibility that other blurs on the film might be Attributable to Zapruder's
reactions to gunshots could not be confirmed or dismissed without additional
data.
Taken together with other evidence, the photographic and acoustical evidence led
the committee to conclude that President Kennedy and Governor Connally were
struck by one bullet at approximately Zapruder frame 190, and that the President
was struck by another bullet at frame 312.
Thus, from the results of the analyses by its experts in the fields of forensic
pathology, photography, acoustics, wound ballistics and neutron activation
analysis, the committee concluded that President Kennedy was struck by two shots
fired from behind.
2. THE SHOTS THAT STRUCK PRESIDENT KENNEDY FROM BEHIND WERE FIRED FROM THE SIXTH
FLOOR WINDOW OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY
BUILDING
The Warren Commission concluded that the shots that killed President Kennedy and
wounded Governor Connally "* * * were fired from the sixth floor window at the
southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository." (51) It based its
conclusion on eyewitness testimony, physical evidence found on the sixth floor
of the depository, medical evidence and the absence of "* * * credible evidence
that the shots were fired from * * * any other location."(52)
(a) Scientific analysis
In investigating this aspect of the case, the committee relied heavily on the
scientific analysis of physical evidence, and again the conclusions of the
forensic pathology panel were relevant. The panel concluded that the two bullets
that struck the President came from behind and that the fatal head shot was
moving in a downward direction when it struck the President. (53) 7 Thus,
forensic pathology provided reli-
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48
able evidence as to the origin of the shots: The gunman who fired the shot that
hit President Kennedy and Governor Connally at approximately frame 190 of the
Zapruder film fired from behind, and the gunman who fired the shot that hit the
President in the head at frame 312 was positioned above and to the rear of the
presidential limousine.
(1) Trajectory analysis.--Another project pertaining to the origin of the shots
involved the trajectory of the bullets that hit the President. Although the
Warren Commission also studied trajectory, its analysis consisted of proving
that a bullet fired from the southeast corner of the sixth floor of the book
depository could have hit the President and then hit the Governor and that
another bullet fired from that location could have caused the wound to the
President's head. Basically, purpose of the Commission's trajectory analysis was
to prove that it was possible for the prime suspect, Lee Harvey Oswald, to have
hit both the President and the Governor from the sixth floor of the depository.
The committee approached the problem without making prior assumptions as to the
origin of the shots. It was an interdisciplinary effort, drawing from the
expertise of forensic pathologists, acoustical and photographic analysts and an
engineer from the staff of the tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, who
plotted the trajectories. (54)
The trajectory analysis was based on three types of data. From the acoustical
analysis of the radio transmission, the timing of the shots was obtained. From
the photographic analysis of the Zapruder film and the acoustical analysis, it
was possible to know with relative precision when each of the shots struck--at
approximately Zapruder frame 190 for the shot that struck the President in the
back of the neck, and at Zapruder frame 312, for the fatal shot to the
President's head. Through an analysis of those frames and still photographs
taken at approximately the same time from the south side of Elm Street, it was
possible to determine the location of the limousine in the plaza, the sitting
positions of President Kennedy and Governor Connally and their alinement to one
another. (55)
By then coordinating this data with the forensic pathology panel's analysis of
the exit and entry wounds sustained by President Kennedy, it was possible to
plot the path of the bullets out to their source. Separate direction and slope
trajectories were developed for two bullets---the one that caused the
President's back and neck wounds, and the one that caused his fatal head
wound.(56) A third trajectory analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that
the first bullet also caused the wounds to Governor Connally, using for this
analysis the exit wounds to the President's neck and the entry wound to the
Governor's back. (57)
All three trajectories intercepted the southeast face of the Texas School Book
Depository building.(58) While the trajectories could not be plotted with
sufficient precision to determine the exact point from which the shots were
fired, they each were calculated with a margin of error reflecting the precision
of the underlying data. The margins of error were indicated as circles within
which the shots originated. The southeast corner window of the depository was
inside each of the circles. (59)
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49
(2) Photographic evidence.--The photographic evidence panel examined evidence
possibly relevant to the question of the origin of the shots, as follows:
The panel examined a motion picture of the southeast corner window of the
depository taken a short time prior to the shots. (60) While there is an
impression of motion in the film, the panel could not attribute it to the
movement of a person or an object and instead attributed the motion to
photographic artifacts.(61) The panel's finding were the same with respect to
apparent motion in adjacent windows shown in the film.(62)
The panel studied two photographs taken within minutes of the assassination.
(63) While no human face or form could be detected in the sixth floor southeast
window, the panel was able to conclude that a stack of boxes in the window had
been rearranged during the interval of the taking of the two photographs.(64)
There is evidence, a motion picture film made by Charles L. Bronson, that some
independent researchers believe shows a figure or figures in the sixth floor
depository window several minutes before the shooting. The film came to the
attention of the committee toward the end of its investigation. Some members of
the committee's photographic evidence panel did conduct a preliminary review
(without enhancement) of the film. While motion was detected in the window, it
was considered more likely to be a random photographic artifact than human
movement. Nevertheless, the limited review was not sufficient to determine
definitively if the film contained evidence of motion made by human figures.(65)
Because of its high quality, it was recommended that the Bronson film be
analyzed further.
(b) Witness testimony
While the committee relied primarily on scientific analysis of physical evidence
as to the origin of the shots, it also considered the testimony of witnesses.
The procedure used to analyze their statements was as follows:
First, all available prior statements were read by the committee and studied for
consistency. The objective was to identify inconsistencies either between the
words of one witness and another or between the various words of a witness whose
story had changed. The statements were obtained from the files of the Dallas
Police Department, dallas
Sheriff's Office, the FBI, Secret Service and Warren Commission.
Second, an attempt was made to locate the witnesses and to show them the
statements they made in the course of the original investigation. Each witness
was asked to read his statements and to indicate whether they were complete and
accurate. If statements were inaccurate, or if a witness was aware of
information that was not include, he was asked to make corrections or provide
additional information. In addition, where relevant questions had not been
asked, the committee asked them.(66)
There are inherent limitations in such a process. Any information provided by a
witness in 1978--15 years after the assassination--must be viewed in light of
the passage of time that causes memories to fade and honest accounts to become
distorted. Certainly, it cannot be considered with the same reliability as
information provided in 1963-64.
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50
To the extent that they are based on witness testimony, the conclusions of the
committee were vitally affected by the quality of the original investigation.
The inconsistencies in the statements--the questions not asked, the witnesses
not interviewed--all created problems that defied resolution 15 years after the
events in Dallas.
Nevertheless, the committee considered all of the witness statements and
determined to what extent they corroborated or independently substantiated, or
contradicted, the conclusions indicated by the scientific evidence.
An example of such witness testimony is that relating to the discovery of the
rifle and shell casings in the Texas School Book Depository. (Because detailed
versions of witness testimony taken in the original investigation are a matter
of public record, only brief resumes are included here. )
Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney testified to the Warren Commission that at
approximately 1 p.m. on November 22, 1963, he discovered three spent rifle
shells on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. (67) He stated
that he was in the southeast corner of the building when he noticed boxes
stacked high in the vicinity of the window. (68) He then squeezed in between a
space in the boxes and saw three spent rifle shells in the vicinity of the
window. (69) Mooney also told of seeing boxes stacked up as though they were a
prop or rest for a weapon. (70)
Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone told the Warren Commission that he arrived on the
sixth floor of the depository subsequent to the discovery of the three spent
rifle shells. (71) He said he went to the east end of the floor and began
working his way across to the west end, looking in, under and around boxes and
pallets. (72) At the wall near a row of windows, he noticed a small space
between some of the boxes. When he squeezed through the opening, he saw a rifle
between two rows of boxes. The time was 1:22 p.m. (73)
(c) Firearms evidence
The rifle Boone found, a. 6.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano, was analyzed by the
FBI in 1963-64 and by the committee's firearms panel in 1978, as was the other
firearms evidence that was recovered. It was determined in both investigations
that the bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital had been fired from
the rifle found in the depository, as were two fragments recovered from the
Presidential limousine. (741) Further, the three cartridge cases found on the
sixth floor of the depository were determined to have been fired in the
Mannlicher-Carcano. 8 (75)
Through neutron activation analysis, the committee found that the firearms
evidence could be even more directly linked to the wounds suffered by the
President and Governor Connally. It is highly likely that the bullet found on
the stretcher was the one that passed through Governor Connally's wrist, leaving
tiny particles behind, and the frag-
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ments retrieved from the limousine came from the same bullet as the fragments
taken from President Kennedy's brain. (76)
Over the years, skepticism has arisen as to whether the rifle found in the
depository by Boone is the same rifle that was delivered to the Warren
Commission and is presently stored in the National Archives. The suspicion has
been based to some extent on allegations that police officers who first
discovered the rifle identified it as a 7.5 millimeter German Mauser. (77) The
controversy was intensified by the allegation that various photographs of the
rifle, taken at different times, portray inconsistencies with respect to the
proportions of the various component parts. (78)
To resolve the controversy, the committee assembled a wide range of photographs
of the rifle: a police photograph taken where it was found in the depository; a
motion picture film taken by a television station showing the rifle when it was
found by the police; a series of photographs of a police officer carrying the
rifle from the depository; photographs taken as the rifle was carried through
the Dalls of Dallas Police Department; and photographs taken later by the FBI
and Dallas Police Department. (79)
The examination by committee photographic consultants determined that all
photographs were of the same rifle. Both a study of proportions and a comparison
of identifying marks indicated that only one rifle was involved. (80)
(d) Summary of the evidence
In the final analysis, the committee based its finding that the shots that
struck President Kennedy were fired from the Texas School Book Depository on the
quantity and quality of the evidence, to wit:
The findings of forensic pathologists that the shots that hit the President came
from behind;
The results of the trajectory analysis that traced the bullets to the vicinity
of sixth floor window of the depository;
The conclusion of acoustics experts that the shots came from the vicinity of the
sixth floor window of the depository;
The positive identification by firearms experts that the rifle. found on the
sixth floor of the depository was the one that fired the bullet found on a
stretcher at Parkland Hospital and fragments retrieved from the Presidential
limousine;
The results of neutron activation analysis indicating that it was highly likely
that the bullet found on the stretcher at Parkland Hospital was the one that
,passed through Governor Connally's wrist, and that the fragments found in the
limousine were from the bullet that struck the President in the head;
The conclusion of photographic experts that the rifle found in the depository
was the same one that was repeatedly photographed in November 1963 and that is
presently stored at the National Archives.
The committee also weighed the firsthand testimony of witnesses but with
caution, because of the problem of the passage of time. Besides the statements
of law officers on the scene immediately after the assassination, it considered
the accounts of bystanders in Dealey Plaza, bearing in mind that these were
recollections of fleeting mo-
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52
ments when emotions were running high. The committee noted, however, that a
number of the Dealey Plaza witnesses said they saw either a rifle or a man with
a rifle in the vicinity of the sixth floor southeast corner window of the book
depository.
3. LEE HARVEY OSWALD OWNED THE RIFLE THAT WAS USED TO FIRE THE SHOTS FROM THE
SIXTH FLOOR WINDOW OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY
BUILDING
The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle found on
the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Since the Commission
further concluded that Oswald was the assassin of the President, his background
is relevant.
(a) Biography of Lee Harvey Oswald
Oswald was born in New Orleans, La., on October 18, 1939, two months after the
death of his father. His mother remarried, and, from 1945 until 1952, the family
lived in a number of cities in Texas and Louisiana. This marriage ended in
divorce when Oswald was nine.
In 1952, Oswald and his mother moved to New York City. His school record was
marked by chronic truancy, and a psychiatric examination suggested that he was
emotionally disturbed. Oswald and his mother returned to New Orleans in 1954.
After finishing the ninth grade, the 16-year-old Oswald dropped out of school.
The following year, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps. Asserting the iII-health
and distressing financial situation of his mother, Oswald obtained a release
from the Marines in 1959. Following his discharge, he spent 3 days with his
mother in Fort Worth, Tex., and then went to New Orleans. From there, he
traveled to the Soviet Union where he tried to become a Soviet citizen.
In April 1961, Oswald married a 19-year-old Russian woman, Marina Nikolaevna
Prusakova, whom he had met while working in Minsk. Having become disillusioned
with Soviet life, he returned to the United States with his wife and baby
daughter the following year. The Oswalds arrived in Fort Worth, Tex. on June 14,
1962, and soon became acquainted with a number of people in the Dallas-Fort
Worth Russian-speaking community. Oswald moved to Dallas in October 1962 where
he found a job with a graphic arts company. Marina followed in November, but
their marriage was plagued by intermittent feuding.
In March 1963, according to the Warren Commission, Oswald purchased a
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle and telescopic sight from a Chicago mail order house.
He also ordered a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol from a Los Angeles firm.
According to Marina Oswald, he probably used the rifle in an attempt in April to
kill Edwin A. Walker, a retired Army general who had been relieved from his post
in West Germany for distributing rightwing literature to his troops. Walker was
not harmed.
In April 1963, Oswald went to New Orleans. Meanwhile, Marina and the baby moved
to the home of a friend, Ruth Paine, in Irving, Tex., in late April. In May, she
joined Oswald in New Orleans. On July 19, Oswald was dismissed from his job for
inefficiency. In May
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and June, Oswald had expressed an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
In August, he distributed pro-Castro leaflets and also made two radio broadcasts
on behalf of the Castro regime. Marina Oswald and her baby returned to Texas to
stay with Ruth Paine in Irving on September 22.
Oswald went to Mexico City in the latter part of September. He visited the
Russian Embassy and Consulate and the Cuban Consulate there, but he failed to
get permission to travel to either country. He returned to Dallas on October 3,
1963. He visited Marina in Irving on several occasions but continued to try to
find a place to live in Dallas. On October 14, Oswald moved into a roominghouse
on North Beckley Avenue in Dallas. He began work at the Texas School Book
Depository 2 days later. On October 20, Marina gave birth to their second
daughter. She returned to the Paine home in Irving where Oswald visited on
November 1, and from November 8 until November 11. Oswald next visited Marina
and his children in Irving on the evening of November 21. He returned to Dallas
the following morning.
Shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963,
Dallas Patrolman J.D. Tippit was shot and killed. At approximately 2 p.m., Lee
Harvey Oswald was arrested in the Texas Theatre. He was subsequently charged in
the murder of Tippit and named as a suspect in the Kennedy assassination.
On November 24, 1963, while he was being escorted through the basement of Dallas
police headquarters in preparation for being transferred to the Dallas County
Sheriff's office, Oswald was fatally wounded by a single shot fired from a
pistol by Jack Ruby, a Dallas nightclub operator.
As noted, the Warren Commission had traced the chain of possession of the
alleged assassination rifle and determined that the name on the money order and
purchase form used to buy the rifle was "A. Hidell" which it determined to be an
alias used by Oswald. (81) It also determined that the rifle was sent to a
Dallas post office box rented on October 9, 1962 by Oswald. (82) Through
handwriting analysis, the Commission determined that Oswald had filled out and
signed the documents relative to the purchase and receipt of the rifle. (83)
Moreover, the Commission received testimony that Oswald owned a rifle and that
it was not in its usual storage place at the residence of Michael and Ruth Paine
in Irving, Tex., when police searched the residence on the afternoon of November
22, 1963.
Photographs of Oswald holding a rifle were also recovered from among his
personal possessions, and the Commission concluded that the rifle in the
photograph was the one found on the sixth floor of the book depository. (85) A
palm print taken from the barrel of the rifle was identified as a latent
palmprint of Oswald.(86) Finally, the Commission treated as significant evidence
a brown paper sack on which was identified a latent palmprint of Oswald. (87) It
contained fibers that were determined to be identical to certain fibers of a
blanket in which Oswald had allegedly wrapped the rifle. (88)
The committee concluded that the rifle found on the sixth floor of the book
depository was the murder weapon. This determination, coupled with Warren
Commission evidence of Oswald's ownership of the rifle, if accepted, proved
conclusively that Oswald was the owner of the murder weapon.
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54
Nevertheless, doubt has been cast on the evidence that Oswald owned the rifle in
question. Critics of the Warren Commission have asserted that the chain of
possession is meaningless, because more than one Mannlicher-Carcano was issued
with the serial number C2766.(89) They have also argued that the photograph of
Oswald holding the rifle is a fake and that his palmprint was planted on the
barrel. (90)
(b) The committee's approach
The committee decided that one way to determine whether Oswald did, in fact, own
the murder weapon was to test the reliability of the evidence used by the Warren
Commission to establish ownership and to subject the available evidence to
further scientific analysis.
The committee posed these questions:
Could the handwriting on the money order used to purchase the rifle and the
application for the post office box be established with confidence as that of
Lee Harvey Oswald? 9
Are the photographs of Oswald holding the rifle authentic, and is that rifle the
one that was found in the book depository after the assassination?
(1) Handwriting analysis.--With respect to the first issue, the committee's
questioned documents panel, composed of three experts with approximately 90
years of combined experience in the field of questioned document examination,
was provided with approximately 50 documents allegedly containing Oswald's
handwriting. (91) The panel was asked to determine whether all of the documents
were written by the same person. Among the documents provided to the panel was
the money order sent to Klein's Sporting Goods Co. of Chicago to pay for a
Mannlicher-Carcano, serial number C2766, the application for the post office box
to which the rifle was subsequently mailed, and two fingerprint cards signed by
Oswald. (92) One of the cards was signed at the time of his enlistment in the
Marine Corps on October 24, 1956; the other, dated August 9, 1963, was signed
`by Oswald at the time he was arrested in New Orleans for disturbing the peace.
(Although Oswald was fingerprinted when he was arrested in Dallas on November
22, 1963, he refused to sign the card.) 10
The questioned documents panel determined that the money order and the post
office box application were filled out and signed by the same person and that
the handwriting on them was identical to the handwriting on the two fingerprint
cards signed by Oswald. (94) On the basis of this analysis. the committee
determined that Oswald bought the weapon in question from Klein's Sporting Goods
Co.
(2) The backyard photographs.--The photographs of Oswald holding the rifle, with
a pistol strapped to his waist and also holding copies of "The Militant" and
"The Worker," were taken by his wife in the backyard of Oswald's home on Neeley
Street in Dallas in March or April 1963, according to the testimony of Oswald's
widow, Marina,
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given to the Warren Commission and the committee. 11 (95) There has been
considerable controversy about the photographs. While in the custody of the
Dallas police from November 22 to November 24, 1963, Oswald claimed that he did
not own a rifle and that the photographs were composites, with his head
superimposed over someone else's body.(96) The Warren Commission, however,
concluded that the photographs were authentic.(97) Critics of the Commission
have questioned their authenticity for reasons generally based on alleged shadow
inconsistencies, an indication of a grafting inbetween the mouth and chin,
inconsistent body proportions and a disparate square-shaped chin.(98)
To determine if evidence of fakery was present in these photographs, the
photographic evidence panel first sought to determine if they could be
established as having been taken with Oswald's Imperial Reflex camera. This was
done by studying the photographs (and the single available original negative)
for unique identifying characteristics that would have been imparted by that
camera. Once this was successfully done, the objects imaged in the photographs,
as well as their shadows, were analyzed photogrammetrically. Finally, the
materials were visually scrutinized, using magnification, stereoscopic analysis
and digital image processing.(99)
In its analyses, the photographic evidence panel worked with the original
negative and first-generation prints of the photographs.(100) Only such
materials contain the necessary and reliable photographic information.
Incontrast, some of the critics who claimed the photographs were faked relied on
poor quality copies for their analyses.(101) Copies tend to lose detail and
include defects that impair accurate representation of the photographic image.
After subjecting these original photographic materials and the camera alleged to
have taken the pictures to sophisticated analytical techniques, the photographic
evidence panel concluded that it could find no evidence of fakery.(102)
Of equal significance, a detailed scientific photographic analysis was conducted
by the panel to determine whether the rifle held by Oswald in the backyard
photographs was, in fact, the rifle stored at the National Archives. The panel
found a unique identifying mark present on the weapon in the Archives that
correlated with a mark visible on the rifle in the Oswald backyard photographs,
as well as on the alleged assassination rifle as it appeared in photographs
taken after the assassination in 1963.(103) Because this mark was considered to
be a unique random pattern (ie., caused by wear and tear through use), it was
considered sufficient to warrant the making of a positive identification.
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In addition, the relative lengths of component parts of the alleged
assassination rifle at the National Archives were compared to component parts of
the rifle that appeared in various 1963 photographs, including the backyard
photographs.(104) They were found to be entirely consistent, component part for
component part, with each other. 12 Upon completion of its analysis, the
photographic evidence panel concluded that the rifle depicted in the backyard
photographs is the one that was found in the book depository after the
assassination and that was stored at the National Archives. (105)
In addition to the photographic analysis, the committee was able to employ
handwriting analysis to aid in the determination of whether the photograph was
anthentic. During the course of the committee's investigation, George de
Mohrenschildt, who had been a friend of Oswald, committed suicide. The
committee, pursuant to a subpena, obtained de Mohrenschildt's personal papers,
which included another copy of the Oswald backyard photograph. This copy, unlike
any of those previously recovered, had an inscription on the back: "To my dear
friend George, from Lee." It was dated April 1963 and signed "Lee Harvey
Oswald." (106)
In an unpublished manuscript, de Mohrenschildt referred to this copy of the
photograph and stated that after his return from Haiti, where he had been at the
time of the assassination, he discovered the photograph among personal
possessions that he had previously stored in a warehouse. (107) The committee
examined the photograph to determine its authenticity and examined the
handwriting to determine if Oswald had actually written the inscription and
signed it. If Oswald did sign the photograph, his claim that he did not own the
rifle and that the photograph was a fake could be discounted.
The photographic panel found no evidence of fakery in the backyard photographs,
including the one found in de Mohrenschildt's effects.(108) The handwriting on
the back of the de Mohrenschildt copy was determined by the questioned documents
panel to be identical to all the other documents signed by Oswald, including the
fingerprint cards. (109)
Thus, after submitting the backyard photographs to the photographic and
handwriting panels, the committee concluded that there was no evidence of fakery
in the photographs and that the rifle in the photographs was identical to the
rifle found on the sixth floor of the depository on November 22, 1963. Having
resolved these issues, the committee concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald owned the
rifle from which the shots that killed President Kennedy were fired.
4. LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION, HAD ACCESS TO AND WAS
PRESENT ON THE SIXTH FLOOR OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY BUILDING
The Warren Commission found that Lee Harvey Oswald worked principally on the
first and sixth floors of the Texas School Book Depository, gathering books
listed on orders and delivering them to
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the shipping room on the first floor. (110) He had, therefore, ready access to
the sixth floor and to the southeast corner window from which the shots were
fired. The Commission reached this conclusion by interviewing Oswald's
supervisors and fellow employees. (111)
(a) Testimony of school book depository employees
In its investigation, the committee also considered the statements and testimony
of employees of the Texas School Book Depository who worked with and supervised
Oswald. Roy Truly, superintendent of the depository, had stated to the Warren
Commission that Oswald "had occasion to go to the sixth floor quite a number of
times every day, each day, after books."(112) Truly and others testified that
Oswald normally had access to the sixth floor of the depository, and a number of
them said that they saw and heard Oswald in the vicinity of the sixth floor
throughout the morning of November 22, 1963. (113)
(b) Physical evidence of Oswald's presence
In determining whether Oswald was actually present on the sixth floor of the
depository, the committee paid primary attention to scientific analysis of
physical evidence. Materials were examined for fingerprints, including a long,
rectangular paper sack that was discovered near the southeast corner window and
cartons that were found stacked adjacent to the window. The paper sack, which
was suitable for containing a rifle, showed a latent palmprint and fingerprint
of Oswald; one of the cartons showed both a palmprint and fingerprint identified
as belonging to Oswald, and the other showed just his palmprint. The
determination that Oswald's prints were on the sack and cartons was originally
made in the investigation that immediately followed the assassination. It was
confirmed by a fingerprint expert retained by the committee. (114)
The committee was aware that Oswald's access to the sixth floor during the
normal course of his duties would have provided the opportunity to handle these
items at any time before the assassination. Nevertheless, the committee believed
that the way the boxes were stacked at the window and the proximity of the paper
sack to the window from which the shots were fired must be considered as
evidence indicating that he handled the boxes in the process of preparing the
so-called sniper's nest and that he had used the paper sack to carry the rifle
into the depository.
(c) Oswald's whereabouts
As for Oswald's presence on the sixth floor shortly before the assassination,
the committee considered the testimony of Oswald's fellow employees at the
depository. Although a number of them placed him on the fifth or sixth floor
just before noon, a half hour before the assassination, one recalled he was on
the first floor at that same time. (115)
The committee decided not to try to reconcile the testimony of these witnesses.
Whether Oswald was on the first, fifth or sixth floor at noon, he could have
still been on the sixth floor at 12:30. There was no witness who said he saw
Oswald anywhere at the time of the assassination, and there was no witness who
claimed to have been on the sixth floor and therefore in a position to have seen
Oswald, had he been there.
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(1) Lovelady or Oswald?---It has been alleged that a photograph taken of the
president's limousine at the time of the first shot shows Oswald standing in the
doorway of the depository.(116) Obviously, if Oswald was the man in the doorway,
he could not have been on the sixth floor shooting at the President.
The Warren Commission determined that the man in the doorway was not Oswald, it
was Billy Lovelady, another depository employee. (117) Critics have challenged
that conclusion, charging that Commis- sion members did not personally question
Lovelady to determine if he was in fact the man in the photograph. In addition,
they argue that no photograph of Lovelady was published in any of the volumes
issued by the Warren Commission (118).
The committee asked its photographic evidence panel to determine whether the man
in the doorway was Oswald, Lovelady or someone else. Forensic anthropologists
working with the panel compared the photograph with pictures of Oswald and
Lovelady, and a photoanalyst studied the pattern of the shirt worn by the man in
the doorway and compared it to the shirts worn by the two men that day. (119)
Based on an assessment of the facial features, the anthropologists determined
that the man in the doorway bore a much stronger resemblance to Lovelady than to
Oswald. In addition, the photographic analysis of the shirt in the photograph
established that it corresponded more closely with the shirt worn that day by
Lovelady. Based on these analyses, the committee concluded that it was highly
improbable that the man in the doorway was Oswald and highly probable that he
was Lovelady.
The committee's belief that the man in the doorway was Lovelady was also
supported by an interview with Lovelady in which he affirmed to committee
investigators that he was the man in the photograph.(120)
(2) Witness testimony.--The committee also considered witness testimony as to
Oswald's whereabouts immediately following the assassination. Three witnesses
were particularly significant. Depository Superintendent Roy Truly and Dallas
Police Officer M.L. Baker both entered the depository right after the shots were
fired. They encountered Oswald on the second floor, and in testimony to the
Warren Commission, they gave the time as 2 to 3 minutes after the shots. (121) A
witness who personally knew Oswald, Mrs. Robert A. Reid, also a depository
employee, testified to the Warren Commission that she also saw him on the second
floor approximately 2 minutes after the assassination. (122)
The testimony of these three witnesses was mutually corroborating. Since all
were outside the depository when the shots were fired. their statements that it
took them about 2 minutes to get to the second floor were reasonable.(123) It
appeared equally reasonable that in those same 2 minutes Oswald could have
walked from the sixth floor window to the rear stairway and down four flights of
stairs to the second floor.
The conclusion with respect to this evidence alone was not that Lee Harvey
Oswald was the assassin, but merely that the testimony of these witnesses
appeared credible and was probative on the question of Oswald's whereabouts at
the time of the assassination-
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5. LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S OTHER ACTIONS TEND TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT HE
ASSASSINATED PRESIDENT KENNEDY
The Warren Commission Concluded that shortly after the assassination, Oswald
boarded a bus, but when the bus got caught in a traffic jam, he disembarked and
took a taxicab to his roominghouse.(124) The Commission also found that Oswald
changed clothes at the roominghouse and walked about nine-tenths of a mile away
from it before
he encountered Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit. (125) After being stopped by
Tippit, the Commission concluded, Oswald drew a revolver and shot Tippit four
times, killing him. He then ran from the scene.(126) He was apprehended at
approximately 1:50 p.m. in a nearby movie house, the Texas Theatre. (127)
The committee found that while most of the depository employees were outside of
the building at the time of the assassination and returned inside afterwards,
Oswald did the reverse; he was inside before the assassination, and afterward he
went outside. That Oswald left the building within minutes of the assassination
was significant. Every other depository employee either had an alibi for the
time of the assassination or returned to the building immediately thereafter.
Oswald alone neither remained nor had an alibi.
(a) The Tippit murder
The committee investigated the murder of Officer Tippit primarily for its
implications concerning the assassination of the President. The committee relied
primarily on scientific evidence. The committee's firearms panel determined
positively that all four cartridge cases found at the scene of the Tippit murder
were fired from the pistol that was found in Lee Harvey Oswald's possession when
he was apprehended in the Texas Theatre 35 minutes after the murder.13 (128)
In addition, the committee's investigators interviewed witnesses present at the
scene of the Tippit murder.(129) Based on Oswald's possession of the murder
weapon a short time after the murder and the eyewitness identifications of
Oswald as the gunman, the committee concluded that Oswald shot and killed
Officer Tippit. The committee further concluded that this crime, committed while
fleeing the scene of the assassination, was consistent with a finding that
Oswald assassinated the President.
The Warren Commission had investigated the possibility that Oswald and Tippit
were associated prior to the assassination. but it failed to find a connection.
(130) Similarly, the committee's investigation uncovered no direct evidence of
such a relationship, nor did it attribute any activity or association to Officer
Tippit that could be deemed suspicious. The committee, however, did find and
interview one witness who had not been interviewed by the Warren Commission or
FBI in 1963-64. His name is Jack Ray Tatum, and he reported witnessing the final
moments of the shooting of Officer Tippit. (131) Oswald, according to Tatum,
after initially shooting Tippit from his position on the sidewalk, walked around
the patrol car to where Tippit
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lay in the street and stood over him while he shot him at point blank range in
the head. This action, which is often encountered in gangland murders and is
commonly discribed as a coup do grace, is more indicative of an execution than
an act of defense intended to allow escape or prevent apporhension. Absent
further evidence--which the committee did not develop--the meaning of this
evidence must remain uncertain. 14
(b) Oswald: A capacity for violence?
The committee also considered the question of whether Oswald's words or actions
indicated that he possessed a "capacity for violence." The presence of such a
trait would not, in and of itself, prove much. Nevertheless, the absence of any
words or actions by Oswald that indicated a capactity for violence would be
inconsistent with the conclusion that Oswald assassinated the President and
would be of some significance.
In this regard, the committee noted that Oswald had on more than one occasion
exhibited such behavior. The most blatant example is the shooting of Officer
Tippit. The man who shot Tippit shot him four times at close range and in areas
that were certain to cause death. There can be no doubt that the man who
murdered Officer Tippit intended to kill him, and as discussed above, the
committee concluded that Oswald was that man.
Another example of such behavior occurred in the Texas Theatre at the time of
Oswald's arrest. All of the police officers present--and Oswald himself--stated
that Oswald physically attempted to resist arrest.(132) The incident is
particulary significant, if, as some of the officers testified, Oswald
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to fire his revolver during the course of the
struggle.
Another incident considered by the committee in evaluating Oswald's capacity for
violence was the attempted murder of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker on April 10,
1963. The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald shot at Walker and that this
demonstrated "his propensity to act dramatically and, in this instance
violently, in furtherance of his beliefs."(133) Many critics of the commission,
however, dispute the conclusion that Oswald was the shooter in the Walder
case.(134)
The committee turned to scientific analysis to cast light on the issue. As
discussed earlier, the evidence is conclusive that Oswald owned a
Mannlicher-Carano rifle. The committee's firearms panel examined the bullet
fragment that was removed from the wall in the home of General Walker and found
that it had characteristics similar to bullets fired from Oswald's
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.(135) In addition, neutron activation analysis of this
fragment confirmed that it was probably a Mannlicher-bullet.(136)
In addition, the committee considered the testimony of Marina Oswald, who
stated, among other things, that Lee Harvey Oswald told her that he had shot at
Walder.(137) Further, the committee's handwriting experts determined that a
handwritten note that, according to Marina Oswald's testimony, was written to
her by Oswald prior to the
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Walker shooting, was written by Oswald,(138) This undated note, although it did
not mention General Walker, clearly indicated that Oswald was about to attempt
an act during the course of which he might be killed or taken into custody.(139)
15
The committee concluded that the evidence strongly suggested that Oswald
attempted to murder General Walker and that he possessed a capacity for
violence. Such evidence is supportive of the committee's conclusion that Oswald
assassinated President Kennedy.
(c) The motive
Finding a possible motive for Oswald's having assassinated President Kennedy was
one of the most difficult issues that the Warren Commission addressed. The
Commission stated that "many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald's
motivation for the assassination, and the Commission does not believe that it
can ascribe to him any one motive or group of motives."(140) The Commission
noted Oswald's overriding hostility to his environment, his seeking a role in
history as a great man, his commitment to Marxism, and his capacity to act
decisively without regard to the consequences when such action would further his
aims of the moment.(141)
The committee agreed that each of the factors listed by the Warren Commission
accurately characterized various aspects of Oswald's political beliefs, that
those beliefs were a dominant factor in his life and that in the absence of
other more compelling evidence, it concluded that they offered a reasonable
explanation of his motive to kill the President.
It is the committee's judgment that in the last 5 years of his life, Oswald was
preoccupied with political ideology. The first clear manifestation of this
preoccupation was his defection to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1959 at the
age of 20.(142) This action, in and of itself, was an indication of the depth of
his political commitment. The words that accompanied the act went even further.
Oswald stated to officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he wanted to
renounce his citizenship and that he intended to give the Russians any
information concerning the Marine Corps and radar operations that he
possessed.(143) In letters written to his brother Robert, Oswald made it clear
that in the event of war he would not hesitate ot fight on the side of the
Russians against his family or former country.(144) The paramount importance of
his political commitment was indicated in one letter in which he informed his
family that he did not desire to have any further communications with them as he
was starting a new life in Russia. It was also reflected in his attempt to
commit suicide when he was informed he would not be allowed to remain in the
Soviet Union. (145) In considering which were the dominant forces in Oswald's
life, the committee, therefore, relied on Oswald's willingness
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to renounce his citizenship, to betray military secrets, to take arms against
his own family, and to give up his own life, if necessary, for his political
beliefs.
Upon Oswald's return to the United States from the Soviet Union in 1962,
although his fervor for that country might have diminished, his words and
actions still revolved around ideological causes. Oswald made no attempt to hide
or tone down his deep-seated feelings. He expounded them to those with whom he
associated, even when they could be expected to be opposed. He subscribed to
Marxist and Communist publications such as "The Worker" and "The Militant," and
he openly corresponded with the American Communist Party and the Socialist
Worker's Party. (146) His devotion to his political beliefs was cogently
symbolized by the photograph, authenticated by the committee's photographic and
handwriting panels, in which he is defiantly holding copies of "The Worker" and
"The militant" and his rifle, with a handgun strapped to his waist. (147)
His involvement in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was another example of
Oswald's affinity for political action. (148) This organization was highly
critical of U.S. policy toward the Cuban government of Fidel Castro Oswald not
only professed to be a member of the organization, but he characteristically
chose to become a highly visible spokesman. He corresponded with the national
office, distributed handbills on the streets of New Orleans and twice appeared
on a local radio program representing himself as a spokesman for the
organization.
The committee fully recognized that during the course of Oswald's activities in
New Orleans he apparently became involved with certain anti-Castro elements,
although such activities on Oswald's part have never been fully explained.(149)
Considering the depth of his political commitment, it would not have been
uncharacteristic for Oswald to have attempted to infiltrate anti-Castro Cuban
organizations. (150) But the significant point is that regardless of his purpose
for joining, it is another example of the dominance of political activity in
Oswald's life.
A short time before the assassination of the President, Oswald traveled to
Mexico City, where he went to the Cuban Consulate and indicated an intense
desire to travel to Cuba and Russia. (151) Once again, it appears that Oswald
was ready to leave his family and his country to fulfill a political goal.
Precisely why Oswald wanted to go to Cuba or Russia is not known, but it was
certainly of significance that he chose those particular countries, both of
which are Marxist.
Finally, in considering the extent to which Oswald acted on behalf of his
political beliefs, the Walker shooting also was relevant. As discussed above,
the committee concluded that Oswald attempted to murder Major General Walker in
April 1963. In the city of Dallas, no one figure so epitomized anticommunism as
General Walker. Considering the various activities to which Oswald devoted his
time, his efforts and his very existence, General Walker could be readily seen
as "an ultimate enemy." It is known that Oswald was willing to risk death for
his beliefs, so it is certainly not unreasonable to find that he might attempt
to kill Walker, a man who was intensely opposed to his ideology.
In analyzing Oswald's possible political motive, the committee considered the
fact that as one's position in the political spectrum moves
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far enough to the left or right, what may otherwise be recognized as strikingly
dissimilar viewpoints on the spectrum may be viewed as ideologically related.
President Kennedy and General Walker hardly shared a common political ideology.
As seen in terms of American political thinking, Walker was a staunch
conservative while the President was a liberal. It can be argued, however, that
from a Marxist's perspective, they could be regarded as occupying similar
positions. Where Walker was stridently anti-Communist, Kennedy was the leader of
the free world in its fight against communist. Walker was a militarist. Kennedy
had ordered the invasion of Cuba and had moved to within a hairsbreadth of
nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. Consequently, it may be argued that
Oswald could have seen Walker and Kennedy in the same ideological light.
The depth and direction of Oswald's ideological commitment is, therefore, clear.
Politics was the dominant force in his the right down to the last days when,
upon being arrested for the assassination, he requested to be represented by a
lawyer prominent for representing Communists. Although no one specific
ideological goal that Oswald might have hoped to achieve by the assassination of
President Kennedy can be shown with confidence, it appeared to the committee
that his dominant motivation, consistent with his known activities and beliefs,
must have been a desire to take political action. It seems reasonable to
conclude that the best single explanation for the assassination was his
conception of political action, rooted in his twisted ideological view of
himself and the world around him.
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(blank page)
Scientific Acoustical Evidence Establishes a High Probability that Two Gunmen
fired at JFK
Page 65
B. SCIENTIFIC ACOUSTICAL EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A HIGH PROBABILITYTHAT TWO GUNMEN
FIRED AT PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY; OTHER SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE
THE POSSIBILITY OF TWO GUNMEN FIRING AT THE PRESIDENT; SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
NEGATES SOME SPECIFIC CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS
The committee tried to take optimum advantage of scientific analysis in
exploring issues concerning the assassination. In many cases, it was believed
that scientific information would be the most reliable information available,
since some witnesses had died and the passage of time had caused the memories of
remaining witnesses to fail and caused other problems affecting the
trustworthiness of their testimony.
As noted in the preceding section of this report, the committee turned to
science as a major source of evidence for its conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald
fired three shots from the Texas School Book Depository, two of which hit
President Kennedy. The evidence that was most relied upon was developed by
committee panels specializing in the fields of forensic pathology, ballistics,
neutron activation, analysis, handwriting identification, photography and
acoustics. Of these, acoustics--a science that involves analysis of the nature
and origin of sound impulses--indicated that the shots from the book depository
were not the only ones fired at President Kennedy.
(a) Warren Commission analysis of a tape
The Warren Commission had also employed scientific analysis in its investigation
and had recognized that acoustics might be used to resolve some questions about
the shots fired at the President. It had obtained a tape recording, an alleged
on-the-scene account of the assassination made by Sam Pate, a Dallas radio
newsman, but an FBI examination of the tape "failed to indicate the presence of
any sounds which could be interpreted as gunshots."(1) The FBI also informed the
Commission that the newsman had stated that most of the tape was not recorded in
Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination, but was recorded in a studio
several days later after he had been dismissed by his station, KBOX. (2)
The Commission independently submitted the tape for analysis to Dr. Lawrence
Kersta of Bell Telephone Acoustics & Speech Research Laboratory. As reported in
a letter from Kersta to the Commission on July 17, 1964,(3) spectograms (visual
representations of tonal qualities in the sounds) were made of a key 8-second
portion of the tape. The spectograms indicated there were six nonvoiced
noises--one nonvoiced "spike" (a scientific term for a graphic display of a
noise) followed by three other nonvoiced spikes of different acoustical
characteristics occurring .86 seconds, 1.035 seconds and 1.385 seconds after the
first. These, in turn, were followed by two events apparently caused by sound
and believed to have been related to the previous ones.
(65)
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Dr. Kersta did not indicate in his letter that he had found shots, and the
results of his tests were not mentioned in the Warren Report.
The committee was unable to locate the Kersta spectographs in the National
Archives until late 1978 (they had been mistled), but it did obtain the tape
recording made on November 22, 1963, by KBOX reporter Sam Pate. On May 11, 1978,
the committee submitted the tape to an acoustical consultant for analysis, with
these results:(4)
While a portion of the tape was recorded on November 22, 1963,in the vicinity of
Dealey Plaza, it was thought not to be contemporaneous with the assassination.
Other portions of the tape, moreover, seemed to have been recorded, at least in
large part, in a studio, since appropriate background noise was not present.
And even if the tape had been made during the firing of the shots and had
recorded them, Kersta's spectographic analysis would not have found them. The
committee's consultant advised that spectographic analysis is appropriate only
for detecting tonal, or harmonic, sound. To identify a gunshot, the analysis
must be able to portray a waveform on an oscilloscope or similar such device.
(b) Dallas Police Department recordings
To resolve questions concerning the number, timing, and origin of the shots
fired in Dealey Plaza, the committee asked its acoustical consultant to examine
recordings not analyzed acoustically by the Warren Commission, specifically,
Dallas Police Department dispatch transmissions for November 22, 1963.1
These transmissions, received over the police radio network from officers in the
field, were recorded at Dallas police headquarters. Two recording systems were
in use at the time--a Dictabelt for channel 1, and a Gray Audograph disc
recording for channel 2.2 (5)
The committee held 2 days of public hearings on September 11, 1978 and December
29, 1978--in which it attempted to present the essential evidence from the
acoustical analysis. Because of time limitations, it was not possible to present
all of the evidence in the hearings.
(1) Analysis by Bolt Beranek and Newman.--In order to identify the nature and
origin of sound impulses in a recording, acoustical analysis may include, among
other means of examination, a delinea tion and study of the shape of its
electrical waveforms and a precise measurement and study of the timing of
impulses on the recording. In May 1978, the committee contracted with Bolt
Beranek and New man Inc. (BBN) of Cambridge, Mass. to perform this sort of anal
ysis. The study was supervised by Dr. James E. Barger, the firm's chief
scientist.
Bolt Beranek and Newman specializes in acoustical analysis and performs such
work as locating submarines by analyzing underwater sound impulses. It pioneered
the technique of using sound recordings
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to determine the timing and direction of gunfire in an analysis of a tape that
was recorded during the shootings at Kent State University in 1970. In a
criminal case brought against members of the National Guard by the Department of
Justice, the analysis of the tape by BBN, combined with photographs taken at the
time of the shootings, were used by the prosecution in its presentation to a
grand jury to help establish which guardsmen were the first to fire shots. The
firm was also selected by Judge John J. Sirica to serve on a panel of technical
experts that examined the Watergate tapes in 1973.
The Dallas police dispatch materials given to BBN to analyze in May 1978 were as
follows:
The original Dictabelt recordings made on November 22, 1963,
of transmissions over channel 1;
A tape recording of channel 1 Dictabelts;
A tape recording of transmissions over channel 2.3 (7)
These materials were obtained by a committee investigator in March 1978, from
Paul McCaghren, who in 1963 was a Dallas police lieutenant who had submitted
investigative reports and materials on the assassination to Chief Curry. (8) In
1969, a newly appointed chief of police had ordered that a locked cabinet
outside his office be opened. It contained reports and materials concerning the
assassination that had been submitted to Curry; among the items were the
Dictabelt recordings and tapes of the November 22, 1963, dispatch transmissions.
McCaghren, who in 1969 was director of the Intelligence Division, had then taken
custody of the materials and retained them until he gave them to the committee's
investigator in 1978. (9) There was no evidence that any of the materials had
been tampered with while in the police department's or McCaghren's possession.
To the human ear, the tapes and Dictabelts contain no discernible sounds of
gunfire. The dispatcher's voice notations of the time of day indicate that
channel 2 apparently was not in use during the period when the shots were fired.
Channel 1 transmissions, however, were inadvertently being recorded from a
motorcycle or other police vehicle whose radio transmission switch was stuck in
the "on" position. (10)
BBN was asked to examine the channel 1 Dictabelts and the tape that was made of
them to see if it could determine: (1) if they were, in fact, recorded
transmissions from a motorcycle with a microphone stuck in the "on" position in
Dealey Plaza; (2) if the sounds of shots had been, in fact, recorded; (3) the
number of shots; (4) the time interval between the shots; (5) the location of
the weapon or weapons used to fire the shots; and (6) the type of weapon or
weapons used.
BBN converted the sounds on the tape into digitized waveforms and produced a
visual representation of the waveforms.(11) By employing sophisticated
electronic filters, BBN filtered out "repetitive noise," such as repeated
firings of the pistons of the motorcycle engine. (12) It then examined the tape
for "sequences of impulses" that might be significant. (A "sequence of impulses"
might be caused by a loud noise--such as gunfire--followed by the echoes from
that
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loud noise.) Six sequences of impulses that could have been caused by a noise
such as gunfire were initially identified as having been transmitted over
channel 1. (13) Thus, they warranted further analysis.
These six sequences of impulses, or impulse patterns, were subjected to
preliminary screening tests to determine if any could be conclusively determined
not to have been caused by gunfire during the assassination. The screening tests
were designed to answer the following questions:(14)
Do the impulse patterns, in fact, occur during the period of the assassination?
Are the impulse patterns unique to the period of the assassination?
Does the span of time of the impulse patterns approximate the duration of the
assassination as indicated by a preliminary analysis of the Zapruder film? (Are
there at least 5.6 seconds between the first and last impulse? 4)
Does the shape of the impulse patterns resemble the shape of impulse patterns
produced when the sound of gunfire is recorded through a radio transmission
system comparable to the one used the Dallas police dispatch network?
Are the amplitudes of the impulse patterns similar to those produced when the
sound of gunfire is recorded through a transmission system comparable to the one
used for the Dallas police dispatch network?
All six impulse patterns passed the preliminary screening tests.(15)
BBN next recommended that the committee conduct an acoustical reconstruction of
the assassination in Dealey Plaza to determine if any of the six impulse
patterns on the dispatch tape were caused by shots and, if so, if the shots were
fired from the Texas School Book Depository or the grassy knoll. (16) The
reconstruction would entail firing from two locations in Dealey Plaza--the
depository and the knoll--at particular target locations and recording the
sounds through numerous microphones. The purpose was to determine if the
sequences of impluses recorded during the reconstruction would match any of
those on the dispatch tape. If so, it would be possible to determine if the
impulse patterns on the dispatch tape were caused by shots fired during the
assassination from shooter locations in the depository and on the knoll. (17)
The theoretical rationale for the reconstruction was as follows:
The sequence of impulses from a gunshot is caused by the noise of the shot,
followed by several echoes. Each combination of shooter location, target
location and microphone location produces a sequence of uniquely spaced
impulses. At a given microphone location, there would be a unique sequence of
impulses depending on the location of the noise source (gunfire) and the target,
and the urban environment of the surrounding area (echo-producing structures in
and surrounding Dealey Plaza). The time of arrival of the echoes would be the
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significant aspect of the sequence of impulses that would be used to compare the
1963 dispatch tape with the sounds recorded during
the 1978 reconstruction. (18)
The echo patterns in a complex environment such as Dealey Plaza are unique, so
by conducting the reconstruction, the committee could obtain unique "acoustical
fingerprints" of various combinations of shooter, target and microphone
locations. The fingerprint's identifying characteristic would be the unique
time-spacing between the echoes. If any of the acoustical fingerprints produced
in the 1978 reconstruction matched those on the 1963 Dallas police dispatch
tape, it would be a strong indication that the sounds on the 1963 Dallas police
dispatch tape were caused by gunfire recorded by a police microphone in Dealey
Plaza. (19)
At the time of the reconstruction in August 1978, the committee was extremely
conscious of the significance of Barger's preliminary work, realizing, as it
did, that his analysis indicated that there possibly were too many shots, spaced
too closely together, 5 for Lee Harvey Oswald to have fired all of them, and
that one of the shots came from" the grassy knoll, not the Texas School Book
Depository.
The committee's awareness that it might have evidence that Oswald was not a lone
assassin affected the manner in which it conducted the subsequent phase of the
investigation. For example, it was deemed judicious to seek an independent
review of Barger's analysis before proceeding with the acoustical
reconstruction. So, in July 1978, the committee. contacted the Acoustical
Society of America to solicit recommendations for persons qualified to review
the BBN analysis and the proposed Dallas reconstruction. The society recommended
a number of individuals, and the committee selected Prof. Mark Weiss of Queens
College of the City University of New York and his research associate, Ernest
Aschkenasy. Professor Weiss had worked on numerous acoustical projects. He had
served, for example, on the panel of technical experts appointed by Judge John
J. Sirica to examine the White House tape recordings in conjunction with the
Watergate grand jury investigation. Aschkenasy had specialized in developing
computer programs for analyzing large. volumes of acoustical data.
Weiss and Aschkenasy reviewed Barger's analysis and conclusions and concurred
with them. In addition, they agreed that the acoustical reconstruction was
necessary, (20) and they approved Barger's plan for conducting it.
The committee authorized an acoustical reconstruction, to be conducted on August
20, 1978. Four target locations were selected, based on:(21)
The estimated positions of the Presidential limousine according to a correlation
of the channel 1 transmissions with the Zapruder film, indicating that the first
shot was fired between Zapruder frames 160 and 170 and that the second shot was
fired between Zapruder frames 190 and 200; 6
The position of the President at the time of the fatal head shot (Zapruder frame
312); and
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Evidence that a curb in Dealey Plaza may have been struck by a bullet during the
assassination.
Two shooter locations were selected for the reconstruction :(22)
The sixth floor southeast corner window of the Texas School Book Depository,
since substantial physical evidence and witness testimony indicated shots were
fired from this location; and
The area behind a picket fence atop the grassy knoll, since there was
considerable witness testimony suggesting shots were fired from there. 7
A Mannlicher-Carcano rifle was fired from the depository, since it was the type
of weapon found on the sixth floor on November 22, 1963.
Both a Mannlicher-Carcano (chosen mainly because it fires a medium velocity
supersonic bullet) and a pistol, which fires a subsonic bullet, were fired from
the grassy knoll, since there was no evidence in August 1978 as to what type of
weapon, if any, may have been fired from there on November 22, 1963.8 (22)
Microphones to record the test shots were placed every 18 feet in 36 different
locations along the motorcade route where a motorcycle could have been
transmitting during the assassination. (25)
A recording was made of the sounds received at each microphone location during
each test shot, making a total of 432 recordings of impulse sequences (36
microphone locations times 12 shots), or "acoustical fingerprints," for various
target-shooter-microphone combinations. Each recorded acoustical fingerprint was
then compared with each of the six impulse patterns on the channel 1 dispatch
tape to see if and how well the significant points in each impulse pattern
matched up. The process required a total of 2,592 comparisons (432 recordings of
impulse sequences times six impulse patterns), an extensive effort that was not
completed until 4 days before Barger was to testify at a committee public
hearing on September 11, 1978.
The time of the arrival of the impulses, or echoes, in each sequence of impulses
was the characteristic being compared, not the shape, amplitude or any other
characteristic of the impulses or sequence. (27) If a point (representing time
of arrival of an echo) in a sequence of the 1963 dispatch tape could be
correlated within plus or minus 6/1,000 of a second to a point in a sequence of
the reconstruction, it was considered a match. (28)
A plus or minus 6/1,000 of a second "window" was chosen, because the exact
location of the motorcycle was not known. Since the microphones were placed 18
feet apart in the 1978 reconstruction, no microphone was expected to be in the
exact location of the motorcycle microphone during the assassination in 1963.
Since the location was not apt to be exactly the same, and the time of arrival
of the echo is unique at each spot, the +-6/1,000 of a second "window" would
allow for the contingency that the motorcycle was near, but not exactly at, one
of the microphone locations selected for the reconstruction.(29)
Those sequences of impulses that had a sufficiently high number of points that
matched (a "score" or correlation coefficient of .6 or higher) were considered
significant.(30) The "score" or correlation
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coefficient was set at this level to insure finding all sequences that might
represent a true indication that the 1963 dispatch tape contained gunfire.
Setting it at this level, however, also allowed a sequence of impulses on the
dispatch tape that might have been caused by random noise or other factors to be
considered a match and therefore significant. (31) Such a match, since it did
not in fact represent a true indication of gunfire on the 1963 dispatch tape,
would be considered an "invalid match." (32)
Of the 2,592 comparisons between the six sequences of impulses on the 1963
police dispatch tape and the sequences obtained during the acoustical
reconstruction in August 1978, 15 had a sufficient number of matching. points (a
correlation coefficient of .6 or higher) to be considered significant.(33) The
first and sixth sequence of impulses on the dispatch tape had no matches with a
correlation coefficient over .5. The second sequence of impulses on the dispatch
tape had four significant matches, the third sequence had five, the fourth
sequence had three, and the fifth sequence had three.(34) Accordingly, impulses
one and six on the dispatch tape did not pass the most rigorous acoustical test
and were deemed not to have been caused by gunfire from the Texas School Book
Depository or grassy knoll.(35) Additional analysis of the remaining four
impulse sequences was still necessary before any of them could be considered as
probably representing gunfire from the Texas School Book Depository or the
grassy knoll.
The locations of the microphones that recorded the matches in the 1978
reconstruction were plotted on a graph that depicted time and distance. It was
observed that the location of the microphones at which matches were recorded
tended to cluster around a line on the graph that was, in fact, consistent with
the approximate speed of the motorcade (11 mph), as estimated from the Zapruder
film. (36) For example, of the 36 microphones placed along the motorcade route,
the one that recorded the sequence of impulses that matched the third impulse on
the 1963 dispatch tape was farther along the route than the one that recorded
the impulses that matched the second impulse on the dispatch tape. The location
of the microphones was such, it was further observed, that a motorcycle
traveling at approximately 11 miles per hour would cover the distance between
two microphones in the elapsed time between impulses on the dispatch tape. This
relationship between the location of the microphones and the time between
impulses was consistent for the four impulses on the dispatch tape, a very
strong indication, the committee found, that the impulses on the 1963 dispatch
tape were picked up by a transmitter on a motorcycle or other vehicle as it
proceeded along the motorcade route. Applying a statistical formula, Barger
estimated that since the microphones clustered around a line representing the
speed of the motorcade, there was a 99 percent probability that the Dallas
police dispatch tape did, in fact, contain impulses transmitted by a microphone
in the motorcade in Dealey Plaza during the assassination. (37)
Some of the matches found between the 1978 reconstruction and the dispatch tape
were, however, thought to be clearly "invalid," that is, they did not represent
a true indication of gunfire from the Texas School Book Depository or the grassy
knoll. In one case, for example, there was a match for a shot in the
reconstruction that had been aimed
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at a target located in a different direction from where the Presidential
limousine was located at the moment, the limousine's location having been
established by a correlation of the dispatch tape and the Zapruder film. (38)
Only an unlikely misfire could explain why an assassin would fire in the
opposite direction. By applying similar principles of logic, six matches were
ruled out. This left three matches for impulse pattern one, three for impulse
pattern two, one for impulse pattern three and two for impulse pattern four.
(39) The remaining matches for impulse patterns one, two and four on the
dispatch tape were for rifle firings from the Texas School Book Depository in
the 1978 reconstruction, while the match for impulse pattern three was for a
rifle firing from the grassy knoll.
These matches did not, however, prove conclusively that the impulses on the 1963
dispatch tape did, in fact, represent gunfire from the depository or grassy
knoll. There still was a chance that random or other noise could have produced
the pattern on the dispatch tape that matched the pattern obtained in the
reconstruction, therefore being invalid as well. Based on statistical
probabilities, including the observation that the locations of the microphones
that picked up the matching impulse patterns tended to cluster along a line on
the graph that approximated .the speed of the motorcycle, Barger estimated there
was 50 percent chance that anyone of the matches was invalid. (40) Consequently,
Barger testified before the committee in September 1978 that the probability of
there having been a shot from the grassy knoll was only 50 percent.(411) He
based this estimate on there being only one match for impulse three, combined
with his conclusion that there was a 50-50 chance that any one match, including
the one for impulse pattern three, had been caused .by random noise. and was
invalid. (412) (Barger was also saying, however, that if the match for impulse
pattern three was valid, it meant that a shot was fired at President Kennedy
from the grassy knoll.) 9
(2) Weiss-Aschkenasy analysis.--In mid-September 1978, the committee asked Weiss
and Aschkenasy, the acoustical analysts who had reviewed Barger's work, if they
could go beyond what Barger had done to determine with greater certainty if
there had been a shot from the grassy knoll. Weiss and Aschkenasy conceived an
analytical extension of Barger's work that might enable them to refine the
probability estimate. (45) They studied Dealey Plaza to determine which
structures were most got to have caused the echoes received by the microphone in
the 1978 acoustical reconstruction that had recorded the match to the shot from
the grassy knoll. They verified and refined their identifications of
echo-generating structures by examining the results of the reconstruction. And
like BBN, since they were analyzing the arrival time of echoes, they made
allowances for the temperature differential, because air temperature affects the
speed of sound. (46) Barget then reviewed and verified the identification of
echo-generating sources by Weiss and Aschkenasy. (47)
Once they had identified the echo-generating sources for a shot from the
vicinity of the grassy knoll and a microphone located near the
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point indicated by Barger's tests, it was possible for Weiss and Aschkenasy to
predict precisely what impulse sequences (sound fingerprints) would have been
created by various specific shooter and microphone locations in 1963. (48) (The
major structures in Dealey Plaza in 1978 were located as they had been in 1963.)
Weiss and Aschkenasy determined the time of sound travel for a series of sound
triangles whose three points were shooter location, microphone location and
echo-generating structure location. While the location of the structures would
remain constant, the different combinations of shooter and microphone locations
would each produce a unique sound travel pattern, or sound fingerprint. (149)
Using this procedure, Weiss and Aschkenasy could compare acoustical fingerprints
for numerous precise points in the grassy knoll area with the segment identified
by Barger on the dispatch tape as possibly reflecting a shot fired from the
knoll. (50) 10
Because Weiss and Aschkenasy could analytically construct what the impulse
sequences would be at numerous specific shooter and microphone locations, they
decided to look for a match to the 1963 police dispatch tape that correlated to
within ±1/1.000 of a second, as opposed to +-6/1.000) of a second, as Barger had
done.(51) By looking for a match with such precision, they considerably reduced
the possibility that any match they found could have been caused by random or
other noise,(52) thus substantially reducing the percentage probability of an
invalid match.
Weiss and Aschkenasy initially pinpointed a combination of shooter-microphone
locations for which the early impulses in pattern three matched those on the
dispatch tape quite well, although later impulses in the pattern did not.
Similarly, they found other microphone locations for which later impulses
matched those on the dispatch tape, while the earlier ones did not. They then
realized that, a microphone mounted on a motorcycle or other vehicle would not
have remained stationary during the period it was receiving the echoes. They
computed that the entire impulse pattern or sequence of echoes they were
analyzing on the dispatch tape occurred over approximately three-tenths of a
second, during which time the motorcycle or other vehicle would have, at 11
miles per hour, traveled about five feet. By taking into account the movement of
the vehicle. Weiss and Aschkenasy were able to find a sequence of impulses
representing a shot from the grassy knoll in the reconstruction that matched
both the early and late impulses on the dispatch tape. (53)
Approximately 10 feet from the point on the grassy knoll that was picked as the
shooter location in the 1978 reconstruction and four feet from a microphone
location which, Barger found, recorded a shot that matched the dispatch tape
within +-6/1,000 of a second, Weiss and Aschkenasy found a combination of
shooter and microphone locations they needed to solve the problem. It
represented the initial position of a microphone that would have received a
series of impulses matching those on the dispatch tape to within +-1/1.000 of a
second. The microphone would have been mounted on a vehicle that was moving
along the motorcade route at 11 miles per hour.
Weiss and Aschkenasy also considered the distortion that a wind-shield might
cause to the sound impulses received by a motorcycle
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microphone. They reasoned that the noise from the initial muzzle blast of a shot
would be somewhat muted on the tape if it traveled through the windshield to the
microphone. Test firings conducted under the auspices of the New York City
Police Department confirmed this hypothesis. Further, an examination of the
dispatch tape reflected similar distortions on shots one, two, and three, when
the indicated positions of the motorcycle would have placed the windshield
between the shooter and the microphone.11 On shot four, Weiss and Aschkenasy
found no such distortion. (55) The analysts' ability to predict the effect of
the windshield on the impulses found on the dispatch tape, and having their
predictions confirmed by the tape, indicated further that the microphone was
mounted on a motorcycle in Dealey Plaza and that it had transmitted the sounds
of the shots fired during the assassination.
Since Weiss and Aschkenasy were able to obtain a match to within +-1/1,000 of a
second, the probability that such a match could occur by random chance was
slight. Specifically, they mathematically computed that, with a certainty factor
of 95 percent or better, there was a shot fired at the Presidential limousine
from the grassy knoll. (56)
Barger independently reviewed the analysis performed by Weiss and Aschkenasy and
concluded that their analytical procedures were correct. (57) Barger and the
staff at BBN also confirmed that there was a 95 percent chance that at the time
of the assassination a noise as loud as a rifle shot was produced st the grassy
knoll. When questioned about what could cause such a noise if it were not a
shot, Barger noted it had to be something capable of causing a very loud
noise--greater than a single firecracker.(58) Further, given the echo patterns
obtained, the noise had to have originated at the very spot behind the picket
fence on the grassy knoll that had been identified,(59) indicating that it could
not have been a backfire from a motorcycle in the motorcade. (60)
In addition, Barger emphasized, the first part of the sequence of impulses
identified as a shot from the grassy knoll was marked by an N-wave, a
characteristic impulse caused by a supersonic bullet. (61) The N-wave, also
referred to as a supersonic shock wave, travels faster than the noise of the
muzzle blast of a gun and therefore arrives at a listening device such as a
microphone ahead of the noise of a muzzle blast. The presence of the N-wave was,
therefore, a significant additional indication that the third impulse on the
police dispatch tape represented gunfire, and, in particular, a supersonic
bullet.(62) The weapon may well have been a rifle, since most pistols -- except
for some, such as a .44 magnum--fire subsonic bullets.
The N-wave was further substantiation for a finding that the third impulse
represented a shot fired in the direction of the President. Had the gun been
discharged when aimed straight up or down, or away from the motorcade, no N-wave
would have appeared. (63) Of the impulse patterns on the dispatch tape that
indicated shots from the book depository, those that would be expected to
contain an N-wave, given the location of the vehicle's microphone, did so,
further corroborating the conclusion that these impulses did represent
supersonic bullets. (64)
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When questioned about the probability of the entire third impulse pattern
representing a supersonic bullet being fired at the President from the grassy
knoll, Barger estimated there was a 20 percent chance that the N-wave, as
opposed to the sequence of impulses following it, was actually caused by random
noise.(65) Accordingly, the mathematical probability of the entire sequence of
impulses actually representing a supersonic bullet was 76 percent, the product
of a 95 percent chance that the impulse pattern represented noise as loud as a
rifle shot from the grassy knoll times an 80 percent chance that the N-wave was
caused by a supersonic bullet. (66)
The committee found no evidence or indication of any other cause of noise as
loud as a rifle shot coming from the grassy knoll at the time the impulse
sequence was recorded on the dispatch tape, and therefore concluded that the
cause was probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade.
(3) Search for a motorcycle.---As the work of Weiss and Aschkenasy produced
strong indications of a shot from the grassy knoll, the committee began a search
of documentary and photographic evidence to determine if a motorcycle or other
vehicle had been in the locations indicated by the acoustical tests.
Earlier in its investigation, the committee had interviewed many Dallas police
officers who had ridden in the presidential motorcade, although the purpose of
the interviews was not to determine the location of a motorcycle that might have
had its radio transmitting switch stuck in the "on" position. Among the officers
who were interviewed, one who subsequently testified in a public hearing was
H.B. McLain. In his interview on September 26, 1977, McLain said that he had
been riding to the left rear of Vice President Johnson's car and that just as he
was completing his turn from Main onto Houston Street, he heard what he believed
to have been two shots. (67) Sergeant Jimmy Wayne Courson was also interviewed
on September 26. 1977. He stated that his assignment in the motorcade was in
front of the press bus, approximately six or seven cars to the rear of the
presidential limousine, and that as he turned onto Houston Street, he heard
three shots about a second apart. (68) Neither officer was asked specifically
whether his radio was on channel one or two, or whether his microphone switch
might have been stuck in the transmit position.
The committee obtained Dallas Police Department assignment records confirming
that McLain and Courson had both been assigned to the left side of the
motorcade, (69) and it discovered photographic evidence (70) that Courson was
riding to the rear of McLain, and, as Courson recalled,(71) he was in the
vicinity of the press bus. The available films revealed that throughout the
motorcade the spacing of the motorcycles varied, but that McLain was generally
several car lengths ahead of Courson and therefore much closer to the
presidential and Vice Presidential limousines. (72) No photographs of the
precise locations of the two officers at the moment of the assassination were,
at that time, found. Photographs taken shortly before the assassination,
however, did indicate that McLain was on Houston Street heading toward Elm as
the presidential limousine was turning onto Elm in front of the Texas School
Book Depository. 12 (73) At the time of the assassina-
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tion, therefore, he would have been in the approximate position of the
transmitting microphone, as indicated by the acoustical analysis.
The committee reviewed transcripts of the Dallas police dispatch tapes for both
channel one and channel two. It did not find any voice Transmissions from McLain
on either channel on November 22, 1963. (As noted, it was determined that the
shots fired during the assassination were recorded over channel one. If it could
have been established that McLain was transmitting over channel two, then the
gunfire transmissions could not have come from his motorcycle radio.)
McLain was asked by the committee to come to Washington to testify. He was shown
all of the photographic evidence that the committee had assembled, as well as
the Dallas police records of the mororcade assignments. McLain testified before
the committee on December 29, 1978, that he was assigned to ride on the left
side of the motorcade; that since he would slow down at corners, often stopping
momentarily, and then speed up during straight stretches, his exact, position in
the motorcade varied; and that he was the first motorcycle to the rear of the
Vice presidential limousine. (75)
He further stated that he was the officer in the photographs taken of the
motorcade on Main and Houston Streets, and that at the time of the assassination
he would have been in the approximate position of the open microphone near the
corner of Houston and Elm, indicated by the acoustical analysis. (76) He did not
recall using his radio during the motorcade nor what channel it was tuned to on
that day. (77) He stated it unusally was tuned to channel one. (78) The button
on his transmitter receiver, he acknowledged, often got stuck in the "on"
position when he was unaware of it, but he did not know if it was stuck during
the motorcade. (79)
McLain testified before the committee that he recalled hearing only one shot and
that he thereafter heard Chief Curry say to go to the hospital. (80) McLain
testified it was possible that he heard the broadcast of Chief Curry (which
would have been on channel two) over the speaker of his own radio, or over the
speaker of the radio of another motorcycle.(81)
Following the hearing, the committee secured a copy of the daily assignment
sheet for motorcycles from the Dallas Police Department and found that McClain
had been assigned motorcycle number 352 and call sign 155 on November 22,
1963.(82) preliminary photographic enhancement of the films taken on Houston and
Main Streets indicated that the number on the rear of the motorcycle previously
identified as having been ridden by McLain was, in fact, 352. (83) 13
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The committee recognized that its acoustical analysis first established and then
relied on the fact that a Dictabelt had recorded transmissions from a radio with
a stuck microphone switch located in Dealey Plaza. The committee realized that
the authenticity of the tape and the location of the stuck microphone were both
of great importance to the acoustical analysis. Consequently, it sought to
verify that the tape in fact contained a broadcast from an open motorcycle
microphone in Dealey Plaza during the assassination.
The findings of the acoustics experts may be challenged by raising a variety of
questions, questions prompted, for example, by the sound of sirens on the
tape,(84) by statements by Officer McLain subsequent to his hearing testimony in
which he denied that it was his radio that was transmitting, (85)"by what
appears to be the sound of a carillon bell on the tape, (86) and by the apparent
absence of crowd noise. The committee carefully considered these questions as
they bore on the authenticity of the tape and the location of the stuck
microphone.
Approximately 2 minutes after the impulse sequences that, according to the
acoustical analysis, represent gunfire, the dispatch tape contains the sold of
sirens for approximately 40 seconds. The sirens appear to rise and then recede
in intensity, suggesting that the position of the microphone might have been
moving closer to and then farther away from the sirens, or that the sirens were
approaching the microphone and then moving away from it. (87)
If the sirens were approaching the microphone and then moving away from it, it
could be suggested that the motorcycle with the stuck transmitter was stationary
on the Stemmons Freeway and not in Dealey Plaza. The sirens would appear to
increase and then decrease as some vehicles in the motorcade, with their sirens
turned on, drove along the freeway on the way to Parkland Hospital, approaching
and then passing by the motorcycle with the stuck microphone. According to a
transcript of channel two transmissions, approximately 3 1/2 minutes after the
assassination Dallas Police Department dispatcher Gerald D. Henslee stated that
an unknown motorcycle on Stemmons Freeway appeared to have its microphone switch
stuck open on channel one.(88) The committee interviewed Henslee on August 12,
1978. He told the committee he had assumed the motorcycle was on the freeway
from the noise of the sirens. (89) Other Dallas police officers have also
speculated that the motorcycle may have been standing near the Trade Mart.
Officer McLain's acknowledged actions subsequent to the assassination might
explain the sound of sirens on the tape. McLain was in fact probably on Stemmons
Freeway at the time Henslee noted that an unknown motorcycle appeared to have
its microphone switch stuck open. McLain himself testified that following the
assassination, he sped up to catch the front cars of the motorcade that had
entered Stemmons Freeway en route to Parkland Hospital. (90) In any event, it is
certain he left the plaza shortly after the assassination. The cars in the
motorcade had their sirens on, and this could account for the sound of the
sirens increasing as McLain drew closer to them, whether he left Dealey Plaza
immediately or shortly after the assassination. 14 A
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variety of other actions might also account for the sound appearing to recede.
Officer McLain might have fallen back after catching the cars, he might have
passed by the cars, or he might have arrived at the hospital shortly after
catching up, at a time when the sirens were being turned down as the cars
approached the hospital.
Subsequent to his hearing testimony, McLain stated that he believed he turned on
his siren as soon as he heard Curry's order to proceed to Parkland Hospital. He
said that everyone near him had their sirens on immediately. (91) Should his
memory be reliable, the broadcast of the shots during the assassination would
not have been over his radio, because the sound of sirens on the tape does not
come until approximately 2 minutes later. The committee believed that McLain was
in error on the point of his use of his siren. Since those riding in the
motorcade near Chief Curry had their sirens on, there may have been no
particular need for McLain to turn his on, too. The acoustical analysis
pinpointing the location of the microphone, the confirmation of the location of
the motorcycle by photographs, his own testimony as to his location, and his
slowing his motorcycle as it rounded the corner of Houston and Elm (as had been
previously indicated by the acoustical analysis),(92) and the likelihood that
McLain did not leave the plaza immediately, but legged behind momentarily after
the assassination, led the committee to conclude it was Officer McLain whose
radio microphone switch was stuck open.
Further, the committee noted. it would have been highly improbable for a
motorcycle on Stemmons Freeway to have received the echo patterns for the four
impulses that appear on the dispatch tape. As noted in more detail below, to
contend that the microphone was elsewhere carries with it the burden of
explaining all that appears on the tape. To be sure, those who argue the
microphone was in Dealey Plaza must explain the sounds that argue it was not.
Similarly, those who contend it was not in Dealey Plaza must explain the sounds
that indicate it was. As Aschkenasy testified, the echo patterns on the tape
would only have been received by a microphone located in a physical environment
with the same acoustical characteristics as Dealey Plaza. (93) It is extremely
unlikely that the echo patterns on the tape, if received from elsewhere, would
so closely parallel the echo patterns characteristic of Dealey Plaza.
The tape contains the faint sound of a carillon-like bell about 7 seconds after
the last impulse believed to have been a shot, but no such bell was known to
have been in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza. Accordingly, the possibility that the
motorcycle with the stuck radio transmitter might not have been in Dealey Plaza
was considered. The committee found that the radio system used by the Dallas
Police Department permitted more than one transmitter to operate at the same
time, and this frequently occurred.(94) The motorcycle whose radio transmitted
the sound of a bell was apparently not positioned in Dealey Plaza, but this did
not mean that the transmissions of gunshots were also from a radio not in Dealey
Plaza. The logical explanation was that the dispatch tape contains the
transmissions of two or more radios. (95)
The absence of identifiable crowd noise on the tape also might raise questions
as to whether the motorcycle with the stuck transmitter was in Dealey Plaza. The
lack of recognizable crowd noise, however, may be explained by the transmission
characteristics of the microphone.
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Dallas police motorcycle. radios were equipped with a directional microphone and
were designed to transmit only very loud sounds. A human voice would transmit
only if it originated very close to the front of the mike. The chief objective
of this characteristic was to allow a police officer, when speaking directly
into the microphone, to be heard over the sound of his motorcycle engine.
Background noise, such as that of a crowd, would not exceed the noise level from
the much closer motorcycle engine, and it would not be identifiable on a tape of
the radio transmission. The sound of a rifle shot is so pronounced, however,
that it would be picked up even if it originated considerably farther away from
the microphone than other less intense noise sources, such as a crowd. (96)
(c) Other evidence with respect to the shots
To address further the question of whether the dispatch tape contained sounds
from a microphone in Dealey Plaza with a stuck transmitting switch, the
committee reviewed independent evidence. It reasoned that if the timing, number
and location of the shooters, as shown on the tape, were corroborated or
independently substantiated in whole or in part by other scientific or physical
evidence--that is, the Zapruder film, findings of the forensic pathology and
firearms panels, the neutron activation analysis and the trajectory
analysis--the validity of the acoustical analysis and the authenticity of the
tape could be established. Conversely, any fundamental inconsistency in the
evidence would undermine the analysis and the authenticity of the tape.
The tape and acoustical analysis indicated that, in addition to the shot from
the knoll, there were three shots fired at President Kennedy from the Texas
School Book Depository. This aspect of the analysis was corroborated or
independently substantiated by three cartridge cases found on the sixth floor of
the Texas School Book Depository on November 22, 1963, cartridge cases that had
been fired in Oswald's rifle,(97) along with other evidence related to the
number of shots fired from Oswald's rifle. This corroboration was considered
significant by the committee, since it tended to prove that the tape did indeed
record the sounds of shots during the assassination.
Further corroboration or substantiation was sought by correlating the Zapruder
film to the acoustical tape. The Zapruder film contains visual evidence that two
shots struck the occupants of the Presidential limousine.(98) The committee
attempted to correlate the observable reactions of President Kennedy and
Governor Connally in the film to the time spacing of the four impulses found in
the recording of the channel one transmission. The correlation between the film
and the recording however, could only be approximate because it was based on the
estimated real-time characteristics of the recording (calculated from the
frequent time annotations made by the dispatcher) (99) and the average running
time of the film (between 18.0 and 18.5, or an average of 18.3 frames per
second). 15
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The committee correlated the film to the tape in two ways. The first assumed the
fourth shot was the fatal head shot to the President and occurred at frame 312.
Its results are as follows:(101)
Bullet reached Acoustical determi-
limousine at Za- nation of source
Channel time pruder frame No. of impulse _
Impulse pattern I ..............................................................
12:30:47.0 157-161 TSBD.
Impulse pattern II ............................................................
12:30:48.6 188-191 TSBD.
Impulse pattern III ............................................................
12:30:54.6 295-296 Grassy knoll.
Impulse pattern IV ............................................................
12:30:55.3 312 TSBD.
_ _
The committee believed that the fourth impulse pattern probably represented that
fatal head shot to the President that hit at Zapruder frame 312. Nevertheless,
the possibility of frame 312 representing the shot fired from the grassy knoll,
with the fourth shot consequently occurring at frame 398, was also considered.
The problem with this possibility is that it appeared to be inconsistent with
other scientific evidence that established that all the shots that struck the
President and he Governor came from the Texas School Book Depository.
The forensic pathology panel concluded that there was no evidence that the
President or Governor was hit by a bullet fired from the grassy knoll and that
only two bullets, each fired from behind, struck them.(102) Further, neutron
activation analysis indicated that the bullet fragments removed from Governor
Connally's wrist during surgery, those removed from the President's brain during
the autopsy, and those found in the limousine were all very likely fragments
from Mannlicher-Carcano bullets. (103) It was also found that there was evidence
of only two bullets among all the specimens tested--the fragments removed from
Governor Connally's wrist during surgery were very likely from the almost whole
bullet found on the stretcher at Parkland Hospital, and the fragments removed
from the President's brain during the autopsy very likely matched bullet
fragments found in the limousine.(104) The neutron activation analysis findings,
when combined with the finding of the committee that the almost whole bullet
found on the stretcher at Parkland Hospital as well as the larger fragment found
in the limousine were fired from Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle,(105)
established that only two bullets struck the President and the Governor, and
each was fired from the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book
Depository and owned by Oswald.
The committee considered whether proper synchronization of the tape to the film
should assume that. the shot from the grassy knoll hit the President at Zapruder
from 312. It did so because Dr. Michael Baden, chairman of the committee's
forensic pathology panel, acknowledged there was a possibility, although highly
remote, that the head wound depicted in Zapruder frame 312 could have been
caused by a shot from the grassy knoll, and that medical evidence of it had been
destroyed by a shot from the rear a fraction of a second later. (106) 16 The
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significance of this, the committee reasoned, was the realization that it could
mean that the President's fatal head wound was caused by the shooter from the
grassy knoll, not Oswald.
Since the medical, ballistics and neutron activation analysis evidence, taken
together, established that the President was struck by two bullets fired from
Oswald's rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, the
committee sought to determine if such shots could have struck the President,
given the known position of his body, even the grassy knoll shot struck him at
Zapruder frame 312. The results correlating the acoustical tape to the film,
assuming the shot from the knoll was at Zapruder frame 312, are as follows
:(107)
_ _
Acoustical
determination
Zapruder frame of origin _
Impulse pattern I
..................................................................... 173-177
TSBD.
Impulse pattern II
..................................................................... 205-208
TSBD.
Impulse pattern III
.................................................................. 312 Grassy
knoll.
Impulse pattern IV
.................................................................... 328-329
TSBD.
_ _
It was determined by medical, ballistics and neutron activation evidence that
the President was struck in the head by a bullet fired
from a rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. For
that bullet to have destroyed the medical evidence of the President being hit at
Zapruder frame 312, it would have had to have struck at Zapruder frame 328-329.
But a preliminary trajectory analysis, based on the President's location and
body position at frame 328-329 failed to track to a shooter in the sixth floor
southeast corner window of the depository within a minimum margin of error
radius,(108) thus indicating it was highly unlikely the President was struck in
the head at Zapruder frame 328 by a shot fired from the sixth floor southeast
corner window of the depository. Further, there is no Visual evidence in the
Zapruder film of the President being struck in the head at Zapruder frames
173-177 or 205-208, the frames at which shots one and two would have been fired
if the shot from the knoll was a hit to the head at frame 312. Accordingly, if
the shot from the grassy knoll occurred at frame 312, no shot fired from the
Texas School Book Depository would have struck the President in the head at any
time. Such a finding is contrary to the weight of the scientific evidence. The
committee concluded, therefore, that the shot fired from the grassy knoll was
not the shot visually represented at Zapruder frame 312: that the shot from the
grassy knoll missed President Kennedy;17 and that the most accurate
synchronization of the tape and the film would be one based on a correlation of
impulse pattern four on the tape with the fatal head shot to the President at
frame 319 of the Zapruder film. When the tape and film are so synchronized, the
sequence on the film corroborated or substantiated the timing of the shots
indicated on the 1963 tape.
According to the more logical synchronization, the first shot would have
occurred at approximately Zapruder frame 160. This would also
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be consistent with the testimony of Governor Connally, who stated that he heard
the first shot and began to turn in response to it. (109) His reactions, as
shown in Zapruder frames 162-167, reflect the start of a rapid head movement
from left to right. (110)
The photographic evidence panel's observations were also relevant to the
acoustics data that indicated that the second shot hit the limousine's occupants
at about Zapruder frames 188-191. The panel noted that at approximately Zapruder
frame 200 the President's movements suddenly freeze, as his right hand seemed to
stop abruptly in the midst of a waving motion Then during frames 200-202, his
head moves rapidly from right to left. The sudden interruption of the presidents
hand-waving motion, coupled with his rapid head movements, was considered by the
photographic panel as evidence of President Kennedy's reaction to some "severe
external stimulus." (111)
Finally, the panel observed that Governor Connally's actions during frames
222-226, as he is seen emerging from behind the sign that obstructed Zapruder's
view, indicated he was also reacting to some "severe external stimulus." 18
(112) Based upon this observation and upon the positions of President Kennedy
and Governor Connally within the limousine, the panel concluded that the
relative alinement of the two men was consistent with the theory that they had
been struck by the same bullet. (113)
The forensic pathology panel, with one member in dissent, stated that the
medical evidence was consistent with the hypothesis that
a single bullet caused the wounds to the Governor and the President. (114)
The committee conducted a trajectory. analysis for the shot that it ultimately
concluded struck both the Governor and the President. It was based on the
location of the limousine and the body positions of President Kennedy and
Governor Connally at Zapruder frame 190 and the bullet's course as it could be
determined from their wounds. 19 When President Kennedy's entry and exit wounds
were used as reference points for the trajectory line, it intersected the Texas
School Book Depository within a 13 foot radius of a point approximately 14 feet
west of the building's southeast corner and approximately 2 feet below the sixth
floor window-sills. (115) When President Kennedy's exit wound and Governor
Connally's entrance wound were used as the reference points for the trajectory
line, it intersected the Texas School Book Depository within a 7-foot radius of
a point approximately 2 feet west of the southeast corner and 9 feet above the
sixth floor window sills. (116)
The committee's examination of the synchronization of the tape to the Zapruder
film, therefore, demonstrated that the timing of the impulses on the tape
matched the timing of events seen in the film. Further, the other scientific
evidence available to the committee was
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consistent with the reactions viewed in the film and the timing of the shots
indicated by the acoustical analysis. The synchronization of the 1963 dispatch
tape with the film, based on a fatal hit to the President's head at frame 312
having been fired from the Texas School Book Depository, along with related
evidence, corroborated or independently substantiated that the tape is one of
transmissions from a microphone that recorded the assassination in Dealey Plaza
on November 22, 1963.
Despite the existence of adequate corroboration or substantiation of the tape's
authenticity., the committee realized that other questions were posed by the
timing sequence of the impulses on the tape. The acoustical analysis had
indicated both the first and second impulse patterns were shots from the
vicinity of Texas School Book Depository, but that there were only 1.66 seconds
between the onset of each of these impulse patterns. The committee recognized
that 1.66 seconds is too brief a period for both shots to have been fired from
Oswald's rifle, given the results of tests performed for the Warren Commission
that found that the average minimum firing time between shots was 2.3
seconds.(117)
The tests for the Warren Commission, however, were based on an assumption that
Oswald used the telescopic sight on the rifle. (118) The committee's panel of
firearms experts, on the other hand, testified that given the distance and angle
from the sixth floor window to the location of the President's limousine, it
would have been easier to use the open iron sights.(119) During the acoustical
reconstruction performed for the committee in August, the Dallas Police
Department marksmen in fact used iron sights and had no difficulty hitting the
targets.
The committee test fired a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle using the open iron sights.
It found that it was possible for two shots to be fired within 1.66
seconds.(120) One gunman, therefore, could have fired the shots that caused both
impulse pattern 1 and impulse pattern 2 on the dispatch tape. The strongest
evidence that one gunman did, in fact, fire the shots that caused both impulse
patterns was that all three cartridge cases found on the sixth floor of the
Texas School Book Depository came from Oswald's rifle.(121) In addition, the
fragments from the two bullets that were found were identified as having been
fired from
Oswald's rifle. (122) Accordingly, the 1.66 seconds between the onset of the
first and second impulse patterns on the tape are not too brief a period of time
for both of these patterns to represent gunfire, and for Oswald to have been the
person responsible for firing both shots.
To explore further whether the tape contained sounds transmitted from a
microphone in Dealey Plaza, the committee reviewed evidence produced by its
photographic evidence panel. The panel conducted a "jiggle analysis" of the
Zapruder film on the theory that Zapruder's panning errors, which would be
apparent as a blur in the film, might have been caused by his reaction to the
sound of gunfire. An original jiggle analysis, performed without knowledge of
the results of the acoustical analysis, showed strong indications of shots
occurring at about frame 190 and at about frame 310. (123) The photographic
evidence panel also noted some correlation between the acoustics results and a
panning error reaction to the apparent sound of gunfire at about
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frame 160. Little evidence of another shot was found in the jiggle analysis, 20
but the expert who performed it testified that since the third and fourth shots
occurred within less than a second of each other, it might be difficult to
differentiate between them.
In summary, the various scientific projects indicated that there was a high
probability that two gunmen were firing at the President. Scientifically, the
existence of the second gunman was established only by the acoustical study, but
its basic validity was corroborated or independently substantiated by the
various other scientific projects.
The committee had its photographic evidence panel examine evidence that might
also reveal that there was in fact more than one gunman shooting at the
President. Each item of relevant photographic evidence available to the
committee was evaluated to determine whether image enhancement techniques
(digital image processing, photo-optical/chemical enhancement, and
autoradiographic enhancement) might show additional gunmen.(125) As the use of
nonoriginal photographic materials frequently introduces image distortion that
precludes accurate photo interpretation, only original photographic materials
were subjected to image enhancement techniques. (126) Similarly, since opaque
film, such as photographic print paper, does not have the dynamic range (of
brightness) of properly processed transparent film, it was not as suitable for
enhancement. (127)
There was considerable witness testimony, as well as a large body of critical
literature, that had indicated the grassy knoll as a source of gunshots.
Accordingly, this area received particular emphasis in the photographic
interpretation analysis. The panel directed its attention to that portion of the
knoll that extended from the retaining wall situated by the pergola to the
stockade fence to the west of the wall. This analysis included enhancement of
photographs taken by Mary Moorman, Philip Willis and Orville Nix, as well as
Zapruder.
Mary Moorman, a bystander, had taken a Polaroid photograph of the grassy knoll
at approximately the time of Zapruder frame 313.(128) As far as the committee
knew, it was the one photograph taken at the moment of the fatal head shot that
showed the area that the acoustical analysis indicated was the location of the
second gunman. Viewing the photograph with the naked eye, one could detect
images that might be construed as something significant behind the stockade
fence. These images may, however, only represent parts of a tree, or they may be
photographic artifacts. Due to the poor quality of the photograph and its
deterioration over the years, it was not possible to determine the nature of the
images with the naked eye. The photograph, because of this poor quality and
because it was taken on opaque film that is less suitable for photographic
enhancement, was considered by the photographic evidence panel to be of limited
usefulness.(129) Prior to the acoustical analysis, it was the subject of only
limited clarification efforts, none of which involved computer technology.(130)
Enhancement attempts in the region of the retaining wall produced no significant
increase in detail and no evidence of any human form. (131) Because the stockade
fence region of the photograph was of even
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poorer quality than the retaining wall area, no enhancement attempts were
recommended. (132) Subsequent to the acoustical analysis, the author of the
section of the photograph evidence panel's report that addressed the question of
whether there were other gunmen in Dealey Plaza indicated that the likelihood of
successfully enhancing this print was extremely remote. (133)
The significance of the Moorman film may, therefore, be largely negative. It was
not possible to draw anything positive from the film 15 years after it was
taken. Nevertheless, if the film did not contain images that might be construed
to be a figure behind the fence, it would be a troubling lack of corroboration
for the acoustical analysis. At the same time, the committee noted, the
Department of Justice might consider further enhancement, if it is deemed to be
feasible.
Zapruder frame 413, showing a bush situated between Zapruder and the
presidential limousine, was also analyzed by the photographic evidence panel.
Image enhancement techniques successfully established the presence of a human
head visible among the leaves of the bush in Zapruder's field of view. (134)
Photogrammetric analysis determined that this so called gunman in the bush was
actually located on the other side of the bush from Zapruder. (135) It is
probably one of the men who can be seen in other photographs standing in the
middle of the sidewalk that runs from the top of the grassy knoll down to Elm
Street. Consequently, he was not, as had been alleged, in a position to have
been a hidden gunman. Further, the linear feature associated with this person,
alleged by Warren Commission critics to be a rifle, is actually in front of the
leaves on the same side of the bush as Zapruder. (136) Analytical photogrammetry
and image enhancement with special color analysis attributed this linear feature
to natural surroundings. The narrow portion of the linear feature (the alleged
rifle barrel) was established to be one of a number of twigs in the bush.(137)
All of them were characterized by the same general direction and spacing,
consistent with the natural growth patterns of the bush.(138) The thicker part
of the linear feature (the alleged rifle "stock") was a hole in the bushes
through which a portion of the Presidential limousine was visible. (139)
Willis photograph No. 5 was the third knoll photograph enhanced and evaluated by
the panel. The relevant area of analysis was the retaining wall situated
approximately 41 feet to the east of the point of the stockade fence that,
according to the acoustics analysis, was the source of gunfire. A fleshtone
comparison performed by analyzing measurements of color values on an object
located behind the west end of the retaining wall confirmed that the image
perceived was actually a human being. (140) The panel did perceive "a very
distinct straight-line feature" near the region of this person's hands, but it
was unable to deblur the image sufficiently to reach any conclusion as to
whether the feature was, in fact, a weapon. (141)
Photographic enhancement of selected portions of a film taken by Orville Nix was
also performed by the panel. One object in the vicinity of the retaining wall
near the pergola was carefully studied, but the panel could not identify it as a
human being and decided that the image was more likely the result of light and
shadow patterns. (142)
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The Nix frames analyzed included those that purportedly depict a gunman in a
"classic" firing stance. This individual" is located by the southwest corner of
the pergola beyond the retaining wall, approximatly 41 feet north of the point
of the the stockade fence that, according to the acoustics study, was the source
of the gunfire. The panel was able to conclude that this image was not, in fact,
a human being. Its conclusion was based on both a shadow analysis and its
inability to attribute flesh, ones or motion to the alleged gunman.(143)
None of the photographs of the grassy knoll that were analyzed by the
photographic evidence panel revealed any evidence of a puff of smoke or flash of
light,(144) as reported by several people in the crowd.
The committee's analysis of available photographic evidence, therefore, did not
confirm or preclude the presence of a gunman firing at the President from behind
the stockade fence on the grassy knoll. In addition to photographs of the knoll
area, the committee enhanced photographic materials of the Texas School Book
Depository taken by Robert Hughes, Tom Dillard, and James Powell. These were
examined for an evidence with respect to the source of the shots fired from the
depository, as well as any evidence of conspiratorial activity before or after
the assassination. (The committee was not aware of the existence of any
photographs of the sixth floor southeast corner window of the depository at the
actual moment of the assassination.) The Hughes film, taken moments before the
first shot was fired at the President, was enhanced for the purpose of
determining whether any motion could be discerned in the sixth floor southeast
corner window where Oswald was alleged to have been positioned. Although motion
in this window was alleged, the panel concluded that it was only apparent rather
than real. (115) This conclusion was based upon the rapidity of the perceived
motion, its lack of consistent direction, and the fact that the object
disappears from view during a two-frame (approximately one-ninth of a second)
sequence.(146) Accordingly, the motion was attributed to photographic
artifact.(147) An appearance of motion in an adjacent set of windows was also
attributed to a photographic artifact.(148)
The question of motion of both sets of windows is similarly raised by the film
taken by Charles L. Bronson several minutes before the assassination. Because
this film was not made available to the committee until December 2, 1978, it was
not reviewed by the full panel. In a preliminary examination of the film by
several members of the panel, it was observed that the characteristics of the
Bronson film were similar to those of the Hughes film that were examined by the
entire panel. The apparent motion in the window seemed to be random and
therefore not likely to be caused by human motion.(149) Because of the high
quality of the Bronson film, the panel members recommended it be subjected to
computer analysis.(150) The committee recommended, in turn, that the Bronson
film be subjected to analyis by the Department of Justice.
Enhancement efforts with respect to the Dillard and Powell photographs, taken
shortly after the assassination, successfully generated considerable detail
within the depository window.(151) Based upon its review of these materials, the
panel was able to conclude that at
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the time these photographs were taken, no human forms were present in the sixth
floor southeast corner window of the depository.(152)
No photographs of the sixth floor southeast corner window of the Texas School
Book Depository were taken at the time of the assassination, photographic
evidence did not confirm or preclude a firing by an assassin from the window.
Photographs of the sixth floor window taken shortly before and after the
assassination did not reveal evidence of human forms. Allegations that these
photographs contain evidence of there having been more than one gunman on the
sixth floor were not supported by the enhancement efforts. In summary, the
photographic evidence with respect to the grassy knoll and the Texas School Book
Depository did not confirm or preclude that a gunman fired at the president from
either location.
None of the scientific evidence available to the committee photography, forensic
pathology, ballistics, neutron activation analysis--was inconsistent with the
acoustical evidence that established a high probability that two gunmen fired at
the President.
(d) Witness testimony on the shots.---The committee, in conjunction with its
scientific projects, had a consultant retained by Bolt Beranek and Newman
analyze the testimony of witnesses in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, to
advise the committee what weight, if any, it should give such testimony, and to
relate the testimony to the acoustics evidence the committee had obtained.
The statements of 178 persons who were in Dealey Plaza, all of whom were
available to the Warren Commission, were analyzed: (153) 49 (27.5 percent)
believed the shots had come from the Texas School Book Depository; 21 (11.8
percent) believed the shots had come from the grassy knoll; 30 (16.9 percent.)
believed the shots had originated elsewhere; and 78 (43.8 percent) were unable
to tell which direction the shots were fired from. Only four individuals
believed shots had originated from more than one location. (154)
Some comment on these statistics is called for. The committee noted that a
significant number of witnesses reported that shots originated from the grassy
knoll. The small number of those who thought shots originated from both the book
depository and grassy knoll might be explained by the fact that the third and
fourth shots were only seven-tenths of a second apart. Such a brief interval
might have made it difficult for witnesses to differentiate between the two
shots, or to distinguish their direction. While recognizing the substantial
number of people who reported shots originating from the knoll, the committee
also believed the process of collecting witness testimony was such that it would
be unwise to place substantial reliance upon it. The witnesses were interviewed
over a substantial period of time, some of them several days, even weeks, after
the assassination. By that time, numerous accounts of the number and direction
of the shots had been published. The committee believed that the witnesses'
memories and testimony on the number, direction, and timing of the shots may
have been substantially influenced by the intervening publicity concerning the
events of November 22, 1963.(155) Consequently standing alone, the statistics
are an unreliable foundation upon which to rely with great confidence for any
specific finding. It was of obvious im-
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portance, however, that some witness testimony would corroborate the acoustical
finding of a shot from the grassy knoll. If no testimony indicated shots from
the knoll, there would have been a troubling lack of corroboration for the
acoustical analysis.
The Warren Commission had available to it the same testimony concerning shots
from the knoll, but it believed it should not be credited because of "the
difficulty of accurate perception." (156) The Commission stated, "* * * the
physical and other evidence" only compelled the conclusion that at least two
shots were fired. (157) The Commission noted, however, that the three cartridge
cases that were found, when taken together with the witness testimony, amounted
to a preponderance of evidence that three shots were fired. (158) Nevertheless,
the Commission held, "* * * there is no credible evidence to indicate shots were
fired from other than the Texas School Book Depository."(159) It therefore
discounted the testimony of shots from the grassy knoll.
While recognizing that the Commission was correct in acknowledging the
difficulty of accurate witness perception, the committee obtained independent
acoustical evidence to support it. Consequently, it was in a position where it
had to regard the witness testimony in a different light.
The committee assembled for the purpose of illustration the substance of the
testimony of some of the witnesses who believed the shots may have come from
somewhere in addition to the depository. A Dallas police officer, Bobby W.
Hargis, was riding a motorcycle to the left and slightly to the rear of the
limousine. Hargis described the direction of the shots in a deposition given to
the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964:
Well, at the time it sounded like the shots were right next to me. There wasn't
any way in the world I could tell where they were coming from, but at the time
there was something in my head that said that they probably could have been
coming from the railroad overpass, because I thought since I had got splattered
* * * I had a feeling that it might have been from the Texas School Book
Depository, and these two places was (sic) the primary place that, could have
been shot from. (160)
Hargis stated that after the shooting he saw a man fall to the ground at the
base of the incline and cover his child. He also saw other people running.
Hargis himself stopped his motorcycle and ran up the incline. (161)
The man Officer Hargis saw lying on the ground was probably
William Eugene Newman. Newman and his wife and child were ob-
serving the motorcade from the curb near the west end of the concrete
standard on Elm Street. Newman gave this description of their actions
after hearing the shots to the sheriff's department on November 22,
1963:
Then we fell down on the grass as it seemed that we were in direct path of fire
. . . I thought the shots had come from the garden directly behind me, that was
on an elevation from
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where I was as I was right on the curb. I do not recall looking toward the Texas
School Book Depository. I looked back in the vicinity of the garden. (162)
Abraham Zapruder, since deceased, was standing on a concrete abutment on the
grassy knoll, just beyond the Stemmons Freeway sign, aiming his 8 millimeter
camera at the motorcade. He testified in deposition given to the Commission on
July 22, 1964, that he thought a shot may have come from behind him, but then
acknowledged in response to questions from Commission counsel that it could have
come from anywhere. He did, however, differentiate among the effects the shots
had on him. One shot, he noted, caused reverberations all around him and was
much more pronounced than the others. (163) Such a difference, the committee
noted, would be consistent with the differing effects Zapruder might notice from
a shot from the knoll, as opposed to the Texas School Book Depository.
A Secret Service agent, Paul E. Landis, Jr., wrote a statement on the shooting,
dated November 30, 1963. Landis was in the follow-up car, behind the
Presidential limousine, on the outside running board on the right. He indicated
that the first shot "sounded like the report of high-powered rifle from behind
me, over my right shoulder." (164) According to his statement, the shot he
identified as number two might have come from a different direction. He said:
I still was not certain from which direction the second shot
came, but my reaction at this time was that the shot came
from somewhere, towards the front, right-hand side of the
road. (165)
Another witness, S.M. Holland, since deceased, also noted signs of a shot coming
from a group of trees on the knoll. Holland was standing on top of the railroad
overpass above Elm Street. Testifying in a deposition to ehe Warren Commission
on April 8, 1964, he indicated
he heard four shots. After the first, he said, he saw Governor Connally turn
around. (166) Then there was another report. The first two sounded as if they
came from "the upper part of the street." The third was not as loud as the
others. Holland said:
There was a shot, a report. I don't know whether it was a shot. I can't say
that. And a puff of smoke came out about 6 or 8 feet above the ground right out
from under those trees. And at just about this location from where I was
standing, you could see that puff of smoke, like someone had thrown a
firecracker, or something out, and that is just about the way it sounded. It
wasn't as loud as the previous reports or shots. (167)
When counsel for the Warren Commission asked Holland if he had any doubts about
the four shots, he said:
I have no doubt about it. I have no doubt about seeing that puff of smoke come
out from those trees either. (168)
These witnesses are illustrative of those present in Dealey Plaza
on November 22, 1963, who believed a shot came from the grassy
knoll.
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(1) Analysis of the reliability of witness testimony.---The committee also
conducted, as part of the acoustical reenactment in Dealey Plaza in August 1978,
a test of the capacity of witnesses to locate the direction of shots, hoping the
experiment might give the committee an independent basis with which to evaluate
what weight, if any, to assign to witness testimony. Two expert witnesses were
asked to locate the direction of shots during the test,(169) and Dr. David
Green, the BBN consultant, supervised the test and prepared a report on the
reactions of the expert witnesses. Green concluded in the report, "* * * it is
difficult to draw any firm conclusions relative to the reports of witnesses in
the plaza as to the possible locus of any assassin." (170) Nevertheless, he
stated that "it is hard to believe a rifle was fired from the knoll" during the
assassination, since such a shot would be easy to "localize." Green cited as
support for his conclusion the fact that only four of the 178 Dealey Plaza
witnesses pointed to maor than one location as the origin of the shots.(171)
In its evaluation of Green's conclusions, the committee considered the different
circumstances affecting the expert: witnesses in the test and the actual
witnesses to the assassination. The expert witnesses in August 1978 were
expecting the shooting and knew in advance that guns would be fired only from
the Texas School Book Depository and the grassy knoll and they had been fold
their assignment was to determine the direction of the shots. Further, there was
no test in which shots were fired within seven-tenths of a second of each other,
so no reliable conclusion could be reached with respect to the possibility that
such a brief interval would cause confusion. Dr. Green's report also reflects
that even though the two trained observers correctly identified the origin of 90
percent of the shots, their own notes indicated something short of
certainty.(172) Their comments were phrased with equivocation: "Knoll? "Over my
head. Not really on knoll or even behind me;" "Knoll/underpass;" and "Knoll? Not
really confident." Their comments, in short, frequently reflected ambiguity as
to the origin of the shots, indicating that the gunfire from the grassy knoll
often did not solred very different from shots fired from the book depository.
An analysis by the committee of the statements of witnesses in Dealey Plaza on
November 22, 1963, moreover, showed that about 44 percent were not able to form
an opinion about the origin of the shots,(173) attesting to the ambiguity showed
in the August 1978 experiment. Seventy percent of the witnesses in 1963 who had
an opinion as to origin said it was either the book depository or the grassy
knoll.21 (174) Those witnesses who thought the shots originated from the grassy
knoll represented 30 percent of those who chose between the knoll and the book
depository and 21 percent of those who made a decision as to origin. Since most
of the shots fired on November 22, 1963 (three out of four, the committee
determined) came from the book depository, the fact that so many witnesses
thought they heard shots from the knoll lent additional weight to a conclusion
that a shot came from there.
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The committee, therefore, concluded that the testimony of witnesses in Dealey
Plaza on November 22, 1963 supported the finding of the acoustical analysis that
there was a high probability that a shot was fired at the President from the
grassy knoll. There were also witness reports of suspicious activity in the
vicinity of the knoll.(175)
(e) Certain conspiracy allegations
While the committee recognized, as discussed in section C, that a finding that
two gunmen fired at the President did not in itself establish that President
Kennedy was assassinated as a result of a conspiracy, it did establish, in the
context of common experience, the probability that a conspiracy did exist that
day. Consequently, the committee sought to employ scientific analysis to examine
some conspiracy theories about the assassination. The scientific analysis that
could be applied to these conspiracy allegations refuted each one of them.
The committee had its photographic evidence panel investigate allegations
concerning certain specific individuals who had been linked to the assassination
and were allegedly present in Dealey Plaza. For ensic anthropologists were asked
to compare photographs of these known subjects with those of unidentified
persons photographed in Dealey Plaza on the day of the assassination. The
anthropological studies involved comparisons of morphological traits (wrinkles,
scars, and shape of ears, nose, et cetera) and facial dimensions and statural
measurements to the extent that these could be derived from the photographs
examined and other related documents available to the committee.(176)
The first photograph examined contained an individual appearing in a press
photograph of motorcade spectators on Houston Street.(177) Some critics had
contended the individual appeared to be Joseph A. Milteer, a militant
conservative who had been secretly recorded on tape by a police informant 2
weeks prior to the assassination as he described a plan to assassinate the
President. 22 The anthropologists concluded, however, that based on available
photographs and records of Milteer's height, the individual in the photograph
could not have been Milteer.(178)
Press photographs of three "tramps" apprehended by the Dallas police near Dealey
Plaza shortly after the assassination were analyzed and compared with
photographs of a number of persons, including E. Howard Hunt, 23 Frank Sturgis,
Thomas Vallee, Daniel Carswell, and Fred Lee Chrisman, each of whom had been
alleged by critics to be linked to the assassination. Of all the subjects
compared, only Fred Lee Chrisman, a conservative active in New Orleans at the
time of the assassination, was found to have facial measurements consistent with
any of the tramps.(180) Anthropologists could not make a positive identification
of Chrisman, (181) however. The committee could not establish any link between
Chrisman and the assassination. In addi-
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tion, the committee independently determined that Chrisman was not in Dealey
Plaza on the day of the assassination.(182)
The committee sought, by employing scientific analysis, to explore other
allegations of conspiratorial activity-Establishing the authenticity of the
autopsy photographs and X-rays was of fundamental importance, not only because
these evidentiary materials were a pri-
mary basis for the committee's findings concerning the nature and causes of the
president's head wounds, but because allegations that they had been altered
raised implications of a wide-based conspiracy operating at high levels of the
U.S. Government. As it has been noted, the committee found that the X-rays and
photographs had not been altered.
Another conspiratorial theory that implied there was an extensive and
sophisticated conspiracy rested on the allegation that the photographs of Oswald
in his backyard holding a rifle were composites. Similar conspiratorial
implications were raised by the allegation that the rifle currently in the
National Archives was a different rifle than that seen in the backyard
photographs of Oswald with rifle, as well as other photographs of the rifle
taken on November 22 and November 23, 1963. As discussed in section A 3,
scientific analysis performed by the committee refuted each of these
allegations.(183)
The final conspiratorial theory the committee investigated by scientific
analysis was the so-claled "two Oswald theory." This was an assertion by some
critics that the Lee Harvey Oswald who returned from Russia in 1962 was a
different person than the Lee Harvey Oswald who defected to Russia in 1959.
(184) Forensic anthropologists analyzed and compared the number of photos of
Oswald taken different times during his life for any indication that they were
not photographs of one and the same individual. Based on an analysis of facial
dimensions, they found all the photographs consistent with those of a single
individual. (185)
In addition the photographic evidence panel conducted height and proportion
studies of various Oswald photographs, utilizing test photographs of subjects
against a height chart. (186) The panel noted that significant variations can
arise from this type of measurement due to differences in orientation and
distance of the subject from the camera. (187) The panel explained," * * *
unless the subject photographed is standing directly with his back against the
height chart at a correct distance from the properly positioned camera equipped
with an appropriate lens, it is unreasonable to assume that the resulting
picture is ever a precisely accurate indicator of both his height, and head
size." (188) The panel noted that because of the impediments to accuracy, the
use of height charts in pictures is no longer a common practice in law
enforcement or industrial security work.(189)
The committee also engaged the services of three handwriting experts to explore
the "two Oswald theory." These experts viewed documents purported to have been
written by Lee Harvey Oswald. They examined documents from the years 1956 to
1963 to determine if the handwriting of the man who joined the Marines in 1956
was the same as that of the man who had applied fore passport in 1959, tried to
revoke his American citizenship in 1959, returned to the United States
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93
in 1962, journeyed to Mexico in late September 1963, and ordered the rifle which
was found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository on November 22
1963. A careful examination of these documents demonstrated that the man who
signed those items was the same man throughout the entire 7-year peried.(190)
Accordingly, on the basis of the committee's scientific analysis, there was no
evidence to support the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald who returned from
Russia in 1962 was a different person than the Lee Harvey Oswald who defected to
Russia in 1959.
(f) Summary of the evidence
Where it was available, the committee extensively employed scientific analysis
to assist it in the resolution of numerous issues. The committee considered all
the other evidence available to evaluate the scientific analysis. In conclusion,
the committee found that the scientific accoustical evidence established a high
probability that two gunmen fired at President John f. Kennedy. Other scientific
evidence did not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President,
but it did negate some specific conspiracy allegations.
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(blank page)
The Committee Believes, JFK was Probably Assassinated as a Result of a
Conspiracy
Page 95
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C. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
TO IT, THAT PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS PROBABLY ASSASSINATED
AS A RESULT OF A CONSPIRACY. THE COMMITTEE IS UNABLE THE OTHER
GUNMAN OR THE EXTENT OF THE CONSPIRACY
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once simply defined conspiracy as "a
partnership in criminal purposes." (1) That definition is adequate.
Nevertheless, it may be helpful to set out a more recise definition. If two or
more individuals agreed to take action to kill president Kennedy, and at least
one of them took action in furtherance of the plan, and it resulted in president
Kennedy's death, the President would have been assassinated as a result of a
conspiracy.
The committee recognizes, of course, that while the work "conspiracy"
technically denotes only a "partnership in criminal purposes," it also, in fact,
connotes widely varying meanings to many people, and its use has vastly
differing societal implications depending upon the sophistication, extent and
ultimate purpose of the partnership. For example, a conspiracy to assassinate a
President might be a complex plot orchestrated by foreign political powers; it
might be the scheme of a group of American citizens dissatisfied with particular
governmental policies; it also might be the plan of two largely isolated
individuals with no readily discernible motive.
Conspiracies may easily range, therefore, from those with important implications
for social or governmental institutions to those with no major societal
significance. As the evidence concerning the probability that President Kennedy
was assassinated as a result of a "conspiracy" is analyzed, these various
connotations of the word "conspiracy" and distinctions between them ought to be
constantly borne in mind. Here, as elsewhere, words must be used carefully, lest
people be misled.1
A conspiracy cannot be said to have existed in dealey Plaza unless evidence
exists from which, in Justice Holmes' words, a "partnership in criminal
purposes" may be inferred. The Warren Commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey
Oswald was not involved in a conspiracy to assassinate the President was, for
example, largely based on its findings of the absence of evidence of significant
association (2) between Oswald and other possible conspirators and no physical
evidence of conspiracy.(3) The Commission reasoned, quite rightly, that in the
absence of association or physical evidence, there was no conspiracy.
Even without physical evidence of conspiracy at the scene of the assassination,
there would, of course, be a conspiracy if others assisted Oswald in his
efforts. Accordingly, an examination of Oswald's associates is necessary. The
Warren Commission recognized that a first premise in a finding of conspiracy may
be a finding of association. Because the Commission did not find any significant
Oswald associ-
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ates, it was not compelled to face the difficult questions posed by such a
finding. More than association is required to establish conspiracy. There must
be at least knowing assistance or a manifestation of agreement to the criminal
purpose by the associate.
It is important to realize, too, that the term "associate" may connote widely
varying meanings to different people. A person's associate may be his next door
neighbor and vacation companion, or it may be an individual he has met only once
for the purpose of discussing a contract for a murder. The Warren Commission
examined Oswald's past and concluded he was essentially a loner. (4) It
reasoned, therefore, that since Oswald had no significant associations with
persons who could have been involved with him in the assassination, there could
not have been a conspiracy. (5)
With respect to Jack Ruby, 2 the Warren Commission similarly found no
significant associations, either between Ruby and Oswald or between Ruby and
others who might have been conspirators with him. (8) In particular, it found no
connections between Ruby and organized crime, and it reasoned that absent such
associations, there was no conspiracy to kill Oswald or the president. (9)
The committee conducted a three-pronged investigation of conspiracy in the
Kennedy assassination. On the basis of extensive scientific analysis and an
analysis of the testimony of Dealey Plaza witnesses, the committee found there
was a high probability that two gunmen fired at president Kennedy.
Second, the committee explored Oswald's and Ruby's contact for any evidence of
significant associations. Unlike the Warren Commission, it found certain of
these contacts to be of investigative significance. The Commission apparently
had looked for evidence of conspiratorial association. Finding none on the face
of the associations it investigated, it did not go further. The committee,
however, conducted a wider ranging investigation. Notwithstanding the
possibility of a benign reason for contact between Oswald or Ruby and one of
their associates, the committee examined the very fact of the contact to see if
it contained investigative significance. Unlike the Warren Commission, the
committee took a close look at the associates to determine whether
conspiratorial activity in the assassination could have been possible, given
what the committee could learn about the associates, and whether the apparent
nature of the contact should, therefore, be examined more closely. 3
Third, the committee examined groups-political organizations, national
governments and so on--that might have had the motive, opportunity and means to
assassinate the President.
The committee, therefore, directly introduced the hypothesis of conspiracy and
investigated it with reference to known facts to determine if it had any bearing
on the assassination.
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The committee examined a series of major groups or organizations that have been
alleged to have been involved in a conspiracy to assassinate the President. If
any of these groups or organizations, as a group, had been involved in the
assassination, the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy would have been
one of major significance.
As will be detailed in succeeding sections of this report, the committee did not
find sufficient evidence that any of these groups or organizations were involved
in a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. Accordingly, the committee
concluded, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet
government, the Cuban government, anti-Castro Cuban groups, and the national
syndicate of organized crime were not involved in the assassination. Further,
the committee found that the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency were not involved in the
assassination.
Based on the evidence available to it, the committee could not preclude the
possibility that individual members of anti-Castro Cuban groups or the national
syndicate of organized crime were involved in the assassination. There was
insufficient evidence, however, to support a finding that any individual members
were involved. The ramifications of a conspiracy involving such individuals
would be significant, although of perhaps less import than would be the case if
a group itself, the national syndicate, for example had been involved.
The committee recognized that a finding that two gunmen fired simultaneously at
the President did not, by itself, establish that there was a conspiracy to
assassinate the President. It is theoretically possible that the gunmen were
acting independently, each totally unaware of the other. It was the committee's
opinion, however, that such a theoretical possibility is extremely remote. The
more logical and probable inference to be drawn from two gunmen firing at the
same person at the same time and in the same place is that they were acting in
concert, that is, as a result of a conspiracy.
The committee found that, to be precise and loyal to the facts it established,
it, was compelled to find that President Kennedy was probably killed as a result
of a conspiracy. The committee's finding that President Kennedy was probably
assassinated as a result of a conspiracy was premised on four factors:
(1) Since the Warren Commission's and FBI's investigation into the possibility
of a conspiracy was seriously flawed, their failure to develop evidence of a
conspiracy could not be given independent weight.
(2) The Warren Commission was, in fact, incorrect in concluding that Oswald and
Ruby had no significant associations, and therefore its finding of no conspiracy
was not reliable.
(3) While it cannot be inferred from the significant associations of Oswald and
Ruby that any of the major groups examined by the committee were involved in the
assassination, a more limited conspiracy could not be ruled out.
(4) There was a high probability that a second gunman, in fact, fired at the
President.
At the same time, the committee candidly stated, in expressing it finding of
conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, that it was "unable to identify the
other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy.
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The photographic and other scientific evidence available to the committee was
insufficient to permit the committee to answer these questions. In addition, the
committee's other investigative efforts did not develop evidence from which
Oswald's conspirator or conspirators could be firmly identified. It is possible,
of course, that the extent of the conspiracy was so limited that it involved
only Oswald and the second gunman. The committee was not able to reach such a
conclusion, for it would have been based on speculation, not evidence. Aspects
of the inestigation did suggest that the conspiracy may have been relatively
limited, but to state with precision exactly how small was not possible. Other
aspects of the committee's investigation did suggest, however, that while the
conspiracy may not have involved a major group, it may not have been limited to
only two people. These aspects of the committee's investigation are discussed
elsewhere.
If the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy was limited to Oswald and a
second gunman, its main societal significance may be in the realization that
agencies of the U.S. Government inadequately investigated the possibility of
such a conspiracy. In terms of its implications for government and society, an
assassination as a consequence of a conspiracy composed solely of Oswald and a
small number of persons, possibly only one, and possibly a person akin to Oswald
in temperament and ideology, would not have been fundamentally different from an
assassination by Oswald alone. 4
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Footnote 4 continued
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1. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
With the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy,
speculation arose over the significance of Oswald's defection to the Soviet
Union from October 1959 to June 1969, and his activities while living in that
country. Specifically, these troubling questions were asked:
Had Oswald been enlisted by the KGB, the Soviet secret police ?.
Could the assassination have been the result of a KGB plot? (1)
(a) United States-Soviet relations
To put these concerns in context, it is necessary to look at Soviet-American
relations in the 1960's. United States-Soviet relations had, in fact, been
turbulent during the Kennedy Presidency. There had been major confrontations:
over Berlin, where the wall had come to symbolize the barrier between the two
superpowers; and over Cuba, where the emplacement of Soviet missiles had nearly
started World War III. (2)
A nuclear test-ban treaty m August 1963 seemed to signal detente, but in
November, tension was building again, as the Soviets harassed, American troop
movements to and from West Berlin.(3) And Cuba was as much an issue as ever. In
Miami, on November 18, President Kennedy vowed the United States would not
countenance the establishment of another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.(4)
(b) The Warren Commission investigation
The Warren Commission considered the possibility of Soviet complicity in the
assassination, but it concluded there was no evidence of it.(5) In its report,
the Commission noted that the same conclusion had been reached by Secretary of
State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, among others.(6) Rusk
testified before the Commission on June 10, 1964:
I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union
considered that it had any interest in the removal of President Kennedy * * * I
can't see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make any such
effort.
(c) The committee's investigation
The committee, in analyzing Oswald's relationship to Russian intelligence,
considered:
Statements of both Oswald and his wife, Marina, about their life in the Soviet
Union;(7)
Documents provided by the Soviet Government to the Warren Commission concerning
Oswald's residence in the Soviet Union; (8)
Statements by Soviet experts in the employ, current or past, of the Central
Intelligence Agency;(9)
Files on other defectors to the Soviet Union; (10) and
Statements by defectors from the Soviet Union to the United States. (11)
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(1) Oswald in the U.S.S.R.---The committee reviewed the documents Oswald wrote
about his life in the Soviet Union, including his diary and letters to his
mother, Marguerite, and brother, Robert. They paralleled, to a great extent, the
information in documents provided to the Warren Commission by the Soviet
Government after the assassination. (13) These documents were provided to the
Commission in response to its request that the Soviet Government give the
Commission any "available information concerning the activities of Lee Harvey
Oswald during his residence from 1959 to 1962 in the Soviet Union, in
particular, copies of any official records concerning him."(14)
Two sets of documents, totaling approximately 140 pages, were turned over to the
Commission by the Soviets in November 1963 and in May 1964.(15) They were
routine, official papers. None of them appeared to have come from KGB files, and
there were no records of interviews of Oswald by the KGB, nor were there any
surveillance reports. Unfortunately, the authenticity of the documents could not
be established. The signatures of Soviet officials, for example, were
illegible.(16)
Nevertheless, the Soviet documents and Oswald's own statements give this account
of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union:
He lived there from October 1959 to June 1962.
He attempted suicide on learning he would not be permitted to remain in the
U.S.S.R.
He worked in a radio plant in Minsk.
He met and married Marina.
He was originally issued a residence visa for stateless persons and later issued
a residence visa for foreigners.
He obtained exit visas for himself and his family before departing the Soviet
Union.
Neither the documents nor Oswald's own statements indicate that he was debriefed
or put under surveillance by the KGB.
The committee interviewed U.S. officials who specialize in Soviet intelligence,
asking them what treatment they would have expected Oswald to have received
during his defection. (17) For the most part, they suspected that Oswald would
have routinely been debriefed by the KGB and that many persons who came in
contact with Oswald in the U.S.S.R. would have been connected with the KGB.(18)
(2) Treatment of defectors by the Soviet Government.---The committee examined
the CIA and FBI files on others who had defected in the same period as Oswald
and who had eventually returned to the United States.(19) The purpose was to
determine the frequency of KGB contact and whether the treatment of Oswald
appeared to be significantly different from the norm. The defectors studied by
the committee were selected because their backgrounds and other characteristics
were similar to Oswald's, on the theory that their treatment by the KGB could be
expected to parallel that of Oswald, if he was not a special case, a. recruited
assassin, for example.
The examination of the defector files was inconclusive, principally because the
case of nearly every defector. was unique. (20) In addition, the files available
on the experiences of the defectors were often not adequate to extract
meaningful data for the purpose of this investiga-
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tion, since, they were compiled for other reasons. (21) As to contacts with the
KGB, the experiences of American defectors appeared to have varied greatly. Some
reported daily contact with Soviet intelligence agents, while others did not
mention ever having been contacted or debriefed.(22)
(3) Yuri Nosenko.--Of all the areas investigated by the committee with respect
to possible Soviet involvement in the assassination, none seemed as potentially
rewarding as an examination of statements made by KGB officers who had defected
to the United States. In determining how the KGB treats American defectors, an
ex-KGB officer would certainly be of great interest. In this regard, the
committee had access to three such men, one of whom, Yuri Nosenko, claimed to
possess far more than general information about American defectors.
In January 1964,5 Nosenko, identifying himself as a KGB officer, sought asylum
in the United States. (23) He claimed to have worked in the KGB Second Chief
Directorate whose functions, in many respects, are similar to those of the
FBI.(24) According to Nosenko, while working in 1959 in a KGB department dealing
with American tourists, he learned of a young American who sought to defect to
the Soviet Union. The American was Lee Harvey Oswald. (25)
Nosenko stated he had worked extensively on the Oswald case, and he provided the
FBI and CIA with data pertaining to Oswald's request to defect and remain in the
Soviet Union, the initial rejection of that request by the KGB, Oswald's suicide
attempt and a subsequent decision to permit him to remain in Russia. (26)
Although the KGB, according to Nosenko, was well aware of Oswald, it made no
attempt to debrief or interview him.(27) Never was any consideration given by
the KGB to enlist Oswald into the Soviet intelligence service. (28)
The committee was most interested in Nosenko's claim that in 1963, after Oswald
was arrested in the assassination, he had an opportunity to see the KGB file on
the suspected assassin. As a result, Nosenko said, he was able to state
categorically that Oswald was not a Soviet agent and that no officer of the KGB
had ever interviewed or debriefed him. (29)
Nosenko's testimony, however, did not settle the question of Soviet complicity
in the assassination. From the time of his defection, some U.S. intelligence
officers suspected Nosenko was on a disinformation mission to mislead the
American Government. Since other CIA officials believed Nosenko was a bona fide
defector, a serious disagreement at the top level of the Agency resulted. (30)
The Warren Commission found itself in the middle of the Nosenko controversy--and
in a quandary of its own, since the issue of Nosenko's reliability bore
significantly on the assassination investigation.(31) If he was telling the
truth, the Commission could possibly write off Soviet involvement in a
conspiracy. 6 If, on the other hand, Nosenko was lying, the Commission would be
faced with a dilemma. While a deceitful Nosenko would not necessarily point to
Soviet complicity, it would leave the issue in limbo. The Warren Commission
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chose not to call Nosenko as a witness or to mention him in its report,
apparently because it could not resolve the issue of his reliability. (32)
The committee, on the other hand, reviewed all available statements and files
pertaining to Nosenko. (33) It questioned Nosenko in detail about Oswald.
finding significant inconsistencies in statements he had given the FBI, CIA and
the committee. (34) For example, Nosenko told the committee that the KGB had
Oswald under extensive surveillance, including mail interception, wiretap and
physical observation. Yet, in 1964, he told the CIA and FBI there had been no
such surveillance of Oswald.(35) Similarly, in 1964, Nosenko indicated there had
been no psychiatric examination of Oswald subsequent to his suicide attempt,
while in 1978 he detailed for the committee the reports he had read about
psychiatric examinations of Oswald.(36)
The committee also found that the CIA had literally put Nosenko in solitary
confinement from 1964 to 1968. (37) Strangely, while he was interrogated during
this period, he was questioned very little about Oswald. (38) The Agency did not
seem to realize Nosenko's importance to an investigation of the assassination.
While Richard Helms, then the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, did tell Chief
Justice Warren about Nosenko, the Agency's interest in him seemed to be largely
limited to its own intelligence-gathering problem:did the KGB send Nosenko to
the United States to deceive the CIA on many matters, only one of them perhaps
related to the assassination? (39)
In the end, the committee, too, was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter. The
fashion in which Nosenko was treated by the Agency--his interrogation and
confinement--virtually ruined him as a valid source of information on the
assassination. Nevertheless, the committee was certain Nosenko lied about
Oswald--whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978,
or perhaps to both.(40) The reasons he would lie about Oswald range from the
possibility that he merely wanted to exaggerate his own importance to the
disinformation hypothesis with its sinister implications.
Lacking sufficient evidence to distinguish among alternatives, 7 the committee
decided to limit its conclusion to a characterization of Nosenko as an
unreliable source of information about the assassination, or, more specifically,
as to whether Oswald was ever contacted, or placed under surveillance, by the
KGB.
(4) Opinions of other defectors.--In addition to interviewing Nosenko, the
committee questioned two other former KGB officers who had defected to the
United States. While neither could base an opinion on any personal experience
with that part of the KGB in which Nosenko said he had served, both said that
Oswald would have been of interest to the Soviet intelligence agency, that he
would have been debriefed and that he may have been kept under surveillance.(41)
(5) Marina Oswald.--The committee not only considered a possible connection
between Oswald and the KGB, it also looked into charges that his widow, Marina,
was an agent of the KGB, or that she at least influenced her husband's actions
in the assassination on orders from
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Soviet officials. The committee examined Government files on Marina, it
questioned experts on Soviet affairs and former KGB officers, and it took
testimony from Marina herself.(42) The committee could find no evidence to
substantiate the allegations about Marina Oswald Porter.
Mrs. Porter testified before the committee that Oswald had never been contacted
directly by the KGB, though she assumed that he and she alike had been under KGB
surveillance when they lived in the Soviet Union.
(6) Response of the Soviet Government.--Finally, the committee attempted to
obtain from the Soviet Government any information on Oswald that it had not
provided to the Warren Commission. In response to a committee request relayed by
the State Department, the Soviet Government informed the committee that all the
information it had on Oswald had been forwarded to the Warren Commission. (43)
The committee concluded, however, that it is highly probable that the Soviet
Government possessed information on Oswald that it has not provided to the U.S.
Government. It would be the extensive information that most likely was gathered
by. a KGB surveillance of Oswald and Marina while they were living m Russia. It
is also quite likely that the Soviet Government withheld files on a KGB
interview with Oswald. 8
(d) Summary of the evidence
Its suspicions notwithstanding, the committee was led to believe, on the basis
of the available evidence, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the
assassination. In the last, analysis, the Committee agreed with the testimony of
former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. To wit, there is no evidence that the
Soviet Government had any interest in removing President Kennedy, nor is there
any evidence that it planned to take advantage of the President's death before
it happened or attempted to capitalize on it after it occurred. In fact, the
reaction of the Soviet Government as well as the Soviet people seemed to be one
of genuine shock and sincere grief. The committee believed, therefore, on the
basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet Government was not
involved in the assassination.
2. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT
THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
When the leader of a great nation is assassinated, those initially suspected
always include his adversaries. When President John F. Kennedy was struck down
by rifle fire in Dallas in November 1963, many people suspected Cuba and its
leader, Fidel Castro Ruz, of involvement in the assassination, particularly
after it was learned that Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin, had sought to
travel to Cuba in September 1963.(1) To evaluate those suspicions properly, it
is
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necessary to look at Cuban-American relations in the years immediately before
and after President Kennedy took office.
(a) United States-Cuban relations
The triumphant arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana on, January 1, 1959, marking a
victorious climax of file revolution he had led, was initially heralded in the
United States as well as in Cuba. Castro was hailed as a champion of the people,
a man who would lead a free and democratic Cuba. While some suspected that
Castro had Communist leanings, the majority of the American public supported
him. (2) The appointment of Philip Bonsal as U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, replacing
Earl E.T. Smith, who was personally wary of Castro, was a clear signal that the
United States was interested in amicable relations with the revolutionary
government. On appointing Bonsal President Eisenhower expressed the hope for an
"ever closer relationship between Cuba and the United States."(3)
By the end of 1959, however, United States-Cuban relations had deteriorated to
the point that there was open hostility between the two countries. (4) President
Kennedy was to inherit the problem in 1961, and by the time of his assassination
on November 22, 1963, the antagonism had developed into a serious international
crisis.
To begin with, the United States deplored the mass executions of officials of
the Batista government that Castro had deposed. (5) In reply, Castro charged
that the United States had never voiced objections to killing and torture by
Batista. He said the trials and sentences would continue. (6) In his
revolutionary economic policies. Castro took steps that severely challenged the
traditional role of the United States. In March 1959, the Cuban Government took
over the United States-owned Cuban Telephone Co. in May. U.S. companies were
among those expropriated in the Cuban Govermnent's first large-scale
nationalization action, also in May, the agrarian reform law resulted in the
expropriation of large landholdings, many of them U.S.-owned. (7)
Vice President Nixon met with Castro in Washington in April. Castro left the
meeting convinced that Nixon was hostile. For his part, Nixon recommended to
President Eisenhower that the United States take measures to quash the Cuban
revolution. (8)
Disillusionment with Castro also spread to significant elements of the Cuban
populace. In June. the chief of the Cuban Air Force, Maj. Pedro Diaz Lanz, fled
to the United States, charging there was Communist influence in the armed forces
and the Government of Cuba. (9) A few weeks later, Manuel Urrutria Lleo, the
President of Cuba, stated on Cuban national television that communist was not
concerned with the welfare of the people and that it constituted a throat to the
revolution. In the succeeding flurry of events, President Urrutria resigned
after Castro accused him of "actions bordering on treason."(10)
By the summer of 1960, Castro had seized more than $700 million in U.S.
property; the Eisenhower administration had canceled the Cuban sugar quota;
Castro was cementing his relations with the Soviet Union. having sent his
brother Raul on a visit to Moscow Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a top Castro
lieutenant. had proclaimed publicly that the revolution was on a course set by
Marx: and CIA Director Allen Dulles had said in a speech that communist had
pervaded Castro's
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revolution. (11) On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower quietly authorized the
CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to
overthrow Castro. (12)
On January 2, 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.(13)
A period of increased tension followed. It was marked by an exchange of bitter
statements by the new U.S. President, John F. Kennedy, and the Cuban Premier.
Castro charged CIA complicity in counterrevolutionary activity against his
Government and publicly predicted an imminent U.S. invasion. (141) In his state
of the Union address on January 30, Kennedy said:
In Latin America, Communist agents seeking to exploit that region's peaceful
revolution of hope have established a base on Cuba, only 90 miles from our
shores. Our objection with Cuba is not over the people's drive for a better
life. Our objection is to their domination by foreign and domestic tyrannies * *
*.
President Kennedy said further that "* * * Communist domination in this
hemisphere can never be negotiated." (15)
(1) Bay of Pigs.--After much deliberation, President Kennedy gave the go-ahead
for a landing of anti-Castro Cubans, with U.S. support, at the Bay of Pigs on
the southern coast of Las Villas Province. It was launched on April 17, 1961,
but it was thwarted by Cuban troops, said to have been commanded by Castro
himself. (16)
On President Kennedy's orders, no U.S. military personnel actually fought on
Cuban soil, but U.S. sponsorship of the landing was readily apparent. President
Kennedy publicly acknowledged "sole responsibility" for the U.S. role in the
abortive invasion. (17)
After the Bay of Pigs debacle, the tension continued to escalate. As early as
April 20, President Kennedy reaffirmed, in a speech to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, that the United States was resolved not to abandon Cuba to
communist.(18) On May 1, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs that if the Castro regime
engaged in acts of aggression, the United States would "defend itself." (19) On
May 17, the House of Representatives passed a resolution declaring Cuba to be "a
clear and present danger" to the Western Hemisphere.(20)
Throughout 1961 and 1962, U.S. policy was to subject Cuba to economic isolation
and to support stepped-up raids by anti-Castro guerrillas, many of which were
planned with the assassination of Castro and other Cuban officials as a probable
consequence, if not a specific objective. (21) The Cuban Government, in turn,
assumed often correctly--that the raids were instigated and directed by the U.S.
Government.(22) In preparation for another large-scale attack, the Castro regime
sought and received increased military support from the Soviet Union.(23)
(2) Cuban missile crisis.--All-out war between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. was narrowly averted in the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962.
On October 22, President Kennedy announced that U.S. photographic reconnaissance
flights had discovered that work was underway in Cuba on offensive missile sites
with a nuclear strike capability. (24) On October 23, the President issued a
proclamation impos-
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ing a quarantine on the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, to be enforced by
a U.S. naval blockade. (25)
Negotiations conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted
in an end to the immediate crisis on November 20, 1962.(26) To most observers,
President Kennedy had won the confrontation with Castro and Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev.9 War had been averted, however narrowly. Russian IL-28 bombers were
to be withdrawn from Cuba, and progress was being made on the removal of
offensive missiles and other weapons.(27) The Soviets and the Cubans gained a
"no invasion" pledge that was conditional upon a United Nations inspection to
verify that Soviet offensive weapons had been removed from Cuba. (28) Because
Castro never allowed the inspection, the United States never officially made the
reciprocal pledge not
to invade Cuba.(29)
There is evidence that by the fall of 1963, informal overtures for better United
States-Cuban relations had been authorized by President Kennedy. (30) Talks
between United States and Cuban officials at the United Nations were under
consideration. In addition, the United States had attempted in the period after
the missile crisis to stem the anti-Castro raids by, at least publicly, refusing
to sanction them.(31) But covert action by the United States had neither ceased
nor escaped Castro's notice, and the rhetoric indicated that the crisis could
explode anew at any time. (32)
On September 7, 1963, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel
Harker, Castro warned against the United States "aiding terrorist plans to
eliminate Cuban leaders," and added that U.S. leaders would be in danger if they
promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders of Cuba. (33) On November 18, in
Miami, Fla., just 4 days before his assassination, President Kennedy stated:
* * * what now divides Cuba from my Country * * * is the fact that a small band
of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over
the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond this
hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument
of the policy of others. a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to
subvert the other American Republics. This, and this alone, divides us. (34)
(b) Earlier investigations of Cuban complicity
When President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the basic outlines
of the recent history of United States-Cuban relations, if not the specific
details, were known to every American who even occasionally read a newspaper.
Thus, when speculation arose as to the possibility of conspiracy, Fidel Castro
and his Communist government were natural suspects. While rationality may have
precluded any involvement of the Cuban Government, the recognition that Castro
had been among the late President's most prominent enemies compelled such
speculation.
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(1) The Warren Commission investigation.--Investigative efforts into the
background of Lee Harvey Oswald led to an early awareness of his Communist and
pro-Castro sympathies, his activities in support of the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee, and a trip he made in September 1963 to Mexico City where he visited
the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate. (35)
All of this information had been gathered prior to the beginning of the Warren
Commission's investigation, and it was sufficient to alert the Commission to the
need to investigate the possibility of a conspiracy initiated or influenced by
Castro. The report of the Warren Commission reflects that it was indeed
considered, especially with respect to the implications of Oswald's Mexico City
trip. (36) In addition, the Warren Commission reviewed various specific
allegations of activity that suggested Cuban involvement, concluding, however,
that there had been no such conspiracy. (37) For the next few years, suspicions
of Cuban involvement in the assassination were neither wide-spread nor vocal.
Nevertheless, beginning with a 1967 column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson,
press reports that. suggested Castro's involvement in the assassination began to
circulate once again. (38) Specifically, they posed the theory that President
Kennedy might have been assassinated in retaliation for CIA plots against the
life of the Cuban leader.
(2) The U.S. Senate investigation.--Thereafter, the Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities was formed
to investigate the performance of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence
agencies.(39) The Senate committee detailed two general types of operations that
the CIA had directed against Castro. One, referred to as the AMLASH operation,
involved the CIA's relationship with an important Cuban figure (code-named
AMLASH) who,(40) while he was trusted by Castro, professed to the CIA that he
would be willing to organize a coup against the Cuban leader. The CIA was in
contact with AMLASH from March 1961 until June 1965. (41) A second plot
documented by the Senate committee was a joint effort by the CIA and organized
crime in America. It was initiated in 1960 in a conversation between the
agency's Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of
Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. According to the Senate committee, this
operation lasted until February 1963. (42)
The Senate committee concluded from its review of the joint operations of the
CIA and organized crime that "* * * Castro probably would not have been certain
that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts." (43) Nor, in the view of the
Senate committee, would Castro have distinguished between the CIA-underworld
plots and the numerous other plots by Cuban exiles which were not affiliated in
any way with the CIA. (44) By-emphasizing these two conclusions, the Senate
committee apparently intended to suggest that the efforts by the CIA and
organized crime to eliminate Castro would not have resulted any retaliation
against officials of the United States.(45)
The Senate committee identified the AMLASH operation as being "clearly
different" from the CIA-underworld plots.(46) It was still in progress at the
time of the assassination, and it could clearly be traced to the CIA, since
AMLASH's proposed coup had been endorsed
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by the CIA, with the realization that the assassination of Castro might be a
consequence.(47) Nevertheless, the Senate committee found "* * * no evidence
that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban Government plotted President Kennedy's
assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba."(48) The Senate
committee left the door open, however, starting, "* * * the investigation should
continue in certain areas, and for that reason (the committee) does not reach
any final conclusions." (49)
(3) The CIA's response to the Senate.--In response to publication of the report
of the Senate committee, a special internal CIA task force was assigned in 1977
to investigate and evaluate the critical questions that had been raised. The
task force first considered the retaliation thesis. It advanced the position
that the Senate committee had essentially ignored the history of adversarial
relations between the United States and Cuba which, if provocation were the
issue, provided adequate grounds to support a theory of possible retaliation
without the necessity of reaching for specific Agency programs such as the Mafia
and AMLASH plots. (50) In essence, the task force report suggests, those plots
were only one aspect of a large picture and in themselves were not sufficient to
have provoked retaliation. (51).
The 1977 CIA task force then specifically responded to the Senate committee with
respect to the AMLASH operation:
Whatever the relationship with AMLASH, following the death of President Kennedy,
there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH had no
basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a
provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he
knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot
directed against Castro. (52)
With respect to the CIA-sponsored organized crime operations, the CIA task force
noted:
It is possible that the CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional
resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway * *
* [I]n a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition
to its material contributions was also providing an aura of official sanction.
(53)
The task force argued, therefore, that the plots should have been seen as Mafia,
not CIA, endeavors.
A conclusion of the Senate committee had been that further investigation was
warranted, based in Dart on its finding that the CIA had responded inadequately
to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information. The
CIA had not told the Commission of the plots. (54) In response, the 1977 CIA
task force observed:
While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to
normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the
credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too,
could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms-- the
possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the JFK
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assassination because of the tensions of the time * * * The Agency should have
taken broader initiatives, then, as well. That CIA employees at the time
felt--as they obviously did-- that the activities about which they knew had no
relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record
of conscious review. (55)
(c) The committee's analysis of the CIA task force report
The committee believed its mandate compelled it to take a new look at the
question of Cuban complicity in the assassination.
The Warren Commission had expressed its view, as follows:
* * * the investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence that
Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assassination of
President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the Cuban Government had
any involvement in the assassination. (56)
There are two ways that this statement may be read:
The Warren Commission's investigation was such that had a conspiracy existed, it
would have been discovered, and since it was not, there was no conspiracy.
The Warren Commission's investigation, limited as it was, simply did not find a
conspiracy.
Although the Commission inferred that the first interpretation was the proper
one, the committee investigated the possibility that the second was closer to
the truth.
Similarly, the committee investigated to see if there was a factual basis for a
finding made by the Senate Select Committee that the CIA plots to assassinate
Castro could have given rise to crucial leads that could have been pursued in
1963 and 1964, or, at a minimum, would have provided critical additional impetus
to the Commission's investigation. (57)
As previously noted, although the 1977 CIA Task Force Report at least nominally
recognized that the Agency, in 1962-64, "* * * could have considered in specific
terms what most saw then in general terms-- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban
involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time," and that
the Agency "should have taken broader initiatives then," the remainder of the
Task Force Report failed to specify what those broader initiatives should have
been or what they might have produced. It did, however, enumerate four areas for
review of its 1963-64 performance:
Oswald's travel to and from the U.S.S.R.;
Oswald's Mexico visit in September-October 1963;
The CIA's general extraterritorial intelligence collection requirements; and
Miscellaneous leads that the Senate committee alleged the
Agency had failed to pursue. (58)
The 1977 Task Force Report reviewed the question of Agency operations directed
at Cuba, including, in particular, the Mafia and AMLASH plots.(59) In each area,
the report concluded that the Agency's 1963-64 investigation was adequate and
could not be faulted, even with the benefit of hindsight.(60) The task force
uncritically accepted the Senate committee's conclusions where they were favor-
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able to the Agency, 10 and it critically rejected the Senate committee's
conclusions (as in the case of AMLASH) wherever some possible investigative
oversight was suggested. (62)
The 1977 Task Force Report, in sum, did little more than suggest that any
theoretically "broader initiatives" the Agency could have taken in 1963-64 would
have uncovered nothing. They would only have served to head off outside
criticism. That conclusion is illustrated in the following passage of the
report:
* * * [our] findings are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized
that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in
1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by
those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked
about the assassination of President Kennedy. (63)
The committee, of course, realized that the CIA's 1977 review might be correct,
that broader initiatives might only have been window dressing and would have
produced nothing of substance. But the 1977 report failed to document that fact,
if it were a fact. For example, it provided no detailed resume of the
backgrounds of those CIA case
officers, Cubans and Mafia figures who plotted together to kill Castro. There is
nothing in the report on the activities of the anti-Castro plotters during the
last half of 1963. If the Agency had been truly interested in determining the
possible investigative significance to the Kennedy assassination of such
CIA-Cuban-Mafia associations, the committee assumed it would have directed its
immediate attention to such activities in that period.
The task force report also noted that even without its taking broader
initiatives, the CIA still sent general directives to overseas stations and
cited, as an example, a cable which read:
Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any
unusual intelligence development. Although we have no reason to expect anything
of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert for the
next few days while the new President takes over the reins.(64)
The report, reasoned that the CIA's tasking of its stations was "necessarily
general," since little was known at the time about which it could be specific.
(65)
The CIA task force further noted that 4 days after this general cable was sent,
a followup request for any available information was sent to 10 specific
stations. The task force argued, in any event, that such general requirements
for intelligence-gathering would have been adequate, since "relevant information
on the subject" would have been reported anyway. (66)
Conspicuously absent from such self-exculpatory analysis was any detailed
discussion of what specific efforts the Agency's stations actually made to
secure "relevant information" about the assassination.
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For example, it became generally known that in 1963 the CIA had a station in
Florida through which it monitored the activities of most of the anti-Castro
Cuban groups operating in the United States. While the Florida station was
mentioned, the task force report failed to make a comprehensive analysis of what
requirements were placed on the station and the station's response. It might
have been expected that the station would have been required to contact and
debrief all of its Cuban sources. In addition, the station should have been
asked to use all of its possible sources to determine if any operatives in the
anti-Castro Cuban community had information about possible Cuban Government
involvement or about any association between Oswald and possible Cuban
Government agents. Further, the station, or possibly other units of the CIA,
should have been tasked to attempt to reconstruct the details of the travels and
activities of known pro-Castro Cuban operatives in the United States for 60 or
90 days prior to the assassination. (Such undertakings might have been made
without specific cables or memoranda requiring them. The Task Force Report
implied such efforts were taken by the stations "on their own initiative." (67)
But the Task Force Report failed to document or even discuss the details of such
efforts or the responses of the stations to CIA headquarters.)
The committee found that the CIA's 1977 Task Force Report was little more than
an attempted rebuttal of the Senate Select Committee's criticisms, and not a
responsible effort to evaluate objectively its own 1963-64 investigation or its
anti-Castro activities during the early 1960's or to assess their significance
vis-a-vis the assassination.
The committee made an effort to evaluate these questions through its own
independent investigation. In investigating the implications of the CIA plots
and the Warren Commission's ignorance of them, the committee conducted
interviews, depositions and hearings for the purpose of taking testimony from
pertinent individuals, conducted interviews in Mexico and Cuba, and reviewed
extensive files at the CIA and FBI. (68)
(1) AMLASH.---Turning first to the AMLASH operation, the committee received
conflicting testimony as to whether, prior to the Kennedy assassination, it was
considered to be an assassination plot. Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms, in
his testimony before the committee, stated that the AM"LASH operation was not
designed to be an assassination plot. (69) And, as already indicated, the 1977
Task Force Report concluded that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leaking or
reporting any actual Central Intelligence Agency plot directed against Castro"
during President Kennedy's life.(70)
The committee, however, noted that such characterizations were probably both
self-serving and irrelevant. The committee found that the evidence confirmed the
Senate committee's report that AMLASH himself envisioned assassination as an
essential first step in any over-throw of Castro. (71) It also noted that it was
Castro's point of view, not the Agency's, that would have counted.
The CIA's files reflect that as early as August 1962, AMLASH spoke to his CIA
case officer about being interested in the "* * * sabotage of an oil refinery
and the execution of a top ranking, Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador
and of Castro himself."(72) The case officer,
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in his report, while stating he made no commitments to AMLASH, acknowledged that
he did tell AMLASH "* * * schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place,
but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-collection, et cetera,
were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and success of such plans."(73)
Further, cables between the case officer and CIA headquarters reflected that the
Agency decided not to give AMLASH a "physical elimination mission as [a]
requirement," but that it was something "he could or might try to carry out on
his own initiative."(74) Thus, the CIA's relationship with AMLASH at least left
him free to employ. assassination in the coup he was contemplating. That
relationship could also have been viewed by Castro as one involving the CIA in
his planned assassination.
Ultimately, the CIA also provided AMLASH with the means of assassination and
assurances that the U.S. Government would back him in the event his coup was
successful.(75) CIA files reflect that AMLASH returned to Cuba shortly after the
August 1962 meetings. (76) He next left Cuba and met with a CIA officer in
September 1963. At that time, the CIA learned that AMLASH had not abandoned his
intentions and that he now wanted to know what the U.S. "plan of action" was.
(77) On October 11, the case officer cabled headquarters that AMLASH was
determined to make the attempt on Castro with or without U.S. support.(78) On
October 21, he reported that AMLASH wanted assurance that the United States
would support him if his effort was successful.(79) On October 29, Desmond
FitzGerald, chief of the Special Affairs Staff, met with AMLASH, representing
himself as a spokesman for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. FitzGerald gave
AMLASH the assurance he had asked for, (80) although the CIA has argued that the
support did not specifically include assassination.
At the end of the meeting, according to the case officer's memorandum. AMLASH
asked for "technical support" which, according to FitzGerald's memory, was
described by AMLASH as being a high-powered rifle, or other weapon, to kill
Castro. (81) Although the CIA files reflect that AMLASH did not receive the
assurances of pre-assassination "technical support" he had asked for on October
29, the matter was further discussed, at least within the Agency, and on
November 20 AMLASH was told that the meeting he "had requested" had been
granted. (82) The technical support, as the Senate committee reported, was
actually offered to AMLASH on November 22, 1963, the day President Kennedy was
assassinated. (83)
Whether CIA officials chose to characterize their activity as an assassination
plot, it is reasonable to infer that had Castro learned about the meetings
between AMLASH and the CIA, he could also have learned of AMLASH's intentions,
including the fact that his assassination would be a natural and probable
consequence of the plot. In a deposition to the committee, Joseph Langosch, in
1963 the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff,(84)
recalled that, as of 1962, it was highly possible that Cuban intelligence was
aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA.(8.5) (SAS was responsible for
CIA operations against the Government of Cuba and as such was in charge of the
AMLASH operation. (86))
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The committee was unable to determine if that possibility was a reality. The
Cuban Government informed the committee that it had come to believe that AMLASH
was in fact Rolando Cubela (based upon its construction of a profile from
biographic information on AMLASH made public by the Senate committee).(87) It
stated it did not know of Cubela's intentions until 1966. (88) The committee was
unable to confirm or deny the validity of the
Cuban Government's belief that AMLASH was Cubela. Nevertheless, the committee
considered the statement that, if Cubela were AMLASH, the Cuban Government did
not know of his intentions until 1966. On this point, the committee was unable
to accept or reject the Cuban Government's claim with confidence. The committee
merely noted that the statement was corroborated by other information known
about the dates of Cubela's arrest and trial in Cuba and the charges against
him. The Cuban Government's position must, however, be recognized as potentially
self-serving, since it must be assumed the Cuban Government would be inclined
not to reveal any knowledge it may have had about AMLASH's assassination plans
and the CIA prior to November 22, 1963. If it had indicated it knew, it would
have contributed to the credibility. of the Senate's theories about possible
Cuban involvement in the assassination as a retaliatory act. (89)
The committee, while in Cuba, spoke to Rolando Cubela, who was serving a life
sentence for acts against the Cuban Government. He confirmed the statements of
the Cuban Government to the committee(90) that he did not give the Cuban
Government any information that would have led it to believe that the CIA was
involved in a plot on Castro's life in 1963. In considering Cubela's testimony,
the committee took into account the possible influence of his confinement.
After reviewing all the available evidence, the committee concluded that Castro
may well have known about the AMLASH plot by November 22, 1963, and, if so, he
could have either documented or assumed it was backed by the United States and
that it was directed at his life. The committee believed that the details of the
AMLASH operation should have been provided to the Warren Commission, since the
Commission might have been able to develop leads to participants in the Kennedy
assassination. At a minimum, the existence of the plot, if it had been brought
to the Commissions attention, would have served as a stimulus in the 1963-64
investigation.
In conclusion, the committee believed a description of the activities of
participants in the AMLASH plot should have been provided to the Warren
Commission. It based this not only on the possibility that the plots could have
increased Castro's motivation to conspire to assassinate President Kennedy
(assuming he, in fact, was privy to the plot prior to November 22, 1963), but
also because knowledge of the AMLASH plot might have increased the interest of
the CIA, FBI, and Warren Commission in a more thorough investigation of the
question of Cuban conspiracy In stating this view, the committee did question
reject the suggestion in the CIA's 1977 Task Force Report that
Castro already had significant motivation to assassinate President Kennedy, even
if he were not aware of the AMLASH plot. The committee noted however, that to
the extent that that thesis was true, it did not negate the conclusion that the
AMLASH plot was relevant
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and that information about it should have been supplied to the Warren
Commission. If it had been made available, it might have affected the course of
the investigation.
(2) CIA-Mafia Plots.--Turning next to the CIA-Mafia plots, the committee found
in its investigation that organized crime probably was active in attempts to
assassinate Castro, independent of any activity it engaged in with the CIA, as
the 1977 Task Force Report had suggested. (91) The committee found that during
the initial stages of the joint operation, organized crime decided to assist the
CIA for two reasons: CIA sponsorship would mean official sanction and logistical
support for a Castro assassination; and a relationship with the CIA in the
assassination of a foreign leader could be used by organized crime as leverage
to prevent prosecution for unrelated offenses. (92)
During the latter stages of the CIA-Mafia operation, from early 1969, to early
1963, however, organized crime may no longer have been interested in
assassinating Castro. (93) The Soviet influence in Cuba had rendered the
prospect of regaining the old Havana territory less likely, and there were
fortunes to be made in the Bahamas and elsewhere.(94) There is reason to
speculate that the Mafia continued to appear to participate in the plots just to
keep the CIA interested, in hopes of preventing prosecution of organized crime
figures and others involved in the plots. (95)
This theory is supported by the actions of Robert Maheu, an FBI agent turned
private investigator who had acted as a CIA-organized crime go-between, and John
Roselli, a Mafia principal in the plots. (96) Maheu, for example, was the
subject of an FBI wiretap investigation in Las Vegas in the spring of 1962. He
had installed a telephone wiretap, which he claimed was done as a favor to Mafia
chieftain Sam Giancana, who was also involved in the anti-Castro plots.(97)
Maheu's explanation to the FBI was that the tap was placed as part of a CIA
effort to obtain Cuban intelligence information through organized crime
contacts. The CIA corroborated Maheu's story, and the case was not prosecuted.
(98) In addition, in 1966, Maheu used his contacts with the CIA to avoid
testifying before a Senate committee that was conducting hearings into invasion
of privacy. (99)
As for Roselli, the committee considered it significant that public revelations
about the plots corresponded with his efforts to avoid deportation in 1966 and
1971 and to escape prosecution for illegal gambling activities in 1967.(100) It
was Roselli who managed the release of information about the plots and who
proposed the so-called turnaround theory of the Kennedy assassination (Cuban
exiles hired by the Mafia as hit men, captured by Castro. were forced to "turn
around" and murder President Kennedy). (101) The committee found it quite
plausible that Roselli would have manipulated public perception of the, facts of
the plots, then tried to get the CIA to intervene in his legal problems as the
price for his agreeing to make no further disclosures.
The allegation that President Kennedy was killed as a result of a Mafia-CIA plot
that was turned around by Castro was passed to Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson by
Washington attorney Edward P. Mor-
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gan; its ultimate source was Roselli.(102) The committee found little
credibility in such an explanation for the President's death because, if for no
other reason, it would have been unnecessarily risky The committee determined
from CIA files that, in 1963, the Cuban Government had agents of its own in
nearly every country of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, who
undoubtedly would have been more dependable for such an assignment. Even if
Castro had wanted to minimize the chance of detection by using hired non-Cuban
killers, it a peared unlikely to the committee that he would have tried to force
Mafia members or their Cuban exile confederates to engage in the assassination
of an American head of state.
The committee found it more difficult to dismiss the possibility that the Mafia,
while it was not turned around by Castro, might have voluntarily turned around
with him. By late 1962 and 1963 when the underworld leaders involved with the
CIA in the plots had perhaps lost their motivation to assassinate Castro, they
had been given sufficient reason by the organized crime program of the
Department of Justice to eliminate President Kennedy.
The committee's investigation revealed that Mafia figures are rational,
pragmatic "businessmen" who often realine their associations and form
partnerships with ex-enemies when it is expedient.(103) While Castro, by 1963,
was an old enemy of organized crime, it was more important that both Castro and
the Mafia were ailing financially, chiefly as a result of pressures applied by
the Kennedy administration. (104) Thus, they had a common motive that might have
made an alliance more attractive than a split based on mutual animosity.
By 1963 also, Cuban exiles bitterly opposed to Castro were being frustrated by
the Kennedy administration. (105) Many of them had come to conclude that the
U.S. President was an obstacle requiring elimination even more urgently than the
Cuban dictator.(106) The Mafia had been enlisted by the CIA because of its
access to anti-Castro Cuban operatives both in and out of Cuba.(107) In its
attempt to determine if the Mafia plot associations could have led to the
assassination, the committee, therefore, recognized that Cuban antagonism toward
President Kennedy did not depend on whether the Cubans were pro- or anti-Castro.
The committee found that the CIA-Mafia-Cuban plots had all the elements
necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy--people, motive and means,
and the evidence indicated that the participants might well have considered
using the resources at their disposal to increase their power and alleviate
their problems by assassinating the President. Nevertheless, the committee was
ultimately frustrated in its attempt to determine details of those activities
that might have led to the assassination--identification of participants,
associations, timing of events and so on. Many of the key figures of the Castro
plots had, for example, since died or, as in the case of both Giancana and
Roselli, had been murdered.
The committee was also unable to confirm in its investigation the findings of
the Senate committee and the CIA that there were reasons to discount the dangers
to President Kennedy that may have resulted from CIA associations with the Mafia
in anti-Castro activities, The
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committee did not agree with the Senate committee that Castro would not have
blamed President Kennedy for the CIA-Mafia plots against his life. They were
formulated in the United States, and the history of United States-Cuban
relations shows that when Castro erred in his assumptions, it was in the
direction of attributing more, not less, responsibility for attempts to depose
him to U.S. Government actions than might have been merited.
In its 1977 Task Force Report, the CIA commented on this reality:
The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted
their independent operations against the Castro government. Some of these exiles
had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government,
and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S.
support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do.
The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and
it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA
responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was
involved or not. (108)
From its investigation of documents and from the testimony of officials and
others, the committee decided that the Senate committee was probably mistaken in
its conclusion that the CIA-Mafia plots were less significant than the AMLASH
plot. In the judgment of the committee, the CIA-Mafia plots, like the AMLASH
plot, should have been aggressively explored as part of the 1963-64
investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. At that time, it might
still have been possible to determine precise dates of trips, meetings,
telephone communications: and financial transactions, and the participants in
these potentially pertinent transactions could have been questioned. At least in
this one respect, the committee must concur with a sentiment expressed in the
1977 CIA Task Force Report:
Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in
the various Cuban operations in the period preceding Pres-
ident Kennedy's death cannot be recaptured in the form that
it existed then. These persons are scattered, their memories
are blurred by time, and some are dead. (109)
The committee, moreover, was unable to accept the conclusion of the CIA and the
Senate committee that the CIA-Mafia plots were irrelevant because they had been
terminated in February 1963, several months before the assassination. The record
is clear that the relationships created by the plots did not terminate, nor had
the threat to Castro abated by that time. There is insufficient evidence to
conclude that the inherently sinister relationships had become benign by
November 22, 1963.
In June 1963, according to the interim report of the Senate committee, Roselli
had dinner with William Harvey, chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force.(110) CIA
files show that Roselli continued to maintain direct contact with Harvey at
least until 1967, and he was in touch, at least indirectly, with the Agency's
Chief of the Operational Support Branch. Office of Security, as late as 1971.
(111) The Task Force Report itself alluded to information that, as late as June
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1964, gangster elements in Miami were offering $150,000 for Castro's life, an
amount mentioned to the syndicate representatives by CIA case officers at an
earlier date." (112)
In the absence of documentation of the activities of Mafia plot participants
between February 1963 and November 22, 1963--which had not been obtained in
earlier investigations, and the committee was able to do no better--the
committee found it difficult to dismiss the CIA-Mafia plots, even assuming they
had been terminated in February 1963, as of no consequence to the events in
Dallas on November 22, 1963. The plots, in short, should have been made known to
the Warren Commission. If they had been investigated in 1964, they might have
provided insights into what happened in Dallas and resolved questions that have
persisted.
(3) Summary of the the evidence--By its conclusions about the AMLASH operation
and the CIA-Mafia plots--that they were of possible consequence to the
assassination investigation and therefore should have been revealed to the
Warren Commission--the committee did not intend to imply it had discovered a
link to the assassination. To the contrary, the committee was not able to
develop evidence that President Kennedy was murdered in retaliation for U.S.
activities against Castro. What the committee did determine, however, was that
there was no basis, in terms of relevance to the assassination, for the CIA to
decide that the AMLASH operation and the CIA-Mafia plots were of no significance
to the Warren Commission's investigation. On the other hand, the possibility
that President Kennedy was assassinated in retaliation for anti-Castro
activities of the CIA should have been considered quite pertinent, especially in
light of specific allegations of conspiracy possibly involving supporters of the
Cuban leader.
(d) Cubana Airlines flight allegation
The committee considered specific allegations of conspiracy involving supporters
of Castro.
One such charge, referred to in book V of the Senate select committee's report,
concerns a Cubana Airlines flight from Mexico City to Havana on the evening of
November 23, 1963. (113) It had been alleged that the flight was delayed 5
hours, awaiting the arrival at 9:30 p.m. of a private twin-engined
aircraft.(114) The aircraft was supposed to have deposited an unidentified
passenger who boarded the Cubans flight without clearing customs and traveled to
Havana in the pilot's cabin. (115)
The Senate committee reported that the Cubana flight departed at 10 p.m. This
committee checked the times of key events that night by reviewing extensive
investigative agency documents. It found the following facts:
The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of only about 4
hours and 10 minutes and thus could not have been delayed five hours. (116)
The Cubana flight had departed for Havana at 8:30 p.m., about an hour before the
arrival of the private aircraft reportedly carrying a mysterious passenger, so
he could not have taken the flight. (117)
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The committee found that extensive records of flight arrivals and departures at
the Mexico City airport were available and deemed it doubtful that the alleged
transfer of a passenger from a private aircraft to the Cubana flight could have
gone unnoticed, had it occurred. (118) The committee concluded, therefore, that
the transfer did not occur.
(e) Gilberto Policarpo Lopez allegation
More troubling to the committee was another specific allegation discussed by the
Senate committee. It concerned a Cuban-American named Gilberto Policarpo
Lopez.(119) According to the account, Lopez obtained a tourist card in Tampa,
Fla., on November 20, 1963, entered Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on November 23, and
flew from Mexico City to Havana on November 27. (12O) Further, Lopez was alleged
to have attended a meeting of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee on November 17, 1963, and at a December meeting of the chapter, Lopez
was reported to be in Cuba. (12l)
The committee first examined the CIA files on Policarpo Lopez.(122) They reflect
that in early December 1963, CIA headquarters received a classified message
stating that a source had requested "urgent traces on U.S. citizen Gilberto P.
Lopez." (123) According to the source, Lopez had arrived in Mexico on November
23 en route to Havana and had disappeared with no record of his trip to Havana.
The message added that Lopez had obtained tourist card No. 24553 in Tampa on
November 20, that he had left Mexico for Havana November 27 on Cubana Airlines,
and that his U.S. passport number was 310162.(124)
In another classified message of the same date, it was reported that the FBI had
been advised that Lopez entered Mexico on November 27 at Nuevo Laredo. (125)
Two days later these details were added: Lopez had crossed the border at Laredo,
Tex., on November 23; registered at the Roosevelt Hotel in Mexico City on
November 25; and departed Mexico on November 27 on a Cubana flight for Havana.
(126) Another dispatch noted that Lopez was the only passenger on Cubans flight
465 on November 27 to Havana. (127) It said he used a U.S. passport and Cuban
courtesy visa. It noted, too: "Source states the timing and circumstances
surrounding subject's travel through Mexico and departure for HaVana are
suspicious." It was this dispatch that alerted headquarters to the source's
"urgent" request for all available data on Lopez. (128)
The same day as the dispatch, headquarters sent a cable identifying the
Cuban-American as Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, born January 26, 1940. It added that
Lopez was not identical with a Gilberto Lopez who had been active in pro-Castro
groups in Los Angeles. (129)
Headquarters was also told that there existed a "good" photograph of Lopez,
showing him wearing dark .glasses. A copy of the photograph with "27 November
1963" stamped on the back was found in his CIA file by committee investigators
in 1978. (130)
In March 1964, CIA headquarters received a classified message: a source had
reported in late February that an American citizen named
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Gilberto Lopes 11 had been involved in the Kennedy assassination; that Lopes had
entered Mexico on foot from Laredo, Tex., on November 13 carrying U.S. passport
319962, which had been issued July 13, 1960; that he had been issued Mexican
travel form. B24553 in Nuevo Laredo; that Lopes had proceeded by bus to Mexico
City "where he entered the Cuban Embassy"; and that he left the Cuban Embassy on
November 27 and was the only passenger on flight 465 for Cuba. (132)
The following day, a classified message was sent to headquarters stating that
the information "jibes fully with that provided station by [source] in early
December 1963." (133)
A file had been opened on Lopez at headquarters on December 16, 1963. (134) It
contained a "Review of [material omitted] file on U.S. Citizen" by an operations
officer of the responsible component of the agency. In the review, the file was
classified as a "counterintelligence case, (that is, involving a foreign
intelligence or security service)." The date of entry of that category in the
agency's records is indicated as January 22, 1975. (135)
The committee also reviewed an FBI investigation of Gilberto Policarpo Lopez in
Key West, Fla., contained in a report dated August 1964.(136)
In an interview, Lopez' cousin, Guillermo Serpa Rodriguez, had said that Lopez
had come to the United States soon after Castro came to power, stayed about a
year and returned to Cuba because he was homesick. He returned to the United
States in 1960 or 1961 fearing he would be drafted into the Cuban militia. (137)
The FBI also interviewed an American woman Lopez had married in Key West. She
listed companies where he had been employed, including a construction firm in
Tampa. She also said he began suffering from epileptic attacks, was confined for
a time at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami in early 1963, and was treated by
doctors in Coral Gables and Key West. She said she believed the epilepsy was
brought on by concern for his family in Cuba. (138)
Lopez' wife said she received a letter from him in about November 1963, saying
he had returned to Cuba once more. She said she had been surprised, although he
had mentioned returning, to Cuba before he left for Tampa in November 1963. In a
later letter, Lopez told his wife he had received financial assistance for his
trip to Cuba from an organization in Tampa. His wife explained that he would not
have been able to pay for the trip without help. She said, however, he had not
had earlier contacts with Cuban refugee organizations. (139)
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Rodriguez said Lopez left Key West in late 1963 for Tampa with the hope of being
able to return to Cuba, explaining he was afraid he would be drafted into the
U.S. military. Rodriguez said Lopez had not been involved in pro-Castro activity
in Key West, but that he was definitely pro-Castro, and he had once gotten into
a fistfight over his Castro sympathies. (140)
The FBI had previously documented that Lopez had actually been in contact with
the Fair Play for Cuba. Committee and had attended a meeting in Tampa on
November 20, 1963. In a March 1964 report, it recounted that at a November 17
meeting of the Tampa FPCC, Lopez had said he had not been granted permission to
return to Cuba but that he was awaiting a phone call about his return to his
homeland. In that March report, a Tampa FPCC member was quoted as saying she
called a friend in Cuba on December 8, 1963, and was told that Lopez had arrived
safely. She also said that the Tampa chapter of the FPCC had given Lopez about
$190 for the trip to Cuba and that he had gone to Cuba by way of Mexico because
he did not have a passport. (141)
The March 1964 FBI report stated that Lopez did have a U.S. passport--it had
been issued in January. 1960 and was numbered 310162. His Mexican tourist card
was numbered M8-24553 and was issued November 20, 1963 in Tampa. The report also
confirmed that Lopez entered Mexico via. Laredo, Tex., by automobile on November
23, and he departed for Havana on November 27, the only passenger on a Cubana
flight. He was carrying a Cuban courtesy visa.(142)
Lopez' FBI file contained a memorandum from the Tampa office. Dated October 26,
1964, it read:
It is felt that information developed regarding the subject is not sufficient to
merit consideration for the Security Index. (143)
The only information transmitted by the FBI to the Warren Commission. the
committee determined, concerned a passport check on Lopez. Information sent to
the Commission by the FBI on the Tampa chapter of the FPCC did not contain
information on Lopez' activities. The CIA apparently did not provide any
information to the Warren Commission on Lopez. (144) The committee concurred
with the Senate select committee that this omission was egregious, since sources
had reported within a few days of the assassination that the circumstances
surrounding Lopez' travel to Cuba seemed "suspicious." Moreover, in March 1964,
when the Warren Commission's investigation was in its most active stage, there
were reports circulating that Lopez had been involved in the assassination.
In its 1977 Task Force Report, the CIA responded to the charges of the Senate
committee. It claimed that the agency had carried its investigation of Lopez as
far as it could, having questioned a Cuban defector about him. (145) The
committee found that the absence of access to additional sources of information
was not an adequate explanation for the agency's failure to consider more
seriously the suspicions of its sources or to report what information it did
have to the Warren Commission. Attempts in the Task Force Report to denigrate
the information that was provided on Lopez were not an adequate substitute for
enabling the Warren Commission itself to pursue the leads more aggressively.
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From the information gathered by the FBI, there appeared to be plausible reasons
both for Lopez' desire to return to Cuba and for his solicitation of financial
aid from the Tampa FPCC chapter. Lopez' contacts in Florida appeared to have
been innocent and not connected with the assassination, and while there was a
suggestion in the Senate committee's report that Lee Harvey Oswald also was in
contact with the Tampa FPCC chapter, the committee could find no evidence of it.
Nor could the committee find any evidence that Oswald was in contact with Lopez.
Lopez' association with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, however, coupled with
the facts that the dates of his travel to Mexico via Texas coincide with the
assassination, plus the reports in Mexico that Lopez' activites were
"suspicious," all amount to a troublesome circumstance that the committee was
unable to resolve with confidence.
(f) Other allegations
The committee also pursued allegations of Cuban complicity that were not
suggested by the investigation of the Senate committee. For example, it looked
into an allegation by one Autulio Ramirez Ortiz, who hijacked an aircraft to
Cuba in 1961. Ramirez claimed that while being held by the Cuban Government, he
worked in an intelligence facility where he found a dossier on Lee Harvey
Oswald. (146) It was labeled the "Oswald-Kennedy" file and contained a
photograph of "Kennedy's future assassin."(147) In the Spanish language
manuscript of a book he wrote Ramirez claimed the Oswald file read, in part "* *
* The KGB has recommended this individual * * * He is a North American, married
to an agent of the Soviet organism who has orders to go and reside in the United
States. Oswald is an adventurer. Our Embassy in Mexico has orders to get in
contact with him. Be very careful."(148)
The committee, in executive session, questioned Ramirez, who had been returned
to the United States to serve a 20-year Federal sentence for hijacking.(149) He
testified he was unable to describe the photograph he had allegedly seen and
that the writing in the file was in Russian, a language he does not speak. (150)
The committee sought from the FBI and CIA independent evidence of the accuracy
of Ramirez' allegations, but there was no corroboration of the existence of an
"Osvaldo-Kennedy" file to be found. On the other hand, in every instance where
there was independent evidence of allegations made by Ramirez (the identities of
Cuban officials named by him, for example) Ramirez' statements were found to be
accurate.(151)
In the end, however, the committee was forced to dismiss Ramirez' story about
the "Osvaldo-Kennedy" file. The decisive factor was the committee's belief that
the Cuban intelligence system in the 1961-63 period was too sophisticated to
have been infiltrated by Ramirez in the manner he had described. While some
details of his story could be corroborated, the essential aspects of his
allegation were incredible.
The committee also considered the allegation that appeared in an article in a
1967 issue of the National Enquirer, written by a British freelancer named Comer
Clark.(152) Purportedly based on an exclusive interview with Castro, it quoted
the Cuban President as admitting to having heard of threats by Oswald to
assassinate president
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Kennedy. According to Clark, Castro told him that while at the Cuban consulate
in Mexico City in September 1963, Oswald vowed he would kill the President.
(153)
On a trip to Havana in April 1978. the committee met with President Castro and
asked him about the charge. Castro denied there had ever been an interview with
Clark.(154) He also suggested that had such a threat been overheard by Cuban
officials, they and he would have been morally obligated to transmit it to U.S.
authorities.(155)
The committee did not agree that the Cuban Government would have been obligated
to report the threat. Nothing in the evidence indicated that the threat should
have been taken seriously, if it had occurred, since Oswald had behaved in an
argumentative and obnoxious fashion during his visit to the consulate. (156)
Cuban officials would have been justified, the committee reasoned, to have
considered the threat an idle boast, deserving no serious attention.
The accuracy of Clark's account was also undermined by the committee's
investigation of his background. Clark had been the author of articles with such
sensational titles as "British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves," "I Was Hitler's Secret
Love" and "German Plans to Kidnap the Royal Family." The committee was unable to
question Clark himself, as he had since died. (157)
Despite the committee's doubts about the Clark interview with Castro, it was
informed that the substance of it had been independently reported to the U.S.
Government. A highly confidential but reliable source reported that Oswald had
indeed vowed in the presence of Cuban consulate officials to assassinate the
President. (158)
This information prompted the committee to pursue the report further in file
reviews and interviews. The files that were reviewed included records of
conversations of relevant people at appropriate times and places. Only one of
them provided any possible corroboration. It was the record of a reported
conversation by an employee of the Cuban Embassy named Luisa Calderon. (159) The
absence of other corroboration must be considered significant.
A blind memorandum 12 provided by the CIA to the committee contained Calderon's
pertinent remarks:
1. A reliable source reported that on November 22, 1963, several hours after the
assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, Luisa Calderon Carralero, a Cuban employee of
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be a
member of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence
(DGI), discussed news of the assassination with an acquaint-
ance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest news,
Calderon replied, in what appeared to be a joking manner,
"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."
2. After further discussion of the news accounts about the
assassination, the acquaintance asked Calderon what else she
had learned. Calderon replied that they [assumed to refer to
personnel of the Cuban Embassy] learned about it a little
while ago. (160)
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Luisa Calderon's statements on the day of the assassination could be construed
as either an indication of foreknowledge or mere braggadocio. The preponderance
of the evidence led the committee to find that it was braggadocio. While the
committee attempted to interview Calderon in Cuba, it was unable to, since she
was ill. (161) Nevertheless, it forwarded interrogatories to her, which she
responded to denying foreknowledge of the assassination.(162) The committee also
interviewed other employees of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in 1963 all of
whom denied the allegation.(163) While it may be argued that they had a reason
to do so because of Castro's view that the Cuban Government would have had a
moral obligation to report the threat had it occurred, these officials, in the
committee's judgment, indicated by their demeanor that they were testifying
truthfully.
The committee also made a judgment about the risk that would have been incurred
by Cubans had they testified falsely on this issue or by those who might have
orchestrated their false testimony. Based on newspaper reporting alone, the
Cuban Government might reasonably have believed that the committee had access to
extensive information about conversations in the Cuban consulate in Mexico City
and that such information might have provided convincing evidence of a coverup.
To have been caught in a lie in public testimony in the United States 13 would
have been a major embarrassment for the Cuban Government, one that might have
implied more than moral responsibility for failing to report a threat against
President Kennedy in advance of the assassination.
On balance, the committee did not believe that Oswald voiced a threat to Cuban
officials. However reliable the confidential source may be, the committee found
it to be in error in this instance.
The committee investigated other aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico City in
September 1963 to see if it could develop information that bore on the question
of a Cuban conspiracy. It considered the claim by the Cuban consul in Mexico
City in 1963, Eusebio Azcue, that a man posing as Oswald applied for a Cuban
visa. 14 It also investigated two plausible, though unsubstantiated, allegations
of activities that had not previously been publicly revealed:
That of a Mexican author, Elena Garro de Paz, who claimed that Oswald and two
companions had attended a "twist" party at the home of Ruben Duran,
brother-in-law of Silvia Duran, the secretary of Cuban consul Azcue who dealt
with Oswald when he applied at the consulate for a Cuban visa.(164)
That of a Mexican named Oscar Contreras who, in 1967, claimed he had met Oswald
on the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. (165)
The committee conducted extensive interviews with respect to these allegations.
(166)
The significance of the Elena Garro allegation, aside from its pointing to
Oswald associations in Mexico City that the Warren Commis-
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sion did not investigate, lay in her description of one of the companions as
gaunt and blond-haired. (167) These are characteristics that both Azcue and
Silvia Duran attributed to the visitor to the Cuban consulate who identified
himself as Lee Harvey Oswald. (168) Even though "gaunt and blond-haired" did not
describe Oswald, Duran said that the American visitor was the man later arrested
in the assassination of the President. (169) Azcue, on the other hand, insisted
that the visitor was not the individual whose published photograph was that of
Oswald. (170)
The committee was unable to obtain corroboration for the Elena Garro allegation,
although Silvia Duran did confirm that there was a "twist" party at her
brother-in-law's home in the fall of 1963 and that Elena Gerro was there. (171)
She denied, however, that Oswald was there, insisting that she never saw Oswald
outside of the Cuban consulate.(172) The committee was unable to check the story
with official U.S. investigative agencies because they failed to pursue it, even
though they were aware of it in 1964.15
The committee's investigation was sufficient, however, to develop a conclusion
that the Elena Garro allegation had warranted investigation when it was first
received by the CIA in October 1964. Even in the late 1960's, at a time when
Garro and others were available for questioning, there was still the potential
for sufficient corroboration 16 to make the allegation worth pursuing. Further,
while the allegation did not specifically show a Cuban conspiracy, it did
indicate significant Oswald associations that were not known to the Warren
Commission.
The other Oswald association in Mexico City that might have proven significant,
had it been pursued, was the one alleged by Oscar Contreras, a student at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico. The committee made an effort to
investigate this allegation. Silvia Duran, for example, admitted to the
committee. that she had advised Oswald he might obtain a Cuban visa if he could
get a letter of recommendation from a Mexican in good standing with the Cuban
revolutionary hierarchy. (175) The committee also learned that the chairman of
the philosophy department at the National Autonomous University, Ricardo Guerra,
held seminars from time to time at the Duran home on Kant, Hegel, and Marx.
(176) The committee speculated that these circumstances might explain why Oswald
contacted Contreras, who reported to Mexican authorities that Oswald approached
him in Sep-
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tember 1963 following a roundtable discussion at the school of philosophy. 17
The committee's attempts to contact Contreras were frustrated. On two occasions,
the Mexican Government said he would be available for an interview, but neither
materialized. The committee also was unable to contract Guerra. who in 1978 was
Mexico's Ambassador to East Germany. (177) The significance of the Contreras
allegation, therefore, remains largely indeterminate.
The committee also pondered what deductions might be drawn from Azcue's
conviction that the man who applied for a Cuban visa was not Oswald. One
possibility considered, although ultimately rejected by the committee, was that
there was a sinister association between Oswald and the Castro regime that Azcue
was attempting to conceal.
The committee weighed the evidence on both sides of the
Oswald-at-the-Cuban-consulate issue:
That it was Oswald was indicated by the testimony of Silvia Duran and Alfredo
Mirabal, who was in the process of succeeding Azcue as Cuban consul when the
visit occurred in late September 1963. They both identified Oswald from
post-assassination photographs as the man who applied for a Cuban visa.
That it was not Oswald was a possibility raised by the committee's inability to
secure a photograph of him entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban
consulate. The committee obtained evidence from the Cuban Government that such
photographs were being taken routinely in 1963. Further, the committee found
that Oswald paid at least five visits to the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban
consulate. 18 (178)
The committee also sought to understand the significance of a Secret Service
investigation of threats against President Kennedy by pro-Castro Cubans. In
April 1961, for example, when the President and Mrs. Kennedy were scheduled to
address a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States,
the State Department reported that Cuba would be represented by one Quentin Pino
Machado. Machado, a Cuban diplomat, described as a character of ill repute,
armed and dangerous, ultimately did not attend the meeting.(179)
On November 27, 1963, a Miami Secret Service informant told Special Agent Ernest
Aragon that if the assassination involved an international plot in which Castro
had participated, then Castro's agent in the plot would have been Machado, a
well-known terrorist. There were
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rumors in the Miami Cuban community at the time that Machado had been assigned
to escort Oswald from Texas to Cuba after the assassination. The plan went awry,
the report continued, because Oswald had not been wearing clothing of a
prearranged color and because of the shooting of Dallas Patrolman J.D.
Tippit.(180)
The reports on Machado, along with other suspicions of Castro complicity in the
assassination, were forwarded only in brief summary form by the Secret Service
to the Warren Commission. The committee could find no record of follow-up
action. (181) The committee's investigation of actions by the Secret Service
subsequent to the assassination, however, revealed the most extensive work of
the Agency to have been in response to reports of pro-Castro Cuban
involvement.(182)
(g) The committee's trip to Cuba
The committee took its investigation to Cuba in the spring and summer of 1978.
It sought information on numerous allegations, such as those mentioned above,
and it put to President Castro the question of Cuban involvement in the
assassination. The committee found the Cuban Government to be cooperative, both
in supplying written reports and documents in response to questions and by
making a number of its citizens available for interviews. (183) While the
committee was unable to interview Luisa Calderon personally, the Cuban
Government did permit its former consuls in Mexico City, Eusebio Azcue and
Alfredo Mirabal, to come to Washington to testify in a public hearing of the
committee. (184)
In response to the question of Cuban complicity in the assassination, Castro
replied:
That [the Cuban Government might have been involved in the President's death]
was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the
political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you
here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We
just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed
to that idea would have been judged insane * * * absolutely sick. Never, in 20
years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a
measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the
death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most
perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country. which is what I
have tried to prevent for all these years, m every possible sense. Since the
United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war
with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction
would have been here. (185)
Castro added:
I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It
has never done that. (186)
In the interview, Castro also commented on his speech of September 7, 1963,
which on its face might have been viewed as an indication
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that Castro may have been prompted to retaliate for a CIA-inspired
attempt on his life:
So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, a very
serious one--that could become a boomer and against the authors of those actions
* * * but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that * * * not
in the least * * * but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news
about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of
leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent * * * something very
negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same
circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said [then] because
I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by
that that we were going to take measures--similar measures-- like a retaliation
for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For 3
years, we had known there were plots against us. So the conversation came about
very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were
part of the everyday life.(187)
Finally, President Castro noted that although relations between the United
States and Cuba were strained during the Kennedy administration, by 1963 there
were definite hopes for reconciliation. (188) The committee confirmed from the
historic record that, in 1963, the Cuban Government made several overtures.
While, for the most part, Kennedy did not respond favorably, he did, in
November, direct that the possibility of holding talks be explored by United
Nations Delegate William Atwood with Cuban United Nations Ambassador Carlos
Lechuga. (189) There was also reason to believe that French journalist Jean
Daniel was asked by Kennedy to relay a peace message to Castro.(190) At least,
that was how Castro interpreted it when he met with Daniel on November 20, 1963.
(191)
In his interview with the committee, Castro referred to these two developments
toward rapprochement, as he viewed them, suggesting that he would not have had a
motive to eliminate President Kennedy. Instead, it would have been to his
advantage, Castro insisted, to have pursued the prospect for better relations
that had been portended.
(192)
(h) Deficiencies of the 1963-64 investigation
In attempting to resolve the question of possible Cuban conspiracy, the
committee concluded that a definitive answer had to come, if at all, largely
from the investigation conducted in 1963-64 by the Warren Commission and the FBI
and CIA. What the committee was able to do 15 years later could fill in
important details, but it could not make up for basic insufficiencies.
Unfortunately, the committee found that there were in fact significant
deficiencies in the earlier investigation. The Warren Commission knew far less
than it professed to know about Oswald's trip to Mexico and his possible
association with pro-Castro agents in Mexico and elsewhere. This was true, in
part, because the Commission had demanded less of the FBI and CIA than called
for in its mandate. (193)
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For its part, the FBI mechanically ran out thousands of leads, but it failed to
make effective use of its Cuban Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division or
to develop and systematically pursue investigative hypotheses of possible Cuban
complicity. It must be said that the FBI generally exhausted its resources in
confirming the case against Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin, a case that
Director J. Edgar Hoover, at least, seemed determined to make within 24 hours of
the assassination. (194)
With respect to the CIA, the committee determined that it could have been better
equipped to investigate the question of Cuban complicity. 19 The CIA had, at the
time, only limited access to Cuban intelligence defectors, and most of its
information sources inside Cuba were better equipped to report on economic
developments and troop movements than on political decisions, especially
sensitive ones, such as those involving political assassination.(198)
As the CIA admitted in its 1977 Task Force Report, it could have taken "broader
initiatives" in pursuing the investigation. The committee found that such
initiatives could have included more comprehensive instructions on debriefing
Cuban sources and more explicit tasking of stations for specific investigative
efforts.
With respect to the CIA's investigation of possible Cuban complicity, however,
the committee found that the Agency's shortcomings were not attributable to any
improper motive. The committee found that the CIA did generally gather and
analyze the information that came to its attention regarding possible Cuban
involvement, at least until the Warren Commission made its report in 1964.
Indeed, the committee noted that the Agency acted not only out of dedication,
but out of a specific motivation related to Cuba. The officers, agents and
employees in the Cuba-related divisions had devoted their careers to the
overthrow of Castro, and evidence of his participation in the assassination, if
it had existed and could have been brought to light, would have vindicated their
long-frustrated efforts, of not, in fact, led directly to a U.S. invasion of
Cuba and destruction of the Castro regime.
That being said, the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA
officials who were aware that close scrutiny of U.S.-Cuban relations in the
early 1960's could have inadvertently exposed the CIA-Mafia plots against
Castro, might have attempted to prevent the CIA's assassination investigation or
that of the Warren Commission from delving deeply into the question of Cuban
complicity. The committee determined, however, that only CIA Deputy Director
Richard Helms would have been in a position to have had both the requisite
knowledge and the power to accomplish such a coverup, and it was satisfied, on
the basis of its investigation, that it was highly unlikely he in fact did so.
(199)
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While noting the deficiencies in the CIA assassination investigation, the
committee was impressed with certain overseas capabilities of the CIA in 1963.
The Agency had, for example? comprehensive coverage of anti-Castro Cuban groups
that, in turn, had extensive information sources in and out of Cuba. (200) Thus,
while it was flawed in certain specific respects, the committee concluded that
the CIA assassination investigation could, in fact, be relied on--with only
limited reservations-as a general indicator of possible Cuban involvement. That
investigation found no evidence of Cuban complicity.
(i) Summary of the findings
While the committee did not take Castro's denials at face value, it found
persuasive reasons to conclude that the Cuban Government was not involved in the
Kennedy assassination. First, by 1963 there were prospects for repairing the
hostility that had marked relations between the two countries since Castro had
come to power. Second, the risk of retaliation that Cuba would have incurred by
conspiring in the assassination of an American President must have canceled out
other considerations that might have argued for that act. President Castro's
description of the idea as "insane" is appropriate. And there was no evidence
indicating an insane or grossly reckless lack of judgment on the part of the
Cuban Government. Third, the CIA had both the motive to develop evidence of
Cuban involvement and access to at least substantial, if incomplete, information
bearing on relevant aspects of it, had such involvement existed. Its absence,
therefore, must be weighed in the balance. Finally, the Cuban Government's
cooperation with this committee in the investigation must be a factor in any
judgment. In conclusion, the committee found, on the basis of the evidence
available to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination
of President Kennedy.
3. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN GROUPS, AS GROUPS, WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY, BUT THAT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED
The committee investigated possible involvement in the assassination by a number
of anti-Castro Cuban groups and individual activists for two primary reasons:
First, they had the motive, based on what they considered President Kennedy's
betrayal of their cause, the liberation of Cuba from the Castro regime; the
means, since they were trained and practiced in violent acts, the result of the
guerrilla warfare they were waging against Castro; and the opportunity, whenever
the President, as he did from time to time, appeared at public gatherings, as in
Dallas on November 22, 1963.
Second, the committee's investigation revealed that certain associations of Lee
Harvey Oswald were or may have been with anti-Castro activists.
The committee, therefore paid close attention to the activities of anti-Castro
Cubans--in Miami, where most of them were concentrated and their organizations
were headquartered,(1) and in New Orleans
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and Dallas, where Oswald, while living in these cities in the months preceding
the assassination, reportedly was in contact with anti-Castro activists.(2)
The Warren Commission did not, of course, ignore Oswald's ties to
anti-Castroites. From the evidence that was available in 1964, two Warren
Commission staff attorneys, W. David Slawson and William Coleman, went so far as
to speculate that Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer,
might actually have been an agent of anti-Castro exiles.(3) Indeed, pressing for
further investigation of the possibility, they wrote a memorandum which read in
part:
The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination
on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as
being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, so the
anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also
aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the
public would also learn of them * * * Second, someone in the anti-Castro
organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for
violence * * * On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was
used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas * * * The
motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was
killed, Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law
enforcement authorities and the public would blame the assassination on the
Castro government. and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible *
* *. (4)
While it is seemingly in contradiction of Oswald's personal character and known
public posture, the committee seriously considered, therefore, the possibility
of an anti-Castro conspiracy in the assassination (perhaps with Oswald unaware
of ifs true nature). It is appropriate to begin that consideration with an
examination of the history of United States-Cuban relations from the perspective
of the anti-Castro movement, beginning with the victorious end of the revolution
on January 1, 1959. (5)
(a) The anti-Castro Cuban perspective
The anti-Castro movement began not long after Fidel Castro assumed control of
Cuba. (6) At first. the Cuban people cheered the revolution and its leader for
the defeat of the dictatorial Batista regime, but it was not long before many
former supporters found reason to condemn the new premier's policies and
politics. (7) Many Cubans were deeply disillusioned when it became apparent that
the Castro government was renouncing the country's long affiliation with the
United States and moving closer to the Soviet Union. (8) As Castro's preference
for Marxism became evident, underground opposition movements were born. (9) They
survived for a time within Cuba, but as the effectiveness of Castro's militia
system was recognized, they retreated to the exile communities of Miami and
other cities in the United States. (10)
The U.S. Government was responsive to the efforts of exiles to remove a
Communist threat from the Caribbean, only 90 miles from the
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Florida coast, and to recapture business investments lost to the nationalization
of industry in Cuba. (11) An official, yet covert, program to train and equip
exiles determined to overthrow Castro was sanctioned by President Eisenhower and
his successor, President Kennedy, and carried out by the American intelligence
agencies, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency. (12). The Cuban exiles,
dependent on the United States for arms and logistical support, had little
choice but to put their trust in Washington. (13)
Their trust collapsed however, at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, when an
exile invasion of Cuba was annihilated by Castro's troops. (14) The failure of
American airpower to support the landing shattered the confidence of the
anti-Castro Cubans in the U.S. Government.(15) They blamed President Kennedy,
and he publicly accepted responsibility for the defeat. (16)
President Kennedy's readiness to take the blame for the Bay of Pigs served to
intensify the anger of the exiles.(17) In executive session before the
committee, Manuel Antonio Varona, who in 1961 was the head of the united exile
organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, told of a tense and emotional
encounter with the President at the White House, as hope for the invasion was
fading.(18) "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything," Varona
testified.(19) "We knew he was not in charge of the military efforts directly.
Nevertheless, President Kennedy told us he was the one--the only one
responsible." (20)
A noted Cuban attorney, Mario Lazo, summed up Cuban feeling toward President
Kennedy in his book, "Dagger in the Heart":
The Bay of Pigs was wholly self-inflicted in Washington. Kennedy told the truth
when he publicly accepted responsibility * * * The heroism of the beleaguered
Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them,
long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people * * * had always
admired the United States as strong, rich, generous--but where was its sense of
honor and the capacity of its leaders? (21)
President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter legacy of the Bay of Pigs
debacle. Far from abandoning the Cuban exiles, he set out to convince them of
his loyalty to their cause. One of the most emotionally charged events of his
relationship with the Cuban exiles occurred on December 29, 1962, at the Orange
Bowl in Miami. (22) He had come to welcome the survivors of the invasion force,
Brigade 2506, the 1,200 men who had been ransomed from Cuba after almost 20
months in prison.(23) The President was presented with the brigade flag in a
dramatic and tumultuous scene.
The euphoria was false and misleading. Although the Cuban exiles cheered
President Kennedy that day, there also coursed through the crowd a bitter
resentment among some who felt they were witnessing a display of political
hypocrisy. Later, it would be claimed that the brigade feeling against President
Kennedy was so strong that the presentation nearly did not take place, and it
would be alleged (incorrectly, as it turned out) that the brigade flag given to
Kennedy was actually a replica.(25)
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It is not possible to know fully how the Bay of Pigs defeat changed President
Kennedy's attitude toward Cuba, but when journalists Taylor Branch and George
Crile wrote in Harper's Magazine about a massive infusion of U.S. aid to
clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, they titled
their article, "The Kennedy Vendetta."(26) What is known is that the period
between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 can be
characterized as the high point of anti-Castro activity. (27) Miami, the center
of the exile community, became a busy staging ground for armed infiltrations
Cuba.(28) While not every raid was supported or even known about in advance by
Government agencies, the United States played a key role in monitoring,
directing and supporting the anti-Castro Cubans. (29) Although this effort was
cloaked in secrecy, most Cubans in the exile community knew what was happening
and who was supporting the operations. (30)
(1) The missile crisis and its aftermath.--At the time of the missile crisis in
October 1969, the Cuban exiles were initially elated at the prospect of U.S.
military action that might topple the Castro regime.(31) In the end, it seemed
to the world that President Kennedy had the best of the confrontation with
Castro and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev by demanding, and getting, the
withdrawal of offensive missiles and bombers from Cuba. From the exiles'
perspective, however, they had been compromised, since as part of the bargain,
President Kennedy made a pledge not to invade Cuba. 20 (32)
Anti-Castro forces in the United States were all the more embittered in the
spring of 1963 when the Federal Government closed down many of their training
camps and guerrilla bases. (34) In cases where government raids intercepted the
illegal arms transfers, weapons were confiscated and arrests were made.(35) Some
anti-Castro operations did continue, however, right up to the time of the
assassination, though the committee. found that U.S. backing had by that time
been
reduced. (36)
(2) Attitude of anti-Castro Cubans toward Kennedy.--President Kennedy's
popularity among the Cuban exiles had plunged deeply by 1963. Their bitterness
is illustrated in a tape recording of a meeting of anti-Castro Cubans and
right-wing Americans in the Dallas suburb of Farmer's Branch on October 1, 1963.
(37) In it, a Cuban identified as Nestor Castellanos vehemently criticized the
United States and blamed President Kennedy for the U.S. Government's policy of
"non-interference" with respect to the Cuban issue. (38) Holding h copy of the
September 26 edition of the Dallas Morning News, featuring a front-page account
of the President's planned trip to Texas in November, Castellanos vented his
hostility without restraint:
CASTELLANOS. * * * we're waiting for Kennedy the 22d,
buddy. We're going to see him in one way or the other. We're
going to give him the works when he gets in Dallas Mr. good
ol' Kennedy. I wouldn't even call him President Kennedy He
stinks.
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QUESTIONER. Are you insinuating that since this downfall came through the leader
there [Castro in Cuba], that this might come to us * * * ?
CASTELLANOS. Yes ma'am, your present leader. He's the one who is doing
everything right now to help the United States to become Communist.21 (39)
(b) The committee investigation
The committee initiated its investigation by identifying the most violent and
frustrated anti-Castro groups and their leaders from among the more than 100
Cuban exile organizations in existence in November 1963. (40) These groups
included Alpha 66, the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), Commandos L, the
Directorio Revolutionary Estudiantil (DRE), the Cuban Revolutionary Council
(CRC) which included the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), the Junta del
Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (JGCE), the 30th of November, the International
Penetration Forces (InterPen), the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR), and
the Ejercito Invasor Cubano (EIC).(41) Their selection evolved both from the
committee's independent field investigation and the examination of the files and
records maintained by the Federal and local agencies then monitoring Cuban exile
activity. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA,
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement
Administration, or DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Department of Defense.
The groups that received the committee's attention were "action groups"--those
most involved in military actions and propaganda campaigns. Unlike most others,
they did not merely talk about anti-Castro operations, they actually carried out
infiltrations into Cuba, planned, and sometimes attempted, Castro's
assassination, and shipped arms into Cuba. These were also the groups whose
leaders felt most betrayed by U.S. policy toward Cuba and by the President; they
were also those whose operations were frustrated by American law enforcement
efforts after the missile crisis.
(1) Homer S. Echevarria.---For the most part the committee found that the
anti-Castro Cuban leaders were more vociferous than potentially violent in their
tirades against the President. Nevertheless, it was unable to conclude with
certainty that all of the threats were benign. For example, one that the
committee found particularly disturbing especially so, since it was not
thoroughly looked into in the 1963-64 investigation came to the attention of the
Secret Service within days of the President's death, prompting the Acting
Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago field office to write an urgent
memorandum indicating he had received reliable information of "a group in the
Chicago area who [sic] may have a connection with the J.F.K. assassination."(43)
The memorandum was based on a tip from an informant who reported a conversation
on November 21, 1963, with a Cuban activist named Homer S. Echevarria.(44) They
were discussing an illegal arms sale, and Echevarria was quoted as saying his
group now
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had "plenty of money" and that his backers would proceed "as soon as we take
care of Kennedy." (45)
Following the initial memorandum, the Secret Service instructed its informant to
continue his association with Echevarria and notified the Chicago FBI field
office. (46) It learned that Echevarria might have been a member of the 30th of
November anti-Castro organization, that he was associated with Juan Francisco
Blanco-Fernandez, military director of the DRE, and that the arms deal was being
financed through one Paulino Sierra Martinez by hoodlum elements in Chicago
and elsewhere.
Although the Secret Service recommended further investigation, the FBI intitally
took the position that the Echevarria case "was primarily a protection matter
and that the continued investigation would be left to the U.S. Secret Service,"
(48) and that the Cuban group in question was probably not involved in illegal
activities. (49) The Secret Service initially was reluctant to accept this
position, since it had developed evidence that illegal acts were, in fact,
involved. (50) Then, on November 29, 1963, President Johnson created the Warren
Commission and gave the FBI primary investigative responsibility in the
assassination.(51) Based on its initial understanding that the President's order
meant primary, not exclusive, investigative responsibility, the Secret Service
continued its efforts;(52) but when the FBI made clear that it wanted the Secret
Service to terminate its investigation, (53) it did so, turning over its files
to the FBI. (54) The FBI, in turn, did not pursue the Echevarria case. (55)
While it was unable to substantiate the content of the informant's alleged
conversations with Echevarria or any connection to the events. in Dallas, the
committee did establish that the original judgment of the Secret Service was
correct, that the Echevarria case did warrant a thorough investigation. It
found, for example, that the 30th of November group was backed financially by
the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (JGCE), a Chicago-based organization
run by Paulino Sierra Martinez.(56) JGCE was a coalition of many of the more
active anti-Castro groups that had been rounded in April 1963; it was dissolved
soon after the assassination. 22 (57) Its purpose was to back the activities of
the more militant groups, including Alpha 66 and the Student Directorate, or
DRE, both of which had reportedly been in contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. (58)
Much of JGCE's financial support, moreover, allegedly came from individuals
connected to organized crime. (59)
As it surveyed the various anti-Castro organizations, the committee focused its
interest on reported contacts with Oswald. Unless an association with the
President's assassin could be established, it is doubtful that it could be shown
that the anti-Castro groups were involved in the assassination. The Warren
Commission, discounting the recommendations of Slawson and Coleman. had either
regarded these contacts as insignificant or as probably not having been made or
else was not aware of them. (60) The committee could not so easily dismiss them.
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(2) Antonio Veciana Blanch.--The committee devoted a significant portion of its
anti-Castro Cuban investigation to an alleged contact with Oswald that had been
reported by Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder of Alpha 66 which, throughout
1962 and most of 1963, was one of the most militant of the exile groups. (61)
Its repeated hit-and-run attacks had drawn public criticism from President
Kennedy in the spring of 1963, to which Veciana replied, "We are going to attack
again and again."
Veciana claimed to have had the active support of the CIA, and in 1976 he
reported to a Senate investigator that from 1960 to 1973 his adviser, whom he
believed to be a representative of the CIA, was known to him as Maurice Bishop.
(62) Veciana stated that over their 13-year association, he and Bishop met on
over 100 occasions and that Bishop actually planned many Alpha 66 operations.
(63) He also said that he knew the man only. as Maurice Bishop and that all of
their contacts were initiated by Bishop. (64)
Veciana said that Bishop had guided him in planning assassination attempts of
Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop had directed him to
organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop, on ending their relationship in
1973, had paid him $253,000 in cash for his services over the years. (65)
Veciana also revealed that at one meeting with Bishop in Dallas in late August
or early September 1963, a third party at their meeting was a man he later
recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald. (66)
Veciana also indicated to the committee that subsequent to the assassination, he
had been contacted by Bishop, who was aware that Vecigna had a relative in Cuban
intelligence in Mexico.(67) Bishop, according to Veciana, offered to pay
Veciana's relative a large sum of money if he would say that it was he and his
wife who had met with Oswald in Mexico City.(68) Veciana said he had agreed to
contact his relative, but he had been unable to do so. (69)
The committee pursued the details of Veciana's story, particularly the alleged
meeting with Oswald. It conducted numerous file reviews and interviews with
associates and former associates of Veciana, to try to confirm the existence of
a Maurice Bishop or otherwise assess Veciana's credibility. On a trip to Cuba,
the committee interviewed Veciana's relative, the Cuban intelligence agent.
While the committee was unable to find corroboration for the contacts with
Bishop, it did substantiate other statements by Veciana. For example, he did
organize an attempted assassination of Castro in Havana in 1961, (70) and he
probably did participate in another plot against Castro in Chile in 1971. (71)
That Veciana was the principal organizer of the militant Alpha 66 organization
was a matter of record. (72)
The committee went to great lengths in its unsuccessful effort to substantiate
the existence of Bishop and his alleged relationship with Oswald. It reviewed
CIA files, but they showed no record of such an agent or employee. It circulated
a sketch via the national news media, but no one responded with an
identification. (73) It pursued a lead originating with the Senate investigation
that a former chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division of the Directorate
of Operations bore a resemblance to the Bishop sketch.(74) The committee
arranged for
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a chance meeting between Veciana and the CIA officer, who had since retired.
(75) Veciana said he was not Bishop. (76) In an executive session of the
committee, the retired officer testified under oath that he had never used the
name Maurice Bishop, had never known anyone by that name and had never known
Veciana. (77) Veciana, also before a committee executive session, testified the
officer was not Bishop although he bore a "paysical similarity."23 (78)
A former Director of the CIA, John McCone, and an agent who had participated in
covert Cuban operations, each told the committee they recalled that a Maurice
Bishop had been associated with the Agency, though neither could supply
additional details.(80) Subsequently, McCone was interviewed by CIA personnel,
and he told them that his original testimony to the committee had been in error.
(81) The agent did confirm, however, even after a CIA reinterview, that he had
seen the man known to him as Maurice Bishop three or four times at CIA
headquarters in the early 1960's. (82) He did not know his organizational
responsibilities, and he had not known him personally. (83) The agent also
testified that he had been acquainted with the retired officer who had been
chief of the Western Hemisphere Division and that he was not Bishop. (84)
The committee also requested flies on Bishop from the FBI and Department of
Defense, with negative results.(85) It did discover, however, that Army
intelligence had an operational interest in Veciann as a source of information
on Alpha 66 activities, and that Veciana complied, hoping to be supplied in
return with funds and weapons. (86) Veciana acknowledged his contacts with the
Army, but he stated that the only relationship those contacts had to Bishop was
that he kept Bishop informed of them. (87)
The CIA's files reflected that the Agency had been in contact with Veciana three
times during the early 1960's, but the Agency maintained it offered him no
encouragement.(88) (The committee could discover only one piece of arguably
contradictory evidence--a record of $500 in operational expenses, given to
Veciana by a person with whom the CIA had maintained a longstanding operational
relationship. (89)) The CIA further insisted that it did not at any time assign
a case officer to Veciana. 24 (90)
The committee was left with the task of evaluating Veciana's story, both with
respect to the existence of Maurice Bishop and the alleged meeting with Oswald,
by assessing Veciana's credibility. It found several reasons to believe that
Veciana had been less than candid:
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First, Veciana waited more than 10 years after the assassination to reveal his
story.
Second, Veciana would not supply proof of the $253,000 payment from Bishop,
claiming fear of the Internal Revenue Service.
Third, Veciana could not point to a single witness to his meetings with Bishop,
much less with Oswald.
Fourth, Veciana did little' to help the committee identify Bishop.
In the absence of corroboration or independent substantiation, the committee
could not, therefore, credit Veciana's story of having met with Lee Harvey
Oswald.
(3) Silvia Odio. The incident of reported contact between Oswald and anti-Castro
Cubans that has gained the most attention over the years involved Silvia Odio, a
member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta, or JURE. (91) Mrs. Odio had not
volunteered her information to the FBI.(92) The FBI initially contacted Mrs.
Odio after hearing of a conversation she had had with her neighbor in which she
described an encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald. (93) Subsequently, in testimony
before the Warren Commission, she said that in late September 1963, three men
came to her home in Dallas to ask for help in preparing a fundraising letter for
JURE.(94) She stated that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they
also had characteristics that she associated with Mexicans. (95) The two
individuals, she remembered, indicated that their "war" names were "Leopoldo"
and "Angelo."(96) The third man, an American, was introduced to her as "Leon
Oswald," and she was told that he was very much interested in the anti-Castro
Cuban cause. (97)
Mrs. Odio stated that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans
and that they were then about to leave on a trip. (98) The next day, one of the
Cubans called her on the telephone and told her that it had been his idea to
introduce the American into the underground "* * * because he is great, he is
kind of nuts." (99) The Cuban also said that the American had been in the Marine
Corps and was an excellent shot, and that the American had said that Cubans "* *
* don't have any guts * * * because President Kennedy should have been
assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that,
because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually."(100) Mrs.
Odio claimed the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. (101)
Mrs. Odio's sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the
three men and who stated that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering
the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. (102) Mrs. Odio
fixed the date of the alleged visit as being September 26 or 27.(103) She was
positive that the visit occurred prior to October 1. (104)
The Warren Commission was persuaded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on
the dates given by Mrs. Odio. (105) Nevertheless, it requested the FBI to
conduct further investigation into her allegation, and it acknowledged that the
FBI had not completed its Odio investigation at the time its report was
published in September 1964. (106)
How the Warren Commission treated the Odio incident is instructive. In the
summer of 1964, the FBI was pressed to dig more deeply into the Odio allegation.
(107) On July 24, chief counsel J. Lee Rankin,
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in a letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, noted, "... the Commission already
possesses firm evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was on a bus traveling from
Houston, Tex., to Mexico City, Mexico, on virtually the entire day of September
26."(108) J. Wesley Liebeler, the Warren Commission assistant counsel who had
taken Mrs. Odio's deposition, disagreed, however, that there was firm evidence
of Oswald's bus trip to Mexico City. (109) In a memorandum to another Commission
attorney, Howard Willens, on September 14, 1964, Liebeler objected to a section
of the Warren Report in which it was stated there was strong evidence that
Oswald was on a bus to Mexico on the date in question.(110) Liebeler argued,
"There really is no evidence at all that [Oswald] left Houston on that
bus."(111) Liebeler also argued that the conclusion that there was "persuasive"
evidence that Oswald was not in Dallas on September 24, 1963, a day for which
his travel was unaccounted, was "too strong." (112) Liebeler urged Willens to
tone down the language, of the report,(113) contending in his memorandum:"There
are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns
out that she is." (114)
On August 23, 1964, Rankin again wrote to Hoover to say, "It is a matter of some
importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegation either be proved or
disproved." (115) Rankin asked that the FBI attempt to learn the identities of
the three visitors by contacting members of anti-Castro groups active in the
Dallas area, as well as leaders of the JURE organization. (116) He asked the FBI
to check the possibility that Oswald had spent the night of September 24, in a
hotel in New Orleans, after vacating his apartment. (117) Portions of this
investigation, which were inconclusive in supporting the Warren Commission's
contention that Mrs. Odio was mistaken, were not sent to Rankin until November
9,(118) at which time the final report already had been completed. (119)
The FBI did attempt to alleviate the "problems." In a report dated September 26,
it reported the interview of Loran Eugene Hall who claimed he had been in Dallas
in September 1963, accompanied by two men fitting the general description given
by Silvia Odio, and that it was they who had visited her. (120) Oswald, Hall
said, was not one of the men.(121) Within a week of Hall's statement, the other
two men Hall said had accompanied him. Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, were
interviewed.(122) They denied ever having met Silvia Odio. (123) Later, Hall
himself retracted his statement about meeting with Mrs. Odio. (124)
Even though the Commission could not show conclusively that Oswald was not at
the Odio apartment, and even though Loran Hall's story was an admitted
fabrication, the Warren report published this explanation of the Odio incident:
While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the
time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey
Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September 1963. (125)
Not satisfied with that conclusion, the committee conducted interviews with and
took depositions from the principals--Silvia Odio,(126) members of her
family,(127) and Dr. Burton Einspruch,
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(128) her psychiatrist. (Mrs. Odio had contacted Dr. Einspruch for consultation
about problems that could not be construed to affect her perception or
credibility.) (129) The committee also set up a conference telephone call
between Dr. Einspruch in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which she
related to him the visit of the three men. (130) Mrs. Odio and Dr. Einspruch
concurred that she had told him of the nighttime meeting shortly after its
occurrence, but prior to the president's assassination.(131)
Loran Hall testified before the committee in executive session on October 5,
1977; Howard and Seymour were interviewed.(132) The FBI agent who wrote up the
Hall story also testified before the committee. (133) From a review of FBI
files, the committee secured a list of persons who belonged to the Dallas
Chapter of JURE, and the committee attempted to locate and interview these
individuals. Additionally, staff investigators interviewed the leader of JURE,
Manolo Ray, who was residing in Puerto Rico. (134)
Further, the committee secured photographs of scores of pro-Castro and
anti-Castro activists who might have fit the descriptions of the two individuals
who, Mrs. Odio said, had visited her with Oswald.(135) The committee also used
the resources of the CIA which conducted a check on all individuals who used the
"war" names of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo", and the name "Leon", or had similar
names.(136) An extensive search produced the names and photographs of three men
who might possibly have, been in Dallas in September 1963. (137) These
photographs were shown to Mrs. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the
men she had seen. (138)
The committee was inclined to believe Silvia Odio. From the evidence provided in
the sworn testimony of the witnesses, it appeared that three men did visit her
apartment in Dallas prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified themselves
as members of an anti-Castro organization. Based on a judgment of the
credibility of Silvia and Annie Odio, one of these men at least looked like Lee
Harvey Oswald and was introduced to Mrs. Odio as Leon Oswald.
The committee did not agree with the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald
could not have been in Dallas at the requisite time. Nevertheless, the committee
itself could reach no definite conclusion on the specific date of the visit. It
could have been as early as September 24, the morning of which Oswald was seen
in New Orleans,(139) but it was more likely on the 25th, 26th or 27th of
September. If it was on these dates, then Oswald had to have had access to
private transportation to have traveled through Dallas and still reached Mexico
City when he did, judging from other evidence developed by both the Warren
Commission and the committee. (140)
(c) Oswald and anti-Castro Cubans
The committee recognized that an association by Oswald with anti-Castro Cubans
would pose problems for its evaluation of the assassin and what might have
motivated him. In reviewing Oswald's life, the committee found his actions and
values to have been those of a self-proclaimed Marxist who would be bound to
favor the-Castro regime in Cuba, or at least not advocate its overthrow. For
this reason, it did not seem likely to the committee that Oswald would have
allied
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himself with an anti-Castro group or individual activist for the sole purpose of
furthering the anti-Castro cause. The committee recognized the possibility that
Oswald might have established contacts with such groups or persons to implicate
the anti-Castro movement in the assassination. Such an implication might have
protected the Castro regime and other left-wing suspects, while resulting in an
intensive investigation and possible neutralization of the opponents of Castro.
It is also possible, despite his alleged remark about killing Kennedy, that
Oswald had not yet contemplated the President's assassination at the time of the
Odio incident, or if he did, that his assassination plan had no relation to his
anti-Castro contacts, and that he was associating with anti-Castro activists for
some other unrelated reason. A variety of speculations are possible, but the
committee was forced to acknowledge frankly that, despite its efforts, it was
unable to reach firm conclusions as to the meaning or significance of the Odio
incident to the President's assassination.
(1) Oswald in New Orleans.--Another contact by Lee Harvey Oswald with
anti-Castro Cuban activists that was not only documented, but also publicized at
the time in the news media, occurred when he was living in New Orleans in the
summer of 1963, an especially puzzling period in Oswald's life. His actions were
blatantly pro-Castro, as he carried a one-man Fair Play for Cuba Committee
crusade into the streets of a city whose Cuban population was predominantly
anti-Castro. Yet Oswald's known and alleged associations even at this time
included Cubans who were of an anti-Castro persuasion and their anti-Communist
American supporters. New Orleans was Oswald's home town; he was born there on
October 18, 1939.(141) In April 1963, shortly after the Walker shooting, he
moved back, having lived in Fort Worth and Dallas since his return from the
Soviet Union the previous June.(142) He spent the first 2 weeks job hunting,
staying with the Murrets, Lillian and Charles, or "Dutz," as he was called, the
sister and brother-in-law of Oswald's mother, Marguerite. (143) After being
hired by the Reily Coffee Co. as a maintenance man, he sent for his wife Marina
and their baby daughter, who were still in Dallas, and they moved into an
apartment on Magazine Street.
In May, Oswald wrote to Vincent T. Lee, national director of the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee, expressing a desire to open an FPCC chapter in New Orleans and
requesting literature to distribute. (145) He also had handouts printed, some of
which were stamped "L. H. Oswald, 4907 Magazine Street," others with the alias,
"A. J. Hidell, P.O. Box 30016," still others listing the FPCC address as 544
Camp Street. (146)
In letters written earlier that summer and spring to the FPCC headquarters in
New York, Oswald had indicated that he intended to rent an office.(147) In one
letter he mentioned that he had acquired a space but had been told to vacate 3
days later because the building was to be remodeled. The Warren Commission
failed to discover any record of Oswald's having rented an office at 544 Camp
and concluded he had fabricated the story. (149)
In investigating Oswald after the assassination, the Secret Service learned that
the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary
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Council (CRC), an anti-Castro organization, had occupied an office at 544 Camp
Street for about 6 months during 1961-62.(150) At that time, Sergio Arcacha
Smith was the official CRC delegate for the New Orleans area.(151) Since the CRC
had vacated the building 15 months before Oswald arrived m New Orleans, the
Warren Commission concluded that there was no connection with Oswald.(152)
Nevertheless, the riddle of 544 Camp Street persisted over the years.
Oswald lost his job at the Reily Coffee Co. in July, and his efforts to find
another were futile.(153) Through the rest of the summer, he filed claims at the
unemployment office.
On August 5, Oswald initiated contact with Carlos Bringuier, a delegate of the
Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE).(155) According to his testimony
before the Warren Commission, Bringuier was the only registered member of the
group in New Orleans. (156) Bringuier also said he had two friends at the time,
Celso Hernandez and Miguel Cruz, who were also active in the anti-Castro cause.
(157) Oswald reportedly told Bringuier that he wished to join the DRE, offering
money and assistance to train guerrillas.(158) Bringuier, fearful of an
infiltration attempt by Castro sympathizers or the FBI, told Oswald to deal
directly with DRE headquarters in Miami. (159) The next day, Oswald returned to
Bringuier's store and left a copy of a Marine training manual with Rolando
Pelaez, Bringuier's brother-in-law. (160)
On August 9, Bringuier learned that a man was carrying a pro-Castro sign and
handing out literature on Canal Street. (161) Carrying his own anti-Castro sign,
Bringuier, along with Hernandez and Cruz, set out to demonstrate against the
pro-Castro sympathizer. (162) Bringuier recognized Oswald and began shouting
that he was a traitor and a Communist.(163) A scuffle ensued, and police
arrested all participants.(164) Oswald spent the night in jail.(165) On August
12, he pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace and was fined $10. (166) The
anti-Castro Cubans were not charged. (167)
During the incident with Bringuier, Oswald also encountered Frank Bartes, the
New Orleans delegate of the CRC from 1962-64.(168) After Bringuier and Oswald
were arrested in the street scuffle, Bartes appeared in court with Bringuier.
(169) According Bartes, the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement after
the hearing. (170) Bartes then engaged in an argument with the media and Oswald
because the Cubans were not being given an opportunity to present their
anti-Castro views. (171)
On August 16, Oswald was again seen distributing pro-Castro literature.(172) A
friend of Bringuier, Carlos Quiroga, brought one of Oswald's leaflets to
Bringuier and volunteered to visit Oswald and feign interest in the FPCC in
order to determine Oswald's motives. (173) Quiroga met with Oswald for about an
hour.(174) He learned that Oswald had a Russian wife and spoke Russian himself.
Oswald gave Quiroga an application for membership in the FPCC chapter, but
Quiroga noted he did not seem intent on actually enlisting members. (175)
Oswald's campaign received newspaper, television, and radio coverage. (176)
William Stuckey, a reporter for radio station WDSU who had been following the
FPCC, interviewed Oswald on August 17 and
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proposed a television debate between Oswald and Bringuier, to be held on August
21. (177) Bringuier issued a press release immediately after the debate, urging
the citizens of New Orleans to write their Congressmen demanding a congressional
investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald.(178)
Oswald largely passed out of sight from August 21 until September 17, the day he
applied for a tourist card to Mexico.(179) He is known to have written letters
to left-wing political organizations, and he and Marina visited the Murrets on
Labor Day. (180) Marina said her husband spent his free time reading books and
practicing with his rifle. (181)
(2) Oswald in Clinton, La.--While reports of some Oswald contacts with
anti-Castro Cubans were known at the time of the 1964 investigation, allegations
of additional Cuba-related associations surfaced in subsequent years. As an
example, Oswald reportedly appeared in August-September 1963 in Clinton, La.,
where a voting rights demonstration was in progress. The reports of Oswald in
Clinton were not, as far as the committee could determine, available to the
Warren Commission, although one witness said he notified the FBI when he
recognized Oswald from news photographs right after the assassination.25 (182)
In fact, the Clinton sightings did not publicly surface until 1967, when they
were introduced as evidence in the assassination investigation being conducted
by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison.(184) In that investigation, one
suspect, David W. Ferrie, a staunch anti-Castro partisan, died within days of
having been named by Garrison; the other, Clay L. Shaw, was acquitted in
1969.(185) Aware that Garrison had been fairly criticized for questionable
tactics, the committee proceeded cautiously, making sure to determine on its own
the credibility of information coming from his probe. The committee found that
the Clinton witnesses were credible and significant. They each were interviewed
or deposed, or appeared before the committee in executive session. While there
were points that could be raised to call into question their credibility, it was
the judgment of the committee that they were telling the truth as they knew it.
There were six Clinton witnesses, among them a State representative, a deputy
sheriff and a reg, istrar of voters. (186) By synthesizing the testimony of all
of them, since they each contributed to the overall account, the committee was
able to piece together the following sequence of events.
Clinton, La. about 130 miles from New Orleans, is the county seat of East
Feliciana Parish. In the late summer of 1963 it was targeted by the Congress of
Racial Equality for a voting rights campaign. (187) Oswald first showed up in
nearby Jackson, La., seeking employment at East Louisiana State Hospital, a
mental institution. (188) Apparently on advice that his job would depend on his
becoming a registered voter, Oswald went to Clinton for that purpose (although
the committee could find no record that he was successful. (189)
In addition to the physical descriptions they gave that matched that of Oswald,
other observations of the witnesses tended to substantiate
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their belief that he was, in fact, the man they saw. For example, he referred to
himself as "Oswald," and he produced his Marine Corps discharge papers as
identification.(190) Some of the witnesses said that Oswald was accompanied by
two older men whom they identified as Ferrie and Shaw. (191) If the witnesses
were not only truthful but accurate as well in their accounts, they established
an association of an undetermined nature between Ferrie, Shaw and Oswald less
than 3 months before the assassination.
(3) David Ferrie.--The Clinton witnesses were not the only ones who linked
Oswald to Ferrie. On November 23, the day after the assassination, Jack S.
Martin, a part-time private detective and police informant, told the office of
the New Orleans District Attorney that a former Eastern Airlines pilot named
David Ferrie might have aided Oswald in the assassination. (192) Martin had
known Ferrie for over 2 years, beginning when he and Ferrie had performed some
investigative work on a case involving an illegitimate religious order in
Louisville, Ky. (193) Martin advised Assistant New Orleans District Attorney
Herman Kohlman that he suspected Ferrie might have known Oswald for some time
and that Ferrie might have once been Oswald's superior officer in a New Orleans
unit of the Civil Air Patrol.(194) Martin made further allegations to the FBI on
November 25.(195) He indicated he thought he once saw a photograph of Oswald and
other CAP members when he visited Ferrie's home and that Ferrie might have
assisted Oswald in purchasing a foreign firearm.(196) Martin also informed the
FBI that Ferrie had a history of arrests and that Ferrie was an amateur
hypnotist, possibly capable of hypnotizing Oswald. (197)
The committee reviewed Ferrie's background. He had been fired by Eastern
Airlines,(198) and in litigation over the dismissal, which continued through
August 1963, he was counseled by a New Orleans attorney named G. Wray Gill.
(199) Ferrie later stated that in March 1960, he and Gill made an agreement
whereby Gill would represent Ferrie in his dismissal dispute in return for
Ferrie's work as an investigator on other cases. (200) One of these cases
involved deportation proceedings against Carlos Marcello, the head of the
organized crime network in Louisiana and a client of Gill.26 (201) Ferrie also
said he had entered into a similar agreement with Guy Banister, a former FBI
agent (Special Agent-in-Charge in Chicago) who had opened a private detective
agency in New Orleans. (203)
(4) 544 Camp Street.--Banister's firm occupied an office in 1963 in the Newman
Building at 531 Lafayette Street. (204) Another entrance to the building was at
544 Camp Street, the address Oswald had stamped on his Fair Play for Cuba
Committee handouts. (205) During the summer of 1963, Ferrie frequented 544 Camp
Street regularly as a result of his working relationship with Banister. (206)
Another occupant of the Newman Building, was the Cuban Revolutionary Council,
whose chief New Orleans delegate until 1962 was Ser-
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gio Arcacha Smith. (207) He was replaced by Luis Rabel who, in turn, was
succeeded by Frank Bartes.(208) The committee interviewed or deposed all three
CRC New Orleans delegates. (209) Arcacha said he never encountered Oswald and
that he left New Orleans when he was relieved of his CRC position in early 1962.
(210) Rabel said he held the post from January. to October 1962, but that he
likewise never knew or saw Oswald and that the only time he went to the Newman
Building was to remove some office materials that Arcacha had left there. (211)
Bartes said the only time he was in contact with Oswald was in their courtroom
confrontation, that he ran the CRC chapter from an office in his home and that
he never visited an office at either 544 Camp Street or 531 Lafayette Street.
(212)
The committee, on the other hand, developed information that, in 1961, Banister,
Ferrie, and Arcacha were working together in the anti-Castro cause. Banister, a
fervent anti-Communist, was helping to establish Friends of Democratic Cuba as
an adjunct to the New Orleans CRC chapter run by Arcacha in an office in the
Newman Building. (213) Banister was also conducting background investigations of
CRC members for Arcacha.(214) Ferrie, also strongly anti-Communist and
anti-Castro, was associated with Arcacha (and probably Banister) in anti-Castro
activism. (215)
On November 22, 1963, Ferrie had been in a Federal courtroom in New Orleans in
connection with legal proceedings against Carlos Marcello.27 (216) That night he
drove, with two young friends, to Houston, Tex. then to Galveston on Saturday,
November 23, and back to New Orleans on Sunday. (218) Before reaching New
Orleans, he learned from a telephone conversation with G. Wray Gill that Martin
had implicated him in the, assassination.(219) Gill also told Ferrie about the
rumors that he and Oswald had served together in the CAP and that Oswald
supposedly had Ferrie's library card in his possession when he was arrested in
Dallas.(220) When he got to his residence, Ferrie did not go in, but sent in his
place one of his companions on the trip, Alvin Beauboeuf.(231) Beauboeuf and
Ferrie's roommate, Layton Martens, were detained by officers from the district
attorney's office. (222) Ferrie drove to Hammond, La, and spent the night with a
friend. (223)
On Monday, November 25, Ferrie turned himself in to the district attorney's
office where he was arrested on suspicion of being involved in the
assassination. (224) In subsequent interviews with New Orleans authorities, the
FBI and the Secret Service, Ferrie denied ever having known Oswald or having
ever been involved in the assassination. (225) He stated that. in the days
preceding, November 22, he had been working intensively for Gill on the Marcello
case. (226) Ferrie said he was in New Orleans on the morning of November 22, at
which time Marcello was acquitted in Federal court of citizenship falsification.
(227) He stated that he took the weekend trip to Texas for relaxation.(228)
Ferrie acknowledged knowing Jack Martin, stating that Martin resented him for
forcibly removing him from Gill's office earlier that year. (229)
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The FBI and Secret Service investigation into the possibility that Ferrie and
Oswald head been associated ended a few days later.(230) A Secret Service report
concluded that the information provided by Jack Martin that Ferrie had been
associated with Oswald and had trained him to fire, a rifle was "without
foundation." (231) The Secret Service report went on to state that on November
26, 1963, the FBI had informed the Secret Service that Martin had admitted that
his information was a "figment of his imagination." 28(232) The investigation of
Ferrie was subsequently dosed for lack of evidence against him.(234)
(5) A committee analysis of Oswald in New Orleans.---The Warren Commission had
attempted to reconstruct a daily chronology of Oswald's activities in New
Orleans during the summer of 1963, and the committee used it, as well as
information arising from critics and the Garrison investigation, to select
events and contacts that merited closer analysis. Among these were Oswald's
confrontation with Carlos Bringuier and with Frank Bartes, his reported
activities in Clinton, La., and his ties, if any, to Guy Banister, David Ferrie,
Sergio Arcacha Smith and others who frequented the office building at 544 Camp
Street.
The committee deposed Carlos Bringuier and interviewed or deposed several of his
associates. (235) It concluded that there had been no relationship between
Oswald and Bringuier and the DRE with the exception of the confrontation over
Oswald's distribution of pro-Castro literature. The committee was not able to
determine why Oswald approached the anti-Castro Cubans, but it tended to concur
with Bringuier and others in their belief that Oswald was seeking to infiltrate
their ranks and obtain information about their activities.
As noted, the committee believed the Clinton witnesses to be telling the truth
as they knew it. It was, therefore, inclined to believe that Oswald was in
Clinton, La., in late August, early September 1963, and that he was in the
company of David Ferrie, if not Clay Shaw. The committee was puzzled by Oswald's
apparent association with Ferrie, a person whose anti-Castro sentiments were so
distant from those of Oswald, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee campaigner. But
the relationship with Ferrie may have been significant for more than its
anti-Castro aspect, in light of Ferrie's connection with G. Wray Gill and Carlos
Marcello.
The committee also found that there was at least possibility that Oswald and Guy
Banister were acquainted. The following facts were considered:
The 544 Camp Street address stamped on Oswald's FPCC handouts was that of the
building where Banister had his office;
Ross Banister told the committee that his brother had seen Oswald handing out
FPCC literature during the summer of 1963;
(236) and
Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, told the committee she saw Oswald in
Banister's office on several occasions, the first being
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when he was interviewed for a job during the summer of 1963.29 (237)
The committee learned that Banister left extensive files when he died in
1964.(238) Later that year, they were purchased by the Louisiana State Police
fram Banister's widow.(239) According to Joseph Cambre of the State police,
Oswald's name was not the subject of any file, but it was included in a file for
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.(240) Cambre said the FPCC file contained
newspaper clippings and a transcript, of a radio program on which Oswald had
appeared. (241) The committee was not able to review Banister's files, since
they had been destroyed pursuant to an order of the superintendent of Louisiana
State Police that all files not part of the public record or pertinent to
ongoing criminal investigations be burned. (242)
Additional evidence that Oswald may have been associated or acquainted with
Ferrie and Banister was provided by the testimony of Adrian Alba, proprietor of
the Crescent City Garage which was next door to the Reily Coffee Co. where
Oswald had worked for a couple of months in 1963. (The garage and the coffee
company were both located less than a block from 544 Camp Street.) Although
Alba's testimony on some points was questionable, he undoubtedly did know Oswald
who frequently visited his garage, and the committee found no reason to question
his statement that he had often seen Oswald in Mancuso's Restaurant on the first
floor of 544 Camp. (243) Ferrie and Banister also were frequent customers at
Mancuso's. (244)
(6) Summary of the evidence.--In sum, the committee did not believe that an
anti-Castro organization was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy. Even though the committee's investigation did reveal that in 1964 the
FBI failed to pursue intelligence reports of possible anti-Castro involvement as
vigorously as it might have, the committee found it significant that it
discovered no information in U.S. intelligence agency files that would implicate
anti-Castroites. Contact between the intelligence community and the anti-Castro
movement was close, so it is logical to suppose that some trace of group
involvement would have been detected had it existed.
The committee also thought it significant that it received no information from
the Cuban Government that would implicate anti-Castroites. The Cubans had
dependable information sources in the exile communities in Miami, New Orleans,
Dallas and other U.S. cities, so there is high probability that Cuban
intelligence would have been aware of any group involvement by the exiles.
Following the assassination, the Cuban Government would have had the highest
incentive to report participation by anti-Castroites, had it existed to its
knowledge, since it would have dispelled suspicions of pro-Castro Cuban
involvement. The committee was impressed with the cooperation it received from
the Cuban Government, and while it acknowledged this cooperation might not have
been forthcoming in 1964, it concluded that, had such information existed in
1978, it would have been supplied by Cuban officials.
On the other hand, the committee noted that it was unable to preclude from its
investigation the possibility that individuals with anti-
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Castro leanings might have been involved in the assassination. The committee
candidly acknowledged, for example that it could not explain Oswald's
associations--nor at this late date fully determine their extent--with
anti-Castro Cubans. The committee remained convinced that since Oswald
consistently demonstrated a left-wing Marxist ideology, he would not have
supported the anti-Castro movement. At the same time, the committee noted that
Oswald's possible association with Ferrie might be distinguishable, since it
could not be simply termed an anti-Castro association. Ferrie and Oswald may
have had a personal friendship unrelated to Cuban activities. Ferrie was not
Cuban, and though he actively supported the anti-Castro cause, he had other
interests. For one, he was employed by Carlos Marcello as an investigator. (245)
(It has been alleged that Ferrie operated a service station in 1964 the
franchise for which was reportedly paid by Marcello.) (246) The committee
concluded, therefore, that Oswald's most significant apparent anti-Castro
association, that with David Ferrie, might in fact not have been related to the
Cuban issue.
In the end, the committee concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
the conclusion that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in
the assassination, but it could not preclude the possibility that individual
members may have been involved.
4. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
TO IT, THAT THE NATIONAL SYNDICATE OF ORGANIZED CRIME AS A GROUP,
WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, BUT
THAT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY
THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED
Lee Harvey Oswald was fatally shot by Jack Ruby at 11:21 a.m on Sunday, November
24, 1963, less than 48 hours after President Kennedy was assassinated. While
many Americans were prepared to believe that Oswald had acted alone in shooting
the President, they found their credulity strained when they were asked to
accept a conclusion that Ruby, too, had not acted as part of a plot. As the
Warren Commission observed,
* * * almost immediately speculation arose that Ruby had acted on behalf of
members of a conspiracy who had planned the killing of President Kennedy and
wanted to silence Oswald. (1).
The implications of the murder of Oswald are crucial to an understanding of the
assassination itself. Several of the logical possibilities should be made
explicit:
Oswald was a member of a conspiracy, and he was killed by Ruby, also a
conspirator, so that he would not reveal the plot.
Oswald was a member of a conspiracy, yet Ruby acted alone, as he explained, for
personal reasons.
Oswald was not a member of a conspiracy as far as Ruby knew, but his murder was
an act planned by Ruby and others to take justice into their own hands.
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Both Oswald and Ruby acted alone or with the assistance of only one or two
confederates, but there was no wider conspiracy, one that extended beyond the
immediate participants.
If it is determined that Ruby acted alone, it does not necessarily follow that
there was no conspiracy to murder the President. But if Ruby was part of a
sophisticated plot to murder Oswald, there would be troublesome implications
with respect to the assassination of the President. While it is possible to
develop an acceptable rationale of why a group might want to kill the
President's accused assassin, even though its members were not in fact involved
in the assassination, it is difficult to make the explanation sound convincing.
There is a possibility, for example, that a Dallas citizen or groups of citizens
planned the murder of Oswald by Ruby to revenge the murders of President Kennedy
or Patrolman J.D. Tippit, or both. Nevertheless, the brief period of time
between the two murders, during which the vengeful plotters would have had to
formulate and execute Oswald's murder, would seem to indicate the improbability
of such an explanation. A preexisting group might have taken action within 48
hours, but it is doubtful that a group could have planned and then carried out
Oswald's murder in such a short period of time.
(a) The Warren Commission investigation
The Warren Commission looked at Ruby's conduct and associations from November 21
through November 24 to determine if they reflected a conspiratorial relationship
with Oswald.(2) It found no "* * * grounds for believing that Ruby's killing of
Oswald was part of a conspiracy."(3) It accepted as true his explanation that
his conduct reflected "genuine shock and grief" and strong affection for
President Kennedy and his family. (4) As for numerous phone contacts Ruby had
with underworld figures in the weeks preceding the assassination, the Commission
believed his explanation that they had to do with his troubles with the American
Guild of Variety Artists, rather than reflecting any sinister associations that
might have been related to the President's assassination. (5)
The Commission also found no evidence that Ruby and Oswald had ever been
acquainted, although the Commission acknowledged that they both lived in the Oak
Cliff section of Dallas, had post office boxes at the terminal annex, and had
possible but tenuous third party links. These included Oswald's landlady,
Earlene Roberts, whose sister, Bertha Cheek, had visited Ruby at his nightclub
on November 18, (6) and a fellow boarder at Oswald's roominghouse, John Carter,
who was friendly with a close friend and employee of Ruby, Wanda Killam.(7).
The Commission also looked to Ruby's ties to other individuals or groups that
might have obviated the need for direct contact with Oswald near the time of the
assassination. Ruby was found not to be linked to pro- or anti-Castro Cuban
groups;(8) he was also found not to be linked to "illegal activities with
members of the organized underworld."(9) The Commission noted that Ruby
"disc]aimed that he was associated with organized criminal activities," and it
did not find reason to disbelieve him. (10) The evidence "fell short" of
demonstrating that Ruby "was significantly affiliated with organized crime."(11)
He was, at worst, "familiar, if not friendly" with some
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criminal elements, but he was not a participant in "organized criminal
activity." (12) Consequently, the Commission concluded that "the evidence does
not establish a significant link between Ruby and organized crime?' (13) And in
its central. conclusion about Jack Ruby, the Commission stated that its
investigation had "yielded no evidence that Ruby conspired with anyone in
planning or executing the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald."(14) For the Warren
Commission, therefore, Ruby's killing of Oswald had no implications for Oswald's
killing of the President.
(b) The committee investigation
Like the Warren Commission, the committee was deeply troubled by the
circumstances surrounding the murder of the President's accused assassin. It,
too, focused its attention on Jack Ruby, his family and his associates. Its
investigation, however, was not limited to Ruby, Oswald and their immediate
world. The committee's attention was also directed to organized crime and those
major figures in it who might have been involved in a conspiracy to kill the
President because of the Kennedy administration's unprecedented crackdown on
them and their illicit activities.
(1) Ruby and organized crime.--The committee, as did the Warren Commission,
recognized that a primary reason to suspect organized crime of possible
involvement in the assassination was Ruby's killing of Oswald. For this reason,
the committee undertook an extensive investigation of Ruby and his relatives,
friends and associates to determine if there was evidence that Ruby was involved
in crime, organized or otherwise, such as gambling and vice, and if such
involvement might have been related to the murder of Oswald.
The evidence available to the committee indicated that Ruby was not a "member"
of organized crime in Dallas or elsewhere, although it showed that he had a
significant number of associations and direct and indirect contacts with
underworld figures, a number of whom were connected to the most powerful La Cosa
Nostra leaders. Additionally, Ruby had numerous associations with the Dallas
criminal element.
The committee examined the circumstances of a well-known episode in organized
crime history in which representatives of the Chicago Mafia attempted in, 1947,
a move into Dallas, facilitated by the bribery of members of the Dallas
sheriff's office. (15) The Kefauver committee of the U.S. Senate, during, its
extensive probe of organized crime in the early 1950's, termed this attempt by
the Chicago syndicate to buy protection from the Dallas authorities an
extraordinary event, one of the more brazen efforts made during that postwar
period of criminal expansion.
In the years since the assassination, there had been allegations that Ruby was
involved in organized crime's 1947 attempt to move into Dallas, perhaps as a
frontman for the Chicago racketeers. (16) During discussions of the bribe offer.
Dallas Sheriff Steve Guthrie secretly taped conversations in which the Chicago
mob representative outlined plans for its Dallas operation. (17) They spoke of
establishing a nightclub as a front for illegal gambling. It happens that Ruby
moved from Chicago to Dallas in 1947 and began operating a number of nightclubs.
(18) While the FBI and the Warren Commission were aware in 1964 of the alleged
links between Ruby and those involved in the
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bribery attempt, a thorough investigation of the charges was not undertaken.
(19)
The committee frankly realized that because this incident occurred years in the
past, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to answer all the allegations
fully and finally. Nevertheless, the committee was able to develop substantial
evidence from tape recordings made by the sheriff's office, detailed law
enforcement documents and the testimony of knowledgeable witnesses.
As a result, the committee concluded that while Ruby and members of his family
were acquainted with individuals who were involved in the incident, including
Chicago gangsters who had moved to Dallas, and while Ruby may have wished to
participate, there was no solid evidence that he was, in fact, part of the
Chicago group. (20) There was also no evidence available that Ruby was to have
been involved in the proposed gambling operation had the bribery attempt been
successful, or that Ruby came to Dallas for that purpose. (21)
The committee found it reasonable to assume that had Ruby been involved in any
significant way, he would probably have been referred to in either the tape
recordings or the documentation relating to the incident, but a review of that
available evidence failed to disclose any reference to Ruby. (22) The committee,
however, was not able to interview former Sheriff Guthrie, the subject of the
bribery attempt and the one witness who maintained to the FBI in 1963-64 that
Ruby was significantly involved in the Chicago syndicate plan.1 (23)
The committee also examined allegations that, even before the 1947 move to
Dallas, Ruby had been personally acquainted with two professional killers for
the organized crime syndicate in Chicago, David Yaras and Lenny Patrick. (25)
The committee established that Ruby, Yaras and Patrick were in fact acquainted
during Ruby's years in Chicago, particularly in the 1930's and 1940's.(26) Both
Yaras and Patrick admitted, when questioned by the FBI in 1964, that they did
know Ruby, but both said that they had not had any contact with him for 10 to 15
years. (27) Yaras and Patrick further maintained they had never been
particularly close to Ruby, had never visited him in Dallas and had no knowledge
of Ruby being connected to organized crime. (28) Indeed, the Warren Commission
used Patrick's statement as a footnote citation in its report to support its
conclusion that Ruby did not have significant syndicate associations. (29)
On the other hand, the committee established that Yaras and Patrick were, in
fact, notorious gunmen, having been identified by law enforcement authorities as
executioners for the Chicago mob(30) and closely associated with Sam Giancana,
the organized crime leader in Chicago who was murdered in 1975. Yaras and
Patrick are believed to have been responsible for numerous syndicate executions,
including the murder of James Ragan, a gambling wire service owner. (31) The
evidence implicating Yaras and Patrick in syndicate activities is unusually
reliable.(32) Yaras, for example, was overheard in a 1969, electronic
surveillance discussing various underworld murder con-
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tracts he had carried out and one he had only recently been assigned. While the
committee found no evidence that Ruby was associated with Yaras or Patrick
during the 50's or 1960's, (33) it concluded that Ruby had probably talked by
telephone to Patrick during the summer of 1963. (34)
While Ruby apparently did not participate in the organized crime move to Dallas
is 1947, he did establish himself as a Dallas nightclub operator around that
time. His first club was the Silver Spur, which featured country and western
entertainment. Then he operated the Sovereign, a private club that failed and
was converted into the Carousel Club, a burlesque house with striptease acts.
Ruby, an extroverted individual, acquired numerous friends and contacts in and
around Dallas, some of whom had syndicate ties.
Included among Ruby's closest friends was Lewis McWillie. McWillie moved from
Dallas to Cuba in 1958 and worked in gambling casinos in Havana until 1960.(35)
In 1978, McWillie was employed in Las Vegas, and law enforcement files indicate
he had business and personal ties to major organized crime figures, including
Meyer Lansky and Santos Trafficante. (36)
Ruby traveled to Cuba on at least one occasion to visit McWillie. (37) McWillie
testified to the committee that Ruby visited him only once in Cuba, and that it
was a social visit.(38) The Warren Commission concluded this was the only trip
Ruby took to Cuba,(39) despite documentation in the Commission's own files
indicating Ruby made a second trip.
Both Ruby and McWillie claimed that Ruby's visit to Cuba was at McWillie's
invitation and lasted about a week in the late summer or early fall of 1959.
(41) The committee, however, obtained tourist cards from the Cuban Government
that show Ruby entered Cuba on August 8, 1959, left on September 11, reentered
on September 12 and left again on September 13, 1959.(42) These documents
supplement records the committee obtained from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) indicating that Ruby left Cuba on September 11,
1959, traveling to Miami, returned to Cuba on September 12, and traveled on to
New Orleans on September 13, 1959.(43) The Cuban Government could not state with
certainty that the commercial airline flights indicated by the INS records were
the only ones Ruby took during the period.(44)
Other records obtained by the committee indicate that Ruby was in Dallas at
times during the August 8 to September 11, 1959, period. (145) He apparently
visited his safe deposit box on August 21, met with FBI Agent Charles W. Flynn
on August 31,2 and returned to the safe deposit box on September 4. (47)
Consequently, if the tourist card documentation, INS, FBI and bank records are
all correct, Ruby had to have made at least three trips to Cuba. While the
records appeared to be accurate, they were incomplete. The committee was unable
to determine, for example, whether on the third trip, if it occurred, Ruby
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traveled by commercial airline or some other means. Consequently, the committee
could not rule out the possibility that Ruby made more trips during this period
or at other times.
Based on the unusual nature of the l-day trip to Miami from Havana on September
11-12 and the possibility of at least one additional trip to Cuba, the committee
concluded that vacationing was probably not the purpose for traveling to Havana,
despite Ruby's insistence to the Warren Commission that his one trip to Cuba in
1959 was a social visit. (48) The committee reached the judgment that Ruby most
likely was serving as a courier for gambling interests when he traveled to Miami
from Havana for 1 day, then returned to Cuba for a day, before flying to New
Orleans.(49) This judgement is supported by the following:
McWillie had made previous trips to Miami on behalf of the owners of the
Tropicana, the casino for which he worked, to deposit funds; (50)
McWillie placed a call to Meyer Panitz, a gambling associate in Miami, to inform
him that Ruby was coming from Cuba, resuiting in two meetings between Panitz and
Ruby; (51)
There was a continuing need for Havana casino operators to send their assets out
of Cuba to protect them from seizure by the Castro government; (52) and
The 1-day trip from Havana to Miami was not explained by Ruby, and his testimony
to the Warren Commission about his travels to Cuba was contradictory.(53)
The committee also deemed it likely that Ruby at least met various organized
crime figures in Cuba, possibly including some who had been detained by the
Cuban government. (54) In fact, Ruby told the Warren Commission that he was
later visited in Dallas by McWillie and a Havana casino owner and that they had
discussed the gambling business in Cuba. 3 (55)
As noted by the Warren Commission, an exporter named Robert McKeown alleged that
Ruby offered in 1959 to purchase a letter of introduction to Fidel Castro in
hopes of securing the release of three individuals being held in a Cuban prison.
(57) McKeown also claimed Ruby contacted him about a sale of jeeps to Cuba. 4
(58) If McKeown's allegations were accurate, they would support a judgment that
Ruby's travels to Cuba were not merely for a vacation. (The committee was unable
to confirm or refute McKeown's allegations. In his appearance before the
committee in executive session, however, McKeown's story did not seem to be
credible, based on the committee's assessment of his demeanor.(61)
It has been charged that Ruby met with Santos Trafficante in Cuba sometime in
1959.(62) Trafficante, regarded as one of the Nation's most powerful organized
crime figures, was to become a key participant in Castro assassination attempts
by the Mafia and the CIA from 1960 to 1963.(63) The committee developed
circumstantial evidence
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that makes a meeting between Ruby and Trafficante a distinct possibility,(64)
but the evidence was not sufficient to form a final conclusion as to whether or
not such a meeting took place.
While allegations of a Ruby link to Trafficante had previously been raised,
mainly due to McWillie's alleged close connections to the Mafia leader, it was
not until recent years that they received serious attention. Trafficante had
long been recognized by law enforcement officials as a leading member of the La
Cosa Nostro, but he did not become the object of significant public attention in
connection with the assassination of the President until his participation in
the assassination plots against Castro was disclosed in 1975.
In 1976, in response to a freedom of information suit, the CIA declassified a
State Department cablegram received from London on November 28, 1963. It read:
On 26 November 1963, a British Journalist named John Wilson, and also known as
Wilson-Hudson, gave information to the American Embassy in London which
indicated that an "American gangster-type named Ruby" visited Cuba around 1959.
Wilson himself was working in Cuba at that time and was jailed by Castro before
he was deported.
In prison in Cuba, Wilson says he met an American gangster-gambler named Santos
who could not return to the U.S.A. * * * Instead he preferred to live in
relative luxury in a Cuban prison. While Santos was in prison, Wilson says,
Santos was visited frequently by an American gangster type named Ruby. (65)
Several days after the CIA had received the information, the Agency noted that
there were reports that Wilson-Hudson was a "psychopath" and unreliable. The
Agency did not conduct an investigation of the information, and the Warren
Commission was apparently not in formed of the cablegram. The former staff
counsel who directed the Commission's somewhat limited investigation of
organized crime told the committee that since the Commission was never told of
the CIA's use of the Mafia to try to assassinate Castro from 1960 to 1963, he
was not familiar with the name Santos Trafficante in 1964. (66) The committee
was unable to locate John Wilson-Hudson- (According to reports, he had died.)
Nor was the committee able to obtain independent confirmation of the
Wilson-Hudson allegation. The committee was able, however, to develop
corroborative information to the effect that Wilson-Hudson was incarcerated at
the same detention camp in Cuba as Trafficante. (67)
On June 6, 1959, Trafficante and others who controlled extensive gambling
interests in Cuba were detained as part of a Castro government policy that would
subsequently lead to the confiscation of all underworld holding in Cuba.(68)
They were held in Trescornia, a minimum security detention camp. (69) According
to documentation supplied by the Cuban Government, Trafficante was released from
Trescornia on August 18, 1959. (70) Tourist card documentation, also obtained by
the committee, as well as various Warren Commission documents, indicate Ruby's
first trip to Cuba began on August 1959.(71) Thus, Ruby was in Cuba during part
of the final days of Trafficante's detention at Trescornia.(72)
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McWillie testified before the committee that he had visited another detainee at
Trescornia during that period, and he recalled possibly seeing Trafficante
there. McWillie claimed, however, he did not say more than "hello" to him. (73)
McWillie further testified it was during that period that Ruby visited him in
Havana for about a week, and that Ruby tagged along with him during much of his
stay. (74) McWillie told the committee that Ruby could have gone with him to
visit Trescornia, although he doubted that Ruby did so.(75) McWillie testified
that he could not clearly recall much about Ruby's visit. (76)
Jose Verdacia Verdacia, a witness made available for a committee interview by
the Cuban Government, was the warden at Trescornia in August 1959.(77) Verdacia
told the committee that he could not recall the name John Wilson-Hudson, but he
could remember a British journalist who had worked in Argentina, as had
Wilson-Hudson, who was detained at Trescornia. (78)
In his own public testimony before the committee, Trafficante testified that he
did not remember Ruby ever having visited him at Trescornia. Trafficante stated,
There was no reason for this man to visit me. I have never seen this man before.
I have never been to Dallas, I never had no contact with him. I don't see why he
was going to come and visit me. (79)
Trafficante did, however, testify that he could recall an individual fitting
British journalist John Wilson-Hudson's description, and he stated that the man
was among those who were held in his section at Trescornia. (80)
The importance of a Ruby-Trafficante meeting in Trescornia should not be
overemphasized. The most it would show would be a meeting, at that a brief one.
No one has suggested that President Kennedy's assassination was planned at
Trescornia in 1959. At the same time, a meeting or an association, even minor,
between Ruby and Trafficante would not have been necessary for Ruby to have been
used by Trafficante to murder Oswald. (81) Indeed, it is likely that such a
direct contact would have been avoided by Trafficante if there had been a plan
to execute either the President or the President's assassin, but, since no such
plot could have been under consideration in 1959, there would not have been a
particular necessity for Trafficante-to avoid contact with Ruby in Cuba.
The committee investigated other aspects of Ruby's activities that might have
shown an association with organized crime figures. An extensive computer
analysis of his telephone toll records for the month prior to the President's
assassination revealed that he either placed calls to or received calls from a
number of individuals who may be fairly characterized as having been affiliated,
directly or indirectly, with organized crime. (82) These included Irwin Weiner a
Chicago bondsman well know as a frontman for organized crime and the Teamsters
Union;(83) Robert "Barney" Baker, a lieutenant of James R. Hoffa and associate
of several convicted organized crime executioners:(84) Nofio J. Pecora, a
lieutenant of Carlos Marcello, the Mafia boss in Louisiana (85) Harold
Tannenbaum, a New Orleans French Quarter nightclub manager who lived in a
trailer park owned
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by Pecora;(86) McWillie, the Havana gambler;(87) and Murray "Dusty" Miller, a
Teamster deputy of Hoffa and associate of various underworld figures.(88)
Additionally, the committee concluded that Ruby was also probably in telephonic
contact with Mafia executioner Lenny Patrick sometime during the summer of 1963.
(89) Although no such call was indicated in the available Ruby telephone
records, Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, told the Warren Commission that Ruby had
spoken more than once of having contacted Patrick by telephone during that
period. (90)
The committee found that the evidence surrounding the calls was generally
consistent--at least to the times of their occurrence--with the explanation that
they were for the purpose of seeking assistance in a labor dispute. (91) Ruby,
as the operator of two nightclubs, the Carousel and the Vegas, had to deal with
the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA), an entertainers union.(92) Ruby
did in fact have a history of labor problems involving his striptease
performers, and there was an ongoing dispute in the early 1960's regarding
amateur performers in Dallas area nightclubs.(93) Testimony to the committee
supported the conclusion that Ruby's phone calls were, by and large, related to
his labor troubles. (94) In light of the identity of some of the individuals,
however, the possibility of other matters being discussed could not be
dismissed.(95)
In particular, the committee was not satisfied with the explanations of three
individuals closely associated with organized crime who received telephone calls
from Ruby in October or November 1963. (96)
Weiner, the Chicago bondsman, refused to discuss his call from Ruby on October
26, 1963, with the FBI in 1964,(97) and he told a reporter in 1978 that the call
had nothing to do with labor problems.(98) In his executive session testimony
before the committee, however, Weiner stated that he had lied to the reporter,
and he claimed that he and Ruby had, in fact discussed a labor dispute. (99) The
committee was not satisfied with Weiner's explanation of his relationship with
Ruby. Weiner suggested Ruby was seeking a bond necessary to obtain an injunction
in his labor troubles, yet the committee could find no other creditable
indication that Ruby contemplated seeking court relief, nor any other
explanation for his having to go to Chicago for such a bond. (100)
Barney Baker told the FBI in 1964 that he had received only one telephone call
from Ruby (on Nov. 7, 1963) during which he had curtly dismissed Ruby's plea for
assistance in a nightclub labor dispure.(101) The committee established,
however, that Baker received a second lengthy call from Ruby on November 8.(102)
The committee found it hard to believe that Baker, who denied the conversation
ever took place, could have forgotten it. (103)
The committee was also dissatisfied with the explanation of a call Ruby made on
October 30, 1963, to the New Orleans trailer park office of Nofio J. Pecora, the
long-time Marcello lieutenant.(104) Pecora told the committee that only he would
have answered his phone and that he never spoke with Ruby or took a message from
him.(105) The committee considered the possibility that the call was actually
for Harold Tannenbaum, a mutual friend of Ruby and
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Pecora who lived in the trailer park, although Pecora denied he would have
relayed such a message. (106)
Additionally, the committee found it difficult to dismiss certain Ruby
associations with the explanation that they were solely related to his labor
problems. For example, James Henry Dolan, a Dallas AGVA representative, was
reportedly an acquaintance of both Carlos Marcello and Santos Trafficante.(107)
While Dolan worked with Ruby on labor matters, they were also allegedly
associated in other dealings, including a strong-arm attempt to appropriate the
proceeds of a one-night performance of a stage review at the Adolphus Hotel in
Dallas called "Bottoms Up." (108) The FBI, moreover, has identified Dolan as an
associate of Nofio Pecora. (109) The committee noted further that reported links
between AGVA and organized crime figures have been the subject of Federal and
State investigations that have been underway for years.5 (110) The committee's
difficulties in separating Ruby's AGVA contacts from his organized crime
connections was, in large degree, based on the dual roles that many of his
associates played. 6
In assessing the significance of these Ruby contacts, the committee noted, first
of all, that they should have been more thoroughly explored in 1964 when
memories were clearer and related records (including, but not limited to,
additional telephone toll records) were available. Further, while there may be
persuasive arguments against the likelihood that the attack on Oswald would have
been planned in advance on the telephone with an individual like Ruby, the
pattern of contacts did show that individuals who had the motive to kill the
President also had knowledge of a man who could be used to get access to Oswald
in the custody of the Dallas police. In Ruby, they also had knowledge of a man
who had exhibited a violent nature and who was in serious financial trouble. The
calls, in short, established knowledge and possible availability, if not actual
planning.
(2) Ruby and the Dallas Police Department. The committee also investigated the
relationship between Ruby and the Dallas Police Department to determine whether
members of the department might have helped Ruby get access to Oswald for the
purpose of shooting him.(111) Ruby had a friendly and somewhat unusual
relationship with the Dallas Police Department, both collectively and with
individual officers, but the committee found little evidence of any significant
influence by Ruby within the force that permitted him to engage in illicit
activities.(112) Nevertheless, Ruby's close relationship with one or more
members of the police force may have been a factor in his entry to the police
basement on November 24, 1963. (113)
Both the Warren Commission and a Dallas Police Department investigative unit
concluded that Ruby entered the police basement on November 24, 1963, between
11:17 a.m., when he apparently sent a telegram, and 11:21, when he shot Oswald,
via the building's Main Street ramp as a police vehicle was exiting, thereby
fortuitously
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creating a momentary distraction.(114) The committee, however, found that Ruby
probably did not come down the ramp,(115) and that his most likely route was an
alleyway located next to the Dallas Municipal Building and a stairway leading to
the basement garage of police headquarters. (116)
The conclusion reached by the Warren Commission that Ruby entered the police
basement via the ramp was refuted by the eyewitness testimony of every witness
in the relevant area only Ruby himself excepted. (117) It was also difficult for
the committee to reconcile the ramp route with the 55-second interval (derived
from viewings of the video tapes of the Oswald murder) from the moment the
police vehicle started up the ramp and the moment Ruby shot Oswald. (118) Ruby
would have had to come down the ramp after the vehicle went up, leaving him less
than 55 seconds to get down the ramp and kill Oswald. Even though the Warren
Commission and the Dallas police investigative unit were aware of substantial
testimony contradicting the ramp theory, (119) they arrived at their respective
conclusions by relying heavily on Ruby's own assertions and what they perceived
to be the absence of a plausible alternative route. (120)
The committee's conclusion that Ruby entered from the alley was supported by the
fact that it was much less conspicuous than the alternatives,(121) by the lack
of security in the garage area and along the entire route,(122) and by the
testimony concerning the security of the doors along the alley and stairway
route. (123) This route would also have accommodated the 4-minute interval from
Ruby's departure from a Western Union office near police headquarters at 11:17
a.m. to the moment of the shooting at 11:21.(124)
Based on a review of the evidence, albeit circumstantial, the committee believed
that Ruby's shooting of Oswald was not a spontaneous act, in that it involved at
least some premeditation.(125) Similarly, the Committee believed that it was
less likely that Ruby entered the police basement without assistance, even
though the assistance may have been provided with no knowledge of Ruby's
intentions. The assistance may have been in the form of information about plans
for Oswald's transfer or aid in entering the building or both.7 (126)
The committee found several circumstances significant in its evaluation of
Ruby's conduct. It considered in particular the selectively recalled and
self-serving statements in Ruby's narration of the events of the entire November
22-24 weekend in arriving at its conclusions. (127) It also considered certain
conditions and events. The committee was troubled by the apparently unlocked
doors along the stairway route and the removal of security guards from the area
of the garage nearest the stairway shortly before the shooting;(128) by a
Saturday night telephone call from Ruby to his closest friend, Ralph Paul, in
which Paul responded to something Ruby said by asking him if he was crazy;(129)
and by the actions and statements of several Dallas police officers,
particularly those present when Ruby was initially interrogated about the
shooting of Oswald. (130)
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There is also evidence that the Dallas Police Department withheld relevant
information from the Warren Commission concerning Ruby's entry to the scene of
the Oswald transfer.(131) For example, the fact that a polygraph test had been
given to Sergeant Patrick Dean in 1964 was never revealed to the Commission,
even though Dean was responsible for basement security and was the first person
to whom Ruby explained how he had entered the basement.(132) Dean indicated to
the committee that he had "failed" the test, but the committee was unable to
locate a copy of the actual questions, responses and results. (133)
(3) Other evidence relating to Ruby.---The committee noted that other Ruby
activities and movements during the period immediately following the
assassination--on November 22 and 23--raised disturbing questions. For example,
Ruby's first encounter with Oswald occurred over 36 hours before he shot him.
Ruby was standing within a few feet of Oswald as he was being moved from one
part of police headquarters to another just before midnight on November 22.(134)
Ruby testified that he had no trouble entering the building, and the committee
found no evidence contradicting his story. The committee was disturbed, however,
by Ruby's easy access to headquarters and by his inconsistent accounts of his
carrying a pistol. In an FBI interview on December 25, 1963, he said he had the
pistol during the encounter with Oswald late in the evening of November 22. But
when questioned about it by the Warren Commission, Ruby replied, "I will be
honest with you. I lied about it. It isn't so, I didn't have a gun." (135)
Finally, the committee was troubled by reported sightings of Ruby on Saturday,
November 23, at Dallas police headquarters and at the county jail at a time when
Oswald's transfer to the county facility had originally been scheduled. These
sightings, along with the one on Friday night, could indicate that Ruby was
pursuing Oswald's movements throughout the weekend.
The committee also questioned Ruby's self-professed motive for killing Oswald,
his story to the Warren Commission and other authorities that he did it out of
sorrow over the assassination. and sympathy for the President's widow and
children. Ruby consistently claimed there had been no other motive and that no
one had influenced his act. (136) A handwritten note by Ruby, disclosed in 1967,
however, exposed Ruby's explanation for the Oswald slaying as a fabricated legal
ploy. (137) Addressed to his attorney, Joseph Tonahill, it told of advice Ruby
had received from his first lawyer. Tom Howard, in 1963: "Joe, you should know
this. Tom Howard told me to say that I shot Oswald so that Caroline and Mrs.
Kennedy wouldn't have to come to Dallas to testify. OK?" (138)
The committee examined a report that Ruby was at Parkland Hospital shortly after
the fatally wounded President had been brought there on November 22, 1963. Seth
Kantor, a newsman then employed by Scripps-Howard who had known Ruby, later
testified to the Warren Commission that he had run into him at Parkland and
spoken with him briefly shortly before the President's death was announced.
(139) While the Warren Commission concluded that Kantor was mistaken.(14O) the
committee determined he probably was not. The committee was impressed by the
opinion of Burr W. Griffin, the
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Warren Commission counsel who directed the Ruby investigation and wrote the Ruby
section of the Warren report. Griffin told the committee he had come to believe,
in light of evidence subsequently brought out, that the Commission conclusion
about Kantor's testimony was wrong.(141)
Subsequent to Ruby's apprehension, he was given a polygraph examination by the
FBI in which he denied that he had been involved with any other person in
killing Oswald, or had been involved in any way in the assassination of
President Kennedy.(142) The Warren Commission stated it did not rely on this
examination in drawing conclusions, although it did publish a transcript of the
examination.(143) The FBI in 1964 also expressed dissatisfaction with the
test,(144) based on the circumstances surrounding its administration. A panel of
polygraph experts reviewed the examination for the committee and concluded that
it was not validly conducted or interfered.(145) Because there were numerous
procedural errors made during the test, the committee's panel was unable to
interpret the examination.(146)
Finally, the committee analyzed the finances of Ruby and of his family to
determine if there was any evidence of financial profit from his killing of the
accused assassins.(147) It was an analysis the Warren Commission could not
perform so soon after the assassination. (148) Some financial records, including
tax returns, could not be legally obtained by the committee without great
difficulty, and others no longer existed. (149) Nevertheless, on the basis of
the information that it did obtain, the committee uncovered no evidence that
Ruby or members of his family profired from the killing of Oswald. (150)
Particular allegations concerning the increased business and personal incomes of
Ruby's brother Earl were investigated, but the committee found no link between
Earl Ruby's finances and the Oswald slaying. (151) Earl Ruby did say he had been
approached by the Chicago bondsman and associate of organized crime figures,
Irwin Weiner, who made a business proposition to him in 1978. the day before
Earl Ruby was to testify before the committee. (152) Earl Ruby said he declined
the offer,(153) while Weiner denied to the committee he ever made it. (154) The
committee was not able to resolve the difference between the two witnesses.
(4) Involvement of organized crime.---In contrast to the Warren Commission, the
committee's investigation of the possible involvement of organized crime in the
assassination was not limited to an examination of Jack Ruby. The committee also
directed its attention to organized crime itself.
Organized crime is a term of many meanings. It can be used to refer to the
crimes committed by organized criminal groups--gambling, narcotics,
loan-sharking, theft and fencing, and the like.(155) It can also be used to
refer to the criminal group that commit those crimes. (156) Here, a distinction
may be drawn between an organized crime enterprise that engages in providing
illicit goods and services and an organized crime syndicate that regulates
relations between individual enterprises--allocating territory, settling
personal disputes, establishing gambling payoffs, etc. (157) Syndicates, too,
are of different types. They may be metropolitan, regional, national or interna-
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tional in scope; they may be limited to one field of endeavor--for example,
narcotics- or they may cover a broad range of illicit activities. (158).
Often, but not always, the term organized crime refers to a particular organized
crime syndicate, variously known as the Mafia or La Cosa Nostro,(159) and it is
in this sense that the committee has used the phrase. This organized crime
syndicate was the principal target of the committee investigation. (160)
The committee found that by 1964 the fundamental structure and operations of
organized crime in America had changed little since the early 1950's, when,
after conducting what was then the most extensive investigation of organized
crime in history, the Kefauver committee concluded:
1. There is a nationwide crime syndicate known as the Mafia, whose tentacles are
found in many large cities. It has international ramifications which appear most
clearly in connection with the narcotics traffic.
2. Its leaders are usually found in control of the most lucrative rackets in
their cities.
3. There are indications of a centralized direction and control of these
rackets, but leadership appears to be in a group rather than in a single
individual.
4. The Mafia is the cement that helps to bind the * * * syndicate of New York
and the * * * syndicate of Chicago as well as smaller criminal gangs and
individual criminals through the country.
5. The domination of the Mafia is based fundamentally on "muscle" and "murder."
The Mafia is a secret conspiracy against law and order which will ruthlessly
eliminate anyone who stands in the way of its success in any criminal enterprise
in which it is interested. It will destroy anyone who betrays its secrets. It
will use any means available--political influence, bribery., intimidation, et
cetera, to defeat any attempt on the part of law enforcement to touch its top
figures * * *. (161)
The committee reviewed the evolution of the national crime syndicate in the
years after the Kefauver committee and found continuing vitality, even more
sophisticated techniques, and an increased concern for the awareness by law
enforcement authorities of the danger it posed to the Nation. (162) In 1967,
after having conducted a lengthy examination of organized crime in the United
States, the President's Crime Commission offered another description of the
power and influence of the American underworld in the 1960's:
Organized crime is a society that seeks to operate outside
the control of the American people and their governments. It
involves thousands of criminals, working within structures
as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws
more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments.
Its actions are not impulsive but rather the result of intricate
conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining
control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge
profits.(163)
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An analysis by the committee revealed that the Kennedy administration brought
about the strongest effort against organized crime that had ever been
coordinated by the Federal Government.(164) John and Robert Kennedy brought to
their respective positions as President and Attorney General an unprecedented
familiarity with the threat of organized crime--and a commitment to prosecute
its leaders--based on their service as member and chief counsel respectively of
the McClellan Committee during its extensive investigation of labor racketeering
in the late 1950's. (165) A review of the electronic surveillance conducted by
the FBI from 1961 to 1964 demonstrated that members of La Cosa Nostra, as well
as other organized crime figures, were quite cognizant of the stepped-up effort
against them, and they placed responsibility for it directly upon President
Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy. (166)
During this period, the FBI had comprehensive electronic coverage of the major
underworld figures, particularly those who comprised the commission. 8(167) The
committee had access to and analyzed the product of this electronic coverage; it
reviewed literally thousands of pages of electronic surveillance logs that
revealed the innermost workings of organized crime in the United States. (168)
The committee saw in stark terms a record of murder, violence, bribery,
corruption, and an untold variety of other crimes. (169) Uniquely among
congressional committees, and in contrast to the Warren Commission, the
committee became familiar with the nature and scope of organized crime in the
years before and after the Kennedy assassination, using as its evidence the
words of the participants themselves.
An analysis of the work of the Justice Department before and after the tenure of
Robert Kennedy as Attorney General also led to the conclusion that organized
crime directly benefited substantially from the changes in Government policy
that occurred after the assassination. (170) That organized crime had the
motive, opportunity and means to kill the President cannot be questioned. (171)
Whether it did so is another matter.
In its investigation of the decisionmaking process and dynamics of organized
crime murders and intrasyndicate assassinations during the early 1960's. the
committee noted the extraordinary web of insulation, secrecy, and complex
machinations that frequently surrounded organized crime leaders who ordered such
acts.(172) In testimony before the Senate on September 25, 1963, 2 months before
his brother's assassination, Attorney. General Kennedy spoke of the Government's
continuing difficulty in solving murders carried out by organized crime
elements, particularly those ordered by members of the La Cosa Nostra
commission. Attorney General Kennedy testified that:
* * * because the members of the Commission, the top mem-
bers, or even their chief lieutenants, have insulated themselves
from the crime itself, if they want to have somebody knocked
off, for instance, the top man will speak to somebody who will
speak to somebody else who will speak to somebody else and
order it. The man who actually does the gun work, who might
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get paid $250 or $500, depending on how important it is, perhaps nothing at all
he does not know who ordered it. To trace that back is virtually impossible.
(173)
The committee studied the Kennedy assassination in terms of the traditional
forms of violence used by organized crime and the historic pattern of underworld
slayings. While the murder of the President's accused assassin did in fact fit
the traditional pattern--a shadowy man with demonstrable organized crime
connections shoots down a crucial witness--the method of the President's
assassination did not resemble the standard syndicate killing.(174) A person
like Oswald-young, active in controversial political causes, apparently not
subject to the internal discipline of a criminal organization--would appear to
be the least likely candidate for the role of Mafia hit man, especially in such
an important murder. Gunmen used in organized crime killings have traditionally
been selected with utmost deliberation and care, the most important
considerations being loyalty and a willingness to remain silent if apprehended.
These are qualities best guaranteed by past participation in criminal
activities. (175)
There are, however, other factors to be weighed in evaluating the method of
possible operation in the assassination of President Kennedy. While the
involvement of a gunman like Oswald does not readily suggest organized crime
involvement, any underworld attempt to assassinate the President would in all
likelihood have dictated the use of some kind of cover, a shielding or disguise.
(176) The committee made the reasonable assumption that an assassination of a
President by organized crime could not be allowed to appear to be what it was.
Traditional organized crime murders are generally committed through the use of
killers who make no effort to hide the fact that organized crime was responsible
for such murders or "hits."(177) While syndicate-authorized hits are usually
executed in such a way that identification of the killers is not at all likely,
the slayings are nonetheless committed in what is commonly referred to as the
"gangland style."(178) Indeed, an intrinsic characteristic of the typical mob
execution is that it serves as a self-apparent message, with the authorities and
the public readily perceiving the nature of the crime as well as the general
identity of the group or gang that carried it out.(179)
The execution of a political leader--most particularly a President would hardly
be a typical mob execution and might well necessitate a different method of
operation. THe overriding consideration in such an extraordinary crime would be
the avoidance of any appearance of
organized crime complicity. (180)
In its investigation, the committee noted three cases, for the purposes of
illustration, in which the methodology employed by syndicate figures was
designed to insulate and disguise the involvement of organized crime. (181)
These did not fit the typical pattern of mob killings, as the assassination of a
President would not. (182) While the a typical cases did not involve political
leaders, two of the three were attacks on figures in the public eye. (183)
In the first case, the acid blinding of investigative reporter Victor Riesel in
April 1956, organized crime figures in New York used a complex series of
go-betweens to hire a petty thief and burglar to
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commit the act. (184) Thus, the assailant did not know who had actually
authorized the crime for which he had been recruited. (185) The use of such an
individual was regarded as unprecedented, as he had not been associated with the
syndicate, was a known drug user, and outwardly appeared to be unreliable.(186)
Weeks later, Riesel's assailant was slain by individuals who had recruited him
in the plot. (187)
The second case, the fatal shooting of a well-known businessman, Sol Landie, in
Kansas City, Mo., on November 22, 1970, involved the recruitment, through
several intermediaries, of four young Black men by members of the local La Cosa
Nostra family.(188) Landie had served as a witness in a Federal investigation of
gambling activities directed by Kansas City organized crime leader Nicholas
Civella. The men recruited for the murder did not know who had ultimately
ordered the killing, were not part of the Kansas City syndicate, aug had
received instructions through intermediaries to make it appear that robbery was
the motive for the murder. (189) All of the assailants and two of the
intermediaries were ultimately convicted.
The third case, the shooting of New York underworld leader Joseph Columbo before
a crowd of 65,000 people in June 1971, was carried out by a young Black man with
a petty criminal record, a nondescript loner who appeared to be alien to the
organized crime group that had recruited him through various go-betweens.(190)
The gunman was shot to death immediately after the shooting of Columbo, a murder
still designated as unsolved. (191) (Seriously wounded by a shot to the head,
Columbo lingered for years in a semiconscious state before he died in 1978.)
The committee found that these three cases, each of which is an exception to the
general rule of organized crime executions, had identifiable similarities.(192)
Each case was solved, in that the identity of the perpetrator of the immediate
act became known. (193) In two of the cases, the assailant was himself murdered
soon after the crime.(194) In each case, the person who wanted the crime
accomplished recruited the person or persons who made the attack through more
than one intermediary.(195) In each case, the person suspected of inspiring the
violence was a member of, or connected to, La Cosa Nostro. (196) In each Case,
the person or persons hired were not professional killers, and they were not
part of organized criminal groups. (197) In each case, the persons recruited to
carry out the acts could be characterized as dupes or tools who were being used
in a conspiracy they were not fully aware of. (198) In each case, the intent was
to insulate the organized crime connection, with a particular requirement for
disguising the true identity of the conspirators, and to place the blame on
generally nondescript individuals. (199) These exceptions to the general rule of
organized crime violence made it impossible for the committee to preclude, on
the basis of an analysis of the method of the assassination, that President
Kennedy was killed by elements of organized crime. (200)
In its investigation into the possibility that organized crime elements were
involved in the President's murder, the committee examined various internal and
external factor that bear on whether organized crime leaders would have
considered, planned and executed an assas-
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sination conspiracy. (201) The committee examined the decisionmaking process
that would have been involved in such a conspiracy, and two primary propositions
emerged. (202) The first related to whether the national crime syndicate would
have authorized and formulated a conspiracy with the formal consent of the
commission, the ruling council of Mafia leaders. (203) The second related to
whether an individual organized crime leader, or possibly a small combination of
leaders, might have conspired to assassinate the President through unilateral
action, that is, without the involvement of the leadership of the national
syndicate. (204)
The most significant evidence that organized crime as an institution or group
was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy was contained in the
electronic surveillance of syndicate leaders conducted by the FBI in the early
1960's. (205) As the President's Crime Commission noted in 1967, and as this
committee found through its review of the FBI surveillance, there was a distinct
hierarchy and structure to organized crime. (206) Decisions of national
importance were generally made by the national commission, or at least they
depended on the approval of the commission members. (207) In 1963, the following
syndicate leaders served as members of the commission: Vito Genovese, Joseph
Bonanno, Carlo Gambino, and Thomas Lucchese of New York City; Stefano Magaddino
of Buffalo; Sam Giancana of Chicago; Joseph Zerilli of Detroit; Angelo Bruno of
Philadelphia and Raymond Patriarca of Providence. (208) The committee's review
of the surveillance transcripts and logs, detailing the private conversations of
the commission members and their associates, revealed that there were extensive
and heated discussions about the serious difficulties the Kennedy
administration's crackdown on organized crime was causing. (209)
The bitterness and anger with which organized crime leaders viewed the Kennedy
administration are readily apparent in the electronic surveillance transcripts,
with such remarks being repeatedly made by commission members Genovese,
Giancana, Bruno, Zerilli, Patriarca and Magaddino.(210) In one such conversation
in May 1962, a New York Mafia member noted the intense Federal pressure upon the
mob, and remarked, "Bob Kennedy won't stop today until he puts us all in jail
all over the country. Until the commission meets and puts its foot down, things
will be at a standstill."(211) Into 1963, the pressure was continuing to mount,
as evidenced by a conversation in which commission member Magaddino bitterly
cursed Attorney General Kennedy and commented on the Justice Department's
increasing knowledge of the crime syndicates inner workings, stating, "They know
everything under the sun. They know who's back of it--they know there is a
commission. We got to watch right now--and stay as quiet as possible." (212)
While the committee's examination of the electronic surveillance program
revealed no shortage of such conversations during that period, the committee
found no evidence in the conversations of the formulation of any specific plan
to assassinate the President. (213) Nevertheless, that organized crime figures
did discuss possible violent courses of action against either the President or
his brother, Attorney Gen-
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eral Robert F. Kennedy--as well as the possible repercussions of such action-can
be starkly seen in the transcripts.(214)
One such discussion bears quoting at length. It is a conversation between
commission member Angelo Bruno of Philadelphia and an associate Willie Weisburg,
on February 8, 1962. (215) In the discussion, in response to Weisburg's heated
suggestion that Attorney General Kennedy should be murdered, Bruno cautioned
that Kennedy might be followed by an even worse Attorney General:
WEISBURG. See what Kennedy done. With Kennedy, a guy should take a knife, like
all them other guys, and stab and kill the [obscenity], where he is now.
Somebody should kill the [obscenity], I mean it. This is true. Honest to God.
It's about time to go. But I tell you something. I hope I git a week's notice,
I'll kill. Right in the [obscenity] in the White House. Somebody's got to rid of
this [obscenity].
BRUNO. Look, Willie, do you see there was a king, do you understand. And he
found out that everybody was saying that he was a bad king. This is an old
Italian story. So, he figured. Let me go talk to the old woman. She knows
everything. So he went to the old wise woman. So he says to her: "I came here
because I want your opinion." He says: "Do you think I'm a bad king? She says:
"No, I think you are a good king." He says: "Well how can everybody says I'm a
bad king?" She says: "Because they are stupid. They don't know." He says: Well
how come, why do you say I'm a good king?" "Well," she said, "I knew your great
grandfather. He was a bad king. I knew your grandfather. He was worse. I knew
your father. He was worse than them. You, you are worse than them, but your son,
if you die, your son is going to be worse than you. So its better to be with
you." [All laugh.] So Brownell--former Attorney General--was bad. He was no
[obscenity] good. He was this and that.
WEISBURG. Do you know what this man is going to do? He ain't going to leave
nobody alone.
BRUNO. I know he ain't. But you see, everybody in there was bad. The other guy
was good because the other guy was worse. Do you understand? Brownell came. He
was no good. He was worse than the guy before.
WEISBURG. Not like this one.
BRUNO. Not like this one. This one is worse. right? If something happens to this
guy * * *[laughs]. (216)
While Angelo Bruno had hoped to wait out his troubles, believing that things
might get better for him as time went by, such was not to be the case during the
Kennedy administration. The electronic surveillance transcripts disclosed that
by mid 1963, Bruno was privately making plans to shut down his syndicate
operations and leave America, an unprecedented response by a commission member
to Federal law enforcement pressure.(217)
Another member of the mob commission, Stefano Magaddino, voiced similar anger
toward the President during that same period. (218) In October 1963, in response
to a Mafia family member's
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remark that President Kennedy "should drop dead," Magaddino exploded, "They
should kill the whole family, the mother and father too. When he talks he talks
like a mad dog, he says, my brother the Attorney General." (219)
The committee concluded that had the national crime syndicate, as a group, been
involved in a conspiracy to kill the President. some trace of the plot would
have been picked uD by the FBI surveillance of the commission. (220)
Consequently, finding no evidence in the electronic surveillance transcripts of
a specific intention or actual plan by commission members to have the President
assassinated, the committee believed it was unlikely that it existed. The
electronic surveillance transcripts included extensive conversations during
secret meetings of various syndicate leaders, set forth many of their most
closely guarded thoughts and actions, and detailed their involvement in a
variety of other criminal acts, including murder.(221) Given the far-reaching
possible consequences of an assassination plot by the commission, the committee
found that such a conspiracy would have been the subject of serious discussion
by members of the commission, and that no matter how guarded such discussions
might have been, some trace of them would have emerged from the surveillance
coverage. (222) It was possible to conclude, therefore, that it is unlikely that
the national crime syndicate as a group, acting under the leadership of the
commission, participated in the assassination of President Kennedy.(223)
While there was an absence of evidence in the electronic surveillance materials
of commission participation in the President's murder, there was no shortage of
evidence of the elation and relief of various commission members over his
death.(224) The surveillance transcripts contain numerous crude and obscene
comments by organized crime leaders, their lieutenants, associates and families
regarding the assassination of President Kennedy.(225) The transcripts also
reveal an awareness by some mob leaders that the authorities might be watching
their reactions. (226) On November 25, 1963, in response to a lieutenant's
remark that Oswald "was an anarchist * * * a Marxist Communist," Giancana
exclaimed, "He was a marksman who knew how to shoot."(227) On November 29, 1963,
Magaddino cautioned his associates not to joke openly about the President's
murder, stating, "You can be sure that the police spies will be watching
carefully to see what we think and say about this." (228) Several weeks later,
during a discussion between Bruno and his lieutenants, one participant remarked
of the late President, "It is too bad his brother Bobby was not in that car
too."(229)
While the committee found it unlikely that the national crime syndicate was
involved in the assassination, it recognized the possibility that a particular
organized crime leader or a small combination of leaders, acting unilaterally,
might have formulated an assassination conspiracy without the consent of the
commission. (230)
In its investigation of the national crime syndicate, the committee noted
factors that could have led an organized crime leader who was considering an
assassination to withold it from the national commission.(231) The committee's
analysis of the national commission disclosed that it was splintered by
dissension and enmity in 1963. Rivalry between two blocks of syndicate families
had resulted in a partial paralysis of the commission's functions. (232)
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One significant reason for the disarray was, of course, the pressure being
exerted by Federal law enforcement agencies. (233) In the fall of 1963, Attorney
General Kennedy noted,
* * * in the past 2 years, at least three carefully planned commission meetings
had to be called off because the leaders learned that we had uncovered their
well-concealed plans and meeting places.
The Government's effort got an unprecedented boost from the willingness of
Joseph Valachi, a member of the "family" of commission member Vito Genovese of
New York, to testify about the internal structure and activities of the crime
syndicate, a development described by Attorney General Kennedy as "the greatest
intelligence breakthrough" in the history of the Federal program against
organized crime. (234) While it was not until August 1963 that Valachi's
identity as a Federal witness became public, the surveillance transcripts
disclose that syndicate leaders were aware as early as the spring of 1963 that
Valachi was cooperating with the Justice Department.(235) The transcripts
disclose that the discovery that Valachi had become a Federal informant aroused
widespread suspicion fear over the possibility of other leaks and informants
within the upper echelons of the syndicate. (236) The televised Senate testimony
by Valachi led to considerable doubt by syndicate leaders in other parts of the
country as to the security of commission proceedings, with Genovese rapidly
losing influence as a result of Valachi's actions. (237)
The greatest source of internal disruption within the commission related to the
discovery in early 1963 of a secret plan by commission member Joseph Bonanno to
assassinate fellow members Carlo Gambino and Thomas Lucchese. (238) Bonanno's
assassination plan, aimed at an eventual takeover of the commission leadership,
was discovered after one of the gunmen Bonanno had enlisted, Joseph Columbo,
informed on him to the commission. (239) The Bonanno conspiracy, an unheard-of
violation of commission rules, led to a long series of acrimonious deliberations
that lasted until early 1964. (240) Bonanno refused to submit to the judgment of
the commission, and his colleagues were sharply divided over how to deal with
his betrayal, Gambino recommending that Bonanno be handled with caution, and
Giancana urging that he be murdered.(241)
The committee concluded, based on the state of disruption within the commission
and the questions that had arisen as to the sanctity of commission proceedings,
that an individual organized crime leader who was planning an assassination
conspiracy against President Kennedy might well have avoided making the plan
known to the commission or seeking approval for it from commission members.
(242) Such a course of unilateral action seemed to the committee to have been
particularly possible in the case of powerful organized crime leaders who were
well established, with firm control over their jurisdictions.(243)
The committee noted a significant precedent for such a unilateral course of
action. In 1957, Vito Genovese engineered the assassination of Albert Anastasia,
then perhaps the most feared Mafia boss in the country. (244) Six months
earlier, Genovese's men had shot and wounded Frank Costello, who once was
regarded as the single most influential
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organized crime leader.(245) Both the Anastasia assassination and the Costello
assault were carried out without the knowledge or consent of the national
commission.(246) Genovese did, however, obtain approval for the crimes after the
fact. (247) It was an extraordinary sequence of events that Attorney General
Kennedy noted in September 1963, when he stated that Genovese "* * * wanted
Commission approval for these acts--which he has received." The Genovese plot
against Anastasia and Costello and the ex post facto commission approval were
integral events in the rise to dominance of organized crime figures for the
years that followed. It directly led to the assemblage of national syndicate
leaders at the Apalachin conference 3 weeks after the Anastasia murder, and to
the rise of Carlo Gambino to a position of preeminence in La Costa Nostra. (248)
(5) Analysis of the 1963-64 investigation--In its investigation, the committee
learned that fears of the possibility that organized crime was behind the
assassination were more common among Government officials at the time than has
been generally recognized. Both Attorney General Kennedy and President Johnson
privately voiced suspicion about underworld complicity.(249) The Attorney
General requested that any relevant information be forwarded directly to him,
and there was expectation at the time that the recently created Warren
Commission would actively investigate the possibility of underworld involvement.
(250)
The committee found, however, that the Warren Commission conducted only a
limited pursuit of the possibility of organized crime complicity. (251) As has
been noted, moreover, the Warren Commission's interest in organized crime was
directed exclusively at Jack Ruby, and it did not involve any investigation of
the national crime syndicate in general, or individual leaders in
particular.(252) This was confirmed to the committee by J. Lee Rankin, the
Commission's general counsel, and by Burt W. Griffin, the staff counsel who
conducted the Ruby investigation. (253) Griffin testified before the committee
that "* * * the possibility that someone associated with the underworld would
have wanted to assassinate the President * * * [was] not seriously explored" by
the Warren Commission. (254)
The committee similarly learned from testimony and documentation that the FBI's
investigation of the President's assassination was also severely limited in the
area of possible organized crime involvement. While the committee found that the
Bureau was uniquely equipped, with the Special Investigative Division having
been formed 2 years earlier specifically to investigate organized crime, the
specialists and agents of that Division did not play a significant role in the
assassination investigation. (255) Former Assistant FBI Director Courtney Evans,
who headed the Special Investigative Division, told the committee that the
officials who directed the investigation never consulted him or asked for any
participation by his Division.(256) Evans recalled, "I know they sure didn't
come to me. We had no part in that that I can recall." (257) Al Staffeld, a
former FBI official who supervised the day-to-day operations of the Special
Investigative Division, told the committee that if the FBI's organized crime
specialists had been asked to participate, "We would have gone at it in every
damn way possible."(258)
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Ironically, the Bureau's own electronic surveillance transcripts revealed to the
committee a conversation between Sam Giancana and a lieutenant, Charles English,
regarding the FBI's role in investigating President Kennedy's assassination.
(259). In the December 3, 1963 conversation, English told Giancana:"I will tell
you something, in another 2 months from now, the FBI will be like it was 5 years
ago. They won't be around no more. They say the FBI will get it (the
investigation of the President's assassination). They're gonna start running
down Fair Play for Cuba, Fair Play for Matsu. They call that more detrimental to
the country than us guys."(260)
The committee found that the quality and scope of the investigation into the
possibility of an organized crime conspiracy in the President's assassination by
the Warren Commission and the FBI was not sufficient to uncover one had it
existed. The committee also found that it was possible, based on an analysis of
motive, means and opportunity, that an individual organized crime leader, or a
small combination of leaders, might have participated in a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy. The committee's extensive investigation led it to
conclude that the most likely family bosses of organized crime to have
participated in such a unilateral assassination plan were Carlos Marcello and
Santos Trafficante. (261) While other family bosses on the commission were
subjected to considerable coverage in the electronic surveillance program, such
coverage was never applied to Marcello and almost never to Trafficante. (262)
(6) Carlos Marcello.--The committee found that Marcello had the motive, means
and opportunity to have President John F. Kennedy assassinated, (263) though it
was unable to establish direct evidence of Marcello's complicity.
In its investigation of Marcello, the committee identified the presence of one
critical evidentiary element that was lacking with the other organized crime
figures examined by the committee: credible associations relating both Lee
Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby to figures having a relationship, albeit tenuous,
with Marcello's crime family or organization. (264) At the same time, the
committee explicitly cautioned: association is the first step in conspiracy; it
is not identical to it, and while associations may legitimately give rise to
suspicions, a careful distinction must always be drawn between suspicions
suspected and facts found.
As the long-time La Cosa Nostra leader in an area that is based in New Orleans
but extends throughout Louisiana and Texas, Marcello was one of the prime
targets of Justice Department efforts during the Kennedy administration.(265) He
had, in fact, been temporarily removed from the country for a time in 1961
through deportation proceedings personally expedited by Attorney General
Kennedy. (266) In his appearance before the committee in executive session,
Marcello exhibited an intense dislike for Robert Kennedy because of these
actions, claiming that he had been illegally "kidnaped"by Government agents
during the deportation. (267)
While the Warren Commission devoted extensive attention to Oswald's background
and activities, the committee uncovered significant details of his. exposure to
and contacts with figures associated
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with the underworld of New Orleans that apparently had escaped the
Commission.(268) One Such relationship actually extended into Oswald's own
family through his uncle, Charles "Dutz" Murret, a minor underworld gambling
figure.(269) The committee discovered that Murret, who served as a surrogate
father of sorts throughout much of Oswald's life in New Orleans, was in the
1940's and 1950's and possibly until his death in 1964: an associate of
significant organized crime figures affiliated with the Marcello organization.
(270)
The committee established that Oswald was familiar with his uncle's underworld
activities and had discussed them with his wife, Marina, in 1963.(271)
Additionally, the committee found that Oswald's mother, Marguerite Oswald, was
acquainted with several men associated with lieutenants in the Marcello
organization. One such acquaintance, who was also an associate of Dutz Murret,
reportedly served as a personal aide or driver to Marcello at one time. (272) In
another instance, the committee found that an individual connected to Dutz
Murret, the person who arranged bail for Oswald following his arrest in August
1963 for a street disturbance, was an associate of two of Marcello's syndicate
deputies. (One of the two, Nofio Pecora, as noted, also received a telephone
call from Ruby on October 30, 1963, according to the committee's computer
analysis of Ruby's phone records.) (273)
During the course of its investigation, the committee developed several areas of
credible evidence and testimony indicating a possible association in New Orleans
and elsewhere between Lee Harvey Oswald and David W. Ferrie, a private
investigator and even, perhaps, a pilot for Marcello before and during
1963.(274) From the evidence available to the committee, the nature of the
Oswald-Ferrie association remained largely a mystery. The committee established
that Oswald and Ferrie apparently first came into contact with each other during
Oswald's participation as a teenager in a Civil Air Patrol unit for which Ferrie
served as an instructor, although Ferrie, when he was interviewed by the FBI
after his detainment as a suspect in the assassination,(275) denied any past
association with Oswald.
In interviews following the assassination, Ferrie stated that he may have spoken
in an offhand manner of the desirability of having President Kennedy shot, but
he denied wanting such a deed actually to be done.(276) Ferrie also admitted his
association with Marcello and stated that he had been in personal contact with
the syndicate leader in the fall of 1963. He noted that on the morning of the
day of the President's death he was present with Marcello at a courthouse in New
Orleans. (277) In his executive session testimony before the committee, Marcello
acknowledged that Ferrie did work for his lawyer, G. Wray Gill, on his case, but
Marcello denied that Ferrie worked for him or that their relationship was close.
(278) Ferrie died in 1967 of a ruptured blood vessel at the base of the brain,
shortly after he was named in the assassination investigation of New Orleans
District Attorney Jim Garrison.
The committee also confirmed that the addresses. 544 Camp Street, that Oswald
had printed on some Fair Play for Cuba Committee handouts in New Orleans, was
the address of a small office building
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where Ferrie was working on at least a part-time basis in 1963. The Warren
Commission stated in its report that despite the Commission's probe into why
Oswald used this return address on his literature, "investigation has indicated
that neither the Fair Play for Cuba Committee nor Lee Oswald ever maintained an
office at that address." (280)
The committee also established associations between Jack Ruby and several
individuals affiliated with the underworld activities of Carlos Marcello. (281)
Ruby was a personal acquaintance of Joseph Civello, the Marcello associate, who
allegedly headed organized crime activities in Dallas; he also knew other
individuals who have been linked with organized crime, including a New Orleans
nightclub figure, Harold Tannenbaum, with whom Ruby was considering going into
partnership in the fall of 1963. (282) 9
The committee examined a widely circulated published account that Marcello made
some kind of threat on the life of President Kennedy. in September 1962 at a
meeting at his Churchill Farms estate outside New Orleans.(284) It was alleged
that Marcello shouted an old Sicilian threat, "Livarsi na petra di la scarpa!"
"Take the stone out of my shoe!" against the Kennedy brothers, stating that the
President ways going to be assassinated. He spoke of using a "nut" to carry out
the murder. (285)
The committee established the origin of the story and identified the informant
who claimed to have been present at the meeting during which Marcello made the
threat.(286) The committee also learned that even though the FBI was aware of
the informant's allegations over a year and half before they were published in
1969, and possessed additional information indicating that the informant may in
fact have met with Marcello in the fall of 1962, a substantive investigation of
the information was never conducted. (287) Director Hoover and other senior FBI
officials were aware that FBI agents were initiating action to "discredit" the
informant, without having conducted a significant investigation of his
allegations. (288) Further, the committee discovered that the originating office
relied on derogatory information from a prominent underworld figure in the
ongoing effort to discredit the informant (289) An internal memorandum to Hoover
noted that another FBI source was taking action to discredit the informant, "in
order that the Carlos Marcello incident would be deleted from the book that
first recounted the information. (290)
The committee determined that the informant who gave the account of the Marcello
threat was in fact associated with various underworld figures, including at
least one person well-acquainted with the Marcello organization.(291) The
committee noted, however, that as a consequence of his underworld involvement,
the informant had a questionable reputation for honesty and may not be a
credible source of information. (292)
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The committee noted further that it is unlikely that an organized crime leader
personally involved in an assassination plot would discuss it with anyone other
than his closest lieutenants, although he might be wiping to discuss it more
freely prior to a serious decision to undertake such an act. In his executive
session appearance before the committee, Marcello categorically denied any
involvement in organized crime or the assassination of President Kennedy.
Marcello also denied ever making any kind of threat against the President's
life.(293)
As noted, Marcello was never the subject of electronic surveillance coverage by
the FBI. The committee found that the Bureau did make two attempts to effect
such surveillance during the early 1960's, but both attempts were
unsuccessful.(294) Marcello's sophisticated security system and close-knit
organizational structure may have been a factor in preventing such surveillance.
10 A former FBI official knowledgeable about the surveillance program told the
committee, "That was our biggest gap * * *. With Marcello, you've got the one
big exception in our work back then. There was just no way of penetrating that
area. He was too smart."(296)
Any evaluation of Marcello's possible role in the assassination must take into
consideration his unique stature within La Cosa Nostra. The FBI determined in
the 1960's that because of Marcello's position as head of the New Orleans Mafia
family (the oldest in the United States, having first entered the country in the
1880's), the Louisiana organized crime leader had been endowed with special
powers and privileges not accorded to any other La Cosa Nostra members. (297) As
the leader of "the first family" of the Mafia in America, according to FBI
information, Marcello has been the recipient of the extraordinary privilege of
conducting syndicate operations without having to seek the approval of the
national commission.(298)
Finally, a caveat, Marcello's uniquely successful carreer in organized crime has
been based to a large extent on a policy of prudence; he is not reckless. As
with the case of the Soviet and Cuban Governments, a risk analysis indicated
that he would be unlikely to undertake so dangerous a course of action as a
Presidential assassination. Considering that record of prudence, and in the
absence of direct evidence of involvement, it may be said that it is unlikely
that Marcello was in fact involved in the assassination of the President. On the
basis of the evidence available to it, and in the context of its duty to be
cautious in its evaluation of the evidence, there is no other conclusion that
the committee could reach. On the other hand, the evidence that he had the
motive and the evidence of links through associates to both Oswald and Ruby,
coupled with the failure of the 1963-64 investigation to explore adequately
possible conspiratorial activity in the assassination, precluded a judgment by
the committee that Marcello and his associates were not involved.
(7) Santos Trafficante.--The committee also concentrated .its attention on
Santos Trafficante, the La Cosa Nostra leader in Florida. The
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committee found that Trafficante, like Marcello, had the motive, means, and
opportunity to assassinate President Kennedy. (299)
Trafficante was a key subject of the Justice Department crackdown on organized
crime during the Kennedy administration, with his name being added to alist of
the top 10 syndicate leaders targeted for investigation. (300) Ironically,
attorney General Kennedy's strong interest in having Trafficante prosecuted
occurred during the same period in which CIA officials, unbeknownst to the
Attorney General, were using Trafficante's services in assassination plots
against the Cuban chief of state, Fidel Castro. (301)
The committee found that Santos Trafficante's stature in the national syndicate
of organized crime, notably the violent narcotics trade, and his role as the
mob's chief liaison to criminal figures within the Cuban exile community,
provided him with the capability of formulating an assassination conspiracy
against President Kennedy. Trafficante had recruited Cuban nationals to help
plan and execute the CIA's assignment to assassinate Castro. (The CIA gave the
assignment to former FBI Agent Robert Maheu, who passed the contract along to
Mafia figures Sam Giancana and John Roselli. They, in turn, enlisted Trafficante
to have the intended assassination carried out.) (302)
In his testimony before the committee, Trafficante admitted participating in the
unsuccessful CIA conspiracy to assassinate Castro, an admission indicating his
willingness to paracipate in political murder. (303) Trafficante testified that
he worked with the CIA out of a patriotic feeling for his country, an
explanation the committee did not accept, at least not as his sole motivation.
(304)
As noted, the committee established a possible connection between Trafficante
and Jack Ruby in Cuba in 1959. (305) It determined there had been a close
friendship between Ruby and Lewis McWillie, who, as a Havana gambler, worked in
an area subject to the control of the Trafficante Mafia family. (306) Further,
it assembled documentary evidence that Ruby made at least two, if not three or
more, trips to Havana in 1959 when McWillie was involved in underworld gambling
operations there. (307) Ruby may in fact have been serving as a courier for
underworld gambling interests in Havana, probably for the purpose of
transporting funds to a bank in Miami. (308)
The committee also found that Ruby had been connected with other Trafficante
associates--R. D. Matthews, Jack Todd, and James Dolan--all of Dallas. (309)
Finally, the committee developed corroborating evidence that Ruby may have met
with Trafficante at Trescornia prison in Cuba during one of his visits to Havana
in 1959, as the CIA had learned but had discounted in 1964. (310) While the
committee was not able to determine the purpose of the meeting, there was
considerable evidence that it did take place.(311)
During the course of its investigation of Santos Trafficante, the committee
examined an allegation that Trafficante had told a prominent Cuban exile, Jose
Aleman, that President Kennedy was going to be assassinated. (312) According to
Aleman, Trafficante made the statement in a private conversation with him that
took place sometime in September 1962. (313) In an account of the alleged
conversation pub-
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lished by the Washington Post in 1976, Aleman was quoted as stating that
Trafficante had told him that President Kennedy was "going to be hit." (314)
Aleman further stated, however, that it was his impression that Trafficante was
not the specific individual who was allegedly planning the murder. (315) Aleman
was quoted as having noted that Trafficante had spoken of Teamsters Union
President James Hoffa during the same conversation, indicating that the
President would "get what is coming to him" as a result of his administration's
intense efforts to prosecute Hoffa. (316)
During an interview with the committee in March 1977, Aleman provided further
details of his alleged discussion with Trafficante in September 1962.(317)
Aleman stated that during the course of the discussion, Trafficante had made
clear to him that he was not guessing that the President was going to be killed.
Rather he did in fact know that such a crime was being planned.(318) In his
committee interview, Aleman further stated that Trafficante had given him the
distinct impression that Hoffa was to be principally involved in planning the
Presidential murder. (319)
In September 1978, prior to his appearance before the committee in public
session. Aleman reaffirmed his earlier account of the alleged September 1962
meeting with Trafficante. Nevertheless, shortly before his appearance in public
session, Aleman informed the committee staff that he feared for his physical
safety and was afraid of possible reprisal from. Trafficante or his
organization. In this testimony, Aleman changed his professed understanding of
Trafficante's comments. Aleman repeated under oath that Trafficante had said
Kennedy was "going to be hit, but he then stated it was his impression that
Trafficante may have only meant the President was going to be hit by "a lot of
Republican votes" in the 1964 election, not that he was going to be
assassinated. (320)
Appearing before the committee in public session on September 28, 1978,
Trafficante categorically denied ever having discussed any plan to assassinate
President Kennedy. (321) Trafficante denied any foreknowledge of or
participation in the President's murder. (322) While stating that he did in fact
know Aleman and that he had met with him on more than one occasion in 1962,
Trafficante denied Aleman's account of their alleged conversation about
President Kennedy, and he denied ever having made a threatening remark against
the President.(323)
The committee found it difficult to understand how Aleman could have
misunderstood Trafficante during such a conversation, or why he would have
fabricated such an account. Aleman appeared to be a reputable person, who did
not seek to publicize his allegations, and he was well aware of the potential
danger of making such allegations against a leader of La Costa Nostra. The
committee noted, however, that Aleman's prior allegations and testimony before
the committee had made him understandably fearful for his life.
The committee also did not fully understand why Aleman waited so many years
before publicly disclosing the alleged incident. While he stated in 2976 that be
had reported Trafficante's alleged remarks about the President to FBI agents in
1962 and 1963, the committee's review
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of Bureau reports on his contacts with FBI agents did not reveal a record of any
such disclosure or comments at the time. (324) Additionally, the FBI agent who
served as Aleman's contact during that period denied ever being told such
information by Aleman.
Further, the committee found it difficult to comprehend why Trafticante, if-he
was planning or had personal knowledge of an assassination plot, would have
revealed or hinted at such a sensitive matter to Aleman. It is possible that
Trafficante may have been expressing a personal opinion, "The President ought to
be hit," but it is unlikely in the context of their relationship that
Trafficante would have revealed to Aleman the existence of a current plot to
kill the president. As previously noted with respect to Carlos Marcello, to have
attained his stature as the recognized organized crime leader of Florida for a
number of years. Trafficante necessarily had to operate in a characteristically
calculating and discreet manner. The relationship between Trafficante and
Aleman, a business acquaintance, does not seem to have been close enou for
Trafficante to have mentioned or alluded to such a murder plot. The committee
thus doubted that Trafficante would have inadvertently mentioned such a plot. In
sum, the committee believed there were substantial factors that called into
question the validity of Aleman's account.
Nonetheless, as the electronic surveillance transcripts of Angelo Bruno, Stefano
Magaddino and other top organized crime leaders make clear, there were in fact
various underworld conversations in which the desirability of having the
President assassinated was discussed. (325) There were private conversations in
which assassination was mentioned, although not in a context that indicated such
a crime had been specifically planned.(326) With this in mind, and in the
absence of additional evidence with-which to evaluate the Aleman account of
Trafficante's alleged 1962 remarks, the committee concluded that the
conversation, if it did occur as Aleman testified, probably occurred in such a
circumscribed context.
As noted earlier, the committee's examination of the FBI's electronic
surveillance program of the early 1960's disclosed that Santos Trafficante was
the subject of minimal, in fact almost nonexistent, surveillance coverage. (327)
During one conversation in 1963, overheard in a Miami restaurant, Trafficante
had bitterly attacked the Kennedy administration's efforts against organized
crime, making obscene comments about "Kennedy's right-hand man" who had recently
coordinated various raids on trafficante gambling establishments.(328) In the
conversation, Trafficante stated that he was under immense pressure from Federal
investigators, commenting "I know when I'm beat, you understand? (329)
Nevertheless, it was not possible to draw conclusions about Trafficante actions
based on the electromic surveillance program since the coverage was so limited.
Finally, as with Marcello, the committee noted that Trafficante's cautious
character is inconsistent with his taking the risk of being invovled in an
assassination plot against the President. The committee found, in the context of
its duty to be cautious in its evaluation of the evidence, that it is unlikely
that Trafficante plotted to kill the President, although it could not rule out
the possibility of such participation on the basis of available evidence.
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(8) James R. Hoffa--During the course of its investigation, the committee also
examined a number of areas of information and allegations pertaining to James R.
Hoffa and his Teamsters Union and underworld associates. The long and close
relationship between Hoffa and powerful leaders of organized crime, his intense
dislike of John and Robert Kennedy dating back to their role in the McClellan
Senate investigation, together with his other criminal activities, led the
committee to conclude that the former Teamsters Union president had the motive,
means and opportunity for planning an assassination attempt upon the life of
President John F. Kennedy.
The committee found that Hoffa and at least one of his Teamster lieutenants,
Edward Partin, apparently did, in fact, discuss the planning of an assassination
conspiracy against President Kennedy's brother, Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, in July or August of 1962.(330) Hoffa's discussion about such an
assassination plan first became known to the Federal Government in September
1962, when Partin informed authorities that he had recently participated in such
a discussion with the Teamsters president. (331)
In October 1962, acting under the orders of Attorney General Kennedy, FBI
Director Hoover authorized a detailed polygraph examination of Partin. (332) In
the examination, the Bureau concluded that Partin had been truthful in
recounting Hoffa's discussion of a proposed assassination plan.(333)
Subsequently, the Justice Department developed further evidence supporting
Partin's disclosures, indicating that Hoffa had spoken about the possibility of
assassinating the President's brother on more than one occasion. (334)
In an interview with the committee, Partin reaffirmed the account of Hoffa's
discussion of a possible assassination plan, and he stated that Hoffa had
believed that having the Attorney General murdered would be the most effective
way of ending the Federal Government's intense investigation of the Teamsters
and organized crime.(335) Partin further told the committee that he suspected
that Hoffa may have approached him about the assassination proposal because
Hoffa believed him to be close to various figures in Carlos Marcello's syndicate
organization.(336) Partin, a Baton Rouge Teamsters official with a criminal
record, was then a leading Teamsters Union official in Louisiana. Partin was
also a key Federal witness against Hoffa in the 1964 trial that led to Hoffa's
eventual imprisonment. (337)
While the committee did not uncover evidence that the proposed Hoffa
assassination plan ever went beyond its discussion, the committee noted the
similarities between the plan discussed by Hoffa in 1962 and the actual events
of November 22, 1963. While the committee was aware of the apparent absence of
any finalized method or plan during the course of Hoffa's discussion about
assassinating Attorney General Kennedy. he did discuss the possible use of a
lone gunman equipped with a rifle with a telescopic sight, (338) the
advisability of having the assassination committed somewhere in the South, (339)
as well as the potential desirability of having Robert Kennedy shot while riding
in a convertible. (34O) While the similarities are present, the committee also
noted that they were not so unusual as to point ineluctably in a particular
direction. President Kennedy himself, in fact, noted that he was vulnerable to
rifle fire before his Dallas trip. Nevertheless, references
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to Hoffa's discussion about having Kennedy assassinated while riding in a
convertible were contamed in several Justice Department memoranda received by
the Attorney General and FBI Director Hoover in the fall of 1962.(341) Edward
Partin told the committee that Hoffa believed that by having Kennedy shot as he
rode in a convertible, the origin of the fatal shot or shots would be obscured.
(342) The context of Hoffa's discussion with Partin about an assassination
conspiracy further seemed to have been predicated upon the recruitment of an
assassin without any identifiable connection to the Teamsters organization or
Hoffa himself.(343) Hoffa also spoke of the alternative possibility of having
the Attorney General assassinated through the use of some type of plastic
explosives. (344)
The committee established that President Kennedy himself was notified of Hoffa's
secret assassination discussion shortly after the Government learned of it. The
personal journal of the late President's friend, Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive
editor of the Washington Post, reflects that the President informed him in
February 1963 of Hoffa's discussion about killing his brother. (345) Bradlee
noted that President, Kennedy mentioned that Hoffa had spoken of the
desirability of having a silenced weapon used in such a plan. Bradlee noted that
while he found such a Hoffa discussion hard to believe "the President was
obviously serious" about it. (346)
Partly as a result of their knowledge of Hoffa's discussion of assassination
with Partin in 1962, various aides of the late President Kennedy voiced private
suspicions about the possibility of Hoffa complicity in the President's
assassination.(347) The committee learned that Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy and White House Chief of Staff Kenneth O'Donnell contacted several
associates in the days immediately following the Dallas murder to discuss the
possibility of Teamsters Union or organized crime involvement. (348)
As noted in the account of Ruby's telephone records, the committee confirmed the
existence of several contacts between Ruby and associates of Hoffa during the
period of October and November 1963,(349) including one Hoffa aide whom Robert
Kennedy had once described as one of Hoffa's most violent lieutenants. (350)
Those associates, Barney Baker, Irwin Weiner and Dusty Miller, stated that Ruby
had been in touch with them for the sole purpose of seeking assistance in a
nightclub labor dispute. (351)
The committee learned that Attorney General Kennedy and his aides arranged for
the appointment of Charles Shaffer, a Justice Department attorney, to the Warren
Commission staff in order that the possibility of Teamster involvement be
watched. Shaffer confirmed to the committee that looking into Hoffa was one
purpose of his appointment.(352)
Yet, partly as a result of the Commission's highly circumscribed approach to
investigating possible underworld involvement, as well as limited staff
resources, certain areas of possible information relating to Hoffa--such as the
Ruby telephone calls--were not the subject of in-depth investigation.(353)
Nevertheless, in a lengthy Commission memorandum prepared for the CIA in
February 1964, the Teamsters Union had been listed first on a list of potential
groups to be investigated in probing "ties between Ruby and others who might
have been interested in the assassination of President Kennedy." (354)
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During the course of its investigation, the committee noted the existence of
other past relationships between Ruby and associates of Hoffa, apart from those
disclosed by a review of the Ruby phone records. Two such figures were Paul
Dorfman, the Chicago underworld figure who was instrumental in Hoffa's rise to
power in the labor movement, and David Yaras, the reputed organized crime
executioner whose relationship to Ruby dated back to their early days in
Chicago. (355)
The committee also confirmed that another Teamsters official, Frank Chavez, had
spoken to Hoffa about murdering Robert Kennedy in early 1967, shortly before
Hoffa went to Federal prison. (356) During that incident, Hoffa reportedly
sharply rebuked his aide, telling him that such a course of action was dangerous
and should not be considered. (357)
In an interview with a newsman several weeks before his disappearance and
presumed murder, Hoffa denied any involvement in the assassination of President
Kennedy, and he disclaimed knowing anything about Jack Ruby or his motivations
in the murder of Oswald. Hoffa also denied that he had ever discussed a plan to
assassinate Robert Kennedy. (358)
As in the cases of Marcello and Trafficante, the committee stressed that it
uncovered no direct evidence that Hoffa was involved in a plot on the
President's life, much less the one that resulted in his death in Dallas in
November 1963. In addition, and as opposed to the cases of Marcello and
Trafficante, Hoffa was not a major leader of organized crime. Thus, his ability
to guarantee that his associates would be killed if they turned Government
informant may have been somewhat less assured. Indeed, much of the evidence
tending to incriminate Hoffa was supplied by Edward Grady Partin, a Federal
Government informant who was with Hoffa when the Teamster president was on trial
in October 1962 in Tennessee for violating the Taft-Hartley Act. 11
It may be strongly doubted, therefore, that Hoffa would have risked anything so
dangerous as a plot against the President at a time that he knew he was under
active investigation by the Department of Justice.12
Finally, a note on Hoffa's character. He was a man of strong emotions who hated
the President and his brother, the Attorney General. He did not regret the
President's death, and he said so publicly. Nevertheless, Hoffa was not a
confirmed murderer, as were various organized crime leaders whose involvement
the committee considered, and he cannot be placed in that category with them,
even though he had extensive associations with them. Hoffa's associations with
such organized crime leaders grew out of the nature of his union and the
industry whose workers it represented. Organized crime and the violence of the
labor movement were facts of life for Hoffa; they were part of the milieu in
which he grew up and worked. But when he encountered the only specific plot
against a Kennedy that came to the attention of the committee (the suggestion
from Frank Chavez), he rejected it.
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The committee concluded, therefore, that the balance of the evidence argued that
it was improbable that Hoffa had anything to do with the death of the President.
(c) Summary and analysis of the evidence
The committee also believed it appropriate to reflect on the general question of
the possible complicity of organized crime members, such as Trafficante or
Marcello, in the Kennedy assassination, and to try to put the evidence it had
obtained in proper perspective.
The significance of the organized crime associations developed by the
committee's investigation speaks for itself, but there are limitations that must
be noted. That President Kennedy's assassin and the man who, in turn, murdered
him can be tied to individuals connected to organized crime is important for one
reason: for organized crime to have been involved in the assassination, it must
have had access to Oswald or Ruby or both.
The evidence that has been presented by the committee demonstrates that Oswald
did, in fact, have organized crime associations. Who he was and where he lived
could have come to the attention of those in organized crime who had the motive
and means to kill the President. Similarly, there is abundant evidence that Ruby
was knowledgeable about and known to organized crime elements. Nevertheless, the
committee felt compelled to stress that knowledge or availability through
association falls considerably short of the sort of evidence that would be
necessary to establish criminal responsibility for a conspiracy in the
assassination. It is also considerably short of what a responsible congressional
committee ought to have before it points a finger in a legislative context.
It must also be asked if it is likely that Oswald was, in fact, used by an
individual such as Marcello or Trafficante in an organized crime plot. Here,
Oswald's character comes into play. As the committee noted, it is not likely
that Oswald was a hired killer; it is likely that his principal motivation in
the assassination was political. Further, his politics have been shown to have
been generally leftwing, as demonstrated by such aspects of his life as his
avowed support of Fidel Castro. Yet the organized crime figures who had the
motive and means to murder the President must be generally characterized as
rightwing and anti-Castro. Knitting these two contradictory strands together
posed a difficult problem. Either the assassination of President Kennedy was
essentially an apolitical act undertaken by Oswald with full or partial,
knowledge of who he was working for--which would be hard to believe--or Oswald's
organized crime contacts deceived him about their true identity and motivation,
or else organized crime was not involved.
From an organized crime member's standpoint, the use of an assassin with
political leanings inconsistent with his own would have enhanced his insulation
from identification with the crime. Nevertheless, it would have made the
conspiracy a more difficult undertaking, which raises questions about the
likelihood that such a conspiracy occurred. The more complicated a plot becomes,
the less likely it will work. Those who rationally set out to kill a king, it
may be argued, first design a plot that will work. The Oswald plot did in fact
work, at
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least for 15 years, but one must ask whether it would have looked workable 15
years ago. Oswald was an unstable individual. Shortly before the assassination,
for example, he delivered a possibly threatening note to the Dallas FBI office.
With his background, he would have been an immediate suspect in an assassination
in Dallas, and those in contact with him would have known that. Conspirators
could not have been assured that Oswald or his companion would be killed in
Dealey Plaza; they could not be sure that they could silence them. The plot,
because of Oswald's involvement, would hardly have seemed to be a low risk
undertaking.
The committee weighed other factors in its assessment of Oswald, his act and
possible co-conspirators. It must be acknowleged that he did, in the end,
exhibit s high degree of brutal proficiency in firing the shot that ended the
President's life, and that, as an ex-marine, that proficiency may have been
expected. In the final analysis, it must be admitted that he accomplished what
he set out to do.
Further, while Oswald exhibited a leftist political stance for a number of
years, his activities and associations were by no means exclusively leftwing.
His close friendship with George de Mohrenschildt, an oilman in Dallas with
rightwing connections, is a case in point. Additionally, questions have been
raised about the specific nature of Oswald's pro-Castro activities. It has been
established that on at least one occasion in 1963, he offered his services for
clandestine paramilitary actions against the Castro regime, though, as has been
suggested, he may have merely been posing as an anti-Castro activist.
That the evidence points to the possibility that Oswald was also associated in
1963 with David Ferrie, the Marcello operative who was openly and actively
anti-Castro, is troubling, too. Finally, the only Cuba-related activities that
have ever been established at 544 Camp Street, New Orleans, the address of an
office building that Oswald stamped on some of his Fair Play for Cuba Committee
handouts, were virulently anti-Castro in nature.
Thus, the committee was unable to resolve its doubts about Lee Harvey Oswald.
While the search for additional information in order to reach an understanding
of Oswald's actions has continued for 15 years, and while the committee
developed significant new details about his possible organized crime
associations, particularly in New Orleans, the President's assassin himself
remains not fully understood. The committee developed new information about
Oswald and Ruby, thus altering previous perceptions, but the assassin and the
man who murdered him still appear against a backdrop of unexplained, or at least
not fully explained, occurrences, associations and motivations.
The scientific evidence available to the committee indicated that it is probable
that more than one person was involved in the President's murder. That fact
compels acceptance. And it demands re-examination of all that was thought to be
true in the past. Further, the committee's investigation of Oswald and Ruby
showed a variety of relationships that may have matured into an assassination
conspiracy. Neither Oswald nor Ruby turned out to be "loners," as they had been
painted in the 1964 investigation. Nevertheless, the committee frankly
acknowledged that it was unable firmly to identify the other gunman or the
nature and extent of the conspiracy.
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5. THE SECRET SERVICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
As the symbolic leader of the Nation, the President means many things to many
people. His loss is keenly felt; it is a traumatic event. The President is also
more than the symbolic leader of the Nation; in fact, he holds both political
and military power, and his death is an occasion for its transfer. It was,
therefore, understandable that in foreign. and domestic speculation at the time
of President Kennedy's assassination, there was a suggestion of complicity by
agencies of the U.S. Government. This was one of the principal reasons for the
Warren Commission's creation.
With the publication of the Commission's report, the question was quieted, if
not completely stilled. Nevertheless, critics continued to imply that the Secret
Service, the FBI or the CIA had somehow been involved in the tragedy in Dallas,
and the Warren Commission itself came to be viewed by some as part of a
Government effort to conceal the truth. With the revelation of the illegal
domestic programs of the FBI and the foreign assassination plots of the CIA by
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities in 1976, speculation was rekindled that Government
itself may have been involved in the President's death.
The committee carefully considered various charges of Government complicity and
coverup. A major portion of its resources were devoted to examining a variety of
allegations directed at the Secret Service, the FBI, and the CIA as well as the
Warren Commission. As the investigation proceeded, the committee carefully
sought evidence that Government agents had foreknowledge of an assassination,
took advantage of it after the event, or afterwards covered up information
relevant to ascertaining the truth. The committee made a conscientious effort,
for example, to determine if the autopsy materials were authentic. Had they been
tampered with, it would have raised the most serious of questions. The committee
also carefully assessed the performance of the Secret Service in the planning
and execution of the Dallas trip for signs that it may have actively sought to
bring about the President's death. In addition, the committee carefully examined
the relationship, if any, that Lee Harvey Oswald might have had with various
governmental agencies, particularly the FBI and CIA. Over the years, there has
been speculation that. Oswald might have been an FBI informant or an agent of
the CIA. However Oswald is seen--patsy or perpetrator--his relationship to the
agencies of the Government was crucial to assessing the question of Government
complicity. If he had had a relationship with one or more of the agencies,
serious issues would be raised. If he had not, the question would be less
pressing.
(a) The Secret Service
The committee's investigation of alleged Secret Service complicity in the
assassination was primarily, although not, exclusively, concerned with two
questions. One, did the Secret Service facilitate the shooting by arranging a
motorcade route that went through the heart of downtown Dallas and past the
Texas School Book Depository? Two, did
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any Secret Service personnel engage in conduct at the site of the assassination
that might indicate complicity in the assassination? The committee's
investigation involved extensive file reviews, interviews, depositions, and
hearings. Former White House personnel, Secret Service agents, Dallas Police
Department officers, Texas public officials and private citizens who had
witnessed the assassination were interviewed or questioned. In addition,
relevant files and documents of former White House staff, the Secret Service,
and the Dallas Police Department pertaining to the planning of the motorcade
route were reviewed. These included the Secret Service's contingency plans for
the Dallas trip that set forth scheduling, security factors and related
considerations for the motorcade route.
(1) Connally testimony.---Governor John B. Connally testified at a public
hearing that he first heard of the possibility of a Presidential trip to Texas
during his gubernatorial campaign in the spring of 1962, when Vice President
Johnson told him the President wanted to make a fundraising visit to the State.
(1) Connally said he discussed the trip with the President himself in El Paso,
Tex., in June 1963, and in October he went to the White House to help formulate
plans.(2) According to former White House aides, President Kennedy expressed a
desire to make use of a motorcade during the trip,(3) since he had found it a
useful political instrument during his campaign for the Presidency. Further, the
Dallas luncheon engagement under discussion involved only a limited speaking
appearance, and Kennedy believed a motorcade would broaden his public exposure.
(4)
The decision to use a motorcade was opposed initially by Governor Connally, who
testified that he thought it would fatigue the President. (5) Frank Erwin,
executive secretary of the Texas Democratic Committee, also opposed the
motorcade, but for a different reason. He testified that because of Adlai
Stevenson's ugly confrontation with rightwing extremists only weeks earlier, he
was concerned about the possibility of a similar embarrassing and potentially
difficult situation.(6) These objections, however, were overruled by the White
House. (7)
(2) Choice of the motorcade route.--Once the motorcade decision was made, the
choice of a route was dependent more upon the selection of a site for the
President's luncheon speech than upon security considerations. The White House
staff at first favored the Dallas Women's Building near the Dallas County
Fairgrounds because its capacity was greater than that of the alternative site,
the Trade Mart, a commercial center with more limited facilities. (8) The White
House staff felt that the Women's Building would have permitted more of the
President's supporters to attend.
According to Jerry Bruno, a White House advance man, the route to the Women's
Building would have led the motorcade to proceed along Main Street eastward to
the Fairgrounds, which lay to the southeast of the business district. Access to
Main Street on the west side of Dealey Plaza would have been by a cloverleaf
from the expressway. Using this route, the motorcade would have proceeded at a
relatively high speed (40 to 50 mph) into Dealey Plaza and it would maintain
this speed until it reached the intersection of Main and Houston Streets where
crowds would have gathered. (9)Had it taken
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this route, the motorcade would not have passed directly in front of the Texas
School Book Depository at the slow (approximately 11 mph) speed that it did en
route to the Trade Mart.
In his testimony, Forrest Sorrels, the special agent-in-charge of the Dallas
Secret Service office in 1963, indicated that the Secret Service also preferred
the Women's Building as the luncheon site because, as a single story structure,
it would have been easier to secure than the Trade Mart.(10) For political
reasons, however, Governor Connally insisted on the Trade Mart,1 (11) and the
White House acquiesced to his wishes so it could avoid a dispute with the
Governor, whose assistance was needed to assure the political success of the
trip.
Accordingly, a motorcade to the Trade Mart was planned, and since the purpose of
the motorcade was to permit the President to greet well-wishers in downtown
Dallas, the route that was chosen was west along Main, right on Houston, then
left on Elm Street, proceeding past the book depository, and through Dealey
Plaza. Main Street, according to Governor Connally, had been the usual route for
ceremonial occasions,(13) such as a procession in 1936 although in the opposite
direction--in honor of President Roosevelt, the last President to have traveled
through Dallas in a motorcade.
While the Secret Service was consulted regarding alternative. luncheon sites,
its role in the ultimate decisionmaking process was secondary to that of
Governor Connally and the White House staff. (14) Similarly, once the actual
motorcade route had been set, also without significant Secret Service input, it
was the White House staff, not the Secret Service, who made the decision to
publish the route in Dallas newspapers. Presidential aides wanted to assure
maximum public exposure for President Kennedy. (15)
The committee found no evidence, therefore, suggesting that the selection of a
motorcade route involved. Secret Service complicity in a plot to assassinate the
President.2 (18)
(3) Allegation a Secret Service agent was on the grassy knoll.- After the
assassination, several witnesses stated they had seen or encountered Secret
Service agents behind the stockade fence situated on the grassy knoll area and
in the Texas School Book Depository. (19) Other witnesses reported Secret
Service agents leaving the motorcade and running to various locations in Dealey
Plaza. (20) Warren Commission critics have alleged that these Secret Service
agents either participated in the assassination itself or were involved in a
coverup of the evidence. (21)
None of the witnesses interviewed by the committee was able provide further
corroborating information concerning their original statementS. The majority,
however, indicated that they were mistaken in their original interpretation of
events.(22) Committee interviews or depositions with 11 of the 16 agents3 who
were on duty with the motorcade and with their supervisors produced evidence
that only one
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agent had left the motorcade at any time prior to the arrival at Parkland
Hospital. This agent, Thomas "Lem" Johns, had been riding in Vice President
Johnson's followup car. In an attempt to reach Johnson's limousine, he had left
the car at the sound of shots and was momentarily on his own in Dealey Plaza,
though he was picked up almost immediately and taken to Parkland Hospital.(23)
In every instance, therefore, the committee was able to establish the movement
and the activities of Secret. Service agents. Except for Dallas Agent-in-Charge
Sorrels, who helped police search the Texas School Book Depository, no agent was
in the vicinity of the stockade fence or inside the book depository on the day
of the assassination.(24)
Significantly, most of the witnesses who made identifications of Secret Service
personnel stated that they had surmised that any plain clothed individual in the
company of uniformed police officers must have been a Secret Service agent. (25)
Because the Dallas Police Department had numerous plainclothes detectives on
duty in the Dealey Plaza area,(26) the committee considered it possible that
they were mistaken for Secret Service agents.
One witness who did not base his Secret Service agent identification merely upon
observing a plainclothesman in the presence of uniformed police officers was
Dallas police officer Joseph M. Smith. Smith, who had been riding as a
motorcycle escort in the motorcade, ran up the grassy knoll immediately after
the shooting occurred. He testified to the Warren Commission that at that time
he encountered a man who stated that he was a Secret Service agent and offered
supporting credentials. Smith indicated that he did not examine these
credentials closely, and he then proceeded to search the area unsuccessfully for
suspicious individuals. (27)
The committee made an effort to identify the person who talked to Patrolman
Smith. FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty stated that Frank Ellsworth, then an
agent for the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of the Treasury Department,
had indicated that he had been in the grassy knoll area and for some reason had
identified himself to someone as a Secret Service agent. (28) The committee
deposed Ellsworth, who denied Hosty's allegation. (29)
The committee did obtain evidence that military intelligence personnel may have
identified themselves as Secret Service agents or that they might have been
misidentified as such. Robert E. Jones, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who in
1963 was commanding officer of the military intelligence region that encompassed
Texas, told the committee that from 8 to 12 military intelligence personnel in
plainclothes were assigned to Dallas to provide supplemental security for the
President's visit. He indicated that these agents had identification credentials
and, if questioned, would most likely have stated that they were on detail to
the Secret Service. (30)
The committee sought to identify these agents so that they could be questioned.
The Department of Defense, however, reported that a search of its files showed
"no records * * * indicating any Department of Defense Protective Services in
Dallas."(31) The committee was unable to resolve the contradiction.
(4) Conclusion.--Based on its entire investigation, the committee found no
evidence of Secret Service complicity in the assassination.
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(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation
In the weeks that followed the assassination, it was alleged in several
newspaper articles that Lee Harvey Oswald had been an FBI informant.
Consequently, the Warren Commission expended considerable effort addressing the
question. Testimony was taken from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Assistant to
the Director Alan H. Belmont, and FBI Special Agents John W. Fain, John L.
Quigley and James P. Hosty, Jr. (1) "All declared, in substance, that Oswald was
not an informant or agent of the FBI, and that he did not act in any other
capacity for the FBI, and that no attempt was made to recruit him in any
capacity." In addition, "Director Hoover and each Bureau agent, who according to
the FBI would have been responsible for or aware of any attempt to recruit
Oswald * * * provided the Commission with sworn affidavits to this effect."1
This testimony was corroborated by the Warren Commission's independent review of
FBI files. (3)
Nevertheless, the allegation that Oswald was associated in some capacity with
the FBI persisted. (4) There are three main reasons for this that may be traced
to actions by the Bureau.
First, Oswald's address book contained the name, address, telephone number and
automobile license plate number of Special Agent James P. Hoary. That entry has
been a source of controversy, especially since this information was not
contained in an FBI report to the Warren Commission in December 1963, one that
purportedly contained the contents of the address book.
Second, based on FBI contacts with Oswald in Fort Worth in 1962 and New Orleans
and Dallas in 1963, rumors that he was an informant for the Bureau continued to
circulate.
Third, shortly after the assassination, Dallas FBI agent Hosty destroyed a note
that had been delivered to his office allegedly by Oswald shortly before the
assassination. When that conduct was finally made public in 1975 it aroused
great suspicions, especially since it had not been previously revealed, even to
the Warren Commission. (5)
The committee attempted to investigate each of the alleged links between Oswald
and the FBI. It conducted extensive file reviews, interviews, depositions, and
hearings. Testimony was taken from present and former FBI officials and
employees as well as from private citizens claiming to have relevant
information. On occasion, formal explanations were sought directly from the FBI.
Even though the testimony of two special agents of the FBI appeared to be
seriously lacking credibility on two of the major issues (the destruction of the
Oswald note and the omission of Hosty's name from a report purporting to contain
a list of the entries in Oswald's notebook), the results of the committee's
investigation were consistent with the conclusions reached by the Warren
Commission. The committee found no credible evidence that Oswald was an FBI
informant.
(1) Early rumors that Oswald was an informant.--Shortly after the assassination
of President Kennedy, rumors that Oswald had been an
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FBI informant began to circulate. This allegation was discussed in articles by
Joseph C. Goulden, Alonzo Hudkins, and Harold Feldman, among others. (6) The
committee's review of these articles indicated that they set forth the rumors
and speculation concerning the informant issue, but they offered no direct
evidence supporting the allegation. Moreover, Hudkins admitted to the committee
that his involvement with the issue began when he and another newsman discussed
by telephone a mythical FBI payroll number for Oswald in order to test their
suspicion that they were under FBI surveillance. Hudkins told the committee that
he was subsequently contacted by the FBI and asked what he knew about Oswald's
alleged informant status, and that shortly afterward a newspaper article
appeared in which the FBI denied any relationship with Oswald. (7) Neither
Hudkins nor Goulden was able to give the committee any additional information
that would substantiate the informant allegation. (8) The committee was unable
to locate Feldman.
(2) The Hosty entry in Oswald's address book.-- After the assassination, Dallas
police found Oswald's address book among his possessions and turned it over to
the FBI in Dallas. It contained FBI Special Agent Hosty's name, address,
telephone number and car license plate number.(9) Dallas FBI agents recorded
some of the entries in the address book and, on December 23, 1963, sent a report
to the Warren Commission. This report, however, did not include the Hosty
entry.2 (10)
The committee's review of the December 23 report established in likelihood that
page 25 of that document, the page that logically would have contained the Hosty
entry had it been properly included,3 had been retyped. The page was numbered in
the upper left-hand corner, whereas all other pages of the report--save page 1,
the retyping of which had been clearly recorded--were numbered at the bottom
center. In addition, the horizontal margins of page 25 were unusually
wide.
The former special agent who had coordinated the FBI's Dallas investigation and
had submitted the December 23, 1963, report, testified in a committee executive
session that he had ordered the contents of Oswald's notebook transcribed for
the purpose of indicating any investigative leads. (11) The agent acknowledged
that page 25 of the report would have contained the Hosty entry had it been
included, and that both the numbering of that page and its unusually wide
horizontal margins indicated it had been retyped.(12) Nevertheless, he stated
that the page had not been retyped to mislead anyone, and indicated that the
only reason the Hosty entry had been omitted from his report was because the
original office memorandum setting out investigative leads generated from
Oswald's address book had failed to include it. (13)
A second special agent, the one who had prepared the original office memorandum
that was incorporated into the December 23, 1963, re-
----------------------------------
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port, testified that the Hosty entry had not been included because it was not
considered to be of significance as an investigative lead. (14) This agent
contended it had already been known that Hosty had called at the home of Ruth
and Michael Paine looking for Oswald prior to the assassination, so the entry of
his name and related data in Oswald's book would not have been of potential
evidentiary value. (15)
The committee did not accept the explanation that the Hosty entry was omitted
from the report because it was not of lead significance, since the FBI's
December 23, 1963, report included other entries from Oswald's address book that
clearly had no legal significance at the time. For example, by December 23, it
was generally known that the Oswalds had been living at the Paine home, yet the
Ruth Paine address book entry was included in the report. (16) Similarly, a
Robert W. Oswald entry that referred to Oswald's brother would not have been
significant as a lead at that time. (17) Numerous other examples could be given.
(18) Moreover, the agent who prepared the memorandum failed to include in it
several entries that he acknowledged could not automatically be dismissed as
lacking in lead significance (e.g., numbers and letters of the alphabet whose
meaning was not then known). (19)
Finally, in the December 23 report that was given to the Warren Commission, the
FBI did not indicate that the report of the address book's contents had been
limited to those items of lead significance.4 (20)
When the committee apprised the FBI of the testimony of the two agents (first,
the agent who coordinated the investigation; second, the one who prepared the
memorandum that was incorporated in the December 23 report), the Bureau
initiated its own inquiry. It produced an FBI airtel (an interoffice telegram)
dated December 11, 1963, that seemed to verify that the second agent's original
instructions were to set out investigative leads, rather than to transcribe the
complete contents of the address book. (21) The FBI investigation also led to
the discovery of a "tickler" copy of the December 23 report that did contain the
Hosty entry on page 25. 5(22) The two agents were then reinterviewed by FBI
investigators.
Based on his review and analysis of FBI documents, the second agent
substantially revised the testimony he had given the committee. He told the
Bureau investigators that since his assignment was to review the information
contained in Oswald's address book and to set out appropriate leads where
necessary, he initially reproduced by dictation those entries in the address
book that he thought might require investigative action. He recalled that he was
vitally concerned with accuracy; consequently, he initially included the Hosty
entry. Nevertheless, he explained that when he later had time to determine what
investigative work remained to be done with regard to the address book he
decided that it was not necessary to include the Hosty data in his second
dictation of an investigative "lead sheet." (23)
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A December 8, 1977, report of the FBI interview with the second agent records
his recollection in further detail:
He specifically recalls that by the time of the second dictation, he had had the
opportunity to check on the Hosty entry to the extent that he was aware of
Hosty's visits to the Paine residence and that the address book entry reflected
the Dallas FBI Field Office telephone number and the license number of the
Government vehicle assigned to Hosty.
Upon learning these facts, he was convinced that the Hosty entry was not
required in a "lead sheet" since it did not require further investigative
attention. In addition, he was unofficially aware, through office conversations,
that Hosty was being criticized not only in the media, but also by the FBI
hierarchy, for his conduct of the Oswald case. Since he realized that a "lead
sheet" would receive wide dissemination in the Dallas Field Office, he was
doubly convinced that the Hosty data should not be included in the "lead
sheet"-- Hosty's connection to the Oswald case was officially known and had been
explained in previous reports, and, furthermore, he did not wish to cause Hosty
any unnecessary unpleasantness or exposure. At that time he never considered
that Hosty might have been a target of Lee Harvey Oswald, and, further, any
contention that Hosty was involved in an assassination conspiracy would have
been so preposterous that he would not even have thought of it. He, therefore,
did not dictate the Hosty data and thereby excluded it from the product of his
second dictation which was, in effect, an office memorandum to be used only as a
"lead worksheet." He also never considered that the "lead sheet" might have been
converted to a report insert and disseminated outside the FBI. Had he known it
would be, he would have considered that the memorandum or "lead sheet" should
have reflected all the entries in the address book, to include Hosty's name,
since to do otherwise would not have been an accurate reporting of the entire
contents of the address book.
He could not recall specifically what may. have occasioned the redoing of page
25 after the second dictation, but it is possible that it became necessary
because either he or someone else noticed that the "Ministry of Finances of the
U.S.S.R." information should have been attributed to the Fame page in the
address book as was the "Katya Ford" and "Delean Ford" information. This error
was made by him during his first dictation and may have persisted through the
second dictation, thereby necessitating an additional change which caused page
25, to be numbered as it appears in the December 23, 1963, report.
[The second agent] concluded by stating that his recall of these events was
triggered only by a review and discussion of all the pertinent documents
retrieved. Until viewing the tickler version of the address book contents which
reproduced the entries more identically than the "lead sheet" version with its
editorializations, he had no specific recall with regard to his first dictation.
(24)
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When the first agent was reinterviewed by the FBI, he was unable to explain the
origin of the headquarters tickler copy. In addition, after reviewing the
December 11, 1963, FBI headquarters airtel to the Dallas office, he indicated
that, contrary to his earlier recollection, he never instructed the second agent
to transcribe the address book. That order had apparently been issued by another
special agent. (25)
Bureau interviews with the former special-agent-in-charge of the Dallas office
in 1963 and six other special agents who were involved in the assassination
investigation generated no additional information concerning how the tickler
copy of the December 23, 1963, report on the contents of the address book came
to reside in FBI headquarters. Nor did they shed new light on the circumstances
surrounding the omission of the Hosty entry from the copy of the report that was
sent to the Warren Commission. Laboratory tests for fingerprints were
inconclusive. (26) They did not indicate who had worked on the tickler copy of
the December 23 report. Laboratory tests did determine, however, that the
typewriter used to prepare page 25 of the December 23 report had also been used
to prepare all but 10 pages of the report.
The committee also sought testimony from Special Agent Hosty concerning the
circumstances by which his name was entered in Oswald's notebook and why this
particular entry might have been omitted from the December 23, 1963, report.
Hosty stated that he had been assigned to internal security cases on both Lee
Harvey Oswald and his wife Marina. (27) He recalled that he spoke briefly to
Marina Oswald twice during the first week of November 1963 and that he had had
no other contacts with her. (28) On this first occasion, he had given Ruth
Paine, with whom Marina Oswald was residing, his name and telephone number and
had told her to call him if she had any information on Oswald to give him.(29)
It was Hosty's belief that Ruth Paine probably gave this information to Oswald.
Hosty added that Oswald could have obtained the address of the Dallas FBI office
from the front page of any Dallas telephone book. (30) Hosty believed that
during his second visit to the residence, while he was talking to Ruth Paine,
Marina Oswald went outside and copied his license plate number. (31) He
suggested that Oswald may have wanted this data so he could write his
self-serving letter of protest to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.(32) In
addition, he stated that it is possible that Oswald wanted this information so
that he could complain to the FBI in Dallas. (33) Hosty indicated that he could
think of no good reason for withholding the references to him in Oswald's
address book from the report on the address book that was sent to the Warren
Commission, as this information was already well-known at the Dallas Police
Department.(34) The committee also learned that Hosty dictated two memoranda in
December 1963 that included the fact that his name and address were in Oswald's
address book. In addition, FBI headquarters was aware of the Hosty entry in the
address book; it had been made public by the media, and the FBI had advised the
Warren Commission of it on January 27, 1964.
Based on all this evidence, the committee concluded that there was no plan by
the FBI to withhold the Hosty entry in Oswald's address book for sinister
reasons. This conclusion was based on several factors,
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the most important of which was the discovery of the tickler copy of the
December 23, 1963 report.6
The committee considered the fact, on the other hand, that information about the
entry was withheld. One explanation might be that it was unintentional, although
the evidence was also consistent with an explanation that one or more Dallas FBI
agents sought to protect Hosty from personal embarrassment by
trying--ineffectually, as it turned out to exclude his name from the reporting.
The committee, though it deemed the incident regrettable, found it to be trivial
in the context of the entire investigation.
(3) FBI contacts with Oswald (Fort Worth, 1962).--Oswald was interviewed twice
by FBI agents in Fort Worth in 1962 shortly after his return from the Soviet
Union. (35) Special Agent Fain, who had been assigned the Oswald internal
security case in Fort Worth, and Special Agent Burnett Tom Carter conducted the
initial Oswald interview at the Fort Worth FBI office on June 26, 1962. In his
report of this interview, Fain described Oswald as cold, arrogant and
uncooperative. He also reported that when asked if he would be willing to submit
to a polygraph examination, Oswald refused without giving a reason.(36)
On August 16, 1962, Fain and Special Agent Arnold J. Brown reinterviewed Oswald,
this time in Fain's automobile near Oswald's Fort Worth residence. (37) The fact
that the interview was conducted in Fain's car has been cited as an indication
that Oswald was being developed as an informant.
Fain, Carter, and Brown submitted affidavits to the Warren Commission asserting
Oswald was not an informant.(38) All three were interviewed by the committee,
and they affirmed their previous positions.
Fain told the committee that in the first encounter, Oswald displayed a bad
attitude and gave incomplete answers (39) while Carter remembered Oswald as
arrogant, uncooperative, and evasive. (119) Fain said the second contact was
necessitated by Oswald's bad attitude and incomplete answers in the first
interview. In the second interview, Fain explained, Oswald invited him and Brown
into his home, but decided to conduct the interview in his car so not to upset
or frighten Oswald's wife.(41) Brown told the committee that his memory was
hazy, but he did recall that he and Fain met Oswald as he was returning from
work and that they interviewed him in or near Fain's car, possibly for the sake
of convenience. (42)
The committee found the statements of these three FBI agents credible. They had
legitimate reasons for contacting Oswald because his background suggested he
might be a threat to the internal security of the United States. They
corroborated each other's accounts of the two interviews of Oswald, and their
statements were entirely consistent with reports written shortly after these
interviews occurred. Given Oswald's documented unwillingness to cooperate, there
was little reason to believe that he would have been considered by these agents
for use as an informant.
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(4) FBI contacts with Oswald (New Orleans, 1963).--The committee interviewed the
special agent in charge of the FBI office in New Orleans in 1963 and three
special agents who handled the Oswald case in that city, and it found their
statements that Oswald had not been an FBI informant to be credible.
Harry Maynor, the special agent in charge of the New Orleans FBI office in 1963,
explained that if Oswald had been an FBI informant in New Orleans, he would have
known about it because of his supervisory position; if Oswald had been paid for
any information, would have approved the payments. Maynor noted that he had
submitted an affidavit to the Warren Commission in which he had stated that no
effort was made to develop Oswald as an informant.(43)
Similarly, former Special Agent Milton Kaack, who had been signed the FBI
security investigation of Oswald, told the committee that Oswald had never been
an FBI informant. Kaack explained that if Oswald had been an FBI informant, he
would have known about it by virtue of having been assigned the internal
security case on him.7 (44)
The statements of Maynor, Kaack, and two other former FBI employees were
considered in the context of allegations made by three witnesses, William S.
Walter, Orest Pena, and Adrian Alba.
On August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested in New Orleans for disturbing the peace
after he had gotten into a fight with anti-Castro Cubans while distributing Fair
Play for Cuba Committee leaflets. FBI Special Agent John L. Quigley interviewed
Oswald the following day in a New Orleans jail. (45) Quigley's willingness to
meet with Oswald in jail has been cited as evidence that Oswald was an FBI
informant. Moreover, in connection with this incident, William S. Walter, who
was an FBI security clerk in New Orleans in 1963, told the committee that he had
been on duty on the day this interview occurred. In response to Quigley's
request for a file check on Oswald, he had determined that the New Orleans FBI
office maintained both a security file and an informant file on Oswald.
In a committee interview, Quigley, who had submitted an affidavit to the Warren
Commission asserting that, Oswald had not been an FBI informant, (47) reaffirmed
his position. He explained that he interviewed Oswald at Oswald's request, and
that he then checked the file indices at the New Orleans office and found that
Oswald was the subject of a security investigation assigned to Special Agent
Kaack. He advised that the indices check provided no indication that Oswald had
ever been an FBI informant. He added that if Oswald had been an informant, he
would have known about it by virtue of this indices search. (48)
The committee could find no independent basis for verifying Walter's testimony
about an Oswald informant file, but another allegation made by him, unrelated to
the informant issue, led the committee to reject his testimony in its entirety.
In a committee deposition, Walter stated that on November 17, 1963, while he was
on night duty as an FBI security clerk, he received a teletype from FBI
headquarters warning of a possible assassination attempt against President Ken-
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nedy during the forthcoming trip to Dallas on November 22 or 23, 1963. (49)
Walter recalled that the teletype was addressed to all special agents in charge
of FBI field offices and that it instructed them to contact criminal, racial and
hate group informants in order to determine whether there was any basis for the
threat.(50) Walter contended that this teletype was removed from the New Orleans
FBI office files soon after the Kennedy assassination. (51)
Walter admitted that he did not publicly allege the existence of this telephone
until 1968 (52) At that time, the FBI instituted an investigation that failed to
find any corroboration for Walter's story. According to the Bureau, no record of
a teletype or any other kind of communication reporting that there would be an
attempt to assassinate President Kennedy in Texas could be found. Over 50 FBI
employees of the New Orleans FBI office were interviewed by the Bureau, and none
of them stated that they had any knowledge of any such teletype. (53) In 1975,
the Bureau reinvestigated the teletype allegation after Walter claimed he had
retained a replica of the teletype and that it had been sent to all FBI field
offices. The FBI examined the text of the alleged replica and determined that it
varied in format and wording from the standard. The Bureau also reported that
searches at each of its 59 field offices yielded no evidence indicating the
existence of such a teletype. (54)
Walter advised the committee that he did not know of anyone who could definitely
substantiate his teletype allegation, although he suggested that his former
wife, Sharon Covert, who also had worked for the FBI in New Orleans, might be
able to do so. (55) Sharon Covert, however, advised the committee that she could
not support any of Walter's allegations against the FBI and that Walter had
never mentioned his allegations to her during their marriage. (56)
New Orleans Special Agent in Charge Maynor also denied that he had been
contacted by Walter in regard to an assassination threat. (57)
More fundamentally, however, the committee was led to distrust Walter's account
of the assassination teletype because of his claim that it had been addressed to
the special agents in charge of every FBI field office. The committee found it
difficult to believe that such a message could have been sent without someone 15
years later--a special agent in charge or an employee who might have seen the
teletype--coming forward in support of Walter's claim. The committee declined to
believe that that many employees of the FBI would have remained silent for such
a long time. Instead, the committee was led to question Walter's credibility.
The committee concluded that Walter's allegations were unfounded.
Orest Pena, a bar owner in New Orleans, testified that during the early 1960's
he was an FBI informant who reported to Special Agent Warren D. deBrueys.(58) He
told the committee that on several occasions he saw Oswald in the company of
deBrueys and other Government agents in a restaurant and that he believed Oswald
and deBrueys knew each other very well.8 Finally, Pena alleged that Special
Agent
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DeBrueys was "transferred" to Dallas at the same time Oswald was "transferred"
there. He added that he was "very, very, very sure" that deBrueys went to Dallas
before the assassination of President Kennedy. (59)
Pena maintained that a few days before he went to testify before the Warren
Commission, deBrueys threatened him physically and warned him not to make any
accusations against him. Pena also stated that Warren Commission staff counsel
Wesley J. Liebeler did not cooperate with him and did not let him talk freely,
so he decided to "keep [his] mouth shut." (60)
In testimony before the committee, deBrueys denied that Oswald was his
informant, that he had ever met Oswald, or that he had ever knowingly talked to
him by telephone.(61) He acknowledged that he did use Pena informally as an
occasional source of information because of his position as a bar owner in New
Orleans, but he declined to characterize Pena as an informant because of the
absence of any systematic reporting relationship. (62) He also denied having
threatened Pena prior to Pena's Warren Commission testimony. (63) Finally,
deBrueys testified that he was transferred to Dallas in 1963, but that this was
the result of a temporary assignment to assist in the assassination
investigation. (64) The transfer did not coincide with Oswald's move from New
Orleans to the Dallas area.9
FBI files served to corroborate relevant aspects of deBrueys' testimony.
DeBrueys' personal file indicates that the only time he was transferred to
Dallas was to work on the assassination investigation, and that he was in Dallas
from November 23, 1963, until January 24, 1964. In addition, there is no Bureau
record of Pena ever having served as an informant. This, too, supported
deBrueys' testimony that Pena was never used on any systematic basis as a source
of information.
Pena, moreover, was unable to explain adequately why he waited until 1975 to
make this allegation, and he declined to testify specifically that Oswald was,
in fact, an FBI informant. Pena's responses to committee questions on the
informant issue and others were frequentry evasive. (65) The committee found,
therefore, that he was not a credible witness.
Adrian Alba testified before the committee that he was an employee and part
owner of the Crescent City Garage in New Orleans and that in the summer of 1963
he had become acquainted with Oswald, who worked next door at the Reily Coffee
Co. (66) He related that one day an FBI agent entered his garage and requested
to use one of the Secret Service cars garaged there. The FBI agent showed his
credentials, and Alba allowed him to take a Secret Service car, a dark green
Studebaker. Later that day or the next day, Alba observed the FBI agent in the
car handing a white envelope to Oswald in front of the Reily Coffee Co, There
was no exchange of words. Oswald, in a bent position, turned away from the car
window and held the envelope close
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to his chest as he walked toward the Reily Coffee Co. Alba believed that he
observed a similar transaction a day or so later as he was returning from lunch,
but on this occasion he was farther away and failed to see what was handed to
Oswald. Alba did not recall when the Secret Service car was returned or by whom.
He never questioned Oswald about these incidents. (67)
Alba did not relate his account of the transactions between Oswald and the FBI
agent when he testified before the Warren Commission. (68). He told the
committee in 1978 that he first remembered these incidents in 1970, when his
memory was triggered by a television commercial showing a merchant running to
and from a taxi to assist a customer. (69)
The committee examined Alba's records for possible corroboration. These records
indicated that in 1963 several Secret Service agents had signed out two
Studebakers, a Ford and a Chevrolet at various times, but the records did not
indicate that any FBI agents had signed out any of these cars. (70)
The committee regarded Alba's testimony, at least on this point, to be of
doubtful reliability and outweighed by the evidence provided by the former FBI
personnel stationed in New Orleans.
(5) FBI contacts with Oswald (Dallas, 1963).--According to a 1964 FBI
memorandum, an FBI agent, later identified as Will Hayden Griffin of the Dallas
field office, allegedly stated in 1964 that Oswald was definitely an FBI
informant and that FBI files in Washington would prove that fact.(71) Griffin,
however, advised the committee that he had never made such an allegation.
Moreover, in 1964, he had executed an affidavit specifically denying this
allegation. (72) Griffin's position is consistent with that of other Dallas FBI
personnel.
J. Gordon Shanklin, who was special-agent-in-charge of the Dallas FBI office in
1963, submitted an affidavit to the Warren Commission in which he denied that
Oswald was an FBI informant.(73) In a committee interview, he again stated that
Oswald was never an informant for the FBI in Dallas and he added he had not even
heard of Oswald prior to President Kennedy's assassination. (74)
Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., testified that Oswald had not been an FBI
informant. (75) Hosty had submitted an affidavit to this effect to the Warren
Commission.10 Hosty told the committee that he had never interviewed Oswald
before the assassination of President Kennedy. From his testimony, it appeared
that his only contacts with Oswald had been indirect, in the form of two
occasions that he had conversed with Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine. He added that
Oswald was neither an informant for Special Agent Fain in Fort Worth nor an
informant for any FBI agent in New Orleans. Had Oswald been an informant in
either case, Hosty insisted he would have known about it by virtue of having
been assigned the internal security case on Oswald in Dallas. (76)
Hosty also addressed the purported Griffin allegation. He testified to the
committee that Griffin knew that Jack Ruby had been a poten-
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tial criminal informant for the FBI in Dallas. He suggested that someone could
have heard Griffin talking about Ruby's contacts with the FBI and might then
have repeated the story with the mistaken assertion that Griffin was talking
about Oswald. (77)
In support of Hosty's explanation, Shanklin stated to the committee that the
Dallas office did send the potential criminal informant file on Ruby to FBI
headquarters in Washington after the Kennedy assassination. He added that he did
not know whether this file was sent to the Warren Commission. 11 (78) Griffin
told the committee in a second interview that soon after the Kennedy
assassination he learned that the FBI in Dallas had approached Ruby in order to
obtain information from him. He advised that, although his recollection was
unclear, he might have seen an FBI informant file on Ruby and then may have
talked to persons outside the Bureau about the FBI's contacts with Ruby.
(6) The destruction of Oswald's note.--Approximately 2 or 3 weeks before the
assassination of President Kennedy, Oswald allegedly delivered a note addressed
to Hosty at the FBI office in Dallas. (80) The varying accounts of the note's
contents suggest that it was threatening or complaining in tone, ordering Hosty
to stop bothering Oswald's wife.(81) Several hours after Oswald was murdered by
Jack Ruby, Hosty, according to his own admission, destroyed the note after
having been instructed to do so by J. Gordon Shanklin, the
special-agent-in-charge of the Dallas FBI office. (82) Shanklin denied that he
knew anything about the note until a reporter asked him about it in 1975. (83)
Between 1963 and 1975, the existence of the note and its destruction were kept
secret by the Dallas FBI Office.
In his committee testimony, Hosty stated that the note, according to his memory,
did not contain Oswald's name and that he first determined that the note might
have been from Oswald on the day of the assassination of President Kennedy.
Hosty explained that soon after Oswald's arrest, he was instructed to sit in on
the interrogation of Oswald at the Dallas Police Department, and that when he
identified himself to Oswald, Oswald became upset and stated that Hosty had been
bothering his wife, Marina. Hosty suggested that Special-Agent-in-Charge
Shanklin, who was told by another FBI agent about Oswald's reaction to Hosty,
probably made the same connection between Oswald and the anonymous note. Hosty
advised that he was surprised that Shanklin wanted him to destroy the note
because the note's contents were not particularly significant.
Hosty recalled that the note was complaining in tone, but that it contained no
threats and did not suggest that Oswald was prone to violence. Hosty stated that
he destroyed the note because Shanklin, his superior, ordered him to do so. When
asked what motivation Oswald might have had for writing this note, Hosty
suggested that Oswald might have wanted to prevent Hosty from contacting his
wife because he was afraid that she would tell Hosty about Oswald's trip to
Mexico in the fall of 1963 and of his attempt to shoot Gen. Edwin Walker in the
spring of 1963. (85)
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The committee regarded the incident of the note as a serious impeachment of
Shanklin's and Hosty's credibility. It noted, however, that the note, if it
contained threats in response to FBI contacts with Oswald's wife, would have
been evidence tending to negate an informant relationship. The committee noted
further the speculative nature of its findings about the note incident. Because
the note had been destroyed, it was not possible to establish with confidence
what its contents were.
(7) Conclusion--In summary, although there have been many allegations of an
Oswald-FBI informant relationship, there was no credible evidence that Oswald
was ever an informant for the Bureau. Absent a relationship between Oswald and
the FBI, grounds suspicions of FBI complicity in the assassination become
remote.
(c) The Central Intelligence Agency 1
In 1964, the CIA advised the Warren Commission that the Agency had never had a
relationship of any kind with Lee Harvey Oswald. Testifying before the
Commission, CIA Director John A. McCone indicated that:
Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or
solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly
or in any other manner * * * Oswald was never associated or connected directly
or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. (1)
McCone's testimony was corroborated by Deputy Director Richard M. Helms. (2) The
record reflects that once these assurances had been received, no further efforts
were made by the Warren Commission to pursue the matter.
Recognizing the special difficulty in investigating a clandestine agency, the
committee sought to resolve the issue of Oswald's alleged association with the
CIA by conducting an inquiry that went beyond taking statements from two of the
Agency's most senior officials. The more analytical approach used by the
committee consisted of a series of steps:
First, an effort was made to identify circumstances in Oswald's life or in the
way his case was handled by the CIA that possibly suggested an intelligence
association.
Then, the committee undertook an intensive review of the pertinent files,
including the CIA's 144-volume Oswald file and hundreds of others from the CIA,
FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and other agencies.
Based on these file reviews, a series of interviews, depositions and executive
session hearings was conducted with both Agency and non-Agency witnesses. The
contacts with present and former
CIA personnel covered a broad range of individuals, including staff and division
chiefs, Clandestine case officers, area desk officers, research analysts,
secretaries and clerical assistants. In total, more
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than 125 persons, including at least 50 present and former CIA employees, were
questioned.2
The results of this investigation confirmed the Warren Commission testimony of
McCone and Helms. There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file that he had ever
had contact with the Agency. Finally, taken in their entirety, the items of
circumstantial evidence that the committee had selected for investigation as
possibly indicative of an intelligence association did not support the
allegation that Oswald had an intelligence agency relationship.
This finding, however, must be placed in context, for the institutional
characteristics--in terms of the Agency's strict compartmentalization and the
complexity of its enormous filing system--that are designed to prevent
penetration by foreign powers have the simultaneous effect of making
congressional inquiry difficult. For example, personnel testified to the
committee that a review of Agency files would not always indicate whether an
individual was affiliated with the Agency in any capacity. (3) Nor was there
always an independent means of verifying that all materials requested from the
Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any finding that is essentially
negative in nature--such as that Lee Harvey Oswald was neither associated with
the CIA in any way, nor ever in contact with that institution--should explicitly
acknowledge the possibility of oversight.
To the extent possible, however, the committee's investigation was designed to
overcome the Agency's security-oriented institutional obstacles that potentially
impede effective scrutiny of the CIA. The vast majority of CIA files made
available to the committee were reviewed in undeleted form.(4) These files were
evaluated both for their substantive content and for any potential procedural
irregularities suggestive of possible editing or tampering. After review, the
files were used as the basis for examination and cross-examination of present
and former Agency employees. Each of the present and former Agency employees
contacted by the committee was released from his secrecy oath by the. CIA
insofar as questions relevant to the committee's legislative mandate were
concerned. Because of the number of Agency personnel who were interrogated,(5)
it is highly probable that significant inconsistencies between the files and
witnesses' responses would have been discovered by the committee.
During the course of its investigation, the committee was given access by
the-CIA to information based on sensitive sources and methods that are protected
by law from unauthorized disclosure. The committee noted that in some
circumstances disclosure of such information in detail would necessarily reveal
the sensitive sources and methods by which it was acquired. With respect to each
item of such information, the committee carefully weighed the possible
advancement of public understanding that might accrue from disclosure of the
details of the information against the possible harm that might be done to the
national interests and the dangers that might result to individuals. To
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the extent required by the balancing process, sections of this report were
written in a somewhat conclusionary manner in order to continue the protection
of such classified information.
(1) CIA personnel in the Soviet Russia Division.3--Since Oswald spent time in
the Soviet Union, a subject of special attention by the committee was the
Russia-related activities of the CIA. In addition to obtaining testimony from
former Directors McCone and Helms, the committee interviewed the chiefs of the
Soviet Russia Division from 1959 to 1963. In each case, the committee received a
categorical denial of any association of the CIA with Oswald. (6)
To investigate this matter further, the committee interviewed the persons who
had been chiefs or deputy chiefs during 1959-62 of the three units within the
Soviet Russia Division that were responsible respectively for clandestine
activities, research in support of clandestine activities, and the American
visitors program. 4 The heads of the clandestine activity section stated that
during this period the CIA had few operatives in the Soviet Union and that
Oswald was not one of them. Moreover, they stated that because of what
they-perceived to be his obvious instability, Oswald would never have met the
Agency's standards for use in the field 5 (7) The heads of the Soviet Russia
Division's section that sought the cooperation of visitors to the Soviet Union
informed the committee that they met with each person involved in their program
and that Oswald was not one of them.(8) These officials also advised the
committee that "clean-cut" collegiate types tended to be used in this program,
and that Oswald did not meet this criterion.(9) Finally, the officers in charge
of the Soviet Russia Division's research section in support of clandestine
activities indicated that, had Oswald been contacted by the Agency, their
section would probably have been informed, but that this, in fact, never
occurred. (10)
(2) CIA personnel abroad.--Turning to particular allegations, the committee
investigated the statement of former CIA employee James Wilcott, who testified
in executive session that shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy
he was advised by fellow em ployees at a CIA post abroad that Oswald was a CIA
agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym.6
(11) Wilcott explained that he had been employed by the CIA as a finance officer
from 1957 until his resignation in 1966. In this capacity, he
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served as a fiscal account assistant on the support staff at a post abroad from
June 1960 to June 1964. In addition to his regular responsibilities, he had
performed security duty on his off-hours in order to supplement his income. This
put him in contact with other employees of the post who would come by the office
and engage in informal conversations. On the day after President Kennedy's
assassination, Wilcott claimed he was informed by a CIA case officer that Oswald
was an agent.(12) He further testified that he was told that Oswald had been
assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had unknowingly disbursed payments
for Oswald's project. (13) Although Wilcott was unable to identify the specific
case officer who had initially informed him of Oswald's agency relationship, he
named several employees of the post abroad with whom he believed he had
subsequently discussed the allegations. (14)
Wilcott advised the committee that after learning of the alleged Oswald
connection to the CIA, he never rechecked official Agency disbursement records
for evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was because at .that
time he viewed the information as mere shop talk and gave it little credence.
(15) Neither did he report the allegations to any formal investigative bodies,
as he considered the information hearsay.(16) Wilcott was unable to recall the
agency cryptonym for the particular project in which Oswald had been involved,
(17) nor was he familiar with the substance of that projec t. In this regard,
however, because project funds were disbursed on a code basis, as a disbursement
officer he would not have been apprised of the substantive aspects of projects.
In an attempt to investigate Wilcott's allegations, the committee interviewed
several present and former CIA employees selected on the basis of the position
each had held during the years 1954-64. Among the persons interviewed were
individuals whose responsibilities covered a broad spectrum of areas in the post
abroad, including the chief and deputy chief of station, as well as officers in
finance, registry, the Soviet Branch and counterintelligence.
None of these individuals interviewed had ever seen any documents or heard any
information indicating that Oswald was an agent. (18) This allegation was not
known by any of them until it was published by critics of the Warren Commission
in the late 1960's.(19) Some of the individuals, including a chief of
counterintelligence in the Soviet Branch, expressed the belief that it was
possible that Oswald had been recruited by the Soviet KGB during his military
tour of duty overseas, as the CIA had identified a KGB program aimed at
recruiting U.S. military personnel during the-period Oswald Was stationed there.
(20) An intelligence analyst whom Wilcott had specifically named as having been
involved in a conversation about the Oswald allegation told the committee that
he was not in the post abroad at the time of the assassination.(21) A review of
this individual's office of personnel file confirmed that, in fact, he had been
transferred from the post abroad to the United States in 1962. (22) The chief of
the post abroad from 1961 to 1964 stated that had Oswald been used by the Agency
he certainly would have learned about it.(23) Similarly, almost all those
persons interviewed who
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worked in the Soviet Branch of that station indicated they would have known if
Oswald had, in fact, been recruited by the CIA when he was overseas.(24) These
persons-expressed the opinion that, had Oswald been recruited without their
knowledge, it would have been a rare exception contrary to the working policy
and guidelines of the post abroad. (25)
Based on all the evidence, the committee conclused that Wilcott's
allegation was not worthy of belief.
(3) Oswald's CIA file.--The CIA has long acknowledged that prior to the
president's assassination, it had a personality file on Oswald, that is, a file
that contained data about Oswald as an individual. This file, which in Agency
terminology is referred to as a 201 file, was opened on December 9, 1960. (26)
The Agency explained that 201 files are opened when a person is consedered to be
of potential intelligence or counterintelligence significance.(27) The opening
of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of placing certain CIA
information pertaining to that individual in one centralized records system. The
201 file is maintained in a folder belonging to the Directorate for Operations,
the Agency component responsible for clandesting activities.(28)
The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily connote any actual relationship
or contact with the CIA. For example, the Oswald file was opened, according to
the Agency, because as an American defector, he was considered to be of
continuing intelligence interest.(29) Oswald's file contained no indication that
he had ever had a relationship with the CIA. Nevertheless, because the committee
was aware of one instance (in an unrelated case) where an Agency officer had
apparently contemplated the use of faked files with forged documents, (30)
special attention was given to procedural questions that were occasioned by this
file review.
(4) Why the delay in opening Oswald's 201 file?--A confidential State Department
telegram dated October 31, 1959, sent from Moscow to Washington and forwarded to
the CIA, reported that Oswald, a recently discharged Marine, had appeared at the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow to renounce his American citizenship and "has offered
Soviets any information he has acquired as [an] enlisted radar operator."(31) At
least three other communications of a confidential nature that gave more detail
on the Oswald case were sent to the CIA in about the same time period.(32)
Agency officials questioned by the committee testified that the substance of the
October 31, 1959, cable was sufficiently important to warrant the opening of a
201 file.(33) Oswald's file was not, however, opened until December 9, 1960.(34)
The committee requested that the CIA indicate where documents pertaining to
Oswald had been disseminated internally and stored prior to the opening of his
201 file. The agency advised the committee that because document dissemination
records of relatively low national security significance are retained for only a
5-year period, they were no longer in existence for the years 1959-63. (35) 8
Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when these documents had
been received or by which component.
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An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1975, indicates that Oswald's file was
opened on December 9, 1960, in response to the receipt of five documents: two
from the FBI, two from the State Department and one from the Navy. (36) This
explanation, however, is inconsistent with the presence in Oswald's file of four
State Department documents dated in 1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is,
of course, possible that the September 18, 1975, memorandum is referring to
State Department documents that were received by the Directorate for Plans 9 in
October and November of 1960 and that the earlier State Department
communications had been received by the CIA's Office of Security but not the
Directorate for Plans. In the absence of dissemination record however, the issue
could not be resolved.
The September 18, 1975, memorandum also states that Oswald's file was opened on
December 9, 1960, as a result of his "defection" to the U.S.S.R. on October 31,
1959 and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning
possible reentry into the United States."(37) There is no indication, however,
that Oswald expressed to any U.S. Government official an intention to return to
the United States until mid-February 1961. (38) Finally, reference to the
original form that was used to start a file on Oswald did not resolve this issue
because the appropriate space that would normally indicate the "source document"
that initiated the action referred to art Agency component rather than to a
dated document. 10 (39) the basis for opening Oswald's file on December 9, 1960,
by interviewing and then deposing the Agency employee who was directly
responsible for initiating the opening action. This individual explained that
the CIA had received a request from the State Department for information
concerning American defectors. After compiling the requested information, she
responded to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector involved.
(40)
This statement was corroborated by review of a State Department letter which
indicated that such a request, in fact, had been made of the CIA on October 25,
1960. Attached to the State Department letter was a list of known defectors;
Oswald's name was on that list. The CIA responded to this request on November
21, 1960, by providing the requested information and adding two names to the
State De-
partment's original list. (41)
Significantly, the committee reviewed the original State Department list and
determined that files were opened in December 1960 for each of the five
(including Oswald) who did not have 201 files prior to receipt of the State
Department inquiry. In each case, the slot for "source document" referred to an
Agency component rather than to a dated document.(42)
Even so, this analysis only explained why a file on Oswald was finally opened;
it did not explain the seemingly long delay in opening of the file. To determine
whether such a delayed opening was unusual, the committee reviewed the files of
13 of the 14 persons on the CIA's November 21 1960, response to the State
Department and
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of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380) who were American-born, had
defected during the years 1958-63, and who had returned to the United States
during that same time period. Of 29 individuals whose-files were reviewed, 8 had
been the subject of 201files prior to the time of their defection. In only 4 of
the remaining cases were 201 files opened at the time of defection. The files on
the 17 other defectors were opened from 4 months to several years after the
defection. (43) At the very least, the committee's review indicated that during
1958-63, the opening of a file years after a defection was not uncommon. In many
cases, the opening was triggered by some event, independent of the defection,
that had drawn attention to the individual involved.
(5) Why was he carried as Lee Henry Oswald in his 201 file? Oswald's 201 file
was opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald. (44) No Agency witness was able to
explain why. All agency personnel however, including the person who initiated
the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned innocently by
bureaucratic error.(45) Moreover, the committee received substantial testimony
to the effect that this error would not-have prevented the misnamed file from
being retrieved from the CIA's filing system during a routine name trace done
under the name Lee Harvey Oswald. (46)
(6) The meaning of "AG" under "Other Identificatian" in Oswald's 201 file.---The
form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file for Lee Harvey Oswald contains
the designation AG in a box marked "Other Identification." Because this term was
considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of Oswald's
alleged Agency relationship, the CIA was asked to explain its meaning.
The Agency's response indicated that "AG" is the OI ("Other Identification")
code meaning "actual or potential defectors to the East or the Sino/Soviet block
including Cuba," and that anyone so described could have the OI code "AG." This
code was reportedly added to Oswald's opening form because of the comment on the
form
that he had. defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (47)
An Agency official, who was a Directorate of Operations records expert and for
many years one who had been involved in the CIA's investigation of the Kennedy
assassination, gave the committee a somewhat different explanation of the
circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on Oswald's opening
form. This individual testified that "AG" was an example of a code used to aid
in preparing computer listings of occupational groupings or intelligence
affiliations. He explained that these codes always used two letters and that, in
this case, the first letter "A" must have represented communism, while the
second letter would represent some category within the Communist structure.
His recollection was that at the time of the assassination, the "AG" code was
not yet in existence because there were no provisions then in effect within the
Agency for indexing American defectors. He recalled that it was only during the
life of the Warren Commission that the CIA realized that its records system
lacked provisions for indexing an individual such as Oswald. Consequently, the
CIA revised its records manual to permit the indexing of American defectors and
established a code for its computer system to be used for that category.
Although
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this witness did not know when the notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening
sheet, he presumed that it must have been following the addition of the American
defector code, thus placing the time somewhere in the middle of the Warren
Commission's investigation. He explained that it was difficult to determine when
any of the notetions on the opening sheet-had been made, since it was standard
procedure to update the forms whenever necessary so that they were as reflective
as possible of the available information.11 (49)
Finally, this witness testified that the regulations regarding the use of this
occupation and intelligence code specifically prohibited indicating that a
particular person was either an employee of the Agency or someone who was used
by the Agency. This prohibition was designed to prevent anyone from being able
to produce any kind of categorical listing of CIA employees, contacts or
connections.(50)
(7) Why was Oswald's 201 file restricted?--The form used to initiate the opening
of Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that the file was to be
"restricted". (51) This indication was considered potentially significant
because of the CIA's practice of restricting access to agents' files to persons
on a "need-to-know" basis. Further investigation revealed, however, that
restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of an relationship
with the CIA.
The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified
that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that
might have occurred with regard to the file.(52) The restriction achieved this
purpose because any person seeking access to the file would first have to notify
the restricting officer, at which time the officer would be apprised of any
developments.
This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert who further testified that
had the file been permanently charged to a particular desk or case officer, as
well as restricted, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have
been greater. (53) There is no indication on Oswald's form that it had been
placed on permanent charge.
Finally, the committee reviewed the files of four other defectors that had been
opened at the same time and by the same person as Oswald's, and determined that
each of the files had been similarly restricted. Each of these other individuals
was on the lists of defectors that had been exchanged by the CIA and State
Department. None of the files pertaining to these other defectors had any
evidence suggestive of a possible intelligence agency association.
(8) Were 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file? In the course of reviewing
Oswald's 201 file, the committee discovered an unsigned memorandum to the Chief
of Counterintelligence. Research and Analysis, dated February 20, 1964, which
stated that 37 documents were missing from Oswald's 201 file.(54) According to
the memorandum, this statement was based on a comparison of a machine listing of
documents officially recorded as being in the 1201 file and those documents
actually physically available in the file. (55) While the memorandum mentioned
that such a machine listing was attached, no such attachment was found in the
201 file at the time of the committee's
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review. The memorandum itself bears the classification "Secret Eyes Only" and
was one of the documents that had been fully withheld from release under the
Freedom of Information Act. (56)
In response to a committee inquiry, the CIA advised that, because Oswald's file
had been so active during the course of the Warren Commission investigation,
up-to-date machine listings were produced periodically. On this basis, the
Agency stated that
* * * it must be assumed that whoever was responsible for maintaining the Oswald
file brought this file up-to-date by locating the 37 documents and placing them
in the file. (57)
Because this response was incomplete, the author of the memorandum was deposed.
He testified that once a document had been registered into a 201 file by the
Agency's computer system, physical placement of the document in the file was not
always necessary. (58) On this basis, he explained, the items listed in the
memorandum were not missing but rather had either been routinely placed in a
separate file because of their sensitivity or were being held by other
individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. (59) He further stated that
in the course of his custodianship of Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as
many as 100 computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While there
had been many instances in which one or more documents had been charged out to
someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually
missing. (60) According to his testimony, the 37 documents were, in fact,
available, but they were not located in the file at the time. (61) The committee
regarded this to be a plausible explanation.
(9) Did the CIA maintain a dual filing system on Oswald? The committee was aware
of the possibility that a dual filing system (one innocuous file and one that
contained operational detail of a relationship with the CIA) could have been
used to disguise a possible relationship between Oswald and the Agency. This
awareness became a concern with the discovery that at least two Agency officers
had contemplated the use of faked files and forged documents to protect the ZR
Rifle project from disclosure.12(62) The implications of this discovery in terms
of the possibility that the Oswald file might also have been faked were
disturbing to the committee.
In the Oswald case, two items were scrutinized because they were potentially
indicative of a dual filing system. The first was a photograph of Oswald that
had been taken in Minsk in 1961; the second was a copy of a letter that had been
written to Oswald by his mother during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time
of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in the CIA's
possession, but neither was in Oswald's 201 file.
The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him posing with several other
people. According to the CIA, the picture was found after the assassination as a
result of a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially
relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet
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Union.(64) The Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others
not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in 1962 from some tourists by the
CIA's Domestic Contacts Division, an Agency component that regularly sought
information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in
Communist countries. (65)
Committee interviews with the tourists in question confirmed that the
photograph, along with 159 other photographic slides, had routinely been made
available to the Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had heard of Oswald
prior to the assassination or knew which photographs had been of interest to the
Agency. (66)
CIA records indicate that only 5 of the 160 slides initially made available were
retained. (67) Committee interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled
the slides for the Domestic Contacts Division established that Oswald had not
been identified at the time that these photographic materials were made
available.(68) One of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been
retained because it depicted a Soviet Intourist guide; the other employee
indicated that the picture had been kept because it showed a crane in the
background.(69) Of these two employees, the one who worked at CIA headquarters
(and therefore was in a position to know) indicated that the photograph of
Oswald had not been discovered until a postassassination search of the Minsk
graphics file for materials pertaining to Oswald. (70)
Accordingly, this photograph was not evidence that the CIA maintained a dual
filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was kept in a
separate file until 1964, when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its
subjects.
The committee's investigation of a copy of a letter to Oswald from his mother
that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not show any evidence of a
dual filing system. This letter, dated July 6, 1961 and sent by Marguerite
Oswald, was intercepted as a result of a CIA program (71) known as HT-Lingual,13
the purpose of which was to obtain intelligence and counterintelligence
information from letters sent between the United States and Russia. Typically,
intercepted letters and envelopes would be photographed and then returned to the
mails.(72)
In response to a committee inquiry, the CIA explained that because of
HT-Lingual's extreme sensitivity, all materials generated as a result of mail
intercepts were stored in a separate project file that was maintained by the
counterintelligence staff.(73) Consequently, such items were not placed in 201
files. This explanation was confirmed by the testimony of a senior officer from
the counterintelligence staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project
files14 (74)
(10) Did Oswald ever participate in a CIA counterintelligence project? The
committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining to
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the Oswald case 15 resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four index
cards, two with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald and two to Marina Oswald, which
were dated after the assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing
the reproductions of these cards were stamped "Secret Eyes Only." (75)
The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald, dated November 9, 1959, states that
Oswald is a recent defector to the U.S.S.R. and a former marine. It also bears
the notation "CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. (76) The second
card on Oswald places him in Minsk. It contains background information on him
and states that he "reportedly expresses a desire for return to the United
States under certain conditions." This card is dated August 7, 1961, and also
bears the notation "Watch List." (77) These cards, particularly the reference to
"CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether Oswald was, in fact, involved in
some sort of counterintelligence project for the CIA.
The committee questioned former employees of the CIA who may have had some
knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual project in general and these cards in
particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the
HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning of the notation,
"CI/Project/RE." (78)
One employee, however, testified that the "CI Project" was "simply a name of
convenience that was used to describe the HT-Lingual project"; (79) another
testified that "CI Project" was the name of the component that ran the
HT-Lingual project. This person also explained that "RE" represented the
initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign language documents and
that the initials had probably been placed there so that someone could come back
to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents.(80)
Another employee indicated that the "Watch List" notation on the second card
referred to persons who had been identified as being of particular interest with
respect to the mail intercept program. (81)
The committee requested the CIA to provide an explanation for the terms
"CI/Project/RE" and "Watch List" and for the handwritten notations appearing on
the index cards. In addition, the committee requested a description of criteria
used in compiling a "Watch List?'
With respect to the meaning of the notation "CI/Project/RE." the CIA explained
that there existed an office within the counterintelligence staff that was known
as "CI/Project," a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the
officers functions. In fact, this office was responsible for the exploitation of
the material produced by the HT-Lingual project. The Agency further explained
that "RE" represented the initials of a former employee. (82)
In responding to a request for the criteria used in compiling a "Watch List,"
the CIA referred to a section of the "Report to the President by the Commission
on CIA Activities Within the United States," which states:
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207
Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest (one should
also add counterintelligence interest) were specified in watch lists provided to
the mail project by the counterintelligence staff, by other CIA components, and
by the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to
time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names, including
about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners
and of U.S. citizens. (83)
Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on November 9, 1959, an employee
whose initials were RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List" for the
HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card--that Oswald was a recent
defector to the U.S.S.R. and a former Marine.(84)
The response went on to state that the handwritten number, No. 7-305, which also
appears on the first card, is a reference to the communication from the CI staff
to the Office of Security. expressing the CI staff's interest in seeing any mail
to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the other handwritten notation,
"N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59" signifies that a name trace run through the central records
register indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as of that date.16
(85)
The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second card was that on August 7,
1961, the CIA staff officer who opened the Oswald 201 file requested that
Oswald's name be placed on the "Watch List" because of Oswald's expressed desire
to return to the United States, as stated on the card. The handwritten notation
indicates, in this instance, that Oswald's name was deleted from the "Watch
List" on May 28, 1962.(86)
With reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the Agency stated that her
name was first placed on the "Watch List" on November 26, 1963, because she was
the wife of Lee Harvey Oswald. The second card served the purpose of adding the
name Marina Oswald Porter to the "Watch List" on June 29, 1965, after she had
remarried. Both names were deleted from the list as of May 26, 1972. (87)
Thus the statements of former CIA employees were corroborated by the Agency's
response regarding the explanation of the index cards in the CIA's HT-Lingual
files pertaining to Oswald. The explanations attested that the references on the
cards were not demonstrative of an Agency relationship with Oswald, but instead
were examples of notations routinely used in connection with the HT-Lingual
project.
(11) Did the CIA ever debrief Oswald?--The CIA has denied ever having had any
contact with Oswald,(88) and its records are consistent with this position.
Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division that routinely attempts to
solicit information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling
abroad,(89) the absence of any record indicating that Oswald, a returning
defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, had been debriefed has been
con-
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sidered by Warren Commission critics to be either inherently unbelievable (that
is, the record was destroyed) or indicative that Oswald had been contacted
through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels. (90)
After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this issue, the committee
interviewed the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research
related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union. He had written a
November 25, 1963, memorandum indicating that, upon Oswald's return from the
Soviet Union, he had considered "the laying of interviews [on him] through the
[Domestic Contacts Division] or other suitable channels."17(91) The officer
indicated that Oswald was considered suspect because the Soviets appeared to
have been very solicitous of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact,
either by the Domestic Contacts Division or other "suitable channels" such as
the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was considered.(92) The
officer stated, however, that to his knowledge no contact with Oswald was ever
made. Moreover, if a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would
have been inforaged. Finally, he said that Oswald was considered a potential
lead, but only of marginal importance, and therefore the absence of a debriefing
was not at all unusual. (93)
The committee interviewed five other Agency employees who were in a position to
have discussed Oswald in 1962 with the author of this memorandum, including the
person who replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research
section. None of them could recall such a discussion.(94) Interviews with
personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's clandestine operations section, the
visitors program and the clandestine activity research section failed to result
in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been contacted at any time by the
CIA.(96)
The author of the November 25, 1963, memorandum also informed the committee that
the CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in
which Oswald had worked. This information was stored in the Office of Research
and Reports.(96)
Another former CIA employee, one who had worked in the Soviet branch of the
Foreign Documents Division of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised
the committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding
the Minsk radio plant. In fact, this individual claimed that during the summer
of 1962 he reviewed a contact report from representatives of a CIA field office
who had interviewed a former marine who had worked at the Minsk radio plant
following his defection to the U.S.S.R. This defector, whom the employee
believed may have been Oswald, had been living with his family in Minsk. (97)
The employee advised the committee that the contact report had been filed in a
volume on the Minsk radio plant that should be retrievable from the Industrial
Registry Branch, then a component of the Office of Central Reference.
Accordingly, the committee requested that the CIA provide both the contact
report and the volume of ma-
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209
terials concerning the Minsk radio plant. A review by the committee of the
documents in the volumes on the Minsk radio plant, however, failed to locate any
such contact report. (98)
Since the Minsk radio plant seemed to be a logical subject of CIA concern, the
committee theorized that questions about it would have been included in the
debriefing of defectors. The committee therefor asked the Agency for a statement
regarding its procedures for debriefing defectors. In response, the CIA stated
that between 1958 and 1963 it had no procedure for systematically debriefing
overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead, the Agency relied
upon the FBI both to make such contacts and report any significant results.(99)
To investigate this question further, the committee reviewed the files of 22
other defectors to the Soviet Union (from an original list of 380) who were born
in America and appeared to have returned to the United States between 1958 and
1963.18 Of these 22 individuals, only 4 were interviewed at any time by the CIA.
These four instances tended to involve particular intelligence or
counterintelligence needs, but this was not always the case. (100)
Based on this file review, it appeared to the committee that, in fact, the CIA
did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter of standard operating
procedure. For this reason, the absence of any Agency contact with Oswald on his
return from the Soviet Union could not be considered unusual, particularly since
the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional obligation to conduct defector
interviews.(101)
(12) The Justice Department's failure to prosecute Oswald.-- When Oswald
appeared at the U.S. Embassy on October 31, 1959, to renounce his American
citizenship, he allegedly threatened to give the Soviets information he had
acquired as a Marine Corps radar operator.(102) The committee sought to
determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute Oswald on his return to
the United States for his offer to divulge this kind of information.
A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American Embassy in Moscow
indicates that on February 13, 1961, the embassy received a letter in which
Oswald expressed a "desire to return to the United States if * * * some
agreement [could be reached] concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings
against [him]." (103) On February 28, 1961, the embassy sought guidance from the
State Department concerning Oswald's potential liability to criminal
prosecution.(104) The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961,
that it was
not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his desired return to the
United States he may be amenable to prosecution for any possible offenses
committed in violation of the laws of the United States * * *.(105)
In May 1961 Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a "full guarantee" against the
possibility of prosecution.(106) He visited with Embassy Consul Richard Snyder
on July 16, 1961, and denied that he had ever given any information to the
Soviets. (107) Snyder advised
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Oswald on an informal basis that, while no assurances could be given, the
embassy did not perceive any basis for prosecuting him. (108)
There is no record that the State Department ever gave Oswald any assurances
that he would not be prosecuted. Upon his return to the United States, Oswald
was interviewed twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever having given
information to the Soviet Union. (109)
In response to a committee request, the Department of Justice indicated that
prosecution of Oswald was never considered because his file contained no
evidence that he had ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense
information to the Soviet Union.(110) In a subsequent response, the Department
acknowledged the existence of some evidence that Oswald had offered information
to the Soviet Union, but stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles
to a possible prosecution:
It [the Department file] does contain a copy of an FBI memorandum, dated July 3,
1961, which is recorded as having been received in the Justice Department's
Internal Security Division on December 10, 1963, which states that the files of
the Office of Naval Intelligence contained a copy of a Department of State
telegram, dated October 31, 1959, at Moscow. The telegram, which is summarized
in the FBI report, quoted Oswald as having offered the Soviets any information
he had acquired as a radar operator. The FBI report did not indicate that the
information to which Oswald had access as a radar operator was classified.
Oswald returned to the United States on June 13, 1962. He was interviewed by the
FBI on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Tex., at which time he denied furnishing
any information to the Soviets concerning his Marine Corps experiences. He
stated that he never gave the Soviets any information which would be used to the
detriment of the United States.
In sum, therefore, the only "evidence" that Oswald ever offered to furnish
information to the Soviets is his own reported statement to an official at the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow. That statement, of course, was contradicted by his
denial to the FBI, upon his return to the United States, that he had ever made
such an offer.
In the prosecution of a criminal case, the Government cannot establish a prima
facie case solely on a defendant's unsupported confession. The Government must
introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the defendant's statement. See, Opper v. United States 348
U.S. 84 (1954).
Accordingly, in the absence of any information that Oswald had offered to reveal
classified information to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his
statement that he had proletted information of any kind to the Russians, we did
not consider his prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes 18 U.S.C.
793, 794. (111)
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211
Based upon this analysis, the committee could find no evidence that Oswald
received favorable treatment from either the State Department or the Justice
Department regarding the possibility of criminal prosecution.
(13) Oswald's trip to Russia via London to Helsinki has been a a visa in 2
days.--Oswald's trip from London indicates he arrived in Finland on October 10,
1959. The Torni Hotel in Helsinki, however, had him registered as a guest on
that date, although the only direct flight from London to Helsinki landed at
11:33 p.m. that day. According to a memorandum signed in 1964 by Richard Helms,
"[i]f Oswald had taken this flight, he could not normally have cleared customs
and landing formalities and reached the Torni Hotel downtown by 2400 (midnight)
on the same day." (112) Further questions concerning this segment of Oswald's
trip have been raised because he had been able to obtain a Soviet entry visa
within only 2 days of having applied for it on October 12, 1959.(113)19
The committee was unable to determine the circumstances surrounding Oswald's
trip from London to Helsinki. Louis Hopkins, the travel agent who arranged
Oswald's initial transportation from the United States, stated that he did not
know Oswald's ultimate destination at the time that Oswald boodied his passage
on the freighter Marion Lykes.(114) Consequently, Hopkins had nothing to do with
the London-to-Helsinki leg of Oswald's trip. In fact, Hopkins stated that had he
known Oswald's final destination, he would have suggested sailing on another
ship that would have docked at a port more convenient to Russia.(115) Hopkins
indicated that Oswald did not appear to be particularly well-informed about
travel to Europe. The travel agent did not know whether Oswald had been referred
to him by anyone.(116).
A request for any CIA and Department of Defense files on Louis Hopkins resulted
in a negative response. The committee was unable to obtain any additional
sources of information regarding Oswald's London-to-Helsinki trip.
The relative ease with which Oswald obtained his Soviet Union entry visa was
more readily amenable to investigation. This issue is one that also had been of
concern to the Warren Commission.(117) In a letter to the CIA dated May 25,
1964, J. Lee Rankin inquired about the apparent speed with which Oswald's Soviet
visa had been issued. Rankin noted that he had recently spoken with Abraham
Chayes, legal adviser to the State Department, who maintained that at the time
Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki,
normally at least 1 week would elapse between the time of a tourist's
application and the issuance of a visa. Rankin contended that if Chayes
assessment was accurate, then Oswald's ability to obtain his tourist visa in 2
days might have been significant. (118)
The CIA responded Rankin that the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki 1964. Helms wrote
to Rankin that the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki
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212
was able to issue a transit visa (valid for 24 hours) to U.S. businessmen within
5 minutes, but if a longer stay were intended, at least 1 week was needed to
process a visa application and arrange lodging through Soviet Intourist. (119) A
second communication from Helms to Rankin, dated September 14, 1964, added that
during the 1964 tourist season, Soviet consulates in at least some Western
European cities issued Soviet tourist visas in from 5 to 7 days. (120)
In an effort to resolve this issue, the committee reviewed classified
information pertaining to Gregory Golub, who was the Soviet Consul in Helsinki
when Oswald was issued his tourist visa. This review revealed that, in addition
to his consular activities, Golub was suspected of having been an officer of the
Soviet KGB. Two American Embassy dispatches concerning Golub were of particular
significance with regard to the time necessary for issuance of visas to
Americans for travel into the Soviet Union. The first dispatch recorded that
Golub disclosed during a luncheon conversation that:
Moscow had given him the authority to give Americans visas without prior
approval from Moscow. He [Golub] stated that this would make his job much
easier, and as long as he was convinced the American was "all right" he could
give him a visa in a matter of minutes * * .(121)
The second dispatch, dated October 9, 1959, 1 day prior to Oswald's arrival in
Helsinki, illustrated that Golub did have the authority to issue visas without
delay. The dispatch discussed a telephone contact between Golub and his consular
counterpart at the American Embassy in Helsinki:
* * * Since that evening [September 4, 1959] Golub has only phoned [the U.S.
consul] once and this was on a business matter. Two Americans were in the Soviet
Consulate at the time and were applying for Soviet visas thru Golub. They had
previously been in the American consulate inquiring about the possibility of
obtaining a Soviet visa in 1 or 2 days. [The U.S. Consul] advised them to go
directly to Golub and make their request, which they did. Golub phoned [the U.S.
Consul] to state that he would give them their visas as soon as they made
advance Intourist reservations. When they did this, Golub immediately gave them
their visas * * *.20(122)
Thus, based upon these two factors, (1) Golub's authority to issue visas to
Americans without prior approval from Moscow, and (2) a demonstration of this
authority, as reported in an embassy dispatch approximately 1 month prior to
Oswald's appearance at the Soviet Embassy, the committee found that the
available evidence tends to support the conclusion that the issuance of Oswald's
tourist visa within 2 days after his appearance at the Soviet Consulate was not
indicative of an American intelligence agency connection. 21
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(14) Oswald's contact with Americans in the soviet Union.--Priscilla Johnson
McMillan, author of Marina and Lee," became a subject of the committee's inquiry
because she was one of two American coorespondents who had obtained an interview
with Oswald during his stay in Moscow in 1959. The committee sought to
investigate an allegation that her interview with Oswald may have been arranged
by the CIA.(124)
John McVickar, a consul at the American Embassy, testified that he
had discussed Oswald's case with McMillan, and that he thought "* * *she might
help us in communicating with him and help him in dealing with what appeared to
be a very strong personal problem if she were able to talk with him."(125)
McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any capacity for the CIA,
nor did he believe that McMillan had any such affiliation.(126) McVickar's State
Department and CIA files were consistent with his testimony that he had never
been associated with the CIA.
McMillan gave the following testimony about the events surrounding her interview
with Oswald. In November 1959 she had returned from a visit to the United States
where she covetea the Camp David summit meeting between president Eisenhower and
Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she went to the American Embassy to
pick her mail for the first time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail
pickup facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular Officer John
A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed McMillan back to the Soviet
Union. They exchanged a few words, and, as she was leaving, McVickar commented
that at her hotel was an American who was trying to defect to the Soviet Union.
McVickar stated that the American would not speak to "any of us," but he might
speak to McMillan because she was a woman. She recalled that as she was leaving,
McVickar told her to remember that she was an American.(127)
McMillan proceeded to her hotel, found out the American's room number, knocked
on his door and asked him for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did
not ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her in her room later
that night. (128) No American Government official arranged the actual interview.
McMillan met with Oswald just once. She believed that McVickar called her on
November 17, the day after the interview, and asked her to supper. That evening
they discussed the interview. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald
and believed that the attitude of another American consular official might have
pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection. McVickar indicated a
personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for Oswald to defect in view of
his age, but he did not indicate that this was the U.S. Government's position.
(129)
McMillan also testified that she had never worked for the CIA, nor had she been
connected with any other Federal Government agency at the time of her interview
with Oswald. (130) According to an affidavit that McMillan filed with the
committee, her only employment with the Federal Government was as a 30-day
temporary translator. (131).
Finally, McMillan testified that because of her background in Russian studies,
she applied for a position with the CIA in 1952 as an
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intelligence analyst. The application, however, was withdrawn.(132) She
acknowledged having been debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning
from her third trip to the Soviet Union, but explained that this contact was in
some way related to the confiscation of her notes by Soviet officials. (133)22
The committee's review of CIA files pertaining to Ms. McMillan corroborated her
testimony. There was no indication in these files suggesting that she had ever
worked for the CIA. In fact, the Agency did not even debrief her after her first
two trips to the Soviet Union. An interview with the former Agency official who
had been deputy chief and then chief of the visitors program during the years
1958 to 1961 similarly indicated that McMillan had not been used by the CIA in
the program. (134)
There was information in McMillan's file indicating that on occasion during the
years 1969-65 she had provided cultural and literary information to the CIA.
None of this information was, however, suggestive in any way of a clandestine
relationship. Accordingly, there was no evidence that McMillan ever worked for
the CIA or received the Agency assistance in obtaining an interview with
Oswald.23
Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who
handled the Oswald case. It was Snyder with whom Oswald had met in 1959 when he
sought to renounce his American citizenship.(135) Two years later, when Oswald
initiated his inquiries about returning to the United States, Snyder again
became involved in the case.(136) Warren Commission critics have alleged that
Snyder was associated in some way with the CIA during his service in the Moscow
Embassy.(137)
In his committee deposition, Richard Snyder acknowledged that for a 11-month
period during 1949-50 he worked for the CIA while he was on the waiting list for
a foreign service appointment with the State Department. (138) Snyder testified,
however, that since resigning from the CIA in March 1950, he had had no contact
with the other than a letter written in 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment
on a contractual basis. (139)24
The committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State Department, Defense
Department and the CIA. Both the State Department and Defense Department files
are consistent with his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that, at one time
prior to 1974, it had been red flagged and maintained on a segregated basis. The
file contained
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routing indicator that stated that the file had been red flagged because of a
"DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] statement and a matter of cover"
concerning Snyder.(140)
In response to a committee inquiry, the CIA indicated that the DCI statement
presumably refers to comments which former Director Richard Helms had made in
1964 concerning the Oswald case, when Helms was Deputy Director for Plans25 The
CIA also stated that Snyder's file had been flagged at the request of DDO/CI
(Directorate of Operations/Central Intelligence) to insure that all inquiries
concerning Sayder would be referred to that office. The Agency was unable to
explain the reference to "cover," because, according to its records, Snyder had
never been assigned any cover while employed. Further, the Agency stated that
"[t]here is no record in Snyder's official personnel file that he ever worked,
directly or indirectly, in any capacity for the CIA after his resignation on 26
September 1950."
The committee did not regard this explanation as satisfactory, especially since
Snyder's 201 file indicated that for approximately 1 year during 1956-57 he had
been used by an Agency case officer as a spotter at a university campus because
of his access to others who might be going to the Soviet Union, nor was the
Agency able to explain specifically why someone considered it necessary to red
flag the Snyder file.
The remainder of the Snyder file, however, is consistent, with his testimony
before the committee concerning the absence of Agency contacts. In addition, the
CIA personnel officer who handled Snyder's case in 1950 confirmed that Snyder
had, in fact, terminated his employment with the CIA at that time. Moreover, he
added that Sayder had gone to the State Department as a bona fide employee
without any CIA ties. (143) This position was confirmed by a former State
Department official who was familiar with State Department procedures regarding
CIA employees. In addition, this individual stated that at no time from 1959 to
1963 did the CIA use the State Department's overseas consular positions as cover
for CIA intelligence officers. (144)
The CIA's failure to explain adequately the red-flagging of Snyder's file was
extremely troubling to the committee. Even so, based on Snyder's sworn
testimony, the review of his file and the statements of his former personnel
officer, a finding that he was in contact with Oswald on behalf of the CIA was
not warranted.
Dr. Alexis H. Davison was the U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow from May 1961 to
May 1963. In May 1963, the Soviet Union declared him persona non grata in
connection with his alleged involvement in the Penkovsky case. (145) After the
assassination of President Kennedy, it was discovered that the name of Dr.
Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal Davison, and her Atlanta address were in Oswald's
address book under the heading "Mother of U.S. Embassy Doctor."(146) In
addition, it was determined that the flight that Oswald, his wife and child took
from New York to Dallas on June 14, 1962, had stopped in Atlanta. (147) For this
reason, it has been alleged that Dr. Davison was Oswald's intelligence contact
in Moscow. (148)
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In a committee interview, Dr. Davison stated that he had been a physician in the
U.S. Air Force and was stationed in Moscow as the U.S. Embassy physician from
May 1961 to May 1963. In this capacity, it was his duty to perform physical
examinations on all Soviet immigrants to the United States. He recalled that
most of these immigrants were elderly, but he remembers two young women, one who
was a mathematics teacher from the south of Russia and one who was married to an
American. The individual who was married to the American was frightened by the
prospect of going to the United States. She stated that she was going to Texas
with her husband. Davison told her that if she and her husband traveled through
Atlanta on their way to Texas, his mother, a native-born Russian, would be happy
to see her. He gave his mother's name and address in Atlanta to the woman's
husband, who was "scruffy looking." This was not an unusual thing to do, since
his family had always very hospitable to Russians who visited Atlanta. In
retrospect, he assumed that he gave his mother's name and address to either Lee
or Marina Oswald, but he was uncertain about this. (149)
After the assassination of President Kennedy, Davison was interviewed first by a
Secret Service agent and later by an FBI agent in connection with the entry of
his mother's name and address in Oswald's address book. The FBI agent also
interviewed Davison's mother, Natalia Alekseevna Davison. Davison indicated that
the Secret Service and the FBI were the only Government agencies to interview
him about his contact with the Oswalds. (150)
Davison stated that in connection with his assignment as U.S. Embassy physician
in Moscow, he had received some superficial intelligence training. This training
mainly involved lectures on Soviet life and instructions on remembering and
reporting Soviet names and military activities. (151)
Davison admitted his involvement in the Penkovsky spy case. During his tour of
duty in Moscow, Davison was asked by an Embassy employee, whose name he no
longer remembered, to observe a certain lamppost on his daily route between his
apartment and the Embassy and to be alert for a signal by telephone. Davison
agreed, According to his instructions, if he ever saw a black chalk mark on the
lamppost, or if he ever received a telephone call in which the caller blew into
the receiver three times, he was to notify a person whose name he also no longer
remembered. He was told nothing else about the operation. Davison performed his
role for approximately 1 year. On just one occasion, toward the end of his stay
in the Soviet Union, he observed the mark on the lamppost and his wife received
the telephone signal. As instructed, he reported these happenings. Shortly
thereafter, the Soviets reported that they had broken the Penkovsky spying
operation. The Soviets declared Davison persona non grata just after he left
Moscow, his tour of duty having ended. He did not recall any intelligence
debriefings on the Penkovsky case. (152)
Davison denied under oath participating in any other intelligence work during
his tour in Moscow. (153) The deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia
clandestine activities section from 1960 to 1962 confirmed Davison's position,
characterizing his involvement in the Penkovsky case as a "one shot" deal. (154)
In addition, a review of Davison's CIA
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and Department of Defense files showed them to be consistent with his committee
testimony.
Accordingly, there was as insufficient evidence for concluding that Dr. Davison
was an intelligence contact for Oswald in Moscow.
(15) Alleged intelligence contacts after Oswald returned from Russia.--George de
Mohrenschildt was an enigmatic man--a geologist-businessman who befriended
Oswald in Texas in 1962,(155) thus causing considerable speculation based on the
contrasting backgrounds of the two men. De Mohrenschildt, who committed suicide
in 1977, was sophisticated and well educated, a man who moved easily among
wealthy Texas oilmen and a circle of white Russians in Dallas many of whom were
avowed conservatives. Oswald, because of his background and his Marxist
ideological positions, was shunned by most of the people de Mohrenschildt
counted among his friends.
In his Warren Commission testimony, de Mohrenschildt stated that he believed he
had discussed Oswald with J. Walton Moore, whom he described as "a Government
man--either FBI or Central Intelligence."(156) He said that Moore was known as
the head of the FBI in Dallas and that Moore had interviewed him in 1957 when he
returned from a trip to Yugoslavia. (157) De Mohrenschildt indicated that he had
asked Moore and Fort Worth attorney Max Clark about. Oswald, to reassure himself
that it was "safe" for the de Mohrenschildts to assist him and was told by one
of these persons, "The guy seems to be OK"(158) This admitted association with
J. Walton Moore, an empployee of the CIA, gave rise to the question of whether
de Mohrenschildt had contacted Oswald on behalf of the CIA. (159)
In 1963 J. Walton Moore was employed by the CIA in Dallas in the Domestic
Contacts Division. (160) According to Moore's CIA personnel file, he had been
assigned to the division in 1948. During the period April 1, 1963, to March 31,
1964, he was an overt CIA employee assigned to contact persons traveling abroad
for the purpose of eliciting information they might obtain. He was not part of a
covert or clandestine operation.
In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977, contained in do Mohrenschildt's
CIA file, Moore set forth facts to counter a claim that had been recently made
by a Dallas television station that Oswald had been employed by the CIA and that
Moore had known him. In that memorandum, Moore was quoted as saying that,
according to his records, the last time he had talked with de Mohrenschildt was
in the fall of 1961. Moore said that he had no recollection of any conversation
with de Mohrenschildt concerning Oswald. The memorandum also said that Moore
recalled only two occasions when he had met de Mohrenschildt--first, in the
spring of 1958, to discuss a mutual interest in China, and then in the fall of
1961, when de Mohrenschildt and his wife showed films of their Latin American
walking trip. (161)
Other documents in de Mohrenschildt's CIA file, however. indicated more contact
with Moore than was stated in the 1977 memorandum. In a memorandum dated May 1,
1964, submitted to the Acting Chief of the Domestic Contacts Division of the
CIA, Moore stated that he had known de Mohrenschildt and his wife since 1957, at
which time Moore obtained biographical data on de Mohrenschildt following his
trip to Yugoslavia for the International Cooperation Administration. Moore
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also wrote in that 1964 memorandum that he had seen de Mohrenschildt several
times in 1958 and 1959. De Mohrenschildt's CIA file contained several reports
submitted by de Mohrenschildt to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavia. (162)
De Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that he had never been
in any respect an intelligence agent. (163) Further, the committee's interview
with Moore and its review of the CIA's Moore and de Mohrenschildt files showed
no evidence that de Mohrenschildt had ever been an American intelligence agent.
(In this regard, the committee noted that during 1959-63, upon returning from
trips abroad, as many as 25,000 Americans annually provided information to the
CIA's Domestic Contacts Division on a nonclandestine basis. (164) Such acts of
cooperation should not be confused with an actual Agency relationship).26
Prior to visiting Mexico in September 1963, Oswald applied in New Orleans for a
Mexican tourist card. The tourist card immediately preceding his in numerical
sequence was issued on September 17, 1963, (167) to William G. Gaudet, a
newspaper editor. Two days later, Gauet departed on a 3- or 4-week trip to
Mexico and other Latin American countries.(168) This happened to coincide with
Oswald's visit to Mexico City between September 27, 1963, and October 3,
1963.(169) After the assassination, Gaudet advised the FBI during an interview
that he had once been employed by the CIA.(170) Speculation about Gaudet's
possible relationship with Oswald arose when it was discovered that the Warren
Commission Report contained a list, provided by the Mexican Government,
purporting to include all individuals who had been issued Mexican tourist cards
at the same time as Oswald, a list that omitted Gaudet's name. (171)
In a committee deposition, Gaudet testified that his contact with the CIA was
primarily as a source of information (obtained during his trips abroad). In
addition, he explained that he occasionally performed errands for the Agency.
(172) Gaudet stated that his last contact with the CIA was in 1969, although the
relationship had never been formally terminated. (173)
The committee reviewed Gaudet's CIA file but found neither any record reflecting
a contact between him and the Agency after 1961, nor any indication that he had
"performed errands" for the CIA. A memorandum, dated January. 23, 1976, also
indicated the absence of any further contact after this time:
The Domestic Collections Division (DCD) has an inactive file on William George
Gaudet, former editor and publisher of the Latin American Report. The file shows
that Gaudet was a source of the New Orleans DCD (Domestic Contacts Division)
Resident Office from 1948 to 1955 during which period he provided foreign
intelligence information on Latin American political and economic conditions
resulting from his extensive travel in South and Central America in pursuit
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of journalistic interests. The file further indicates that Gaudet was a casual
contact of the New Orleans Office between 1955 and 1961 when, at various times,
he furnished fragmentary intelligence.(174)
Gaudet said he could not recall whether his trip to Mexico and other Latin
American countries in 1963 involved any intelligence-related activity. (175) He
was able to testify, however, that during that trip he did not encounter Oswald,
whom he had previously observed on occasion at the New Orleans Trade
Mart.(176)27 Gaudet stated that he was unaware at the time his Mexican tourist
card was issued that it immediately preceded Oswald's, and he could not recall
having seen Oswald on that day.(177) Finally, Gaudet said he did not have any
information concerning the omission of his name from the list published in the
Warren Commission Report. (178)
Based upon this evidence, the committee did not find a basis for concluding that
Gaudet had contacted Oswald on behalf of the CIA. Although there was a conflict
between Gaudet's testimony and his CIA file concerning the duration of his
Agency contacts as well as the performance of errands, there was no indication
from his file or testimony that Gaudet's cooperation involved clandestine
activity. Again, it should be stressed that the Domestic Contacts Division,
which was the Agency component that was in touch with Gaudet, was not involved
in clandestine operations.
(16) Alleged intelligence implications of Oswald's military service--The
committee reviewed Oswald's military records because allegations that he had
received intelligence training and had participated in intelligence operations
during his term of Marine service.(179) particular attention was given to the
charges that Oswald's early discharge from the corps was designed to serve as a
cover for an intelligence assignment and that his records reflected neither his
true security clearance nor a substantial period of service in Taiwan. These
allegations were considered relevant to the question of whether Oswald had been
performing intelligence assignments for military intelligence, as well as to the
issue of Oswald's possible association with the CIA.
Oswald's Marine Corps records bear no indication that he ever received any
intelligence training or performed any intelligence assignments during his term
of service. As a Marine serving in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald had a security
clearance of confidential, but never received a higher classification.(180) In
his Warren Commission testimony, John E. Donovan, the officer who had been in
charge of Oswald's crew at the El Toro Marine base in California, stated that
all personnel working in the radar center were required to have a minimum
security clearance of secret (181) Thus, the allegation has been made that the
security clearance of confidential in Oswald's records is inaccurate. The
committee however, reviewed files belonging to four enlisted men who had worked
with Oswald either in Japan or California and found that each of them had a
security clearance of confidential.(182) 28
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It has been stated that Oswald claimed to have served in Taiwan. (183) The
committee's review of his military records, including unit diaries that were not
previously studied by the Warren Commission, indicated, however, that he had not
spent substantial time, if any, in Taiwan. These records show that, except for a
3 1/2 month period of service in the Philippines, Oswald served in Japan from
September 12, 1957, until November 2, 1958. (184) Although Department of Defense
records do indicate that MAG (Marine Air Group) 11, Oswald's unit, was deployed
to Taiwan on September 16, 1958, and remained in that area until April 1959, an
examination of the MAG 11 unit diaries indicated that Oswald was assigned at
that time to a rear echelon unit. (185) The term rear echelon does not, on its
face, preclude service with the main unit in Taiwan, but the Department of
Defense has specifically stated that "Oswald did not sail from Yokosuka, Japan
on September 16, 1958. He remained aboard NAS Atsugi as part of the MAG-11 rear
echelon." 29(186)
Oswald's records also reflect that on October 6, 1958, he was transferred within
MAG 11 to a Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron subunit in Atsugi, Japan.
(187) He reportedly spent the next week in the Atsugi Station Hospital. (188) On
November 2, 1958, Oswald left Japan for duty in the United States. (189)
Accordingly, based upon a direct examination of Oswald's unit diaries, as well
as his own-military records, it does not appear that he had spent any time in
Taiwan. This finding is contrary to that of the Warren Commission that Oswald
arrived with his unit in Taiwan on September 30, 1958, and remained there
somewhat less than a week,(190) but the Commission's analysis apparently was
made without access to the unit diaries of MAG 11.30
Moreover, even if Oswald, in fact, did make the trip with his unit to Taiwan, it
is clear that any such service there was not for a substantial time. The unit
arrived at Atsugi on September 30, 1958, and by November 2, 1958, Oswald had
left from Japan to complete his tour of duty in the United States. (191)
Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding Oswald's rapid
discharge from the military do not appear to have been unusual. Oswald was
obligated to serve on active duty until December 7, 1959, but on August 17 he
applied for a hardship discharge to support his mother. About 2 weeks later the
application was approved. (193) 31
It appeared that Oswald's hardship discharge application was processed so
expeditiously because it was accompanied by all of the necessary documentation.
In response to a committee inquiry, the Department of Defense stated that "...
to a large extent, the time involved m processing hardship discharge
applications depended on how well the individual member had prepared the
documentation needed for
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consideration of his or her case."(195) A review of Oswald's case indicates that
his initial hardship discharge application was accompanied by all of the
requisite documentation. Oswald had met the, preliminary requirements of having
made a voluntary contribution to the hardship dependent (his mother) and of
applying for a dependent's quarters allotment 32 to alleviate the hardship.
(196) Even though all of the supporting affidavits for the quarters allotment
had not been submitted at the time that the hardship discharge application was
filed, the endorsements on the application indicated that the reviewing officers
were aware that both the requisite voluntary contribution and the application
for a quarters allotment had been made. (197) Moreover, that application was
accompanied by two letters and two affidavits attesting to Marguerite Oswald's
inability to support herself. (198)
Documents provided to the committee by the American Red Cross indicate that
Oswald had sought its assistance and therefore was probably well advised on the
requisite documentation to support his claim.(199) Indeed, Red Cross officials
interviewed Marguerite Oswald and concluded that she "could not be considered
employable from an emotional standpoint."(200) The Fort Worth Red Cross office
indicated a quarters allotment was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than
a hardship discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the preparation of the
necessary application documents.(201) Nevertheless, Oswald informed the Red
Cross office in El Toro, Calif., where he was then stationed, that he desired to
apply for a hardship discharge. (202)
The unusual aspect of Oswald's discharge application was that, technically, his
requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother should have been
disallowed because Marguerite's dependency affidavit stated that Oswald had not
contributed any money to her during the preceding year. (203) Even so, the first
officer to review Oswald's application noted in his endorsement, dated August
19, 1959, that "[a] genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my opinion
approval of the 'Q' [quarters] allotment will not sufficiently alleviate this
situation."(204) This quotation suggests the possibility that applications for
quarters allotments and hardship discharges are considered independently of one
another. In addition, six other officers endorsed Oswald's application.(205) The
committee was able to contact three of the seven endorsing officers (one had
died); two had no memory of the event,(206) and one could not recall any
details. (207) The committee considered their absence of memory to be indicative
of the Oswald, case having been handled in a routine manner.
Based on this evidence, the committee was not able to discern any unusual
discrepancies or features in Oswald's military record.
(17) Oswald's military intelligence file.--On November 22, 1963, soon after the
assassination, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Jones, operations officer of the
U.S. Army's 112th Military Intelligence Group Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio,
Tex. contacted the FBI offices in San Antonio and Dallas and gave those offices
detailed information concerning Oswald and A. J. Hidell, Oswald's alleged alias.
(208) This information suggested the existence of a military intelli-
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gence file on Oswald and raised the possibility that he had intelligence
associations of some kind. (209)
The committee's investigation revealed that military. intelligence officials had
opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible
counterintelligence threat. Robert E. Jones testified before the committee that
in June 1963 he had been serving as operations officer of the 112th Military
Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Tex. 33 Under the group's control were
seven regions encompassing five States: Texas, Louisiana. Arkansas, New Mexico
and Oklahoma. Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations,
background investigations, domestic intelligence and any special operations in
this five-State area. (210) He believed that Oswald first came to his attention
in mid-1963 through information provided to the 112th MIG by the New Orleans
Police Department to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in
connection with Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities. (211) As a result of
this information, the 112th Military Intelligence Group took an interest in
Oswald as a possible counterintelligence threat.(212) It collected information
from local agencies and the military central records facility, and opened a file
under the names Lee Harvey Oswald and A.J. Hidell.(213) Placed in this file were
documents and newspaper articles on such topics as Oswald's defection to the
Soviet Union, his travels there, his marriage to a Russian national, his return
to the United States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans.
Jones related that on November 22, 1963. while in his quarters at Fort Sam
Houston, he heard about the assassination of President Kennedy. (215) Returning
immediately to his office, he contacted MIG personnel in Dallas and instructed
them to intensify their liaisons with Federal, State and local agencies and to
report back any information obtained. Early that afternoon, he received a
telephone call from Dallas advising that an A.J. Hidell had been arrested or had
come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked the MIG
indexes, which indicated that there was a file on Lee Harvey Oswald, also known
by the name A. J. Hidell.(216) Pulling the file, he telephoned the local FBI
office in San Antonio to notify the FBI that he had some information. (217) He
soon was in telephone contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he summarized
the documents in the file. He believed that one person with whom he spoke was
FBI Special-Agent-in-Charge J. Gordon Shanklin. He may have talked with the
Dallas FBI office more than one time that day. (218)
Jones testified that his last activity with regard to the Kennedy assassination
was to write an "after action" report that summarized the actions he had taken,
the people he had notified and the times of notification. (219) In addition,
Jones believed that this "after action" report included information obtained
from reports filed by the military intelligence agents who performed liaison
functions with the Secret Service in Dallas on the day of the assassination.
(220) This "after action" report was then maintained in the Oswald file.(221)
Jones did not contact, nor was he contacted by, any other law enforce-
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ment or intelligence agencies concerning information that he could provide on
Oswald. (222) To Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement
agency ever requested a copy of the military intelligence file on Oswald. (223)
To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA nor Warren Commission ever
interviewed him. (224) No one ever directed him to withhold any information; on
the other hand, he never came forward and offered anyone further information
relevant to the assassination investigation because he "felt that the
information that [he] had provided was sufficient and ...a matter of record.
..."(225)
The committee found Jones' testimony to be credible. His statements concerning
the contents of the Oswald file were consistent with FBI communications that
were generated as a result of the information that he initially provided. Access
to Oswald's military intelligence file, which the Department of Defense never
gave to the Warren Commission, was not possible because the Department of
Defense had destroyed the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating
all of its files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel. In response to a committee
inquiry, the Department of Defense gave the following explanation for the file's
destruction:
1. Dossier AB 652876, Oswald, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRR
(Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings on Julian date 73060 (1 March 1973)
as stamped on the microfilmed dossier cover. It is not possible to determine the
actual date when physical destruction was accomplished, but is credibly surmised
that the destruction was accomplished within a period not greater than 60 days
following the identification for deletion. Evidence such as the type of deletion
record available, the individual clerk involved in the identification, and the
projects in progress at the time of deletion, all indicate the dossier deletion
resulted from the implementation of a Department of the Army, Adjutant General
letter dated 1 June 1971, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons
and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD) (Incl 1).
Basically, the letter called for the elimination of files on non-DOD affiliated
persons and organizations.
2. It is not possible to determine who accomplished the actual physical
destruction of the dossier. The individual identifying the dossier for deletion
can be determined from the clerk number appearing on the available deletion
record. The number indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identifying clerk.
Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969 until late 1973, at which time she
transferred to the Defense Investigative Service, Fort Holdbird, Md., where she
is still a civil service employee. The individual ordering the destruction or
deletion cannot be determined. However, available evidence indicates that the
dossier was identified for deletion under a set of criteria applied by IRR
clerks to all files. The basis for these criteria were [sic] established in the
1 June 1971 letter. There is no indication that the dossier was specifically
identified for review or deletion. All evidence shows that the file was
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reviewed as part of a generally applied program to eliminate any dossier
concerning persons not affiliated with DOD.
3. The exact material contained in the dossier cannot be determined at this
time. However, discussions with all available persons who recall seeing the
dossier reveal that it most probably included: newspaper clippings relating to
pro-Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal Bureau of Investigation reports,
and possibly some Army counterintelligence reports. None of the persons
indicated that they remember any significant information in the dossier. It
should be noted here that the Army was not asked to investigate the
assassination. Consequently, any Army-derived information was turned over to the
appropriate civil authority.
4. At the time of the destruction of the Oswald dossier, IRR was operating under
the records disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum to Secretaries of
the Military Departments, OASD(A), 9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal
Authority (Incl 2). The memorandum forwards National Archivist disposal criteria
which is similar in nature to the requirements outlined in the 1 June 1971
instructions. It was not until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria to
ensure non-destruction of investigative records that may be of historical value.
(226)
Upon receipt of this information, the committee orally requested the destruction
order relating to the file on Oswald. In a letter dated September 13, 1978, the
General Counsel of the Department of the Army replied that no such order
existed:
Army regulations do not require any type of specific order before intelligence
files can be destroyed, and none was prepared in connection with the destruction
of the Oswald file. As a rule, investigative information on persons not directly
affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained in Army files only for
short periods of time and in carefully regulated circumstances. The Oswald file
was destroyed routinely in accordance with normal files management procedures,
as are thousands of intelligence files annually.(227)
The committee found this "routine" destruction of the Oswald file extremely
troublesome, especially when viewed in light of the Department of Defense's
failure to make this file available to the Warren Commission. Despite the
credibility of Jones' testimony, without access to this file, the question of
Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence could not be fully
resolved.
(18) The Oswald photograph in Office of Naval Intelligence files.--The Office of
Naval Intelligence's (ONI) Oswald file cantamed a photograph of Oswald, taken at
the approximate time of his Marine Corps reduction. It was contained in an
envelope that had on it the language "REC'D 14 November 1963" and "CIA 77978."
(228) These markings raised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way
associated with the CIA.
In response to it committee inquiry, the Department of Defense stated that the
photograph had been obtained by ONI as a result of
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an October 4, 1963 CIA request for two copies of the most recent photographs of
Oswald so that an attempt could be made to verify his reported presence in
Mexico City. The requested copies, however, were Pot made available to the CIA
until after the President's assassination. 34 Because of the absence of
documentation, no explanation could be given for how or when the Office of Naval
Intelligence received this particular photograph of Oswald. (229)
The committee's review of CIA cable traffic confirmed that cable No. 77978,
dated October 24, 1963, was in fact a request for two copies of the Department
of the Navy's most recent photograph of Lee Henry [sic] Oswald. Moreover, review
of other cable traffic corroborated the Agency's desire to determine whether Lee
Harvey Oswald had, in fact, been in Mexico City. (230)
The committee concluded, therefore, that the ONI photograph of Oswald bearing a
reference to the CIA, was not evidence that Oswald was a CIA agent. Again,
however, the destruction of the military file on Oswald prevented the committee
from resolving the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military
intelligence.
(19) Oswald in Mexico City.--The committee also considered whether Oswald's
activities in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 were indicative of a relationship
between him and the CIA. This aspect of the committee's investigation involved a
complete review both of alleged Oswald associates and of various CIA operations
outside of the United States. (231)
The committee found no evidence of any relationship between Oswald and the CIA.
Moreover, the Agency's investigative efforts prior to the assassination
regarding Oswald's presence in Mexico City served to confirm the absence of any
relationship with him. Specifically, when apprised of his possible presence in
Mexico City, the Agency both initiated internal inquiries concerning his
background and, once informed of his Soviet experience, notified other
potentially interested Federal agencies of his possible contact with the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City. (232)
Conclusion
Based on the committee's entire investigation, it concluded that the Secret
Service, FBI and CIA were not involved in the assassination. The committee
concluded that it is probable that the President was assassinated as a result of
a conspiracy. Nothing in the committee's investigation pointed to official
involvement in that conspiracy. While the committee frankly acknowledged that
its investigation was not able to identify the members of the conspiracy besides
Oswald, or the extent of the conspiracy, the committee believed that it did not
include the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Central
Intelligence Agency.
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President John F. Kennedy did not Receive Adequate Protection
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D. AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PERFORMED WITH VARYING
DEGREES OF COMPETENCY IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR DUTIES; PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE PROTECTION; A THOROUGH AND RELIABLE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD FOR THE ASSASSNATION
WAS CONDUCTED; THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSPIRACY IN THE
ASSASSINATION WAS INADEQUATE; THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS WERE ARRIVED
AT IN GOOD FAITH, BUT PRESENTED IN A FASHION THAT WAS TOO DEFINITIVE
1. THE SECRET SERVICE WAS DEFICIENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS DUTIES
The assassination of President Kennedy was the first and only such crime since
the Secret Service was assigned responsibility for full-time protection of the
President in 1901, as a result of the assassination of William McKinley.(1) When
originally formed in 1865, the Secret Service had not been given responsibility
for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered.
(2) Its primary purpose was to deal with counterfeiting, which had become a
national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national currency
was adopted. (3) By the end of the 1860's, the new agency had all but eliminated
the problem. (4)
For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various
criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's
(5) Spanish espionage in the 1890's(6) organized crime in New York City in the
1880's and 1890's (7) and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the
century. (8)
Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary purpose, the
Secret Service was not always given the necessary annual appropriations to carry
out the task. (9) It was not until 1908 that the agency's mission was better
defined (10) and, at that, for an ironic reason. When the Secret Service exposed
the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several
Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the Agency
and creating a new Federal law enforcement body that ultimately would become the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (11) Indeed, the original FBI men were eight
agents transferred from the Secret Service. (12)
The law left the Secret Service with two concerns: Treasury matters, or
counterfeiting, and protection of the President. (13) On occasion, however, it
was given special assignments. During World War I, the Agency was concerned with
German saboteurs, (14) and in 1921 it investigated the roles of Secretary of the
Interior Albert B. Fall and Atty. Gen. Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome
Scandal.(15) From about 1930 on, however, the Secret Service was an
anticounterfeiting agency with file additional assignment of protecting the
President. In its protective role, on only two occasions before November 22,
1963, was it tested by an actual assault on a President.
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In February 1932, the car in which president Roosevelt was riding was fired on
in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Anton Cermak. (16) In November 1950,
members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party tried to force their way into
Blair House, the temporary home of president Truman.(17)
(a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed,
investigated, or used by the Secret Service in connection with the president's
trip to Dallas; in addition, Secret Serv ice agents in the motorcade were
inadequately prepared to protect the president from a sniper.
President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a
policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, startlingly so in comparison with
the cautious approach of President Eisenhower.(18) His personal style was known
to cause agents assigned to him deep concern. He traveled more frequently than
any of his predecessors, and he relished contact with crowds of well-wishers. He
scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger
of assult philosophically.(19) If someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it
would be very difficult to prevent.(20) Commenting on the relationship between
the President and the Secret Swervice, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell
told Gerald Behn, Special Agent-in-Charge of the White House detail, "Politics
and protection don't mix."(21)
The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White
House Detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents.(22) In addition,
there were six special agent-drivers, eight special agents assigned to the
Kennedy family and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy home in
Hyannisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the
Presidential entourage.(23)
In all, out of 552 employees in November 1963, there were 70 special agents and
8 clerks--or 14 percent of the total Secret Service work force--assigned to
protect the President and vice President directly or to the Protective Research
Section, a preventive intelligence division charged with gathering and
evaluating threat information and seeing that it is usefully disseminated.(24)
In addition, there were 30 employees in the office of the Chief of the Secret
Service, plus 313 agents and 131 clerks in 66 field offices, all of whom were on
call to assist in presidential protection.(25)
The time when the most manpower was needed in 1963 (as it was in 1978) was when
the President traveled and was exposed to crowds of people in open spaces. On
such occasions, the Secret Service called on municipal, county, and State law
enforcement agencies for personnel who assisted in the preparation of
large-scale protective plans.(26)
(1) The committee approach.--From the beginning of its investigation of the
Secret Service, the committee realized the great importance of the Protective
Research Section, renamed the Office of Protective Research in October 1965.
This office is the memory of the Secret Service and is responsible for analyzing
threat data.(27) By reviewing PRS files and interviewing its personnel, the
committee sought to clarify just how much the Secret Service knew about the
nature and degree of the dangers the President faced in the fall of 1963 and to
learn what protective tactics had been devised in response to them.
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The committee took care to distinguish between major and minor threats to the
President in order that it could concentrate on the followup action to the
significant ones. A threat was considered major if: (a) it was verbal or
communicated by a threatening act, or (b) it created a danger great enough to
require either an in-depth and intense investigation by the Secret Service or
other law enforcement agency, or a cancellation or alteration of the President's
planned trip itinerary.
The Committee examined all threat profile investigations from March to December
1963 and incorporated into its analysis information on some major threat
activities dating back to March 1961.(28)
The committee also considered the following questions in its investigation of
Secret Service threat activity files, questions raised by the Kennedy
assassination itself:
Were there indications of a conspiracy behind threats to harm persons under
Secret Service protection?
Was there information developed in investigations of earlier threats that might
have been useful in the investigation of the assassination?
Was the pertinent information in Secret Service files made available to the
Warren Commission?
The committee began its investigation of Secret Service performance by reviewing
the Warren Commission's findings on it. Although the Commission had considered
both the question of intelligence gathering and threat identification and the
question of physical protection, it had relied primarily on a study conducted by
the Secret Service in response to the President's assassination and to limited
questioning of Secret Service personnel in depositions and hearings. The
Commission's findings, in turn, stressed inadequate liaison between the Secret
Service and other Government agencies in intelligence-gathering; (29) the need
for broader criteria and automatic data processing in the assimilation of
intelligence data by the Protective Research Section; (30) and the need for
closer working arrangements between the PRS and the advance survey teams that
handled preparations for Presidential trips. (31)
With respect to physical protection of the President, the Commission found that
some aspects could have been improved, citing specifically the need for closer
coordination and clearer definition of responsibilities among Secret Service
headquarters, advance and protective detail agents, and local police
authorities; (32) the failure to arrange for prior inspection of buildings along
the motorcade route; (33) and a lack of discipline and bad judgment by some
members of the Secret Service protective detail in Dallas, who were drinking on
the night before the assassination. (34)
In its investigation, the committee relied heavily on Protective Research
Section files. In addition, it took extensive testimony under oath from agents
and officials who occupied pertinent positions in the Secret Service in 1963.
The committee's investigation confirmed that the Warren Commission's suggestions
for improved Secret Service performance were well founded. The committee also
noted that there were additional issues not addressed by the Warren Commission.
One important one not analyzed by the Commission was whether the information
that the Secret Service did possess prior to November 22, 1963, was properly
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analyzed and acted upon. The committee found that the Secret Service did in fact
possess information that was not properly analyzed and disseminated within the
Secret Service. Consequently, it was not put to use with respect either to a
protective investigation or to physical protection of President Kennedy in
advance of the trip to Dallas.
The Warren Commission had found that the Secret Service should have taken a
broader view of information that was considered a threat to the President. (35)
The committee also took a closer look st Secret Service files to see if they
contained what could have been recognized as significant threats that were
simply overlooked in connection with the Dallas trip.
The committee discovered that the 1963 Protective Research Section files had
since been summarized and computerized, (36) and the origifiles then destroyed.
The committee thus reviewed the computerized summaries of PRS case files for the
period March to December 1963.(37) The summaries indicated that during this
period, the PRS received information on over 400 possible threats to the
President, approximately 20 percent of which could have been attributed to
political motivation. The committee then reviewed the trip files for 1963 to
determine which threats the Secret Service had recognized as significant. (38)
Although there are other concepts of significance, the cornmittee decided to
limit its review to those that actually caused cancellation of a trip, an
alteration of the President's planned itinerary, or an intensive preliminary
investigative effort by the Secret Service. By limiting the definition in this
way, the committee believed it could reach a clear determination of the manner
in which the Secret Service responded to significant threats.
The Secret Service "trip files" actually consisted of two basic documents a
preliminary survey report, reflecting the basic plans for a trip, and a final
survey report, prepared after a trip had been compieted, and incorporating any
changes that had been made in the original plan. (39) These files were intended
by the Secret Service to reflect principal problems encountered on each trip. A
comparison of the preliminary and final reports should have revealed not only
alterations of the President's itinerary, but the reasons for such changes.
Because the final survey reports did not always reveal the specific nature of
threats,(40) other files on investigations conducted prior to the President's
trips in 1963 were also reviewed, and interviews with agents who worked on each
trip were conducted.
(2) Significant threats in 1963.--The committee's review determined there were
three significant threats to the President in the March to December 1963 period:
first, a postcard warned that he would be assassinated while riding in a
motorcade this resulted in additional protection being provided when the
President went to Chicago in March;(41) second, a threat in connection with a
November 2 trip to Chicago that was canceled;(42) third, a threat in connection
with a trip to Miami on November 18, (43) 1 resulting in an extensive
preliminary investigation. The nature of the threats on November 2 and November
18 revealed these had been the reason for the Secret Service.
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to have investigated individuals identified with them in terms of future danger
to the president. (45)
The committee was unable to determine specifically why the President's trip to
Chicago, scheduled for November 2, was canceled. The possibilities range from
the condition of his health(46) to concern for the situation in South Vietnam
following the assassination of President Diem (47) to the threat received on
October 30.(48) On that date, the Secret Service learned that an individual
named Thomas Arthur Vallee, a Chicago resident who was outspokenly opposed to
President Kennedy's foreign policy, was in possession of several weapons.(49)
Further, Vallee's landlady reported that he had requested time off from his job
on November 2.(50) Vallee was subsquently interviewed, surveilled and eventually
arrested by the Chicago police, who found an M-1 rifle, a handgun and 3,000
rounds of ammunition in his automobile. (51) Vallee was released from custody on
the evening of November 2. (52)
The committee found that the Secret Service learned more about Vallee prior to
the President's trip to dallas on November 22: he was a Marine Corps veteran
with a history of mental illness while on active duty;(53) he was a member of
the John Birch Society(54) and an extremist in his criticism of the Kennedy
administration;(55) and he claimed to be an expert marksman.(56) further, he
remained a threat after November 2, because he had been released from jail.(57)
The committee also learned that the information the Secret Service obtained on
Vallee was not forwarded to the agents responsible for the President's trip to
Texas on November 21-22, although it was transmitted to Protective Research
Section upon receipt on October 30.(58) The potential significance of Vallee as
a threat was illustrated by the Secret Service's reports, which included a
notation on November 27, 1963 of the similarity between his background and that
of Lee Harvey Oswald,(59) and a record of extensive, continued investigation of
Vallee's activities until 1968.(60)
In addition, the committee obtained the testimony of a former Secret Service
agent, Abraham Bolden, who had been assigned to the Chicago office in 1963. He
alleged that shortly before November 2, the FBI sent a teletype message to the
Chicago Secret Service office stating that an attempt to assassinate the
President would be made on November 2 by a four-man team using high-powered
rifles, and that at least one member of the team had a Spanish-sounding
name.(61) Bolden claimed that while he did not personally participate in
surveillance of the subjects, he learned about a surveillance of the four by
monitoring Secret Service radio channels in his automobile and by observing one
of the subjects being detained in his Chicago office.(62)
According to Bolden's account, the Secret Service succeeded in locating and
surveillance two of the threat subjects who,(63) when they discovered they were
being watched, were arrested and detained on the evening of November 1 in the
Chicago Secret Service office.(64)
The committee was unable to document the existence of the alleged assassination
team. Specifically, no agent who had been assigned to Chicago confirmed any
aspect of Bolden's version.(65) One agent did state there had been a threat in
Chicago during that period, but he was unable to recall details.(66) Bolden did
not link Vallee to the supposed
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four-man assassination team, although he claimed to remember Vallee's name in
connection with a 1963 Chicago case. (67) He did not recognize Vallee's
photograph when shown it by the committee. (68)
The questionable authenticity of the Bolden account notwithstanding, the
committee believed the Secret Service failed to make appropriate use of the
information supplied it by the Chicago threat in early November 1963.
Similarly, the Secret Service failed to follow up fully on a threat in Miami,
also in November 1963. On November 9, 1963, an informant for the Miami police,
William Somersett, had secretly recorded a conversation with a rightwing
extremist named Joseph A. Milteer, who suggested there was a plot in existence
to assassinate the President with a high-powered rifle from a tall building.
(69) Miami Police intelligence officers met with Secret Service agents on
November 12 and provided a transcript of the Somersett recording. (70) It read
in part:
SOMERSETT. I think Kennedy is coming here November 18 to make some kind of
speech. I don't know what it is, but I imagine it will be on TV.
MILTEER. You can bet your bottom dollar he is going to have a lot to say about
the Cubans; there are so many of them here.
SOMMERSETT. Well, he'll have a thousand bodyguards, don't worry about that.
MILTEER. The more bodyguards he has, the easier it-is to get him.
SOMERSETT. What?
MILTEER. The more bodyguards he has, the easier it is to get him.
SOMERSETT. Well, how in the hell do you figure would be the best way to get him?
MILTEER. From an office building with a high-powered rifle.
* * * * * *
SOMERSETT. They are really going to try to kill him?
MILTEER. Oh, yeah; it is in the working.
* * * * * *
SOMERSETT. * * * Hitting this Kennedy is going to be a hard proposition. I
believe you may have figured out a way to get him, the office building and all
that. I don't know how them Secret Service agents cover all them office
buildings everywhere he is going. Do you know whether they do that or not?
MILTEER. Well, if they have any suspicion, they do that, of course. But without
suspicion, chances are that they wouldn't.
During the meeting at which the Miami Police Department provided this transcript
to the Secret Service, it also advised the Secret Service that Milteer had been
involved with persons who professed a dislike for President Kennedy and were
suspected of having committed violent acts, including the bombing of a
Birmingham, Ala. church in which four young girls had been killed. They also
reported that Milteer was connected with several radical rightwing organizations
and traveled extensively throughout the United States in support of their views.
(71)
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Although it would have been possible to read Milteer's threats as hollow
speculation, the Secret Service did not dismiss them lightly. The case agent in
the Miami office forwarded a report and a recording of the Somersett-Milteer
conversation to the Protective Research Section.(72) Robert I. Bouck, special
agent in charge of PRS, then requested that the Miami office make discreet
inquiries about Milteer. (73)
On November 18, 1963, Special Agent Robert Jamison of the Miami Secret Service
office, in an interview with Somersett, had him place a telephone call to
Milteer at his home in Valdosta, Ga., to verify he was in that city.(74) In
addition, Jamison learned that Somersett did not knew the identity of any
violence-prone associates of-Milteer in the Miami area.(75) The November 26
Miami field office report indicated that the information gathered "was furnished
the agents making the advance arrangements before the visit of the President * *
*."(76) PRS then closed the case, and copies of its report were sent to the
Chief of Secret Service and to field offices in Atlanta, Philadelphia,
Indianapolis, Nashville, Washington, and Miami.(77)
The Milteer threat was ignored by Secret Service personnel in planning the trip
to Dallas. PRS Special Agent-in-Charge Bouck, who was notified on November 8
that the President would visit Miami on November 18, told the committee that
relevant PRS information would have been supplied to the agents conducting
advance preparations for the scheduled trip to Miami,(78) but no effort was made
to relay it to Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, who was responsible for
preparations for the trip to Dallas, 2 or to Forrest Sorrels, special
agent-in-charge of the Dallas office. Nor were Sorrels or any Secret Service
agent responsible for intelligence with respect to the Dallas trip informed of
the Milteer threat before November 22, 1963. (80)
Following the assassination, Somersett again met with Milteer. Milteer commented
that things had gone as he had predicted. Somersett asked if Milteer actually
had known in advance of the assassination or had just been guessing. Milteer
asserted that he had been certain forehand about the inevitability of the
assassination. (81)
Bouck and Inspector Thomas Kelley, who was assigned to represent the Secret
Service in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, testified to the
committee that threat information was transmitted from one region of the country
to another if there was specific evidence it was relevant to the receiving
region. (82) The fact was, however, that two threats to assassinate President
Kennedy with high-powered rifles, both of which occurred in early November 1963,
were not relayed to the Dallas region.
(3) Inspection of the motorcade route.--During the Secret Service check of the
Dallas motorcade route, Special Agent-in-Charge Sorrels commented that if
someone wanted to assassinate the President, it could be done with a rifle from
a high building.(83) President
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Kennedy himself had remarked he could be shot from a high building and little
could be done to stop it. (84) But such comments were just speculation. Unless
the Secret Service had a specific reason to suspect the occupants or activities
in a certain building, it would not inspect it. (85) The committee found that at
the time of the Dallas trip, there was not sufficient concern about the
possibility of an attack from a high building to cause the agents responsible
for trip planning to develop security precautions to minimize the risk.
The Warren Commission commented that a building survey conducted under a "level
of risk" criterion might well have included the Texas School Book
Depository.(86) Although the agent in the lead vehicle had some responsibility
to scan the route for danger, (87) this would have been woefully inadequate to
protect against a concealed sniper. Television films taken in Dallas on November
22, 1963 show foot patrolmen facing the motorcade but not the crowd or the
buildings. (88) The police captain in charge of security on the route was not
instructed to have his men watch the buildings, although they were ordered to
watch the crowds.(89) The committee found that if the threats that the PRS was
aware of had been communicated to agents responsible for the Dallas trip,
additional precautions might have been taken. 3
(4) Performance at the time of the assassination.--The committee concluded that
Secret Service agents in the motorcade were inadequately prepared for an attack
by a concealed sniper. Using films and photographs taken of the motorcade at the
time of the firing of the shots and immediately thereafter, the committee
studied the reac tions of Secret Service agents. (96) In addition, the committee
ques tioned agents who had been in the motorcade with respect to their
preparedness to react to gunfire.
The committee found that, consistent with the protective proce dures and
instructions they had been given,(97) the Secret Service agents performed
professionally and reacted quickly to the danger. But the committee also found
that a greater degree of awareness of the possibility of sniper fire could have
decreased reaction time on the part of the agents and increased the degree of
protection afforded the President. 4
No actions were taken by the agent in the right front seat of the Presidential
limousine to cover the President with his body, although it would have been
consistent with Secret Service procedure for him
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to have done so. (99) The primary function of the agent was to remain at all
times in close proximity to the President in the event of such emergencies.(100)
The committee found that the instructions to the driver of the limousine were
inadequate to maximize his recognition of, and response to, such
emergencies.(101) He should have been given the responsibility to react
instantaneously on his own initiative and to take evasive action. Instead, his
instructions were to act only at the judgment of the agent in the right
passenger seat, who had general supervisory responsibilities.(102)
The committee found from its acoustical analysis that approximately 8.3 seconds
elapsed from the first shot to the fatal head shot.(103) Under the
circumstances, each second was crucial, and the delay in taking evasive action
while awaiting instructions should have been avoided. Had the agents assigned to
the motorcade been alert to the possibility of sniper fire, they possibly could
have convinced the President to allow them to maintain protective positions of
the rear bumper of the Presidential limousine, and both shielded the President
and reacted more quickly to cover him when the attack began. The committeee
recognized, however, that President Kennedy consistently rejected the secret
Service's suggestions that he permit agents to ride on the rear bumper of the
Presidential limousine or permit motorcycles on the rear bumper of the
Presidential limousine or permit motorcycles to ride parallel to the limousine
and in close proximity to it.(104)
Although the conduct of the agents was without firm direction and evidenced a
lack of preparedness,(105) the committee found that many of the agents reacted i
na positieve, protective manner. Agent Clint Hill, assigned to protect the first
lady, reacted almost instantaneously.(106) Agent Thomas "Lem" Johns left Vice
President Johnson's follow-up car in an effort ot reach the Vice President's
limousine, but he was left behind momentarily in dealey Plaza as the procession
sped away to Parkland Hospital.(107) Photographic analysis revealed that other
agents were beginning to react approximately 1.6 seconds after the first
shot.(108)
In reviewing the reactions of the agents, the committee also reexamined the
allegation that several had been out drinking the evening before and the morning
of the assassination.(109) Four of the nine agents alleged to have been involved
were assigned to the motorcade and had key responsibilities as members of the
President's followup car.(110) The supervisor of the agents involved advised
that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental
and physical capabilities and was entirely ready to perform his assiged
duties.(111) Inspector Thomas Kelley, who was in charge of an evaluation of
Secret Service performance in t he assassination, testified before the committee
that an investigation of the drinking incident led to a conclusion that no agent
violated any Secret Service rule.(112)
In an effort to reach its own conclusion about the drinking incident, the
committee reviewed film coverage of the agents' movements at the time of the
shooting. The committee found nothing in the reactions of the agents that would
contradict the testimony of the Secret Service officials.(113)
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(b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination
was terminated when the Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed primary
investigative responsibility.
The committee found that the investigation by the Secret Service after the
assassination was terminated prematurely when president Johnson ordered that the
FBI assume primary investigative responsibility. (114) Although the initial
investigative efforts of the Secret Service lacked coordination, individual
field offices with information that might have been related to the assassination
had started their own investigations and pursued them aggressively.
How the Secret Service responded after the assassination is illustrated by the
investigation conducted by the Chicago Secret Service office. After the
assassination, the acting special agent-incharge of the Chicago field office
wrote an urgent report indicating he had received reliable information about "a
group in the Chicago area who (sic) may have a connection with the JFK
assassination."(115) this report was based on information received after the
assassination from a reliable informant who reported a conversation he had had
on November 21, 1963.(116) The informant, Thomas Mosley, reported that for some
time he had been involved in negotiating the sale of illegal arms with a Cuban
exile, an outspoken critic of President Kennedy named Homer S. Echeverria.(117)
On November 21, Echevarria had said his group now had "plenty of money" and that
they were prepared to proceed with the purchases "as soon as we [or they] take
care of Kennedy."(118)
After receiving the initial report, the Secret Service surveilled subsequent
meetings between Mosley and Echevarria, (119) received reports from Mosley about
the conversations,(120) and discussed the progress of the investigation with the
local FBI office.(121) By December 3, 1963, a fuller picture of Echevarria was
obtained(122) and reported to the Protective Research Section.(123) By that
date, it appeared that Echevarria was a member of the 30th of November (Cuban
exile) Movement,(124) that an associate of his who had also spoken directly with
osley about the arms sales was Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez, military
director for the cuban Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE), (125)5 and that
the arms purchases were being financed through paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban
exile who had become a Chicago lawyer.(126) Mosley inferred from his
conversation with Echevarria and Blanco that Sierra's financial backers
consisted in part of "hoodlum elements" who were "not restricted to
chicago."(127)
The committee's investigation provided suabstantial corroboration for the Secret
Service's concern about the Mosley allegations. The committee found that the
30th of November Movement was receiving financial backing through the Junta del
Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (JGCE), a Chicago-based organization led by
Sierra. JGCE was essentially a coalition of prodominantly right-wing anti-Castro
groups.(128) It had been formed in April 1963 and abolished abruptly in January
1964. (129) During its short life, JGCE apparently acquired enormous financial
backing, secured at least in part from
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organized gambling interests in Las Vegas and Cleveland.(130) JGCE actively used
its funds to purchase large quantitiies of weapons and to support is member
groups in conducting military raids on cuba.(131) The affiliates of JGCE, in
addition to the 30th of November Movement, included Alpha 66, led by Antonio
Veciana Blance, 6 and the MIRR, whose leader was militant anti-Castro terrorist,
orlando Bosch Avila.(132)
The Secret Service recognized the need to investigate the alleged plots by Cuban
exile groups more fully, especially that of Echevarria's 30th of November
group.(133) But when the progress of the investigation was discussed with the
FBI, the FBI responded that the 30th of November group was not likely to have
been inolved in any illegal acts.(134)7 The Secret Service initially was
reluctant to accept this representation in light of the evidence it had
developed that indicated the group was in fact involved in illegal
activities,(137) and therefore began preparations to place an undercover agent
in Echevarria's groups to investigate his activities more closely.(138) On
November 29, 1963, however, President Johnson created t he Warren Commission and
gave the FBI primary investigative responsibility.(139) Although the Secret
Service understood the President's order to mean primary, not exclusive,
investigative responsibility, (140) the FBI, according to testimony of former
Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley and Inspector Thomas J. Delley, soon made
it clear that it did not consider the Secret Service to be an equal collaborator
in the post-assassination investigation. Rowley testified that "in the
ultimate," there was "no particular jurisdiction" on the part of the Secret
Service to cooperate in the post-assassination investigation.(141) Inspector
Kelley testified that an order came down not only to the Secret Service but to
the Dallas Police Department that the FBI would take "full responsibility,"(142)
not joint responsibility, for the postassassination investigation of
conspiracies.
In summary, the committee concluded that the Secret Service did in fact possess
information that was nto properly analyzed and put to use with respect to a
protective investigation in advance of President Kennedy's trip to Dallas.
Further, it was the committee's opinion that Secret Service agents in the
Presidential motorcade in Dallas were not adequately prepared for an attack by a
concealed sniper. Finally, the committee found that the investigation by the
Secret Service of a possible assassination conspiracy was terminated prematurely
when President Johnson ordered that the FBI assume primary investigative
responsibility.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FAILED TO EXERCISE INITIATIVE IN SUPERVISING AND
DIRECTING THE INVESTIGATION BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF THE
ASSASSINATION
The position of Attorney General was created by law in 1789, but not until after
the Civil War did not role of the chief legal officer of the
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U.S. Government acquire its modern institutional farms. Since the post was (and
is) appointive, the Department of Justice was established in 1870 to insure
continuity from one administration to another. Over time, the Department
increasingly took the lead in major Federal prosecutions and other Federal legal
matters.
In the aftermath of the assassination of President Kennedy, the Justice
Department participated in various discussions with White House and FBI
officials, and it had a major part in the formation of the Warren Commission.
The committee found, however, that the Department largely abdicated what should
have been important responsibilities in the continuing investigation.
The committee determined, for example, that during the critical early days
before there was a Warren Commission, officials at Justice did not exercise any
significant role in shaping, monitoring or evaluating the FBI's investigation,
despite the Bureau's organizational status as an agency within the Department.
(1) Similarly, the committee discovered little indication that Justice
Department officials moved to mount a sophisticated criminal investigation of
the assassination, including its conspiracy implications, an investigation that
could have relied on the enormous resources of the Department--its specialized
investigative sections and attorneys, as well as the powers and capabilities of
a Federal grand jury and the granting of immunity. (2) There was, the committee
concluded, ample reason for the Department to have become so involved, since
various officials contacted by the committee agreed that Federal jurisdiction
existed, in spite of some confusion over each of the applicable statutes.
In examining the performance of the Department of Justice in the Kennedy
assassination, the committee took into account the importance of the
understandable personal situation of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy during
the period following his brother's death. The committee found that the Attorney
General's deep-felt grief in fact significantly affected the Government's
handling of the investigation and that this effect was magnified by the
inability of Attorney General Kennedy's deputies to take a strong position with
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on the course of the investigation.
The committee did note that officials at Justice, notably Deputy Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, were instrumental in creating the Warren
Commission, in effect transferring the focus of the investigation from the FBI
to a panel of distinguished Americans. Nevertheless, as before, the Department
exercised little authority in the investigation that followed the formation of
the Commission. (3)
In testimony at a public hearing of the committee, Katzenbach said he believed
it would have been distasteful and of questionable propriety for Robert Kennedy
to have Dresided over the investigation of his brother's death. (4) He insisted
there had been a need for a, special investigative body that could make use of
the resources of a number of Federal agencies.(5) The committee agreed with
Katzenbach's general points.
The committee observed, nevertheless, that it was regrettable that the
Department of Justice was taken out of the investigation, for whatever reason.
It was unfortunate that it played so small a role in insuring the most thorough
investigation of President Kennedy's as-
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sassination. The promise of what the Department might have realized in fact was
great, particularly in the use of such evidence-gathering tools such as a grand
jury and grants of immunity.
3. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PERFORMED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF
COMPETENCY IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS DUTIES
(a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation adequately investigated Lee Harvey
Oswald prior to the assassination and properly evaluated the evidence it
possessed to assess his potential to endanger the public safety in a national
emergency
(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough and professional
investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination
(c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to investigate adequately the
possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President
(d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of
information with other agencies and departments
(1) History of the FBI.---Until after the turn of the century Federal agencies
and departments were responsible for their own investigations. The Department of
Justice was primarily a prosecutorial body, although it had been given statutory
authority to perform investigations in 1891. In 1907, Atty. Gen. Charles J.
Bonaparte proposed an investigative force in the Justice Department and went
ahead with it despite objections in Congress. His successor, George Wickersham,
named the force the Bureau of Investigation. (1)
By the end of World War I, the Bureau was firmly established as the main
investigative arm of the Federal Government, its size increasing fivefold from
1916 to 1920. The two major influences on this growth were: (1) the war itself,
which confronted the Bureau with the task of enforcing President Wilson's alien
enemy proclamations and with the problems of draft evasion and enemy espionage;
and (2) the passage of the Mann Act, which gave the Federal Government
jurisdiction over certain interstate criminal activities. Both made increased
personnel and budgetary demands on the Bureau. (2)
After the war--in the period 1919 to 1924 two successive Attorneys General
abused the power of the Bureau of Investigation. A. Mitchell Palmer, in his
campaign against Bolshevist radicals, acted with questionable legality. After
the bombing of his home in June 1919, Palmer created a General Intelligence
Division within the Bureau to deal with radicalism. He named a young Justice
Department attorney, J. Edgar Hoover, to head the Division. It used covert as
well as overt means to gather information on suspected radicals. (3)
In 1920, Attorney General Palmer also directed the wholesale deportation of
members of the American Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party. This led
to the controversial "Palmer raids," which diminished the standing of American
Communists and came to symbolize the misuse of police power for a political
purpose.
Then came the Harding administration, under which Harry Daugherty, the
President's campaign manager, was named Attorney General. He in turn appointed
his friend, William S. Burns, of the Burns Detective Agency, to run the Bureau.
Burns was antiradical and antilabor
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as well, and he continued the questionable tactics of wiretapping and
surreptitious entry in investigative work. Although the primary target continued
to be Communists, the Bureau dealt a heavy blow to the Ku Klux Klan. (4)
Harlan Fiske Stone, a New York attorney and civil libertarian, was appointed
Attorney General by Calvin Coolidge in 1924. Stone was reformer, and he named
Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigtion, with a mandate to clean it up.
Hoover created it structure and a set of policies that were to endure for the
nearly 50 years of his tenure. He also established the independence of the
Bureau within the Department of Justice.1
The Bureau stayed out of the limelight until the 1930's, when the emergence of a
resourceful criminal underworld, feeding on the public response to Prohibition,
became a national menace. The Bureau was recognized as the single law
enforcement agency in the country that could cope with crime of such a national
scope.
In 1933 public outrage over the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh's infant son led
to enactment of the so-called "Lindbergh Law." It added kidnapping to the list
of interstate crimes that came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
Then, in 1934, there was a major expansion of Federal criminal when Congress
passed a package of nine new statutes. They dealt with such crimes as killing or
assaulting a Federal law enforcement officer, fleeing across a State line to
avoid apprehension or prosecution, extortion involving interstate commerce. (5)
That same year, Bureau agents were granted authority to go beyond general
investigative powers to serve warrants and subpenas, to make seizures and
arrests and to carry-arms. They were soon to be tagged "G-men" by the
underworld.
The Bureau was renamed in 1935, becoming the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and by the end of the decade it was able to point to an array of
accomplishments, for example:
A Division of Identification with central fingerprint records; An FBI laboratory
with up-to-date scientific law enforcement techniques; and A National Police
Academy for training State and local law enforcement officers. (6)
The Bureau had no internal security or counterintelligence functions until they
were established, beginning in 1936, by a series of Presidential orders coupled
with a secret oral agreement between Hoover and President Roosevelt. The FBI was
authorized to store intelligence information collected by other Federal
agencies.
In 1939, a written directive was issued providing that the FBI take charge of
investigative work relating to "espionage, sabotage, and violation of neutrality
regulations." Subversive activities were not specifically mentioned until 1950,
in an Executive order by President Truman. (7)
The FBI's primary responsibility during World War II was enforcement of laws
dealing with espionage, sabotage, and conscription. It also handled the
apprehension of enemy aliens.(Hoover was one of
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the few Government officials who opposed the relocation of Japanese citizens as
a violation of their civil rights.) (8)
The FBI also conducted foreign intelligence in South America, attempting to
gather information on activities detrimental to U.S. interests. FBI involvement
in foreign intelligence was ordered terminated after World War II when the
Central Intelligence Agency was formed.
After World War II, the fear of communist was such that internal security
activities against it were acceptable to most Americans. The FBI's actions were
based on statutes that covered membership in the Communist Party, including the
Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of
1954. (9)
J. Edgar Hoover himself defined as disloyal any acts that could pose a threat to
the Government, and even after the anti-Communist fervor of the McCarthy era had
subsided, the internal security operations of the FBI continued at a high pace.
By 1960, Hoover had developed a force of agents who employed sophisticated
investigative techniques and enjoyed unusual independence. Hoover himself had
become a formidable figure who deftly handled Presidents, Attorneys General, and
Members of Congress. He was looked upon as an extraordinary crime fighter, and
FBI appropriations passed without serious opposition alter pro forma hearings.
(2) The FBI investigation.--From the beginning of its examination of the
performance of the FBI in the Kennedy investigation, the committee was impressed
with the extraordinary work that was done in certain aspects of the case. The
thoroughness and efficiency of the collection and processing of such a mass of
evidence, for example, could hardly be overstated. What can be said in criticism
of the Bureau must be placed in the context of the superior performance of the
vast majority of the agents who worked long hours on the investigation.
Nevertheless, the committee did find some deficiencies and shortcomings in the
FBI investigation.
The FBI was the only Federal agency to conduct a full field investigation in the
period immediately a after the assassination, the period in which the
evidentiary components at the crime scene for solving a homicide are assembled
in the great majority of cases. Thereafter, the FBI continued to assume an
overwhelming share of the burden of the investigation. Since the Warren
Commission did not have its own investigative staff, the Bureau was responsible
for the investigative raw product, including the evidence upon which the
Commission's deliberations about a possible domestic conspiracy were to be
based. (10)
The committee concluded from its lengthy study of the roles of the FBI, Secret
Service, CIA, and other Federal agencies that assissted the Warren Commission
that the final determinations of who was responsible for President Kennedy's
murder and whether there had been a conspiracy were based largely on the work of
the FBI.(11) With an acute awareness of the significance of its finding, the
committee concluded that the FBI's investigation of whether there had been a
conspiracy in President Kennedy's assassination was seriously flawed. The
conspiracy aspects of the investigation were characterized by a
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limited approach and an inadequate application and use of available
resource.(12)
The committee concluded that the FBI's investigation into a conspiracy was
deficient in the areas that the committee decided were most worthy of suspicion
organized crime, pro- and anti-Castro Cubans, and the possible associations of
individuals from these areas with Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. In those
areas in particular, the committee found that the FBI's investigation was in all
likelihood insufficient to have uncovered a conspiracy.
Given the FBI's justifiable reputation as one of the most professional and
respected criminal investigative agencies in the world, its effort in the
Kennedy assassination was expected to be of the highest degree of thoroughness
and integrity. Indeed, it was an effort of unparalleled magnitude in keeping
with the gravity of the crime, resulting in the assignment of more Bureau
resources than for any criminal case in its history. (13) In terms of hours
worked, interviews conducted and tests performed, the FBI's response was, in
fact, unexcelled. It was wide-ranging that it could not be easily summarized, as
could the FBI's investigation of the assassination in 1968 of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. Over 80 Bureau personnel were sent to Dallas, over 25,000 interviews
were conducted, and 2,300 reports, consisting of 25,400 pages, were prepared.
(14)
The FBI collected and examined the physical evidence with an impressive array of
scientific equipment and personnel. By means of unusually rapid compilation of
test results, laboratory and field personnel of the Bureau were. able to trace
elements of the physical evidence to Oswald, and a series of sophisticated
techniques led to early identification of Oswald's rifle as the murder weapon.
(15) Then, using spectrographic, fingerprint, textile, and other analyses, the
Bureau was able to assemble a substantial mass of evidence that led to the
identification of Oswald as a possible gunman. (16) Based on the committee's
independent evaluation of the FBI's test results, the committee found that the
FBI's performance in the investigation was at its best in the area of scientific
analysis. Similarly, the FBI's ability to compile abundance of disparate
documentary evidence pertaining to Oswald's background and activities at the
time of the assassination was highly commendable; it made full and efficient use
of hundreds of FBI personnel. (17)
On the other hand, a qualitative assessment of aspects of the investigation
raised some perplexing questions. From an appraisal of the structure of the
operation, the committee detected weakesses in both formulation and execution.
The committee found evidence of organizational fragmentation,(18) an allocation
of duties among. various divisions of the Bureau that considerably, if
unintentionally, compromised the quality of the effort, to investigate the
possibility of a conspiracy(19).2
The assassination investigation was divided between two main divisions of the
FBI, the General Investigative Division and the Domestic
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Intelligence Division. A primary responsibility. of the General InDivision (21)
was assembly of the basic facts of the assassination by means of testing and
analysis of physical evidence.(22) Traditionally the General Investigative
Division handled FBI-murder investigations, and it was the official in charge of
the bank robbery desk in that Division who supervised the assassination
investigation, since, according to the Bureau's manual of operations,
jurisdiction for assaults on Federal officials was appropriately assigned to his
desk.
The committee's conclusion that conspiracy was a blind spot in the FBI's
investigation was reflected in the observation of the assistant FBI director in
charge of the General Investigative Division, who said that while the Division
was charged with investigating who specifically fired the shot or shots that
killed President Kennedy, whether persons other than Oswald were involved was an
"ancillary matter" that was not part of his division's responsibility. (23) He
also characterized the investigation by saying, "* * * we were in the position
of standing on the corner with our pocket open, waiting for someone to drop
information into it, and we utilized what was fed to us, and disseminated it * *
* to the Warren Commission." (24)
Within the General Investigative Division, the probe of Jack Ruby was delegated
to the Civil Rights Division on the theory that Ruby violated Oswald's civil
rights by killing him. (25) While the committee, in its investigation, found
that Ruby's links to various organized crime figures were contained in reports
received by the FBI in the weeks following his shooting of Oswald, the Bureau
was seriously delinquent in investigating the Ruby-underworld connections. (26)
The committee established that the Bureau's own organized crime and Mafia
specialists were not consulted or asked to participate to any significant
degree. (27) The assistant director who was in charge of the organized crime
division, the Special Investigative Division, told the committee, "They sure
didn't come to me * * * We had no part in that that I can recall."(28) The
committee also determined that the Bureau's lack of interest in organized crime
extended to its investigation of Oswald.
The Domestic Intelligence Division was responsible for the FBI's investigation
of Oswald's activities, associations, and motivations, and it was assigned to
consider all questions of a possible foreign conspiracy. (29) The assistant
director who ran this phase of the investigation, however, had been one of
several FBI officials and agents who were disciplined by Director Hoover
following the assassination for what the Inspection Division determined to have
been deficient performance in the investigation of Oswald prior to the
assassination. The disciplinary action was kept a Bureau secret. Not even the
Warren Commission was informed of it.
Within the Domestic Intelligence Division, the investigation Oswald and a
possible conspiracy was assigned to a team of agents from the Bureau's Soviet
section because Oswald had been an avowed Marxist who had defected to the Soviet
Union. (30)
While numerous specialists on Cuban affairs and exile activities were assigned
to the Domestic Intelligence Division, the committee found that they were seldom
consulted on the assassination or asked to participate in the investigation,
despite the reported connections
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between both Oswald and Ruby and individuals active in Cuban revolutionary
activities. (31) Supervisors of Cuba-related activities at the Bureau in the
early 1960's told the committee they were unaware of any investigation of the
Cuban issue with respect to the assassination. Similarly, the committee found
that neither the Domestic Intelligence Division nor FBI headquarters authorized
an intelligence investigation into possible foreign complicity in the
assassination.(32)
While the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division had some of the most sophisticated
investigators and resources at its disposal, the committee concurred with the
conclusion of the Senate select committee when it stated in 1976:"Rather than
addressing its investigation to all significant circumstances, including all
possibilities of conspiracy, the FBI investigation focused narrowly on Lee
Harvey-Oswald."(33)
The committee further concluded that the critical early period of the FBI's
investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of considerable haste and pressure
from Hoover to conclude the investigation in an unreasonably short period of
time. (34) The committee also noted that Hoover's personal predisposition that
Oswald had been a lone assassin affected the course of the investigation, adding
to the momentum to conclude the investigation after limited consideration of
possible conspiratorial areas. While Hoover continued to press conspiracy leads,
his apparent attitude was reflected in a telephone conversation with President
Johnson on November 24, 1963, just hours after Oswald had been shot of death by
Ruby. Hoover said:"The thing I am most concerned about * * * is having something
issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."(35) Two
days later, on November 26, 1963, Hoover received a memorandum from an assistant
director stating that, "* * * we must recognize that a matter of this magnitude
cannot be fully investigated in a week's time."(36) In a notation on the memo,
indicating his impatience, Hoover jotted:"Just how long do you estimate it will
take. It seems to me we have the basic facts now."(37) Three days later, on
November 29, in a memorandum regarding a conversation he had with President
Johnson earlier that day, Hoover stated:
I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today,
but probably won't have it before the first of the week, due to an additional
lead being pursued in Mexico.(38)
The committee also concurred with other House and Senate committees that the FBI
failed to cooperate fully with the Warren Commission. The committee found the
Bureau's relationship with the Commission to have been distinctly adversarial
and that there were limited areas in which the FBI did not provide complete
information to the Commission and other areas in which the Bureau's information
was misleading. (39) An entry from Oswald's notebook containing the name,
address and phone number of an FBI agent in Dallas for example, was initially
withheld from the Warren Commission (40) In addition, the same special agent in
Dallas destroyed a note he had received, apparently from Oswald, within 2 weeks
of the assassination. (41) The note, in which Oswald reportedly threatened the
agent, (42) was flushed down a toilet several hours after Oswald was mur-
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dered by Ruby. The existence of the note was also withheld from the Warren
Commission and did not come to light for over 12 years. (43)
Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin addressed himself to instances
of FBI misconduct in testimony before the committee:
* * * it just raises doubt about the way our government has been conducted and
the fact that it seems to be more important to people that they protect their
particular agency or bureau than their own country. It does not prove that there
was ever a conspiracy. By that I mean conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. But
there may have been a conspiracy as far as the Commission was concerned, and
what they were going to do to it, and it has worked. (44)
The committee also found that the FBI was deficient in failing to inform the
Warren Commission that a number of Bureau officials had been disciplined by
Hoover for deficiencies in the security investigation of Oswald prior to the
assassination. (45) These same officials were subsequently assigned to the
post-assassination investigation of Oswald and the possible conspiratorial
involvement of others. Hoover had ordered an investigation shortly after the
assassination to determine whether Bureau personnel had adequately probed
Oswald's potential for subversive actions or violence and whether he should have
been listed on the Bureau's security index. (46) The FBI Inspection Division
concluded that there had been numerous deficiencies in the preassassination
investigation and recommended various forms of disciplinary action or censure
for five field agents, one field supervisor, three special agents-in-charge,
four headquarters supervisors, two headquarters section chiefs, one inspector,
and one assistant director. (47)
Subsequently, Hoover did in fact carry out most of the disciplinary actions
recommended. A former assistant director stated that such action was taken in
strict secrecy so that the Warren Commission would not become aware of the
deficiencies. The committee found that Hoover's action in ordering the official
disciplining (48) of some of these personnel went beyond what was justified, and
that the Bureau's preassassination security investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald
had been adequate.3 Nevertheless, the circumstances of such disciplinary action
should have been communicated to the Warren Commission, particularly since a
number of the personnel disciplined participated in the assassination
investigation.
The committee determined further that in several instances Hoover's pled to the
Warren Commission that the FBI would continue to investigate information it
received in years to come on the President's murder was not kept. The committee
found specific cases in which the Bureau did not follow up on such information
provided to it. (49) Two examples relate to leads received from underworld
sources.
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In the first instance, the Bureau received information from Chief Justice Warren
regarding organized crime figure John Roselli's claim of personal knowledge
relating to Cuban or underworld complicity. The Bureau declined to investigate
the information and did not take any action until President Johnson personally
intervened. (50) In the second instance, the Bureau received information from a
source in 1967 regarding a reported meeting at which New Orleans Mafia leader
Carlos Marcello had allegedly made a threat against the life of President
Kennedy. (51) Rather than investigating the information, Bureau personnel took
repeated action to discredit the source. (52)
To summarize, the committee found that the Bureau performed with varying degrees
of competency in the investigation of the President's death. Its investigation
into the complicity of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to and after the assassination
was thorough and professional. Nevertheless, it failed to conduct an adequate
investigation into the possibility of a conspiracy in key areas, and it was
deficient in its sharing of information with the Warren Commission.
4. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS DEFICIENT IN ITS COLLECTION AND SHARING
OF INFORMATION BOTH PRIOR TO AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE ASSASSINATION
Created by the National Security Act of 1947,(1) the CIA was, in fact, a postwar
outgrowth of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The head of OSS, though
never a CIA official, was William J. Donovan, who in World War II adopted the
British approach of combining the intelligence activities of various agencies
into one office.
Toward the end of World War II, President Roosevelt sought Donovan's advice on a
permanent intelligence apparatus. Donovan's classified reply, leaked to the
press 3 months later, described an "allpowerful intelligence service... [which]
would supersede all existing Federal police and intelligence units."(2) The
reaction among the heads of existing intelligence and investigative agencies was
predictably negative. Few wanted to see the OSS become more powerful.
President Roosevelt's death turned out to be a serious blow to OSS nearly
crippling, for President Truman abolished the wartime agency without consulting
Donovan or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the United States was
handicapped by a serious intelligence gap in immediate postwar international
struggles.
(a) Establishment of the CIA
Unification of the Armed Forces was the main objective of the 1947 act. It also
created the National Security Council, of which the CIA was to be the
intelligence coordinating unit. Under the act, the CIA was charged with four
responsibilities:
To advise the NSC on intelligence matters relating to national security;
To make recommendations on the coordination of intelligence
activities;
To correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence; and
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To engage in additional intelligence activities and national
security functions at the direction of the NSC.
The Agency was given no law enforcement functions.
In its early years, the CIA was hampered by internal organizational difficulties
and bad relationships with other agencies. The turnover of directors was rather
rapid--Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg in 1946, Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter in
1947, Lt. Gen. Walter BedeIl Smith in 1950, Alien W. Dulles in 1952.
Dulles, who had been a wartime master spy, had strong opinions as to the type of
men who should be named to top posts in the Agency. At Senate Armed Services
Committee hearings on the National Security Act, he testified that the CIA:
* * * should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a
passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job. They
must find their reward in the work itself, and in the service they render their
Government, rather than in public acclaim. (3)
In addition, in its formative period the CIA was subjected to the harangues of
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, who demanded a purge of Agency personnel. The upshot
was a severe tightening of employment standards, as well as a restriction within
the Agency on -the expression of political viewpoints.
Although the CIA is not required to make public its organizational structure, it
is known to consist of five main entities--the Office of the Director and four
Directorates. The Director and Deputy Director, only one of whom may be a
military officer, are appointed by the President. The four Directorates are as
follows:
The Directorate of Operations--the clandestine services unit, which is comprised
of a number of geographical operating divisions supplemented by functional
staffs.
The Directorate of Intelligence--its responsibility is to analyze and then
synthesize raw intelligence information into finished intelligence products.
The Directorate of Science and Technology--it is responsible for basic research
and development; it operates technical systems and analyzes highly technical
information.
The Directorate of Administration the Agency's housekeeping department.
At one time there were also a number of proprietary organizations, front groups
and social or political institutions that were run by the CIA or on its behalf.
The best known proprietaries were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both
established in the early 1950's. Among the front organizations were airlines and
holding companies to support clandestine operations. In early 1967, it was
learned that the CIA had for years been subsidizing the country's largest
student organization, the National Student Association. Eventually, it became
known that the Agency had channeled money to a number of business, labor,
religious, charitable, and educational organizations.
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(b) Rockefeller Commission investigation of CIA activities
In 1974 and 1975, in response to charges that the CIA had engaged in large-scale
spying on American citizens and had compiled dossiers on many citizens, a
commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller investigated whether domestic
CIA activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. Mail intercepts,
infiltration of dissident groups, illegal wiretaps and break-ins were among the
subjects of the investigation.
The Rockefeller Commission concluded that the "great majority of the CIA's
domestic activities comply with its statutory authority * * * Nevertheless, over
the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged in some activities that should
be criticized and not permitted to happen again--both in light of the limits
imposed on the Agency by law and as a matter of public policy." (4)
(c) The committee investigation
As the committee examined the Agency's role in the investigation of the death of
the President, it focused its investigation in these areas:
The Agency's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination;
CIA support of the Warren Commission investigation; and Developments relevant to
the Kennedy assassination after publication of the Warren report.
The committee's investigation proceeded on the basis of interviews, depositions
and hearings. Evidence was received from present and former CIA officials and
employees, as well as members and staff attorneys of the Warren Commission. The
CIA personnel who testified or were interviewed were assured in writing by the
Acting Director of Central Intelligence that their secrecy obligation to the CIA
was not in effect with respect to questions relevant to the committee's inquiry.
(5) To the extent possible, the committee pursued investigative leads by
interviewing Cuban and Mexican citizens. Further, an extensive review of CIA and
FBI files on Oswald's activities outside of the United States was undertaken.
The CIA materials made available to the committee were examined in unabridged
form. (6)
Much of the information obtained by the committee came from present and former
officials and employees of the CIA and dealt with sensitive sources and methods
of the Agency. Since these sources and methods are protected by law from
unauthorized disclosure, this report of the CIA investigation was written with
the intention of not disclosing them. Much of what is presented is, therefore,
necessarily conclusionary, since detailed analysis would have required revealing
sensitive and classified sources and methods.1
(1) CIA Preassassination performance--Oswald in Mexico City.--- An individual
identified as Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention of the CIA in the fall of
1963 when he made a trip to Mexico City. The committee examined the efforts of
the CIA to determine the true identity of the individual, the nature of his
visit to Mexico and with whom, if anyone, he might have associated while there.
CIA headquarters in Washington, D.C., was informed on October 9, 1963, that a
person who identified himself as Oswald had contacted
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the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on October 1, 1963. Headquarters was also
advised that Oswald had spoken with an individual possibly identified as Soviet
Consul Kostikov on September 28, 1963, and that a photograph, apparently of an
American, had been obtained. This photograph, which was thought to be a positive
idenitifincation of Oswald, did not purport to be a positive identification of
him. The subject of the photograph was described as approximately 35 years old,
6 feet tall, with an athletic build, a balding top, and receding hairline.(7)
During October 1963, 2 CIA intelligence sources abroad determined that Oswald
had visited the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban consulate in Mexico City at least 5
times for the purpose of obtaining an intransit visa to russia via Cuba.(8) Once
CIA headquarters determined that Oswald was a former defector to the Soviet
Union, his activity in Mexico City was considered to be potentially significant
by both headquarters personnel and CIA intelligence sources abroad. (9)
Headquarters, however, was not informed about Oswald's visa request nor of his
visits to the Cuban coluslate. As a result, while other interested Federal
agencies were apprised of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy, they were
not informed about his visa request or of his visit to the Cuban consulate. (10)
The committee considered the possibility that an imposter visited the Soviet
Embassy or Cuban consulate during one or more of the contacts in which Oswald
was identified by the CIA. This suspicion arose, at least in art because the
photograph obtained by the CIA in October 1963 was shown after the assassination
by the FBI to Oswald's mother as possibly showing her son. (Mrs. Oswald
maintained the person in the picture was her son's killer, Jack Ruby.) (11) In
addition the description, based on the photograph, that the CIA had received in
its first report of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, in
fact bore no resemblance to Oswald,(12) The man in the photograph was clearly
neither Oswald nor Ruby, and the CIA and FBI were unable (as was the committee)
to establish the identity of the individual in the photograph. The overwhelming
weight of the evidence indicated to the committee that the initial conclusion of
Agency employees that the individual in the photograph was Oswald was the result
of a careless mistake. It was not, the committee believed, because the
individual was posing as Oswald. In fact, the committee established that the
photograph was not even obtained at a time when Oswald was reported to have
visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.(13)
The question of an Oswald imposter was also raised in an FBI letterhead
memorandum to the Secret Service dated November 23, 1963. It was based in part
upon information received by CIA headquarters on October 9, 1963, that on
October 1, 1963, Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City:
The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely
sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee
Oswald, who contacted the
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Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of
this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Tex., have observed
photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording
of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to
individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.(14)
In response to it committee inquiry, the FBI reported that no tape recording of
Oswald's voice was in fact ever received. The Bureau explained that its Dallas
office only received the report of a conversation to which Oswald had been a
party. This explanation was independently confirmed by the committee. A review
of relevant FBI cable traffic established that at 7:23 p.m. (CST) on November
23, 1963, Dallas Special Agent-in-Charge Shanklin advised Director Hoover that
only a report of this conversation was available, not an actual tape recording.
On November 25, the Dallas office again apprised the Director that "[t]here
appears to be some confusion in that no tapes were taken to Dallas * * * [O]nly
typewritten [reports were] supplied * * *."(15)
Shanklin stated in a committee interview that no recording was ever received by
FBI officials in Dallas. (16) Moreover, former FBI Special Agents James Hosty,
John W. Fain, Burnett Tom Carter, and Arnold J. Brown, each of whom had
conversed with Oswald at one time, informed the committee they had never
listened to a recording of Oswald's voice.3 (17)
Finally, on the basis of an extensive file review and detailed testimony by
present and former CIA officials and employees, the committee determined that
CIA headquarters never received a recording of Oswald's voice.(18) The committee
concluded, therefore, that the information in the November 23, 1963, letterhead
memorandum was mistaken and did not provide a basis for concluding that there
had been an Oswald imposter.
The committee did, however, obtain independent evidence that someone might have
posed as Oswald in Mexico in late September and early October 1963. The former
Cuban consul in Mexico City, Eusebio Azcue, testified that the man who applied
for an in-transit visa to the Soviet Union was not the one who was identified as
Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President Kennedy on November 1963. Azcue,
who maintained that he had dealt on three occasions in Mexico with someone who
identified himself as Oswald, described the man he claimed was an imposter as a
30-year-old white male, about 5 feet 6 inches in height, with a long face and a
straight and pointed nose.(19)
In addition, the committee interviewed Silvia Duran, a secretary in the Cuban
consulate in 1963. Although she said that it was in fact Oswald who had visited
the consulate on three occasions, she described him as 5 feet 6, 125 pounds,
with sparse blond hair, features that did not match those of Lee Harvey Oswald.
(20) The descriptions given by both Azcue and Duran do bear a
resemblance--height aside--to an
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alleged Oswald associate referred to in an unconfirmed report provided by
another witness, Elena Garro de Paz, former wife of the noted Mexican poet,
Octavio Paz. Elena Garro described the associate, whom she claimed to have seen
with Oswald at a party, as very tall and slender [with] * * * long blond hair *
* * a gaunt face [and] a rather long protruding chin." 4 (21)
Two other points warranted further investigation of the imposter issue. The
Oswald who contacted the Russian and Cuban diplomatic compounds reportedly spoke
broken, hardly recognizable Russian, yet there is considerable evidence that Lee
Harvey Oswald was relatively fluent in this language. (22) In addition, Silvia
Duran told the committee that Oswald was not at the Cuban consulate on September
1963, a day the consulate was closed to the public. (23) The committee obtained
reliable evidence of a sensitive nature from another source, however, that a
person who identified himself as Oswald met with Duran at the consulate that
day. (24)
The imposter issue could, of course, have been easily resolved had photographs
of the person or persons in question been taken at the entrance to the Cuban
consulate and Soviet Embassy. The Cuban Government maintained to the committee
that the Cuban consulate was under photographic surveillance. In fact, the Cuban
Government provided the committee with photographs of the alleged surveillance
camera location.(25) The committee had other reports that the CIA had obtained a
picture of Oswald that was taken during at least one of his visits to the Soviet
Embassy and Cuban consulates.(26) The CIA, however, denied that such a
photograph had been obtained, and no such pictures of Oswald were discovered by
the committee during its review of the Agency's files. (27)
Despite the unanswered questions, the weight of the evidence supported the
conclusion that Oswald was the individual who visited the Soviet Embassy and
Cuban consulate. Silvia Duran, who dealt with Oswald at three different times,
told the committee she was certain that the individual who applied for an
in-transit visa to Russia via Cuba was Oswald. (28) She specifically identified
the individual in the photograph On Oswald's visa application form as the Lee
Harvey Oswald who had visited the Cuban consulate. (29) Moreover, Duran stated
that Oswald's visa application was signed in her presence. (30)
Duran's statements were corroborated by Alfredo Mirabal who succeeded Azcue as
Cuban consul in Mexico City in 1963. Mirabal testified that on two occasions,
from a distance of 4 meters, he had observed Oswald at the Cuban consulate and
that this was the same person who was later photographed being shot by Jack
Ruby. (31) Further, the committee was given access by the Cuban Government to
Oswald's original visa application, a carbon copy of which had been supplied to
the Warren Commission. Testimony before the committee established that each of
these forms had been signed separately.(32) The application papers were
photographed, and the signature on them was then studied by the committee's
panel of handwriting experts. The panel's analysis indicated that the signature
on both forms was that of Lee Harvey Oswald.5 (33) Finally, reliable evidence of
a sensitive nature provided to the committee by the CIA tended to indicate that
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the person who contacted the Soviet Embassy was the same Lee Harvey Oswald who
had visited the Cuban consulate. (34)
It can be said that the fact that the Agency's field sources noted Oswald's
movements outside the the United States was an indication of effective
intelligence work. Nevertheless, the CIA's handling of the Oswald case prior to
the assassination was deficient because CIA headquarters was not apprised of all
information that its field sources had gathered with respect to Oswald, and
headquarters, in turn, was thereby prevented from relaying a more complete
resume of Oswald's nations in Mexico City to the FBI, which was charged with
responsibility for the Oswald security case.
The committee was unable to determine whether the CIA did in fact come into
possession of a photograph of Oswald taken during his visits to the Soviet
Embassy and Cuban consulate in Mexico City, or whether Oswald had any associates
in Mexico City. Nevertheless, other information provided by the CIA, as well as
evidence obtained from Cuban and Mexican sources, enabled the committee to
conclude that the individual who represented himself as Lee Harvey Oswald at the
Cuban consulate in Mexico was not an imposter.
(2) The CIA and the Warren Commission.--The CIA took the position that it was
not to conduct a police-type investigation of the assassination of President
Kennedy. According to the testimony of former Director Richard M. Helms, its
role was to provide support for the Warren Commission's effort by responding to
specific inquiries. (35) Nevertheless, because the CIA was the Commission's
primary source of information beyond U.S. territorial limits with respect to the
question of foreign complicity in the assassination, the committee sought to
evaluate both the quality of the CIA's handling of the foreign conspiracy
question and the Agency's working relationship with the Commission. 6
The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities also studied the performance of the intelligence
agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their
relationship with the Warren Commission. The Senate committee's report
emphasized the Agency's failure to pursue certain leads to a possible Cuban
conspiracy or to apprise the Warren Commission of CIA assassination plots
against Fidel Castro. (36) In response, the CIA prepared a Task Force Report
(1977 TFR) on the accuracy of the Senate committee's analysis. In its
investigation, the committee reviewed the 1977 TFR7 and used it as a starting
point in assessing the timeliness and effectiveness of the CIA's responses to
the Warren Commission's periodic requests for information.(37)
The CIA investigation of the Kennedy assassination was focused at the outset on
Oswald's trip to Mexico. It was managed at Washington headquarters by the desk
officer responsible for intelligence activity related to Mexico. Immediately
following the assassination the desk officer was instructed by Richard Helms,
then Deputy Director for
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Plans, to coordinate efforts to compile and evaluate incoming information
pertaining to the assassination. The desk officer was assigned this
responsibility due to his past experience conducting internal CIA security
investigations and because Oswald had visited Mexico months prior to the
assassination.(38) The cable traffic this officer coordinated was voluminous.
By late December 1963, it had become apparent that the CIA's interest in
information related to the assassination had extended beyond Oswald's trip to
Mexico. It encompassed Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union as well as the
possible involvement of foreign powers in an assassination conspiracy.
Consequently, responsibility for coordinating CIA investigative efforts was
shifted to the counterintelligence staff, which had worldwide resources and
expertise in investigating sabotage, guerrilla activities and counterespionage.
(39)
The second phase of the Agency information collection effort, designed
principally to respond to the work of the Warren Commission, was coordinated by
Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis (CI/R & A) for the
counterintelligence staff. CI/R & A was the counterintelligence staff component
particularly concerned with research and analysis related to counterintelligence
and the formulation of policy based on the analysis. Rocca was the CIA's
working-level contact point with the Warren Commission; consequently he was in a
position to review most CIa information pertaining to the assassination, which
comprised a heavy volume of incoming cable traffic. (40) Due to
compartmentalization, however, Rocca did not have access to all materials
potentially relevant to the Warren Commission investigation. For example, Rocca
had no knowledge of efforts by the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early
1960's. (41)
An examination of the functioning of the Warren Commission indicated to the
committee that its staff assumed the CIA would expeditiously provide it with all
relevant information rather than merely furnish data in response to specific
requests.(42) An analysis by the committee showed that the Warren Commission's
view was not shared by certain high-ranking officials of the Agency, including
Deputy Director Helms. In fact, the CIA did not always respond to the
Commission's broad request for all relevant material. In testimony to the
committee, Helms said the CIA's general position was that it should forward
information to the Commission only in response to specific requests. (43) Helms
indicated that he did not inform the Warren Commission of the anti-Castro plots
because he was never "asked to testify before the Warren Commission about * * *
[CIA] operations." (44) This attitude caused, in the view of the Senate
committee, an interpretation of the Warren Commission investigation that was too
narrow in scope. (45)8
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The CIA also failed to provide the Warren Commission with all information in its
possession pertaining to Luisa Calderon, a Cuban consulate employee in Mexico
City suspected of having ties to the Cuban intelligence service. Calderon, who
was alleged in 1964 by a Cuban defector to have been in contact with an American
who might have been Oswald during the period of time of Oswald's visit to Mexico
City, engaged in a conversation approximately 5 hours after the assassination in
which she indicated possible foreknowledge of the assassination. 9 The Warren
Commission, however, was not apprised by the CIA of this conversation. (The CIA
was unable to explain the omission, but the committee uncovered no evidence to
suggest that it was due to anything but careless oversight.) (47)
With the exception of that which was obtained from sensitive sources and
methods, CIA information, in general, was accurately and expeditiously provided
to the Warren Commission. In cases of sensitive sources and methods, rather than
provide the Commission with raw data that would have meant revealing the sources
and methods, the substance of the information was submitted in accurate summary
form.(48)
As a case in point, the committee determined that within two days of the
President's assassination, CIA headquarters received detailed reports of
Oswald's contacts with the Soviet Embassy and Cuban consulate in Mexico City in
late September and early October 1963. (49) Accurate summaries of this material
were given to the Warren Commission on January 31, 1964, but direct access to
the original material (which would have revealed sources and methods that were
sensitive) was not provided until April 1964, when Warren Commission
investigators traveling abroad met with a CIA representative who provided it to
them. (50) One Warren Commission staff member who reviewed the original material
wrote an April 22, 1964, in a morandum, which indicated the impact of this
material:
[The CIA representative's] narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed
immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts
with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies [in Mexico City.] Apparently, the
distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had
entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown
by [the CIA representative] was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We
had previously planned to show the [CIA representative] [Commission Assistant
Counsel W. David] Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at
the Embassies to get [his] opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our
information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we
decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at
some later time during our visit.(51)
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The committee did note that these distortions may have merely been the product
of the staff member's inaccurate analysis of the available material, since the
record reflected that he had reviewed a CIA memorandum dated January 31, 1964,
that accurately summarized these records. (52) Nevertheless, as a result of his
direct review of the original source materials, he was. able to clarify
considerably his analysis of Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
Another instance in which the CIA's concern for protecting its sensitive sources
and methods resulted in delayed access by the Warren Commission had to do with a
photograph that was referred to when CIA headquarters was informed on October 9,
1963, that Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The
photograph was described as apparently depicting an American initially believed
by some CIA personnel to be Oswald.(53) It was also the photograph that was
apparently shown to Marguerite Oswald after the assassination. (54)
The circumstances of the photograph's origin as well as the fact that the
individual in the photograph bore no resemblance to Oswald were known to the CIA
shortly after the assassination. (55) Nevertheless, the Warren Commission was
not told those details by the CIA until late March 1964. (56)10 The Commission
had requested an explanation of the photograph on February 12, 1964, having
inadvertently learned of its existence from the testimony of Marguerite Oswald.
(60)
The committee did not conclude that the CIA's handling of information derived
from sensitive methods and sources, in fact, substantially impeded the progress
of the Warren Commission, but it did find that the Agency's policy with respect
to this information was inconsistent with the spirit of Executive Order 11130
that "[a]ll executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the
Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from
time to time."
(3) Post-Warren report CIA investigation--The committee found that the CIA, as
had the FBI, showed little or no inclination to develop information with respect
to the President's assassination once the Warren Commission had issued its
report. Three cases in point that emerged in the aftermath of the investigation
and seemed relevant enough to warrant more careful consideration than they
received have been described previously in this report.
In the case of Yuri Nosenko, the Soviet defector who clanned that, as an officer
of the KGB, he handled the Oswald file11, the CIA failed to capitalize on a
potential source of critical evidence. By employing inexperienced interrogators
who lacked interest in or knowledge of Oswald or the assassination, and by
subjecting Nosenko to hostile interrogation, the CIA lost an opportunity to
elicit information that might have shed light on Oswald, his wife Marina,
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and a possible KGB connection to them. In the cases of two Mexican citizens who
claimed to have had contacts with Oswald in Mexico City in the fall of 1963,
Elena Garro de Paz and Oscar Contreras,12 the CIA took only perfunctory action,
consequently failing to gain insight into actions by Oswald that might have had
a bearing on the assassination.
5. THE WARREN COMMISSION PERFORMED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF COMPETENCY IN THE
FULFILLMENT OF ITS DUTIES
(a) The Warren Commission conducted a thorough and professional investigation
into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination.
(b) The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a
conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in
part to the failure of the commission to receive all the relevant information
that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government.
(c) The Warren Commission arrived at its conclusions, based on the evidence
available to it, in good faith.
(d) The Warren Commission presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion
that was too definitive
President John F. Kennedy was the fourth American President to be assassinated,
but his death was the first that led to the formation of a special commission
for the purpose of making a full investigation.
In earlier assassinations, the investigations had been left to existing judical
bodies:
In the case of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, a military commission determined that
John Wilkes Booth was part of a conspiracy, and the Office of the Judge Advocate
General of the U.S. Army saw to the prosecution of six defendants, four of whom
were hanged.
The assassins of James A. Garfield in 1881 and William McKinley in 1901 were
promptly tried in courts of law and executed.
In the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, it was decided by President
Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisers that a panel of distinguished citizens should
be given the responsibility for finding the full facts of the case and reporting
them, along with appropriate recommendations, to the American people.
The Commission was authorized by Executive Order 11130 to set its own procedures
and to employ whatever assistance it deemed necessary from Federal agencies, all
of which were ordered to cooperate to the maximum with the Commission, which
had, under an act of Congress, subpena power and the authority to grant immunity
to witnesses who claimed their privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment.(1)
Chief Justice Earl Warren was selected by President Johnson to head the
Commission. Two senior Members of the Senate, Richard B. Russell, Democrat of
Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican Kentucky, were chosen to serve on
the Commission, as were two from the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs,
Democrat of Louisiana, and Gerald Ford, Republican of Michigan. Two attorneys
who
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had long been active in Government service, Allen W. Dulles, former Director of
the CIA, and John J. McCloy, former president of the World Bank, were also
named.(2) J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of the United States, was
sworn in as General Counsel on December 16, 1963, and 14 attorneys were
appointed within a few weeks to serve as assistant counsel. (3)
The Commission did not employ its own investigative staff. Instead, it relied on
agencies in place---the FBI and Secret Service for domestic aspects, the CIA for
activities involving foreign countries.
In September 1964, following a 9-month effort, the Warren Commission published a
report that not only included its conclusions and recommendations, but also a
detailed analysis of the case. The Commission had seen its task to be:
* * * to uncover all the facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy
and to determine if it was in any way directed or encouraged by unknown persons
at home or abroad.
While the committee concluded that the Warren Commission failed in significant
areas to investigate "all the facts and circumstances" surrounding the tragic
events in Dallas, the committee also found that assigning the responsibility for
that failure needed to be approached with utmost caution and care. In large
measure, the Warren Commission's inadequacies in investigating important aspects
of the President's assassination were the result of failures by the CIA and the
FBI to provide it with all relevant evidence and information. (4)
It has been the contention of the CIA and FBI that they gave full and complete
responses to all specific requests of the Warren Commission, placing
responsibility with the Commission for assuming it would receive the relevant
materials automatically. (5) This apparent misunderstanding, in the view of the
committee, compromised the effectiveness of the process by which the Warren
Commission arrived at its conclusions.
The committee observed that during the course of its hearings, numerous former
Warren Commission members and staff attorneys testified that the general
atmosphere of Government had changed during the years since President Kennedy's
death. They repeatedly noted that they had been significantly more disposed
toward trusting the CIA and FBI in 1963 and 1964 than they would have been in
1978. (6)
As it began to prepare its report on the performance of the Warren Commission,
the committee took note of the high level of professionalism, dedication, and
integrity it found to have characterized the members and staff of the
Commission. The committee noted that criticisms leveled at the Commission had
often been biased, unfair, and inaccurate. Indeed, the committee believed that
the prevailing opinion of the Commission's performance was undeserved. The
competence of the Commission was all the more impressive, in the opinion of the
committee, in view of the substantial pressure to elicit findings in only 9
months.(7) It was evident to the committee that the Commission could have
productively used several more months for its investigation, although the
committee recognized that this was a judgment based on the benefit of years of
hindsight.
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Nevertheless, the committee made the judgment that the time pressures under
which the Warren Commission investigation was conducted served to compromise the
work product and the conclusions of the Commission. (8) Early in the life of the
Commission, it was working under internal deadlines of March or April 1964 for
completion of the investigation, June 1 for a draft report and June 30 for a
final report to the American public. Although these deadlines were finally
abandoned, the committee found that the Commission staff was in fact under heavy
pressure to meet them. President Johnson, among others in his administration,
was anxious to have the investigation completed in advance of the 1964
Presidential conventions, out of concern that the assassination could become a
political issue. (9)
The committee also found that most of the attorneys recruited for the Commission
staff were promised their work would require no more than 3 or 4 months.
Additionally, a number of lawyers were hired on a part-time basis. (10)
Eventually, the realities of the task began to be apparent.
It was not until March that staff attorneys did any real field work in Dallas
and elsewhere, and it was the middle of March before an investigation of Jack
Ruby could get underway, since he was on trial for murder in Dallas.
Nevertheless, a number of senior staff counsel, those who directed important
areas of the case, left their jobs with the Commission by early summer 1964,
over 4 months before the investigation officially ended. (11)
The committee found that the Commission demonstrated a high degree of competency
and good judgment in its central determination that Lee Harvey Oswald was the
assassin of President Kennedy. (12) Contrary to the allegations of some critics,
the Commission was not part of a sinister Government coverup of the truth. The
committee found that the Commission acted in good faith, and the mistakes it
made were those of men doing their best under difficult circumstances. That
being said, on the subject that should have received the Commission's most
probing analysis--whether Oswald acted in concert with or on behalf of
unidentified co-conspirators the Commission's performance, in the view of the
committee, was in fact flawed.(13) In its effort to fix responsibility for this
failure, the committee, as noted, found one of the primary causes was the
absence of the full and proper cooperation of the FBI and the CIA, along with
the time pressures and the desire of national leaders to allay public fears of a
conspiracy.(14)
Virtually all former Warren Commission members and staff contacted by the
committee said they regarded the CIA-Mafia plots against Fidel Castro to be the
most important information withheld from the Commission. (15) They all agreed
that an awareness of the plots would have led to significant new areas of
investigation and would have altered the general approach of the
investigation.(16) J. Lee Rankin, who was the Commission's General Counsel, said
he was outraged on learning in 1975 of the CIA's use of underworld figures for
Castro assassination plots. Rankin stated to the committee:
Certainly * * * it would have bulked larger, the conspiracy area * * * we would
have run out all the various leads and * * it is very possible that we could
have come down with a good many signs of a lead down here to the underworld.
(17)
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Burt W. Griffin, a Commission assistant counsel who directed much of the
investigation of the possible involvement of organized crime and Cuban exiles,
told the committee:
There was no showing that Oswald had any connection with organized crime.
Therefore, there was no reason to think that simply because Ruby was involved in
organized crime, that this would have been linked to the assassination of the
President.
We needed to fill that in, in some way, but that is why the Cuban link is so
important. If we had known that the wanted. to assassinate Castro, then all of
the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about this made much, much more
sense. If we had further known that the CIA was involved with organized criminal
figures in an assassination attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a
completely different perspective on this thing.
But because we did not have those links at this point, there was nothing to tie
the underworld in with Cuba and thus nothing to tie them in with Oswald, nothing
to tie them in with the assassination of the President. (18)
Apart from the inability of the Commission to obtain all of the information it
needed from the CIA and FBI, the committee found inherent inadequacies in its
investigation of an assassination conspiracy.(19) It was, for example, limited
in approach and resources. In the crucial areas of organized crime, Cuban exiles
and other militant groups, and foreign complicity. the attorneys assigned were
lacking in experience and knowledge. Moreover, the committee found little to
indicate that outside experts in these areas were ever consulted by the
Commission.
The committee also discovered certain basic deficiencies in the capacity of the
Commission to investigate effectively the murder of a President. In the words of
a Commission assistant counsel: "The style of the Commission's own staff * * *
was not one of criminal investigators."(21) The committee found, further, that
the Commission consciously decided not to form its own staff of professional
investigators, choosing instead to rely on an analysis by its lawyers of the
investigative reports of Federal agencies, principally the FBI and CIA. (22) And
even though its staff was composed primarily of lawyers, the Commission did not
take advantage of all the legal tools available to it. An assistant counsel told
the committee:"The Commission itself failed to utilize the instruments of
immunity from prosecution and prosecution for perjury with respect to witnesses
whose veracity it doubted."(23) While the Commission did go beyond the expected
role of traditional factfinding panels serving a President, its inability to
break out of the mold of such blue-ribbon bodies severely restricted its
effectiveness in investigating the assassination of the President and the
murders of Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit and Lee Harvey Oswald.
The committee also found fault with the manner in which the conclusions of the
Warren Commission were stated, although the committee recognized how time and
resource limitations might have come into
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play. There were instances, the committee found, in which the conclusions did
not appropriately reflect the efforts undertaken by the Commission and the
evidence before it.(24) In the Warren report, the Commission overstated the
thoroughness of its investigation and the weight of its evidence in a number of
areas, in particular that of the conspiracy investigation. (25) The Commission
did not candidly enumerate its limitations due to time pressures, inadequate
resources or insufficient information. Instead the language employed in the
report left the impression that issues had been dealt with more thoroughly than
they actually had. This was due in part, according to attorneys who worked for
the Commission, to pressure from Commission members to couch the report in the
strongest language possible. As an example, the Commission declared in the
beginning paragraph of its conclusions section,
No limitations have been placed on the Commission's inquiry; it has concluded
its own investigation, and all Government agencies have fully discharged their
responsibility to cooperate with the Commission in its investigation. (26)
This, in the opinion of the committee, was an inaccurate portrayal of the
investigation.
On conspiracy, the Commission stated, "* * * if there is any * * * evidence [of
it], it has been beyond the reach of all the investigative agencies and
resources of the United States and has not come to the attention of this
Commission."(27) Instead of such definitive language, the Commission should have
candidly acknowledged the limitations of its investigation and denoted areas
where there were shortcomings.
As the committee's investigation demonstrated, substantive new information has
been developed in many areas since the Warren Commission completed its work.
Particular areas where the committee determined the performance of the
Commission was less than complete include the following:
Oswald's activities and associations during the periods he lived in New Orleans;
The circumstances surrounding the 2 1/2 years Oswald spent in the Soviet Union;
The background, activities, and associations of Jack Ruby, particularly with
regard to organized crime;
The conspiratorial and potentially violent climate created by the Cuban issue in
the early 1960's, in particular the possible consequences of the CIA-Mafia
assassination plots against Castro and their concealment from officials of the
Kennedy administration;
The potential significance of specific threats identified by the Secret Service
during 1963, and their possible relationship to the ultimate assassination of
the President.
The possible effect upon the FBI's investigation from Director Hoover's
disciplining agents for their conduct of the Oswald security case;
The full nature and extent of Oswald s visit to Mexico City 2 months prior to
the assassination, including not only his contact
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with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic offices there, and the CIA's monitoring of
his activities there, but also his possible associations and activities outside
of those offices;
The violent attitude of powerful organized crime figures toward the President
and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, their capacity to commit murder, including
assassination, and their possible access to Oswald through his associates or
relatives; and
Analysis of all available scientific evidence to determine the number of shots
fired at the President.
In conclusion, the committee found that the Warren Commission's investigation
was conducted in good faith, competently, and with high integrity, but that the
Warren Report was not, in some respects, an accurate presentation of all the
evidence available to the Commission or a true reflection of the scope of the
Commission's work, particularly on the issue of possible conspiracy in the
assassination. It is a reality to be regretted that the Commission failed to
live up to its promise.
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Findings of the Select Commitee on Assassinations in the Assassination of Martin
L. King
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II. FINDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF
DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, IN MEMPHIS, TENN, APRIL 4, 1968
Introduction: The Civil Rights Movement and Dr. King
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INTRODUCTION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND DR. KING
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., an eloquent Baptist minister from Atlanta, Ga., was
one of the most prominent figures in the civil rights movement in America during
its period of most visible achievement, 1955 to 1968. A disciple of nonviolence
and love, Dr. King became the victim of savage violence, killed by a sniper's
bullet as he stood on the balcony of a Memphis, Tenn, motel on April 4, 1968.
His death signaled the seeming end of a period of civil rights progress that he
had led and for which his life had become a symbol. Dr. King's legacy is one of
profound change in the social fabric, not only for Black Americans, but for all
citizens. But for some, after his death, as a Washington Post writer observed,
"* * * his army of conscience disbanded, the banners fell, the movement
unraveled * * *"
History of Civil Rights Violence
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HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLENCE (1)
Dr. King's tragic death in Memphis in 1968 was not, unfortunately, historical
aberration. The first Blacks arrived in colonial America at Jamestown: Va., in
1619 as slaves from Africa. As they were dispersed among Southern plantations,
they were deprived of their traditions and separated from the rest of the
population by custom and Their fate was determined by the white majority.
Civil rights violence dates back at least to the mid-18th century, with the
slave revolts of that period and their brutal suppression by whites. Roaming
bands of runaway slaves in the South attacked plantations, and, in 1775, fears
of a general slave uprising led to the annihilation of at least one group of
Blacks by white soldiers in Georgia.
After the American Revolution, with the invention of the cotton gin, slavery in
the South intensified. Black Americans provided most of the labor to support the
economy of that region. Laws restricting Black mobility and educational
opportunity were adopted by Southern legislatures, while the rights of
slaveholders were jealously protected. Involuntary servitude was, however,
outlawed in the North, and leaders of the new Nation such as Benjamin Franklin,
John Jay, and John Woolman called for an end to slavery.
During the 1830's, sentiment for emancipation of slaves solidified. The-movement
for the abolition of slavery, led by "radicals," sparked violence throughout the
United States. In 1835, a proslavery band seized abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison and dragged him through the streets of Boston. Two years later, the
presses of the radical Alton, Ill, Observer were destroyed, and its editor,
Elijah P. Lovejoy, was shot to death by white vandals.
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In the 1850's, violence presaged the struggle that was to tear the Union
asunder. The pillaging and burning of Lawrence, Kans., by a proslavery mob on
May 21, 1856, led abolitionist John Brown to launch a bloody retaliatory raid on
Potawatamie, Kans., 3 days later. The massacre touched off a guerrilla war that
lasted until Kansas was granted statehood in 1861. In 1859, Brown seized the
Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, W. Va., in the hope of arming a Black force
that would free slaves in the South. The arsenal was recaptured 2 days after
Brown's raid, and Brown was hanged following his trial and conviction of
treason, conspiracy, and murder.
Sectional differences led to the Civil War that fractured the Union in 1861; it
lasted 4 years and became one of the bloodiest military conflicts in U.S.
history. Blacks served a limited role in the Union Army; over 200,000 of them
were inducted. Their presence in battle infuriated Confederate military leaders,
some of whom approved a no-prisoner policy for Blacks. Combat reports indicate
that, Black prisoners were murdered by Southern troops following, for example,
the 1864 Battles of Fort Pillow, Tenn., Poison Spring, Ark., and the Crater at
Petersburg, Va.
In the decade following the Northern victory in 1865 and the freeing of slaves
from bondage, a spate of laws, engineered to guarantee the rights of newly
emancipated Blacks, were adopted. They included the 13th, 14th, and 15th
amendments and 7 civil rights acts. The promise of equality during postwar
Reconstruction, the period of reestablishment of the seceded States into the
Union, however, was not realized. Reforms were ultimately defeated by Southern
white intransigence and violence. With emancipation, a wave of murders swept the
South, and Reconstruction became the bloodiest period of civil rights violence
in U.S. history, as the caste system of segregation was violently
institutionalized. Militant groups such as the White Leagues and the Ku Klux
Klan organized to oppose the new challenge to white supremacy.
Outbursts of violence were commonplace throughout the South during this period:
According to General Philip Sheridan, commander of troops in Louisiana and Texas
during Reconstruction, 3,500 civil rights advocates were slain in Louisiana
alone in the decade following the Civil 1,884 of them in 1868 alone.
When Blacks in Memphis, Tenn., appealed for their civil rights in 1866,
rampaging white terrorists burned homes and churches in the Black section of
that city and massacred 47 Blacks.
The killing of 27 delegates by a white mob at the Louisiana State Convention in
New Orleans in 1866 was described by one observer as "systematic massacre of
Negroes by whites."
Of 16 Blacks elected as delegates to the Mississippi Constitutional Convention
in 1868, two were assassinated by whites.
In the Alabama election campaign of 1870, four Black civil rights leaders were
murdered when they attended a Republican rally.
White terrorists took control of Meridian, Miss., in 1871 after they killed a
Republican judge and lynched an interracial group of civil rights leaders.
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In the Mississippi election campaign of 1874, several Black leaders in Vicksburg
were attacked and murdered by members of the Ku Klux Klan.
During the Louisiana election campaign of 1878, Klan gunmen fired on Blacks in
Caddo Parish, killing 40 by one account, as many as 75 by another.
Systematic violence, designed to terrify Blacks asserting their right to vote,
led Attorney General Alfonso Taft to declare in 1876, "It is the fixed purpose
of the Democratic Party in the South that the Negro shall not vote and murder is
a common means of intimidation to prevent them."
Radical Reconstruction in the South was defeated by 1877, and the last of the
Black militias in the South were dissolved. Southern legislatures adopted laws
to deprive Blacks of all opportunity for political or civil participation and to
segregate all facilities for education, travel, and public accommodation.
Despite the waning of Reconstruction, mob violence and lynching occurred almost
unchecked in the South until World War I. Blacks were removed from public
affairs by intimidation.
In the 1890's, the legislatures of all Southern States disenfranchised Black
citizens. With its 1903 ruling in Giles v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court
sanctioned this practice. A few years earlier, in 1896, the Court had also
approved racial segregation, finding in Plessy v. Ferguson that "separate but
equal" facilities were acceptable under the Constitution. As the Black vote
disappeared in the South, the murder of civil rights leaders decreased
dramatically, only to be replaced by other forms of-white terrorism: riots and
lynching. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
was rounded in 1909 to deal with this intimidation at the expense of further
assertion of Black political authority.
Equality in Education---The 20th Century Objective
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EQUALITY IN EDUCATION---THE 20TH CENTURY OBJECTIVE(2)
The civil rights movement that became a major social and political force in the
1950's, and matured in the 1960's, grew out of the efforts of organizations
rounded during the first half of the 20th century. One prominent organization of
this period, the NAACP, was responsible for the gradual emergence of the Black
protest movement. It sought an end to racial segregation primarily through the
court system by providing counsel to Blacks whose rights had been denied. It
also pushed for reform in the Congress and in State legislatures and initiated
programs to educate the public about existing racial injustice. The National
Urban League worked on behalf of middle-class Blacks. The Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), a pacifist organization rounded in 1949, attacked
discrimination in places of public accommodation in Northern and Border States.
CORE took the lead in nonviolent direct action, organizing, for example, sit-ins
in Chicago in 1943, bus rides and stand-ins at Chicago's Palisades Pool in
194748, and, in 1947, the Journey of Reconciliation, a harbinger of later
freedom rides. These activities of CORE, in fact, presaged the work of Dr.
Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the late 1950's
and 1960's.
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With the signs of civil rights progress in the 1940's, particularly judicial
responses to the NAACP, a mass movement began to develop, U.S. Supreme Court
prohibited all-white primary elections and declared unconstitutional racially
restrictive real estate covenants. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
issued an Executive order urging fair employment practices in response to the
threats of mass demonstrations from A Philip Randolph, president of the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 'Porters' The president's Committee on Civil. Rights
recommended the enactment of fair employment legislation in 1947, and in 1948,
president Harry S. Truman barred segregation in the Armed Forces and Government
agencies. The Congress, however, did not act on civil rights issues until 1957.
The modern civil rights movement set its roots in the field of education. The
NAACP had initiated litigation in the 1930's to end segregation in education. At
the beginning of 1954, 17 States and the District of Columbia required
segregation in public schools, while three other States permitted localities to
adopt the practice. Then, on May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its
unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education that segregation in public
schools was unconstitutional. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief
Justice Earl Warren said that "separate education facilities are inherently
unequal." A year later, the Court followed with a ruling that the process of
public school desegregation must proceed with "all deliberate speed," thus
choosing a policy of gradualism rather than requiring desegration by a fixed
date as urged by the Brown plaintiffs through their NAACP attorneys.
The Brown decision the beginning of a long struggle, for it was not readily
accepted in the South. Segregationist and States rights groups emerged to oppose
the goal of integration, and militant organizations such as the White Citizens
Councils and the Ku Klux Klans attracted a new following. Violence was resumed.
On August 28, 1955, for example, a white mob in Mississippi kidnapped and
lynched Emmett Till, a 14-year-old boy from Chicago who had been visiting his
relatives.
A New Leader Emerges
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A NEW LEADER EMERGES
Many historians believe the beginning of the modern Black revolt against
inequality was marked in Montgomery, Ala. on December 1, 1955. Four Black
passengers were asked by the driver of a downtown bus to give up their seats.
Rosa Parks, a 42-year-old Black seamstress, refused and was arrested under a
local segregation ordinance. In protest, Black leaders organized a boycott of
the Montgomery bus system that lasted 382 days, ending only when the U.S.
Supreme Court ordered the buses integrated.
The bus boycott was guided by the words of a 27-year-old Baptist minister who
emerged as a fresh and dynamic force among Blacks. Preaching the "Christian
doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence? Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., represented a new leadership. In Montgomery, he
demonstrated that nonviolent direct action could be used effectively to achieve
social justice. From that time until his death in 1968, Dr. King's life was
inextricably interwoven with the events of the civil rights movement.
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Dr. King was born in Atlanta, Ga., on January 15, 1929, the son of Baptist
minister, Martin Luther King, Sr. and the maternal grandson of another Baptist
minister. He enrolled at Atlanta's all-Black Morehouse College at age 15 and, in
his junior year, decided to enter the clergy. In 1947, he was ordained a
minister at his father's Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta. The following year,
he continued his studies at the Crozer Theological Seminary in Chester, Pa. He
was elected president of his class in his senior year and was named outstanding
student when he graduated first in his class. At Crozer, he became acquainted
with the work of Christian social theologians, as well as Mohandas K. Gandhi's
doctrine of nonviolent direct action, Satyagraha (Sanskrit for truth-force), and
Henry David Thoreau's essay, "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience."
With a fellowship he received to pursue his doctorate, King entered graduate
school at Boston University in 1951. His doctoral thesis compared the
conceptions of God in the thinking of Paul Tillich and Harry Nelson Weiman. He
received his doctorate in the spring of 1955.
In Boston, he met Coretta Scott, a graduate of Antioch College who was attending
the New England Conservatory of Music. They were married in June 1953, and in
the ensuing years had four children: Yolanda, Martin Luther III, Dexter Scott,
and Bernice.
At the beginning of 1954, as he continued work toward his doctorate, Martin
Luther King was hired as pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in
Montgomery, Ala., the city where he was to begin his civil rights career.
As president of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), Dr. King led the
bus boycott with the assistance of Montgomery Black leaders E.D. Nixon, a civil
rights activist who had worked with A. Philip Randolph's Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, and Reverend E.N. French. At the
first meeting of the MIA on December 5, 1955, Dr. King enunciated principle from
which he would never waver: "We will not resort to violence. We will not degrade
ourselves with hatred. Love will be returned for hate." In the tradition of
Gandhi, leader of the struggle for Indian independence and an advocate of
passive resistance, Dr. King urged his followers to forswear violence and to
work for ultimate reconciliation with their opponents by returning good for
evil.
After mass arrests, threats and physical attacks, including the dynamiting of
Dr. King's home, the Montgomery bus boycott ended successfully in December 1956.
That month the Southern Regional Council announced that 25 other Southern cities
had desegregated their buses either voluntarily or as the result of boycotts.
Despite the successful Montgomery bus boycott, 1956 was also marked by
disappointments to the rising hopes of Black Americans. The admission of
Autherine Lucy to the University of Alabama in February was met by white mob
violence. To avert further disturbances, she was expelled by university
officials, That decision was upheld by a Federal district court and the
University of Alabama remained segregated until 1963. Also in 1956, 101 members
of Congress from the States that had comprised the Confederacy signed the
Southern Manifesto, which declared that the school desegregation decisions of
the Supreme Court were a "clear abuse of judicial power." Nothing that
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neither the Constitution nor the 14th amendment mentioned education and that the
Brown decision had abruptly reversed precedents established in Plessy v.
Ferguson and subsequent cases, the manifesto signers vowed "to use all lawful
means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the
Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation."
A Philosophy of Nonviolence
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A PHILOSOPHY OF NONVIOLENCE
White resistance notwithstanding, the civil rights movement continued its growth
in 1957. Recognizing the need for a mass movement to capitalize on the
Montgomery bus boycott, Black leaders formed the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) early in the year, and the boycott leader, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., was elected its first president. Adopting a nonviolent approach and
focusing on the South, the SCLC was dedicated to the integration of Blacks in
all aspects of American life.
In May 1957, to commemorate the third anniversary of the Supreme Court's Brown
ruling on school desegration, Dr. King led a prayer pilgrimage in Washington,
D.C., the first large-scale Black demonstration in the capital since World War
II. In his first national address, Dr. King returned to a theme that had lain
dormant for 80 years, the right to vote. "Give us the ballot," he pleaded, "and
we will no longer have to worry the Federal Government about our basic rights *
* * we will quietly and nonviolently, without rancor or bitterness, implement
the Supreme Court's decision." Dr. King was on his way' to becoming one of the
most influential Black leaders of his time, a symbol of the hopes for equality
for all Americans.
It was a time of fast-moving events, actions and counteractions, in a continuing
conflict. On September 9, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the first
Civil Rights Act since 1875. The law markedly enlarged the Federal role in race
relations. It established a Civil Rights Commission and a Civil Rights Division
in the Department of Justice. Most important, it gave the Attorney General
authority to seek injunctions against obstruction of voting rights.
That same month, in Little Rock, Ark., violent rioting erupted over the
integration of Central High School. Nine Black students were successfully
enrolled, but not before 1,000 paratroopers and 10,000 National Guardsmen were
sent into the beleaguered city. The appearance of Federal troops in Little Rock
brought back unpleasant memories of Reconstruction, and the price of progress
was a polarization of southern attitudes. Meanwhile, as Dr. King continued to
carry the civil rights banner, he became the victim of a near fatal assault on
September 20, 1957. As he was autographing copies of his first book, "Stride
Toward Freedom," in a Harlem department store, a deranged Black woman, Izola
Curry, stabbed him with an 8-inch letter opener. Though the weapon penetrated
near his heart, Dr. King recovered after 2 weeks of hospitalization.
1960: The Year of the Sit-Ins
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1960: THE YEAR OF THE SIT-INS
Civil rights activism intensified in 1960 the year of the sit-ins. On February
1, 1960, four Black students dedicated to nonviolent direct
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action sat at the lunch counter of a Greensboro, N.C., Woolworth's store. Though
they were refused service, the students sat at the counter until the store
closed, and each succeeding day they returned with more students. The sit-in
movement spread to cities in Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Alabama, Kentucky, and Florida. Recognizing the need for organization of this
new movement, the SCLC provided the impetus for the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in April 1960.
The sit-ins that continued throughout the year became a successful means to
protest. By the end of 1960, Blacks were being served at lunch counters in
hundreds of southern stores.
Inevitably, there was white resistance. As the sit-ins set the pace of a
campaign to open up public facilities of all sorts, there were thousands of
arrests and occasional outbreaks of violence. Dr. King was arrested with other
demonstrators at an Atlanta, Ga., department store sit-in in October 1960.
Trespass charges were dropped against him at his trial, but he was sentenced to
4 months hard labor at the Reidsville State Prison Farm on the pretext that he
had violated probation for an earlier minor traffic offense. National concern
for Dr. King's safety prompted the intercession of Democratic Presidential
candidate John F. Kennedy, which led to the civil rights leader's release. Some
observers believed this action contributed to Kennedy's narrow election victory
over Vice President Richard M. Nixon a week later by attracting Black support.
Violence increased with attempts to integrate the interstate transportation
system in 1961, the year of the freedom rides. They began in May when members of
CORE boarded two buses in Washington, D.C., and set out for New Orleans,
determined to test southern segregation laws on buses as well as in terminals en
route. Trouble broke out when the buses reached Alabama. One bus was burned and
stoned by whites in Anniston, and, in Birmingham, protestors on the second bus
were brutally beaten by a mob awaiting their arrival. Another group of students
left Atlanta, Ga., for Montgomery, Ala. the following week. Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy sent 500 Federal marshals to protect them, but the students
arrived before the marshals and were savagely beaten. The next evening an angry
throng of whites surrounded a church where Dr. King was scheduled to speak. The
marshals and federalized National Guard troops had to rescue the congregation
and Dr. King from the mob. Although the freedom riders met with little violence
in Mississippi, they did have to reckon with an unsympathetic legal system. Over
300 demonstrators were arrested for breach of the peace and for disobeying
police orders to disperse in segregated Mississippi terminals.
In response to the attacks on freedom riders, Attorney General Kennedy
petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to adopt stricter
regulations against segregation. On September 22, 1961, the ICC announced new
rules prohibiting segregation on interstate buses and in terminals.
Across-the-board desegregation of all public facilities in Albany, Ga., was the
focus of a campaign led by Dr. King from late 1961 through the summer of 1962.
The city reacted by arresting over 1,100 demonstrators during the campaign,
including Dr. King and his
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colleague, Reverend Abernathy. City officials stubbornly refused to confer with
Black leaders and steadfastly rejected proposals for desegregation. By September
1962, public parks pools and libraries had been closed or sold to white business
groups. The Albany campaign received national attention, but it failed to crack
the southern resistance symbolized by the city. From the Albany defeat Dr. King
learned that the scattergun approach of simultaneously attacking all aspects of
segregation was ineffective.
On the other hand, the admission of the first Black student to the all-white
University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962 marked a significant
integrationist victory. James Meredith, an Air Force veteran, had been enrolled
at Jackson State College when he decided to transfer to "Ole Miss." With the
assistance of the NAACP, he filed suit when he was rejected. After 16 months of
litigation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that he had been turned
down solely because of his race and ordered that-he be accepted. Outright
obstruction by State officials led the court to order that Mississippi's Gov.
Ross Barnett and Lt. Gov. Paul Johnson pay fines unless they stop interfering
with its ruling. On October 1, 1962, 320 Federal marshals arrived at Oxford to
escort Meredith to his dormitory. This action set off a riot that left 2 persons
killed and 375 injured before it was quelled by Federal troops. When the tear
gas cleared, Meredith was the first Black student to enter "Ole Miss." Despite
Governor Barnett's vow to continue to fight his enrollment, Meredith graduated
in August 1963.
1963: A Year of Triumph and Despair
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1963: A YEAR OF TRIUMPH AND DESPAIR
Dr. King led an all-out attack in the spring of 1963 on racial discrimination in
Birmingham, Ala., which he described as "the most segregated city in the United
States." Civil rights activists sought removal of racial restrictions in
downtown snack bars, restrooms and stores, as well as nondiscriminatory hiring
practices and the formation of a biracial committee to negotiate integration.
Sit-ins, picket lines and parades were met by the police forces of Eugene "Bull"
Connor, commissioner of public safety, with hundreds of arrests on charges of
demonstrating without a permit, loitering and trespassing.
On Good Friday, April 12, 1963, Dr. King, Reverend Abernathy and Rev. Fred
Shuttlesworth were arrested for leading a demonstration in defiance of an
injunction obtained by Bull Connor. Dr. King was placed in solitary confinement
and refused access to counsel. During his incarceration, he penned his "Letter
from the Birmingham Jail," a response to a statement by eight leading local
white clergymen-Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish--who had denounced him as an
outside agitator and urged Blacks to withdraw their support for his crusade. In
this eloquent statement, Dr. King set forth his philosophy of nonevidence and
enumerated the steps that preceded the Gandhian civil disobedience in
Birmingham. Specifically citing southern segregation laws, he wrote that any law
that degraded people was unjust and must be resisted. Nonviolent direct action,
Dr. King explained, sought to foster tension and dramatize an issue "so it can
no longer be ignored."
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Dr. King was released from jail on April 20, 1963. The Birmingham demonstrations
continued. On May 2, 500 Blacks, most of them high school students, were
arrested and jailed. The next day, a group of demonstrators was bombarded with
brickbats and bottles by onlookers while another cluster of 2,500 protestors was
met by the forces of Police Commissioner Connor, with his snarling dogs and
high-pressure firehoses.
Worldwide attention was being focused on the plight of Blacks whose reasonable
demands were being met by the unbridled brutality of the Birmingham police.
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon said Birmingham "would disgrace a Union of South
Africa or a Portuguese Angola." The outcry led to negotiations with the city,
and Dr. King sue ended his campaign on May 8. Two days later, an agreement was
reached to desegregate lunch counters, restrooms, fitting rooms, and drinking
fountains in department stores and to promote Blacks over a 60-day period The
following day, however, the bombings of a desegregated hotel and the home of Dr.
King's brother, Rev. A. D. King, led to a disturbance by hundreds of Blacks that
lasted until State troopers arrived to assist local police. Calm was restored.
Dr. King was considered victorious because of the attention he had attracted to
racial injustice. One by one, public facilities in Birmingham were opened to
Blacks.
Birmingham became a rallying cry for civil rights activists hundreds of cities
in the summer of 1963. Marches were held in Selma, Ala., Albany, Ga., Cambridge,
Md., Raleigh and Greensboro, N.C., Nashville and Clinton, Tenn, Shreveport, La.,
Jackson and Philadelphia, Miss., as well as in New York and Chicago.
This period was also one of tragedy. On June 19, 1963, the day after President
Kennedy's dramatic call for comprehensive civil rights legislation, Medgar
Evers, NAACP field secretary for Mississippi, was shot to death in front of his
Jackson home. Evers had been instrumental in James Meredith's efforts to enter
the University of Mississippi, and a month before his death had launched an
antisegregation drive in Jackson. Byron de la Beckwith, a fertilizer salesman,
was charged with the murder and tried twice; both trials ending in hung juries.
In September 1963, attention reverted to Birmingham, Ala., when the 16th Street
Baptist Church was bombed, killing four Black girls, aged 11 to 14, in their
Sunday school class. The tragedy was compounded by the deaths of two Black
youths, killed later that day in an outburst of violence that followed the
bombing.
The climatic point of the campaign for Black equality came on August 28, 1963,
when Dr. King led 250,000 followers in the march on Washington, a nonviolent
demonstration of solidarity engineered by A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin
to dramatize Black discontent and demand an open, desegregated society with
equal justice for all citizens regardless of race. A goal of the march was
passage of a comprehensive civil rights bill to insure integrated education,
equal access to public accommodations, protection of voting rights and
nondiscriminatory employment practices. In his address, acclaimed as the most
memorable moment of the day, Dr. King recounted his dream for an integrated
society:
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I have a dream that one day this Nation will rise up, live out the true meaning
of its creed:"We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created
equal." I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia sons of former
slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at
the table of brotherhood. I have a dream that one day even the State of
Mississippi, a State sweltering with the heat of injustice * * * will be
transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice. I have a dream that my four
little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by
the color of their skin but by the content of their character.
Dr. King pledged to continue to fight for freedom and concluded:
When we allow freedom to ring * * * from every town and every hamlet, from every
State and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's
children, Black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics
will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual,
"Free at last! Free at last! Great God All Mighty, we are free at last!"
The march provided new impetus to the civil rights movement and helped solidify
the recognition of Dr. King as one of the most important spokesmen for the Black
cause.
Within weeks of President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963, his
successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, asked the Congress to end its deadlock
and submit strong civil rights legislation for his approval. Congress responded
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contained provisions that:
Guaranteed Blacks the right to vote; guaranteed access to public accommodations,
such as restaurants, hotels, and amusement areas; authorized the Federal
Government to sue to desegregate public facilities, including schools; mandated
nondiscrimination in Federal programs; and required equal employment
opportunity. In addition, on February 5, 1964, poll taxes, a device that had
been used to prevent Blacks from voting, were barred with the adoption of the
24th amendment.
CORE and SNCC recruited 1,100 northern college students in a drive to register
on the voting rolls as many of Mississippi's 900,000 Blacks as possible in the
freedom summer voter registration campaign of 1964. The campaign came to the
forefront of public attention on August 4 when the bodies of three civil rights
workers--James E. Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner--were found
buried in a dam near Philadelphia, Miss. The three men, missing since June 21,
had been shot to death. Eighteen whites, including several police officers, were
arrested and charged with conspiracy to deprive the victims of their civil
rights. Dismissed by Federal District Court Judge W. Harold Cox, the charges
were reinstated in 1968 after the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Federal
Government could prosecute State officials, as well as private persons who
conspire with them, who deprive persons of their constitutional rights.
The year 1964 also marked an important personal achievement for Dr. King. On
December 10, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
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Oslo, Norway. At age 35, he was the youngest recipient of the award in history
and the second Black American after Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, the 1950 award winner.
Not only was the award a recognition of Dr. King's role in the nonviolent
struggle for civil rights in the United
States, but to many it signified official international recognition of the Black
protest movement.
In 1965, civil rights advocates, led by Dr. King, focused their attention on
Black voting rights. At least two-thirds of Alabama's eligible Black voters were
not registered at the beginning of the year. In Selma, Ala., on January 2, 1965,
Dr. King announced a voter registration drive centering on that city, an attempt
to dramatize the need for a Federal voting rights law. The violence directed
against demonstrators in Selma, along with harassment by State and local
authorities, aroused sentiment for such legislation. In February, Jimmy Lee
Jackson, acivil rights worker from Perry County, Ala., became the first martyr
of the campaign, when he was killed by gunfire in a clash between demonstrators
and State troopers. Dr. King organized, but did not lead an initial march from
Selma to the State capital, Montgomery, on March 7. The demonstrators were
turned back just outside Selma by State troopers with nightsticks, tear gas, and
bull whips. On March 9, 1,500 Black and white marchers, this time led by Dr.
King, made a second attempt to reach Montgomery, despite a Federal court
injunction. They were again met by a phalanx of State troopers just outside
Selma. Rather than force a confrontation, Dr. King asked his followers to kneel
in prayer and then instructed them to return to Selma His caution cost him the
support of many young militants who already mocked him with the title, "De
Lawd." That evening in Selma, three white ministers were attacked and brutally
beaten by white thugs. Rev. James Reeb, a Unitarian pastor from Boston, died 2
days later as a result of his injuries.
On March 13, President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress to propose
enactment of a strong voting rights bill. In one of the most memorable speeches
of his Presidency, Johnson said:
At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape a
turning point in man's unending search for freedom. So it was at Lexington and
Concord. So it was last week in Selma, Ala.
In Alabama the twice-aborted ,march from Selma to Montgomery began for a third
time on March 21, led by two Black Nobel Peace Prize winners, Dr. King and Dr.
Bunche. On March 25, when the civil rights marchers reached Montgomery, their
ranks had swelled to 50,000. In an impassioned address on the statehouse
grounds, Dr. King noted that the Black protest movement was recognizing gains
and no amount of white terrorism would stop it. He said:
* * * I know some of you are asking today, "How long will it take?" I come to
say to you this afternoon, however difficult the moment, however frustrating the
hour, it will not be long, because truth pressed to earth will rise again.
How long? Not long, because no lie can live forever.
How long? Not long, because you will reap what you sow.
How long? Not long, because the arm of the moral universe is long but it bends
toward justice.
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While the march was considered a success, the tragedy that had plagued it from
the outset continued. A civil rights transportation volunteer, Viola Liuzzo of
Detroit, was shot to death as she drove a marcher home to Selma. Four Ku Klux
Klan members were arrested for her murder, three of whom were eventually
convicted of violating Mrs. Liuzzo's civil rights and sentenced to 10 years in
prison.
The Selma campaign led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, signed into law
by President Johnson on August 6, 1965. The act provided for direct action
through use of Federal examiners to register voters turned away by local
officials. The Department of Justice moved swiftly to suspend voter
qualification devices such as lileracy tests in several Southern States, and
within 3 weeks of the law's enactment, Johnson announced that over 27,000 Blacks
had been registered by Federal examiners in three Southern States.
Divisions in the ranks of Black Americans became painfully apparent in 1965.
Militants labeled Dr. King's nonviolence a tool of the white power structure.
The February 21 assassination of Malcolm X, a former leader of the Black Muslims
who had called for Black separation, underscored growing problems among Blacks.
Three Black men were arrested for the Harlem shooting of Malcolm X.
In early 1965, Dr. King suggested that the SCLC wage a, campaign in northern
cities for better housing for Blacks and nondiscriminatory employment practices.
He spoke several times in the North. That summet he attacked patterns of de
facto segregation in Chicago, and led a number of marches in predominantly Black
neighborhoods of that city. It was also in 1965 that he first indicated a nexus
between Federal Government spending for the Vietnam war and cuts in Federal
assistance to the poor.
The euphoria over the August 6, 1965, signing of the Voting Rights Act subsided
a week later when the Watts section of Los Angeles exploded in the Nation's
worst race riot since 1943. It lasted 6 days and left 35 dead, 900 injured, over
3,500 arrested and $46 million of property damage. Dr. King received a mixed
welcome in Watts, as he preached nonviolence in the wake of the tragic
disturbance. He urged massive Federal assistance for the northern urban poor who
suffered from economic discrimination and de facto segregation, the underlying
causes of the Los Angeles violence.
The Watts riot demonstrated the depth of the urban race problems in the North.
At the beginning of 1966, Dr. King launched a campaign against discrimination in
Chicago, focusing his attack on substandard and segregated housing. He moved to
a Chicago slum tenement in January and promised to organize tenants and lead a
rent strike if landlords did not improve living conditions in the ghetto. Mayor
Richard Daley met with Black leaders several times, but he took no concrete
action to promote better housing or to implement nondiscriminatory employment
practices. Violence against demonstrators plagued rallies and marches led by Dr.
King in the spring and summer of 1966. At the end of July, he pressed his drive
for better housing into Chicago's allwhite neighborhoods. Demonstrators were
jeered and attacked during these marches, and Dr. King himself wes stoned in a
parade through the Gage Park section on August 5. Although he was stunned by the
vehement reaction of northern whites to civil rights activities, Dr. King
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planned a march through the all-white suburb of Cicero because demands for
better housing were not acknowledged by the city. He canceled the Cicero
protest, however, when the city administration and Chicago business leaders
agreed to meet with civil rights leaders. The city officials and Black leaders
signed a summit agreement that manifested a commitment to open housing. Though
Dr. King considered the agreement a victory and moderate Black leaders saw it as
setting new precedent by forcing the mayor to the conference table, restive
Black militants criticized it as a middle class sellout. The agreement
ultimately had little effect on the plight of Chicago Blacks, and Dr. King's
campaign was defeated by the combination of Mayor Richard Daley's intransigence
and the complexities of northern racism. A positive byproduct of the effort was
the SCLC's Operation Bread Basket that attacked economic ills and attempted to
create new jobs for Blacks.
During 1966, the Black protest movement crumbled into several factions. SNCC,
led by Stokely Carmichael, and CORE, under Floyd McKissick, adopted the slogan
"Black Power," symbolizing radicalization of the movement. The term dramatically
came to the attention of the public during the Meredith march in June. On June
6, 1966, James Meredith had been shot and wounded shortly after he began a
220-mile "March Against Fear" from Memphis, Tenn., to Jackson, Miss. He had
hoped to embolden Blacks to register and vote, as well as to demonstrate the
right of Blacks to move freely in the South. On the day after the assassination
attempt, the leaders of five major civil rights organizations, Dr. King of the
SCLC; Roy Wilkins, NAACP; Whitney Young, Jr., National Urban League; Floyd
McKissick, CORE; and Stokely Carmichael, SNCC, converged in Memphis to pick up
Meredith s march. Dr. King attempted to walk the line between the militancy of
SNCC and CORE and the moderate tactics of the NAACP and the Urban League. During
the 3-week Meredith march, however, the differing views of King and Carmichael
became increasingly apparent. The SCLC president continued to advocate
nonviolence, cooperation with whites and racial integration, while Carmichael
urged Blacks to resist their white "oppressors" and "seize power."
The marchers reached their destination, Jackson, on June 26. While Meredith and
King addressed the marchers, it was Carmichael's plea for Blacks to build a
power structure "so strong that we will bring them [whites] to their knees every
time they mess with us" that tracted the most attention. In July 1966, CORE
adopted "Black Power" rather than integration as its goal. The NAACP
disassociated itself from the "Black Power" doctrine.
Urban riots in 1966 by angry and frustrated Blacks did not compare to the
magnitude of the Watts riot a year earlier, but violence spread to more cities,
43 for the year, including Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Dayton, St. Louis,
Brooklyn, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Atlanta. By the end of the summer, 7 persons
were dead, over 400 injured, 3,000 arrested; property damage was estimated at
over $5 million.
1967 was a year of widespread urban violence, sanctioned by some Black militant
leaders while abhorred by moderates who saw the up-
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rising as ultimately counterproductive to Black interests. It appeared to some
that the phase of the Black protest movement characterized by nonviolent
demonstrations led by Dr. King was coming to an end. Many civil rights leaders
thought violent upheaval inevitable. In an April 16, 1967, news conference, Dr.
King warned that at least 10 cities "could explode in racial violence this
summer."
Urban racial violence did plague over 100 cities in 1967. During the Spring,
minor disturbances had 'occurred in Omaha, Louisville, Cleveland, Chicago, San
Francisco, Wichita, Nashville, and Houston. Then in June, Boston and Tampa
experienced serious disorders. The most devastating riot since Watts in 1965
occurred, however, in Newark, from June 12 to 17, 1967, an outburst that
resulted in 25 deaths, 1,200 persons injured, and over 1,300 arrested. The
following month Detroit was the site of the worst urban race riot of the decade,
one that left 43 dead, over 2,000 injured and more than 3,800 arrested. Rioting
continued around the country, with outbreaks in Phoenix, Washington, D.C. and
New Haven, among other cities. According to a report of the Senate Permanent
Committee on Investigations released in November 1967, 75 major riots occurred
in that year, compared with 21 in 1966; 83 were killed in 1967, compared with 11
in 1966 and 36 in 1965.
On July 27, 1967, President Johnson established the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders, chaired by Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner, to investigate the
origins of the disturbances and to make recommendations to prevent or contain
such outbursts. On July 26, Dr. King, with Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, and A.
Philip Randolph, issued a statement from NAACP headquarters calling on Blacks to
refrain from rioting and urging them to work toward improving their situation
through peaceful means.
Violence flared early in 1968 as students at South Carolina State College, on
February 5, organized a protest against segregation at a local bowling alley.
Following the arrests of several demonstrators on trespassing charges, a clash
between students and police left eight injured. On February 8, renewed conflicts
on the campus led to the shooting deaths of three Black students. The bowling
alley was ultimately integrated, but only after the National Guard was called
in. Still, sporadic disruptions continued.
On February 29, a jolting summary of the final report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders was made public. The Commission found that the
urban riots of 1967 were not the result of any organized conspiracy, as fearful
whites had charged. Rather, it concluded that the United States was
"moving-toward two separate societies, one Black, one white--separate and
unequal." The report warned that frustration and resentment resulting from
brutalizing inequality and white racism were fostering violence by Blacks. The
Commission suggested that the Nation attack the root of the problems that led to
violence through a massive financial Commitment to programs designed to improve
housing, education, and employment opportunities. This advice was significant
because it came not from militants, but from moderates such as Illinois Governor
and Commission Chairman Kerner, New York City Mayor and Commission Vice Chairman
John V. Lindsay, NAACP executive board chairman Roy Wilkins and Senator Edward
W. Brooke of Massachusetts. In the con-
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clusion of its report, the Commission quoted the testimony of social
psychologist Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, who referred to the reports of earlier
violence commissions:
I read that report * * * of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were
reading the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of 1935,
the report of the investigating committee of the Harlem riot of 1943, the report
of the McCone Commission on the Watts riot.
I must in candor say to you members of this Commission: it is a kind of Alice in
Wonderland, with the same moving picture reshown over and over again, the same
recommendations, and the same inaction.
Black leaders generally felt vindicated by the report. On March 4, 1968, Dr.
King described it as "a physician's warning of approaching death [of American
society] with a prescription to life. The duty of every American is to
administer the remedy without regard for the cost and without delay."
In December 1967, Dr. King had announced plans for a massive campaign of civil
disobedience in Washington to pressure the Federal Government to provide jobs
and income for all Americans. In mid-March, he turned his attention from this
Poor People's Campaign to a strike of sanitation workers in Memphis, Tenn., and
thus began his last peaceful crusade.
The Road to Memphis
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THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS (3)
A quest for world peace and an end to economic deprivation for all American
citizens, regardless of race, were uppermost in Dr. King's mind during the last
year of his life, as manifested by his staunch opposition to the Vietnam war and
his Poor People's Campaign, an effort designed to dramatize the scourge of
poverty in the United States. In March 1968, he interrupted his planning of the
Poor People's March on Washington to travel to Memphis, Tenn., where he hoped to
organize a nonviolent campaign to assist the poorly paid, mostly Black
sanitation workers who were on strike for better better working conditions, and
recognition of their union.
By 1967, American forces in Vietnam had grown to over 500,000, and more than
6,000 Americans had died in the escalating Southeast Asian conflict.(4)
Opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam had begun to intensify. Dr. King was
among those who called for disengagement and peaceful settlement.
The press pointed to Dr. King's address at New York City's Riverside Church on
April 4, 1967, as the time when the SCLC president publicly disclosed his
opposition to the Vietnam war, even though he had made similar statements and
had been urging a negotiated settlement since early 1965. (5) He attacked the
foreign policy of the Johnson administration, emphasizing the connection between
wasteful military spending and its harmful effect on the poor, as social
programs were dropped in favor of Vietnam-related expenditures. He warned that
this pattern was an indication of the "approaching spiritual death" of the
Nation. Dr. King described the United States as the "greatest purveyor of
violence in the world today," and said that the high proportion of fatalities
among Black soldiers in Viet-
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nam demonstrated "cruel manipulation of the poor" who bore the burden of the
struggle. On April 15, 1967, at a rally at the United Nations, he called for a
halt to U.S. bombing.
Dr. King was stunned by the vehement reaction to his call for peace, especially
from his colleagues in the civil rights movement. For example, Urban League
president Whitney Young and NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins strongly
condemned Kings' pacificism.(6) Moderate Black leaders feared that the generally
sympathetic Johnson administration would be antagonized by the SCLC president's
ministrations, while Dr. King argued that war priorities diverted valuable
resources that could be used to improve the condition of America's Blacks. At
the same time, his indefatigable belief in nonviolence was increasingly
challenged by younger, more militant Blacks who did not renounce the use of
violence to achieve their goals. A King biographer, David L. Lewis, wrote that
by early 1967, "the verdict was that Martin was finished." (7)
In late 1967, in keeping with his belief that the problem of domestic poverty
was exacerbated by use of Government funds to finance the war in Vietnam, Dr.
King turned his attention to the plight of the poor in America. At an SCLC
meeting in Atlanta in December 1967, he presented a plan for a nonviolent
demonstration by a racially integrated coalition of the poor, to take place in
Washington, D.C., in April 1968. Using creative nonviolence, these ignored
Americans would demand an economic bill of rights with the objectives of a
guaranteed annual income, employment for the able-bodied, decent housing, and
quality education. Dr. King planned that the poor would demonstrate, beginning
on April 20, until the Government responded to their demands. He wrote:
We will place the problems of the poor at the seat of the Government of the
wealthiest Nation in the history of mankind, If that power refuses to
acknowledge its debt to the poor, it will have failed to live up to its promise
to insure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to its citizens.
In the face of criticism of his antiwar views by moderate Blacks and rejection
of his tireless devotion to nonviolence by militants, Dr. King also hoped to use
the Poor People's Campaign to broaden his base of support and buoy the SCLC. In
the opinion of Dr. King's closest associate, Reverend Abernathy, SCLC
vice-president-at-large in 1968, and Dr. King's successor as president of the
organization, SCLC influence had declined since the Selma, Ala. voter
registration campaign in 1965. Stymied in its efforts to deal with the urban
racism of the North, the SCLC had seen a decline in financial contributions
after the 1966 Chicago drive for better housing and nondiscriminatory employment
practices. Abernathy described the SCLC's failure to implement new policies in
Chicago as "the SCDC's Waterloo."
Public sentiment for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam intensified in early
1968, following the bloody Tet offensive during which the National Front
attacked almost every American base in Vietnam and destroyed the U.S. Embassy.
in Saigon. Dr. King continued his criticism of the Johnson administration's
escalation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In a March 16, 1968, address
to delegates at the California Democratic Council's statewide convention in
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Anaheim, he urged that, Johnson's nomination be blocked by the Democratic Party
that year, charging that the President's obsession with the war in Vietnam was
undercutting the civil rights movement. (8) According to one writer, this was
Dr. King's first public call for president Johnson's defeat.(9) Although he did
not endorse either of the Democratic peace candidates, Senator Eugene B.
McCarthy or Senator Robert F. Kennedy, he did praise the civil rights record of
each aspirant.
During the weekend of March 16 to 17, 1968, Dr. King told Rev. James Lawson of
Memphis, Tenn., that he would be willing to make an exploratory trip to Memphis
to speak on behalf of striking sanitation workers. He was expected to appear
there on Monday night, March 18, 1968. Reverend Lawson had first contacted Dr.
King in late February 1968 in the hope that the SCLC president could assist the
garbage workers in pressing their demands, as well as avert further violence
between the strikers and the police.
At the heart of the Memphis strike was the issue of racial discrimination. (10)
As the result of heavy rains in Memphis on January 31, 1968, Black crews of
sanitation workers had been sent home without pay, while white city employees
had been allowed to work and received a full day's wage. On the following day,
two Black sanitation workers took shelter from the rain in the back of a
compressor garbage truck. The truck malfunctioned, and the two were crushed to
death. These events were the catalyst for a strike of Memphis sanitation
workers, 90 percent of whom were Black; they were protesting the problems faced
by the workers: low wages, unsafe working conditions, lack of benefits such as
medical protection and racial discrimination on the job. On February 12, 1968,
all but 200 of the 1,300 Memphis workers walked off their jobs. The American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) supported the
strike and demanded a pay raise, recognition of AFSCME as sole bargaining agent,
seniority rights, health and hospital insurance, safety controls, a meaningful
grievance procedure and other benefits.
Newly elected Memphis Mayor Henry Loeb III rejected the demands labeling the
strike illegal and refusing to negotiate until the workers returned to their
jobs. Using the slogan "I am a man Blacks believed that union representation was
tantamount to their recognition as human beings. The racial issue became a
central theme and the NAACP intervened in the strike.
When the Memphis City Council refused to hear their demands for union
recognition on February 23, 1968, the striking workers had responded with their
first march. They were ruthlessly dispersed by police indiscriminately using
mace and nightsticks. Several marchers were injured. On the following day, the
city obtained an injunction against further marches.
Deeply affected by the violence, Black ministers in Memphis, including Lawson,
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles, and Rev. H. Ralph Jackson, formed a strike support
organization, Community on the Move for Equality (COME) and called for a boycott
of downtown stores. Beginning on February 26, COME organized a large number of
Black Memphians to support the daily marches that continued for the duration of
the strike, and COME leader Lawson invited Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to
Memphis.
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In the midst of organizing his Poor People's Campaign, Dr. King was reluctant to
travel to Memphis when first approached by Lawson in late February. Rev. Andrew
Young, in 1968 the executive vice-president of SCLC, told the committee that the
SCLC staff initially opposed a King trip to Memphis. Dr. King eventually agreed,
however, to make an initial trip in an attempt to discourage further violence,
rearranging his schedule and flying to Memphis on March 18, 1968. He saw the
poorly paid, badly organized, mostly Black garbage workers as epitomizing the
problems of the poor in the United States. On the evening of March 18, Dr. King
gave a well-received address throng of 17,000 strikers and their supporters.
Encouraged by his reception, he announced he would head a citywide demonstration
and sympathy strike of other workers on Friday, March 22. As the result of a
recordbreaking snowstorm, the march was rescheduled for Thursday, March 28. In
the meantime, efforts to settle the strike failed as Mayor Loeb tenaciously
continued to reject union demands.
At about 11 a.m. on March 28, 2 hours after the march had originally been
scheduled to begin, Dr. King arrived at the Clayborn Temple in Memphis to lead
the demonstrators. By this time, the impatient and tense crowd of about 6,000
persons had heard rumors that police had used clubs and mace to prevent a group
of high school students from joining the demonstration.
The march, led by Dr. King and Reverend Abernathy, began shortly after 11. As it
proceeded along Beale Street toward Main, several Black youths broke store
windows with signpost clubs. Police, clad in gas masks and riot gear, blocked
Main Street. Abernathy and Dr. King were somewhere in the middle of the
procession, not at its head, when they heard the shattering of glass. Some
teenagers at the rear of the march began breaking windows and looting stores.
When violence appeared imminent, Dr. King asked Reverend Lawson to cancel the
march. SCLC aides commandeered a private automobile, and Dr. King was hustled
away to safety at the Holiday Inn-Rivermont Hotel.
As Lawson pleaded with the marchers to return to Clayborn Temple, police moved
toward Main and Beale where youths met them with picket signs and rocks. Tear
gas was fired into the mob of young Blacks and stragglers who were unable to
make their way back to the starting point. Police dispersed the crowd with
nightstick, mace and finally guns. In the ensuing melee, 60 persons were
injured, end Larry Payne, a 16-year-old Black youth, was killed by police
gunfire. Much of the violence was attributed to the Invaders, a group of young
Black militants. A curfew was ordered following the riot, and Tennessee Gov.
Buford Ellington called out 3,500 National Guard troops.
Dr. King was upset and deeply depressed by the bloody march. Never before had
demonstrators led by Dr. King perpetrated violence, according to Abernathy. The
press excoriated Dr. King for inciting the tragic confrontation, even though he
was quick to state that his staff had not planned the march and it had been
poorly monitored. The Memphis debacle was labeled a failure of nonviolence
direct action.
Three members of the militant Invaders visited Dr. King on the morning following
the violence, Friday, March 29. They acknowledged their role in inciting the
disturbance but explained that they merely wanted a meaningful role in the
strike. Dr. King said he would do what he could, but stated emphatically that he
could not support a group that condoned violence. At a press conference later
that morn-
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ing, he announced that he would return to Memphis the following week to
demonstrate that he could lead a peaceful march. (11) He and Abernathy then left
Memphis for Atlanta at 3 p.m. Both Jesse Jackson and Andrew Young, members of
the SCLC executive board in 1968, told the committee that they believed Dr. King
would not have returned to Memphis if the March 28 demonstration had been
nonviolent. Following the Memphis incident, critics, including civil rights
leaders such as Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, were doubtful that Dr. King could
control a demonstration and asked that he cancel the Poor People's Campaign to
avoid another bloody eruption.
On Saturday, March 30, 1968, in Atlanta, Dr. King along with the SCLC executive
staff, including Abernathy, Young, Jackson, James Bevel, Walter Fauntroy, and
Hosea Williams, decided it was crucial to resolve the Memphis dispute before
marching on to Washington with the Poor People's Campaign. Abernathy said Dr.
King, was "very delighted" by this plan, which would allow him to prove the
efficiency of nonviolence. The next day, Dr. King preached at Washington's
tional Cathedral, urging human rights in the United States and withdrawal from
Vietnam. He mentioned the Poor People's march and promised an orderly,
nonviolent demonstration. That evening, President Johnson announced his decision
not to seek reelection in 1968.
On Monday, April 1, an entourage of SCLC executive staff members arrived in
Memphis to lay the groundwork for a peaceful demonstration in support of the
striking garbage workers, preparation that regrettably had been ignored before
the last March. Memphis was the focus of national attention the next day as
hundreds of Blacks artended the funeral of riot victim Larry Payne.
Dr. King, with Abernathy and administrative assistant Bernard Scott Lee, arrived
in Memphis on Wednesday, April 3. That morning their flight had been delayed in
Atlanta for more than an hour by an extensive search for a bomb following a
threat against Dr. King. Solomon Jones, a local mortuary employee who served as
Dr. King's chauffeur during his Memphis visits, took Dr. King and Abernathy from
the airport to the Lorraine Motel. Dr. King's April 3 return visit to Memphis
had received heavy publicity. It was common knowledge that he would be staying
at the Lorraine, and at least one radio station announced that he was booked in
room number 306, according to Kyles.
On the morning of April 3, U.S. District Court Judge Bailey Brown issued a
temporary restraining order against the SCLC-sponsored demonsration that was
originally scheduled to occur on Friday, April 5. Dr. King was determined to
lead the march despite the injunction, and the planned protest became a major
attraction for Blacks and union leaders.
Tornado warnings were broadcast in Memphis during the afternoon of April 3, and
heavy rain fell on the city that night. Despite the inclement weather, 2,000
persons gathered that evening at the Mason Temple Church and awaited Dr. King,
who was scheduled to speak there. King had asked Reverend Abernathy to talk in
his place, but when Abernathy saw the enthusiastic crowd waiting to hear the
SCLC president, he telephoned Dr. King and urged him to give the address. King.
agreed to go to Mason Temple, where he gave one of the most stirring speeches of
his career, the last public address of his life.
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After alluding to the bomb scare that morning and other threats against him, Dr.
King explained his return visit to Memphis despite such intimidation. Ambassador
Young later remarked to the committee that the address was "almost morbid," and
Abernathy noted that his friend appeared particularly nervous and anxious.
Dr. King concluded the speech with a reference to his own death:
* * * Well, I don't know what will happen now. We've got some difficult days
ahead. But it really doesn't matter to me now, because I've been to the
mountaintop. I won't mind.
Like anybody, I'd like to live a long life. Longevity has its place but I'm not
concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will and He's allowed me to go
up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land.
So I'm happy tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not fearing any man.
"Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord."
After the talk, Dr. King and Young had dinner at the home of Judge Ben Hooks, a
Memphis Black leader. Later that evening, Dr. King's brother, Rev, A.D. King,
arrived in Memphis from his home in Louisville, Ky. He registered at the
Lorraine Motel at 1 a.m. on April 4. Dr. King, who has not expected his brother
in Memphis, visited with him until almost 4 a.m.
The Last Moments: Memphis, Tenn., April 4, 1968
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THE LAST MOMENTS: MEMPHIS, TENN., APRIL 4, 1968
Dr. King spent the last day of his life, Thursday, April 4, 1968, at the
Lorraine Motel. Walter Lane Bailey, owner of the Lorraine, later recalled that
the usually businesslike SCLC president was particularly jovial that day,
"teasing and cutting up."
At an SCLC staff meeting that morning, the march, planned for the next day, was
postponed until the following Monday, April 8. In addition, that morning, SCLC
general counsel Chauncey Eskridge appeared before Judge Bailey Brown in Federal
court and argued that the city's injunction against the proposed demonstration
should belifted. In the meantime, four members of the Invaders presented a
series of demands to Dr. King, including one for several thousand dollars. He
refused to entertain their demands. After the men left, he told a group of
executive board members that he would not tolerate advocates of violence on his
staff and was angry that two Invaders had been assigned to work with the SCLC.
At about 1 p.m., Dr. King and Reverend Abernathy had a lunch of fried catfish at
the motel, then Abernathy went to his room to take a nap, while Dr. King visited
his brother in his room.
At about 4 p.m. on the afternoon of April 4, Abernathy was awakened from his nap
by the telephone in his motel room. He answered, and Dr. King asked him to come
to his brother's room, No. 201, so they could talk.
When Abernathy reached A.D.'s room, Dr. King told him that he and A.D. had
called Atlanta and had spoken with their mother, who was pleased that her sons
could get together in Memphis. He also said that they were all invited to the.
Kyles home for dinner. At King's direction, Abernathy called Mrs. Kyles to find
out what she would be
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serving, and she said she would have a good dinner of prime rib roast and soul
food such as chitterlings, greens, pig's feet and blackeyed peas.
At about 5 p.m., according to Abernathy, he and Dr. King returned to room 306 to
shave and dress for dinner. He recalled Dr. King's use of an acrid, sulfurous
depilatory to remove his heavy beard, part of his daily shaving ritual. As they
were preparing to leave, Abernathy mentioned that he would not be able to attend
the poor people's march in Washington in April because he had planned a revival
at his West Hunter-Street Baptist Church in Atlanta for that same day. Dr. King
told Abernathy he would not consider going to Washington without him and
attempted to make arrangements for someone else to handle the Atlanta revival.
He called Rev. Nutrell Long in New Orleans but was unable to reach him.
Dr. King then told Abernathy to go to the West Hunter Street Church and tell his
congregation that,
* * * you have a greater revival, you have a revival where you are going to
revive the soul of this Nation; where you are going to cause America to feed the
hungry, to have concern for those who are downtrodden, and disinherited; you
have a revival where you are going to cause America to stop denying necessities
to the masses * * *.
Abernathy agreed to go to Washington with Dr. King.
At about 5:30 p.m., Kyles went to room 306 and urged Dr. King and Abernathy to
hurry so they would get to dinner on time. "OK, Doc, it's time to go," he urged.
Kyles had arrived at the Lorraine at about 4 p.m. and had run into the Bread
Basket Band, an SCLC singing group. He had been singing some hymns and movement
anthems with them until shortly after 5 p.m. Dr. King assured Kyles that he had
telephoned the preacher's home and that Mrs. Kyles had said dinner was not until
6. "We are not going to mess up her program," Dr. King insisted.
When he finished dressing, Dr. King asked Kyles if his tie matched his suit. He
was in a good mood, according to Kyles, who told the committee that Dr. King
teased him about dinner, saying he once had been to a preacher's house for ham
and Kool-Aid, and the ham was cold. "I don't want to go to your house for cold
food."
As Dr. King adjusted his tie, he and Kyles walked onto the balcony outside room
306. The room overlooked a courtyard parking lot and swimming pool. The two men
faced west, toward the backs of several rundown buildings on Mulberry Street.
Dr. King greeted some of the people in the courtyard below, and Kyles said hello
to SCLC attorney Eskridge who had been in Federal court most of the day.
Eskridge was challenging the injunction against the SCLC's proposed Monday
march, and the court had decided to permit a demonstration, though it restricted
the number of marchers and the route. After court had adjourned at 3 p.m.,
Eskridge went with Young to the Lorraine where they saw Dr. King in A.D.'s room
and informed him of the ruling. At that time, Dr. King invited Eskridge to join
him for dinner at the home of Reverend Kyles. Thus, Eskridge was standing in the
Lorraine's courtyard parking lot shortly before 6 p.m., awaiting Dr. King's
departure for dinner. Dr. King, leaning against the iron railing of the balcony,
called to Eskridge and asked that he tell Jesse Jackson,
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a member of the SCLC's Chicago chapter, to come to dinner with him. Eskridge
found Jackson, who was also in the courtyard, and invited him to dinner,
suggesting that he change into something other than the turtleneck he was
wearing.
Rev. James Orange of the SCLC advance team and James Bevel were also in the
courtyard. Both had been assigned by the SCLC staff to work in Memphis with the
Invaders in an effort to get the young militants to cool down. Orange had just
arrived at the Lorraine with Marrell McCullough, a Memphis Police Department
undercover officer. Orange and Bevel wrestled playfully in the courtyard. Dr.
King spotted them and shouted to Bevel: "Don't let him hurt you"
Dr. King's chauffeur, Solomon Jones, was standing next to the funeral home
limousine, which he had parked in front of room 207, below room 306. Jones had
been parked in front of the Lorraine since 8:30 a.m. that morning, and he later
recalled that this was the first time Dr. King had stepped out that day. Dr.
King told Jones to get the car ready for their trip to Kyles' home, and Jones
urged him to bring a top coat because it was chilly that evening. "Solomon, you
really know how to take good care of me," Dr. King responded.
Dr. King's administrative assistant, Bernard Lee, along with Andrew Young and
Hosea Williams, were also talking in the Lorraine parking lot, waiting for Dr.
King to leave for dinner. Young recalled that Jones said, "I think you need a
coat" to Dr. King. Ben Branch, leader of the Bread Basket Band, was also there,
with Jesse Jackson. Dr. King called down to Branch, "Ben, make sure you play
'Precious Lord, Take My Hand' at the meeting tonight. Sing it real pretty." "OK,
Doc, I will," Branch promised.
Meanwhile, in room 306, A, bernathy recalled that at some point shortly before 6
p.m., he and Dr. King put on their coats and were about to leave the motel.
Abernathy hesitated and said, "Wait just a moment. Let me put on some aftershave
lotion."
According to Abernathy, Dr. King replied, "OK, I'll just stand right here on the
balcony."
Kyles recalled that Dr. King asked Abernathy to get his topcoat and then called
to Jackson, "Jesse, I want you to go to dinner with us this evening," but urged
him not to bring the entire Bread Basket Band. Kyles chided Dr. King, "Doc,
Jesse had arranged that even before you had." Kyles then stood on the balcony
with Dr. King for a moment, finally saying, "Come on. It's time to go." Kyles
turned and walked away. to go down to his car. After a few steps, Kyles called
to lawyer Eskridge in the-courtyard below. "Chauncey, are you going with me? I'm
going to get the car."
At 6:01 p.m., as Dr. King stood behind the iron balcony railing in front of room
306, the report of a high-powered rifle cracked the air. A slug tore into the
right side of his face, violently throwing him backward.
At the mirror in room 306, Abernathy poured some cologne into his hands. As he
lifted the lotion to his face, he heard what sounded like a "firecracker." He
jumped, looked out the door to the balcony and saw that Dr. King had fallen
backward. Only his feet were visible, one foot protruding through the ironwork
of the balcony railing. According to Abernathy, the bullet was so powerful it
twisted Dr. King's body so that he fell diagonally backward. As Abernathy rushed
out
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to aid his dying friend, he heard the cries and groans of people in the
courtyard below.
Just below the balcony, Jones recalled that Young and Bevel shoved him to the
ground just after the firecracker sound. He looked up and saw Abernathy come out
of the room and then realized that the prone Dr. King had been shot. Lee, who
had been talking with Young and Bevel, took cover behind a car and then noticed
Dr. King's feet protruding through the balcony railing.
Memphis undercover policeman McCullough recalled that immediately before he
heard the shot, he saw Dr. King alone on the balcony outside room 306, facing a
row of dilapidated buildings on Mulberry Street. As he turned away from Dr. King
and began to walk toward his car, McCullough, an Army veteran, heard an
explosive sound, which he assumed was a gunshot. He looked back and saw Dr. King
grasp his throat and fall backward. According to McCullough's account, he bolted
up the balcony steps as others in the courtyard hit the ground. When he got to
Dr. King's prone figure, the massive face wound was bleeding profusely and a
sulfurous odor like gunpowder, perhaps Dr. King's depilatory, permeated the air.
McCullough took a towel from a housekeeping tray and tried to stem the flow of
blood.
Eskridge had heard a "zing" and looked up toward the balcony. He saw that Dr.
King was down, and as Abernathy walked out onto the balcony, Eskridge heard him
cry out "Oh my God, Martin's been shot." A woman screamed.
Abernathy recalled that when he walked out on the balcony, he had to step over
his mortally wounded friend.
* * * the bullet had entered his right cheek and I patted his left cheek,
consoled him, and got his attention by saying, "This is Ralph, this is Ralph,
don't be afraid."
Kyles, who had started to walk toward his car, ran back to room 306. Young
leaped up the stairs from the courtyard to Dr. King, whom he found lying face
up, rapidly losing blood from the wound. Young checked Dr. King's pulse and, as
Abernathy recalled, said, "Ralph, it's all over."
"Don't say that, don't say that," Abernathy responded.
Kyles ran into room 306. Abernathy urged him to call an ambulance. Kyles tried
to make the call, but was unable to get through to the motel switchboard.
Lee, Jackson, and Williams had followed Young up the steps from the courtyard to
room 306. Dr. King's still head lay in a pool of blood. Abernathy, kneeling over
his friend tried desperately to save Dr. King's life. Several of the men on that
balcony pointed in the direction of the shot. Frozen in a picture taken by
photographer James Louw, they were aiming their index fingers across Mulberry
Street and northwest of room 306.
An ambulance arrived at the Lorraine about 5 minutes after Dr. King had been
shot, according to Abernathy. By this time, police officers "cluttered the
courtyard." Abernathy accompanied the unconscious Dr. King to the emergency room
of St. Joseph Hospital. The 39-year-old civil rights leader described by
Abernathy as "the most peaceful warrior of the 20th Century," was pronounced
dead at 7:05 p.m., April 4, 1968.
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James Earl Ray Fired One Shot at Dr. Martin Luther Jr., The Shot Killed Dr. King
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287
A. JAMES EARL RAY FIRED ONE SHOT AT DR. MARTIN LUTHER JR., THE SHOT KILLED DR.
KING
Shortly after 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was shot and
mortally wounded as he stood on the second-floor balcony outside his room at the
Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tenn. He was pronounced dead at 7:05 p.m. at St.
Joseph Hospital.
James Earl Ray, a 40-year-old convicted armed robber who had escaped from the
Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City, Mo., on April 23, 1967, pleaded
guilty on March 10, 1969, in Shelby County (Tenn.) Criminal Court to the first
degree murder of Dr. King. He was sentenced to 99 years at the State
penitentiary.
(a) Biography of James Earl Ray
James Earl Ray was born on March 10, 1928, in Alton, Ill. The Ray family moved a
few miles from Alton to Bowling Green, Mo., in 1930, and 5 years later they
moved to near Ewing, Mo., where Ray received his elementary school education.
At age 16, Ray moved back to Alton, where he lived with his grandmother. He
worked in the dye room of the International Shoe Tannery in nearby East
Hartford, Ill. He was laid off in December 1945 and, 6 weeks later, enlisted in
the Army. He was stationed in West Germany where he was charged with drunkenness
and breaking arrest. Ray was discharged for ineptness and lack of adaptability
for service in December 1948.
After his discharge, Ray returned to stay with his grandmother in Alton, Ill.,
and embarked on a life of odd jobs and jail sentences. He worked for the Dryden
Rubber Co. in Chicago until he was hid off in September 1949, and then left for
Los Angeles, Calif. On October 11, he was arrested for robbing a care and was
sentenced to 90 days imprisonment.
Upon his release from jail in Los Angeles in the spring of 1950, he traveled
back to Illinois, where he worked until May 1952. During this time he attempted
to earn his high school diploma at night. He robbed a cab driver of $11.90 on
May 6, 1952. He was found guilty of robbery and incarcerated at the State
penitentiary at Joliet and later at the State prison farm in Pontiac until his
release on March 12, 1954.
Ray then moved to Quincy, Ill. On March 7, 1955, Ray and an accomplice, Walter
Rife, broke into the Kellersville, Ill., post office and stole 66 postal money
orders as well as a validating stamp. The two men fled to Miami, Fla., but were
arrested in Missouri on their return. Ray pleaded guilty to the robbery and, on
July 1, 1955, was sentenced to 45 months at the Federal penitentiary in
Leavenworth, Kans.
Ray was paroled from Leavenworth in early 1959. He robbed two grocery stores in
St. Louis, Mo. and one in Alton during the summer
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and fall of 1959. He was eventually captured and tried for the St. Louis robbery
in December 1959. On March 17, 1960, he began serving a 20-year sentence at the
Missouri State Penntentiary. Hay tried to escape November 1961 and again in
March 1966. Following the second attempt, he was examined at the State hospital
in Fulton, Mo, and determined capable of standing trial for escape.
On April 9-3, 1967, Ray did escape from the Missouri State Penitentiary. Over
the following 11 1/2-month period, he traveled extensively in North America,
residing in such cities as Chicago, Montreal,
Birmingham, Los Angeles, and Atlanta. On the afternoon of April 1968, posing as
John Willard, Ray rented a room at a Memphis roominghouse near the Lorraine
Motel. That day, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated as he stood on
the second-floor balcony of the Lorraine Motel.
On May 7, 1968, the Shelby County Criminal Court named James Earl Ray in an
indictment for the first-degree murder of Dr. King. An international manhunt
culminated with Ray's capture at Heathrow Airport in London, England, on June 8,
1968. Following extradition proceedings in England, Ray was returned to the
United States on July 19, 1968. Ray pleaded guilty to the murder of Dr. King on
March 10, 1969. Judge W. Preston Battle sentenced him to 99 years in the
penitentiary.
(b) The Committee's Investigation
With Ray's background and the record of his arrest, trial, conviction, and
sentence as background, the committee undertook an exhaustive investigation of
all available evidence bearing on Ray's involvement in the assassination of Dr.
King. It conducted eight extensive interviews with Ray at Brushy Mountain State
Penitentiary in Petros, Tenn., where he is serving the 99-year sentence for the
murder of Dr. King.1 The committee also listened to 3 days of testimony by Ray
in public session on August 16, 17, and 18, 1978, and it closely examined all
known writings, tape recordings, transcripts and interviews made by or about Ray
since his April 23, 1967, escape from the Missouri State Penitentiary, Further,
the committee interviewed dozens of associates of Ray and hundreds of other
witnesses, many of whom testified under oath in executive session or during 20
days of public hearings. Thousands of Government documents were scrutinized,
particularly files of the Memphis Police Department and the FBI.2 Records from
other agencies, such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence
Agency, were also reviewed. Scientific evidence was thoroughly analyzed by
experts in such areas as firearms, forensic pathology and engineering.
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Based on its investigation, the committee determined that James Earl Ray fired
the shot that killed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
1. DR. KING WAS KILLED BY ONE SHOT FIRED FROM IN FRONT OF HIM
In March 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr, traveled to Memphis, Tenn., to lead a
march in support of striking sanitation workers. The march was disrupted by
violence and ended in a riot. Dr. King returned to Memphis on April 3, 1968, in
an attempt to demonstrate that a peaceful march could succeed in achieving
desired social and economic goals. (1)
Dr. King and his party were staying at the Lorraine Motel, a Black owned
establishment near the waterfront area of Memphis. Dr. King was sharing room 306
with his associate, Dr. Ralph Abernathy, and it was on a balcony in front of
that room, at 6:01 p.m. on April 4, 1968, that Dr. King was struck by a bullet
and mortally wounded. (2)
Shortly after Dr. King was pronounced dead, his body was taken from St. Joseph
Hospital to Gaston Hospital, where an autopsy was performed by Dr. Jerry T.
Francisco, the Shelby County medical examiner. He concluded that. Dr. King's
death was the result of a single "gunshot wound to the chin and neck with a
total transection of the lower cervical and upper thoracic spinal cord and other
structures of the neck."3
Following the submission of Dr. Francisco's report, questions were raised by
critics of the investigation about the thoroughness of the report and the
procedures that were followed. These included questions about whether Dr.
Francisco properly traced the path of the bullet through Dr. King's body and
performed all the normal procedures of a complete autopsy.
To resolve issues raised by the autopsy, the committee retained a panel of three
noted forensic pathologists to review the medical evidence pertaining to the
assassination. The panel examined all available relevant evidence, including
clothing worn by Dr. King at the time of his death, bullet fragments recovered
from his body, photographs, and slides taken during the course of the autopsy
and microscopic slides and tissue blocks from the autopsy and neuropathology
study. The panel also reviewed the report of the committee's firearms panel, as
well as X-rays, medical reports, notes, and documents submitted by physicians
who treated Dr. King. (3) The forensic pathology panel traveled to Memphis to
view the crime scene and meet with Dr. Francisco and the physicians who treated
Dr. King at St. Joseph Hospital. (4)
The panel determined that Dr. Francisco had not dissected the path of the bullet
during the antopsy. Dr. Michael Baden. chief medical examiner for New York City
and spokesman for (5) the autopsy panel, testified that this decision resulted
entirely from Dr. Francisco's "concerns about not causing any unnecessary
deformity to the body" and "his sensitivity to the treatment of the dead." Dr.
Baden also noted, however, that "tracing the bullet track proper at the time of
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the autopsy would have given additional information for questions that might
arise later."(6)
The panel concluded, nevertheless, that the autopsy findings were generally
accurate. Dr. Baden testified that Dr. King died as a result of a single gunshot
wound caused by a bullet that entered the right side of the face approximately
an inch to the right and a half inch below the mouth.(7) The bullet fractured
Dr. King's jaw, exited the lower part of the face and reentered the body in the
neck area. (8) It then severed numerous vital arteries and fractured the spine
in several places, causing severe damage to the spinal column and coming to rest
on the left side of the back. The bullet traveled in a downward, and rearward
from a roedial direction. (9)
The panel found that the wounds to Dr. King were caused by the bullet recovered
from his body--a Remington-Peters, soft-point. metal-jacketed bullet fired from
a distance by a high-velocity rifle. (10) Based on the examination of the
evidence by the forensic pathology panel, the committee concluded that Dr. King
died as a result of one shot fired from in front of him.
2. THE SHOT THAT KILLED DR. KING WAS FIRED FROM THE BATHROOM WINDOW AT THE REAR
OF A ROOMINGHOUSE AT 422 1/2 SOUTH STREET, MEMPHIS, TENN.
An important issue has always been the location of the assassin at the time the
shot was fired. Unfortunately, precise directional and trajectory data could not
be obtained in this investigation through forensic pathology for two reasons.
One, a dissection of the bullet's path was not performed during the autopsy and
could not be done at the time of the committee investigation. Two, it was not
possible to determine Dr. King's exact position at the time of the shooting.(11)
From extrinsic evidence, the autopsy panel accepted that at the moment the
bullet, entered his body, Dr. King was at the balcony railing talking to someone
on the pavement one story below. (12) Accordingly, the panel found that the
bullet pathway was consistent with the shot coming from his right and above.(13)
The autopsy panel concluded that the single bullet that struck Dr. King must
have come from across Mulberry Street, 4 because Dr King's body was facing in
that direction and because a bullet coming from that direction would have
traveled on a downward slope. The panel concluded, further, that the bullet was
probably fired from the area of the roominghouse at 422 1/2 South Main Street,
but the panel could not determine, from the medical evidence alone, whether the
shot was fired from the bathroom window on the second floor or from the
shrubbery below the window. (14) 5
Because of the importance of determining as accurately as possible the location
of the assassin, the committee retained Koogle and Pouls Engineering, Inc. of
Albuquerque, N. Mex., to conduct engineering
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surveys at the scene of the assassination. The engineering consultant met the
committee and committee medical panel members in Memphis in June 1978, and the
firm proceeded to conduct an engineering survey, using sophisticated scientific
equipment. (15)
Eyewitness testimony indicated that at the moment of the bullet's impact, Dr.
King was standing on the motel balcony in front of room 306, conversing with
associates in the courtyard below. (16) The engineering survey was based on
scientific measurements of the rear of the roominghouse from that position and
of the probable posture of Dr. King's body at the instant of impact--that is,
with his head forward, looking down into the parking area and with a slight
forward bend at the waist.(17) While the consultant was unable to state with
certainty the vertical angle of the trajectory,(18) the geometric data was
consistent with both the bathroom window at the rear of the roominghouse(19) and
shrubbery within the garden area at the rear of 418-422 1/2 South Main Street
(20) as possible locations for the assassin. Because the medical and engineering
evidence was not conclusive to the precise origin of the shot,(21) the committee
used the testimony of witnesses at the scene to determine the most likely
origin. Charles Quitman Stephens, a roominghouse tenant who occupied room 6-B
maintained in a sworn affidavit given on June 13, 1968, that on two or three
occasions during the afternoon of April 4, 1968, he "heard footsteps leaving
room 5-B and going past [his] room and into the common bathroom at the end of
the hall."6 A second tenant, William Charles Anschutz, told FBI interviewers
that during the afternoon of April 4, 1968, he made two attempts to use the
bathroom and found it occupied on each occasion. He recalled that Stephens told
him, through the door of room 6-B, that the bathroom was being used by the new
tenant in 5-B.(22) This information became significant in light of the
uncontroverted evidence that Ray did, in fact, rent room 5-B on the afternoon of
April 4.
Neither Anschutz nor Stephens could recall for the committee details of these
bathrooms visits by the occupant of room 5-B, but Stephens noted in a sworn
statement that at the time of the assassination, he was seated at the kitchen
table in room 6-B, when he heard a loud explosion that he recognized as a shot.
After looking out the window toward the Lorraine Motel, he heard footsteps
running in the hallway. He went to the door, opened it, looked out and observed
a man with something under his arm turning the corner at the end of the hallway.
Stephens was sure the individual had come from the bathroom adjoining his
apartment because of the loudness of the shot. (23)
Stephens' sobriety on the afternoon of April 4 was called into question by a
number of sources, and the committee did not rely on his testimony for an
eyewitness identification of the assassin. It believed that he was sober enough,
however, to determine that a loud explosion had occurred nearby and that he saw
a man fleeing down the hallway. (24) Similarly, Anschutz heard a shot, opened
his door and saw a man fleeing down the hallway from the direction of the
bathroom. (25)
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Witnesses in the vicinity of the Lorraine, including several officials of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) who were awaiting Dr. King for
dinner, pointed in the direction of the rear of the roominghouse when asked by a
Memphis police officer about the direction of the shot. 7
Marrell McCullough, an undercover Memphis police officer, was one the first
people to reach Dr. King's body. He testified in a committee public hearing
that, based on his police training and experience, he determined from the
position of the fallen body that the shot had come from the area of the
roominghouse. (26) Others in the courtyard, including Ben Branch and Jesse
Jackson, also believed that the shot had come from the direction of the
roominghouse. (27)
Solomon Jones, who was serving as Dr. King's driver and who was in the courtyard
of the Lorraine at the time of the shot, told the committee in a sworn statement
that he saw a movement of something white and "as tall as a human being" in the
brush beneath the roominghouse after Dr. King was shot. (28) There had been
speculation that Jones observed, in fact, the hasty retreat of an asassin Jones
told the committee, however, that he saw the object for only a brief time. He
did not see a head or arms; he could not tell whether the object was Black or
white male or female; and lie assumed the object was a human being simply
because he could think of no other explanation.(29)
In addition, Jones stated that at the moment of the assassination. both Bernard
Lee and Andrew Young "reached and got me on each shoulder and pulled me to the
ground." He stated further that by the time he got up off the ground, policemen
had "almost" arrived at the Lorraine Motel from a nearby firehouse. (30)
The committee believed that the movement Jones perceived actually occurred
several moments after the shot. If it was, in fact, a person it may have been a
law enforcement officer responding to the shot.
Other evidence, while not weighted heavily, was nonetheless consistent with the
bathroom of the roominghouse as the likely firing location of the assassin. A
slight indentation in a windowsill in the bathroom was originally thought by
Memphis police to have been caused by a rifle barrel. FBI analysis could not
confirm that the murder weapon was the cause of the indentation, nor could the
committee. The committee's firearms panel conducted a microscopic review and
chemical analysis of the windowsill, but it too could not confirm or eliminate
the murder weapon or, in fact, any rifle or other olject as the cause of the
indentation. (31)
Similarly, scuff marks found in the bathtub could indicate that the assassin
stood in the tub while taking aim through the bathroom window. The committee
determined, in fact, that a clear shot at room 306 of the Lorraine could only
have been made from the bathroom if the assassin was standing in the bathtub.
The committee, however, was unable to eliminate the alternative possibility that
these marks apparently made by someone wearing shoes, were left by police
officers attempting to check possible shooting angles immediately after the
assassination.
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Although the scientific evidence did not independently establish the location of
the assassin, when it was combined with witness testimony, it pointed strongly
to the rear of the roominghouse. In light of the mutually corroborated testimony
of Stephens and Anschutz, and the absence of significant evidence of an
alternative firing location, the committee found that the shot that killed Dr.
King was fired from the bathroom window at the rear of the roominghouse at 422
1/2 South Main Street.
3. JAMES EARL RAY PURCHASED THE RIFLE THAT WAS USED TO SHOOT DR. KING AND
TRANSPORTED IT FROM BIRMINGHAM, ALA. TO MEMPHIS TENN., WHERE HE RENTED A ROOM AT
422 1/2 SOUTH MAIN STREET AND MOMENTS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION, HE DROPPED IT
NEAR 424 SOUTH MAIN STREET
Dr. King was killed by a-Remington-Peters, soft-point, metal-jacketed bullet
fired from a high velocity .30-06 rifle. The committee determined that a rifle
purchased by James Earl Ray on March 30 1968, in Birmingham, Ala, and which was
found in front of Canipe's Amusement Co., 424 South Main Street, moments after
the assassination, was the type of rifle that could have fired the bullet that
killed Dr. King.
From a combination of field investigation, scientific data and admissions by
Ray, the committee was convinced that Ray purchased the rifle, transported it to
the scene of the crime and abandoned it near the scene immediately after the
shooting. First, the evidence is conclusive that Ray purchased a .30-06 caliber
Remington Game-variable telescopic sight, serial No. A17350 and Weaver sight
mount. This rifle, sight and mount were recovered by police officers immediately
after the assassination and were later designated exhibit "Q2" by the FBI. Ray
repeatedly admitted, as he did under oath at a committee public hearing, that on
March 29, 1968, he purchased a .243 caliber rifle and a telescopic sight at the
Aeromarine Supply Co. in Birmingham. Further, Ray admitted that the next day he
exchanged the .243 caliber rifle for a more powerful .30-06 Remington
Game-master.(32) That rifle was identified as the rifle found in front of
Canipe's Amusement Co. on April 4, 1968.
Ray's admission about the purchase and exchange was corroborated by the
statements of U.L. Baker and Donald Wood, the Aeromarine employees who dealt
with Ray on March 29 and 30. Wood, in fact, identified Ray as the man known to
him as Harvey Lowmeyer who, on March 30, received the .30-06 rifle in exchange
for the original .243 purchase.(33) In addition, the Aeromarine sales receipt
reflects the initial purchase and subsequent exchange by Lowmeyer, the alias Ray
admitted using at the time of the rifle purchase.(34)
The committee found significant Ray's use of an alias other than Eric S. Galt
during a transaction that could be directly tied to the assassination. Ray had
established identification as Eric S. Galt and used that name almost exclusively
for 9 months preceding the assassination. When he rented an apartment or a room,
bought a car, secured a driver's license, took dance lessons, rented a safe
deposit box, visited a doctor, attended bartending school, and subscribed to a
locksmith
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course, all everyday activities, he did so as Eric Starvo Galt.(35) On the other
hand, in transactions directly linked to the assassination, and therefore the
most, incriminating, Ray deviated from his established identity. He used the
name Harvey Lowmeyer only for the purchase of the rifle; (36) similarly, he used
the name John Willard only to rent the room at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse at
422 1/2 South Main Street, Memphis.8
Although Ray claimed to have taken a slow drive through Alabama and Mississippi
from March 31 to April 4, authenticated documents and sworn testimony convinced
the committee that Ray, in fact, returned to Atlanta and left there for Memphis
no earlier than April 1 and possibly as late as April 3. Regardless, Ray
admitted transporting the rifle from Birmingham to Memphis,(37) claiming that he
gave it to Raoul at the New Rebel Motel on the evening of April 3, never to see
it again.
Thus the committee established that Ray bought a .30-06 Reminton Gamemaster in
Birmingham and took it to Memphis. This same rifle--with Ray's fingerprints on
it--was found on the sidewalk in front of 424 South Main Street moments after
the assassination.
Ray also admitted renting room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse, using the
name John Willard. (38) In interviews with the committee, as well as in the
original investigation, Mrs. Brewer recalled renting room 5-B to John Willard.
She also noted that the tenant rejected the first room shown to him, one
equipped with light house-keeping facilities, saying he only wanted a sleeping
room. Willard then accepted 5-B, Mrs. Brewer recalled, which was in tile rear of
the building near the bathroom and which offered a view of tile front of the
Lorraine Motel. (39) 9 A man matching the general description of Ray was also
seen at the time he rented the room by Charles Stephens and by Berrie Reeves,
another resident of the roominghouse(40).
As noted previously, both Stephens and Anschutz saw a man carrying a bundle that
could have contained a rifle, fleeing down the hallway shortly after the
shooting. Bernell Finley, who was shopping in Canipe's Amusement Co. at the time
of the assassination recalled hearing a sound like the backfiring of an
automobile. A short time later he saw a man walking by the front of the store
heard a noise and saw a bundle in the entranceway of the store. He then caught a
glimpse of the profile of a man walking away in haste.(41) During his FBI
interview, Finley described the man as a white male of average build wearing a
dark suit. Shortly after he saw the mall Finley heard the screech of tires and
saw a white Mustang pull away from the curb. (42)
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Guy Canipe, owner of the amusement company, told the committee he had no
recollection of hearing the shot. He did remember hearing a thud at the front
door and catching a glimpse of a dark-skinned white man passing the store. (143)
In an earlier FBI interview, Canipe described the man as white, between 5 feet
10 inches and 6 feet tall, with a chunky build, wearing a dark suit and
generally clean and neat appearance. He also told the FBI that within moments of
hearing the bundle drop, he saw a small white car pull away from the curb on
Main Street.(44) Canipe did not recall this car (145) when he was interviewed by
the committee. Julius Graham, another customer in Canipe's store, could not
provide the committee with a description of the individual who dropped the
bundle, but he did recall that a white Mustang passed the store heading north
shortly after the bundle has dropped. (416)
The bundle dropped in front of Canipe's was recovered immediately afterward by
Memphis police officers. It contained among other items two cans of Schlitz
beer, the April 18 edition edition of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, a plastic
bottle of aftershave lotion, a .30-06 rifle with a serial number matching that
of the rifle purchased by Ray in Birmingham, ammunition, and a pair of
binoculars.(47) The bundle also contained a portable radio with an
identification number scratched off it. When the FBI was able to decipher the
number, it was revealed to be Ray's Missouri State penitentiary inmate number.
(148)
The committee in an effort to evaluate the available fingerprint evidence in the
case, retained a fingerprint expert, Vincent Scalice of Forensic Control
Systems. Scalice examined latent fingerprints lifted from the rifle, the
binoculars, a Schlitz beer can and the front page of James Earl Ray. Because of
other commitments, Scalice could not complete the fingerprint identification, so
the committee retained Darrell D. Linville and Ray Holbrook, fingerprint,
specialists for the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. They
subsequently identified Ray's prints on the telescopic sight on the rifle and on
the bottle aftershave lotion. No prints, either identifiable or unidentifiable,
other than those identified as Ray's, were found on the rifle.(49)
Having determined that Ray purchased the rifle, that his prints were on the
rifle, that no other prints were on the rifle, and that a man matching Ray's
description dropped the rifle shortly after the shot, the committee turned to
the firearms evidence in an effort to establish, if possible, that the Q2 rifle
was the murder weapon.
The committee retained a panel of five of the foremost firearms examiners in the
United States to review the ballistics evidence.10 A total of 257 man-hours were
constuned by the firearms examination, which consisted of 81 comparisons of Q64,
the bullet taken from Dr. King's body, with test-fired bullets, as well as
exhaustive micro scopic, visual, and chemical analyses. Despite this effort, the
panel was
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forced to conclude that "the bullet, exhibit Q64, cannot be identified or
eliminated as having been fired from the rifle, Q2." 11 (50)
The panel, however, did make the following positive determinations:
1. The Q64 bullet was a .30-06 caliber bullet of Remington-Peters manufacture.
2. The bullet was imprinted with six lands and six grooves and a right twist by
the rifle from which it had been fired.
3. The Q2 rifle-had general class characteristics of six lands and six grooves
with a right twist.
4. The cartridge case (Q3) found in the Q2 rifle had been fired in the Q2 rifle.
5. The damage to Dr. King's clothing, when tested microscopically and
chemically, revealed the presence of lead from a disintegrating bullet and also
revealed the absence of nitrites (the presence of nitrites would have indicated
a close-range discharge).
6. The damage to the clothing was consistent with the caliber and condition of
the Q64 bullet. (51)
While the firearms panel could not say conclusively that the rifle found in
front of Canipe's, one with Ray's fingerprints on the stock and scope, fired the
fatal shot, it did conclude that it was possible for the shot to have been fired
from that rifle. When the panel's conclusions were combined with Ray's
admissions, fingerprint evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses, there
was ample evidence for the committee to conclude that Ray had purchased the
.30-06 rifle, transported it to Memphis, shot Dr. King and dropped the murder
weapon in front of Canipe's Amusement Co. while fleeing from the scene of the
crime.
4. IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT JAMES EARL RAY STALKED DR. KING FOR A PERIOD
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ASSASSINATION
The committee considered allegations that Ray stalked Dr. King for a period of
time preceding the assassination, and it developed evidence Indicating a high
probability that Ray did, in fact, pursue Dr. King from Los Angeles to Atlanta
and ultimately to the Lorraine Motel in Memphis.
In all likelihood, the stalking began about March 17, 1968, the day that Ray
left Los Angeles and drove eastward. Ray's decision to leave California was not
impulsive. In discussions with his acquaintances from a bartending school
earlier in March 1968, he had mentioned his plans to travel east on two separate
occasions. (52) Moreover, Ray submitted a postal change of address card12 with a
forwarding address of Atlanta, Ga., Dr. King's home city, before leaving Los
Angeles.
Ray, however, never conceded his intent to travel to Atlanta from
Los Angeles. In an interview with Dan Rather of CBS in 1977. Ray flatly stated
that he never knew he was going to Atlanta until he arrived in Birmingham, "* *
* and there was no forwarding address [when I left Los Angeles] and, of course,
that would be very damaging
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against me." (53) Similarly, in his public hearing testimony, Ray emphatically
denied filing a change of address in Los Angeles, although he did acknowledge
the possibility that he mentioned Atlanta during a telephone conversation with
an associate of Raoul. (54) When the committee confronted Ray with the change of
address card that he had filed in Los Angeles on March 17, indicating a
temporary change of address to General Delivery, Atlanta, until April 25, Ray
admitted the card was his and that he must have filed it before his departure
from Los Angeles. (55) Ray could not explain his statement to Rather that an
intent to go to Atlanta was damaging. (56) Since Atlanta was the national
headquarters of the SCLC as well as Dr. King's home, the committee found Ray's
anticipated travel to that city as the first significant indication of his
interest in tracking the activities of Dr. King.
Ray's probable stalking of Dr. King continued with his trip to Selma, Ala.,
following his departure from Los Angeles Dr King was in the Selma, area on March
21. Ray admitted being in Selma on March 22 (a motel registration card for his
Galt alias confirms his stay there),13 but his explaintion for being there was
not convinicing. He claimed that while driving from New Orleans to Birmingham,
allegedly to met Raoul, he got lost and and had to spend the night in Selma.
(57) The committee noted, however, that in 1968 there were two direct routes
from New Orleans to Birmingham, and that Selma was on neither of them. It was
situated in between the two routes, about 45 miles out of the way. the committee
further determined that it would be difficult for Ray to have become lost
between New Orleans and Birmingham.
The committee found Ray's activities following the purhase of the rifle relevant
to the stalking theory. On March 28, the day after violence cut short a Memphis
march led ty Dr. King. Ray purchased a .243 caliber rifle in Birmingham.(58) On
March 30, he exchanged it for a .30-06 Remington, (59) the rifle the committee
concluded he used to assassinate Dr. King.
Ray testified that between March 30 and April 3, he took a slow drive through
Alabama and Mississippi, stopping at different motels each night, on his way to
meet Raoul in Memphis.(60 The committee could find no evidence, witness
corroboration or documentation, to support this account. 14 On the other hand,
there was substantial evidence indicating that Ray returned to Atlanta following
the rifle purchase. Thus, Ray's movements roughly paralleled those of Dr. King,
who returned to Atlanta from Memphis on March 30. Except for a trip to
Washington, D.C., on March 31, Dr. King remained in Atlanta until April 3, 1968,
when he returned to Memphis. (61)
Ray adamantly denied that he returned to Atlanta before proceeding to Memphis.
At a public hearing of the committee, he testifies, "I know
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I didn't return to Atlanta. If I did, I will just take the responsibility for
the King case here on TV."
The committee reviewed two incidents, however, that compellingly show that Ray
did, in fact, return to Atlanta after purchasing the murder weapon in
Birmingham. First, the committee established that, on March 31, Ray paid his
Atlanta landlord, Jimmy Garner for a second week's rent; he wrote his name on an
envelope and gave it to Garner. (63) This payment was one of the 56 stipulations
of material fact that Ray agreed to in his guilty plea. (64) In addition, a
committee interview with Garner confirmed the date of the payment.(65) When Ray
was confronted with Garner's statement, he claimed Garner was in error. He
suggested that the issue of his presence in Atlanta could be cleared up by
checking with the Piedmont Cleaners where he left his laundry on March 25, 26,
or 27 and picked it up on April 5, 1968.(66)
While Ray was correct about the date he retrieved the clothing, both the laundry
receipts(67) and the Piedmont Cleaners ledger, as well as the public testimony
of a retired Piedmont employee, Annie Estelle Peters, proved that Ray left his
laundry at Piedmont on April 1, 1968. (68) Ray's charge that the incriminating
documents were somehow falsified was refuted by both the sworn public testimony
of Mrs. Peters and the Piedmont ledger book.
The committee observed that while Ray was in Atlanta on April 1, both the
Atlanta Constitution and the Atlanta Journal published stories about the
volatile situation in Memphis and Dr. King's intention to return to the troubled
city. (69) The committee believed that after learning from news accounts of Dr.
King's intention to return to Memphis, Ray left, Atlanta and headed for Memphis
himself. After arriving in Memphis on April 3, Ray checked into the New Rebel
Motel, on the outskirts of the city.(70) The next-day he moved to a roominghouse
adjacent to the Lorraine Motel. (71)
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles of Memphis, an associate of Dr. King, recalled that on
April 3 he heard a radio broadcast reporting that Dr. King was staying at room
306 of the Lorraine. (72) Among Ray's possessions left in front of Canipe's,
authorities recovered a copy of the Memphis Commercial Appeal with a front page
story about Dr. King, one that placed him at the Lorraine Motel for lunch on
April 3. (73) Ray's fingerprint was found on the front page of the newspaper.
(74)
With information that Dr. King was staying at the Lorraine available to Ray, the
transfer from the New Rebel Motel to Bessie Brewer's roominghouse takes on
special significance. The rear of the roominghouse faces the Lorraine offering
an ideal vantage point for one who was stalking Dr. King and waiting for an
opportunity to assassinate him. (75)
Ray testified that he might have purchased the newspaper, but that he did not
read it on April 4 and that he was not aware Dr. King was in Memphis. "I really
wasn't aware that he was existing,"(76) he stated. In light of the high
visibility of the sanitation worker's strike, Ray's natural sensitivity to the
increased police activity because of his fugitive status, the radio and
newspaper coverage of Dr. King's activities, and Ray's fingerprint on the April
4 edition of the Memphis
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Commercial Appeal, the committee concluded that Ray's denial was not worthy of
belief.
The manner in which Ray selected his room at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse
provided additional evidence of his intent to monitor Dr. King's movements. Room
8, the first room Ray was shown, was located toward the front (South Main
Street) side of the building. It was across the hall from the office where Ray
had approached Mrs. Brewer. It offered neither privacy nor the possibility of a
view of the Lorraine Motel located to the rear of the building.15 Ray rejected
the room, telling Mrs. Brewer he wanted only a sleeping room and not an
apartment. (77)
The second room, 5-B, was located in another wing of the building, away from the
office and toward the rear of the building. Further, its window offered the
possibility of a direct view of the Lorraine. The committee found no evidence
that Ray entered the room and examined the view from the window before accepting
it. Nevertheless, the privacy and its location at the rear of the building
apparently made the room more acceptable to Ray.
Ray's monitoring of Dr. King was also indicated by his purchase of a pair of
binoculars after renting the room. Ray admitted purchasing binoculars on the
afternoon of April 4, 1968. (78) This admission was corroborated by a sales
receipt from the York Arms Co., 162 South Main Street, Memphis, dated April 4,
1968; the statement of Ralph Carpenter, the sales clerk who sold the binoculars
to Ray;(79) and Ray's fingerprint on the binoculars. The binoculars with the
receipt were found in the bundle of evidence outside Canipe's. Although
inexpensive, they would have enabled Ray to keep a close watch on movement at
the Lorraine Motel from the rear of the roominghouse. Ray could have observed
the Lorraine either from room 5-B, by leaning slightly out of the window, or
from the bathroom at the end of the hall. Examination of room 5-B immediately
after the assassination revealed that a dresser had been pushed from in front of
the window and that a chair had been moved up to the window,(80) indicating that
Ray had, in fact, used the window for surveillance of the Lorraine.
Thus, there is compelling circumstantial evidence that from March 17, 1968, Ray
tracked Dr. King's movements from Los Angeles eastward, and then followed him to
Selma, Ala., Atlanta, Ga., and ultimately Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room
from which he could observe Dr. King and purchased a pair of binoculars to
assist him in his observations. The committee concluded that these were
activities performed by Ray in preparation for assassinating Dr. King.
5. JAMES EARL RAY FLED THE SCENE OF THE CRIME IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
ASSASSINATION
The committee concluded that James Earl Ray shot Dr. King from the bathroom
window on the second floor of the north wing of Bessie Brewer's roominghouse,
fled from the building carrying a bundle containing the weapon and other items,
and dropped the bundle in the entranceway of Canipe's Amusement Co. The evidence
further
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indicated that Ray then drove from the area in a small white car, heading north.
Police radio broadcasts shortly after the assassination identified a white
Mustang with a single white occupant as the car and suspect seen fleeing the
scene.16
After his flight from the immediate scene, the evidence established, moreover,
that he drove for 11 hours to Atlanta, Ga., where he abandoned his automobile,
picked up laundry, hastily packed some belongings at Garner's roominghouse, and
then fled north to Canada.(81)17 Ray's flight alone provided substantial
corroboration for Ray's involvement in the assassination. Thus, the committee
questioned him about it at length in interviews and during his appearance at a
committee public hearing.
Although Ray denied in his public testimony that he was at the roominghouse at
the time the shot was fired, he admitted leaving Memphis in the Mustang shortly
after 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968. He claimed that while returning from a service
station shortly after 6 p.m., he saw a police roadblock near the roominghouse.
(82) He gave as a reason for leaving Memphis his instinctive fear of police and
his concern that something had gone wrong with Raoul's gunrunning scheme. (83)
By his own account, Ray proceeded to drive south toward New Orleans, planning to
telephone Raoul's associates in that city to see whether they could explain what
had happened at the roominghouse. Ray asserted that, up to this time, he was
unaware of Dr. King's assassination in Memphis. (84)
During his second interview with the committee, Ray explained that somewhere
south of Memphis he had turned on his car radio and heard, for the first time,
of the attempt on the life of the civil rights leader. Ray claimed that at this
time he saw no connection between the police activity around the roominghouse,
Raoul and the reported assassination attempt:
STAFF COUNSEL. * * * [W]hen you first heard the bulletin that Dr. King had been
shot did you in your mind then realize that this had nothing to do with you or
Raoul?
RAY. I didn't even pay too much attention to that. There was another bulletin,
and I listened to it, and I think music was on before it, and--
STAFF COUNSEL. But his question is that, when you heard that, did you at least
then assume that that must have been what the police car was blocking the --
RAY. No, no there was no connection there whatsoever. (85)
Approximately 15 minutes later, while still driving toward New Orleans and
seeking a telephone to contact Raoul's associates, Ray stated that he heard a
second report that announced that the police
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were seeking a person in a white Mustang in connection with the assassination.
At this time, Ray decided that he was somehow involved in the assassination and
that the police were looking for his white Mustang. (86) The realization caused
Ray to change his plans immediately and head east for Atlanta. He was by then
convinced that Raoul was involved in the assassination, and he feared that he
had become the object of a nationwide manhunt. Ray was so certain of this
involvement that he said he threw out everything he had in the car, including
some expensive photographic equipment, apparently thinking that these items
might link him to the assassination. (87) By his own account, he continued
nonstop for Atlanta.
Ray was asked to explain the thought process by which he had concluded, based on
the information available to him, that Raoul was involved in the assassination.
Ray specified a general apprehension about the "guns," that is, the gunrunning
operation, and the involvement of a Mustang:
STAFF COUNSEL. Well, that's what I'm trying to pin point--when you started to
think Raoul may be involved in the shooting of Dr. King, what was it you were
thinking of? It can't be the broadcast about the car, it's got to be some other
things, and what were they?
RAY. Well, of course, the guns was always a consideration. I thought that when
I, I first pulled out of the area in the car, but I hate to keep getting back to
this same thing, but that Mustang was what really concerned me.
STAFF COUNSEL. That's why you wanted to get out of there, but I'm trying to find
out what is it that made you decide or think Raoul may be involved in the
shooting of King?
RAY. Well, I think it was his association with the Mustang, he was in the
general area, and, of course, the guns.* * *(88)
At another time, Ray described his thought process as follows:
RAY. * * * The assumptions were step by step. The first assumption I made was
when they started looking for the Mustang, was that they were looking probably
for me. If they were looking for me, then the next assumption was that they
might have been looking for this Raoul, and there may have been some offense
committed in this area.(89)
Ray's explanation for his flight from Memphis to Atlanta was crucial to his
claim of innocence in light of the highly suspicious character of his conduct
during the hours following the assassination. Consequently, the committee
examined his account in great detail and found it unpersuasive.
First, there was no mention of the suspect's description, or of any of Ray's
aliases--John Willard, for example during the broadcasts that Ray heard. He,
therefore, had little reason to suppose the authorities were looking for him.
Second, Ray testified in public hearings that he was unaware of Dr. King's
presence at the Lorraine Motel. (90) Further, the radio
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broadcasts apparently made no mention of the Lorraine, Bessie Brewer's
roominghouse or the addresses of either. There was no reason, therefore, to
associate the police activity at the roominghouse with the reports of an
assassination attempt on Dr. King.
Third, Raoul had never exhibited overt racial animosity or mentioned the
possibility of shooting Dr. King during their extended period of criminal
association. (91) There was no reason, therefore, to associate Raoul with the
reported attempt on Dr. King's life.
Fourth, Ray claimed that he was in his own Mustang--away from the
roominghouse--at the time of the assassination. In addition, he stated that by
the time he returned to the vicinity of the roominghouse, police roadblocks had
already been erected, a clear indication that the Mustang reported to have been
seen leaving the crime scene had departed some time before. Thus, it is
difficult to understand why Ray would have believed that the police were not
looking for his Mustang.
Fifth, Ray's story of his flight assumes, as a necessary ingredient, Raoul's
presence in the Memphis roominghouse. The committee, however, found no evidence
to support the existence of Raoul on April 4, 1968, or any other time.
Finally, as an "innocent dupe," Ray's immediate danger stemmed from the
possibility of an erroneous stop of his white Mustang and the subsequent
discovery of his status as an escapee from Missouri State Penitentiary.
Nevertheless, he accepted this risk and remained in the car for 11 hours during
the drive from Memphis to Atlanta. This behavior was illogical, and it suggested
that Ray believed the benefit to be gained in placing distance between himself
and the area of the assassination outweighed the substantial risk of an arrest
on an all points bulletin for the white Mustang. The committee found Ray's
decision to accept this risk comprehensible only if he knew of the bundle
drop-and the substantial evidence he had left behind tying him directly to the
assassination.
Ray's decision to flee south to Atlanta, rather than directly north to Canada,
was also significant, since it too created an increased risk of arrest. The
committee considered two explanations. First, Ray returned to Atlanta to receive
money for the assassination. Second, there was highly incriminating evidence in
Atlanta that Ray needed to eliminate before leaving the country.
The committee found no evidence to support the first explanation. Some evidence
indicated that Ray had photographed Dr. King while in Atlanta,18 raising the
possibility that he had left photographs in the city. This possibility was
perhaps corroborated by Ray's admission that he threw out his camera equipment
during the drive from Memphis. Ultimately, however, the committee was unable to
develop concrete evidence supporting this explanation for Ray's return to
Atlanta. Nevertheless, the committee found Ray's conduct following the
assassination, and his inadequate explanation for that conduct, to be
significant additional evidence of his involvement in the assassination.
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6. JAMES EARL RAY'S ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE ASSASSINATION,
HIS STORY OF "RAOUL," AND OTHER ALLEGEDLY EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE ARE NOT WORTHY OF BELIEF
(a) Ray's alibi
One of the best defenses available to a criminal defendant is an alibi--"the
plea of having been at the time of the commission of a [criminal] act elsewhere
than at the place of its commission." If the defense can be established, the
prosecution's case inevitably fails.
The committee received substantial evidence that James Earl Ray was at Bessie
Brewer's roominghouse during the hours immediately preceding the assassination;
that he fired the murder weapon; that he fled the roominghouse; that he dropped
a bundle in the doorway of Canipe's Amusement Co.; and that he fled from Memphis
to Atlanta in his white Mustang immediately after the assassination.
Ray, however, asserted an alibi defense. He told the committee that he was not
at the roominghouse at the moment Dr. King was murdered, but was, in fact,
blocks away at a service station, attempting to get a flat tire fixed. It was
upon his return from the service station to the roominghouse that he ran into
the police roadblock that precipitated his flight from Memphis. (92)
Ray's story to the committee was not his first alibi for the assassination. He
had told his attorney, Arthur Hanes, Sr., that at approximately 6 p.m. on April
4, 1968, he was sitting in his parked Mustang in front of 422 1/2 South Main
Street when Raoul came running out of the roominghouse, jumped in the back of
the car, threw a white sheet over himself and told Ray to drive away. Ray told
Hanes that he followed the instructions. After they had driven a few blocks,
Raoul jumped out of the car, never to be seen again. (93) This story was also
given to author William Bradford Huie, who was working with Hanes. Huie quoted
it in his book about the King assassination, "He Slew the Dreamer."(94)
Ray changed his alibi to the gas station story after replacing Hanes with Percy
Foreman as his defense counsel.(95) He relied on it to prove his innocence in
his 1978 public testimony. When questioned as to why he switched alibis, Ray
said the "white sheet" story was intended as a joke at the expense of Huie who
had an interest in the Ku Klux Klan. (96) Ray claimed that he did not tell Hanes
or Huie the true story because he was afraid they would give the information to
the FBI whose agents would then be able to undermine it. Ray said he had planned
to give the gas station account at his trial, when he took the witness stand in
his own defense.
Chairman STOKES. All I want to know is why you didn't tell
this man [Hanes] who is representing you in a capital case
the truth.
RAY. It wasn't I wasn't telling you the truth; I just didn't
tell him that. It was my intention to tell the jury that.
Chairman STOKES. You were going to spring this on your
attorney at the trial ?
RAY. Yes; that's correct.(97)
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The committee was unable to understand why Ray, who planned to go to trial and
take the stand, would have decided to withhold a valid alibi from his own
attorney, especially since Ray faced the possibility of capital punishment. If
the gas station story were true and Hanes had been told of it, he could have
found witnesses to corroborate it and support Ray's testimony. By withholding
his story, Ray guaranteed that his testimony, which was subject to impeachment
because of his prior criminal record, would stand alone without independent
corroboration.
The committee found it impossible to believe that Ray would have engaged in such
risky trial tactics had the gas station story been anything more than an
unsupportable fabrication.
Mark Lane, Ray's attorney at the time of the committee's public hearings,
circulated Ray's gas station alibi and identified witnesses who allegedly saw
Ray at a Texaco service station at the corner of Linden Avenue and Second Street
in Memphis at the time of the assassination.19 When the committee investigated
Lane's account, however, it found no factual support for it. Coy Dean Cowden,
one of the men who, according to Lane, saw Ray at the station, testified in
public session that he was 400 miles away, in Port Naches, Tex. at the time of
the assassination and therefore could have seen no one at a Memphis service
station on the evening of April 4, 1968. (98) Cowden explained that he
fabricated the story to assist a friend, Renfro Hays, who had been an
investigator for Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Congressman EDGAR. Can you tell the committee why you told this false story with
such serious implications to the Na tional Enquirer and also to Mark Lane?
Mr. COWDEN. Yes. Renfro Hays was a fellow that supported me for a period of
about 4 months, completely, while I was unemployed. He befriended me in that he
gave me food and lodging and he had the great ability to, you know, let you
know, make you feel like that you really owed him something, you know, and
really what he was trying to do was sell the movie rights, a book, I believe.
There were several things that he mentioned from time to time that he was trying
to market, and he would call on me, especially with Mark Lane and some other
people that came by to talk to me from time to time, with basically this same
story. This story--I don't remember how many of us, not only Mark Lane and the
National Enquirer, but this was to five or six different people. I do not know
who they represented, what publication.(99)
The committee also investigated the whereabouts at the time of the assassination
of Thomas I. Wilson, because he a]so could, according to Lane, substantiate
Ray's alibi. Wilson had died by the time of the committee's investigation, but a
friend of his, Harvey Locke, told committee investigators that he and Wilson
were at a store blocks away from the Texaco station at the time of the
assassination. (100)
Finally, Larce and Phillip McFall, coowners of the Texaco station in question,
testified in public session that no white Mustang entered their station during
the late afternoon of April 4, 1968. (101)
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The committee, therefore, found that there was no evidentiary support for Ray's
alibi.
(b) Ray's "Raoul" story
A character named Raoul had been the cornerstone of Ray's defense. It was Raoul
who, according to Ray, directed him at every incriminating stage prior to the
murder of Dr. King, from the purchase of the murder weapon in Birmingham, Ala.
(ostensibly a sample to show prospective buyers in a gun-running scheme) to the
rental of a room in Bessie Brewer's roominghouse (where the gun-running deal was
to be negotiated). At Raoul's direction, Ray traveled to Memphis and purchased
binoculars shortly before the assassination. Without Raoul, therefore, Ray would
be left with no explanation for his highly incriminatory behavior.
The committee determined that much of Ray's Raoul story was flawed. Ray was
unable to produce witnesses who saw him and Raoul together at any time in their
9 months of association, and he had no explanation for the absence of Raoul's
fingerprints on the murder weapon. Moreover, while Ray told the story of Raoul
countless times over the years to lawyers, journalists, and congressional
investigators, he was inconsistent on details as important as Raoul s physical
description. Even in Ray's sworn testimony before the committee, his answers to
questions about Raoul were vague, incongruous, and evasive. Ultimately, the
committee gave no credence to Ray's story of Raoul. Ray's resulting inability to
explain 'his inculpatory behavior must stand as one of the strongest indications
of his involvement in the assassination of Dr. King.
(1) Conflicting descriptions of Raoul.---Ray's inability to give complete and
consistent description of Raoul was a strong indication of the invalidity of the
story. Ray had ample opportunity to observe Raoul. Although he denied in sworn
testimony before the committee spending a great deal of time with him, Ray did
claim to have met with him from 12 to 15 times and to have engaged in 6 or 7
hours of conversation. (102)
The first publicized description of Raoul appeared in an article by William
Bradford Huie in the November 12, 1968, edition of Look magazine. In this
article, Ray was quoted as describing Raoul as a "blond Latin." (103) Huie
subsequently published a book, "He slew the Dreamer" that drew heavily on
correspondence from Ray. In the book, Raoul was described as a "red-haired
French Canadian." (104) During his testimony, Ray explained this inconsistency
by stating that he had never mentioned blond hair to Huie and that the second
description was correct. (105)
In subsequent interviews, however, Ray gave descriptions of Raoul that differed
from the first two. In March 1977, Ray told CBS reporter Dan Rather that Raoul
was an auburn-haired "Latin Spanish." (106) By September 1977, in Ray's
interview with Playboy magazine, Raoul had become a "sandy-haired Latin." (107)
Ray asserted that Playboy erroneously printed the description just as he alleged
Huie had done 10 years before. (108)
(2) Absence of witnesses to corroborate Raoul's existence.--Significantly, Ray
could not produce one witness to establish Raoul's existence,
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although his meetings with him were more than occasional, as this account shows:
Ray stated that he first met Raoul in July 1967 at the Neptune Bar in
Montreal,(109) and he continued to meet with him there "several more times."
(110) On August 21, 1967, they smuggled contraband across the United
States-Canadian border at Detroit: (111) On August 28, 29 and 30, 1967, they met
at the Starlite Care in Birmingham, Ala., and later on August 30, they went to
Ray's residence at Peter Cherpes' roominghouse. (112) On October 7, 1967, they
met at a motel in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, crossed the border into Texas, and then
drove back into Mexico with same unidentified contraband.(113) Ray recalled
spending that night at the motel where he had originally met Raoul. Ray claimed,
however, that he did not know where Raoul stayed. (114) The next morning they
continued further into Mexico, past an interior customs point, and then parted
company. (115) In mid-December, Ray met with Raoul in the Le Bunny Lounge in New
Orleans, (116) and on March 23, 1968, they met again in the Starlite Cafe in
Birmingham. (117) That same day they traveled to Atlanta where Ray rented a room
at Jimmy Garner's roominghouse. (118) They ate dinner together at a Peachtree
Street diner and on the next day Raoul visited Ray in his room at Garner's
roominghouse. (119) On March 29, after an absence from Atlanta, Raoul returned
to Ray's room, and the two left together for Birmingham to purchase the rifle
that was used in the assassination. Ray checked into the Travelodge Motel in
Birmingham. (120) He could not remember whether Raoul accompanied him to
Aeromarine Supply Co. or simply waited for him at the Travelodge. (121) In any
event, they met at the Travelodge following the purchase of the rifle that was
exchanged the next day. (122) On April 3, Ray met Raoul at the New Rebel Motel
in Memphis and on April 4 at Jim's Grill. (123) Together they went to the room
Ray had rented in Bessie Brewer's roominghouse, (124) the last place Ray ever
saw Raoul.
The committee located and interviewed witnesses from the three roominghouses,
Cherpes' Garner's and Brewer's, where Ray maintained he had met Raoul. While
these witnesses remembered seeing Ray, they did not recall seeing Ray with Raoul
or with any other individual.
Other witnesses who allegedly could corroborate Raoul's existence--for example,
Raoul's telephone contact in New Orleans (125) or his smuggling companion in
Nuevo Laredo--were impossible to locate because of the inadequacy of Ray's
descriptions. He could provide no names or addresses, and the smuggling
accomplice was described only as Mexican with Indian-like features. (126)
The committee conducted an extensive investigation of Ray's activities during
the preassassination period and yet uncovered no witnesses who would corroborate
the existence of Raoul. Ray, who could only gain by such a discovery, provided
no identifying characteristics, names or addresses that ,might. have assisted
the committee. The absence of corroborating witnesses was a strong indication
that Ray fabricated the "Raoul" story.
(c) Preassassination transactions
The committee also found problems in Ray's account of crucial moments in his
preassassination relationship with his alleged com-
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panion. For example, there was overwhelming evidence to substantiate Ray's
purchase of the murder weapon and the binoculars that were found in the bundle
in front of Canipe's Amusement Co. and his rental of room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's
Memphis roominghouse. Ray did not deny these crucial preassassination
transactions, but he contended that he engaged in them at the direction of Raoul
as part of a gunrunning scheme. (127)
Each of these transactions was examined in minute detail, and no support was
found for Ray's claims.
(1) The rifle purchase.--In his correspondence with Huie, Ray wrote that while
in Atlanta, Raoul gave him a two-part role in the gun-running operation. First,
he was to buy a large bore deer rifle fitted with a scope; second, he was to
inquire about the price of some "chear" foreign rifles.(128) According to this
version, Raoul told Ray about the plan at Garner's roominghouse on the day on
the day after their arrival in Atlanta. (129) In a later interview with the
committee, however, Ray stated that Raoul did not outline the gunrunning scheme
until the morning they left Atlanta for Birmingham, 6 days after his arrival in
the city. (130) During his testimony before the committee, Ray reverted to the
account he had given Huie in 1968. (131)
Whenever the plan was proposed, Ray said Raoul initially instructed him to make
the weapon purchase in Atlanta.(132) Ray suggested that since he had an Alabama
driver's license in the name of Eric S. Gait as identification, it would be
easier to buy the rifle in Birmingham. Raoul agreed.(133) Ray's subsequent
conduct, however, was inconsistent with this aspect of the Raoul story, for when
he bought the rifle and ammunition in Birmingham, he did not use his established
identity, Eric S. Galt, but rather a new alias, Harvey Lowmeyer, for which he
had no documentation- When asked why, he used the Lowmeyer name, Ray replied
that he thought it would be safer to buy the guns under a different name. (134)
This explanation contradicted his stated reason for traveling to Birmingham,
since he could have purchased the rifle in Atlanta under the Lowmeyer alias,
thus avoiding a 250-mile drive.
Once in Birmingham, Raoul and Ray decided to purchase the rifle at Aeromarine
Supply Co.(135) Ray claimed that Raoul also instructed him to look into military
surplus rifles for possible sale in their gunrunning operation. Ray told the
committee that he inquired about the surplus rifles at Aeromarine.(136) The
committee's investigation, however, failed to corroborate this aspect of Ray's
story. In a sworn affidavit, U.L. Baker, the clerk who sold the first rifle to
Ray, told the committee that Ray asked only general questions about deer hunting
rifles and said nothing about foreign or military surplus rifles. (137)
Ray testified before the committee that in furtherance of the gun-running scheme
and on Raoul's instructions, he also purchased some military ammunition at
Aeromarine.(138) Although ammunition with machinegun link marks was found in the
bundle of Ray's belongings, he apparently did not purchase it at Aeromarine.
Both Baker and Donald Wood, the store owner who sold the second rifle, said they
did not sell military ammunition to Ray.(139) Further, the sales receipt for the
exchange of the rifle and the purchase of commercial
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ammunition did not reflect the purchase of military ammunition. (140) Confronted
with this evidence at a hearing, Ray said it had not changed his story, though
he offered no explanation for the contradictory evidence, other than to suggest
there must have been a second receipt.(141)
(2) Fingerprints on the rifle.--The most significant problem with Ray's story of
the rifle purchase was his inability to explain the absence of Raoul's
fingerprints on the rifle. In both the fifth (142) and sixth (143) interviews
with the committee, Ray stated that he brought the second rifle back to the
Travelodge Motel, where Raoul examined it and approved the purchase. In the
sixth interview, moreover, Ray conceded that Raoul handled the rifle. Ray's
responses illustrate the vague and evasive manner in which he spoke of Raoul
throughout his interviews with the committee.
STAFF COUNSEL. What did he do? How did he decide that it was OK? What did he do
with the rifle?
RAY. I really couldn't say, he just looked at it and that was it.
STAFF COUNSEL. When you say he looked at it, ah, how did it, what did he do?
RAY. Well he just checked it over and that was it. Just like you check a rifle
over I guess, you---
STAFF COUNSEL. Well, I wasn't there, how did he check it over?
RAY. Well he checked the mechanism and every--I don't remember all the details,
maybe he checked the mechanisms I think and just give it cursory glance and that
would be it.
STAFF COUNSEL. Did he check, pick it up and check the weight to see if it, how
heavy the rifle was?
RAY. I think he just said this was, this will do or something of that order.
STAFF COUNSEL. When you say he checked the mechanism, how did he check the
mechanism?
RAY. I don't recall, see I don't, I don't have the least idea on what the
mechanism was all about.
STAFF COUNSEL. Well he took it out, did he take it out of the box?
RAY. Ah, yes I think it was in the box, yes.
STAFF COUNSEL. And he took it out of the box ?
RAY. Yes, it was taken, it was taken out of the box and looked at yes.
STAFF COUNSEL. Now he did that, Raoul ?
RAY. Yes.
STAFF COUNSEL. Did you lift it and check the weight and check the sight and look
through the magnifying mechanism ?
RAY. No, I, no the only time I looked at it, and I looked at it quite a bit when
I first purchased it. I wanted to try to give the guy the impression that I knew
what I was doing. But after that I never did touch it. There was never any
touching of the sights or checking the mechanism or anything like that.
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STAFF COUNSEL. From the time you purchased that rifle in Aeromarine, that was
the last time that you touched the rifle?
RAY. Ah, yes, I would say so.
STAFF COUNSEL. And then after that Raoul picked up the rifle and checked it out
at, at the motel in Birmingham, is that right?
RAY. Yes.
STAFF COUNSEL. And then how did it get back into the package?
RAY. Well he must of put it there.
STAFF COUNSEL. And then he left the package with you?
RAY. Yes. (144)
Ray stated, during this exchange, that he never handled the rifle after Raoul
examined it. (He had transported it to Memphis in a box, given it to Raoul at
the New Rebel Motel, and never seen it again.) Yet when the rifle was examined
after the assassination, two latent fingerprints of value were lifted from it,
both belonging to Ray. (145) Ray was confronted, therefore, with the need to
explain how Raoul, after handling the rifle, managed to remove all of his prints
while leaving two of Ray's.
Ray addressed this problem in his public hearing testimony by asserting that his
previous statements during committee interviews had been erroneous and that,
when he took the second rifle back to the motel, no one was there. (146) Raoul
had left town and did not see the second rifle until Ray gave it to him in
Memphis. (147)
(3) Rental of room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse.--Ray's sworn testimony
concerning the April 4, 1968, rental of room 5B at Bessie Brewer's Memphis
roominghouse raised further doubts about his Raoul story. Ray told the committee
that at the New Rebel Motel in Memphis the previous night, April 3, he and Raoul
agreed to rent the room under the new alias John Willard. (148) Ray wrote that
name on a slip of paper for Raoul so that he could rent the room if he arrived
at the roominghouse first.
He mentioned that if he were not in a room at the South Main Street address when
I arrived he would be in a bar and grill located on the ground floor of the
building * * * . (149)
Sometime between 3 and 4 p.m. the next day, according to Ray's account, he drove
to downtown Memphis where he parked his car in commercial lot some distance from
Bessie Brewer's roominghouse. Ray had to make at least three inquiries before he
could locate the roominghouse.(150) When he arrived, he testified that he
stopped briefly in the tavern downstairs, and then went into the roominghouse
and registered as John Willard:
Chairman STOKES. Well, when you got there you didn't know whether he had taken a
room in the name of John Willard or not then, did you ?
Mr. RAY. No, I didn't know whether he had or not.
Chairman STOKES. And you didn't inquire, did you ?
Mr. RAY. No, I didn't make any inquiries.
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Chairman STOKES. So you just went right in, furnished your name as John Willard
and got a room, even though he might have still been there already ahead of you
and gotten that room?
Mr. RAY. He very well could have, yes.(151)
There seemed to be only one explanation for Ray's willingness to stick to this
story. He realized that if he said he had asked the landlady if John Willard had
already arrived, she could deny any recollection of this inquiry, further
undermining his Raoul story. He chose, therefore, to cling to an illogical
version of the events.
(4) The binocular purchase.--Ray testified that after the room was rented, Raoul
told him to buy "a pair of binoculars with infrared attachments saying that the
'people' also wanted to examine some glasses."(152) Thus, the binocular purchase
became another step in the gunrunning scheme. Ray testified further that after
some initial difficulty locating the store, he entered the York Arms Co. on
South Main Street and asked the clerk for infrared attachments for binoculars.
The clerk replied that the store did not carry such equipment. He suggested,
however, that Ray could purchase the attachments at an Army surplus store. Ray
bought ordinary binoculars from the clerk and took them back to Raoul.(153)
As with the rifle purchase at Aeromarine, this aspect of the gun-running scheme
could not be corroborated. In 1968, Ralph Carpenter, the clerk at York Arms,
identified James Earl Ray from several photographs he was shown by the FBI.
(154) Carpenter stated that Ray asked to see a pair of binoculars that was in
the window display. After learning the price, he bought a less expensive pair.
It was established in a later committee interview with Carpenter that Ray said
nothing about infrared attachments.(155)
In conclusion, Ray's story of Raoul was deficient on a number of points. First,
Ray s descriptions of Raoul's physical appearance and nationality changed
significantly over the years. Second, the committee was unable to find--and Ray
was unable to produce-one witness who could attest to Raoul's existence. Third,
witnesses at Aeromarine Supply Co. in Birmingham, and York Arms Co. in Memphis,
as well as documentary evidence from Aeromarine, failed to corroborate details
of the gunrunning scheme. Finally, Rays statements about Raoul over the years,
and even during the committee's investigation, were inconsistent and
contradictory.
The committee concluded that "Raoul," as described by Ray, did not exist.20
(d) Grace Walden Stephens
Aside from Ray's own account of his actions on April 4, 1968, the committee
investigated other evidence that had been offered as exculpatory, including the
testimony of Grace Walden Stephens.
A tenant of Bessie Brewer's roominghouse at 422 1/2 South Main Street, Memphis,
Charles Stephens, said he saw a man who fit the general description of James
Earl Ray running down a hallway from the vicinity of the second-floor bathroom
immediately after the shoot-
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ing. (156) William Anschutz: another tenant: said he also saw the man, although
he was unable to give a good description of him. (157)
It had been alleged that a third roominghouse tenant, Grace Walden who in 1968
was the common-law wife of Charles Stephens, saw a man who did not fit. Ray's
description fleeing down the hallway after the shooting.
Further, it had been alleged that because Walden would not agree to sign an
affidavit identifying Ray as the assassin, even though she was offered a
$100,000 reward to do so, she was threatened by an FBI agent and a few days
later arrested by Memphis police and taken to the mental ward of John Gaston
Hospital. Three weeks later, the allegation continues, she was taken by armed
guards to Western State Mental Hospital in Bolivar, Tenn., and committed.
Thus, there had been claims that a witness who could identify Dr. King's
assassin as someone other than Ray was silenced in an effort by the Government
to convict Ray and conceal the identity of the true assassin.
Walden's alleged importance as an eyewitness prompted the committee to conduct a
thorough investigation of her background, her story and the circumstances of her
commitment to a mental institution. The committee learned that at the time of
the assassination, Walden was living with Stephens in room 6-B of Bessie
Brewer's roominghouse. Their room was adjacent to 5-B, the one Ray admitted
renting under the alias of John Willard. The committee also learned that Walden
had a history of arrests and convictions, going back to 1942, for a variety of
offenses, including public drunkenness and driving while intoxicated.
At a public hearing on Walden's account and her reliability as a witness, the
committee was told that Wayne Chastain, a Memphis newspaper reporter, was the
first person to interview her after the assassination, that is, even before the
police arrived on the scene. At that time, Walden described the man she had seen
fleeing from the bathroom as short and wiry, with salt and pepper hair, wearing
a colored plaid shirt and army jacket. (158) During a committee interview,
Chastain asserted that he had interviewed Grace Walden on the night of April 4
and that she had told him she had seen a man come out of the bathroom with "a
military jacket with a box."(159)
The committee's investigation revealed that Chastain's story is improbable, if
not an outright fabrication. First, the committee determined that Memphis police
were at the roominghouse within moments of the shooting(160) and were therefore
most likely the first to take statements from any residents of the roominghouse,
including Walden. Second, the committee found it to be highly improbable that
Chastain even spoke to Walden that first evening, as the police had sealed off
her portion of the roominghouse. Third, there is some question about whether
Walden, admittedly bedridden that day, was able to see the bathroom door from
her bed. (161) Finally, no mention of Chastain's interview appeared in any
Memphis paper immediately after the assassination.
The committee's investigation did determine that Grace Walden had been
interviewed numerous times, beginning immediately after the assassination, and
had given several conflicting stories.
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Shortly after the shooting, Walden was interviewed in her room by Lt. Glynn King
and Capt. R.L. Williams of the Memphis police. She told them that she and her
husband had spent most of the day in their room. The tenant of room 5-B had been
running back and forth between 5-B and the bathroom, and, about 2 minutes before
the shot was fired, he had returned to the bathroom. After the shot, the person
in the bathroom ran down the hall toward the front of the building. She said she
was sick, did not get out of bed that day and did not see the man.(162)
She was interviewed again later that evening at Memphis police headquarters by a
police lieutenant and an FBI agent and again on April 5 and April 24 by FBI
agents. The committee's investigation revealed that at none of those interviews
did Walden claim to have seen anyone fleeing from the bathroom or running down
the hall.(163)
Robert Jensen, special agent in charge of the Memphis FBI field office in 1968,
supervised the FBI's local investigation of the assassination. He told the
committee that Walden's statement to Memphis agents was to the effect that she
saw nothing following the shot that killed Dr. King because she was in bed all
day. He also stated that she "* * * was never requested by the FBI or by anyone
to sign an affidavit identifying James Earl Ray as a man she observed exiting
the bathroom following the shot." In addition, Jensen explained that she was
never offered a reward of $100,000 or any amount to sign such an affidavit, and
she was never threatened for failing to sign such an affidavit. (164)
Thus, by April 25, 1968, Walden had said on numerous occasions that she did not
see the man who exited the bathroom following the shot that killed Dr. King. In
addition, a careful review by the committee of journalistic coverage of the
assassination revealed numerous references to statements by Stephens and
Anschutz, while there was no mention of any account by Walden.
In November 1968, however, Walden allegedly gave a statement to Renfro Hays, 21
an investigator for Ray's original attorney, Arthur Hanes, Sr., that she had
seen a man fleeing from the bathroom who fit the description attributed to her
by Chastain. The substance of that statement appeared in the October 1969 and
April 1977 issues of Saga magazine.
Walden's statement to the committee on July 26, 1977, noted that she did recall
seeing a man leave the bathroom, and though she could not describe him because
he was moving rapidly, she was certain he was white.(165)
Walden's most recent public statement, concerning the events surrounding the
assassination occurred on the August 15, 1978, edition of NBC television's
"Today" show. She said, "Charlie picked James Earl Ray out. I don't think the
man looked anything like him. In the first place I think he was a nigger." (166)
Because of the differences in Walden's statements about whether she saw anyone
at all and, if so, whether the man she saw was white or Black, the committee
found that her testimony was virtually useless.
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In view of allegations that Walden was committed to mental institutions
beginning on July 8, 1968, because of her failure to agree that Ray was the
assassin, the committee investigated the circumstances of her hospitalization.
The investigation included: a careful review of pertinent medical and other
records; interviews with individuals knowledgeable about Walden's commitment,
treatment and release; and sworn public testimony from six persons who knew
about the situation.
The investigation revealed that a few weeks after the assassination, Charles
Stephens was taken into protective custody as a material witness and was
accompanied everywhere by two police officers. On July 8, Stephens took Walden,
who was complaining of a leg or ankle injury, to the hospital; they were
accompanied by two plainclothes Memphis policemen. The trip was unrelated to the
King assassination case, and no request was made that Walden be examined by a
psychiatrist. (167)
After admission to the emergency room at John Gaston Hospital, Walden was
examined by Dr. Mary Slechta, a staff phychiatrist, who concluded that she was
suffering from psychotic depression and was dangerous to herself.(168) Since she
was diagnosed as exhibiting "suicidal tendencies" and presenting a danger to
herself, a record of arrest, called for by Memphis police procedures in all
similar cases, was filed for Walden at the hospital, (169) The officers signing
the arrest record stated "unequivocally" to the committee that no instructions
were given by the Memphis Police Department, Shelby County Attorney General's
Office, the FBI or anyone else to have Walden committed to the John Gaston
Hospital phychiatric ward. Both officers indicated.
* * * it was a matter of standard operating procedure for record of arrest to be
filed with respect to each person who was diagnosed by a staff physician to be
dangerous to himself or others and to be in need of admission for psychiatric
treatment.
Other testimony corroborated the officers' statement. (170)
During her stay at John Gaston, Walden complained that she continued to hear
voices, and on July 29, she attempted to hang herself with strips of bedding.
(171)
An allegation that Walden was given "mind crippling drugs" after her admission
to the John Gaston psychiatric ward and that this treatment led to a
deterioration of her condition and her commitment to Western State Mental
Hospital in Bolivar, Tenn., was found to be unsubstantiated. All treatment,
including drug therapy, was found to be within the range of generally accepted
medical practice at that time. (172)
After Walden's suicide attempt on July 29, doctors at John Gaston Hospital
decided that due to her continued depression and suicidal tendencies, she should
be transferred to Western State Mental Hospital for further treatment.(173) A
petition for commitment was filed with the Shelby County Probate Court on July
29, 1968, by John A. Henderson, administrator of John Gaston Hospital. Dr. David
Moore, supervising psychiatrist at John Gaston, and Dr. Sidney Vick (174)
certified that Walden's psychological condition indicated that
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she was a proper subject for treatment and care in a psychiatric hospital.
Dr. Vick normally handled an average of 15 such commitments in a month, and he
stated to the committee that,
* * * the judicial commitment of Grace E. Walden was handled no differently than
hundreds of other judicial commitments handled by me over my 13-year tenure.
(175)
While testimony at the committee's public hearing and official court records
showed that Tennessee commitment procedures in 1968 might not stand
constitutional scrutiny in 1978, they were applied equally to all in 1968,
including to Grace Walden. The evidence showed that there was no difference
between the proceedings in the Walden case and any of the several hundred other
commitment proceedings held each year. (176) While there were references in
Walden's medical records that noted she was "a witness in the King case," the
committee determined that the question of her possible status as a witness had
no bearing on her commitment.
Dr. James H. Druff, Dr. Jack C. Neale and Dr. Morris Cohen, who served
successively as superintendents of Western State during Walden's commitment,
testified before the committee that once committed, Walden received the
appropriate treatment for somebody suffering from her condition chronic organic
brain syndrome, secondary to alcoholism. The symptomology of that disease
includes impairment of memory, orientation, and judgment, a shallowness of
affect and an impairment of all intellectual functions. The doctors agreed that
her drug therapy, occupational therapy, and other treatment were well within the
acceptable practice of medical and psychiatric standards then prevailing. In
fact, her drug dosage levels were on the moderate to low side. None of the drugs
that she received were mind-crippling or dangerous to her case. (177)
They also agreed that she was incapable of caring for herself and should not
have been released or discharged from the institution until appropriate outside
support facilities were available. In 1978, when such facilities were available,
Walden was released. (178)
The testimony revealed that all judgments about Walden's treatment and
suitability for discharge were made on purely medical bases, and none of the
superintendents was subjected to any pressure from any Federal, State, county or
municipal authorities concerning the commitment, treatment, or retention of
Grace Walden. (179)
On the recommendation of the National Institute on Mental Health, the committee
retained a psychiatric expert. Dr. Roger Peele to review and evaluate the
records from John Gaston Hospital and Western State Mental Hospital to determine
whether Walden's hospitalization, insofar as it was reflected in the records,
met acceptable professional standards of reasonable care and treatment.
Dr. Peele reported:
The treatment and medication afforded Walden were, in general consistent with
her diagnosis and fell well within the acceptable standard of psychiatric care.
In addition, according to an examination of her records, Walden's medical
history was consistent with her subsequent diagnosis. (180)
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315
Concerning her transfer from John Gaston Hospital to Western State Hospital, Dr.
Peele stated:"The 23-day length of hospitalization and the transfer to a State
hospital were not inconsistent with the psychiatric practices in American
psychiatry in 1968?
Taking into consideration these factors concerning Grace Walden:
The numerous conflicting descriptions of what she saw or did not see on April 4,
1968;
The evidence indicating there was nothing sinister in her commitment to John
Gaston or Western State hospitals; and
That her commitment was in no way related to her role as a possible witness in
the King assassination investigation;
The committee concluded that Grace Walden s testimony would be of little or no
value, and her statements to the effect that James Earl Ray was not the assassin
of Dr. King were unworthy of belief.
In summary, after reviewing the evidence, the committee concluded that Grace
Walden's alleged observation of someone other than Ray leaving the roominghouse
bathroom was not worthy of belief. The committee further concluded that her
commitment to John Gaston Hospital and Western State Mental Hospital was based
on medical considerations and was not related to her role as a possible witness
in the assassination investigation.
7. JAMES EARL RAY KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY
PLEADED GUILTY TO THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF DR. MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR.
On March 10, 1969, James Earl Ray appeared before Judge W. Preston Battle of the
Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tenn., and pleaded guilty to the first degree
murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.(181)22 This plea resulted from
negotiations between Ray's principal attorney, Percy Foreinan, and Shelby County
Attorney General Phil N. Canale. (182) Foreman was assisted in his
representation of Ray by Hugh Stanton, Sr. and Hugh Stanton, Jr., (183) both of
the Shelby County Public Defender's Office. The maximum penalty under Tennessee
law in 1969 for first degree murder was death. (184) Neverthe less, under the
terms of the prosecution's recommendation to the court, Ray was spared the death
penalty and was sentenced to 99 years confinement in the State penitentiary.
(185)
During the hearing before Judge Battle, the court questioned Ray extensively in
an effort to determine the voluntariness of the plea and to insure that he knew
the plea would result in the waiver of valuable rights. (186) In addition, as a
condition of the plea, Ray agreed to a proposed stipulation of the material
facts that set forth all the details of his whereabouts, and actions that the
State advanced to support its case against him. (187) Ray ultimately agreed to
the stipulations sought by the prosecution except one concerning his alleged
political activities. A portion of the exchange between Ray and Judge Battle on
March 10, 1969, indicated that Ray admitted his role in the assassi-
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nation of Dr. King and voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea:
The COURT. You are entering a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree as
charged in the indictment as a compromise and settling your case on an agreed
punishment of 99 years in the State penitentiary. Is that what you want to do?
ANSWER. Yes, I do.
The COURT. Is this what you want to do?
ANSWER. Yes, sir.
The COURT. Do you understand that you are waiving which means you are giving up
a formal trial by your plea of guilty although the laws of this State require
the prosecution to present certain evidence to a jury in all cases on pleas of
guilty to murder in the first degree by your plea of guilty you are also waiving
[the court explains Ray's rights in great detail] * * * Has anything besides
this sentence of 99 years in the penitentiary been promised to you to plead
guilty? Has anything else been promised to you by anyone?
ANSWER. No, it has not.
The COURT. Has any pressure of any kind by anyone in any way been used on you to
get you to plead guilty?
ANSWER. No, no one in any way.
The COURT. Are you pleading guilty to murder in the first degree in this case
because you killed Dr. Martin Luther King under circumstances that would make
you legally guilty of murder in the first degree under the law as explained to
you by your lawyer?
ANSWER. Yes, legally yes.
The COURT. Is this plea of guilty to murder in the first degree with an agreed
punishment of 99 years in the State penitentiary free, voluntarily and
understandingly made and entered by you?
ANSWER. Yes, sir.
The COURT. Is this plea of guilty on your part the free act of your free will
made with your full knowledge and understanding of its meaning and consequences?
ANSWER. Yes, sir. (188) 23
Within 3 days of the guilty plea, Ray recanted his admission and requested a new
trial in a letter to Judge Battle dated March 13, 1969. (189) Ray followed this
letter with another dated March 06, 1969, that echoed the first, also directed
to Judge Battle. (190) Judge Battle died on March 31, 1969. He had not taken any
action on Ray's request for a new trial. (191)
Following Judge Battle's death, on April 7, 1969, Ray filed a formal petition
for a new trial. The court denied the motion at the conclusion of its hearing on
Ray's petition on May 26, 1969. (192)
After exhausting his right of appeal under Tennessee law, Ray sought relief in
the Federal courts by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On March
30, 1973, a Federal district court denied
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Ray's request for relief, ruling that Ray's constitutional rights had not been
denied. (193) Ray subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. That panel reversed the district court on January 29, 1974,
finding that the lower court improperly denied Ray an evidentiary hearing before
it ruled on his motion. (194) The State of Tennessee appealed this decision to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case on June 3, 1974. (195)
The matter was returned to the district court, where an evidentiary hearing was
held. On February 27, 1975, the district court ruled that Ray's constitutional
rights had not been violated and denied his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. (196) Ray also appealed this decision, and on May 10, 1976, the Sixth
Circuit Court, of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the
evidence sustained a finding that Ray had voluntarily and knowingly pleaded
guilty in State court to murder:
Considering "all of the relevant circumstances" surrounding Ray's plea * * * we
agree with the district court that the pea was entered voluntarily and
knowingly. As stated, Judge Battle very carefully questioned Ray as to the
voluntariness of his plea before it was accepted on March 10, 1969. Ray
specifically denied at that time that anyone had pressured him to plead guilty *
* *. (197)
The court also noted that a February 18, 1969 letter, signed by Ray, authorizing
Foreman to negotiate a guilty plea, supported the finding that the plea was
voluntary; that he had not been prejudiced by his contracts with writer William
Bradford Huie; that he had not shown inadequate investigation by his counsel;
that he had failed to establish that Foreman gave him incompetent advice in
urging him to plead guilty; and that he had not reasonably believed that he had
no alternative to a guilty plea. The court also rejected Ray's contention that
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by police surveillance
interception of mail and delivery of attorney-client communications to the
prosecution, since he had been unable to demonstrate that these activities
affected the preparation of his defense.24 The court concluded that Foreman's
representation of Ray was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases." (193)
Ray sought review of this decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. On December 13,
1976, the Supreme Court denied Ray's request for a writ of certiorari. (199)
Ray's immediate repudiation of his guilty plea started speculation that it had
been part of an elaborate plot to silence Ray and protect conspirators in the
assassination. Consequently, the committee conducted a full factual and legal
investigation of the plea to determine whether it was voluntarily entered and
legally sufficient, applying appropriate legal standards in its assessment. Ray
had maintained that a number of conditions rendered his guilty plea defective or
involuntary, (200) including:
Irreconcilable conflicts of interest involving his attorneys, Percy Foreman and
Arthur Hanes, Sr.;
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Inadequate investigation by Foreman, Ray's chief defense counsel at the time of
the guilty plea;
Mental coercion exerted by Foreman and the Federal Government to force Ray to
plead guilty; and
Ray's belief that his guilty plea would not preclude his ability to secure a
subsequent trial.
The committee reviewed each of the claims made by Ray.
(a) Irreconcilable conflicts of interest of Foreman and Hanes
Initially in conjunction with Arthur Hanes, Sr., Ray's first attomey, and then
with Percy Foreman, Hanes' successor, Ray entered into contracts with William
Bradford Huie for the literary rights to Ray's version of the assassination of
Dr. King. Ray subsequently maintained that he signed these contracts only at the
insistence of his attorneys. (201) The committee interviewed all parties to the
contracts and reviewed information from the papers filed in Federal court in Ray
v. Foreman .24 and Ray v. Rose. 25
The investigation revealed that Ray, Hanes, and Huie entered into the first
three-party contract on July 8, 1968, just under a month after Ray's arrest in
London and 2 weeks before he was returned to the United States.(202) The
contract gave Huie literary rights to Ray's story and provided for a three-way
split of the proceeds. In September 1968, Ray and Hanes amended the initial
contract's provision for Hanes' fee, limiting the total amount he could realize
to $20,000 plus expenses.(203) After Foreman replaced Hanes, he assumed
contractual rights similar to those of Hanes but without the $20,000 limit on
his fee.(204) Ray maintained that these agreements put Hanes and Foreman in
conflict with his best interests as their client.
A review by the committee of the sworn testimony given in Ray v. Foreman and Ray
v. Rose indicated that Ray was an intelligent party to the literary contracts.
In an interview with the committee, Hanes said the original and primary reason
for entering into the contracts was to assure enough money to finance Ray's
defense. (205) Ray maintained that Foreman was initially critical of the Hanes
contract, and he then broke his word to him by entering into a similar literary
contract with Huie. (206) Foreman, on the other hand, contended that he entered
into the contract with Huie at Ray's request to secure funds to finance the
defense. (207) When questioned about the arguably unconscionable nature of his
fee arrangement with Ray, Foreman said that he took an assignment of all Ray's
interest in the literary contract, at Ray's behest, and held it in trust to
protect Ray from attachment, should Dr. King's widow successfully mount a civil
suit against him for the wrongful death of her husband. (208) After examining
Foreman's contracts with Ray, the committee rejected Foreman's contention that
he intended simply to hold Ray's proceeds in trust. The contracts indicated an
unconditional transfer of Ray's interest in the literary proceeds to the trust.
Nevertheless, Foreman testified that he saw nothing wrong with the contract or
with his fee of $165,000 plus expenses. (209)
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A further review of pertinent court documents indicated that the financial
interest of Huie and Foreman in the literary contract was not enhanced by Ray's
guilty plea. In Ray v. Rose, all of the contractual obligations were subjected
to judicial scrutiny. An examination of contracts between Huie and the
publishing houses that paid him to collect information and write about Ray
showed that the value of Ray's story depreciated markedly once the guilty plea
was entered, for it reduced public interest in the case. (210) This finding
supported Foreman's claim that his only concern in urging Ray's guilty plea was
saving his life and that the money he stood to gain from the literary contracts
did not color his professional judgment.
The committee's conclusions concerning the Hanes-Huie-Ray and Foreman-Huie-Ray
literary agreements were consistent with the findings in Ray v. Rose. In that
case, the court found there was no evidence whatsoever to support Ray's
allegation that the conflicts of interest with his attorneys caused him to plead
guilty involuntarily. (211) The court reached this conclusion despite its
finding that the fee arrangement originally negotiated by Hanes was in apparent
violation of the American Bar Association's code of professional responsibility
and its finding that Foreman's fee, had it been collectable, was
unreasonable.(212)
The committee found no evidence from its interviews, reviews of documents and
other investigative methods to support Ray's claim that the contractual
agreements resulted in prejudice to his defense. While a conflict of interest
did exist between Ray and his attorneys, it did not materially affect the
quality of the representation Ray received. In addition, Hanes had disclosed the
conflict to Ray, and Foreman warned Ray about such arrangements at the time he
was hired. Thus, Ray was both a voluntary and intelligent party to the
contracts.
(b) Foreman's failure to investigate the case
The committee reviewed, with the aid of the Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, the judicial interpretations of the phrase "effective
assistance of counsel," and applied these standards to the factual situation
giving rise to Ray's claim that the assistance of counsel in the King case was
ineffective.
Ray became dissatisfied with the representation of his first attorney, Arthur
Hanes, Sr., primarily as a result of the relationship Hanes had established with
author William Bradford Huie. (213) This dissatisfaction prompted Ray, through
the efforts of his brothers, Jerry and John Ray, to contact Texas trial attorney
Percy Foreman. On November 10, 1968, 2 days before Ray's scheduled trial,
Foreman replaced Hanes. (214) Foreman succeeded in postponing the trial until
March 3, 1969, to prepare a defense for Ray. (215)
Ray alleged that Foreman's investigation was deficient and that he was
consequently deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. (216)
The committee examined the merits of this allegation. As with the conflict of
interest issue, the committee, referred to the court documents filed in Ray v.
Rose and Ray v. Foreman. In addition, the committee interviewed Ray's defense
attorneys, including Foreman, and investigators who were in their employ.
Foreman's investigation was exam-
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ined in light of the legal standard required of counsel in a criminal case to
determine if he was prepared to take the Ray case to trial.
Foreman maintained that from the time he entered the case until the March 10,
1969, guilty plea, he devoted 80 to 90 percent of his time to Ray's defense.
(217) He estimated that he spent between 30 and 75 hours in interviews with Ray.
(218) He also said that he used eight senior law students from Memphis State
University as investigators.(219) Foreman, however, was vague about the duties
of these students, (220) as well as other aspects of his investigation. He
apparently did speak to Huie, Attorney Arthur Hanes, Sr, Hanes' investigator
Renfro Hayes, and some potential witnesses. (221) After a full review, however,
the committee concluded that Foreman did not conduct a thorough and independent
investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr, on behalf of Ray.
Foreman was unable to provide a list of witnesses he interviewed, (222) but the
committee was able to conclude that many potential witnesses were never
interviewed by Foreman or his associates. Stanton did not complete a canvass of
witnesses by the time of the guilty plea,(223) and Foreman's student
investigators apparently never conducted a single interview. (224) In fact, one
of the student investigators interviewed by the committee indicated that the
students never did any investigating for Foreman. (225)
The committee's review of Shelby County jail logs contradicted Foreman's claim
of 30 to 75 hours of consultations with Ray.(226) These hourly activity logs
kept by Ray's jailers indicated that Foreman visited with Ray approximately 20
hours from the time he entered the case in November 1968 until the March 10,
1969, guilty plea.(227) According to the logs, Foreman spent an inordinately
small amount of time with his client for a case of such magnitude.
Foreman differed with the findings of the committee's review, and the committee
found a possible explanation for the discrepancy: Security slackened as time
progressed, and less accurate records may have been kept on Ray after initial
interest in his case diminished. (228) Ray's recollection of the time Foreman
spent with him, however, was consistent with the hours shown in the jail logs.
(229)
Additionally, Arthur Hanes, Sr. told the committee that he attempted to make his
files on Ray's case available to Foreman, but Foreman only used a few of them.
Hanes also noted that Foreman never fully questioned him about his personal
knowledge of the case, even though Hanes had offered to help. (230)
Although Foreman may be faulted for not conducting a more thorough independent
inquiry before he advised Ray to plead guilty, he did have at his disposal the
results of investigations by William Bradford Huie, Arthur Hanes, Sr. and Renfro
Hayes, as well as those of an investigation conducted by the Shelby County
Public Defender's Office. The scope of the combined defense investigations was
substantial,(231) the public defender's probably being the most comprehensive.
Three investigators were assigned to the case and worked closely with Foreman.
They interviewed numerous witnesses and followed up investigative leads,(232)
and they retraced the investigation done for Arthur Hanes, St. by Renfro Hayes.
(Much of that work was later
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found to be unreliable.)(233) The product of the public defender's work in Ray's
defense filled between 10 and 12 files.(234)
The defense team uncovered and considered weaknesses in the State's case, (235)
but when Foreman and co-counsels Hugh Stanton, Sr. and Hugh Stanton, Jr.
discussed the evidence against Ray, they decided, even with the weaknesses, that
the Government's case could not be beaten.(236) Despite Ray's protestations, the
committee concluded that his decision to plead guilty was based primarily upon
Foreman's recitation of the State's case against him. (237)
Ray was unable to demonstrate any actual prejudice to his case, and the
committee believed that the level of representation Ray received from his
attorneys, including Foreman, satisfied the standard established to measure
effective assistance of counsel in the sixth circuit in 1968.
(c) Coercion by Foreman and the Federal Government
In his effort to repudiate his guilty plea, Ray maintained he had entered it
against his will, under pressure from Foreman who misrepresented the facts to
him and gave him bad advice. (238) While only Ray and Foreman were present at
conversations out of which the plea arose, rendering much of what Ray alleged
unverifiable, the committee was able to establish certain facts from the record.
On February 13, 1969, Foreman told Ray in a letter that if the case went to
trial, there was a 100-percent chance he would be found guilty and a 99-percent
chance he would get the death penalty. Foreman commented that it would be "one
of the great accomplishments" of his career if he could save Ray's life with a
negotiated plea. (239) Then, in a letter prepared by Foreman for Ray's signature
and dated February 18, 1969, Ray authorized Foreman to negotiate a guilty plea
for a term of years. It was stated in this letter that Foreman and Ray agreed it
would be impossible to dispute certain incriminating evidence and that they
believed a trial ending in a guilty verdict would result in a 99-year sentence
or the electric chair.
In its review of the district court's evidentiary hearing on Ray's petition for
habeas corpus relief, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the lower
court's reasons for its finding that Foreman had not induced the guilty plea.
(241)
The court found that most of Ray's allegations regarding Foreman's inducement of
the guilty plea were not supported by the proof. Specifically, the court found
that Foreman did not advise Ray, even if innocent, to plead guilty; that Foreman
suggested to Ray that he would be better off financially. with a guilty plea,
but that this statement did not influence Ray in his decision; that Foreman did
not advise Ray to plead guilty because he would be pardoned by John J. Hooker,
Jr., who would be the next Governor of Tennessee; and that Foreman did not
attempt to persuade Ray to plead guilty by telling him either that the
prosecution was prepared to bribe a key witness against Ray, or that Foreman
would exercise less than his best efforts if Ray insisted on a trial, or that
Judge Battle would not allow him to change attorneys and that Foreman would not
withdraw.
The committee found no evidence that would warrant a different judgment.
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At his March 10, 1969, hearing, Ray answered questions put to him by Judge
Battle, not as an intimidated man, but as a defendant convinced that he could
not withstand the State's case against him. Ray indicated at the hearing that
"no one in any way" pressured him to plead guilty. (242) As for his quick
repudiation of that plea, the committee found this to be consistent with Ray's
pattern of behavior. It noted that in 1959, shortly after he was arrested for
robbing a supermarket, Ray made a statement to police admitting the crime. At
the trial, however, Ray reversed his position, charging that his confession had
been coerced by police brutality.
Ray also claimed that part of the coercion to gain his guilty plea was the
"brutal" conditions in the Shelby County jail during his pretrial incarceration,
which had an ill effect on his physical condition. (244)
In its investigation of conditions at the jail, the committee determined that
extraordinary measures were taken to safeguard Ray, as a result of the notoriety
of the case. The precautions included: An entire cellblock to house Ray alone;
steel doors on the entrances to the cellblock; steel plate covers on all the
windows in the cellblock; two guards to watch Ray on each of three daily shifts;
two closed-circuit television cameras to monitor the cellblock; constant
illumination of the cellblock; special food selection; microphone surveillance
within the cellblock.
The committee determined that Dr. McCarthy DeMere was the person best qualified
to comment on Ray's physical condition during his incarceration at the Shelby
County jail and the possible effect of the special precautions. DeMere served as
Ray's physician from the time of his return to Memphis from England on July 19,
1968, until he was taken to the Tennessee State Penitentiary following his
guilty plea. DeMere testified on Ray's health and conditions of confinement at a
1974 evidentiary hearing on Ray's petition for habeas corpus relief,(246) in an
interview with the committee (247) and in a committee public hearing. (248)
DeMere said Ray was in good health when he arrived and that it remained
excellent during his stay at the jail. In fact, DeMere told the committee, Ray
gained weight while he was in the jail. Although Ray complained at first to
DeMere about the lights in his cell, he never complained of losing sleep. The
only medical complaints he made during his stay in the Shelby County jail
concerned occasional headaches and nosebleeds.
The facilities that Ray occupied were comparable to a good motel suite and
compared favorably to a first-grade suite in an ordinary hospital, according to
DeMere. Additionally, DeMere told the committee he never saw Ray depressed and
that he never exhibited any nervous tension. DeMere concluded that Ray was in
better health when he left the Shelby County jail than when he entered it.
Ray argued that another aspect of the coercion was harassment of his family by
the Federal Government and Foreman to get him to plead guilty. He charged
specifically:
That the FBI threatened to have his father arrested and returned to a prison he
had escaped from 40 years earlier; (249)
That the FBI burglarized the home of his sister, Carol Pepper; (250)
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That his brother, John Ray, had been sentenced to 18 years for bank robbery, an
excessive sentence compared to those of his codefendants; (251)
That Foreman told him that his brother, Jerry Ray, would be arrested and charged
with conspiracy in the assassination if Ray did not plead guilty;(252) and
That Foreman tried to induce members of Ray's family to convince him he should
plead guilty. (253)
The committee explored Ray's allegations concerning the FBI and foreman. This
task was complicated because Ray's word and that of members of his family
provided the only support for his allegations. Given their probable bias, the
committee was reluctant to accept such evidence without corroboration.
The committee found no independent evidence to support Ray's contention that the
FBI burglarized his sister's house. The committee also determined that John Ray
had been incarcerated on the bank charge almost 1 1/2 years after James entered
his guilty plea.(254) Rays brother, Jerry, was the original source of the story
that the FBI threatened to rejail their father, and the committee was unable to
substantiate this story.
Ray's allegations concerning Foreman were equally difficult to confirm. During
an interview with the committee at the Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary,
Petros, Tenn., Ray admitted that Foreman at no time said that the FBI had
informed him of Jerry's imminent arrest, but Foreman had alluded to the
possibility that he might be picked up. (255) No independent evidence was found
to support the family's claim that Foreman tried to force them to induce Ray's
plea.
The committee could not find substantiation for any of Ray's charges that his
guilty plea was coerced--specifically, that his plea was induced by Foreman,
that he was subjected to brutal conditions at the Shelby County jail, that his
physical condition was permitted to deteriorate or that members of his family
were pressured and harassed.
(d) Ray's belief a guilty plea would not preclude a new trial
Statements made by Ray both before and after his guilty plea raised questions
about his understanding of the plea's finality. In an interview with the
committee, Ray said his main purpose in entering the guilty plea was to get rid
of Foreman. (256) He looked upon the plea as a technicality, a way out of jail
in Memphis. (257) According to Ray, the guilty plea served as a convenient,
harmless alternative to going to 'trial with Foreman, whom he no longer
trusted;(258) going to trial with the public defender, whom he felt had neither
the skill nor the resources to handle this major case;(259) and going to trial
unrepresented. (260)
Ray's background strongly indicated that he knew that the guilty plea would
effectively extinguish all of his legal remedies. First, he had previous
experience with the appellate court system, as a result of his unsuccessful
appeal of a 1959 robbery conviction. (261) In addition, he was fully apprised of
the consequences of his guilty plea during the March 10, 1969, proceedings.
The committee believed, therefore, that Ray's plea was knowing, intelligent and
voluntary and that constitutional requirements were satisfied. The committee
further concluded that the plea was a significant indication of Ray's guilt in
the assassination of Dr. King.
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(blank page)
The Committee Believes, That there is a likelihood of Conspiracy in MLK
Assassination
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B. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASTS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT
JAMES EARL RAY ASSASSINATED DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AS A
RESULT OF A CONSPIRACY
As noted, the committee concluded that James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr.
King. Other aspects of the. assassination remained to be examined. What was
Ray's motive ? Was he assisted in any way? Was there a conspiracy involved in
Dr. King's death?
Several facts conditioned the thinking of law enforcement officials and the
American public since the day of the assassination: Dr. King was an important
leader of the civil rights movement; he was shot down in a southern city by a
single shot from a high-powered rifle in the midst of a series of turbulent
civil rights demonstrations; only one assailant was seen fleeing the scene. To
most, there would seem to be reason to believe, therefore, that a lone assassin,
acting out of racial animosity, committed the assassination.
1. THE FBI INVESTIGATION
Indeed, as the FBI's investigation in 1908 progressed after that tragic day in
April, the theory that Ray was a lone, racially motivated assassin gained
plausibility. With the identification of Ray as the probable assassin, an
extensive background investigation began. Missouri State Penitentiary inmates
provided evidence indicating his distaste for association with Black inmates.
Further evidence of racial incidents was developed in California and Mexico that
reflected both a volatile temper and a deep-seated racial prejudice. Finally, in
early interviews with the FBI, members of Ray's family---and particularly his
brothers--exhibited strong strains of racism. Although he held open the
possibility of conspiracy. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's views had become clear
by June 20, when he wrote a memorandum summarizing a discussion with Attorney
General Ramsey Clark:
I said I think Ray is a racist and detested Negroes and Martin Luther King and
there is indication that prior to the Memphis situation, lie had information
about King speaking in other towns and then picked out Memphis. (1)
This view of the assassination is reflected in the work of some prominent
authors who have written on the subject. (2) In addition, committee interviews
with FBI and Justice Department officials involved in the original investigation
indicated a general consensus that Ray was a loner who was motivated in the
assassination primarily by racial hatred. Finally, while a 1977 Justice
Department Task Force proposed varying interpretations of Ray's ultimate
motivation;(3)1 it, too, agreed that he acted alone in the assassination.
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The committee recognized that despite the results of earlier investigations, a
respectable body of public opinion supported the theory that the King
assassination was the product of a conspiracy. In addition, the committee was
faced with a variety of well-publicized conspiracy allegations, most based on
speculation and not rounded on fact, and many of them inconsistent with one
another.
2. THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
The committee approached the issue of conspiracy with A range of investigative
techniques. Where applicable, the committee relied on the skills of scientific
experts,(4) retaining panels in the fields of forensic pathology, firearms,
fingerprint analysis, handwriting analysis and polygraphy; it also contracted
with an engineering firm for a survey of the assassination scene. Finally, the
committee undertook an extensive program of file reviews, field interviews,
depositions and hearings. Where necessary, immunity grants were employed to
compel the testimony of witnesses who claimed their privilege against
self-incrimination.
(a) Transactional analysis
A major undertaking in the field investigation was an examination of Ray's known
transactions during the 14 months from his escape from the Missouri State
Penitentiary in April 1967 to his arrest in London in June 1968. The committee
closely examined each transaction for any indication that might lead to a
finding of conspiracy on April 4, 1968. The committee traced every step of Ray's
travels after his escape--to suburban Chicago, where he worked as a dishwasher;
to the area of St. Louis, Mo., home of his brother, John Larry Ray; to Montreal
and to a resort in the Laurentian Mountains, where he vacationed; to Birmingham,
Ala., where he purchased an automobile; to Mexico and to Los Angeles, where he
lived for 4 months until March 1968, except for a brief trip to New Orleans in
December; and finally on his circuitous trip eastward, in mid-March 1968, a trip
that ended with the assassination in Memphis and Ray's flight to Europe via
Canada.
(b) Ray's associates examined
The committee conducted a similar examination of Ray's known or alleged
associates, concentrating on those with whom he was actually or reportedly in
contact during the 14-month period. They included members of his family,
especially his two brothers, John and Jerry: the mysterious Raoul, Ray's alleged
criminal associate; Char]es and Rita Stein and Marie Martin, Ray's acquaintances
in California and several individuals alleged to have been associated with Ray.
In addition to closely examining Ray and his associates in an effort to find
indications of conspiracy, the committee considered a variety of conspiracy
leads to see if any could be independently established as valid or connected to
Ray. The committee also investigated a variety of extremist organizations,
including the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutemen, to determine if they were involved
in the assassination or linked to Ray. Finally, the committee examined more than
20 specific conspiracy theories or allegations. Some were significant and
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received close attention; the committee looked at others, however, that could
be, and were, discredited by a routine check of facts.
By and large, the committee's investigation of suspect organizations and its
exhaustive check of the specific theories and miscellaneous allegations produced
negative results. In many cases these results were, in light of the mutually
exclusive character of the allegations, predictable. The committee was
satisfied, however, that its effort was not wasted, for it provided a sound
evidentiary basis for settling a variety of long-lingering questions and
eliminating deep concerns. 2
3. INVESTIGATION OF RAY'S MOTIVE
Motive is, of course, an integral element of any murder. Its significance is
readily apparent in an examination of criminal trials, where the absence of
convincing evidence of motive will often lead to an acquittal. Such evidence is
not, at least legally, a necessary element of the prosecutor's proof.
Nevertheless, many juries are simply unwilling to convict a defendant for such a
crime without first receiving a satisfactory explanation to the question, "Why?"
In addition, the question of motive is intertwined in the issue of conspiracy.
Several different, yet complementary, motives, if established, could be
consistent with a single assassin theory. If, for example, Ray were found to
possess a strain of virulent racism, a lone assassin theory would be viable.
Similarly, if it was established that Ray were driven by a psychological need
for recognition in the criminal community, his involvement in a notorious crime
such as the assassination, without the help or urging of others, would likewise
be understandable. Nevertheless, to the extent that a theory tied to Ray's
racism or some other motive did not provide a satisfactory rationale, other
explanations had to be sought. And with each additional explanation, its
consistency with a lone assassin theory had to be tested anew.
In its examination of the question of motive, the committee was aware that its
ability ultimately to resolve this issue was necessarily limited. Ray
consistently denied his involvement in Dr. King's murder. The committee,
therefore, did not have access to the most probative evidence--Ray's own
explanation for his conduct. In the absence of a confession, the committee was
forced to rely on the testimony of others and on an analysis of Roy's conduct.
This evidence was valuable, but it was unsatisfactory for the purpose of
understanding the complexities of Ray's psyche, which might lead to firm
conclusions on the issue of motive.
(a) Ray's racial attitudes examined
The committee's investigation of Roy's racial attitudes was extensive, in
keeping with the significance of the issue. Ray, several family members, and a
large number of Ray's associates were questioned on the subject. An effort was
also made to explore the significance of certain alleged incidents in his past
.that have been identified as showing strong racial animosity.
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It had been reported, for example, that while at Missouri State Penitentiary,
Ray exhibited extreme hatred for Black prisoners and for Martin Luther King as
well. (5) To verify this allegation, the committee reviewed some 70 FBI inmate
interviews, compiling a smaller list of inmates who had worked with Ray, celled
near or with him, or who professed knowledge of his personal life and habits.
The committee then interviewed approximately 30 prison associates of Ray.(6)
While some recalled that Ray had demonstrated anti-Black feelings, the majority
said he was not a racist. On balance, therefore, the committee viewed the inmate
testimony as essentially inconclusive. It could not be relied on as proof that
Ray harbored the kind of deep-seated, racial animosity that might, on its own,
trigger the assassination of Dr. King.
The committee also closely examined the facts surrounding two incidents with
alleged racial overtones that occurred within a year before the assassination.
They occurred in Canada and Mexico. William Bradford Huie, author of "He Slew
the Dreamer," had written that a female companion of Ray in Canada in the summer
of 1967 told him that Ray spoke disparagingly of Blacks during a dinner
conversation. According to Huie, she said:
I can't remember how the subject came up. But he said something like, "You got
to live near niggers to know 'em." He meant that he had no patience with the
racial views of people like me who don't "know niggers" and that all people who
"know niggers" hate them. (7)
Despite the assistance of the Canadian authorities, the woman, a Canadian
citizen living in Canada in 1978, declined to be interviewed, so the committee
was able only to review the files of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
which were attained by committee subpena from local authorities. During her RCMP
interview, the woman said Ray never indicated any hatred of Blacks and never
mentioned Dr. King in her presence. Once more, therefore, the committee's
evidence tended to pull in opposite directions.
The second incident that had been cited to show Ray's racism occurred when he
was in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in October 1967. Manuela Aguirre Medrano who,
using the professional name of Irma Morales, worked at a brothel named the Casa
Susana, allegedly told in 1968 of an incident involving Ray, or "Galt," as he
was calling himself at the time. Galt reportedly arrived at the Casa-Susana
about 9 p.m. on a Sunday. He and Morales drank together. At a nearby table,
there was a. group that included four Blacks, sailors who worked on a private
yacht. Morales said Galt became angered at the Blacks, one or more of whom were
laughing noisily. He told Morales he hated Blacks, and he-went over to their
table and insulted one of them. Then, he went to his car, returned and stopped
to berate the Blacks again. When he got back to his own table, he asked Morales
to feel his pocket. She noted he was carrying a pistol. Galt said he intended to
kill the Blacks. When one of them came over to Galt's table to try to make
peace, Gait muttered another insult. When the Blacks left, Galt appeared to want
to go after them, but Morales told him it was about time for the police to pay a
10 p.m. visit. Galt said he wanted nothing to do with the
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police. (8) This incident had since been reported in the writings of popular
authors(9) and was often cited as support for the proposition that Ray harbored
racial hatred toward Blacks.
When investigated by the committee, the evidence was contradictor With the
assistance of the Mexican authorities, the committee reinterviewed Morales in
Puerto Vallarta. (10) Her recollection of her association with Ray and of her
period of employment at the Casa. Susana seemed clear and exact; further, her
memory on many subjects was corroborated by other evidence and testimony taken
by the committee. Yet her description of the alleged incident varied
significantly from the published reports.
Morales explained that she and "Gait" had been seated in the club when a Black
sailor from a nearby table of both Black and white sailors touched her as he was
attempting to maneuver past them. She recalled thinking that the sailor was
drunk, causing him to stumble as he passed her. He reached out and touched her,
she explained, in an effort to break his fall. Morales added that the sailor was
escorted out by another sailor and that Gait did become angry. Nevertheless, it
was her opinion that Galt's anger was prompted by the sailor touching her, and
not because of his race. She said further that Ray never mentioned his feelings
about Blacks to her. Indeed, she said that conversation had been quite limited
because of the language barrier.
The committee found that Morales was a reliable witness on this point, who was
certain of her recollections of the Casa Susana incident. It would appear,
therefore, that the racial overtones of this incident were seriously distorted,
both in the original reports and in subsequent popularized versions of the
event. (11)
While two of the most widely circulated stories of Ray's racism did not
withstand careful scrutiny, the committee noted that a number of Ray's reported
actions or statements did tend to manifest racist attitudes. In sworn testimony
before the committee, Alexander Anthony Eist, a former member of Scotland Yard
who had extensive contact with Ray during the first hours of his confinement in
London, as well as during trips between prison and the extradition hearings,
recalled specific examples of anti-Black sentiments expressed by Ray. (12) 3 In
addition, Say's interests in emigration to the white supremist nations of
Rhodesia and South Africa, while probably just an effort to reach a country
where English was spoken and where there might be sympathy for the
assassination, could also be evidence of Ray's support of the general notion of
white supremacy. (13)
The committee saw a need to scrutinize closely the evidence bearing on Ray's
racial attitudes. In light of the contradictory evidence, the committee was
unwilling to conclude that deepseated hatred of Blacks
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was the sole or even the primary motivating factor in Ray's decision to murder
Dr. King. While the committee was satisfied that Ray's lack of sympathy toward
Blacks and the civil rights movement permitted him to undertake the
assassination, it was equally convinced that the murder did not stem from racism
alone.
(b) Ego gratification as a motive
The committee also examined the possibility that Ray assassinated Dr. King in an
effort to gain recognition and gratification of his ego.4 This psychological
motive had chiefly been promoted by Huie in his book "He Slew the Dreamer." (15)
Huie supported this theory, in part, through an examination of Ray's activities
in California in early 1968, prior to the assassination. He noted Ray's
inability to secure legitimate employment; Rays dancing lessons, indicative of a
"fantasy" of "doing the rhumba in some South American country from which he
could never be extradited;"(16) and his consultation of "no fewer than eight
different psychiatrists, hypnotists, and scientologists, trying to find relief
from his depressions and feelings of inadequacy." (17) Huie concluded:
Ray didn't want to remain a nobody among prisoners all his life. Ray wanted to
make the "Top Ten" * * * Ray wanted to see his own face in full color on his
favorite TV show. Ray thought that attention and recognition would relieve his
feelings of inadequacy and make him feel like somebody. (18)
That the psychological motive could not be summarily dismissed was also
evidenced by the testimony of Eist. Eist told the committee that during
discussions with Ray pending his extradition, he had been able to establish a
rapport with Ray and that Ray had expressed a feeling of pride for his act. In
particular, Eist recalled Ray's interest in the publicity he would receive in
the news media:
* * * He was continually asking me how could he hit the headlines in the
newspapers, and he kept wanting news of publicity.
* * * * * * *
* * * In fact, he said to me, when I told him it hadn't really made too much of
an impact in the British press, that is, as far as he was concerned, he was
telling me, you haven't seen anything yet. I will be in the headlines one of
these days. He was quite proud of the fact that he was going to make the
headlines. (19)
The committee also interviewed a former inmate associate of Ray, George Ben
Edmondson, who characterized Ray as a man in need of substantial egotistical
fulfillment and who recalled speculation among
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Missouri State penitentiary inmates that Ray killed Dr. King to gain a measure
of self-importance. (20)
Taken as a whole, however, the evidence that Ray was motivated in the
assassination by a pressing need for recognition was not substantial. Many of
Ray's activities in Los Angeles, including his purchase of dance lessons, his
enrollment in bartending school, and his employment of a professional
psychiatrist and a hypnotist, may have merely manifested an effort to attain
self-confidence. Similarly, the committee noted that there was an ego-satisfying
dimension to Ray's purchase of a late-model sports car and his reported practice
of regularly paying for drinks in a Los Angeles nightspot with $20 bills. (21)
To argue that Ray killed Dr. King to become somebody, however, necessarily must
assume that Ray expected to be identified. The credible evidence did not support
that possibility. While it has been argued that Ray dropped the bundle of
evidence outside Canipe's Amusement Co. to insure his identification as the
assassin, the committee rejected this theory. Investigation at the crime scene
revealed this at the time of the assassination at least 13 members of the
Memphis Police Department were at a fire station south of Bessie Brewer's
roominghouse on South Main Street.(22) Further, an official police car parked in
the fire station parking lot protruded onto the sidewalk on the east side of
South Main Street and would have been clearly visible to Ray as he fled south
from the roominghouse. The committee believed that Ray threw the bundle of
evidence down in a moment of panic, probably triggered by his seeing police
activity or the police vehicle. 5
In addition, Ray used two new aliases during the period immediately preceding
the assassination and went to a Los Angeles plastic surgeon, Both acts reflect a
concerted effort to avoid identification as the assassin. The committee was,
therefore, unwilling to conclude that Ray's participation in the assassination
resulted solely from a need for recognition and ego-fulfillment.
(c) The prospect of financial reward
Having found in neither race nor psychology adequate motivation for the
assassination, the committee considered a third possibility: financial reward.
The committee found substantial evidence that Ray might have been lured by the
prospect of money.
Once more, however, the evidence was not uncontroverted. First, while Ray had a
background of financially motivated crime, none of it involved physical
violence.(23) From his military discharge in 1948 to the King assassination 20
years later, Ray had spent 14 years in prison. In 1949, he had been convicted of
burglary in California and sentenced to 8 months. Returning to the Midwest after
serving that term, he was arrested for robbery in 1952 and served 2 years.
Shortly after his release, he was, in 1955, convicted for forging an endorsement
on a. money order and sentenced to 3 years at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary.
In 1959, he was arrested in the armed robbery of a St. Louis grocery store and
was sentenced to 20 years at the Missouri State Penitentiary under. the State's
habitual offender law. He was serving
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this term when he escaped from MSP, just short of a year before the
assassination.
Apart from Ray's criminal record, there was the question of Ray's general
character: Here the committee found significant, the opinions of Ray's brothers,
John and Jerry, both given at the time Ray was named in the King assassination
and in hearings before the committee.
In an interview with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch(24) the day following his
brother's 1968 arrest, John Ray speculated on the possible motive:
If my brother did kill King he did it for a lot of money--he never did anything
if it wasn't for money--and those who paid him wouldn't want him sitting in a
courtroom telling everything he knows.
In the committee's public hearings in November 1978, John Ray was asked if his
statement was accurately recorded He responded "I expect so?" (25)
Similar indications of Ray's willingness to commit crimes, and possibly the
assassination, for money were voiced by Ray's second brother, Jerry Ray, around
the time of the assassination. In a conversation with an acquaintance, Jerry's
general response to a question concerning his brother's involvement in the
assassination was:
This is his business. I didn't ask him. If I was in his position and had 18
years to serve and someone offered me a lot, of money to kill someone I didn't
like anyhow and get me out of the country, I'd do it. (26)
In other conversations with the same individual,(27) Jerry stated that his
brother had been paid a substantial sum for the assassination.6
Jerry Ray was questioned during public hearings concerning these statements.
While denying his brother's knowing involvement in a conspiracy, his comments
were illuminating to the search for Ray's motive:
It might have been true. I can't remember exactly what I said, but I have told
other people. I said if he done it there had to be a lot of money involved
because he wouldn't do it for hatred or just because he didn't like somebody,
because that, is not his line of work. (28)
In a subsequent portion of his testimony, Jerry Ray described his initial
feelings concerning the assassination:
* * * before I knew anything about the murder, you know, before it happened, my
kind of opinion was that he was involved some way; I didn't know if he was
unknowingly involved or knowingly involved, but I knew there had to be a lot of
money involved in it before he would get involved in anything like that. (29)
As in the earlier mentioned possibilities concerning motive, the evidence before
the committee was not without contradictions. Ray's par-
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ticipation in a London bank robbery shortly before his arrest (30) and his
impecunIous condition at the time of his arrest were strong indications that if
the assassination were financially motivated, he did not receive a payoff.
Further, despite a major effort by the committee, no evidence of a payoff was
uncovered. The committee noted, however, that contrary to popular impression,
contract killings are not generally paid for in advance. Ray's failure to
receive payment may have resulted from his panicky, unplanned flight abroad
following the assassination. It is also possible that his coconspirators welshed
on their payment to him.
Even though it could find no evidence of a payoff, the committee was convinced
by Ray's lifetime pattern of crime for profit and by testimony about his general
character that one explanation for the assassination probably lay in Ray's
expectation of financial reward. 7
(d) Conclusion on motive
In conclusion, the committee's investigation of Ray's motive revealed that while
Ray's general lack of sympathy for Blacks or the civil rights movement would
have allowed him to commit the assassination without qualms, his act did not
stem from racism alone. The committee was convinced that while Ray's decision to
assassinate Dr. King may have reflected a desire to participate in an important
crime, his predominant motive lay in an expectation of monetary gain. This
conclusion necessarily raised the possibility of conspiracy?8
4. GENERAL INDICATIONS OF CONSPIRACY
In its investigation of Ray's transactions and associates over the 14 months
subsequent to his escape from Missouri State Penitentiary, the committee looked
for associates during this period who had not previously been connected to Ray;
activities or transactions with these associates of a criminal nature or that
might indicate complicity in the assassination itself; and activities and
transactions with known associates that had not been previously known or fully
understood and that might have led to the assassination.
As a fugitive, Ray was on the move in 1967-68; he lived in secondrate motels and
cheap roominghouses. During much of the period, he was observed to be a man
alone, a man without friends or lasting associates. In Mexico, his companions
were prostitutes and bartenders.(31) In California, he was a regular visitor at
the Sultan Room of the St. Francis Hotel, but he was normally alone unless
conversing with employees of the bar. (32) While some of Ray's activities, such
as his enrollment in dancing and bartending school in Los Angeles, brought him
into regular contact with others, a close investigation of these activities
revealed that significant friendships or associations never developed.(33) A
large portion of the committee's evidence, therefore, provided no signs of
association or of criminal involvement
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with individuals beyond the innocent relationships identified in previous
investigations of the assassination.
(a) Transactions as evidence of associations
Despite this general picture of a lonely, uninvolved individual, the committee's
investigation of three separate transactions provided definite evidence of
association in some instances criminal--with other individuals. They were Ray's
activities in California on behalf of the American Independent Party; his brief,
but possibly sinister, trip to New Orleans in December 1967; and his purchase of
the murder weapon in Birmingham, Ala., at the end of March 1968. Much of the
evidence of these transactions did not suggest a direct link to the
assassination. It did convince the committee, however, that the generally
accepted image of Ray wandering aimlessly around the country until he reached a
lonely decision to assassinate Dr. King was not a complete picture.
Ray's rather abrupt involvement with recruiting activity on behalf of the
American Independent Party in California, while not criminal in nature, strongly
suggested association with others.9 Ray's life to this point had been, from all
known indicators, apolitical. He was not a "joiner" or a "grassroots" volunteer.
In addition, as a convicted felon and escaped convict, he could not expect to
vote or to achieve a paid position in the California AlP. His recruitment of
three individuals (34) to register in support of Governor Wallace of Alabama and
the AIP, therefore, stood in stark contrast to a prior life of political
inactivity. Further, Charles Stein, one of the three individuals recruited by
Ray, recalled that Ray appeared familiar with the AIP headquarters, as well as
with the registering procedures, (35) thus suggesting additional campaign
activity not disclosed during the investigation. Standing alone, Ray's AIP
activity raised the definite possibility of association with individuals
unidentified during earlier investigations.
Of similar interest was the evidence on Ray's abrupt trip to New Orleans in
December 1967. Ray's partner on the trip was California resident Charles
Stein.10 Stein was going to New Orleans to pick up his sister's children. The
purpose of Ray's trip could not be determined, although the committee found it
likely that Ray met secretly with another associate in New Orleans. The
secretive nature of that meeting was significant, if not sinister. Stein was
certain when he testified before the committee in executive session (37) that
Ray had his own reason for the cross-country drive. He recalled that Ray told
him about a place where he was to meet an associate or associates, and he said
that once or twice en route to New Orleans, Ray stopped to make a telephone
call. Stein speculated that in one of the calls, Ray
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informed an associate of his arrival time. Further, Stein recounted how Ray told
him, after they had been in New Orleans for part of a day, that he had seen
Stein walking in the French Quarter with his son. Ray explained he had been
drinking. in a Canal Street bar at the time, and Stein figured Ray had been with
someone or else he would have called to him.
Stein also testified that Ray was ready to return to California the day after
they arrived in New Orleans. His testimony and the willingness of Ray, an
escaped prisoner, to drive several thousand miles, risking a random vehicle
check, were additional reliable indications that Ray's purpose in going to New
Orleans was to attend one brief but important meeting. (38)11
The committee discovered sound indications that Ray was not alone, or at least
not without someone to consult, when he purchased the murder weapon in
Birmingham on March 29-30, 1968. First, the fact that he bought one rifle on the
29th, then exchanged it for another--the murder weapon--on the 30th, indicated
the possibility of advice from an associate. In addition, Donald Wood, Jr., the
clerk at Aeromarine Supply Co. where the rifle purchase and exchange took place,
told the committee that while Ray was unaccompanied in his visits to the store,
Ray said he had been advised by someone that the first rifle, a .243 caliber
Remington, was not the one he wanted.(41) In an FBI interview days after the
assassination, Wood recalled that Ray said he had been talking to his brother.
(42) Ray told the committee he got his advice on the rifle purchase from Raoul.
(43) The committee's investigation, however, provided no concrete evidence of
the existence of a Raoul.12 The committee concluded that the circumstances
surrounding the rifle purchase constituted significant signs of unwitting aid,
if not knowing complicity, in the assassination itself. 13
A final indication of criminal association between Ray and others in the period
before and after the assassination arose from an analysis of Ray's spending
patterns.(44) The committee estimated that Ray spent approximately $9,000 during
his 14 months of freedom. That figure included $1,800 for lodging, $900 for food
and drink, $400 for gasoline and $5,700 for miscellaneous purchases--his cars,
dance lessons, airline tickets, camera equipment, clothing, the rifle and so on.
Except for 6 weeks as a dishwasher in a restaurant outside Chicago, for which he
earned $664.34. Ray was unemployed over the 14 months. The committee concluded
that the most likely source of his funding was criminal activity. In light of
Ray's record of criminal ventures in combination with others, the committee felt
that this criminal activity provided an additional indication of possible
involvement with others.
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Ray's explanation, which the committee rejected, was that he received a total of
$7,750 from Raoul for two smuggling ventures at the Canadian and Mexican borders
and for being available for future crimes, including the gunrunning operation
which, Ray claimed, was the reason he went to Memphis.
Thus, the committee's analysis of Ray's AIP recruiting in California, his abrupt
trip to New Orleans in December 1967, the Birmingham rifle purchase shortly
before the assassination, and his spending habits provided ample evidence, not
only of associates, but of criminal associations during the 14-month fugitive
period. What had to be determined, therefore, was whether these associations
could be linked to the assassination of Dr. King.
5. THE BROTHERS, JOHN AND JERRY RAY
The committee viewed the likelihood of a financial motive in the assassination
as one general indication of conspiracy. The finding, however, brought the
committee no closer to identifying Ray s accomplice(s). Similarly, while several
of Ray's activities suggested his preassassination involvement with others,
there was no immediate evidence of their identity. The committee's
investigation, therefore, necessarily focused on the assassin's known
associates, including his brothers, Gerald William Ray and John Larry Ray.
The committee's decision to direct its attention to the brothers reflected a
variety of considerations. Both had criminal backgrounds that included
financially motivated crime. (45) In addition, the committee was struck by the
substantial evidence turned up in the original investigation of Ray's contacts
with one or another of the brothers throughout the preassassination period. In
fact, the 1977 Justice Task Force criticized the FBI's original investigation
for failing to investigate adequately the brothers' possible involvement with
Ray both before and after the assassination. (46) Finally, on the assumption
that there was a conspiracy, Ray's persistent refusals to identify his
coconspirators in the years following the assassination would be most easily
understood if his evidence implicated family members.14
Jerry Ray was born July 16, 1935, in Bowling Green, Mo., the fourth of nine Ray
children and the third son. His criminal record shows convictions for grand
larceny in 1954 and armed robbery in 1956, for which he served prison terms. His
parole on the robbery conviction was to become final in August 1958, but he held
up a gas station before it did, and he was returned to Menard State Penitentiary
in Chester, Ill., where he served an additional 9 years. (48) Following his
release from Menard in 1960, he worked at odd jobs in St. Louis and Chicago. In
September 1964, he was hired as a night maintenance man at the Sportsman Country
Club in Northbrook, Ill., a job he held until the summer of 1968. (49)
John Ray was born February 14, 1933, in Alton, IlL His criminal record shows a
conviction in 1953 for motor vehicle theft, for which
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he was sentenced to 5 to 10 ears at Menard. (50) During the years following his
release from the penitentiary in February 1960, he worked as a bartender, as an
employee of the Greyhound bus depot in Chicago, and as a greenskeeper at the
White Pine Golf Course near Chicago.(51) In 1964 and 1965, he worked for brief
periods in Florida and in the Catskill Mountains of New York. He then traveled
to New York City, where he collected unemployment, and to the Chicago areas,
where he worked at various country clubs before his return to St. Louis in
October 1966. (52) John had no formal employment in 1967, although he testified
that he "believes" he was a painter then.(53) In January of 1968, he and his
sister Carol PeDper, opened and operated the Grapevine Tavern at 1982 Arsenal
Street in St. Louis.(54)
(a) Evidence of Ray's contact with his bothers, 1967-68
Since their first FBI interviews shortly after the assassination, Jerry and John
Ray attempted to minimize the extent of their contact with their brother during
the 14-rnonth period from his prison escape to his arrest in London. On April
19, 1968, (55) Jerry told the FBI he had last seen James in 1964, but over the
years he conceded this statement was false. Both Jerry(56) and James(57) told
the committee of at least three meetings following James' escape from Missouri
State Penitentiary. Two occurred while James was working at the Indian Trails
Restaurant in Winnetka, Ill., from May 3 to June 24, 1967; the third came in
August 1967 when James passed through Chicago on his way from Montreal to
Birmingham and gave Jerry his 1962 Plymouth.
Jerry Ray's testimony before the committee reflected at least "two or three"
telephone conversations, the last coming during James' December trip to New
Orleans:
The last time I talked to him was about four months, approximately four months
before King got killed, and I thought he was calling from Texas; but later he
told me it was New Mexico. * * * The call was under 3 minutes and just a
friendly talk, you know, asking how my old man was and asking about Carol and
John and everybody because I was the only contact he had with the whole
family.(58)
When he was interviewed by the FBI in April 1968, John Ray said he had last seen
James "2 to 4 years ago" during a visit to Missouri State penitentiary and that
prior to that, he had not seen his brother for some fifteen years.(59) Unlike
Jerry, John persistently adhered to his original claim. In fact, in testimony
before the committee, he insisted, as he had before, that he had been totally
unaware of his brother's escape from Missouri State Penitentiary until James was
named on April 19, 1968, as the suspected assassin of Dr. King.(60) James also
deemed to the committee that he was in contact with John following his prison
escape. (61)
Despite the testimony of the Ray brothers, the committee was convinced that
there was substiantially more contact among them than they were willing to
concede. First, the evidence indicated that the Ray brothers were close. Several
Missouri State Penitentiary inmates interviewed by the committee, when asked
about James' closest associates,
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could only recall that he often mentioned a brother. Some of them remembered
that he referred to his brother as a resident of St. Louis. (62) The committee
also interviewed inmate associates of Jerry and John. One who had known them
both, Harvey Lohmeyer, confirmed that the Ray family was close. (63) 15
The best evidence of the close relationship between the Ray brothers came from
John Ray himself, who was quoted in a June 9, 1968, article in the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch: (64)
John Ray said that he and another brother, Jerry, 32, Chicago, were the closest
to James Ray *** in the family. "James would do anything for us, and we for him.
But he wasn't particularly sociable with strangers," said Ray.
In his appearance before the committee, John Ray was asked about the quote in
the Post-Dispatch article:
Congressman FITHIAN. Then could you share the truth with the committee as to
whether or not that does reflect your feeling toward your brother in June of
1968?
RAY. I already answered yes to that. (65)
The committee took note of other factors that suggested the likelihood of
contacts between Ray and his two brothers. For example, Ray acknowledged he had
been in the St. Louis area, where John lived, twice soon after his prison
escape. The first visit occurred right after he broke out of prison in late
April or early May 1967;(66) the second was on a return trip after he quit his
job in Winnetka, Ill. Ray, in fact, told the committee the purpose for the
second visit was "to see some of my relatives down there," although he added, "I
never did see them." (67) Further, throughout his fugitive period--in locations
as varied as Montreal, Los Angeles and Birmingham--Ray talked of recent or
intended contact with a brother. Finally, the committee found significance in
the fact that James and John--both largely apolitical from all accounts and, as
convicted felons, unable to vote--began to campaign actively on behalf of the
American Independent Party's "Wallace for President" campaign at almost exactly
the same time. James, as noted, worked for the AlP in California, and John was
active in St. Louis, Mo., where his Grapevine Tavern served distribution point
for campaign literature.
The committee recognized that at the time of their initial interviews with
authorities, John and Jerry Ray could well have chosen to conceal contact with
their brother, even if innocent, in an attempt to protect him and avoid scrutiny
during the assassination investigation. Another explanation, however, one that
the committee deemed more credible, was that they were concerned with potential
criminal liability stemming from contact with their brother.
The committee found that the evidence established that John Ray had
foreknowledge of his brother's escape from Missouri State Pemtentiary. It was
equally apparent that Ray was assisted by both Jerry and John following his
escape, making them potentially responsible as accessories after the fact to
both James' escape and his interstate flight.
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Finally, the committee received substantial evidence indicating that James and
John were involved in the Alton bank robbery in East Alton, Ill., on July 13,
1967. It was also shown that Jerry Ray was aware of their particiation in this
robber and helped to distribute the proceeds of the crime to James during his
fugitive period.16 The evidence of Jerry Ray's actual involvement in that
robbery was, on balance, insubstantial.
(b) Missouri State penitentiary escape 17
James Earl Ray escaped from Missouri State penitentiary on April 23, 1967,
concealed in a box of bread in the back of a delivery truck. An investigation in
1967 concluded that Ray had escaped in a bread box, probably aided by at least
one fellow inmate who placed bread on top of him. (68) Nevertheless, Ray
asserted for years that he had escaped without assistance by scaling a prison
wall. (69) Finally, an interview with this committee in December 1977, Ray
confirmed the accuracy of the official version. He admitted he left the prison
in a delivery truck bound for a nearby prison farm and jumped out of the truck
as it slowed for an intersection. Ray stated further that, while he planned the
escape alone, he was assisted in executing the plan by two inmates. He refused
to identify them. (70)
Jerry Ray has, over the years, admitted meeting with James on at least three
occasions during the weeks immediately following his escape from Missouri State
penitentiary.(71) On the last occasion, moreover, Jerry shared a room with James
for one night in Chicago before putting his brother on a bus to Birmingham. (72)
His involvement in facilitating James' interstate flight, therefore, seemed
clear. John Ray, on the other hand, consistently maintained that he did not even
know of the escape until after the King assassination. The committee's
investigation, however, produced substantial evidence to contradict John's
assertion.
Certainly the strongest single piece of evidence before the committee indicating
John Ray's foreknowledge of his brother's escape plans was found in the Missouri
State Penitentiary visitor records.(73) These records indicated nine visits by
John during James' incarceration. The last four occurred during the year prior
to the escape on July 10, 1966, November 13, 1966, December 20. 1966, and April
22, 1967. The final visit was of particular interest to the committee since it
was made on the day before the escape. Given the relative sophistication of
James' escape plans and the need for inside assistance from fellow inmates to
cover him with bread and to load the box on the truck, the committee believed
that the escape had been planned by the time of John Ray's visit. It seemed
reasonable, therefore, to assume that a discussion of the break occurred during
their meeting. This assumption was supported, the committee found, by Ray's
admitted trip to St. Louis, John's home city, within a week of his escape.(74)
During his testimony before the committee, John Ray was asked about the visits
reflected in the prison records. His responses were
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inherently incredible, excellent examples of the obstructionist posture John Ray
assumed throughout the committee's investigation:
STAFF COUNSEL. I have at this time introduced into the record MLK exhibit F-634,
and I ask you whether this record accurately reflects the dates that you visited
your brother, James Earl Ray, while he was incarcerated at the Missouri State
Prison.
RAY. I could not remember any dates.
Chairman STOKES. Is the answer of the witness the fact
that he does not recall those visits?
RAY. No; I do not recall them.
Chairman STOKES Proceed * * *.
STAFF COUNSEL Mr. Ray, I am particularly concerned with the last visit that is
reflected on that record. That is the visit on April 22, 1967. That was the day
prior to the escape of your brother from Missouri State Prison. I ask you at
this time, do you have any recollection of visiting your brother James the day
preceding his escape from the State prison.
RAY. I do not have no recollection of that.
STAFF COUNSEL. Do you have any reason to offer this committee at this time as to
why this record before you would not be accurate?
RAY. I did not say it wasn't accurate. I just said I don't recall visiting that
certain day. (75).
John Ray subsequently offered one explanation for the April 22, 1967, entry on
the records:
* * * Jerry, my visiting pass, Jerry used it sometimes. I used it sometimes, and
a guy named John Gawron, I believe, used it sometimes. (76)
After investigation, the committee rejected this explanation. The committee
questioned both James and Jerry Ray about the possibility that someone posing as
John visited the prison on April 22, 1967. James indicated in an interview that
one of his brothers, and probably John, was the visitor:
John or Jerry, I'm not too positive now which one it was.
It was John. I'm not certain.(77) 18
Jerry Ray, when questioned on the same matter, did not recall using an ther's
pass, and he demed emphatically visiting James the day prior to his escape:
RAY. I positively didn't visit him. That is a positive.
STAFF COUNSEL. Do you know if your brother John visited him on that day?
RAY. I don't know if John did. I know definitely I didn't. (79)
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The committee found other evidence of John Ray's knowledge and participation in,
Ray's escape and subsequent flight. In a letter to author George McMillan on
March 5, 1973, John referred to the account of Jalnes' escape by Gerold Frank,
the author of "An American Death":
He [Frank] stated that Jimmy walked for days to get to St. Louis from Jefferson
City when he escaped, when actually he had a car, and I.D. waiting for him in
Jefferson City * * * He also made a phone car [sic] to a certain party in St.
Louis to come down, and fix his car. The person who went and help him, also is
doing time now in a Federal prison for a charge that I expect is a frameup. (80)
At the time he wrote the letter, John was serving time for a bank robbery
conviction that he claimed was an FBI frameup.19
John allegedly made a similar admission to a longtime criminal associate of the
Ray brothers, Walter Rife, who was incarcerated with him in Leavenworth during
the early 1970's. In an unsworn interview with the committee, Rife stated that
John told him that he had picked James up on a highway near Jefferson City
following the escape. (82) The committee, however, found Rife's credibility on
other matters highly suspect, and it gave little weight to this evidence.20
Further evidence of John's willing assistance to James' flight was found in the
fact that James left the Missouri State Penitentiary with a social security
number in the name of John L. Rayns, a number and alias previously used by John
Ray. (83) During a committee interview, James described the number as:
* * * one of my brother's old social security numbers, John L. Rayns, I believe
it was. I don't recall the social security number. I didn't have the card. I got
the number off him. We interchanged these numbers all the time. He used them. I
used them. So I used that social security number. (84)
John Ray was questioned on James' possession of his social security number:
Congressman FITHIAN. Now, my question is, did you, prior to James Earl Ray's
escape from Missouri State Penitentiary, furnish James either with your social
security card or your social security number?
RAY. Well, it is possible. Sometime I might have gave him number. But it is also
possible he might have had the number because he remembered probably that
number. I did not give him no social security card. I did not have one. (85)
The evidence before the committee indicated John Ray had foreknowledge of his
brother's prison escape. The evidence included: the Missouri State Penitentiary
visitor records; the testimony of James that a brother, he believed John, was
his visitor; John's letter to author George McMillan; John's alleged admission
to Walter Rife;
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James' admitted possession of John's old social security number at the time of
his escape; and James' trip to the St. Louis area shortly after the escape.
John's own denials-in particular, his claim that he first learned of the escape
only when James had been named in the assassination--
served to add to the force of the evidence.21 The committee found, therefore,
that John Ray was involved with his brother James in the escape from Missouri
State Penitentiary.
(c) The Alton bank robbery
The committee devoted considerable effort to an investigation of Ray's finances
following his escape from Missouri State Penitentiary on the theory that Ray's
method of financing himself bore on the assassination. Indeed, the committee
considered, but ultimately rejected, the theory that his escape and travels were
part of a single scheme that culminated in the assassination. The committee also
considered a variety of alternative sources of finances: payments from time to
time from Raoul, as Ray claimed; from narcotic trafficking at Missouri State
Penitentiary and during his flight; and from the robbery of the Bank of Alton,
Alton, Ill., on July 13, 1967. 22
As has been noted, the committee, after due deliberation, rejected Ray's Raoul
story. Further, the committee found it highly unlikely that Ray left Missouri
State Penitentiary with a substantial amount of money. Inmates interviewed by
the committee characterized him as a "second-rate hustler" who engaged in
bookmaking, narcotics and the smuggling of contraband, but who operated on a
relatively small scale.(86) The committee also found it improbable that Ray
would have engaged in the menial labor of dishwashing, had he possessed a
significant sum of money at the time of his escape.
The committee received evidence supporting the possibility that Ray trafficked
in marihuana during his stays in Mexico and California. 23 In addition to an
assertion in Huie's "He Slew the Dreamer" that Ray left Mexico with "his Mustang
loaded with marihuana," (89) the committee identified witnesses in both Mexico
and California who confirmed Ray's interest in, and occasional use of,
marihuana. (90) One California witness, Ronald Dennino, provided sworn testimony
indicating Ray's possession, on at least one occasion, of a kilo of
marihuana.(91) Nevertheless, Dennino's evidence was hearsay, and when his
alleged source of information, Marie Martin, was questioned--also under
oath--she denied knowledge of Ray's trafficking in substantial amounts of
marihuana. (92)
The committee was unable to locate evidence, beyond Dennino's testimony,
indicating that Ray received substantial income from dealings
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in marihuana. Thus, while the committee did not foreclose the possibility that
Ray supplemented his income through small-scale marihuana trafficking, there was
no evidence that it constituted a primary source of income during his fugitive
period.
On the other hand, the committee did obtain and analyze a substantial amount of
evidence establishing the likelihood that James and John Ray robbed the Alton
bank and that Jerry Ray, while probably not a participant in the robbery, was
aware of his brothers' involvement and helped distribute funds from the robbery
to James. The committee, therefore, concluded that the Alton bank robbery was
the most likely explanation for Ray's financial independence during his fugitive
period.
The Alton bank was held up by two masked gunmen at approximately 1:30 p.m. on
July 13, 1967. One was described as a middle-aged white male, 5 feet 10 inches
tall, 150 to 160 pounds; the other, a middle-aged white male, 5 feet 8 inches,
170 to 180 pounds. One was armed with a handgun, the other with a shotgun; both
wore stocking masks and hats. Once inside the bank, the one with the shotgun
stood guard, while the other collected $27,230 from behind the teller's counter.
The two men then left the bank and walked westward to a nearby church parking
lot. No further direct evidence was developed in the FBI's investigation of the
robbery or in this committee's reexamination of the crime bearing on the manner,
or the direction, of the robbers' flight from the immediate vicinity of the
bank. At the time of the committee's investigation, none of the stolen money had
been recovered. (93)
The committee first examined eyewitness and physical evidence bearing on the
robbery. Because the bank robbers wore stocking masks, eyewitness descriptions
were imprecise. Nevertheless, none of those that were given would eliminate the
Ray brothers as suspects.24 Moreover, the facts developed in the FBI's
investigation--in particular, the apparent route of flight taken after the crime
and the location of discarded evidence--provided some evidence of the
involvement of James Earl Ray.
Ray had been born in Alton on March 10, 1928. After spending his early childhood
elsewhere, he returned to Alton at the age of 16, joined a grandmother who ran a
local roominghouse, and spent considerable time with his uncle, William Mayer,
still a resident of the city in 1978.(94) While much of his subsequent life was
spent either in the military or in jail, Ray had returned to Alton for periods
in 1948 and again in 1954. On August 21, 1959, he and an accomplice robbed an
Alton supermarket of about $2,000.25 Against this background, Ray's familiarity
with the city of Alton was self-evident, the committee determined.
In the FBI's investigation of the Alton bank robbery, it was estab lished that
the shotgun and partially burned clothes used during the
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robbery were discarded in a wooded area near the National Cemetery in Alton.
This area--a 3-minute car ride from the bank--is situated at the end of a
dead-end street, indicating that the suspects were familiar with the area around
the cemetery and that the evidence drop was planned.(95) Further, the abandoned
evidence was not found along the most direct route from the bank out of Alton,
suggesting the robbers were confident they could elude capture without heading
directly out of town. These considerations, standing alone, suggested a
familiarity with the Alton area such as that possessed by James Earl Ray. In
addition, the drop site for the incriminating evidence was near the home in 1967
of Ray's uncle, William Mayer, and in the general vicinity of former residences
of Ray's mother and of Ray himself. 26 (96)
The committee next investigated the whereabouts of the Ray brothers on the day
of the robbery. James had quit his job at the Indian Trails Restaurant in
Winnetka, Ill., on June 24, 1967, approximately three weeks prior to the bank
robbery. (97) Before that time, while still in prison, he had decided to move to
Canada, (98) as he later indicated in interviews with the committee. But instead
of heading straight for Canada, Ray made two trips in the opposite direction. He
first went to Quincy, Ill., where he stayed for approximately 12 days(99) before
returning to Chicago for 4 to 5 days. In Chicago, he picked up his last weekly
paycheck from the Indian Traits. (100) Then, on July 10 or 11,27 he drove to the
St. Louis area., ostensibly to visit "family members." (101) Ray, however, told
the committee he did not see any relatives, particularly not his brother John.
In fact, Ray testified, he did not even know John's address, although, as noted,
his brother was close enough to him to have visited him regularly in prison.
(102)
The committee found Ray's trip to the St. Louis area 3 days before the bank
robbery especially interesting, not only because it strongly suggested a meeting
with John, but also because Alton, Ill., is only 20 miles north of St. Louis.
When Ray appeared before the committee public hearing, the committee pressed to
learn why he had not visited his St. Louis relatives on his earlier trip to
Quincy, which is far closer to St. Louis than Chicago. In addition, the
committee sought a logical explanation as to why, once he did return to St.
Louis to see relatives, he did not see them. Ray's testimony on these points was
crucial and, at the same time, characteristic of the evasive and illogical
nature of much of his testimony before the committee. His responses are,
therefore, quoted at length:
Congressman FITHIAN. * * * if I remember my Illinois map, Quincy is a lot closer
to the East St. Louis area than Chicago, and you have 12 days where you were in
Quincy. *** Just for my own satisfaction, could you share with the committee why
you didn't drop on over to East St. Louis and try to see your relatives in that
12-day period?
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RAY. I have no particular reason. I always did like Quincy, Ill. I have lived
there quite a bit, and I did intend to see my aunt, but I didn't. Many people I
know had since died, since I have been in prison. I think the only person I
really knew, and I think probably saw me and I talked to him several times, was
a bar owner named Ted Crowley. 28 Other than that I can't think of anyone that
knew me. I know I inquired about several people and they had died.
Congressman FITHIAN. Here is my problem just in terms of logic. You were in the
Chicago area and you decided to quit your job and you have already decided much
earlier you are going to Canada, according to what you just told me, and then
you quit your job and you go down 280 miles southwest to Quincy and spend 12
days there?
RAY. Yes, sir.
Congressman FITHIAN. You go back to the Chicago area. Then on the very eve of
your departure for Montreal, you make a trip all the way down to the St. Louis
area. I am having a little trouble with that just as a normal flow of movement.
Could you help me out on that?
RAY. No. That may have been a little illogical. I don't. know. Of course I had
been in jail 6 years. Sometimes you do things that are not exactly logical.
(104)
* * * * * * *
Congressman FITHIAN. Did you then see your relatives in the East St. Louis area?
RAY. No, I didn't. (105)
* * * * * * *
Congressman FITHIAN. So anyway your testimony to the committee is after you
decided to go to Canada, you traveled the opposite direction to St. Louis, East
St., Louis, for about 300 miles, in order to visit relatives, but you didn't
visit your relatives? Is that your testimony?
RAY. Well, I visited a close friend down there named Jack Gawron.29 Knew him on
the street. He knew all my relatives and I sent a message via him. I don't know
if he delivered it or not. (106)
The committee found Ray's explanation for his trip to St. Louis in July 1967
inadequate. His presence in the vicinity of Alton at the time of the bank
robbery was highly incriminating, albeit circumstantially, of his participation
in the robbery.
John Ray, of course, acknowledged that he was a St. Louis resident in July
1967;(107) Jerry was employed at the Sportsman's Club out-side Chicago. The
Alton bank robbery occurred on a Thursday, which, according to Jerry, was his
day off. (108) Assuming Jerry's recollection
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in testimony to the committee was correct, his presence in Alton could not be
discounted. 30
More important than familiarity with Alton and physical whereabouts, however,
was the evidence bearing on the financial condition of James and John Ray during
the period of the Alton bank robbery. At the time of his prison escape, Ray,
according to his testimony, had about $250. (110) He got a job at the Indian
Trails Restaurant in Winnetka, Ill., earning about $85 a week, so by the time he
quit--on June 24, 1967 (111) he had netted $664.34, giving him a total cash
accumulation of about $915.
During the same period, however, Ray purchased a 1959 Chrysler for $200. (112)
Although he apparently lived frugally, his living expenses placed a constant
drain on his limited financial resources. During the first week of July, in
fact, Ray drove approximately 300 miles from Quincy, Ill., to Chicago(113) to
pick up his last paycheck of $77.53. His conduct was not that of a man of
substantial means.
In late July, Ray's pattern of frugality abruptly changed significantly. On July
14, the day after the Alton bank robbery, he bought a 1962 Plymouth for $210 at
a dealership in East St. Lores, Ill.,(114) having sold his Chrysler for $45. He
then drove to Montreal, where he placed a $150 deposit on an apartment on July
18 and bought $250 worth of clothes on July 19. (115) On July 30, he began a
l-week vacation at Gray Rocks, a resort north of Montreal; his bill came to
$200.31(116)
Ray clearly had come into a substantial amount of money by mid-July, and it was
evident that he received this income sometime after the first week in July, when
he drove 300 miles from Quincy to Chicago to get a $77.53 paycheck.
The Alton bank robbery, coming the day before his extensive spending began,
could have explained his new-found wealth. Ray, however, gave the committee a
different story. He said he departed for Canada with $260 or $270, (117) and
after 2 days in Montreal, he had almost exhausted his cash reserve--for food and
lodging on the road, for the deposit on his apartment and for two visits to a
805 prostitute (118) Ray's solution was to rob a Montreal brothel:
That evening I returned to the aforementioned nightclub and, meeting the same
girl, again accompanied her via taxi to her apartment. Inside her apartment I
gave her another $25, but this time showed her the pistol Mr. Gawron had
purchased for me, and told her I would go with her to wherever she was taking
the money. When she aroused the manager into opening the office I put the pistol
on him. We moved back into the office wherein I asked him for the money. Taking
out his wallet, he offered me the small amount in it, approximately $5 or $10.
When I told him I wanted
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the rest of the money he spoke about a cabinet nearby, and motioned to a
container. Before leaving the office I had the manager lie on a bed and the girl
remove her stockings and tie his hands and legs. I then had her get under the
bed before departing. Later I found I had taken approximately $1,700 in mixed
currency from the manager's office. (119)
The committee's investigation of the story, tracing it back to its origin,
revealed several problems. First, Huie had written in "He Slew the Dreamer" that
Ray had told him initially of an $800 whorehouse robbery, then changed it to a
$1,700 holdup of a Montreal food store. (120)32 In addition, Jerry Ray was
reported to have told McMillan, the author that James had fabricated the brothel
robbery story. (121) Ray's story, moreover, was one that could not be easily
confirmed or denied, since the manager of a brothel was not the type to report a
robbery to police or cooperate with a congressional committee.33 Ray agreed on
this point during his public testimony:
Congressman FITHIAN. Mr. Ray, from your experience would you expect the owner of
an illegal house of prostitution to report a robbery like this to the police?
RAY. No * * * I would think usually prostitution and gambling houses take care
of their own legal problems.(122)
James Earl Ray was an experienced criminal, with an ability, evidenced by his
April 1967 escape from Missouri State Penitentiary, to plan and execute criminal
operations with some degree of sophistication. Moreover, his decision to travel
to Canada was not precipitous. It was a course of action he had apparently
settled on while still in prison. The committee found it difficult to believe,
therefore, that Ray lingered in the United States for 2 1/2 months, traveled to
a strange city in Canada in a destitute condition, and then committed an armed
robbery of a brothel manager. A more sensible course of action would have been
for him to escape from prison, make contact with John in St. Louis, and take
employment at some distant point while a suitable crime could be planned. After
the crime, he would flee to Canada, where he could live undetected and supported
by the proceeds of the crime. The committee found that Ray's financial
transactions in July 1967 strongly pointed to his receipt of unexplained
income--probably from crime--and that the Alton bank robbery was the most likely
source.
An examination of John Ray's travels and financial condition in 1967 was
similarly revealing. His employment history in the 1960's was sporadic. He held
a variety of jobs and spent at least one period on collecting unemployment
insurance. In 1967, while living in St. Louis, he was not a salaried employee,
although in interviews with the FBI and the committee, he said he had worked as
a painter. None-the-less, John went to San Francisco in July 1967 with $3,000 in
cash,(123) his stated purpose being to purchase a tavern in California or in
Reno, Nev.(124) Mrs. Charles F. Terry, manager of an apartment
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on Sutter Street in San Francisco, told FBI agents that he had resided in her
building between July 23, 1967 (10 days after the Alton bank robbery) to August
15, 1967.(125)
In testimony before the committee, John Ray conceded he made the trip to
California with approximately $3,000 in his possession and that he intended to
purchase a tavern. John claimed, however, that the money constituted "savings"
and not proceeds from the Alton bank robbery. (126)
In light of John Ray's work history, the committee was highly skeptical of his
claim to have set aside $3,000 in "savings." His possession of this sizable sum,
together with his decision to leave the St. Louis area almost simultaneously
with James' trip north to Canada, provided additional circumstantial evidence of
his participation in the Alton bank robbery and of a common plan by both Ray
brothers to leave the St. Louis area immediately following the robbery.
(1) Bank robbery modus operandi analysis.--The committee also examined the
conduct of the Ray brothers subsequent to the Alton bank robbery. It found
strong evidence indicating John Ray's involvement in five bank robberies in 1969
and 1970 for which the modus operandi (127) was substantially similar to that of
the Alton bank robbery.34 The evidence surrounding these robberies demonstrated
several points. It undermines John's credibility, since he denied participation
in each of them; it shows his character as a bank robber; and it demonstrates
subsequent criminal activity by John that is similar to and consistent with his
involvement in the Alton robbery.
The committee obtained the following information on the bank robberies from FBI
files and through its own investigation:
At 10:45 a.m. on October 17, 1969, the Farmers Bank of Liberty, Ill., was robbed
of $10,995 by two men wearing stocking. masks and hats, one carrying a shotgun,
the other a revolver. The one with the shotgun stood guard, while his accomplice
collected the money from behind the counter. The stocking masks and an
automobile were abandoned near the crime scene after an attempt to burn them.
(128) John Ray's involvement in the robbery of the Bank of Liberty, Ill., was
established through the sworn testimony of his accomplice, James Rogers, before
the committee.(129) When confronted with this evidence, John Ray denied
involvement in the robbery. 35
At 1:05 p.m. on January 28, 1970, the Farmers & Traders State Bank of Meredosia,
Ill., was robbed of $5,038 by two men wearing stocking masks and hats, one
carrying a sawed-off shotgun, the other a revolver. The one with the shotgun
stood guard, while his accomplice collected the money from behind the counter.
The stocking masks and clothing were left in a wooded area. (131) John Ray's
involvement in this bank robbery was established through the sworn testimony of
James Rogers, (132) an accomplice, and by the unsworn statement of Ronald
Goldenstein, a second accomplice during an interview with
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committee investigators. (133) Nevertheless, John Ray denied involvement in the
robbery.
At 1 p.m. on June 11, 1970, the Laddonia State Bank of Laddonia, Mo., was robbed
of $13,975 by two men wearing stocking masks and hats, one carrying a sawed-off
shotgun, the other a revolver. The one with the shotgun stood guard, while his
accomplice collected the money from behind the counter. The stocking masks and
an automobile were abandoned near the crime scene, and an attempt was made to
burn them. (135) John Ray's involvement in the robbery was established by the
sworn testimony of two accomplices, James Rogers and Clarence Haynes.(136)
Haynes was convicted of the robbery. John Ray, nevertheless, denied involvement
in the robbery. (137)
At 2 p.m. on July 29, 1970, the Bank of Hawthorne, Fla. was robbed of $4,514 by
two men wearing stocking masks and hats, each carrying a revolver. One of the
men stood guard, while his accomplice collected the money from a vault. The
stocking masks were discarded following the robbery.(138) John Ray's involvement
in the crime was established by the sworn testimony of James Rogers,(139) who
was convicted of the robbery. John Ray admitted being with Rogers and a second
convicted participant, Carl Kent, deceased, around the time of the robbery,(140)
but he denied actual involvement or any knowledge of the involvement of others.
(141)
At 1:20 p.m. on October 26, 1970, the Bank of St. Peters, Mo., was robbed of
$53,128 by three men wearing stocking masks and hats, all carrying revolvers.
Two of the men stood guard, while their accomplice collected the money from
behind the counter. The stocking masks and clothing were left in a wooded area.
(142) John Ray was tried and convicted by a jury for his participation in this
robbery. Before the committee, however, he denied his involvement and claimed he
had been framed. (143)
In light of evidence from a variety of sources indicating John Ray s involvement
in these five robberies, and considering his conviction for robbery of the Bank
of St. Peters, Mo., the committee found his denials unworthy of belief. His
participation in these robberies and the similarities they bore to the Alton
bank robbery provided additional circumstantial evidence of his involvement in
the Alton bank robbery.
The committee also examined evidence of a subsequent bank robbery by James Earl
Ray. On June 4, 1968, the Trustee Savings Bank of Fulham in London, England, was
robbed by a lone gunman; the amount taken was approximately 100 pounds, or about
$240 in U.S. currency. Physical evidence from the crime scene included a paper
bag bearing a printed note which read:"Place all 5-10 pound notes in this
bag."(144) Fingerprint comparisons by both the FBI and a committee consultant of
a latent print taken from the bag identified it as the right thumbprint of James
Earl Ray. (145) When confronted by this evidence, Ray still denied
responsibility for the robbery. (146) Ray's denial was, in light of this
physical evidence, unworthy of belief.
The committee believed that the denials themselves (by James, with respect to
the London bank robbery; by John, with respect to four robberies of which he was
accused by his accomplices, as well as
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a fifth for which he was convicted) provided an additional reason to believe
that James and John participated in the Alton bank robbery.
The committee noted that James' refusal to admit the London bank robbery could
not have been based on a fear of implicating others, for he had acted alone. Nor
was there reason to believe that he was reluctant to associate himself with
criminal activity, since he willingly told the committee about his alleged
robbery of a brothel in Montreal and about his smuggling and gunrunning
activities with Raoul. Likewise, John could not have been impelled to deny the
robberies for fear of implicating accomplices, since he was aware of their
cooperation with the committee, or for fear of prosecution, since the statute of
limitations had tolled in the unprosecuted cases.
The committee believed that these denials, in the face of substantial evidence.
to the contrary, reflected a concern by John and James that an admission of
involvement in any bank robbery might implicate them in the Alton holdup. This
would, in turn, undermine Ray's Raoul story, the keystone of his defense in the
assassination. It would also indicate a pattern of joint criminal behavior by
the brothers that would possibly raise a question about their collusion in the
assassination of Dr. King.
(d) A. brother was Raoul
In its investigation of the Alton bank robbery, the committee determined it was
unlikely that Jerry Ray was a participant. He had a steady job in the Chicago
area at the time, and he did not take an abrupt trip or show signs of sudden
wealth right after the Alton robbery, as did James and John. Nevertheless, the
committee received significant evidence, both circumstantial and direct,
indicating that Jerry knew of the involvement of his two brothers and that he
participated directly in the distribution of the robbery proceeds to James at
various times during his fugitive period.
Jerry Ray met several times with John and James during the period of the Alton
robbery. In fact, by his own admission, James traveled to Chicago,(148) where
Jerry lived, only a week before the robbery occurred. Further, a committee
witness, who requested anonymity but who gave a deposition under oath,(149)
reported a conversation in which Jerry revealed that John and James participated
in the bank robbery, adding certain details about their preparation for it. The
committee found particular significance in this reported statement by Jerry to
the witness, in light of his close relationship with his two brothers, one that
afforded ample opportunity for them to have discussed the crime. 36
Jerry's probable involvement in the distribution of funds from the robbery was
revealed through a close analysis of James' Raoul story. 37 Except for
employment at the Indian Trails Restaurant and an alleged robbery of a brothel
in Montreal, Ray's only acknowledged source of income during the 14-month
fugitive period was the payments he claims to have received from Raoul. The
committee's evidence indicated the strong likelihood that Ray shared in the
proceeds of the Alton bank robbery. His Raoul story was viewed, therefore, as a
cover,
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not just for the assassination, but also for the bank robbery. The committee did
find that there was some basis in fact for the Raoul story, because Ray's
spending pattern indicated that ,he received money from some source at about the
times he specified in his Raoul story. Since Ray was traveling throughout the
United States and two foreign countries, Canada and Mexico, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that he was reluctant to carry the entire proceeds of
the robbery with him. At the same time, he was not free, as a fugitive, to
transfer his funds through the banking system. 38 The committee believed,
therefore, that the money he received was, in fact, his share of the Alton bank
robbery proceeds, secured and periodically distributed to him by a brother,
probably Jerry.
In all, Ray claimed he received $7,750 from Raoul, in six payments:
Aug. 21, 1967, at the United States-Canadian border(150)............... $1,500
Aug. 30, 1967, in Birmingham, Ala. (151)
............................................ 2,000
Aug. 31, 1967, in Birmingham, Ala.
(152)............................................. 1,000
Oct. 7, 1967, in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico(153)....................................... 2,000
Dec. 17, 1967, in New Orleans, La. (154)
............................................ 500
Mar. 29, 1968, in Birmingham, Ala.
(155).............................................. 750
______
Total
............................................................................................
7,750
When added to the $1,700 Ray said he got in the holdup of a brothel in Montreal
his total reported income for the period came to $9,450. 39 Moreover, all of the
alleged meetings with Raoul in which money was passed, except for the one in
Nuevo Laredo, coincided with statements about a recent or imminent meeting with
a brother.
According to Ray's account, he first met Raoul at a bar in Montreal soon after
he arrived in that city on July 18 (5 days after the Alton bank robbery).(156)
He had three or four meetings(157) with him before he went on vacation at the
Gray Rocks resort in the Laurentian Mountains, where he struck up a brief
friendship with a woman who worked for the Canadian Government. In an interview
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police after the assassination, she said Ray
told her he had been at the resort for about a week and that "he would be
leaving within the next few days for Montreal to meet his brother."
(158) In fact, he left the next day and returned to Montreal where, according to
his story, he had several more meetings with Raoul. (159)
The committee established that John Ray was in San Francisco between July 23 and
August 15, 1967,(160) so he could not have been the brother referred to by
James. Consequently, this was one of several instances in which Ray's Raoul
story seemed framed to conceal contact with Jerry.
Approximately 2 weeks after his return from Gray Rocks, on August 18 or 19, Ray
went to Ottawa to visit the Canadian Government worker. She later reported to
the RCMP.
He [Ray] stayed in Ottawa for 2 days and I showed him around Ottawa. * * * I
don't recall him saying where he was coming from, but I assumed it was Montreal.
* * * He
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mentioned that he was working for his brother in real estate and that he did not
do much but was paid well. He also said that he had no problems with money and
could always get some. (161).
According to his own account, Ray left Ottawa and, on August he engaged in
smuggling a package of contraband across the U.S. border for which Raoul paid
him $1,500. (162) Ray then went to Birmingham, Ala. A week later, Raoul also
arrived in that city. Raoul funded the purchase of a $2,000 1966 Mustang and
gave Ray $500 for "living expenses" and another $500 for camera equipment.(163)
On August 30, Raoul departed, instructing Ray to "lay low" and promising to
contact him later to discuss "the business at hand and the matter of travel
documents." (164) Between August 21, 1967, and August 1967, then, Ray claimed to
have received $4,500 from Raoul.
Ray's purchase of a $2,000 car in Birmingham on August 30, 1967, was established
independently; clearly he then had a substantial amount of money. His rental of
a safe deposit box on August 28, 1967.(165) indicated, however, that he had that
money before the alleged arrival of Raoul since Ray, in public hearing
testimony, said he did not meet Raoul until that evening at the Starlite
Cafe.(166) The committee, found it significant, therefore, that both James and
Jerry Ray admitted meeting in Chicago between Ray's departure from Canada and
his arrival in Birmingham several days later (167) Raoul fabrication, by which
he tried to explain his receipt of at least $4,500, embraced a known and
uncontroverted meeting with Jerry Ray.
The committee believed, based on Ray's meeting with Jerry on August 22,
1967--followed by his rental of a safe deposit box on August 28, 1967, and his
purchase of an expensive automobile on August 30, 1967---that Ray received
substantial amounts of money, not from Raoul, but from Jerry. Further, the
committee believed the most likely source of this money was the Alton bank
robbery.
Ray also claimed to have met with Raoul during his December 1967 visit to New
Orleans. 40 According to Ray, an associate of Raoul told him by telephone in
early December to travel from Los Angeles to New Orleans Inter in the month to
meet with Raoul. Ray said he made the trip with Charles Stein, met Raoul at the
Le Bunny Lounge, discussed a gunrunning scheme planned for early May, and
received $500 because he was "low on funds." (168)
In addition to hearing Ray's account, the committee examined evidence supplied
by Mark O. Freeman, a clinical phychologist in Los Angeles whom Ray consulted in
November and December 1967. Dr. Freeman's records indicated that Ray's last
appointment was at 10 a.m. on December 14, the day before he departed for New
Orleans. In an FBI interview, Dr-Freeman fold of a telephone call from Ray
subsequent to that appointment. The FBI report stated:
The doctor recalled that Ray bad telephone [sic] him at the office, after making
the appointment for December 18, and
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told him he would be unable to come to the office for the appointment as he had
received information from his brother, that the latter had "found a job for him
in the Merchant Marine in New Orleans, La." The doctor is not sure of the date
or time that Ray telephone [sic] to cancel his last appointment but feels sure
that it was sometime after their 10 a.m. appointment on December 14 * * *. (169)
Dr. Freeman's statement, together with his appointment records, provided clear
evidence that Ray's trip to New Orleans was more impulsive than his Raoul story
indicated and that Ray planned to meet a brother in New Orleans. This inference
was strengthened by the statements of Sharon Rhodes, a Los Angeles dance school
instructor, both in her initial FBI interview (170) and in a statement to the
committee.(171) In the FBI interview, she recalled a discussion with Ray
following his New Orleans trip:
She believes he was a southerner, and she recalled that possibly the first or
second week during January 1968, he did not attend dancing instruction, and upon
his return, stated that he had visited a brother in the State of Louisiana.(172)
In addition to the separate witness statements indicating Ray met with a brother
in New Orleans, the committee obtained convincing evidence that he, in fact,
received money on the trip. On the day of his return to Los Angeles, December
21, Ray paid $365, the balance of what he owed on the 50-hour dance course.
Under his original agreement with the studio, he was obligated to pay only $50 a
week.(173)
James did not identify the brother in New Orleans during his conversations with
the California witnesses. The committee found it likely that Ray at least met
with Jerry in New Orleans. Jerry was still admitted to the committee that he
went to St. Louis for Christmas that year. (174) St. Louis and New Orleans are
only 675 miles apart, so it was at least reasonably possible for Jerry and James
to have met. Further both James and Jerry Ray conceded to the committee that
they talked by telephone during James' drive from Los Angeles to New Orleans.
The committee was unable, however, to rule out the possibility that it was John
Ray---then an unemployed painter living in St. Louis--who traveled to New
Orleans to meet James. The comittee was also unable to determine fully the
purpose of the New Orleans meeting. If, in fact, it was to receive only $500,
that would not seem to justify the risks Ray took in driving several thousand
miles on the open highway. 41 The committee noted that the assassination
occurred 3 1/2 months after the New Orleans trip. While the possibility of a
connection between the trip and the murder of Dr. King existed, the committee
uncovered no direct evidence to that effect. 42
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(e) The brothers and the rifle purchase
The final contact with a brother that James Earl Ray tried to conceal with his
Raoul ruse was considered by the committee to have been by far the most
significant. It occurred in Birmingham, Ala., on March 29 and 30, 1968, just
days before the assassination of Dr. King, and its purpose, the committee
concluded, was a transaction that suggested the likelihood that a brother was
involved in a conspiracy in the assassination. The transaction was the purchase
of the murder weapon.
Ray's testimony before the committee, (175) corroborated by a postal change of
address that, he mailed in Los Angeles, (176) established that he departed
California for the Southeastern United States on March 17, 1968, approximately 2
1/2 weeks prior to Dr. King's assassination.43 On at least three occasions
during the weeks immediately prior to his departure, Ray mentioned upcoming
contact with a brother. On one of these occasions, moreover, he indicated a plan
to meet that brother in Birmingham.
One of Ray's closest friends in Los Angeles was Marie Martin, a waitress at the
Sultan Room in the St. Francis Hotel, who had a casual relationship with him
over a period of several months. In an interview with the FBI on May 14, 1968,
she reported that Ray, using the Galt alias, asked in late February if he could
leave some barbells at her apartment.
Martin * * * told Galt to leave the weights outside of the door [to her
apartment]. Gait called her later the same day on the phone and she asked him
for some money for taking care of the weights. Gait claimed he was broke, but
said he would leave her ten dollars * * * Gait claimed he was waiting for some
money from his brother. (177)
In testimony to the committee, Martin repeated her recollection that Galt
received money by mail from a brother:
I took it for granted it was on a regular basis because it seemed every now and
then he was waiting for an envelope. He asked me, "When you pass the lobby, will
you check my box?"(178)
Martin's testimony provided the first indication of contact between Ray and a
brother during a period proximate to the assassination.
On March 2, during graduation ceremonies at a bartending school Ray had attended
in California, he was asked by the director of the school Tomas Lau. what he
planned to do. Ray's response was overheard by Richard Gonzalez, another student
at the school, and reported to the FBI in an April 16 interview:"* * * Gait
stated he was going to go to Birmingham, Ala., to visit his brother for about 2
weeks."(179) In a public hearing in August 1978, Ray told the committee that he
met Raoul in Birmingham on March 0.3, exactly 3 weeks after he reportedly made
the statement to Lau. (180) Six days thereafter,
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he and Raoul returned to Birmingham to purchase the rifle that was used to kill
Dr. King. (181)
On March 9, Ray talked by telephone to Tomas Lau, who reported the conversation
to the FBI following the assassination:
Lau recalls that approximately 1 week after Galt's graduation on March 2, 1968,
Gait telephonically contacted him [Lau] at which time Lau advised him that he
had a possible job opportunity for him as a bartender. Gait, advised Lau that he
was leaving town within 2 weeks for an undisclosed location to visit his brother
and did not wish to take a job at this time. (182)
Precisely 2 weeks later, according to Ray's testimony to the committee, he met
Raoul in Birmingham. The rifle purchase followed 6 days later.
More significant than the three allusions in California to a brother, however,
was Ray's reference to a brother during the rifle purchase itself. On March 29,
Ray went to the Aeromarine Supply Co. and bought a .243 caliber Winchester,
using the name Harvey Lowmeyer.44 He later decided to exchange the rifle for
another, a transaction that was described by Donald Wood, a clerk at Aeromarine,
in a signed FBI interview on April 5, 1968:
It was, as best I recall, either later that afternoon or early the following
Saturday morning when this individual called on the telephone and stated that he
had had a conversation with his brother and decided that the gun he had
purchased was not the gun he wanted and he requested whether he could exchange
it for a Remington model 760, .30-06 caliber-(183)
Wood stated further that when Ray came to the store on Saturday, he told him
that the Winchester was a big enough gun to bring down any deer in Alabama. "He
stated in an offhand manner that he wanted the .30-06 caliber gun because he was
going to use it to hunt in Wisconsin." (184).
Ray's version of the rifle purchase again seemed to be an effort to disgise
contact with a brother through the character of Raoul. Ray stated that he and
Raoul traveled to Birmingham from Atlanta and that Raoul gave him over $700 to
purchase a "large deer bore rifle."(185) He bought the rifle and brought it back
to the motel Raoul disapproved of the choice and told Ray to exchange it for one
chosen from a brochure.
Chairman STOKES. So, then, after you purchased the second rifle, at Raoul's
direction, because he told you the first rifle was not adequate------
RAY. Yes, he pointed out in a brochure--I had a brochure with the second rifle.
Chairman STOKES. OK. He sent you back to get the second rifle and told you what
kind to get, didn't he?
RAY. That is correct.
Chairman STOKES- And you did what he told you to do?
RAY. Yes, sir. * * * I made a phone call to Aeromarine
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Supply and I asked them about exchanging it and they said they could do it.
(186)
Ray's use of the Harvey Lowmeyer alias also corrobated the possible involvement
of a brother in the rifle purchase. Ray told the committee he got the name from
a friend or criminal associate in Quincy, Ill. (187) Roy's last known visit to
Quincy, however, had been in June and July of 1967, 9 months earlier. Further,
the actual Harvey Lohmeyer 45 told the committee in an interview that while he
knew John Ray and Jerry Ray from a period of overlapping prison terms at Menard
State Penitentiary in Chester, Ill., in the late 1950's, he did not know James
Earl Ray. (188) The committee, therefore, believed it more likely that James got
the idea for this alias from either John or Jerry Ray. In the absence of any
evidence that James Stockpiled aliases, Roy's use of "Harvey Lowmeyer" for the
rifle purchase suggested contact with one or both brothers at that time.
Percy Foreman, Ray's attorney when Ray pled guilty to the assassination on March
10, 1969, testified in a committee hearing to admissions by Ray that his brother
Jerry was with him at the time of the rifle purchase.46 Foreman said:
I cross-examined James Earl Ray for hours and the only name that he ever
mentioned other than his own at any phase or time of his preparation for the
killing * * * Dr. Martin Luther King * * * the only person's name that he ever
mentioned to me was his brother, Jerry.
Jerry was with him when he bought the rifle in Birmingham, the one he did not
use because it was a low caliber. He took it back and traded it for a more
powerful one that would be more likely to kill an individual. The smaller
caliber was more suited for killing small animals. And Jerry was not with him,
according to Roy's statement, when he bought the gun that killed Dr. Martin
Luther King; but he was with him the day before at the same place where he
bought another rifle for that purpose * * *.(189)
In his testimony before the committee, Jerry Ray repeatedly denied that he
participated in the rifle purchase(190) or that he was the Raoul that James
referred to. He also denied having transmitted any funds to James.(191) Finally,
he suggested that James used the brother references as a means of disguising
contact with Raoul:
He would use the statement and he would go along brother said this" and "My
brother said that" or "He wanted the gun" or "I'm going to go visit him" or
something. That was just a way of, you know, of saying he was going to meet
somebody and instead of saying he was going to see he wasn't going to tell
everybody he was going to visit Raoul. (192)
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The committee reviewed Jerry Ray's extensive testimony before the committee, as
well as his prior statements to members of the press, FBI agents, authors and a
number of private citizens, and it found his testimony self-serving and
generally unworthy of belief. For example, the committee obtained evidence from
several sources who requested confidentiality that Jerry Ray believed parts of
the Raoul story were untrue, yet he continued to insist to the committee that
such a character existed. Further, Jerry Ray admitted to the committee that he
gave a false description of Raoul in a New York City radio interview in 1977;
(193) that he falsely denied that James ever mentioned Dr. King in their
conversations during prison visits over the 10 years following the
assassination;(194) and that he falsely claimed his brother was not a beer
drinker.47 (195) Jerry also admitted to the committee that he supplied McMillan,
the author, with bank records he had falsified.(196)
Finally, during his testimony, Jerry told the committee that he had located the
Mississippi motel where James had stayed during a drive from Birmingham to
Memphis that James claimed he made after the rifle purchase. Jerry added that he
had talked to individuals who indicated that the FBI had destroyed the motel
records that reflected this stay. When the committee investigated his charge,
however, it found the motel records still intact 48 and Jerry Ray's testimony an
intentional distortion of the truth. (197)
The committee found Jerry Ray's public hearing testimony, including his denial
of involvement in the Birmingham rifle purchase, unworthy of belief. 49
The committee was at pains to make a careful assessment of the evidence bearing
on the rifle purchase. No less than four separate witnesses--Marie Martin,
Richard Gonzalez, Tomas Lau, and Donald Wood--in separate interviews with
authorities shortly after the assassination, provided evidence of Ray's receipt
of money from, or contact with, a brother during the month preceding the rifle
purchase. Wood's testimony tied that brother directly into the rifle purchase
itself.
Both Jerry and James asserted that Jalnes' reference to a brother as meant to
conceal his involvement with Raoul.(198) The committee's investigation produced
no evidence to corroborate the existence of Raoul, so the proposed explanation
was worthless. The committee believed that Ray's postassassination tale of Raoul
was fabricated to conceal contacts with one or both brothers. The committee was,
however, unable to establish the precise whereabouts of either John or Jerry for
the period of the rifle purchase. John Ray stated in executive session that he
was operating the Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis at the time, (199) and the
committee while unwilling to credit John Ray's unsupported testimony, received
no evidence that
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contradicted his assertion. Jerry Ray's working records were destroyed
approximately 6 months before the committee contacted his employer, the
Sportsman's Club near Chicago. Jerry's working hours at that time were 11 p.m.
to 7 a.m. (200) If his recollection that Thursday was his day off was correct,50
he could conceivably have gone to Birmingham, given advice on the initial rifle
purchase on the afternoon of Friday, March 29, 1968, and returned in time to be
on the job by 11 p.m. that night.
Finally, although James presence at the Birmingham Travelodge was verified, the
committee found no evidence of his brothers, or of any associates, at the motel
with him. (201)
The committee also considered the possibility that James' contact with his
brother was by telephone, rather than in person, but the relevant telephone
records had been destroyed.
On balance, therefore, the committee believed the evidence convincing that James
had some form of contact with a brother both before and during the rifle
purchase. The committee had no direct evidence, which it was willing to credit,
establishing the identity of the brother. Given the limits on the evidence
available to the committee, no more definitive statement could be made.
(f) Motive with respect to John and Jerry Ray
Since the evidence reflected a criminal association of Ray and his two brothers
that was far more substantial than any of the three were willing to admit, and
since that association appeared to extend to complicity in the assassination
itself, it was appropriate to examine the question of motive with reference to
John and Jerry.
The investigation of James Earl Ray's motive in the assassination revealed that
while he was generally unsympathetic with the civil rights movement, he
apparently did not harbor such an intense racial hatred that he would have acted
in the assassination without other inducement. While Ray might have been
attracted by the notoriety he would achieve for committing the crime, the
committee found that his primary inducement was probably the expectation of
financial gain.
The committee reviewed evidence bearing on the racial attitudes of John and
Jerry Ray and found it clear and compelling. John Ray was found to be a man of
pronounced racial bias. By his own admission, his place of business in 1968, the
Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis, was a segregated establishment in a segregated
neighborhood.(202) In addition, many of John Ray's remarks, both to the
committee and at the time of the assassination, reflected strong opposition to
the civil rights movement and to Dr. King himself. In his first interview with
the FBI following the assassination, on April 22, 1968--he voiced approval of
the murder of Dr. King. Quoting from the FBI report:
It is noted that Ray was initially uncooperative and said, "What's all the
excitement about? He only killed a nigger. If he had killed a white man you
wouldn't be here. King should have been killed 10 years ago." 51 (203)
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John Ray's testimony in public hearings, while modified in tone, provided
additional evidence of his general racial attitudes:
STAFF COUNSEL. Again, Mr. Ray my question was: What was your racial attitude
toward Dr. King and the civil rights movement that he headed up in 1968?
* * * * * *
RAY. I would guess you would say I was a mild segregationist, I guess. (206)
One of the strongest indications of John Ray's opposition to Dr. King, however,
appears in a letter that he wrote from prison to George McMillan, the author, in
June 1972. (207)
* * * the common man * * * knows that King was not a saint as these try to
picture him. There are millions of Rays in the United States with the same
background and beliefs, who know that King not only was a rat but with his
beaded eyes and pin ears looked like one. 52
Over the years since Dr. King's assassination, Jerry Ray also overtly exhibited
racist attitudes. He went to work in 1969 as a bodyguard for J.B. Stoner, leader
of the National States Rights Party. The committee found it significant that he
chose to work with the leader of an organization, which, shortly after Dr.
King's death, had declared in The Thunderbolt, the party newspaper, that:
The man who shot King was actually upholding the law of the land and enforcing
the injunction of the U.S. District Court of Memphis which had forbidden King's
marches. The white man who shot King * * * should be given the Congressional
Medal of Honor and a large annual pension for life, plus a Presidential pardon.
(209)
Jerry Ray's support for the views expressed in The Thunderbolt was confirmed in
a letter he later wrote on "J. B. Stoner for United States Senator" stationery:
I am sure when history is written my brother James Earl Ray, and the Hon. Gov.
George Wallace will be heroes along side of J.B. Stoner. (210)53
Finally, Jerry Ray's racism was confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Edward Fields,
secretary of the National States Rights Party, who characterized Jerry as a
"segregationist."
Both Jerry and John Ray, therefore, manifested in their general attitudes
pronounced racial bias, as well as willingness to commit crime for financial
gain, attitudes that would be consistent with their participation in the
assassination of Dr. King.
6. EVIDENCE OF A CONSPIRACY IN ST. LOUIS
An offer on Dr. King's life that existed in St. Louis in late 1966 or early 1967
was brought to the attention of the committee in March
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1978 by the FBI.(213) A Bureau informant contact report dated March 19, 1974,
had been discovered during a file review in an unrelated investigation. (214)54
It indicated that in the fall of 1973 an informant advised that Russell G. Byers
of St. Louis had told him he had been offered $10,000 or $20,000 by a St. Louis
lawyer, then deceased, to kill Dr. King.
The committee began its investigation of the lead by contacting Byers, who
initially denied knowledge of the offer. After consulting with his attorney,
however, Byers agreed to cooperate, but only in response to a subpena and if he
were granted immunity. A subpena was issued, and when Byers appeared before an
executive session of the committee on May 9, 1978, he was granted immunity under
title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Byers' testimony in
committee public hearings was also given under an immunity grant.(215)
(a) The Byers allegation
Byers gave the following account to the committee:(216)
He was contacted in late 1966 or early 1967 by John Kauffmann,
whom he had known since 1962 as a former stockbroker and operator of the Buff
Acres Motel and a drug manufacturing company, both located in Imperial, Mo.
Kauffmann had, in return for payment, perreitted Byers to store stolen
merchandise, including stolen cars, at his motel. Kauffmann asked Byers if he
would like to make $50,000,and Byers asked what he would have to do to earn it.
Kauffmann told him to meet him at 6:30 that evening, which Byers did, and
together they drove to the home in Imperial of John Sutherland, a St. Louis
patent attorney. The three men met in a study that Byers described as decorated
with Confederate flags and Civil War memorabilia. There was a rug replica of a
Confederate flag as well, and Sutherland was wearing what appeared to Byers to
be a Confederate colonel's hat.
After some social conversation, Byers asked Sutherland what he would have to do
for the $50,000. Sutherland said he would have to kill, or arrange to have
killed, Dr. Martin Luther King. Byers, who told the committee he did not know at
the time who Dr. King was, asked where that amount of money would come from.
Sutherland told him he belonged to a secret southern organization that had
plenty of money. According to Byers, no names were mentioned. Byers said he
neither accepted nor rejected the offer, indicating he would think it over.
Outside the door of Sutherland's home, however, he told Kauffmann he was not,
interested.55 He said he saw Sutherland only once again at a water company
meeting and that he soon severed his ties with Kauffmann, having learned he was
involved in an illegal drug operation. Byers indicated he feared he would end up
murdered or in the penitentiary if he got involved in drugs.
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To determine if Byers' story was credible, the committee initiated a full-scale
investigation of Byers, Kauffmann, and Sutherland. Dozens of associates of each
were interviewed or deposed, and several were called to testify in executive
session. In addition, files of local, State and Federal agencies were reviewed.
Although the investigation was hampered by the death of many of the principals,
the committee uncovered enough evidence to be convinced that the Byers
allegation was essentially truthful. There was in existence, in 1966 or 1967, a
St. Louis conspiracy actively soliciting the assassination of Dr. King. The
committee found that Byers was a logical target for solicitation in such a
conspiracy, even though he testified that he did not know why Kauffmann would
have approached him.
(218) The committee learned that Byers had a reputation, at the time of the
offer, for associating with people known to have a propensity for violence. More
specifically, his brother-in-law, John Paul Spica, had been convicted of the
contract murder of a St. Louis businessman.
(219) Kauffmann and Sutherland could well have been led to believe, the
committee reasoned, that while Byer's might not have been willing to undertake
the murder himself, he could have established contact with people willing to
accept the offer.
Nevertheless, the committee sought further corroboration for Byers' account,
realizing that his criminal record raised substantial doubts concerning his
credibility. (220) In addition, questions were raised by his failure to approach
authorities with his information in 1968. Byers himself explained that he had
not wanted to get involved in any way or attract attention to his criminal
activities.(221) He did say, however, that he told two St. Louis attorneys,
Lawrence Weenick 56 and Murray Randall, about his meeting with Kauffmann and
Sutherland. According to Byers, Weenick was told in 1974. Byers had two
conversations with Randall, one in 1968 and the other in 1974. (222)
Byers waived his attorney-client privilege with Weenick and Randall, and they
were interviewed by the committee. (223) Their accounts to staff counsel and
committee investigators essentially supported the testimony Byers had given in
executive session. The two attorneys were then subpenaed to appear at a
committee public hearing. Weenick testified that in 1974 or 1975, while he was
representing Byers in several civil matters, Byers told him he had been offered
$50,000 by Kauffmann and Sutherland to murder Dr. Martin Luther King and that
Byers gave him the impression that, while the offer was seriously made, he
(Byers) never took it seriously. Weenick was pressed by the committee on his
assessment of Byers' credibility. He replied:
* * * Byers had absolutely no reason to tell me this at the time he told it to
me, or any other time. Whether he made it up or not, I don't know. There
was--there seems to be no credible reason why he would have made it up and told
it to me and to Mr. Randall, and evidently to this other person who was an FBI
informant. * * *
* * * I can't say for certain that he is not lying, but I certainly don't know
what his motive would be for doing so. (224)
When Randall, who had since become a judge in the Court of Criminal Corrections
in St. Louis, learned he might be subpenaed to
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testify before the committee in public session, he attempted to avoid an
appearance, arguing that his testimony would be of no value and expressing
concern over the effect the publicity could have on his reelection to the bench.
He complained to staff counsel, committee investigators.(226) the chairman of
the committee,(227) and another Member of Congress. To support his position
about the value of his testimony, he raised--for the first time with the
committee----doubts he said he had about Byers' credibility. He offered the
speculation that Byers might have concocted the story in 1973 and told it to a
person he suspected of being an FBI informant to test his suspicion. According
to Randall's theory, if the FBI subsequently contacted Byers about the King
assassination, he would have his suspicions about the informant confirmed. (228)
Nevertheless, Randall was called to testify, as was Weenick, at a public hearing
on November 29, 1978. (229) He said he first, met Byers in 1967 when Byers pled
guilty to a stolen car charge. He next saw him when he assisted him in
incorporating a business in 1968. He then stated to the committee that he had
run into Byers at the courthouse in 1974, shortly before he left private
practice to take the bench. Byers asked his advice on the procedures for
claiming immunity in a grand Jury investigation, saying he thought he might be
questioned by Federal authorities about his knowledge of a plot to assassinate
Dr. King. Byers then told Randall a story that reflected in essential details
Byers' testimony before the committee and the story Byers told Weenick. During
his committee testimony. Randall said he did not remember that Byers had told
him of the King offer prior to the 1974 meeting. (230)57 In response to
questioning, Randall also repeated his speculation about Byers and the
informant, conceding it was only "speculation, * * * "my belief and
opinion."(231)
The committee accepted the basic outlines of Judge Randall's testimony. Indeed,
he added valuable detail to the story. told by Byers. As such, his testimony
contributed to the work of the committee. Nevertheless, the committee found that
Judge Randall's memory that only one conversation took place was in error. The
committee also rejected Randall's speculation about Byers' possible effort to
unmask an FBI informant. It believed that the theory was offered to undermine
the witness' own testimony in order to discourage the committee from compelling
his public appearance.58 In addition, the committee found Randall's speculation
about Byers' story to be implausible. Byers was a relatively sophisticated and
experienced criminal and he would have known such a ploy would not work. It
would only have served to expose him to an FBI investigation that he, with a
long history of dealing in stolen property, would have wanted to avoid. The very
significance of his information would have subjected him to increased scrutiny.
The committee's chief investigator testified that, based on his experience,
Byers' more likely course of action would have been to
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discontinue dealing with the suspected informant. (232) Moreover, it was
considered highly unlikely that the FBI would have approached Byers in such a
way, since this would have risked making Byers aware of the role of the
informant.
The committee agreed with Weenick's testimony that Byers had no motive to lie
about the offer. Unlike many sources of King death threats, who have fabricated
information for publicity, Byers' conduct since 1967 has demonstrated a
consistent unwillingness to get involved in the investigation of the King
assassination. He did not volunteer his information to the committee; he refused
to cooperate until he was subpenaed and granted immunity.
The committee's conclusion that Byers' testimony of a serious conspiracy to kill
Dr. King in the St. Louis area was essentially truthful was independently
substantiated by the sworn testimony of an unpaid informant for the Jefferson
County, Mo, sheriff's office in 1967 and 1968. This witness spent 3 years
thereafter with a State police agency. He requested anonymity, since he was
concerned that his failure to take more vigorous action in 1968 with the
information might damage his reputation, destroy his marriage, and injure his
career in private industry.59 The committee decided, based on these
considerations and a judgment that the witness was candid and forthcoming, to
grant his request for anonymity and refer to him in this report as witness
A.(234)
As a sheriff's office informant, witness A spent much time at the Buff Acres,
the motel operated by Kauffmann in Imperial, Mo. He had been asked to
investigate numerous individuals who frequented the motel. He testified that
Kauffmann was accepting stolen property in exchange for room rent, running a
prostitution ring out of the motel and dealing in drugs. He then recounted
conversation he had heard at the motel regarding a standing offer to murder Dr.
King:
* * * there was a frequent remark whenever any more than two of the members got
together, if they were hard up for money, somebody would say, "Well, we can
always make $20,000 or $30,000 for killing Martin Luther King, or, on another
occasion, and quite frequently, "We can always make $20,000 or $30,000 if we
kill the big nigger for John."
Asked who John was, witness A replied, "John Kauffmann."(235)
The committee found certain elements of the Sutherland/Kauffmann conspiracy
particularly interesting. First, it provided a source of funds that could
explain the involvement of a financially motivated criminal such as Ray. The
committee had noted that if in fact the Alton bank robbery involved three
people--as circumstances seemed to indicate---James' expenditures in his
fugitive period would have almost, completely exhausted his share of $9,077 by
the time of the assassination. (236) Even if a two-way split were assumed, his
funds would have been substantially depleted. In either case, he would have been
interested in a new source of income at about the time of the assassination.
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Second, the Sutherland-Kauffmann conspiracy was located in the St. Louis area.
The principals lived there, and the offers were made there---both Sutherland's
offer to Byers and the standing offer at Kauffmann's motel. James Earl Ray
visited St. Louis at least twice during his fugitive period, and his brother
John was a permanent resident. Given the circulation of the offer among the
area's criminal elements, st least at the Buff Acres Motel, it seemed entirely
possible that word of the offer might reach the Ray family.
(b) The backgrounds of Kauffmann and Sutherland.
John Kauffmann was born April 7, 1904, and died April 1, 1974. (237) He was a
lifelong St. Louis resident, involved in a variety of business activities,
including the manufacture of gliders and real estate development. From the early
1960's to his death, he owned and resided at the Buff Acres Motel in Barnhardt,
Mo. His widow, Beulah, still lived there in 1978.
Kauffmann's criminal record (238) disclosed that he was arrested and convicted
for the manufacture and sale of amphetamines in 1967.60 The committee reviewed
the files of the Federal drug case that led to Kauffmann's arrest and
conviction. (239) They revealed he had been operating a legitimate drug company
that marketed a cough mixture called Fixaco. Through the company, he was
ordering amphetamine sulfate powder in bulk and making amphetamine pills from
the powder. Kauffmann sold an estimated 1 million pills illegally to undercover
Federal agents in 1967.
Testimony given at Kauffmann's narcotics trial revealed a link between his
illegal drug operation and the Missouri State Penitentiary where James Earl Ray
was incarcerated until his escape in April of 1967.(240) A Federal informant
indicated that some of the illegal contraband was delivered to the prison by one
of Kauffmann's accomplices. During an interview with the committee, one of
Kauffmann's codefendants disclosed that Kauffmann had arranged for an additional
delivery to the Missouri State Penitentiary on the day of his arrest. (241)
Kauffmann's criminal record did not reflect a conviction for any crimes of
violence. Nevertheless, the committee ]earned that a Federal narcotics agent was
ambushed and shot just after talking to an informant about Kauffmann. This
incident occurred shortly after Kauffmann's arrest, but following disclosure
that the victim was a Federal agent who had worked undercover on the Kauffmann
case.(242) Kauffmann also once told an undercover agent he had threatened a
person who owed him money in order to scare him. (243)
In addition, while the committee was unable to obtain information that would
provide substantial details on Kauffmann's political attitudes, it did establish
that he was associated with John Sutherland in efforts to establish an American
Party chapter in the St. Louis area in 1967-68. The American Party supported the
candidacy of Governor George Wallace of Alabama. Examination of numerous
American Party petitions filed with the Missouri Secretary of State for the 1968
Presidential election showed Kauffmann's signature as either circulating officer
or as notary public. (244)
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John Sutherland, a descendant of early colonists, was born in Charlottesville,
Va., October 19, 1905. He died in 1970. (245) He was a 1926 graduate of Virginia
Military Institute, with a degree in electrical engineering; he received a
bachelor of laws degree from City College of Law and Finance, St. Louis, 1931,
and a master of laws degree from Benton College of Law. He held a commission in
the U.S. Army Reserve from 1926 to 1936, though he apparently never served on
active duty. He was married in 1930 to Anna Lee of Atlanta. 61 (246)
Sutherland practiced patent law in St. Louis. He was a lifelong resident of the
St. Louis area and had no criminal record.
A number of associates of Sutherland were interviewed by the committee. One
characterized him as a "die-hard southerner" who "never let the Civil War
die."(247) Others described him as a "strong Wallace supporter," anti-Black, an
"outspoken conservative," and opposed to civil rights, integration, and the
Supreme Court. (248) There were several associates, however, who said that they
could not conceive of Sutherland's involvement in an assassination plot.
Sutherland belonged to a number of social and professional organizations, and he
was active politically throughout his adult life. A segregationist or anticivil
rights strain was apparent in many of these organizations. For example,
information obtained from FBI St. Louis field office files indicated that
Sutherland was the founder and chairman of the steering committee of the first
St. Louis Citizens' Council in 1964. (249) The local group had ties to a parent
organization in the deep South with stated principles of "States rights" and
"racial integrity." (250)
Available information indicated that Sutherland withdrew from an active
leadership role in the citizens' council after the first year of its existence.
(251) Gordon Baum, the field director of the St. Louis organization in 1978,
stated during a committee interview that, to his knowledge, Sutherland had
ceased formal ties with the citizens council prior to 1967. (252) Other members,
however, indicated that Sutherland's name was well known in citizens' council
activities and that he had served as an adviser on the group's activities until
his death in 1970.(253)
Sutherland was associated with a second organization of interest to the
committee, the Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC), headquartered in
Tennessee. The SSIC was an organization of businessmen and industrial leaders,
and its policies as of 1967 reflected opposition to the civil rights movement,
and a suspicion of Communist infiltration of the "Negro movement."(254)
Sutherland served as a regional director of the association and was an associate
of its 1968 president, Theodore Sensing. (255) The committee's examination of
the council developed evidence that some of its members were unsympathetic to
Dr. King. Sensing, for example, addressed the Daughters of the American
Revolution in Washington on April 15,
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1968, less than 2 weeks after the King assassination. While Sensing called it a
"senseless, tragic crime" and recommended that the killer ". . . be apprehended
if possible, and brought to trial for his crime," he also used the occasion to
criticize Dr. King and those associated with him. He stated at one point, "It is
not too much to say, in fact, that Martin Luther King, Jr., brought this crime
upon himself." Holding Dr. King to account for his attitude toward civil
disobedience, Sensing speculated that the assassin, "... may well have said to
himself, 'I think Martin Luther King should be killed. I realize there is a law
against murder, but in this case, I think the law was unjust? "(256) While this
speech did not, of course, provide any evidence of complicity by members of SSIC
in the assassination, it did give an indication of the political persuasion of
Sutherland's associates.
The committee was unable to identify the secret southern organization to which
Sutherland referred as the source of payment when he allegedly made the offer to
Byers. It did, however, establish that he belonged to at least two organizations
with extreme segregationist leanings,62 and it developed evidence of pronounced
racial bias in Sutherland himself.
A committee investigation of Sutherland's financial condition revealed that he
left an estate valued at more than $300,000. (258)
Based on this background investigation, the committee concluded that the two
principals, Sutherland and Kauffmann, met the criteria being serious
conspirators:
They had the motive, i.e., Sutherland's avowed social and political attitudes,
and Kauffmann's readiness to earn money legally or illegally;
They had the monetary means, either from Sutherland's own funds or from
associates; and
They actively sought the opportunity to carry out a plot, as evidenced at least
by their solicitation of Byers.
(c) Connectives to James Earl Ray
The committee turned finally to an examination of the possibility that the
Sutherland-Kauffmann offer might have reached James Earl Ray. Four possible
connectives were explored.63
The first connective was John Paul Spica, brother-in-law of Russell Byers and a
fellow inmate of Ray at Missouri State Penitentiary.
The committee determined that Spica was convicted and imprisoned in 1963 for the
contract murder of a St. Louis businessman. Missouri State Penitentiary records
showed that he was incarcerated from 1963 to 1973 and that for at least part of
that time he occupied a cell in the same cell block and same tier of the prison
as Ray. (259)
In executive session testimony before the committee, Spica acknowledged that he
was acquainted with Ray, but he denied close contact with him.(260) Committee
interviews with prison officials and other
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inmates, on the other hand, indicated a much closer friendship between Spica and
Ray than Spica admitted.(261) Spica also testified that, he knew nothing of the
offer to Byers by Sutherland and Kauffmann. (262)
Byers testified during public hearings that he visited Spica regularly64 until
his conviction, in December 1967, on a Dyer Act charge (interstate
transportation of stolen automobiles). Nevertheless, he stated emphatically that
he did not discuss the Sutherland-Kauffmann offer with him. (263)
In light of Spica's incarceration at Missouri State Penitentiary until 1973, his
only potential role in the assassination might have been as a conduit of
information between Byers and Ray. The committee found no evidence to contradict
the denials of both Spica and Byers that the Sutherland-Kauffmann offer was
discussed prior to the assassination. Finally, the committee believed that
active planning for the assassination of Dr. King did not begin until early
March 1968, a period when Ray had discussions with California associates about
his plans to travel east. Thus, if Ray did receive word of the
Kauffmann-Sutherland plot while still in Missouri State Penitentiary, it would
have to be assumed that Ray stored it away for later consideration.
The second possible connective developed by the committee was Dr. Hugh Maxey, a
medical officer at the Missouri State Penitentiary. Committee interviews with
relatives and associates of John Kauffmann indicated that Kauffmann and Maxey
were associated for several years.(264) Mrs. Kauffmann characterized it as a
purely social relationship, one that lasted from the early 1960's until
Kauffmann was sent to Federal prison for the sale of amphetamines. (265)
The committee looked into other reasons for an association between Maxey and
Kauffmann. It was learned, for example, that Maxey assisted Kauffmann in
obtaining the services of parolees in work release programs. (266) In addition,
the committee received allegations that Maxey was involved with Kauffmann in the
distribution of amphetamines in the prison. (267) While the existence of an
amphetamine problem at the prison was confirmed, the committee found no evidence
to support the charge that Maxey was involved in illegal distribution.
An examination of prison records established that Maxey had contact with James
Earl Ray at the prison and, further, that Ray pushed a food cart in the prison
hospital on occasion. (268) Thus, an opportunity for significant contact between
the two existed.
Maxey, who was over 80 and of failing health when he was interviewed by the
committee, denied his own involvelment in illegal drug distribution. He
characterized his relationship with Kauffmann as social and declined to discuss
the association further. Finally, Maxey stated that he had contact with James
Earl Ray only as a patient. He denied any knowledge of an offer to kill Dr. King
circulating at the prison during his employment there. (269)
The committee's investigation did not substantiate a Maxey connective. The
committee was unable to establish firmly any criminal
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activities shared by Maxey and Kauffmann; thus, the likelihood that the two
would have discussed the Sutherland offer seemed slim. In addition, while the
opportunity existed for extensive contact between Ray and Maxey, there was no
evidence that any relationship developed beyond that of doctor and patient.
The third connective explored by the committee was Naomi Regazzi, an employee of
the Grapevine Tavern when it was operated by John Ray in 1968. Byers told the
committee that he was acquainted with a St. Louis resident named Robert Regazzi
and that Regazzi and Spica also knew each other. The significance of this was
amplified by the fact that Naomi Regazzi, a former wife of Robert, was a
bartender at the Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis from January to July 1968.
In an attempt to substantiate this connective, the committee heard testimony
from a number of people. Byers stated that to the best of his recollection, he
did not discuss the offer with Regazzi. (270) Spica, also questioned under oath,
confirmed that he knew Regazzi, but asserted there was no friendship between
them. Spica further stated that he had had no knowledge of an offer to kill Dr.
King, (271) thus making it impossible for him to have passed the offer to
Regazzi. Regazzi, in an interview with the committee, claimed that he had no
knowledge of events leading to the King assassination. He said he had been
separated from Naomi during the period of her employment at the Grapevine, so he
could not have communicated an offer to her, had he known about it. (272)
Finally, the committee subpenaed Naomi Regazzi to testify under oath in
executive session. She confirmed her employment at the Grapevine between January
1, 1968, and July 1968. She recalled seeing her ex-husband during this period
only when he wanted to see their son. She stated that he was never in the
Grapevine itself.(273) Finally, she testified that she did not know Byers
personally and she could recall no discussion concerning an offer to kill Dr.
King at the Grapevine. She added that she discussed Dr. King with John Ray only
after the assassination. when he confirmed that the assassination suspect was
his brother. (274)
While Naomi Regazzi, who had become Naomi Denny could have brought information
concerning the offer on Dr. King's life to John Ray's tavern, the committee
found no evidence that she, in fact, did. Mrs. Denny was separated from Robert
Regazzi as of 1965 or 1966, and her relationship with him afterwards was limited
to his visits to see their son. (275) It would seem unlikely under these
circumstances that they would have discussed an offer for the murder of Dr.
King. In addition, Byers did not recall telling Regazzi of the offer, and both
Regazzi and his former wife denied having heard of it. The committee noted that
an examination of Mrs. Denny's testimony indicated that she was not always
candid. The connective remained unsubstantiated.
The fourth and final connective between Kauffmann Sutherland, and James Earl Ray
was the American Party campaign of Alabama Governor George C. Wallace for the
Presidency in the ate months of 1967 and early months of 1968. Both Sutherland
and Kauffmann support all the party, also known as the American Independent
Party. In fact, Floyd Kitchen, an organizer for the American Party in St.
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Louis in 1968 and Missouri State chairman of the American Independent Party,
indicated to the committee in a sworn statement that Iris AIP salary of $600 a
month was paid by Sutherland. (276) Additionally, committee interviews with
persons who were officials of the American Party in 1968, revealed that
Sutherland was active at both the local and national levels of the party and was
a candidate for presidential elector. (277)
Former associates of Sutherland reported that his strong support of the American
Party was based in large degree on the party's conservative position on civil
rights. The committee also learned that considerable support for the American
Party campaign was drawn from the White Citizens Council in St. Louis, an
organization dedicated to racial separation. As has been noted, Sutherland was a
member of the council.
John Ray was apparently active in the 1968 American Party campaign. His support
for Wallace was reflected in an article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch:
John Ray said he last saw his brother at the prison. "He and I are both strong
supporters of George C. Wallace * * * so maybe we talked about him a
little."(278)
Jerry Ray's attitude toward Governor Wallace was characterized by Edward Fields,
secretary of the National States Rights Party and editor of The Thunderbolt, who
said that Jerry "is very strongly for George Wallace and always has been a
strong Wallace supporter." (279)
John Roy's Grapevine Tavern was a distribution point for American Party campaign
literature, as the committee's investigation developed from sources including
his brother, Jerry. (280) Further, John helped transport prospective party
registrants to the registration office. (281) During the same general period,
evidence before the committee indicated, James Earl Ray was engaging in AIP
campaign activities in California.65 These activities by John and James Earl Ray
were considered significant by the committee in that they indicated a common
pursuit strongly suggesting a link between the brothers that neither was willing
to admit. Further, James' persistent denials of his AIP activity, despite clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary,66 necessarily raised the additional
question: What, beyond the activity itself, was he trying to conceal? Ray's
concern about his AIP activities was best reflected in his curious sensitivity
about one of the proposed "stipulations of fact" that he was asked to sign as
part of the proceedings leading to his guilty plea in March 1969. (282) The
stipulation involved an admission that he had taken three California residents
to register for Wallace. Ray, through his attorney, Percy Foreman, deleted the
reference to Wallace headquarters. No other stipulations in the 56-paragraph
document were altered.67
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John Ray's interest in AlP politics also seemed out of character, since he
apparently had never evidenced it before 1967 or 1968 and since, as a convicted
felon, he was not able to vote. For this reason, and because of demonstrated
ties between both Sutherland and Kauffmann and the AIP, the committee's
investigation was focused on this connection.
It was determined that a significant amount of AlP campaign activity occurred in
the neighborhood of the Grapevine Tavern. For example, Viola Anderson, Who lived
only one block from the Grapevine Tavern,(283) was active in both the St. Louis
Citizens Council and the American Party. (284) In fact, her residence was a
neighborhood campaign headquarters in the south St. Louis area and a likely
place for John Ray to have acquired his Wallace campaign paraphernalia 68
The committee also closely examined Glen Shrum, since deceased, a close friend
of Viola Anderson and one who was instrumental in American Party organization in
the Third Congressional District, the district in which John Ray's tavern was
located. Shrum was described to the committee as an activist member of radical
right-wing organizations, such as John Birch Society and the Minutemen. Further,
he reportedly artended meetings of the National States Rights Party, and he may
have been in contact with the Ku Klux Klan. (286) His friends also indicated to
the committee that he held strong opinions on civil rights, leading him to be
openly critical of Federal legislation and court actions dealing with equality
for Blacks. (287)
The committee contacted several American Party and White Citizens' Council
members, who said that several informal meetings were held in the neighborhood
in which Ray's tavern was located during the 1968 campaign. Reportedly, Shrum
attended many of them.(288) In addition, Shrum was apparently at least an
occasional patron of the Grapevine Tavern, raising the realistic likelihood of a
contact with John Ray. (289)
Ultimately, however, the committee's investigation of the St. Louis conspiracy
proved frustrating. Only circumstantial evidence was developed. Direct evidence
that would connect the conspiracy in St. Louis to assassination was not
obtained. Several of the principals and possible suspects were, of course, no
longer living, and others were clearly not inclined to be truthful with the
committee even when faced with the possibility of perjury or contempt
prosecutions. Nevertheless, in light of the several alternate routes established
by the evidence through which information of the offer could have reached James
Earl Ray, the committee concluded it was likely that he was aware of the
existence of the St. Louis conspiracy. 69
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7. CONCLUSION
The committee concluded that there was a likelihood of conspiracy in the
assassination of Dr. King. To summarize, several findings were central to the
committee's conspiracy conclusion. First, James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr.
King, and Raoul, as described by Ray, did not exist. In reaching these
conclusions, the committee rejected the possibility that James Earl Ray was an
unwitting "fall guy manipulated by others. The committee found, rather, that Ray
acted with full knowledge of what he was doing in the murder of Dr. King.
Second, an analysis of Ray's conduct before the assassination provided
compelling indications of conspiracy. Ray was not, in fact, a man without
significant associations. His financing, in all likelihood supplied by the Alton
bank robbery in July 1967, was strong evidence of significant criminal
associations with his brothers during the preassassination period. Further, his
campaign activities in California, viewed against the background of his 1967-68
fugitive status, his apolitical nature and his consistent refusal to admit the
activities, also strongly suggested involvement with others. Rays trip to New
Orleans, too, was significant. The abrupt nature of his departure from Los
Angeles the risks he took on the road, his receipt of money during the visit and
the speedy termination of his mission all indicated Ray's involvement with
others in an important meeting with a preplanned purpose.
Third, the analysis of Ray's motive was crucial to the conspiracy conclusion.
After examining Ray's behavior, his character and his racial attitudes, the
committee found it could not concur with any of the accepted explanations for
Ray as a lone assassin. Historically, Ray was a financially motivated criminal.
While unsympathetic to the civil rights movement, he did not manifest the type
of virulent racism that might have motivated the assassination in the absence of
other factors. While the committee recognized the presence of other possible
motives--racism or psychological needs--it concluded that the expectation of
financial gain was Ray's primary motivation. The committee's finding on motive,
therefore, carried conspiratorial implications.
Just as significant in the committee's ultimate conclusions on conspiracy was
the evidence bearing on the complicity of the brothers, John and Jerry Ray.
Three factors, negative in character, raised the possibility of the involvement
of one or both brothers.
First, despite an exhaustive and far-reaching field investigation, neither the
committee nor previous investigators were able to identify significant
associates of the assassin other than his brothers. The possibility of their
involvement in the assassination was necessarily increased by the absence of
alternatives.
Second, despite an offer of assistance from the Justice Department, Ray refused
to provide credible evidence on the subject of conspiracy. His self-sacrificial
posture was possibly explained as an effort to protect his brothers.
Third, the Ray brothers consistently attempted to conceal the true scope of
their preassassination contact with each other. John and James denied any
contact at all. This conduct could be explained
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by a sense of family loyalty. Nevertheless, it also raised the possibility that
preassassination contact, if revealed, would lead to implication in a
conspiracy.
Additional positive factors ultimately convinced the committee of the likelihood
of the involvement of one or both brothers in the assassination. James was, of
course, a fugitive from Missouri State Penitentiary. Automatically, this should
have led him to limit the duration of meetings with his brothers. Nevertheless,
substantial contact in a variety of forms apparently persisted throughout the
preassassination period. Much of this contact, moreover, was criminal in nature.
Both John and Jerry met with and assisted James during the months immediately
following his escape from Missouri State Penitentiary. In addition, John clearly
had foreknowledge of the escape plans and provided James with an alias and
social security number for immediate use. More significantly, the committee
found it highly likely that John and James robbed the Bank of Alton in Alton,
Ill., on July 13, 1967. Jerry knew of the robbery and assisted in distributing
the proceeds to James throughout his fugitive travels. There was evidence of the
receipt of money by James from a brother as late as February 1968, only weeks
before the assassination. Further, the committee concluded that James' trip to
New Orleans in December 1967 could best be understood as a meeting with one or
both of his brothers, with circumstantial evidence suggesting it was Jerry Ray.
The purpose of that meeting, beyond the transfer of funds, could not be firmly
established. but its sinister significance was clear. Finally, there was strong
circumstantial evidence of the involvement of a brother in a consulting capacity
during Ray's purchase of the murder weapon itself, although the evidence was
insufficient to determine the identity of the brother or the nature of the
contact.
Nevertheless, the evidence with respect to Ray and his brothers contained one
serious flaw: by itself, it provided no convincing explanation for their
combination in a plot on Dr. King's life. The committee did receive strong
evidence of pronounced racist attitudes in both John and Jerry. Yet, the
committee believed it unlikely that James or his brothers would have killed Dr.
King solely for racial reasons. The development of additional evidence on a
credible St. Louis-based plot, therefore, became a crucial element in the
committee's conspiracy analysis.
The committee found that there was substantial evidence to establish the
existence of a St. Louis-based conspiracy to finance the assassination of Dr.
King. A serious effort to solicit Russell Byers was made John Sutherland and
John Kauffmann in late 1966 or early 1967, apparent]y on behalf of a wider
authority. In addition, knowledge of Kauffmann's role in the effort to broker
the assassination was circulated and frequently mentioned at his Buff Acres
Motel in 1967. According to witness A, it was perceived as a standing offer. The
committee frankly acknowledged that it was unable to uncover a direct link
between the principals of the St. Louis conspiracy and James Earl Ray or his
brothers. There was no direct evidence that the Sutherland offer was accepted by
Ray, or a representative, prior to the assassination. In addition, despite an
intensive effort, no evidence was found of a payoff to Ray or a representative
either before or after the assassination.
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Despite this, the committee believed that there was a likelihood that word of
the standing offer on Dr. King's life reached James Earl Ray prior to the
assassination. This conclusion was based on several considerations. John was a
permanent resident of St. Louis from October 1966 forward. Ray himself was in
the St. Louis area on at least two occasions during his early fugitive period
once immediately after his escape, and again in July 1967 when he participated
in the robbery of the Bank of Alton. It was possible that either John or James
or both received word of the standing offer through criminal associates in the
St. Louis area. It was more likely, however, that John Ray heard of the offer
through AIP campaign activities in and around the Grapevine Tavern. George
Wallace's Presidenial bid stirred up intense support in the Grapevine's
neighborhood--the south St. Louis area. Race relations and the civil rights
movement became subjects of daily, and increasingly polarized, debate. At the
same time, Dr. King's efforts in the civil rights movement were expanding to
encompass opposition to the Vietnam war and support for the economically
oppressed--to culminate in a Poor People's Campaign in Washington. The committee
found it reasonable to believe that with an increase in the intensity of the St.
Louis AIP campaign effort, and the heightened visibility of Dr. King. discussion
of the Sutherland offer could well have come to James Earl Ray's attention. This
possibility was only strengthened by Sutherland's heavy involvement in the AIP
effort in St. Louis. Kauffmann also did significant work with Sutherland on
behalf of the party. In addition, the committee found at least two individuals
who knew Sutherland, were active in the AIP campaign, and who had been in the
Grapevine Tavern. Finally, John Ray's tavern was used as a local distribution
point for AIP campaign literature and paraphernalia. It was in these campaign
activities that the committee found the most likely connective between James
Earl Ray and the St. Louis conspiracy. In sum, the committee believed that the
weight of the evidence bearing on James and his brothers, taken in combination
with the evidence of the St. Louis-based conspiracy, established the likelihood
of a conspiracy in the death of Dr. King.
Because of a failure of the evidence, the committee's ultimate conclusion must,
however, be phrased in terms of alternatives. The committee believed that the
St. Louis conspiracy provided an explanation for the involvement of Ray and one
or both brothers in the assassination. The manner of their involvement could
have taken one of two forms. James Earl Ray may simply have been aware of the
offer and acted with a general expectation of payment after the assassination;
or he may have acted, not only with an awareness of the offer, but also after
reaching a specific agreement, either directly or through one or both brothers,
with Kauffmann or Sutherland. The legal consequences of the alternative
possibilities are, of course, different. Without a specific agreement with the
Sutherland group, the conspiracy that eventuated in Dr. King's death would
extend only to Ray and his brother(s); with a specific agreement, the conspiracy
would also encompass Suther]and and his group. In the absence of additional
evidence, the committee could not make a more definite statement. The committee
believed, nevertheless, that the evidence provided the likely outlines of
conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King.
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It is unfortunate that this information was not developed in 1968, when it could
have been pursued by law enforcement agencies equipped with tools not available
to the committee and at a time when the principals were still alive and witness'
memories were more precise. 70 It is a matter on which reasonable people may
legitimately differ, but the committee believed that the conspiracy that
eventuated in Dr. King's death in 1968 could have been brought to justice in
1968.
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The Committee Believes, Only those Discussed in Sec. B were Involved in the MLK
Death
Page 375
C. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT NO
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS, OTHER THAN THOSE DISCUSSED UNDER SECTION
B, WERE INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.
Since the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., numerous conspiracy
allegations have been advanced by authors, independent investigators, attorneys
for James Earl Ray and Ray himself. The committee examined these as well as
others that were uncovered during a review of agency files or were otherwise
brought to the committee's attention during the course of its investigation.
Some of the leads merited exhaustive investigation. All were pursued until it
was determined to the satisfaction of the committee that there was no link to
the King assassination.
1. RIGHTWING EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS
The committee investigated rightwing, segregationist, extremist groups and
individuals to find out if their outspoken opposition to Dr. King and their
demonstrated propensity for violence might have resulted in their involvement in
the assassination. FBI files on the Minutemen, Ku Klux Klan, and other extremist
organizations were examined and while the committee found no evidence that these
organizations had anything to do with the assassination, the committee did
discover conspiracy allegations that warranted additional field investigation
beyond that performed in the original investigation.
(a) The Minuteman 1
A review of FBI files on the Minutemen revealed a possible plot against Dr.
King's life that had received some attention by law enforcement officials
shortly before Dr. King's death. On January 15, 1968, Vincent DePalma, a close
associate of Robert B. DePugh, the founder of the Minutemen told a Denver agent
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) that he had defected from
the Minutemen and wished to supply information.(1) DePalma revealed that there
were 19 Minutemen strike teams across the United States assigned to assassinate
several prominent persons, including Dr. King, in the event DePugh was ever
imprisoned. (2) According to DePalma, the Minutemen also planned to incite race
riots in the summer of 1968.(3)
After it received this information from the ATF, the FBI attempted
unsuccessfully to locate DePalma, who had said he was moving to
--------------------------------
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Oregon. (4) As for DePugh, he disappeared in February 1968 following his
indictment by a Federal grand jury in Seattle, Wash., for conspiracy to commit
bank robbery. The FBI made no further attempts to investigate the threat until
shortly after Dr. King's assassination, when one of DePalma's Minutemen
associates, Edward Baumgardner, told a reporter that the artist's drawing of the
suspected assassin resembled DePalma. (5) Baumgardner was interviewed several
times by the FBI. He said that he and DePalma were members of a Minutemen strike
team that had been formed at a training camp in Colorado during the summer of
1967. Baumgardner repeated the information that DePalma had provided ATF and
said DePalma had been assigned the code name Willard. (James Earl Ray used the
alias John Willard when renting a room in a roominghouse in Memphis on April 4,
1968.) (6)
DePalma was located by the FBI several days after Dr. King was killed. He again
detailed information on the Minutemen strike teams that had targeted Dr. King
and on Minutemen plans to precipitate race riots in the summer of 1968 as a
means of facilitating a takeover of the Government.
Work records showed that DePalma was in Newport, R.I., on April 4, 1968.
Information he furnished during 3 days of interviews was verified by several FBI
offices. (7) DePugh and his chief associate in the Minutemen, Walter Peyson,
remained fugitives until their capture in July 1969. There was nothing in the
FBI files to reflect they were ever interviewed regarding possible involvement
of the Minutemen in the assassination of Dr. King.
The committee found that the DePalma lead had not been fully investigated by the
FBI, so it examined it anew. It found that DePalma had been murdered in an
unsolved gangland slaying in January 1978 in Los Angeles. (8) The committee did
locate and interview four persons who had attended the Colorado training camp in
the summer of 1967. Both Jerry Brooks,(9) an associate of DePugh's for at least
12 years, and Mary Tollerton,(10) DePugh's secretary until late 1967, denied
knowing of any plot to kill Dr. King. Although Brooks told of other
assassination plots by the Minutemen and of intelligence files on Dr. King and
other "subversives," Toilerton claimed that these activities were not serious.
Toilerton added that DePugh had trouble keeping the organization together in
1968 while avoiding capture, so he could not have been involved in Dr. King's
assassination. Walter Peyson (11) and Robert DePugh, (12) brought to Washington
under subpena, testified under oath that they were not involved in any plot to
kill Dr. King. They insisted that all discussions of assassination plots and
strike teams were mere paper propaganda.(13) Both Peyson and DePugh also
explained that because DePalma and Baumgardner were believed to be infiltrators,
they were often fed false information.
As a final investigative step, the committee compiled a list of all individuals
associated with the Minutemen in the cities visited by James Earl Ray following
his escape in April 1967 from Missouri State Penitentiary. This list was
cross-checked against a list of known or possible Ray associates. The results
were negative.
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Based on the testimony it heard, interviews with the assistant U.S. attorney who
prosecuted DePugh and Peyson in 1966 and ATF agents who had encountered DePugh,
extensive file reviews and the Ray associates name check, the committee
concluded there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the Minutemen were
involved in Dr. King's death.
(b) Klan organizations
A review of extensive FBI files on a number of Ku Klux Klan organizations
revealed approximately 25 Klan-related leads to potential conspiracies in the
assassination of Dr. King. Four of them warranted the attention of the
committee.
1. Information from a Mobile, Ala. FBI report indicated an informant had told
the Bureau that Sidney Barnes2 and several others had gone to Birmingham, Ala.,
in the fall of 1963 to kill Dr. King. (15) The FBI also learned that a secret
meeting had been held in Birmingham before the September 15, 1963, bombing of a
Birmingham church that left four young Black girls dead. Barnes William Potter
Gale, Noah Jefferson Carden and John C. Crommelin attended this meeting.(16) The
FBI had attempted to determine the whereabouts of the participants in the 1963
Birmingham meeting during the week following Dr. King's assassination. (17) The
Bureau files reflected that the FBI ended its investigation of Barnes after it
found no indication he was away from his home before or after the assassination.
(18)
When the committee approached Barnes for an interview, he refused to
cooperate.(19) The committee, however, extensively interviewed an individual who
was deeply involved in racial violence in the South in the mid-1960s and who was
willing to provide the committee with detailed information. This person, who was
considered very reliable by the committee, said he had met Barnes in 1963. He
characterized Barnes as an independent rightwinger who, despite deep-seated
racial animosity, had never been involved in violence. This source also told the
committee he had been in contact with Barnes and Noah Jefferson Carden during
March and April 1968, and he recalled no indications of their participation in a
conspiracy to kill Dr. King.
Additional interviews (21) and file reviews by the committee failed to reveal
evidence that would indicate Barnes was in any way involved in Dr. King's death.
2. In an interview with an agent of the Dallas FBI field office on April 22,
1968, Myrtis Ruth Hendricks, accompanied by Thomas McGee, maintained she had
overboard discussions of a conspiracy to kill Dr. King. (22) Hendricks said that
while working as a waitress at John's Restaurant in Laurel Miss., on April 2,
1968, she heard the owner, Deavours Nix, say he "had gotten a call on King." Nix
was then head of intelligence and the grand director of the Klan Bureau of
Investigation for the White Knights of Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi (WKKKKOM) the
most violent, Klan organization during 1967
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and 1968. Hendricks said that on April 3, 1968, she saw in Nix's office a rifle
with a telescopic sight in a case, which two men put in a long box in the back
of a 1964 maroon Dodge. Hendricks alleged that on the following day, Nix
received a phone call announcing Dr. King's death before the news was broadcast
on the radio. Hendricks left Laurel shortly after Dr. King's death to join her
boyfriend, Thomas McGee, in Texas. 3
The Bureau had independently confirmed that John's Restaurant was a gathering
place for known Klan members and that members had been there on April 3 and 4,
1968. Nevertheless, it found no corroboration of the Hendricks rifle story. The
committee's review of FBI files concerning the White Knights' activities
uncovered informant, information similar to the Hendricks allegation. In
addition, statements attributed to Samuel H. Bowers, the imperial wizard of the
WKKKKOM, in John's Restaurant on April 5, 1968, raised the possibility of his
involvement in the assassination. (23) As a result of this information and an
indication that it was not developed further in the FBI investigation, the
committee pursued the lead.
Myrtis Hendricks denied the substance of her allegation when contacted by the
committee. (24) While admitting that she had worked for Nix, she said she was
afraid of her former boyfriend, Thomas McGee, but refused to elaborate further.
The committee's attempt to interview FBI informants who had furnished relevant
information was unsuccessful.(25) The informants were either unavailable or
uncooperative.(26) Although the committee initially issued subpenas to Nix,
Bowers and McGee, time and cost constraints prevented their appearance in
executive session. (27)
The committee was, however, able to question at length a former member of the
White Knights who had participated in racial violence in the 1960's. This
witness, who was considered reliable and well informed on the activities of the
White Knights, could provide no information to indicate that Bowers or any other
member of the White Knights was involved in Dr. King's death. Further, he
remarked that it would not have been characteristic for members of the White
Knights to leave Mississippi and go to an unfamiliar locale to commit the
assassination.
The committee concluded that in light of Hendricks' refusal to repeat her
original allegation and the absence of evidence of a connection with James Earl
Ray, the lead should be discounted.
3. On June 15, 1968, 1 week after Ray's arrest a long-distance telephone
operator in Racine, Wis., contacted the FBI with information she believed
pertinent to the King assassination. She said she had placed calls for an
unknown male caller on June 11, 1968, to three numbers in North Carolina.. (28)
She added that in one call she overheard a man who identified himself os
"Robert" ask for his money so he could leave the country immediately.(29) In a
separate call, "Robert" referred to the Klan as the source of this money and
said he feared that Ray would "spill his guts" when he got back in the country.
(30)
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The Bureau identified the subscribers to the three North Carolina telephone
numbers as a used car dealer and his two brothers. (31) Local law enforcement
officials told the Bureau that a third brother was involved with stolen cars and
bad checks. (32) When interviewed by the Bureau, the two brothers had denied any
knowledge of the telephone calls or their brother's activities. (33) The FBI
found no connection between the subscribers to the numbers and any Klan
organizations. No further attempts to pursue this lead were initiated by the
Bureau.
The committee decided to examine this allegation further, despite the FBI's
conclusions in 1968. An attempt to locate the source of the information through
the Wisconsin Telephone Co. revealed that the supposed operator had never been
employed by that company. Based on this information, the committee concluded
that the lead was not, based on credible evidence and not worthy of further
investigation.
4. The most significant Klan-related lead involved informant information that
implied a financial relationship between Arthur Hanes, Sr., James Earl Ray's
attorney in 1968, and Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of
America (UKA). This information indicated Shelton's Klan organization had
contributed to Ray's defense through his attorney and, further, that Shelton had
made arrangements with Hanes to review the jury list for Ray's trial in order to
identify potentially sympathetic jurors. While neither of these acts were
illegal, cooperation between the leader of the UKA and Ray's attorney, if
proven, would have raised the possibility of preassassination agreement between
the UKA and Ray, especially in light of Ray's choice of Hanes as his attorney
following his arrest.
In January 1978, George Wilson,(34) a former midwestern leader of the UKA, told
the committee that the UKA had contributed $10,000 to Hanes when he was
representing Ray, under the pretense of paying for Hanes' legal representation
of a group of North Carolina Klansmen.(35) Wilson said this payment was
mentioned in a speech allegedly made at a Klan meeting by Furman Dean Williams,
Grand Dragon of the South Carolina UKA. The statement was made in the presence
of other persons whom Wilson also named. Two documents in the FBI file covering
the murder of Dr. King indicated that two sources independently corroborated
some of Wilson's information.
Source A alleged that Shelton advised that in August 1968 the defense was in
need of money for Ray's defense. Shelfon inquiry whether Klan members would be
willing to donate money for Ray's defense. Shelton added that he intended to
review the jury list in Ray's case when it was available. (36)
Source B learned that a UKA board meeting was held in 1969, and attended by
Hanes and Melvin Sexton, the UKA secretary who handled Klan finances 4 among
others. The meeting was convened to discuss the Klan's national defense fund, a
fund to assist members arrested while participating in Klan activities. Hanes'
defense of klansmen
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in North Carolina for $12,500 was specifically mentioned. After Hanes left the
meeting, Sexton allegedly commented on the King assassination and said he had a
piece of paper for Hanes pertaining to the Ray case. (37)
The committee's file review also revealed documentation of a contact between
Shelton and Hanes in June and August 1968 relating to legal assistance of
Shelton by Hanes. The document did not, however, specifically refer to Hanes'
representation of Ray. (38) The committee was unable to locate any FBI documents
indicating that the Bureau attempted to interview Hanes, Shelton, Sexton or
other principals concerning cooperation between the Klan and Hanes during Ray's
trial.
The committee's intital interest in Rays choice of Hanes as his first attorney
following his June 1968 arrest, combined with the FBI reformant material, led to
an extensive investigation by the committee to ascertain the nature of the
Hanes-Shelton relationship. (39) First, George Wilson was interviewed at length.
(40) Then, sources A and B were contacted by the FBI and, after giving consent,
were interviewed by the committee. The committee found no indication of a motive
to lie on the part of Wilson or either of the informants. Further, no financial
remuneration was offered in return for information, and there was no sign of a
personal vendetta against Hanes, Shelton, or Sexton.
In addition, Shelton,(41) Sexton,(42) Hanes,(43) Williams,(44) and James
Robertson Jones, (45) Grand Dragon for North Carolina in 1967 and 1968,
testified before the committee in executive session. Williams and Jones stated
under oath that they knew nothing of an understanding or agreement between Hanes
and Shelton or Sexton for funding or any other assistance for Ray's defense.
(46) Hanes, Shelton and Sexton vigorously denied ever considering such an
arrangement.(47)
The committee also uncovered discrepancies between the testimony of Hanes and
that of Shelton and Sexton. For example, Hanes and Sexton disagreed
substantially regarding the duration of their friendship and whether Hanes
helped establish the Klan's national defense fund. (48) Further, the Klansmen
and Hanes attempted to minimize their association, specifically denying meetings
between July 1968 and July 1969 that had been reported to the FBI. While these
contacts were important in establishing the credibility of the witnesses, they
did not bear specifically on Dr. King's assassination and, therefore, were not
pursued further. The discrepancies between the testimony of Hanes and Sexton
regarding the duration of their friendship and whether Hanes took part in
establishing the national defense fund could have been explained by the lapse of
time or by an attempt by Hanes to minimize his relationship with Sexton and the
legal work he did for him.
While the committee was unable ultimately to resolve all conflicts in the
evidence, it found no indications of an agreement between the UKA and James Earl
Ray prior to Dr. King's assassination. The committee concluded that there was no
evidence that Ray and members of the United Klans of America entered into a
conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King.
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(c) J.B. Stoner
J.B Stoner, a Georgia attorney and virulent segregationist, had represented
numerous defendants in racially motivated crimes against Blacks. (49) A founder
and leader of the fanatically anti-Black and anti-Semitic National States Rights
Party, (50) Stoner frequently excoriated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his
campaign for racial integration in the South. 5 After Dr. King's assassination,
the FBI investigated Stoner's activities on April 4, 1968.(52) Once the FBI
established that Stoner had been speaking at an NSRP rally in Meridian, Miss.,
on that day, it eliminated him as a suspect in Dr. King's murder. (53)
Stoner became James Earl Ray's attorney in 1969,(54) and he represented John L.
Ray (55) and Jerry W. Ray (56) in separate criminal matters in 1970. In
addition, Jerry Ray was employed as a bodyguard for Stoner in 1969. Based on
Stoner's blatant racism and his relationship with the three Ray brothers, the
committee decided further to investigate his possible involvement in the
assassination.
The committee's review of FBI files on Stoner revealed that, in the late 1950's,
Stoner was a suspect in a series of bombings directed against Black and Jewish
targets throughout the South.(57) Although no charges had been brought at the
time, Stoner was under indictment in 1978 for the 1958 bombing of a Birmingham
church. An undercover Birmingham police officer who took part in the bombing
investigation said Stoner had a proven propensity for violence. In testimony
before the committee, Dr. Edward R. Fields, a close friend of Stoner and a
leader of the NSRP, provided the committee with the names of other
segregationists with violent backgrounds whom Stoner knew.(60) In addition,
Stoner, Dr. Fields, and several codefendants were indicted in 1963 for
obstruction of justice in connection with their efforts to thwart desegregation
efforts in Birmingham, Ala. (61) The case was dismissed in 1964 for deficiencies
in the wording of the complaint. (62)
Stoner has been extremely active politically. In 1964, he was a candidate for
Vice President of the United States on the NSRP ticket.(63) He ran unsuccessful
campaigns for Governor of Georgia in 1970,(64) for Senator from Georgia in
1979,(65) and for Governor of Georgia in 1978. (66)
The first apparent contact between Stoner and members of the Ray family occurred
following James Earl Ray's apprehension in London on June 8, 1968. (67) Although
it has been suggested that Stoner and Ray or other members of the family had
contact before the assassination.(68)6 The committee found no evidence of such
an association. (70) Ray maintained that he first heard of Stoner when Stoner's
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Patriotic Legal Fund contacted him in London with an offer to finance his
defense.(71) Ray refused the offer at the time. (72) Stoner apparently first met
with Ray in late 1968 and discussed a civil suit against Time Inc. to stop
pretrial publicity.(73) Stoner did not represent Ray, however, until after his
March 10, 1969, guilty plea to the murder of Dr. King. Ray retained Stoner as
cocounsel in the motion for a new trial.(74)
Stoner had indicated publicly that he had information about a conspiracy to
assassinate Dr. King,(75) but when he testified before the committee, he denied
any knowledge of an assassination plot.(76) Further, when asked specific
questions relating to James Earl Ray and the assassination, Stoner declined to
answer, as was his duty on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.(77) (At
the time of Stoner's testimony, Ray had executed waivers of attorney-client
privilege for all of his previous attorneys except Arthur Hanes, Jr., and
Stoner. (78) Ray later executed a waiver for Hanes(79) but refused to waive his
privilege for Stoner.)
For several reasons--his relationship with the three Ray brothers, his racist
views, his demonstrated propensity for violence, as well as his recalcitrant
behavior before the committee--led to a suspicion that Stoner might have had
information about the assassination that he would not divulge. The committee
found no evidence, however, that Stoner in fact participated in the plot to
assassinate Dr. King.
(d) William Hugh Morris
J.B. Stoner told the committee in 1978 that William Hugh Morris offered him
$25,000 in the late 1950's to locate a skilled marksman to assassinate Dr. King.
(80) Stoner, who had contended repeatedly that the FBI was responsible for Dr.
King's death, said he believed Morris was a Bureau informant.(81) Stoner said he
told Morris that for $5,000 in advance, he would kill Dr. King with a bomb, (82)
but Morris explained that the persons financing the assassination wanted it done
with a rifle. (83) Stoner contended that he asked for the $5,000 up front to
insure his receipt of the money beforehand, although he had no intention of
carrying out the assassination.(84) Stoner believed the offer was part of an FBI
plot to entrap him. (85)
Stoner testified before the committee that there were no witnesses to his
discussion with Morris, but, he said, Morris had approached Asa Carter, a Stoner
associate, with the same offer.(86) Carter told the committee that he had been
active in white supremacist groups in the 1950's and 1960's, but he denied that
he had been offered a contract to kill Dr. King. (87) Carter added, however,
that threats on Dr. King's life were commonplace in the 1960's. (88)
In an attempt to resolve the Stoner allegation, the committee reviewed FBI files
concerning Morris and questioned him extensively in interviews and under oath.
The committee learned that the elderly Morris had been actively involved in Klan
organizations most of his adult life and, in 1978, was the Imperial Wizard and
Emperor of the Federated Knights of Ku Klux Klan, an organization with over
1,000 members in at least 7 States. (80) Morris only known criminal conviction
had occurred in 1949 when he was charged with contempt of court for refusing to
provide a Jefferson County. Ala., grand jury with a list of the Alabama members
of the Federated Knights of Ku Klux Klan.
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In executive session testimony before the committee, Morris vehemently denied
ever engaging in a conversation about a bounty on Dr. King's life with Stoner,
Carter, or anyone else.(90) Morris stressed that he was never involved in
violence or advocated its use in effectuating the Klan's principles.(91)
Nevertheless, in its review of the FBI files concerning Morris, the committee
found several FBI intelligence reports, based on informant information, that
indicated Morris, at an October 1961 Klan meeting, had said southern racial
problems could be eliminated by the murder of Dr. King. (92) Morris then
apparently boasted that he had a New Orleans underworld associate who would kill
anyone for a price.(93) Under oath, Morris denied making these statements. (94)
For a brief period in the 1960's, while Morris was active in the Klan, he also
served as an informant to Federal, State and local law enforcement
officials.(95) Although Morris readily admitted this activity, he explained that
he had never been paid and that he had never provided original information to
any law enforcement agency.(96) Rather, Morris contended that he had been merely
a conduit between agencies for information which the FBI, the Alabama attorney
general and the Birmingham police obtained from their own independent sources.
(97) He claimed his underlying objective in acting as an informant was to
ascertain the identities of actual informers in the Klan organizations. (98)
Morris said he believed that Stoner had lodged the allegation to discredit
him.(99) He explained that he and an undercover Birmingham police detective had
been regarded by the Alabama attorney general's office as key witnesses against
Stoner in the 1958 bombing of the Bethel Baptist Church in Birmingham. (100)
The committee uncovered no evidence to support Stoner's allegation against
Morris and concluded that Morris was not involved in the assassination of Dr.
King.
2. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: MEMPHIS
(a) Citizen's band radio broadcast
At approximately 6:36 p.m. on April 4, 1968, an unidentified citizen's band
radio operator in Memphis was heard broadcasting over channel 17. (101) He
stated he was pursuing a white Mustang driven by the killer of Dr. King. The CB
operator, contrary to lawful radio procedure, never identified himself. He
announced that he was chasing the white Mustang east on Summer Avenue from
Parkway Street at a high rate of speed and requested a land line to communicate
to the police department.(102) The broadcast was made about 33 minutes after the
first announcement over police radio that Dr. King had been shot.
A Memphis CB operator, William Herbert Austein, among others, heard the original
broadcast. As he was driving through the intersection of Jackson Avenue and
Hollywood Street, Austein halted a Memphis police cruiser driven by Lt. Rufus
Bradshaw. (103) Austein relayed information received from the unknown CB
operator to the police, (104) and for the remainder of the broadcast, Austein
received transmissions over the CB unit in his automobile, and they were relayed
by Bradshaw to Memphis police headquarters.(105)
Shortly after 6:36 p.m., in response to a request from Austein, the unidentified
operator said that he was pursuing the Mustang east on
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Summer Avenue from Highland Street. (106) In subsequent transmissions, the
operator told Austein he was accompanied by two white males in a blue Pontiac,
and they were chasing the Mustang east on Summer Avenue from Waring. They then
followed the Mustang north on Mendenhall Road from Summer Avenue. At
approximately 6 p.m., the chase proceeded north on Jackson Avenue toward
Raleigh, a suburb northeast of Memphis, according to the broadcast.(107) At
approximately 6:44 p.m., the operator reported that he had just chased the white
Mustang through a red light at the intersection of Jackson and Stage Roads at 95
miles per hour. (108)
At this point, Memphis police began to suspect that the broadcast was a
hoax.(109) Two units of the Shelby County Sheriff's Department, stationed at an
intersection at the very moment the Mustang and Pontiac were supposed to have
passed through, informed the dispatcher they had seen no one.(110)
At approximately 6:45 p.m., the unidentified operator broadcast his position as
going out Austin Peay Highway and said the occupant of the Mustang was shooting
at him. (111) In the CB operator's final broadcast at approximately 6:48 p.m.,
he said he was approaching Millington Road heading to a naval base from Austin
Peay Highway. (112)
In its subsequent investigation of this broadcast, the Memphis Police Department
concluded it had been a hoax and that the chase had never occurred. (113) The
FBI, relying on the field investigation by the Memphis police, concurred.(114)
The committee also concluded that a chase as described in the mysterious
post-assassination CB broadcast never occurred and that the broadcast was in
fact a hoax. The committee noted first that at approximately 6:44 p.m., the
moment the chase was said to have sped through the intersection of State and
Jackson Roads at 95 miles per hour, officers in two patrol cars from the Shelby
County Sheriff"s Department, stationed at the intersection, saw nothing unusual.
(115)
Further, the committee's examination of a map of the route revealed that the
chase covered about 10.5 miles from the first transmission at approximately 6:36
p.m. to the transmission at approximately 6:44 p.m. that described the blue
Pontiac passing through the intersection of Jackson and Stage. (116) For the two
automobiles to have covered such a distance in that time--10.5 miles in 8
minutes---they had to have averaged a speed of 78 miles per hour. A large
segment of the alleged chase route was on a busy artery that was, at the time,
crowded with rush-hour traffic. Under such conditions, a high
speed chase such as that described in the broadcast would have attracted
considerable attention, caused numerous traffic infractions and undoubtedly
given rise to citizen complaints. The committee's examination of Memphis Police
Department records revealed no supporting evidence of such a chase on April 4,
1968.
Investigative records of the Memphis police and the FBI indicated that an
18-year-old CB enthusiast, Edward L. Montedonico, Jr., was considered the most
likely perpetrator of the hoax, although prosecution was not recommended.(117)
Memphis police officers chiefly responsible for the investigation told the
committee that Montedonico was considered the prime suspect. (118)
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The committee's investigation into the identity of the broadcaster, although
hampered by Montedonico's refusal to cooperate,(119) revealed that the evidence
relied upon by the Memphis Police Department and the FBI in naming Montedonico
as the suspect was apparently based on an erroneous interpretation of a key
witness statement.(120) Additionally, an extensive background investigation of
Montedonico failed to reveal incriminating evidence.(121) Indeed, the committee
uncovered specific exculpatory evidence relating to Montedonico as the
broadcaster,(122) and the committee's own consultants, Federal Communications
Commission engineers, doubted that Montedonico was responsible for the hoax.
(123) Ultimately, Montedonico decided to cooperate with the committee, and he
denied under oath that he made the broadcast. (124)
Additional possible suspects were identified and interviewed in the course of
the committee's investigation of the CB broadcast. (125) The committee also made
an effort to pinpoint the broadcast by identifying all operators who had
overheard the broadcast and by obtaining technical data concerning their
location, their equipment and the strength of the signal they had received.(126)
The committee used FCC engineers in an attempt to identify the broadcaster.
(127) As stated by the FCC in its report to the committee, (128) however, the
interval of 10 years made virtually impossible a task that would have been
difficult even in 1968. The committee, therefore, was unable to identify the
broadcaster.
The committee considered indications that the broadcast was a-conspiratorial
act. For instance, the broadcaster asked for a land line relay to police
headquarters, a request that shows he wanted the information to get to the
police and suggests he had more than a hoax in mind. Further, the broadcaster
attempted to lead police to the northern part of Memphis, while the most
accessible route out of town from the vicinity of the Lorraine Motel was to the
south, the direction the committee believed James Earl Ray did indeed follow.
Although its failure to identify the broadcaster prevented the. committee from
determining definitively whether the broadcast was in any way linked
conspiratorially to the assassination of Dr. King, several factors indicated it
probably was not a conspiratorial act. The broadcast came a full 35 minutes
after the assassination, so it could not have assisted in the immediate flight
of the assassin out of Memphis. A description of the suspected assassin's white
Mustang had been broadcast over the police radio at 6:10, so a CB operator who
had been monitoring police calls would have had the description of the
automobile. Moreover, the broadcaster did not use the best means of penetrating
the police network. He used channel 17, one of the lesser used CB frequencies.
Consequently, while the identity of the CB operator remained undetermined, the
committee found that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the Memphis
CB broadcast was linked to a conspiratorial plot to kill Dr. King.
(b) John McFerren
The committee's review of Memphis FBI files revealed that John McFerren
approached agents on April 8, 1968. with information concerning the
assassination. (129) McFerren said that on the afternoon of April 4, 1968, while
he was shopping at the Liberto, Liberto, and
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Latch Produce Store in Memphis, he overheard a "heavy, set white male," later
identified as Frank Liberto,7 the company's president, talking on the telephone.
(130) McFerren asserted that Liberto indicated that his brother in New Orleans,
La. was going to pay $5,000 to someone to kill a person on a balcony.(131) After
hearing of Dr. King's death. later that day and observing a sketch of the
assassin in the newspaper the following day, he felt an individual that had been
employed at Liberto, Liberto and Latch Produce during the last year might be the
fugitive assassin.(132) Based on McFerren's story, a writer, William Sartor,
hypothesized that organized crime was responsible for the King assassination. In
his investigation, Sartor attempted to connect Frank Liberto with organized
crime figures in Memphis and New Orleans. (133) 8
In its 1968 investigation of McFerren's allegation, the FBI and Memphis Police
Department interviewed Liberto and members of his family in New Orleans, and
James W. Latch, vice president of Liberto, Liberto, and Latch Produce. All those
interviewed denied any involvement in, or knowledge of, Dr. King's
assassination. Both Frank Liberto and his business partner, Latch, however,
admitted making disparaging remarks about Dr. King in the presence of their
customers. (134)
Because Liberto lived in the Memphis area and because of reports that he had
displayed pronounced racial bias, the committee determined that McFerren's story
warranted additional investigation. It conducted extensive interviews of
Liberto,(135) members of his family, (136) neighbors (137) and business
associates,(138) in addition to checking the backgrounds of Liberto and his
brother through the FBI and municipal police departments. Liberto and members of
his family provided the committee essentially the same information they had
given the FBI in 1968. Liberto stated under oath that, while on occasion he had
made disparaging remarks concerning Dr. King, he did not recall making the April
4, 1968. statements attributed to him by McFerren. (139) Although an indirect,
link between Liberto's brother, Salvatore, and an associate of New Orleans
organized crime figure Carlos Marcello was established. (140) no evidence was
found to substantiate the claim that Frank Liberto or Carlos Marcello were
involved in the assassination.
In its attempt to evaluate McFerren's credibility, the committee interviewed
local police and FBI agents who had received information from him. McFerren had
a reputation for furnishing the officials with information that could not be
substantiated.(141) The committee noted, however, that this evaluation by law
enforcement officers may have been tainted by McFerren's work as a Black civil
rights activist who frequently lodged complaints of police brutality.
Extensive interviews of McFerren by the FBI in 1968 (142) and the committee
(143) revealed inconsistencies in his basic allegation that could not be
reconciled. For instance, McFerren had told the original investigators, as well
as the committee, that James Earl Ray had worked at the Liberto produce company
before the assassination,
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either in the fall or early winter of 1967.(144) McFerren also told members of
the committee staff that at this time, Ray had "jungle rot" on his cheek and
neck. (145) The committee, however, had no evidence of Ray's presence in Memphis
during the period alleged by McFerren, and persons who had seen Ray during that
period did not recall a similar skin disease.
McFerren also claimed he had positively identified James Earl Ray to the FBI as
the individual who worked at the produce company before the assassination. (146)
An FBI memorandum concerning this incident revealed that McFerren eliminated all
photographs (including one of Ray) of Bureau suspects that he reviewed. McFerren
only claimed that Ray closely resembled the person who worked at the market
after a picture of Ray was pointed out to him. (147)
On the basis of witness denials, lack of corroborating evidence and McFerren's
questionable credibility, the committee concluded that his allegation was
without foundation and that there was no connection between his story and the
assassination of Dr. King.
3. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: NEW ORLEANS 9
(a) William Sartor
Writer William Sartor, in an unpublished manuscript, advanced the possibility,
among other allegations, that organized crime participated in Dr. King's
assassination. The committee focused its attention on Sartor's contention that,
in New Orleans in December 1967, James Earl Ray met with Charles Stein and three
persons who were connected with organized crime and white supremacist groups.
(148) The meeting allegedly was held at either the Town & Country Motel, owned
by New Orleans Mafia boss Carlos Marcello, or the Provincial Motel, where Ray
stayed from December 17 to 19, 1967. (149)
Sartor, who died in 1971,(150) had provided no information about how he
discovered that such a meeting occurred, and he wrote that he was not aware of
the subject of the meeting.(151) In support of his speculation that this meeting
was in some way linked to the assassination of Dr. King, however, Sartor pointed
to the following considerations:
The proximity in time between the meeting and the assassination;
The occurrence of the meeting in a city Sartor described as a bastion of racist
thinking;
The location of the meeting at either one of two hotels that Sartor suggested
were guest houses for an underworld clientele; and
Ray's statement to author William Bradford Huie that he left New Orleans with
$2,500 cash and the promise of $12,000 more for doing one last big job in 2 to 3
months. (152)
Sartor wrote that Sam DiPianzza, Sol La Charta and Lucas Dilles were also at the
meeting. DiPianzza and La Charta were described by Sartor as involved in
organized crime, as well as avid racists. Dilles,
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also a racist, was allegedly connected with the late Leander Perez, Louisiana
political boss and virulent segregationist.(153)
Further investigation by the committee revealed that the correct spelling for
names of the persons alluded to by Sartor was Salvadore "Sam" DiPianzza, Dr.
Lucas A. DiLeo, and Salvadore La Charda.
Sartor also speculated that Ray may have been told during this meeting that
Carlos Marcello would protect him after the assassination because Sartor
believed both DiPianzza and La Charda had direct ties to Marcello.(154)
The committee checked the backgrounds of the three persons named by Sartor.
DiPianzza, a suburban New Orleans resident, was a gambler and bookmaker with
reputed connections to Marcello and other underworld figures. Approximately 3
weeks before the alleged meeting, diPianzza was sentenced to 10 years in prison
on a gambling conviction. Although he was free on bond at the time of the
alleged meeting, he denied in a committee interview ever meeting with Ray.(155)
DiLeo, a practicing physician in a New Orleans suburb, had a record for such
minor offenses as disturbing the peace, resisting arrest, and assult. When
questioned by the committee, he maintained that he never had heard of the
Provincial Motel but admitted he was familiar with the Town & Country Motel
where he had stayed once 20 years earlier. He stated that he had never met or
spoken with Ray or Marcello.(156) Salvadore La Charda, formerly Chief Juvenile
Probation Officer in the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff's Office, committed suicide
in June 1968. He had no criminal record.(157) DiLeo and DiPianzza were unable to
account for their whereabouts on december 17 through 19, 1968.
A review of the Provincial Motel records indicated that the persons named by
Sartor had not registered at the motel while ray was there. Town & Country
records were no longer available. Both Charles Stein10 (158) and Carlos Marcello
(159) told the committee they knew of no such meeting with Ray or the others.
In his manuscript, Sartor named two sources of his information. Carlton Pecot,
the first Black police officer in New Orleans and the director of a Federal
education program aiding minority students in 1978, appeared to be the primary
source of Sartor's New Orleans information. When questioned under oath by the
committee with regard to Sartor's reliability and the accuracy of his notes,
Pecot claimed, however, that he was unfamiliar with most of the facts and
statements in Sartor's manuscript.(160) Pecot did recall meeting with Sartor
five to eight times to assist with his investigation of relevant leads in the
King case.(161)
Robert Lyons, another purported Sartor source, told the FBI in 1968 that Sartor
had attributed false information to him that in reality originated with
Sartor.(162)
The committee found no support for Sartor's contention that Ray met with persons
involved in organized crime in New Orleans before the assassination.
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(b) Raul Esquivel
In 1969, Charles Stein gave Dave Larsen and Jerry Cohen, investigative reporters
for the Los Angeles Times, a New Orleans telephone number that Stein said was
Ray's contact number for his alleged criminal accomplice, Raoul. Larsen and
Cohen discovered that the subscriber to the number was Troop B of the Louisiana
State Police. Assigned to that suburban New Orleans barracks was trooper Raul
Esquivel. The reporters theorized that Esquivel might be the Raoul to whom Ray
had referred.
In an attempt to determine whether Stein actually received thin number from Ray
or merely represented it as Ray's contact number so he could sell it, the
committee reviewed the entire FBI investigation of the information and the FBI
interviews with Larsen, Cohen, and Stein. Larsen and Cohen were interviewed by
the committee, and Stein testified in executive session.
The committee received several different accounts about how Stein originally
obtained this number, and the conversations that led Larsen and Cohen to believe
that the number belonged to a Ray contact. There were allegations that the phone
number was in Ray's handwriting; (163) that the phone number was in Stein's
handwriting; (164) that Ray gave Stein the number, and told Stein it was where
he could be reached; (165) that Ray told Stein he could get a weather report at
the number;(166) that Ray never gave Stein the number but Stein saw the
telephone number on a paper in Ray's car and copied it; (167) that Stein never
gave the reporters the number at all because they only offered him $15 or $20
for the note;(168) and, finally, that Stein obtained the number of a highway
patrol office from a service station attendant to check road conditions.
Although the committee could not find satisfactory proof that this number
actually came from Ray, it conducted a full investigation of Raul Esquivel's
background and his whereabouts on the dates in 1967 and 1968 that Ray alleged he
met with Raoul.11 The committee found that Raul Esquivel was not the Raoul
implicated in the assassination by Ray. Criminal indexes of Federal and local
law enforcement agencies failed to reveal and intelligence data indicating that
Esquivel had a criminal background. His record as a Louisiana State trooper was
unblemished except for one complaint of use of excessive force, a charge later
found by the office of the U.S. attorney to lack prosecutire merit.(169) Work
records for 1967 and 1968 indicated that Esquivel could not have met Ray at the
times and places Ray alleged he was with Raoul. Moreover, in a sworn statement
to the committee, Esquivel denied ever having met with Ray, or with a person
using any of Ray's known aliases, or with Charles Stein.(170) Finally, Esquivel
did not fit any of the physical descriptions of Raoul provided by Ray.(171) The
committee concluded that there was no evidence linking Esquivel with Ray or the
assassination of Dr. King, and that the Larsen-Cohen theory was unsupported by
fact.
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(c) Reynard Rochon
According to author George McMillan's unpublished notes from interviews with
Jerry Ray, James Earl Ray had a New Orleans drug contact named "Eddie." (172)
McMillan made the notes while working on "The Making of an Assassin," a
biography of James Earl Ray. While McMillan's notes were unclear, it appeared
that Jerry Ray told McMillan that James made money on drugs he secured from
"Eddie" and then delivered them to Los Angeles.(173) Jerry recalled that James
asked him to contact this person in New Orleans and tell him that James had not
disclosed their relationship to authorities, which Jerry claimed he did. (174)
In notes of a much later interview, McMillan noted that Jerry referred to "The
Fence" in New Orleans and suggested to McMillan that James carried drugs for
this person to Los Angeles. (175) Jerry seemed to indicate "The Fence" was
Reynard J. Rochon and that he had twice met with Rochon.(176) Jerry claimed he
received money each time he met Rochon and implied, according to McMillan's
notes, that the money was paid to induce James not to expose his relationship
with "The Fence" (177) Jerry told McMillan that "The Fence" knew James as Harvey
Lowmeyer but was unaware that James intended to kill King.(178)
It was unclear from McMillan's notes whether "Eddie." "The Fence" and Reynard J.
Rochon were supposed to be the same person. As a result, the committee asked
McMillan, but he could not recall with any certainty whether Jerry was using
"Eddie" and "The Fence" as nicknames for Rochon. (179) McMillan said that after
he learned from his own investigation that Reynard Rochon was a postal worker,
he dropped the matter. (180)
The committee, although able to confirm Jerry's presence in New Orleans on the
dates he purportedly met with this person,(181) uncovered no evidence that the
meetings he described took place. A complete background check on Rochon was
conducted through the Drug Enforcement Administration,(182) the FBI (183) and
the New Orleans Police Department; no records were found indicating any criminal
activities. Finally, the committee deposed Rochon, a successful Black accountant
in New Orleans, concluding he had never met with James Earl Ray.(184) Rochon
vigorously denied that he had been known by the nicknames "Eddie" or "The
Fence"' (185) or that he ever trafficked in narcotics. (186)
The committee was unable to ascertain why either James Earl Ray or his brother,
Jerry Ray, might choose to implicate Rochon in Ray's 1967 and 1968 activities.
The committee concluded that there was no connection between Rochon and either
Ray brother and that the allegation was without foundation.
(d) Herman Thompson
James Earl Ray maintained that, following his October 6, 1967, departure from
Birmingham, he drove through Baton Rouge, La., and called a telephone number he
had been given by his mysterious co-conspirator, Raoul. The subscriber to this
number, according to Ray, was to give him instructions about his next rendezvous
with Raoul. (187)
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The committee hoped to identify and locate the subscriber to that Baton Rouge
telephone number. Ray's conflicting accounts about this part of his journey,
however, cast doubt on the Baton Rouge story.
In a March 3, 1977, interview with CBS reporter Dan Rather, Ray indicated that
his destination was New Orleans when he left Birmingham, Ala., in October 1967.
(188) Ray claimed he called the number Raoul had given him when he reached Baton
Rouge and the party that answered told Ray his next meeting with Raoul had been
changed to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. (189)
During the committee's third interview with Ray 6 weeks after the Rather
interview, he indicated, however, that he knew his destination was Nuevo Laredo
when he left Birmingham. (190) Ray said he called a number given him by Raoul
while driving through Baton Rouge, but he never spoke with the subscriber of the
number because the line was busy when he made the call. Ray later received more
detailed instructions concerning his next meeting with Raoul by calling a New
Orleans number Raoul had given him. (191)
Ray told the committee that he had the name of the subscriber to the Baton Rouge
number. (192) At the time he called the number, he said he was unaware of the
subscriber's identity, but he later discovered the name by spending several
hours skimming through a local telephone book in a Baton Rouge motel. (193) Once
he found a number ending with the correct last two digits, he explained, he
looked at the whole number until he found the one Raoul had given him. (194)
Ray's efforts ultimately led him to the name Thompson.(195) Ray contended he had
never spoken with Thompson and never mentioned Thompson's name to Raoul. (196)
The person Ray identified was Herman Thompson. Thompson had been an assistant
chief criminal deputy of the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Department for 26 years.
In 1978, Thompson resided at the same address and had the same telephone number
as in 1967.(197)
Thompson was a cooperative committee witness, who submitted to a deposition
following an interview. He stated under oath that he never knew anyone named or
nicknamed Raoul.(198) Although he had heard of James Earl Ray in connection with
the King assassination, he denied ever meeting or speaking with Ray or anyone
using Ray's known aliases. (199) The committee did attempt to determine whether
Ray may have maliciously implicated Thompson as a means of settling a grudge or
aiding a fellow inmate. Thompson could not recall ever arresting, incarcerating
or transporting any person who had contact with either Leavenworth Federal
Penitentiary or Missouri State Penitentiary where Ray had been an inmate. (200)
Thompson stated that he was never a member of any white extremist organization
(201) and that he never had any unusual complaints or disciplinary actions filed
against him while he worked with the sheriff's department. (202) Thompson's
former employer confirmed his statements to the committee.
The committee found no evidence to indicate that Herman Thompson was involved in
the assassination or with an individual named Raoul. The committee concluded,
further, that Ray's allegation was merely an attempt to gain credence for his
Raoul story and to raise an implication of official complicity in the
assassination.
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(e) Jules Ricco Kimble
In June 1968, The Toronto Star named Jules Ricco Kimble as a possible criminal
associate of James Earl Ray in 1967. (203) A reporter for the newspaper wrote
that Kimble, a member of the right-wing Minutemen, had lived within a few blocks
of Ray's 1967 Montreal residence and had met Ray in both Montreal and New
Orleans.
Upon receipt of this information following the assassination, the FBI reviewed
its files on Kimble. They reflected that Kimble had an extensive criminal record
and associations in 1967 with the Ku Klux Klan. (205) The files did not
establish ties between Kimble and the Minutemen. ( 206 )
In light of Kimble's criminal background and his possible presence in Montreal
during the period Ray resided in the city, July and August 1967, the committee
decided that the allegation warranted further investigation. The committee
interviewed Toronto Star reporters Andre Salwyn (207) and Earl MacRae, (208) who
had developed this lead, and reviewed an investigative report on the Kimble lead
prepared by the RCMP. The reporters recalled the story in detail. Their
recollections, however, as well as the version of the allegation that appeared
in the RCMP report, (209) differed on several major points. For instance, Salwyn
alleged that MacRae got the lead from author. William Bradford Huie, for whom he
was doing research in 1968, (210) and MacRae said that Salwyn received the
information from a police contact in Montreal.(211) RCMP files, however,
indicated that a newspaper article regarding James Earl Ray's residence in
Montreal aroused Salwyn's curiosity, and the reporter subsequently discovered
Kimble had lived in the same area. (212) Salwyn wrote that a person whose name
was actually Raoul drove a white Mustang with Louisiana plates, equipped with
guns and a police radio. (213) RCMP files indicated that this person, named
Kimble, made daily calls to New Orleans, listened to police broadcasts, carried
guns and made racist comments. (214)
The committee performed a thorough background check of Kimble. Files from the
offices of Jim Garrison. New Orleans district attorney in 1968, Joseph Oster, a
former investigator for the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry,
the FBI, and the CIA reflected that Kimble had an extensive criminal background,
including active participation in the Ku Klux Klan in 1967. (215) There was no
indication, however, that Kimble was involved in narcotics smuggling and
gunrunning, the criminal activities that James Earl Ray attributed to his
contact, Raoul.
Extensive interviews with Oster, who was familiar with Kimble's history,(216)
and Kimble's former wife(217) indicated that Kimble was in New Orleans in
December 1967 when Ray visited that city, although he apparently did not visit
Montreal until after Ray had left that city in August 1967. Although generally
uncooperative during his interview, Kimble confirmed that he did not go to
Canada until September 1967. (218) Kimble also denied meeting Ray or a person
using any of Ray's aliases. (219)
The committee found no evidence to support a Ray-Kimble connection or to
indicate that Kimble was involved in any plot to kill Dr. King.
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(f) Randy Rosenson
In a 1977 interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Co., James Earl Ray intimated
that Randolph Erwin Rosenson might have information about Raoul, the mysterious
figure who Ray maintained was responsible for the King assassination. Ray
asserted that while cleaning his Mustang when he was in Mexico in November 1967,
a few weeks after Raoul had been in the car, he found a business card with
Rosenson's name on it.(220)
Although Ray apparently withheld this information for 10 years and was elusive
about the nature of Rosenson's possible involvement, the committee conducted an
exhaustive investigation of Rosenson's background, associates and movements in
the 1960's. It uncovered evidence indicating that Rosenson and Ray had had
several opportunities to meet prior to the assassination of Dr. King.
Evidence developed by the committee showed that Rosenson had traveled to Mexico
in late 1965 and early 1966.(221) According to Ray, Raoul was dealing in
unspecified contraband, perhaps narcotics or stolen cars, in Mexico in late
1967. In addition, rosenson's operation of a traveling carnival business gave
him mobility.(222) The committee surmised that he may have been in some of the
same cities Ray visited after escaping from the Missouri State Penitentiary in
1967. For example, Rosenson often traveled to New Orleans to visit friends and
relatives, although the committee found no evidence that he was in New Orleans
in December 1967 when Ray drove there from Los Angeles and allegedly met Raoul.
(223) The committee did establish, however, that Rosenson was in Los Angeles and
Birmingham, Ala., at the same time as Ray in 1967.(224) Rosenson and Ray used
the same Birmingham bank. (225) Rosenson was also in the Birmingham area in
March 1968 when Ray was purchasing the murder weapon there. (226) Finally,
Rosenson traveled in many of the same New Orleans circles as Ray's associate
Charles Stein, a former New Orleans resident who lived in Los Angeles in 1967.
Both Rosenson and Stein were known to the New Orleans Police Department for
similar criminal conduct.(227) They also had mutual acquaintances, frequented
the same bars, and had retained the same lawyer. (228)
Rosenson was interviewed by the committee on at least six occasions, and he
appeared before the committee in executive session. He repeatedly denied knowing
Ray, any Ray family members, or any known Ray associates, including a Raoul, or
Charles Stein. Further, he emphatically denied any involvement in the King
assassination and could provide no reason why Ray would implicate him. (229)
Despite the opportunities for Ray and Rosenson to have met, an extensive field
investigation, including interviews of Rosenson's relatives, friends, business
associates, criminal contacts, and numerous law enforcement officials, failed to
establish a definite link between Ray and Rosenson.(230) The committee concluded
that Rosenson was not involved with Ray in a conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King.
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4. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: ATLANTA
(a) Edna Mathews Lancaster
Edna Mathews Lancaster told the committee in late 1977 that she was associated
with a group of people, including James Earl Ray, who met at a laundry where she
worked in Mableton, Ga., to plot the assassination of Dr. King.(231) According
to Mrs. Lancaster, this group, which she called "the secret American
Revolutionary Army," not only planned but carried out the assassination. (232)
She claimed she had met James Earl Ray in the early 1950's when he and her
husband were stationed in the Army in California. (233)
The committee reviewed FBI files concerning this allegation in an attempt to
check Lancaster's story. The files reflected that after providing a similar,
although not identical story, Lancaster had named several persons who allegedly
could verify certain aspects of her account. (234) When subsequently interviewed
by the FBI, each person had denied any knowledge of the discussions, and most
characterized Lancaster as an unbalanced person with an overactive imagination.
(235) During interviews conducted by the committee, Lancaster's husband (236)
and former employees (237) of the Mableton laundry reported that she had a
severe drinking problem and was generally unstable. In addition, they denied any
knowledge of an assassination plot.
The committee found that Edna Mathews Lancaster was not a credible person. Its
investigation revealed substantial variations in her story over the years to
accommodate new revelations about the CIA, FBI, and prominent figures associated
with various assassinations and government scandals.(238) A further indication
of Lancaster's lack of credibility was her son's statement to the committee that
his mother had convinced him that James Earl Ray was father. (239)
The committee concluded that Lancaster's story was not worthy of further
investigation.
(b) Claude and Leon Powell
In January 1976, Leon Powell contacted the FBI about a possible conspiracy
involving the King assassination. In February. 1978, he testified before the
committee concerning the details of the allegation.(240) According to Powell, he
and his brother Claude Powell were in an Atlanta bar known as "Pete's," or "Pete
Bailey's," in the fall of 1967 when Arnold Ray Godfrey, a mutual friend, told
them he could put them in touch with a person who would pay a large sum of money
to anyone willing to kill Dr. King. (241) Several days later, at the same bar,
Claude and Leon were approached by a white male who introduced himself only as
Ralph. (242) After indicating that he was the person to whom Godfrey had
referred, Ralph displayed an open briefcase full of money.(243) Ralph said it
contained $25,000 and promised that if they took the job, they would receive
$25,000 more when it had been completed. (244) The Powells hesitated to accept
the offer, and Ralph closed his briefcase and left the bar. (245) Leon said he
never saw or heard from this person again. (246)
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In its investigation of the assassination of Dr. King, the FBI interviewed
Claude Powell, who essentially corroborated his brother's story. The FBI also
conducted polygraph examinations of both brothers.(247) Leon's examination was
inconclusive,(248) while responses by Claude to questions about the
assassination plot indicated his responses were not deceptive.(249) After a full
investigation of the Powell allegation, the FBI was unable to corroborate or
discredit the story. The matter was turned over to the Department of Justice for
possible submission to a Federal grand jury. No further action was taken by the
Department. (250)
After reviewing FBI files concerning the Powell brothers, the committee
conducted an extensive field investigation. It interviewed the FBI agent who
first received this information (251) and also made an effort to locate "Ralph"
through interviews of associates of Arnold Ray Godfrey and of customers of
Pete's Bar.(252) In addition, composite drawing of Ralph was released by the
committee to national news organizations; it did not lead to his
identification.12 The committee investigated several possible links between
Ralph's offer to the Powells in Atlanta and John Sutherland's offer to Russell
Byers in St. Louis, primarily because of their similarity and proximity in
time.13 Nevertheless, the committee found no evidence linking the two offers.
The committee was unable to locate any witnesses to the alleged Ralph offer
other than the Powell brothers. Thus, their credibility became a crucial issue.
Both brothers had a history of alcohol abuse and a reputation for violence.
(253) Annie Lois Campos, Leon Powell's former wife, testified in executive
session that Leon told her about the offer in 1973 or 1974 when he was under the
influence of alcohol. (254) In executive session testimony before the committee,
Arnold Ray Godfrey flatly denied ever discussing the assassination with the
Powells. (255) Claude Powell resisted the committee's subpena, indicating he
feared for his life, and subsequently pleaded guilty to contempt of Congress for
his refusal to testify.
As a result of Claude's refusal to cooperate and the absence of corroborating
evidence to support the allegation, the committee was unable to investigate this
allegation further. Although the committee concluded that the Powell brothers'
story was credible, it was not able to uncover any evidence that would link it
to the assassination of Dr. King.
(c) Robert Byron Watson
Robert Byron Watson maintained that on March 28, 1968, exactly 1 week before the
assassination, he overheard a conversation concerning a plot to kill Dr. King in
Memphis on April 4, 1968 in Magellan's Art Gallery in Atlanta, Ga. (257) Watson,
then 14, worked at the gallery after school. (258) He identified those involved
in the discussion as Harold Eugene Purcell and Jerry Adams, co-owners of the
gallery, as well as their associates, Lawrence Meier and Bayne
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S. Culley. Several other persons were also present. (259) According to Watson,
Jerry Adams emphasized that the date and time of the assassination attempt would
be "exactly 1 week from then and about the same time of day." (260) Adams
further said he had just learned King would be in Memphis. Purcell allegedly
made reference to "framing a jailbird," as in the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy. (261)
Watson said he told his mother that afternoon where and when King was to be
murdered but withheld the details from authorities until after the
assassination. (262) Lawrence Meier allegedly confronted Watson after James Earl
Ray's arrest and threatened him with violence if he talked about what he had
overheard. (263)
Watson outlined his allegation in numerous letters to the committee. In order to
evaluate Watson's credibility, as well as his story, the committee reviewed all
available documents on the allegation.
Watson's allegation had been covered extensively in the Atlanta newspapers and
was investigated by the Atlanta Police Department, but the police found no
evidence to substantiate it. (264)
In its review of Atlanta police files, the committee noted that in 1970, Bernard
Fensterwald, an attorney for James Earl Ray during his habeas corpus action,
looked into Watson's allegation. Fensterwald's investigator, Ken Smith, verified
some aspects of the allegation but could not produce any reliable documentation
to support key elements of the story. (265) Subsequently, Fensterwald
commissioned Cleve Backster, an established polygrapher, to examine Watson about
the allegation. The results indicated Watson was 90-95 percent truthful. (266)
The committee's review of the FBI's assassination investigation revealed that in
April 1971, Watson admitted fabricating the Magellan Gallery story about a plot
to kill Dr. King. (267) Watson made the story up because he believed someone at
the Magellan Gallery had defrauded his mother of $50,000. (268)
Watson told various accounts of the plot to the committee and to other sources.
(269) He vacillated significantly on the time of day of the meeting, and, in
November 1977, Watson revealed for the first time that the conspirators
mentioned Ray's name. (270)
Finally, the committee noted that Dr. King did not public, IV announce his
decision to return to Memphis until March 29, (271) the day after Watson
allegedly overheard the conversation.
The committee concluded that Watson was an unreliable witness and that his story
was false.
5. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: BIRMINGHAM
(a) Morris Davis
In early 1977, Morris Davis provided the committee with information that Frank
Liberto, two members of the SCLC and others were involved in a conspiracy to
kill Dr. King. (272) Davis claimed that in 1967 or 1968. he became acquainted
with Dr. Gus J. Prosch, (273) a Birmingham, Ala., doctor who in 1970 was
convicted for possession of a large cache of illegal weapons and for income tax
evasion. According to Davis, he often met, Prosch in early 1968 at the Gulas
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Restaurant in Birmingham. During one of these meetings, Prosch allegedly
introduced Davis to an associate, Frank Liberto. (275) Davis said he witnessed a
meeting a meeting in Gulas' parking lot of Prosch and Liberto with Rev. Ralph D.
Abernathy, a close friend of Dr. King, and Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, also a
friend of Dr. King. (276)
A week later, Prosch and Liberto again met at the Gulas Restaurant, this time
with a man introduced to Davis as Eric Galt. Davis also asserted that he saw a
subsequent meeting of these persons at the restaurant on March 29, 1968. (277)
Davis maintained that on April 3, 1968, he met Prosch at the Gulas Restaurant
and agreed to drive with him to the Aeromarine Supply Co. (Ray bought the weapon
used to kill Dr. King at Aeromarine on March 30, 1968.) Prosch allegedly went in
the store and returned 15 minutes later with a large wooden crate that he put in
the trunk of the car.(278) They then drove back to the restaurant where, in the
parking lot, Prosch opened the crate and showed Davis a rifle inside. (279)
Davis claimed that Prosch told him that he and Liberto had accepted a contract
from Abernathy and Shuttlesworth to kill Dr. King for $265,000 and that this
weapon would be used in the killing.
Eric Galt, who had already purchased a similar rifle at Aeromarine, was to be
the decoy. (281) Galt was to meet Liberto in Detroit after the assassination and
collect $25,000 as payment for his participation in the murder. (282)
Davis told the committee that Prosch often used the name John Willard at the
Gulas Restaurant to avoid being recognized as a doctor. (283) Davis also claimed
that the Eric Galt he met was identical to photographs he had seen of James Earl
Ray. (284)
Davis, who had a background of supplying reliable information to the Drug
Enforcement Administration, told the committee he had approached the FBI several
times with this information since 1970. (285) 14
A review of the FBI file concerning the murder of Dr. King revealed a December
1976 interview with Davis during which he supplied similar information. In light
of Davis' background and the serious nature of the allegation, the committee
conducted a thorough investigation of his story. Davis and those persons named
in his allegation were extensively interviewed by the committee.
During executive session testimony, Dr. Ralph B. Abernathy denied any knowledge
of such a plot.(286) Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth also said he knew of no such
conspiracy to kill Dr. King.(287) Frank Liberto stated under oath that he had
never been to Gulas Restaurant in Birmingham and never had met Prosch,
Abernathy, or Shuttiesworth. (288)
The committee questioned Donald Wood of the Aeromarine Supply Co. about Gus
Proscon. (289) Wood recalled that Prosch was a regular customer at Aeromarine
from 1968 until 1970. When Prosch was arrested for possession of illegal
weapons, Wood pulled all invoices and receipts pertaining to Prosch's purchases,
made copies of them and set them aside. (290) A review of these receipts by the
committee indicated the purchase of two pistols on March 25, 1968, and a
purchase
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of a semiautomatic rifle on April 5, 1968. There is no record of Prosch buying
any weapons on April 3, 1968.(291) Wood mentioned that a customer would use a
large wooden crate only if buying more than one rifle. All single rifles were
packed in cardboard boxes.
The committee then located and interviewed Prosch.(292) He denied involvement in
any plot to kill Dr. King and denied knowing any of the persons connected with
the allegation, including Davis.
As a result of its investigation, the committee called into question Morris
Davis' credibility. Further interviews with Davis revealed basic inconsistencies
in his story that could not be reconciled.(293) Davis additionally claimed that
various Government agencies and prominent individuals associated with Government
scandals were involred in the assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. King.
(294) Davis refused, however, to provide the committee with the source of this
information.
After a thorough field investigation, the committee was unable to corroborate
Davis' allegation and found that his allegation was false.
(b) Walter Maddox
Walter and Virginia Maddox owned and operated the South Birmingham Travelodge
Motor Inn (295) when James Earl Ray registered there as Eric Starvo Galt on
March 29, 1968. When questioned by the committee concerning Ray and his alleged
companion Raoul, Walter Maddox recalled that at approximately that time there
were three men living at the motel, one of whom was called Raoul by his
companions.(296) Maddox added that one of the men was named Billy Fisher and
that they resided there for almost a year and that they left without paying
$1,500 room rent. (297) 15
The committee reviewed the financial records of the motel in the Travelodge
executive offices and found that Billy E. Fisher had stayed at this motel
between May 1965 and February 1966. (298) Fisher was subsequently questioned by
the committee and admitted that he and two companions, Jack Cunningham of
Biloxi, Miss., and Leroy Roell of Jackson, Miss., had spent considerable time at
the Travelodge Motor Inn during this period. (299) Fisher said the three were
attempting to obtain financial backing in Birmingham to purchase a motel in
Huntsville, Ale. (300)
Leroy Roell, who in 1978 owned two Travelodge Inns in Jackson, Miss, was
questioned by committee staff and confirmed Fisher's story. (301) Roell stated
he had lost $30,000 in the venture and therefore had a vivid recollection of it.
(302)
Although attempts to locate Jack Cunningham were unsuccessful, both Fisher and
Roell stated they assumed the Raoul referred to by Walter Maddox was actually
Leroy Roell. (303) Given this explanation and the 2- to 3-year difference
between Roell's residence and Ray's stay at the motel, as evidenced by motel
records, the committee concluded there was no connection between the three men
and James Earl Ray.
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6. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: LOUISVILLE
(a) Clifton Baird
A former Louisville, Ky., police officer, Clifton Baird, raised the possibility
of FBI complicity in Dr. King's assassination. He testified before the committee
in 1977 that, on September 18, 1965, another Louisville police officer, Arlie
Blair, offered him $500,000 to kill Dr. King.(304) Blair allegedly told Baird
that an organization he belonged to was willing to pay someone to assassinate
Dr. King. (305) Baird refused the offer.(306) The next day he overheard several
Louisville police officers and FBI agents discussing the offer at Louisville
police headquarters during afternoon rollcall. (307) In an effort to document
this apparent conspiracy, Baird tape recorded a conversation on September 20,
1965, in which Blair again referred to the $500,000 bounty.(308) Baird turned
this recording over to the committee. 16
Blair testified under oath that he had no recollection of offering Baird anymore
to kill Dr. King and denied he had been a member of any organization seeking to
assassinate Dr. King. (309) Blair did not deny, however, that his voice was on
Baird's recording, and he explained his inability to recall the conversation was
the result of a general physical and mental deterioration caused by alcoholism.
(310)
Baird told the committee the names of five other police officers and three FBI
agents he believed participated in the conversation he overheard on September
19, 1965.(311) Each police officer named was questioned either by deposition or
in executive session. Each claimed to have no knowledge of any meeting or
discussion concerning an offer to kill Dr. King. (312)
Special Agent William Duncan, FBI liaison with the Louisville Police Department
in 1965, testified in executive session that he did remember the discussion of
an offer to assassinate Dr. King. (313) According to Duncan, however, the
discussion was part of a practical joke initiated by Sgt. William Baker of the
Louisville police. (314) Duncan testified that sometime in the midsixties, he
was at police headquarters when Sergeant Baker asked him to help "put some boys
on."(315) Duncan agreed. At Baker's direction, he went to the rollcall area and
confirmed a rumor that there was a reward of $250,000 or $500,000 on the head of
Dr. King and that the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist Party was the source of the
offer.(316) Duncan recalled adding that Special Agent Robert Peters and Special
Agent-in-Charge Bernard C. Brown would confirm the offer.(317) Duncan testified
that he made this statement concerning verification solely to lend credence to
the story. (318) Duncan followed this description of the offer by mentioning to
the committee the poor relationship between FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Dr.
King. (319) Duncan recalled that he made his statement to a group of three to
six people, primarily uniformed officers, whose identities he could not recall.
(320) He did not remember any other remarks and said he left the room almost
immediately after he made the statement. (321) Although he
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did not know to whom the joke was directed, Duncan testified that he believed it
was a gag and characterized Baker as a practical joker. (322) He was certain
that no one connected with the FBI urged that he make this remark (323) and
testified that no other FBI agent was present during his statement about Dr.
King.
The committee toter viewed three other FBI agents from the Louisville office,
Special Agent Robert Peters, Special Agent Warren L. Walsh (retired), and
Special Agent-in-Charge Bernard C. Brown. Each denied any knowledge of an offer
to kill Dr. King. (325) Peters, who testified in executive session, stated that
in his opinion Sergeant Baker would not have concocted such a story even as a
joke. (326) Since Baker had since died, it was difficult for the committee to
determine his motive or whether he actually knew of an assassination conspiracy.
Retired Louisville police officer Vernon Austin, in a designated counsel
statement, maintained that he did not know of such an offer but added that he
believed Baker was capable of fabricating this information. (327).
The committee conducted a thorough background investigation of Clifton Baird,
including a review of medical and criminal records. (328) It concluded that
Baird was highly credible. Results a technical evaluation of Baird's tape
conducted by the FBI indicated that it was consistent with those known to have
been used in 1965. (329) The committee reviewed the personnel files and
attendance records for all the officers allegedly involved. The documents
indicated that all but two officers were on duty on September 19, 1965.(330)
Both officers, however, testified that it was possible they came into the office
on their designated day off. (331)
Duncan's testimony supported a finding that the 1965 conversation did take
place. It may be that someone hearing such an offer, such as Baird did, would
consider it serious. There was no evidence, however, to support a finding that
an actual conspiracy existed or that the events in Louisville in September 1965
were in any way connected with the assassination in Memphis in April 1968. The
committee concluded that both Duncan and Baker purposefully circulated a rumor
of an offer to kill Dr. King. Their conduct reflected, in the committee's view,
an absence of professionalism. The committee found no evidence contrary to
Duncan's statement that he acted alone and not at the direction of any FBI
official or agent.
(b) Charles Lee Bell
Charles Lee Bell claimed in an interview with the committee that Albert Ridley
and Bishop Eubanks Tucker allegedly told him in 1967 and 1968 that Louisville,
Ky. was an alternate site, for the assassination of Dr. King, if the attempt in
Memphis failed. Ridley was to funnel Cuban money from a man named Cordova, an
underworld figure, to Louisville police and to an FBI agent assigned to
Louisville to insure that protection was withdrawn from Dr. King when he came to
Louisville. (333) Bell claimed that Bishop Tucker learned of the plot from
Reverend A.D. King, Dr. King's brother, who in turn was told by a Black director
of safety for the city of Louisville. (334)
Bell told the committee that a number of persons, including Huey Newton and
Stokely Carmichael, knew of the conspiracy,(335) since
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Black militants were receiving aid from the Cubans and wanted Dr. King killed
because of his commitment to nonviolence. (336) Bell added that he had worked as
an FBI informant for years(337) and was certain the FBI did not kill Dr. King.
(338) He also provided elaborate details of an alleged 1977 plot to kill
Ambassador Andrew Young, again involving Ridley and Cordova. (339)
Bell came to the attention of the committee when his attorney, James Skinney,
notified the committee that Bell had information on the King assassination.
Despite a long criminal history (340) that cast doubt on Bell's veracity. the
committee staff questioned him twice while he was incarcerated in Georgia. (341)
and reviewed a 23-page account of the allegation that he. provided. (342)
Although Bell recounted contradictory details in several different versions of
his story, the committee attempted to verify the information he provided.
The committee identified and interviewed the only Black Director of Safety in
Louisville's history, A, Wilson Edwards. (343) Edwards, who knew both Bishop
Tucker and Reverend A.D. King, denied knowing Bell and further stated that he
did not live in Louisville from 1968 through 1970.(344)
The committee also interviewed Thomas Kitchen. According to Bell, Kitchen was an
FBI agent assigned to Louisville and an alleged participant in the conspiracy.
Kitchen told the committee he had not been assigned to Louisville until 1972,
and he had served there as special agent-in-charge until 1975. (345) Kitchen
denied knowing Bell, Ridley, or Cordova, but admitted they may have known him as
the special agent-in-charge in Louisville. (346)
The committee attempted to locate other persons who Bell said could verify the
conspiracy, but efforts to find them failed.(347) Both Reverend A.D. King and
Bishop Eubanks Tucker had died before the committee's 1977 probe of the Bell
contention. Given the lack of witness corroboration of this allegation, the
death of two central figures and Bell's questionable background, the committee
concluded his story was not credible and did not merit further investigation.
7. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS ST LOUIS
(a) Delano Elmer Walker
Delano Elmer Walker told the committee that some time in 1965, he received a
$500 down payment from three unidentified white men for his participation in a
plot to assassinate Dr. King. (348) Walker alleged that the men approached him
with this offer in St. Louis, Mo., while he was under the influence of alcohol.
(349) Only after discussing the proposition with his wife, Ruth Ann, did Walker
decide to report the plan to Sheriff Ken Buckley in Farmington, Mo.(350) Walker
asserted that his meeting with the sheriff and an FBI agent ended when they
decided he was insane.(351) Soon afterward, according to Walker, he was
committed to a mental health facility. (352) Walker was sentenced to 18 months
in Missouri State Penitentiary in October 1967, following an assault conviction.
(353)
In June 1968, Walker's physician, Dr. C.W. Chastain, contacted a San Francisco
magazine and reported that the FBI had questioned him extensively in 1965
regarding Walker's allegation.(354) After
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learning of that contact, the committee located Dr. Chastain and verified this
FBI questioning. (355) Dr. Chastain explained that, in 1977, Walker and his wife
had described the King offer in detail. (356). Dr. Chastain mentioned that
.Sheriff Ken Buckley of Farmington, Mo., believed Walker's story. (357)
The committee interviewed both Delano (358) and Ruth Ann Walker(359) about the
allegation and received substantialy different accounts from each. While Walker
said that he had offered to use his gun to murder Dr. King, (360) his wife
explained that he did not purchase the weapon until 1970. (361) Mrs. Walker
stated that Delano told her the assassination offer was initiated at their house
in Elvins, Mo., not at a tavern in St. Louis. (362) She also said she did not
see the down payment money that Delano supposedly showed her on the day of the
agreement. (363) Walker could not locate the documents that he said would
support his allegation, specifically a card noting the name of the tavern where
the offer was made, and his wife did not know of such a card.(364)
The inconsistencies in details of Walkers story, his inability to provide leads
to the identities of those who made the offer, and his mental problems led to
the committee's conclusion that this allegation was not worthy of further
investigation.
8. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: MIAMI
(a) William Somersett
The committee explored a conspiracy allegation that originated with William
Somersett, a long-time informant in Miami who died in 1970. (365) Somersett had
worked with various law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the Miami
Police Department. (366) He achieved notoriety with his story that, just weeks
before the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he received
information that the President would be killed by someone in an office building
with a high-powered rifle.17
According to an article in Miami Magazine Somersett attended a National Labor
Relations Board meeting in Washington on April 1, 1968, at which he overheard a
conversation among longshoremen and sanitation workers indicating that Dr. King,
on ms next visit to Memphis, would be killed for meddling in the sanitation
strike.(367) Somersett reportedly told a Miami police officer of the death
threat on April 3, 1968, the day before the assassination-(368)
A review of FBI and Miami Police Department files on Somersett revealed a career
of supplying law enforcement officials with valuable and reliable information
since the 1950's.(369) In the early 1960's, however, the FBI discontinued
Somersett as an informant because of his increasing unreliability. (370) The
files showed Somersett had repeatedly supplied information about political
assassinations. (371) In addition to the Kennedy and King death threats, he also
reported to the FBI and the Secret Service alleged conspiracies to kill
presidents Johnson and Nixon. (372) These allegations had been investigated and
found to be unsupported by independent evidence.
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The committee sought to verify Somersett's story by interviewing the Miami
police officer to whom he said he allegedly reported the King death threat.
Detective Sgt. Charles Sapp was questioned under oath by the committee. He said
he remembered receiving the information on April 3, the day before the
assassination. (373) Further, an April 95, 1968, memorandum he wrote (374)18
(the earliest documentation the Miami Police Department could locate pertaining
to the matter) was not the first document he had prepared concerning Somersett's
information on the King assassination. He maintained that an earlier
departmental memo would reflect his receipt of the information prior to the
assassination.
Following Sapp's deposition, an earlier police memorandum by Sapp, dated April
17, 1968, was discovered in the files of a former prosecutor in the State
attorney's office. (376) The document indicated that on April 16, the State
attorney's office asked Sapp to contact Somersett to determine if he had any
information pertaining to the King murder. (377) The memo indicated further that
Sapp contacted Somersett on April 17, 1968. Somersett told him that he had
learned of a death threat against Dr. King "on the eve of his death." (378) When
questioned about this document, Sapp insisted that there was still an earlier
memorandum, dated April 14, 1968, that would reflect Somersett's transmittal of
the information to him before the assassination. (379) No additional reports,
however, were discovered by the committee. In addition, the clear implication of
the April 17 memorandum was that Sapp contacted Somersett for the first time on
that date. The committee concluded, therefore, that despite Sapp's recollection,
he did not receive the information from Sommersett until a week after the
assassination of Dr. King.
The committee also questioned several other police officers to whom Sapp said he
relayed Somersett's information prior to April 4. (380) These individuals,
however, did not recall receiving the account before the assassination. (381)
The committee believed that these veteran police officers would have recalled
receipt of the information before the assassination. had it in fact been
received.
The committee also attempted to determine whether there was an NLRB meeting on
April 1, 1968, in Washington. Several agencies and labor organizations,
including the NLRB, were contacted. The committee discovered that available
files did not reflect such a meeting. (382)
Further, the committee found a number of inconsistencies between the police
reports and Sapp's recollection. Thus, the committee concluded that Sapp did not
Know of Somersett's story before Dr. King's death, but learned of it after the
assassination, probably on April 17, 1968.
The committee was unable to uncover any evidence supporting the purported plot
described by Somersett to Sapp. Indeed, the committee found it improbable that
sanitation workers would plot to kill Dr. King, a supporter of their strike. In
view of Somersett's background of informing law enforcement officials of
unfounded assassination
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plots and the lack of evidence to corroborate his allegation, the committee
found that Somersett's information was without substance.
9. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: TEXAS
(a) Otis Moore
Otis Humphrey Moore alleged that, while he was stationed at Fort Hood, Tex, in
April 1965,(383) an unnamed white male offered him $50,000 to assassinate Dr.
King. (384) The conversation took place in an unknown bar outside Temple, Tex.
(385) Moore said when he returned to the bar shortly after Dr. King's murder in
April 1968, a new building stood in its place. (386)
Also present at the bar during the 1965 conversation, according to Moore, was a
man he described as a "million dollar" lawyer fram Dallas. (387) Moore believed
the prominent attorney's presence in the run-down bar indicated his involvement
in serious plans to kill Dr. King, although the supposed lawver did not
participate in the conversation. (388) Moore, however, could give no leads to
identify the man. (389)
The committee interviewed Moore after he wrote that he had "certain information
that, I am sure, will give a clue to the people really involved in the
conspiracy * * *." (390) Moore provided the committee with a detailed narrative
and records of attempts he made to tell his story to, among others, the FBI,
(391) the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities (392) Senator Edward M. Kennedy,(393) and the Board of
Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Ga., the church of Dr. King's father, Rev.
Martin Luther King, Sr. (394)
In an attempt to evaluate Moore's credibility, the committee reviewed relevant
FBI files on him and discovered that Moore's wife had said he was extremely
drunk on the night he returned home with the assassination story. (395)
The vagueness of Moore's allegation and the interval since he allegedly came
upon the offer made corroboration of this story virtually impossible. Further,
the lack of geographical and time proximity to the assassination of Dr. King in
Memphis in 1968 reduced the significance of Moore's allegations. No further
action was taken on the lead.
10. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: NEW YORK
(a) Myron Billett
Myron Billett, a convicted felon, claimed that in the spring of 1968, during a
meeting he attended of organized crime figures Sam Giancana and Carlos Gambino,
as well as CIA and FBI agents, an offer was proposed for the assassination of
Dr. King. (396) Billett said he drove Giancana to this meeting at the Skyview
Motel near Binghamton, N.Y. (397) Martin Bishop and Lee Leland, allegedly of the
CIA, offered Giancana and Gambino money to kill King.(398) Giancana and
Gambino-refused because, as Giancana supposedly commented, the CIA had messed up
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.(399) Billett also claimed he had
been to a similar meeting attended by Giancana, Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby and
others in 1963 in Dallas, Tex, where an offer to kill President Kennedy was
made.(400)
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Billett, originally came to the committee's attention when a Washington, D.C.
newspaper printed a story concerning his conspiracy allegation. At the time
Billett was interviewed by the committee, he was in prison for armed robbery and
manslaughter convictions. Although cooperative with the committee, Billett
changed important details of his story several times. (401)
In its investigation of Billett's story, the committee tried to verify the names
of the alleged CIA and FBI agents. None of the alleged agents existed.(402)
Although Billett said he had a close relationship with several persons involved
in organized crime, he could not supply details that would enable the committee
to verify these associations.(403) Giancana and Gambino were dead in 1977 when
this allegation was investigated.
The committee found that Billett's story about the meetings involving the
assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King was not credible.
(404)
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(blank page)
No Federal, State or Local, Government Agency was Involved in the Assassination
of MLK
Page 407
D. NO FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL, GOVERNMENT AGENCY WAS INVOLVED IN THE
ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING
Allegations of government complicity in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King have been made by attorneys for James Earl Ray, authors of books and
articles, even prominent civil rights leaders, and they have aroused suspicion
the general public. For the most part, the general public. For the most part,
the charges have been pointed at agencies assigned to investigate the
assassination, specifically the FBI and the Memphis Police Department, or
authorities at the Missouri State Penitentiary, from which Ray escaped a year
before the assassiation. The committee examined each of those agencies in light
of the allegations.
1. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Speculation that the FBI--or, more probably, members of that organization,
including highly placed Bureau officials--might have had a role in the
assassination originated in the early 1970's when the public became aware of
COINTELPRO, the Bureau's counterintelligence program that had Dr. King as one of
its targets. When, in 1976, the report on the investigation of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities was published and the full scope of the attempt by the FBI to
discredit Dr. King became recognized, suspicions were widely rekindled. 19
In November 1975, as the Senate committee was completing its investigation, the
Department of Justice formed a Task Force to examine the FBI's program of
harassment directed at Dr. King, the Bureau's security investigations of him,
his assassination and the criminal investigation that followed. One aspect of
the Task force study was to determine "whether any action taken in relation to
Dr. King by the FBI before the assassination had, or might have had, an effect,
direct or indirect, on that event."
In its report, the Task Force criticized the FBI not for the opening, but for
the protracted continuation of, its security investigation of Dr. King:
We think the security investigation which included both physical and technical
surveillance, should have been terminated *** in 1963. That it was intensified
and augmented by a COINTELPRO type campaign against Dr. King was unwarranted;
the COINTELPRO type campaign, moreover, was ultra vires and very probably ***
felonious.(1)
-------------------------
(407)
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The Task Force concluded, however, that the evidence was overwhelming that Ray
was a lone assassin, and it found no evidence of FBI involvement.
The question of FBI complicity lingered, nonetheless, and alleged deficiencies
in the FBI assassination investigation raised the possibility of a coverup after
the fact. Because of these persistent doubts and because the committee
questioned both the method and the reasoning behind the Justice Department's
report, a decision was made to reexamine the question of involvement by the FBI
in the assassination.
Ultimately, the committee found no evidence that the FBI intentionally brought
about the death of Dr. King. In reaching that conclusion, it sought answers to
specific questions that bore on FBI complicity:
Did the counterintelligence program, initiated in the August 1967 against the
Southern Christian. Leadership Conference and in March 1968 against Dr. King,
result in Dr. King's staying at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis on April 4, 1968?
Did the Bureau pay members of the Invaders, an organization of young Black
activists in Memphis, or act through its informants in the Invaders, to incite
the violence on March 28 that led Dr. King to return to Memphis?
Did the Bureau have foreknowledge of the assassination through surveillance,
informants or other means, on which it did not act?
Did the Bureau, through the use of an undercover agent or informant, act with
James Earl Ray in the assassination of Dr. King?
The committee began its analysis with a review of the investigations by the
Senate committee and the Justice Department. It then turned to the FBI files
generated during both the agency's security investigation1 and COINTELPRO 2
against Dr. King and the SCLC.
While the files reviewed by the committee contained substantial detail and were
invaluable in providing an understanding of the nature and scope of the FBI's
operations, certain decisions and actions were often ambiguous or unexplained.
In addition, there were critical periods of time for which documentation was
either scarce or nonexistent. For these reasons, the committee chose to
supplement its file review with extensive interviews of FBI field agents and
headquarters
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personnel. These interviews were initially unsworn, but because of the gravity
of the issues and the serious implications of the FBI's campaign to undermine
Dr. King's stature as a civil rights leader, extensive testimony was taken under
oath in executive session and in public hearings. With the exception of J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Clyde Tolson, his
Associate Director; and William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the Domestic
Intelligence Division, all of whom were deceased,3 FBI officials and agents
whose testimony was considered essential to a thorough examination of the issue
of FBI complicity were interviewed.
(a) The Lorraine Motel issue
The committee investigated the possibility that the FBI's COINTELPRO effort
influenced Dr. King's decision to be in Memphis on April 4 1968, and, more
specifically, to stay at the Lorraine Motel. The committee determined that Dr.
King had been designated as a man to be discredited as early as December 1963.
(2) On August 25, 1967, FBI headquarters directed 22 field offices, including
Memphis, to commence COINTELPRO activities against Black Nationalist--Hate
Groups."(3) The purpose of the directive, as reflected in supporting. documents,
was to expose, disrupt, misdirect or otherwise neutralize the activities of
specified organizations, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC). Instructions were issued "that no opportunities be overlooked for
counterintelligence action."(4)
On March 4, 1968, a second memo was issued, expanding the COINTELPRO effort to
include 44 field offices and for the first time specifically naming Dr. King.(5)
Several goals of COINTELPRO were set out. One of them was to "[p]revent the rise
of a 'messiah' who could unify and electrify the militant black nationalist
movement." The memo continued,
Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah"; Martin Luther King, Stokely
Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position * * * King could be
a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed obedience
to white, liberal doctrines (nonviolence) and embrace Black Nationalism. (6)
For the first, time, specific reporting requirements were established, with the
first response due from all offices within 30 days. Imagina-
tion and initiative were stressed, although specific operations were to be
approved by headquarters to avoid embarrassment to the Bureau. (7)
The committee found no evidence of COINTELPRO initiatives against Dr. King or
the SCLC from the Memphis field office in response to the March 4 memorandum.
FBI files did reflect a March 14, 1968, response from the Memphis field office,
(8) but it contained no reference to Dr. King or the SCLC.
From the testimony of FBI personnel as well as that of members of the SCLC and
the Invaders, the committee found that Dr. King's
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decision to return to Memphis and stay at the Lorraine Motel was not influenced
by COINTELPRO initiatives. While it was apparent that the FBI learned of Dr.
King's decision to return to Memphis from an informant within SCLC, there was no
evidence that the informant influenced the decision itself.4
The testimony of Ralph Abernathy, Dr. King's close associate and successor as
the leader of SCLC, established that Dr. King's decision to return to Memphis
after the March 28 violence was a personal choice, made after some debate with
his SCLC colleagues. It stemmed from Dr. King's desire to erase the effects of
the highly publicized violence on the success of the upcoming Poor People's
Campaign. (10)
The committee-explored the possibility that a March 29. 1968, FBI headquarters
COINTELPRO initiative directed at Dr. King influenced his decision to stay at
the Lorraine Motel when he returned to Memphis on April 3. (11) The headquarters
memorandum from G.C. Moore, Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, to William
C. Sullivan, Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division,
recommended release of a news item, which read in part:
The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by
Negroes but King didn't go there after his hasty exit [from the demonstration of
March 28]. Instead, King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel. white-owned,
operated, and almost exclusively white patronized was the place to "cool it?
There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.
The memo was initiated by Hoover, who indicated his approval, and by Sullivan
and Moore. The notation, "handled 4/3/68," was written at the bottom. The
committee was unable to determine the meaning of the notation.5 The committee
received testimony which it credited, from Dr. Abernathy that Dr. King's normal
practice was to stay at the Lorraine Motel when he was in Memphis and that his
choice of the Lorraine on April 3 reflected this past practice.(12) Given Dr.
Abernathy's testimony, the committee was satisfied that the March memorandum did
not cause Dr. King to stay at the Lorraine.
The FBI's intent in drafting the memorandum, however, remained open issue. If
its purpose was to cause Dr. King to take a room at the Lorraine, its intent
remained sinister, no matter what the reasons were for the choice of lodgings.
On the other hand, if the purpose was to embarrass Dr. King, it was simply one
of many COINTELPRO initiatives that had no connection with the assassination.
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An examination of Ray's conduct in Memphis led the committee to conclude that
the latter is the more credible alternative. Dr. King returned to Memphis and
checked into the Lorraine on the morning of April 3, 1968. Ray arrived in
Memphis on the evening of April 3. Yet Ray chose to stay fit the New Rebel Motel
and did not check into the roominghouse at 422 1/2 South Main Street until the.
afternoon of April 4. To assume the FBI's purpose on March 29 was to set Dr.
King up for assassination st the Lorraine is to assume that the Bureau had
control over Ray's movements. Ray's presence at the New Rebel on April 3 was
evidence that it did not have such control. The committee concluded, therefore,
that the drafters of the March 29 memorandum did not intend to set Dr. King up
for assassination at the Lorraine.
(b) The inciting of violence by informants issue
The committee investigated the possibility that the violence that interrupted
the sanitation workers march in Memphis on March 28, 1968, leading to Dr. King's
return to the city, was provoked by FBI agents or FBI or law enforcement
informants working within a militant organization known as the invaders.
The Invaders came into being in late 1967 when a number of Black youths,
politically conditioned by the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement and
economic conditions in Memphis, created what they envisioned would be a
coalition of groups to challenge the established leadership of Memphis. The
coalition came to be known as the Black Organizing Project; its most widely
known group was the Invaders.
The committee found evidence that some members of the Invaders, resorting to
inflammatory rhetoric and acts of violence, encouraged the disturbances that
marred the sanitation workers march. In its investigation of the Invaders, the
committee took testimony from several former members (the organization had since
been disbanded), some of whom had provided written releases authorizing the FBI
to turn over their files, investigative or informant. In addition, the committee
reviewed reports of Invader activities in the files of the FBI and the Memphis
Police Department, and it took testimony from FBI agents who controlled
informants in Memphis and monitored the activities of groups and individuals
connected with the sanitation strike. Finally, the committee took testimony from
Marrell McCullaugh, an undercover Memphis police officer who had infiltrated the
Invaders in 1968.
The investigation established the existence of five FBI informants who provided
intelligence on the racial situation to the Memphis field office; their
reporting touched on Invader activities. (13) The committee then gained access
to the headquarters and field office files the FBI maintained on them. In
accordance with an understanding that had been worked out with the FBI, all
information that might identify the informants was excised before the files were
turned over to the committee. The committee specified the informant it
considered most likely to have been influential in Invader activities, and the
FBI was asked to approach him and determine if he would agree to be interviewed
by the committee. An interview was arranged, and the informant was questioned
about the nature of the information provided to
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the Bureau as well as the nature of the instructions given the informant by
Bureau personnel. (14) The other four informants were not in a position to have
influenced Invader activities. Nevertheless, reviews of their files were
conducted. Nothing in the committee's investigation, file review or interview of
the informant indicated that FBI reformants were used as agent provocateurs
during the March 28 violence.
Two serious discrepancies between the testimony of the informant, as opposed to
the flies and the word of the relevant FBI agents, however, did arise as a
result of the committee's interview. The FBI informant denied having provided
certain information that had been attributed to him and placed in his informant
file. He also denied ever having received any instructions from the FBI as to
the conduct of his informant activities. (15) The committee could only speculate
about the significance of the discrepancies, and believed such speculation would
have served no useful purpose. The committee was forced to conclude, however,
that the discrepancy tarnished the evidence given by both the Bureau and the
informant, and it left the committee with a measure of uncertainty about the
scope of FBI involvement with the Invaders.
Marrell McCullough, the undercover Memphis police officer whose intelligence on
the Invaders was transmitted regularly to the local FBI office, was in the
parking lot of the Lorraine Motel at the time of the assassination and was among
the first to reach the fallen Dr. King. Since there had been allegations that
McCullough was a Federal agent, the committee was particularly interested in his
testimony. He denied having had any connections with the FBI or any other
Federal agency, and he specifically stated he had no part in provoking violence
on March 28, 1968. (16) Members of the Invaders supported his testimony, and
while the FBI and other intelligence agencies received his intelligence
regularly from the Memphis Police Department, the committee could find no
evidence that the Bureau or any other agency was aware of McCullough's role or
his identity as an undercover police officer. (17)
The committee noted, further, that in an interview by the FBI shortly after the
assassination, McCullough was treated no differently than other eyewitnesses,
indicating the FBI was unaware of his official ties to the Memphis Police
Department. (18) Thus, the committee found that McCullough was not employed by
the FBI or any Federal agency. Nor did he have knowledge, as far as the
committee could determine, that his information was being transmitted to the
Bureau or the Federal Government. (19)
While the committee found no basis for a conclusion that the FBI, directly or
through its informants, provoked the violence on March FBI files and sworn
testimony to the committee did indicate an awareness by members of the Memphis
field office of the potential for disturbances. (20) The committee reviewed a
memorandum indicating that the Bureau received information prior to the march
that violence was likely to occur. (21) Agents of the field office at the time
confirmed it. One or two hours before the march, an FBI informant reported that
participants had purchased several hundred two-by-two sticks to which they had
attached cardboard placards, and that there was a possibility they would be used
in a violent manner. (22)
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This information was corroborated by Memphis police sources who provided an
additional report that members of the Invaders were distributing the sticks to
"impressionable youngsters between the ages of 10 and 13." (23)
The Memphis office notified FBI headquarters and kept close contact with the
Memphis police, but no steps were taken to relay the warning either to the
strike leaders or to Dr. King and his associates. The committee believed such
preventive steps should have been taken, even though the FBI had no authority to
provide protection to the strike participants. The committee stressed, however,
that it found no evidence that the FBI's failure to warn the strike leaders or
Dr. King and his party indicated a plan to disrupt the march.
(c) The FBI foreknowledge issue
While the committee believed the FBI was guilty. of no more than unwarranted
neglect in its failure to alert the organizers of the march of the threat of
violence, it considered the issue of foreknowledge of the assassination to be
potentially much more significant. The committee noted that the FBI--in
particular, the Memphis field office---closely monitored developments in the
sanitation strike. (25) Further, the committee found that Dr. King's Washington
spring project, the upcoming march on Washington, was the subject of great
concern at FBI headquarters. (26) Consequently, the committee found it curious
that in its review of the King security file it found a scarcity of intelligence
pertaining to Dr. King's activities between March and April 4, 1968.
The committee was told by agents in the Memphis field office at the time that
the absence of data on Dr. King for that period was indicative only of the fact
that the main area of FBI coverage in Memphis was the sanitation strike. (27)
Moreover, Memphis agents adamantly maintained in sworn testimony that no efforts
were made to monitor Dr. King physically or electronically following his arrival
in that city on April 3. (28) Finally, a thorough review of FBI files produced
no evidence that documentation of a surveillance of Dr. King's activities in
Memphis had been destroyed.6
The committee also reasoned that, as ironic as it may seem, the presence of the
FBI COINTELPRO initiatives against Dr. King up to the day of his death could be
used to show that FBI headquarters did not have foreknowledge of his
assassination. It would hardly have been necessary to continue a nationwide
program of harassment against a man soon to be killed. In a review of all
COINTELPRO files on Dr. King, the committee found substantial evidence that the
harassment program showed no signs of abatement as the fateful day approached.
For example, the Mobile, Ala. FBI field office proposed using an unwitting
minister, one influential in Selma, Ala., and somewhat hostile to Dr. King for
personal reasons, to effect a COINTELPRO objective. (29) The minister was to be
sent an anonymous letter stating that Dr. King was using Blacks for personal
aggrandizement
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that demonstrators would be stranded without food or shelter, and that there
might be violence. A copy of the letter would be sent to the Selma Times.
Journal, with a suggestion that the paper interview the minister. On April 2,
headquarters authorized Mobile to issue the letter, suggesting that it be mailed
from Baltimore to disguise the origin.7 (30) Consequently, the committee could
find no indication in its interviews of agents or its file reviews that the FBI
had foreknowledge of the assassination of Dr. King.
(d) The FBI assistance for Ray issue
The committee investigated the possibility that the FBI, either through an agent
or informant, may have acted with James Earl Ray in the assassination of Dr.
King.
The committee first sought to identify all persons who met with Ray during the
period of his incarceration at Missouri State Penitentiary and from the time of
his escape from MSP on April 23, 1967, to the day of the assassination, April 4,
1968. A list was compiled of 663 possible Ray associates, fellow inmates at MSP,
criminal associates and other persons known to have had even fleeting contact
with Ray. The list included individuals associated with establishments
frequented by Ray, or registered at motels, hotels, and roominghouses where Ray
stayed during his fugitive period.
The committee also identified the FBI agents in Jefferson City, Mo., where
Missouri State Penitentiary is located, and those assigned to the unlawful
flight case following Ray's MSP escape.
From the list of known, probable, or possible Ray associates, the FBI was asked
to indicate if any were informants, and the Bureau ackowledged in fact that
three of them had at one time or another supplied information to the Bureau on a
regular basis. Two of these informants were not active in 1967-68; one did have
a confidential relationship with the Bureau in 1968. (32)
Independent of information supplied by the Bureau, the 1968 informant was
interviewed by the committee. (33) He acknowledged his relationship with the
Bureau and indicated that:
His confidential relationship with the FBI dated back to the late 1950's; (34)
and
He had known Ray casually while the two men were serving terms together at
Missouri State Penitentiary in the early 1960's.(35)
It was also learned that the informant left MSP nearly 3 years before the
assassination and was returned there shortly after Ray's escape.(36) The
committee checked the respective whereabouts of the two men during the period in
1967 when they were both at liberty and could find no evidence that they had
been in contact.
Seven key FBI agents were questioned with respect to a direct connection between
Ray and the Bureau, one of whom was in the Jefferson City field office for the
entire period of Ray's detention at MSP. (37) From these interviews, no direct
contact between Ray and the FBI either at MSP or during the fugitive period
could be established. The
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interviews also failed to indicate a contact between the Bureau and any
individual who was also in contact with Ray from the time of his escape to the
assassination.
Based on this investigation, the committee found no evidence that Ray. had
contact either at Missouri State Penitentiary. or during the fugitive period
with any FBI agent or active FBI informant. In the absence of known contact
between Ray and the FBI, either through an a ent or an informant, the committee
found no evidence that Ray acted with the FBI, either knowingly or unwittingly,
in the assassination.8
(e) FBI surveillance files in the National Archives
From the beginning of the committee's investigation, James Earl Ray had
suggested that his innocence or the FBI's role in the assassination of Dr. King
might be revealed by an examination of FBI documents and tape recordings that
are sealed and stored in the National Archives as a result of a court order in
Lee v. Kelley.9 (38) In its effort to seek information from every possible
source, the committee sought access to these materials. (39) Permission was
obtained from the court for the committee to have access to the files deposited
in the Archives. (40) The access sought and obtained was the minimum necessary
to ascertain the relevancy of the material to the work of the committee. Every
effort was made to minimize the invasion of the privacy associated with the
review.
A review was conducted in the latter part of December 1978 of an inventory of
the materials, approximately 845 pages in length. Each entry in the inventory
included the serial number of the document, the date it was written, the name of
the individual who originated it, and the person to whom it was directed. In
addition, a separate portion of the inventory cataloged the tapes that were
produced during the various electronic surveillances that were conducted on Dr.
King, written transcripts of some of those tapes, and handwritten logs and notes
made by the agents who supervised the surveillance.
While the entire inventory was examined, the portion relating to the actual
tapes and transcriptions of the tapes was of particular interest. The
committee's review determined that the earliest item in this category in the
inventory was dated February 18 through 20, 1964. The latest entry was dated May
16, 1966. This information was compared with an internal FBI memorandum dated
April 18, 1968, from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan.(41) The purpose
of the memorandum was to identify all of the microphone and wiretap
installations that had been employed by the Bureau during the course of its
security investigations of Dr. King and the SCLC.(42) While the memorandum
indicated that the last electronic surveillance of Dr. King terminated on
November 30, 1965, as opposed to the May 16,
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1966, termination date10 contained in the inventory, neither document indicated
that electronic surveillance was directed at Dr. King after mid-1966. The
committee's file review uncovered a memorandum, apparently issued for record
purposes, from Atlanta Special Agent in charge Joseph Ponder, dated June 23,
1966. (43) It recounted a June 21, 1966, order from headquarters to remove an
existing technical surveillance on SCLC headquarters. This would indicate that
the technical surveillance of King through the SCLC tap continued at least until
June 21, 1966, in Atlanta. These dates are consistent with information given to
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities by the Bureau on July it, 1975, in response to a request
concerning electronic surveillance of Dr. King from January 1, 1960, until April
5, 1968. (44)
The discrepancies existing between these various dates were not considered
significant by the committee. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark testified
that, during the tenure, authorizations for electronic surveillance by the
Bureau were severely curtailed. (45) The committee's investigation revealed that
during 1968 the Bureau tried unsuccessfully to have Clark authorize electronic
surveillance of SCLC and Dr. King. (46) The committee's investigation uncovered
no evidence that the Bureau ever disregarded the Attorney General's refusal to
authorize the requested surveillance. Given their distance in time from the
assassination, it is extremely improbable, moreover, that the actual tapes,
transcripts, and other materials underlying these intercepts would have
information pertaining to the assassination. Because of the invasion of privacy
that a review of the raw materials would have entailed, the committee decided it
was not necessary to undertake one. It would have been ironic indeed, if a
committee, out of a concern for what happened to Dr. King, unnecessarily invaded
his privacy.
2. MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT
In its investigation of possible official complicity in the assassination, the
committee considered allegations suggesting that the Memphis Police Department
facilitated Dr. King's murder.11 For example, there had been wide dissemination
of a theory that a Black detective was removed from his post at a fire station
adjacent to the Lorraine Motel so that he would not interfere with the
assassination. (47)
To resolve questions concerning the possible complicity of the MPD, the
committee conducted extensive interviews with Memphis police officials,
officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and citizen witnesses;
is also took sworn testimony in depositions and hearings. Further, the committee
reviewed the pertinent files of the MPD, the FBI, and the Department of Justice.
With regard to possible MPD complicity in the assassination, four main issues
were explored:
Why was an MPD security detail assigned to Dr. King withdrawn on April 3, 1968?
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Why was Detective Edward Redditt removed from his observation post at a fire
station next to the Lorraine on April 4, 1968?
Why where two Black firemen transferred from the same fire station shortly
before the assassination?
Were the alleged deficiencies in the postassassination conduct of the MPD
intentionally designed to facilitate the escape of the assassin?
(a) Withdrawal of the security detail
On April 3, 1968, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Dr. King arrived at the airport
in Memphis where he was met by a four-man security detail ordered by Chief of
Detectives W.P. Huston and led by Inspector Don H. Smith (since retired).(48)
The purpose of the detail was to provide physical protection for Dr. King, and
it was apparently provided at the initiative of the Memphis Police Department
because of the violence that had occurred during Dr. King's visit to Memphis the
previous week. It did not appear to the committee that Dr. King or members of
his party requested that the MPD provide security.12
At the airport, the security detail asked members of Dr. King's party what their
schedule was to be during their stay in Memphis. Rev. James Lawson, a Memphis
minister who had been instrumental in getting Dr. King to come to Memphis on
March 28, responded that they had not made up their minds; Inspector Smith
testified that he inferred from Lawson's response that a security detail would
not be welcome. (51) Mrs. Tarlese Matthews, a member of Dr. King's party,
specifically told the police that a security detail had not been requested.
Inspector Smith said he perceived that the detail was not welcome. (52)
Detective Edward Reddirt, who was at the airport, was also told that Dr. King's
part did not want protection.
The security detail followed Dr. King from the airport to the Lorraine Motel,
arriving at approximately 11:90 a.m. At the request of Inspector Smith, another
security unit, composed of an inspector and two additional Memphis police
officers, arrived at the Lorraine to assist.(53) Shortly after noon, the detail
followed Dr. King to the Centenary Methodist Church, where it secured the front
and rear entrances. (54) As they were returning to the Lorraine at approximately
2:15 p.m.(55) Dr. King's party took side routes and avoided the main streets,
giving Inspector Smith the impression, he testified, that Dr. King's party. was
trying to lose the detail. (56)
Inspector Smith further testified that his belief that Dr. King and his party
did not want the detail was reinforced by their refusal to tell police officers
where they were going or how long they were to remain at a given stop, and the
security detail just had to "tag along" (57) At approximately 5 p.m., Smith
telephoned Chief of Detectives Huston and requested permission to remove the
detail due to this apparent lack of cooperation. (58) According to Smith, Huston
had a quick conference with "someone" while Smith held the phone, and he then
granted the request. (59)
According to Henry Lux, who subsequently became police chief and who had since
retired, Huston's conference was with Police Chief
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James MacDonald, now also retired. Lux stated that Huston told MacDonald that
Smith's request was based on the failure of the King party to cooperate with the
security detail. (60) While Lux told the committee that Huston authorized Smith
to secure the detail after receiving permission from MacDonald,(61) MacDonald
stated he had no recollection of Huston's decision to remove the detail or of
his requesting permission to do so. (62)
Having obtained permission from Huston, Smith testified, he withdrew the detail
shortly after 5 p.m. No attempt. was made to inform anyone in Dr. King's party
that it was being pulled back. (63)
Regardless of the attitude of Dr. King and of members of his party toward the
security detail, the committee believed that in light of Dr. King's prominence,
the violence that attended the March 28 demonstration, the tension in Memphis
and the numerous threats that had been made on Dr. King's life, it was highly
improper for the security detail to have been withdrawn. The committee also
believed it improper for members of Dr. King's party not to have been informed
of the withdraw, al of the detail. The committee noted that Frank Holloman,
director of fire and safety in Memphis at the time, maintaining he had not been
informed of these decisions,13 concurred in 1978 that, they were wrong. (64)
The security detail was removed over 24 hours prior to Dr. Kings assassination.
All the evidence the committee obtained indicated that the detail was removed
because of an evident, sense of exasperation at what was perceived to be an
uncooperative attitude on behalf of Dr. King's party. Its removal was not, the
committee found a part of a conspiracy to strip Dr. King of his protection in
order to facilitate the assassination.
(b) The removal of Detective Redditt
In conjunction with its assessment of the withdrawal of Inspector Smith's
security detail, the committee investigated the allegation that Detective Edward
Reddirt, who had been assigned to a security detail near the Lorraine, was
removed two hours prior to the assassination. The fact of Detective Redditt's
April 4 removal from his post at the firehouse across from the Lorraine Motel
was uncontested. The nature of the assignment that Redditt had on April 3 and 4,
1968--whether it was security or surveillance--was central to an assessment of
the significance of his removal. Reddirt and his partner. Patrolman W.B.
Richmond, met Dr. King at the airport on April 3, 1968, (65) on orders from
inspector Graydon Tines, who was in charge of the Inspectional Bureau. (66)
Redditt claimed that he was ordered to go to the airport and report to a detail
headed by Inspector Smith that was to provide security for Dr. King. (67) At the
airport, Redditt said he was threatened by Mrs. Tarlese Matthews, a young Black
woman who had met Dr. King's party. (68) He also testified that a member of Dr.
King's party told him security was not wanted. (69)
Redditt said that he and Richmond followed Dr. King to the Lorraine. Upon
arriving at the Lorraine, he saw Smith talk to members of Dr. King's party and
then proceed to make a phone call. After
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the phone call, he said Smith moved the men back to the sidewalk away from the
patio area. (70) Redditt testified Smith made another phone call and then
ordered the security detail withdrawn.(71) Redditt testified that he spoke with
Smith and then decided by himself to "set up security" in the firehouse. (72)
The committee observed that Redditt's claim to have been assigned to security
for Dr. King at the airport was not supported by the facts. In fact, Redditt's
role was that of surveillance and not security. Inspector Tines, who ordered
Redditt to the airport, was in charge of the Inspectional Bureau in 1968, of
which the Intelligence Section was part. He testified in executive session that
he ordered Reddirt and Richmond to go to the airport for surveillance purposes,
"* * * just to find out who was coming in and who all was around the airport."
(73) The surveillance at the airport, as well as for the remainder of Dr. King's
stay in Memphis was ordered, "* * * not only because Dr. King was a controversal
public figure, but also because he had been meeting with local Black militants
while in Memphis on prior visits."(74)
Patrolman Richmond, Redditt's partner, stated he understood his assignment to be
surveillance and that no one ever told him they were part of a security
detail.(75) Inspector Smith also testified that neither Reddirt nor Richmond had
been assigned to the security detail on April 3, and he would have been aware of
it if they had been. (76) Reddirt conceded that he did not even speak to
Inspector Smith at the airport or beforehand. (77)
Finally, Redditt's account of the events after he arrived at the Lorraine was
clearly in error. Smith's security detail was not, as Redditt claimed, removed
right after King arrived at the Lorraine. As previously described, Dr. King's
party arrived at the Lorraine at approximately 11:30 a.m. Smith's security
detail stayed with the party during its trip to Centenary Church, and it was not
removed until approximately 5 p.m. Reddirt apparently did have Dr. King under
surveillance during this period, and his own report to Tines, dated April 4,
1968, was entitled "Surveillance of MLK, Jr., and related activities."(78) It
appeared, in fact, that Redditt may have set up at the firehouse shortly after
King arrived at the Lorraine. A memorandum prepared for Assistant Chief W.E.
Routt by Tines noted that Redditt was on "surveillance" at the firehouse while
Smith's detail was on "security" for King and that that was one reason Redditt's
reports, while they corroborated Smith's, contained more detail about who came
and went from the area. (79)
The committee noted that when questioned about why he would be chosen to be on a
security detail, Redditt first claimed he believed he was chosen because he had
provided security for Dr. King in the past.(80) He later admitted he had never
previously provided security for Dr. King. (81)
The committee did not believe Redditt's representation that on April 3, 1968, he
was assigned to the airport as part of a security detail for Dr. King, headed by
Inspector Smith,(82) and remained in that capacity until the withdrawal of
Smith's security detail. The committee found that Redditt's sole function was to
observe Dr. King from the moment of his arrival at the airport.
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The nature of Redditt's activities while he was at the firehouse was then
explored by the committee. This was considered more significant than his
activities at the airport on April 3, since Redditt concededly would have been
at the firehouse on April 4, 1968, at the time of the assassination, had he not
been removed some 2 hours earlier. After Smith's security detail was withdrawn,
Redditt first testified he set up a kind of "security surveillance" at the
firehouse. He characterized it as "still giving security in some way, form, or
fashion." (83)
During his testimony, the committee explored with Redditt his characterization
of his job at the firehouse as "security-" The committee noted that both
Inspector Tines (84) and his partner, Richmond,(85) characterized Redditt's job
at the firehouse as one of surveillance. Further, the committee observed,
Redditt did not physically accompany Dr. King to and from the Clayborn Temple on
the evening of April 3, after he set up his post at the firehouse, as he would
have done had he been providing physical protection or security for Dr.
King.(86) In addition, Redditt admitted to the committee that the firehouse was
at least, 180 feet away from Dr. King's room, and he was in no position to
provide physical protection for Dr. King. (87) His actions at the firehouse,
such as the covering of most of the windows with newspaper so that he could see
out without being noticed from the street,(88) further demonstrated to the
committee that he was surveilling, not providing security for Dr. King. Finally,
the committee showed him his own statement given April 10, 1968, in which he
stated his assignment on April 3 and 1968, was "* * * to keep Dr. Martin Luther
King under surveillance and observation while he was in the city." (89')
When confronted with the evidence that his job on the day of the assassination
was to surveil Dr. King, and not to provide security. Redditt conceded that this
was correct. Finally, Redditt admitted it would be "absolutely false" to
characterize his function as one security on the day of the assassination. (90)
The committee observed that Reddirt previously had appeared on television with
various authors,(91) granted interviews to the BBC, and actively participated in
the public forum, knowingly allowing the nature of his job on the day of the
assassination to be misrepresented and exploited by advocates of conspiracy
theories. The committee believed that Redditt's participation in such activities
was reprehensible. In a committee hearing, Redditt retracted statements made to
the BBC and others that he had provided security for Dr. King on the day of the
assassination. (92) Redditt also formally apologized to committee if statements
he had made might have caused people to misinterpret the nature of his
assignment on the day of the assassination. (93)
Despite the clear evidence that Redditt's function was surveillance and not
security, the committee explored the reason for Redditt's removal from the
firehouse 2 hours prior to the assassination, since it had been alleged that
Redditt had a plan that he had shared with Richmond in case of trouble on the
scene (94) and that Redditt's removal facilitated the escape of the assassin.
Redditt first stated he had a contingency plan in case of trouble near the
Lorraine. The plan was to have Richmond remain looking out the
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window, while he would go to Main Street.(95) Redditt stated he communicated
this plan to Richmond and his superiors. (96) During the hearing, the committee
informed Redditt that his partner, Richmond, had stated that Redditt never
communicated a plan to him. (97) Similarly, Redditt was informed that Inspector
Tines had testified he had no knowledge of a contingency plan formulated by
Redditt. (98)
Redditt then equivocated and acknowledged that he was "almost sure" he had
devised a plan because "you usually in your own mind think of ways to protect
yourself." (99) He first stated that he perhaps only discussed it with Richmond,
and not his superiors.(100) He then conceded that there was no defined plan he
had communicated to anyone and that the formulation of any plan was only in his
mind. (101). He eventually admitted that he did not have even a definitive plan
in his own mind. (102)
The committee found that Redditt did not communicate a plan relating to what he
would do in the event of trouble to anyone. Indeed, he did not have a concrete
plan formulated in his own mind. Thus, his removal obviously could not have been
an intentional attempt to facilitate the escape of the assassin. The committee
believed, as Redditt ultimately testified, that allegations that he was removed
to facilitate the assassination were without substance. (103)
The committee concluded that Redditt was removed from his surveillance post 2
hours prior to the assassination primarily because his superiors perceived a
threat on his life. Their perception and evaluation of the threat was apparently
reinforced by previous threats that had been made against Redditt.
On March 8, 1968, Redditt wrote a memorandum to Tines relating a threat made to
him by people sympathetic to the sanitation strike. The memo noted that he was
warned not to attend a meeting because people planned to harm him and strike
sympathizers saw him as "the type of Negro that was not needed." (104) Other
threats were made directly to Reddirt on April 3 and 4,(105) although it was
unclear if these were brought to the attention of Redditt's supervisors by the
time they had ordered his removal.
There was conflicting evidence as to the specific source of the threat that
prompted the meeting that. resulted in Redditt's removal. Tines testified that
on April 4, Lt. E.H. Arkin told him that Philip Manuel an investigator for the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate had received
information that someone was en route to Memphis to kill a police lieutenant.
(106) Arkin, however, believed he was called into the office by Tines and told
of the threat. (107) Tines believed he then discussed this with Chief McDonald
and Fire and Safety Director Holloman. (108) Holloman testified he could not
remember who first told him of the threat on Redditt's life. (109) Arkin was
sent to get Reddirt and bring him back to headquarters. (110)
As to who was present in the meeting at headquarters when Redditt was brought
back, the testimony was conflicting. McDonald only remembered Holloman, Redditt,
and himself being there. (111) Tines recalled that Manuel and he were also
present. (112) Holloman remembered that an agent of the Secret Service was
there, (113) and Redditt recalled that Holloman introduced a person at the
meeting as a representative of the Secret Service. (114)
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Redditt was informed at the meeting that there was a contract on his life, that
he was being relieved from duty at the firehouse (115) and that he and his
family were to be placed under police protection. (116)
Holloman testified he believed the threat might have been passed to the Memphis
police by the Secret Service.(117) A check by the committee with the Secret
Service, however revealed no contact with the Memphis Police Department that
might have resulted in Redditt's being relieved of his post. (118) Holloman
testified he was not informed of the substance of an internal MPD memorandum
dated April 4, 1968, and titled "Information concerning assassination plot of
possibly Det. Redditt."(119) The memorandum referred to Philip Manuel as
transmitting information concerning a possible plot to kill a Negro lieutenant
in Memphis. Holloman did not recall if he was aware of this threat when he made
the decision to relieve Reddirt, though he did not believe it was the basis for
his decision.(120) Tines(121) and Arkin, (122) however, recalled that the threat
relayed by Manuel was the basis for the decision to relieve Redditt.
When interviewed by the committee, Manuel stated he had no independent
recollection of the Redditt affair, but he did remember receiving a call from
his office in Washington informing him that a confidential source had stated a
Black Tennessee policeman's life was in danger. He knew from reading files that
Redditt's life had previously been threatened, and he therefore believed the
threat was directed to Redditt. He so informed the Memphis Police Department.
The committee deposed Manuel's confidential source who stated that he personally
told Manuel over the phone of the threat, but he also informed him that the
target was a police sergeant in Knoxville. The source further said he did not
leave messages in Washington, that he telephoned information only to Manuel
direct. (124)
The committee believed, on the basis of Manuel's testimony, as well as that of
Arkin and Tines, that Manuel believed the threat to be directed at Reddirt and
that some officials of the MPD believed this also, as confirmed in the April 4,
1968, memorandum from Tines to McDonald.(125) The committee, therefore,
concluded that-this threat was the one that resultled in the meeting where the
decision to transfer Reddirt was made.
The committee questioned Tines and Holloman about an internal MPD
memorandum(126) from Arkin to Tines that indicated Arkin had received
information at 4:15 p.m. on April 4, 1968, that the threat Manuel had passed
along was directed at a Black sergeant in Knoxville and not, as had first been
reported, a Black lieutenant in Memphis. The memorandum stated the information
had been incorrectly transmitted from Washington. Tines maintained, (127) as did
Holloman, (128) that they did not receive this information prior to the decision
to remove Redditt. It appeared that this information was being. received by
Arkin as Holloman was holding his meeting with Redditt.
Redditt himself, in a statement he gave on April 10, 1968, at police
headquarters, stated Tines relieved him because of a threatening phone call
Reddirt received at the firehouse on the afternoon of April 4, 1968, another
threat Redditt had received at the airport on Dr. King's arrival, and the report
from the Justice Department,
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indicating his life was in danger. (129) It seems likely that Redditt would have
discussed the other threats on his life in the meeting with Holloman concerning
Redditt's removal from duty because of specific threat. 14
The committee believed that Redditt was removed because his superior perceived
real danger to his safety. In addition, Richmond was not removed; he remained at
the firehouse surveillance post. The committee found that Redditt's removal was
not part of any plot to facilitate the assassination of Dr. King.
(c) The transfer of two Black firemen
Two Black firemen, Floyd Newsum and Norvell E. Wallace, were transferred on
April 3, 1968, from the firehouse where Redditt and Richmond were conducting a
surveillance. It has been charged that their transfers were part of a conspiracy
to facilitate the assassination and the assassin's escape. (130)
Newsum stated that in April 1968, he was working the B shift at fire station No.
2 of the Memphis Fire Department and was assigned a truck company that required
a minimum of five men. B shift did not work the 24-hour period from 7 a.m.,
April 3, to 7 a.m., April but it was scheduled to work the following 24-hour
period. Consequently, Newsum would have been at the firehouse at the time of the
assassination. (131)
According to Newsum, sometime on the night of April 3, while he was at the Mason
Temple rally where Dr. King spoke, a message was left with his daughter for him
to call the fire station. When he did at about 11:30 p.m., he was told to report
the following morning to company 31 in Frazier (North Memphis), not to fire
station No. 2.15 (132)
The transfer appeared to be uncalled for, since the company to which he was
detailed already had the minimum number of men to operate, (133) while his
regular company would be left one man short. Thus, Newsum's transfer meant that
another man would have to be transferred to his former company. Newsum stated
that he subsequently placed a telephone call to another member of his regular
company and learned that such a transfer had in fact been made. (134) An
examination of Memphis Fire Department records supported Newsum with respect to
his characterization of personnel transfers and personnel levels of the
companies involved. (135)
On April 3, 1968, Wallace was working the A shift at fire station No. 2, where
he was assigned to a pumper company that required a minimum force of five. (136)
A shift had begun work at 7 a.m. April 3, and was to be relieved at 7 a.m.,
April 4. At approximately 10 p.m. on April 3, Wallace recalled, he was detailed
to pumper company 33 at the Memphis Airport, where he was an extra man. (137)
Evidence obtained by the committee demonstrated that the transfers of Newsum and
Wallace were prompted by a request from Reddirt. Tines testified that Reddirt or
Arkin informed him there was a fireman or firemen" at the firehouse who Redditt
believed would hinder
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the functioning of the surveillance post and that he was asked "if there was
some way they could be moved."(138) Tines then called either Chief Hamilton or
Williams of the fire department and requested they be transferred. (139)
Tines testimony is corroborated by a memorandum he received from Redditt. Dated
April 4, 1968, it referred to Newsum as being very sympathetic with the
sanitation strike and possibly the cause of the threats he had received. (140)
When confronted by the committee with the memorandum, Redditt acknowledged that
his request could have been the reason the firemen were transferred.(141)
In an interview with the committee, Newsum acknowledged he had been very
sympathetic with the strike, that his support for it was well known, and that he
had in fact passed information to persons affiliated with the strike. (142) He
conceded that his reporting of information may have had something to do with his
transfer,(143) since such activity on his behalf would have jeopardized the
surveillance post.
While Wallace did not have a history of specific activities that would account
for his transfer, it appeared that his transfer was prompted by Redditt's
request to Tines. Wallace's and Newsum's supervisor, James O. Barnett, recalled
that the transfers were made because someone in the police department was
uncomfortable with Black firemen sympathetic to the strike in the vicinity of
the surveillance post.
The committee found that the transfers of Newsum and Wallace were made at the
request of the Memphis Police Department out of a concern for the security of
the surveillance post. Reddirt himself was the person who initiated the request.
The committee found that the transfers in no way facilitated the assassination
or the escape of the assassin. The firemen obviously had no protective or
surveillance responsibilities. Allegations that the transfers were part of a
conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King were determined to be groundless.16
(d) The postassassination performance of the Memphis police
The committee also investigated the possibility that the postassassination
conduct of the Memphis Police Department was indicative of an official effort to
facilitate the escape of the assassin. When Dr. King was shot at approximately 6
p.m. on April 4, 1968, there were from 53 to 66 law enforcement officers within
a mile of the Lorraine Motel. (145) Included in this force were six "tact" or
tactical units, each consisting of three or four vehicles. The purpose of the
tact units was to respond to any disorder or emergency.17 (146) One of the units
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(tact 10) was on a rest break at fire station 2 within 100 yards of the Lorraine
Motel. (147)
Aside from the 12 officers in tact 10, there were two other officers in the
immediate vicinity of the motel Patrolman Richmond, in his observation post at
fire station 2 and Marrell McCullough, an undercover officer who was in the
Lorraine parking lot.(148)
Despite the presence of so many law enforcement officers, James Earl Ray was
able to assassinate Dr. King, gather his belongings and successfully flee the
scene without being observed by a single policeman. Ray's ability to avoid
detection has led to speculation that there may have been official complicity in
the assassination by Memphis officials. This suspicion has even been voiced by
members of the Memphis Police Department. (149)
Consequently, the committee closely scrutinized the actions of key law
enforcement personnel following the shooting. The committee sought to determine:
(1) what actually occurred following Dr. King's assassination; (2) whether this
conduct constituted irregular or substandard performance on the part of the
local law enforcement personnel; and (3) if this conduct indicated official
complicity in the murder of Dr. King.
Ray was able to escape the scene without detection for two main reasons: All of
the officers rushed toward the Lorraine immediately after the shot, leaving
South Main Street unsecured; and there was, in fact, no contingency plan for
units in case of trouble near the Lorraine. Right after Dr. King was shot,
McCullough, who was standing in the parking lot of the Lorraine, ran to Dr.
King's side in an effort to render aid.(150) Simultaneously, Richmond ran from
his observation post to a telephone several feet away and placed a call to the
intelligence section at police headquarters to inform them of the assassination.
(151)
Eleven members of tact 10 had been on a rest break at the fire station for
several minutes, (152) while one member had remained in the lead patrol vehicle
to monitor the radio.(153) Upon realizing Dr. King was shot, the 11 men in the
the house hurriedly exited the building and started to rush toward the Lorraine.
Most dropped over a 10-foot retaining wall at the rear of the fire station in
their rush toward the Lorraine.(154) Some of them then went to the balcony,
while others continued north and then west back to South Main Street. (155) The
commander of the unit remained at the edge of the retaining wall for a few
moments, from which he saw most. of the, men running to the Lorraine. He then
returned to South Main Street where he moved northward toward the roominghouse.
(156) The other patrolman who had not gone over the wall also remained at its
edge for a few moments.
He then went to the lead patrol vehicle to radio news of the assassination.
(157)
The lead patrol vehicle was parked adjacent to the firehouse. Upon realizing
something had happened. the member of the unit who had stayed in the vehicle ran
a short distance along the side of the firehouse. He then returned to the
vehicle and radioed news of the shooting of the police dispatcher.(158) After he
was joined by the member of the unit who had returned to the car, they pulled
out and turned south on Main Street to get to the Lorraine.(159)
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The focus of attention of all members of the Memphis Police Department was on
the Lorraine. During this time, Ray apparently exited the roominghouse on South
Main, moved southward, dropped his bundle into the inset doorway of Canipe's
Amusement Co., entered his white Mustang parked just south of Canipe's and sped
northward on South Main. It seemed likely that Ray dropped the bundle with its
incriminating evidence because he either observed the members of tact 10
departing the firehouse to rush to the Lorraine, or else because he spotted the
lead tact 10 vehicle parked on the north side of the firehouse and protruding on
the sidewalk.
Ray's departure in the Mustang apparently preceded the arrival on South Main of
two officers from tact 10 by only a matter of seconds. The two approached the
roominghouse on South Main from opposite directions after having first
concentrated their attention on the Lorraine. (160)
The failure of the units patrolling the general vicinity to have a contingency
plan in case of trouble near the Lorraine also contributed to Ray's ability to
escape. The assassination took place at approximately 6:01 p.m. Although members
of the Memphis Police Department were aware of the event almost immediately, it
was not until approximately 6:03 p.m., after receiving confirmation, that the
dispatcher transmitted its occurrence over the air.(161) Immediately thereafter,
patrol cars and units in the general vicinity began moving toward the immediate
area of the Lorraine. This activity, however, duplicated the individual actions
of both the undercover policeman and the members of tact 10. Further, it was not
until 6:06 p.m., almost 5 minutes after the assassination, that the dispatcher
ordered the two-block area around the Lorraine and the roominghouse sealed off.
(162) By this time, Ray had almost certainly left the vicinity of the Lorraine
and was headed out of Memphis.
Other questions about the performance of the Memphis Police Department have been
raised. They pertained to the extent of the MPD fugitive search, the failure of
the MPD to issue an all points bulletin for the white Mustang, and its failure
to establish roadblocks on the major arteries leading out of Memphis.
At 6:07 p.m., the dispatcher was advised by a member of tact 10 that the murder
weapon had been recovered in front of 4:24 South Main Street and that the
suspect had run south on South Main. (163) At 6:08 p.m., the description of the
suspect was broadcast as a young, well-dressed white male, and at 6:10 p.m., the
description of the suspected getaway car as a late model white Mustang was
broadcast. (164)
Memphis Police Department records reflecting the actions of the general ward
cars and tact units with respect to the extent of the fugitive search conducted
immediately following the assassination do not exist. The committee, however,
was able to reconstruct a broad outline of these actions through an examination
of the April 4, 1,968, MPD radiotapes and a series of interviews with
individuals involved.
The transcript of the April 4, 1968, Memphis Police Department radio
transmissions immediately following the assassination reflected that the general
ward cars halted at least three white Mustangs, (165) though it was impossible
for the committee to ascertain the actual number of such vehicles halted.(166)
Nevertheless, field interviews
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conducted by the committee revealed that none of the city's tact units engaged
in a fugitive search following the assassination.(167) This meant that an
approximate total of from 49 to 110 patrol vehicles and from 186 to 440 Memphis
law enforcement officers never responded to the 6:10 p.m. broadcast of the white
Mustang. According to Memphis Police Department officials, the reason for the
failure of the tact units to engage in the search was that their primary concern
was with the rioting, firebombing and looting that occurred throughout the city
following news of the assassination.(168) This was corroborated in interviews
with various members of miscellaneous tact units. (169)
The committee's investigation further revealed that, contrary to established
Memphis Police Department procedures, roadblocks were not established on major
arteries leaving Memphis, and an all points bulletin (APB) for a white Mustang
was never broadcast to the surrounding jurisdictions, including Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Alabama. (170) The committee's investigation revealed that, in
all probability Ray was already two to three blocks away from the roominghouse
making his escape in the white Mustang by the time the news of the assassination
was broadcast at 6:03 p.m. By 6:06 p.m., when the two-block area around the
crime scene had been sealed off, Ray could have been in Arkansas. By 6:10 p.m.,
when the description of the white Mustang was broadcast, Ray could have been
halfway to the Mississippi State line.
These time estimates are significant only if Ray did in fact drive to either
Arkansas or Mississippi. Based on Ray's testimony to the committee,(171)
corroborated in part by the fact that he did abandon the Mustang in Atlanta, Ga.
the following morning, it is probable that Ray did drive to the Mississippi
State line following the assassination. The route through Mississippi would have
been the quickest to Atlanta. The failure of the dispatcher to alert the
neighboring States, therefore, may have substantially facilitated Ray's flight
from the scene of the assassination.
According to the MPD officer who was in charge of communications at the time of
the assassination, it was his negligence that resuited in no APB broadcast and
no roadblocks on major arteries. (172) The officer stated that the loop lights
had been switched to red to permit the passage through town of emergency
vehicles, and emergency radio silence had been maintained following news of the
assassination. He stated, however, that a signal Y, calling for an APB and
roadblocks, was never broadcast due to the immense volume of traffic and
confusion in the aftermath of the assassination. Further, it was not his normal
practice to issue an APB to Mississippi because of "a past history of
noncooperation from that State."
The committee found the performance of the Memphis Police Department deficient
following the assassination in a number of respects.
The absence of a contingency plan to seal off the area around the Lorraine
immediately was inexcusable, especially in light of the violence that had
occurred during Dr. King's appearance in Memphis on March 28. Since the MPD was
aware of numerous threats to Dr. King, it had good reason to expect trouble in
the vicinity of the Lorraine, as the number of tactical units assigned to the
area indicated. It would have only been logical, in the view of the committee,
to have developed
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a contingency plan for the use of these tactical units. Similarly, the failure
to issue an all points bulletin or to block egress routes from the city was
indefensible. Nevertheless, the committee found no evidence that the substandard
performance of the Memphis police in the aftermath of the assassination was part
of a conspiracy to facilitate the assassination of Dr. King or the escape from
Memphis of James Earl Ray. The committee found, instead, that these defects
resulted from inadequate supervision, lack of foresight and individual
negligence. They did not constitute complicity in the assassination.
3. MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY
The committee also examined James Earl Roy's escape from the Missouri State
Penitentiary, which occurred on April 23, 1967.(175) The possibility of the
involvement of prison authorities in the escape had been raised by critics,
based or two separate sets of circumstances: (1) The release, shortly after
Ray's escape, of a fugitive-wanted poster with incorrect fingerprints; (2) the
apparent need for Ray to have secured inside assistance.
The committee sought information from a variety of sources. First, it undertook
a complete review of existing prison records, including visitor cards,(176)
financial records,(177) and the report of the prison's official investigation
into the escape.(178) Second, extensive field interviews were held with key
prison officials and former inmate or criminal associates of Ray. (179) Finally,
sworn testimony was taken from members of the assassin's immediate family, as
well as from Ray himself.18
Following the escape, prison officials issued a wanted poster to hundreds of law
enforcement agencies throughout the country that had Ray's photograph and
physical description on it. The fingerprints on the poster were, however, those
of another escaped prisoner,(180) leading to speculation that government
authorities had sought to thwart Ray's apprehension and thus facilitate the
assassination.
The committee was informed by Harry F. Lauf the records officer at the prison,
that the erroneous poster had been printed by inmates at Moberly Training Center
for Men, a medium security institution at Moberly, Mo.(181). When the poster was
ready for distribution. Lauf did not check the prints against the original
fingerprint card that had been sent to Moberly.(182) The mistake was apparently
inadvertent, the result of deadline pressure on Lauf.
The committee then learned that after the mistake was uncovered, immediate
instructions were issued to destroy the old posters. By the early summer of
1967. corrected posters had been printed and distributed. (183) Finally, after
Ray was positively identified as a suspect in the assassination, an oral report
about the incident was made by Lauf to Fred T. Wilkerson, director of the
Missouri Department of Corrections. (184)
The evidence before the committee indicated, therefore, that the release of
erroneous posters was the result of a regrettable but innocent
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oversight by prison officials and that efforts made after discovery of the error
to rectify it minimized its effect. These considerations, together with the fact
that this incident occurred a full year before the assassination, led the
committee to find that the mistaken posters were not part of a conspiracy to
assassinate Dr. King.
The method of Ray's escape from the Missouri State Penitentiary was not so
easily resolved. Following his arrest in London in June 1968, Ray gave an
account of the escape to his attorneys and others that he later admitted was
false.19 It was not until his eighth interview with the committee at Brushy
Mountain Penitentiary that he detailed an escape plan that involved concealment
in a breadbox while being transported beyond prison walls by the innocent driver
of a delivery truck en route to a nearby prison farm. (185) Ray claimed to have
planned the escape alone, though he indicated he received assistance from two
inmates whom he refused to identify.20(186)
The breadbox story conformed to conclusions reached by prison officials after
their original investigation,(187) and it was more or less corroborated by
committee interviews with prison inmates. (188) Nevertheless, the committee was
unable to learn the identity of the inmates who assisted Ray. Specific inmates
who worked with Ray in the kitchen were suggested both by informants during the
original investigation(189) and by individuals interviewed by the committee.
(190) One inmate, Frank Guinan, actually admitted in an unsworn committee
interview that he covered Ray with bread, pushed the breadbox to the loading
dock and, with the assistance of one other inmate whom he refused to identify,
loaded the box on the truck. (191) Guinan, however, later retracted his
admission, (192) and Ray has denied knowing him.(193) With the exception of a
statement by an inmate(194) whose reliability was challenged by several
sources,(195) Guinan's original admission was uncorroborated. The committee,
therefore, was reluctant to reach a conclusion on such tenuous evidence. It
merely found that Ray escaped from Missouri State Penitentiary in a breadbox
with inmate assistance.
The committee also investigated a number of events at the prison that aided Ray
in his escape. For example, as a result of an earlier escape attempt when he hid
within the prison, officials were still searching for Ray inside the walls three
days after his break. (196) Records indicated that law enforcement agencies were
alerted to a "possible escape" after Ray was missed at a 5 p.m. prisoner count
on April 23, 1967.(197) Nevertheless, Lt. William R. Turner, the yard officer at
the time, told the committee that an inmate informant told him at approximately
9 that morning that Ray had just escaped, possibly in a breadbox. (198) Turner
said he immediately told his supervisor and alerted the two prison farms that
would receive a breadbox.
Despite some immediate inquiries about the bread deliveries, prison authorities
did not learn of the crushed condition of the bread that
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arrived at Renz Prison Farm until 10 days later, when the manner of Ray's escape
was finally determined. (199)
Although it was unable to resolve every inconsistency in the various statements,
the committee found that negligence on the part of prison officials, not
conspiracy, was an appropriate explanation for Ray's escape.21 The committee did
not find any evidence of official complicity in Ray's escape or in the
assassination.
-----------------------------------
The Department of Justice and the FBI Performed with Varying degrees of
Competency
Page 431
E. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PERFORMED
WITH VARYING DEGREES OF COMPETENCY AND LEGALITY IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR
DUTIES
Having determined that no agency of Government participated in a conspiracy to
assassinate Dr. King, the committee turned its attention to the performance of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect
to the King case. The committee was concerned with the activities of the
Department and Bureau before, as well as, after the assassination, since the
Bureau had conducted an active campaign to discredit Dr. King and to compromise
his standing in society. The results of this phase of the investigation are
presented in two parts:
Section E 1 contains an evaluation of the FBI COINTEL program against Dr. King,
to determine if it might have had any effect on the assassination and if,
consequently, the Bureau or the Department should bear any responsibility for
the assassination.
Section E 2 contains an analysis of the performance of the Department and the
Bureau in investigating the assassination, in which particular emphasis was
placed on the ability of the Bureau to conduct a full and complete investigation
in light of its campaign to discredit Dr. King.
1. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FAILED TO SUPERVISE ADEQUATELY THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; IN ADDITION, THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, IN THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION'S
COINTELPRO CAMPAIGN AGAINST DR. KING, GROSSLY ABUSED AND EXCEEDED ITS LEGAL
AUTHORITY AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT ACTIONS THREATENING BODILY
HARM TO DR. KING MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRAM
An assessment of responsibility for murder is a difficult and complex task.
requiring a consideration of a wide range of moral and legal concepts.1 The
extent to which law ought to reflect a particular view in the assessment of
responsibility and the merits of competing moral philosophies have been the
subject of debate for centuries. Society's concepts of moral, as opposed to
legal, responsibility, moreover, are frequently at variance. Law can strive, at
best, only to reflect a consensus of society's moral values. Consequently, a
legal assessment of responsibility may be either narrower or broader than a
moral assessment. Further, the extent to which concepts of individual
responsibility may be used to assess institutional responsibility is largely
unprecedented and therefore not settled.
-----------------------------------
(431)
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As it addressed the broad question of the institutional responsibility of the
FBI for the assassination of Dr. King, the committee was aware of the complex
nature of its undertaking. As noted in section D, the committee found there was
no evidence that FBI personnel took intentional action to accomplish or
facilitate Dr. King's assassination. It then proceeded to consider a far more
difficult aspect of the question of responsibility, one that arose from the FBI
campaign to discredit Dr. King and destroy his standing in society.
To resolve this issue, the committee examined both the FBI's security
investigation of Dr. King and its subsequent expansion into a COINTELPRO effort
against Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.2 A security
investigation--the collection of intelligence on a, specified target--is, and
was in 1967-68, a legitimate function of the Bureau, when directed at an
appropriate individual. COINTELPRO on the other hand, was never a legitimate FBI
function. While it had no fixed definition. it may be described in Dr. King's
case as an active covert campaign intended to influence "political choices and
social values." (1) As noted by the Senate select committee that investigated
COINTELPRO, there is a gray area between "aggressive investigation" and
"counterintelligence," and the "line between information collection and
harassment can be extremely thin."(2) It must be concluded that in its
COINTELPRO activities, the Bureau grossly abused and exceeded its legal
authority.
The committee recognized that Dr. King was a prominent social leader and critic
and that his activities and public positions were the subject of considerable
debate and controversy that existed apart from the conduct of the FBI.
Consequently, it could not be easily determined to what degree the Bureau, in
fact, contributed to the climate of controversy that surrounded Dr. King.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to review the history of Bureau activities
pursuant to the security investigation and COINTELPRO campaign to understand the
intensity of anti-King feeling within the FBI and the possible significance of
these activities with respect to responsibility for the assassination by the
Bureau or the Department of Justice.
Dr. King's developing stature in the civil rights movement became apparent in
1955, as he led a successful effort to eliminate discriminatory seating
practices on the buses of Montgomery, Ala.,(3) and, shortly thereafter, with the
creation of SCLC-(4) In July 1959, the first of many FBI files was officially
opened on Dr. King, (5) although Bureau interest in him was minimal and no data
was gathered on his activities for 22 months. (6)
(a) Security investigation and COINTELPRO
The security investigation of SCLC was opened in 1962, based on a suspicion that
Dr. King was taking advice from two Communist associates. It was the
responsibility at FBI headquarters of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which
was supervised by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. (7) The general
function of the Division was to gather intelligence on individuals and
organizations considered to be
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a security threat to the Nation. (8) The investigation of Dr. King and SCLC was
handled in the Division by the Internal Security Section. (9) In October 1967,
the Racial Intelligence Section was formed within the Division,(10) and the
investigations of Dr. King, the SCLC and the civil rights movement in general
became its responsibility. The Racial Intelligence Section also carried out the
separate COINTELPRO campaign against so-called Black nationalist hate groups and
their leaders, including the SCLC (the campaign was formally initiated in August
1967)(11) and Dr. King (formally initiated in March 1968).(12) The Crime Records
Division, the Bureau's principal point of contact with Congress and the news
media, was the conduit for many of the COINTELPRO initiatives, includ ing
derogatory information on Dr. King. (13) FBI field offices also had an important
role in the security investigations as well as COINTELPRO. With respect to the
security investigations, Atlanta was designated as the "office of origin,"
coordinating point for data obtained by all field offices on the SCLC and Dr.
King. (14) With respect to COINTELPRO, field offices were asked to submit
proposals on ways to implement the program. (15) Virtually all COINTELPRO
proposals originated in the field offices and were promptly passed through the
Bureau hierarchy for re-view and authorization. (16)
The Department of Justice played a role in the security investigation, since it
was necessary to obtain the Attorney General's approval to tap telephones,(17)
but the Department had no role in COINTELPRO. Nevertheless, both the 1977
Justice Department Task Force and the Senate select committee found that the
Department failed in its responsibility to supervise the FBI during the
development of COINTELPRO operations, and the committee concurred in this
judgment.
The position of the FBI toward Dr. King and the SCLC cannot be understood apart
from personalities. As noted, Dr. King was a social critic, and FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover was a man who strongly resented criticism of the Bureau from any
source. The initial personal interest of Hoover in Dr. King is said to have
originated with an article in The Nation in 1959 in which Dr. King commented on
the scarcity of Black Federal agents, including FBI agents. (18) This and
subsequent criticisms of the FBI by Dr. King were undoubtedly one explanation
for Hoover's intense animosity toward the civil rights leader. Examples of the
Director's attitude appeared with frequency during the committee's review of FBI
files. In February 1962, James Bland, Chief of the Subversive Control Section,
sent a memorandum to Assistant Director Sullivan asking whether King should be
warned about the suspected Communist background of one. of his advisers. A copy
of the memo was sent to Hoover who rejected the proposal, writing in the margin,
"King is no good anyway."3 (19) In December 1963, Time announced its decision to
name Dr. King "Man of the Year." Hoover wrote on a copy of the news release on
the decision, "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one."
(20) Hoover's resentment had apparently been compounded by remarks made by Dr.
King in 1960. in Albany, Ga., criticizing the Bureau for its failure to pursue
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aggressively civil rights violations in the South. In the opinion of several FBI
agents questioned by the committee, the Albany statement was, from the
Director's standpoint, the single most significant reason for the feud, (21) one
that came to a public climax in November 1964, when Hoover, in a press briefing
referred to Dr King as "the most notorious liar" in the country. (22)
In addition to Dr. King's criticism of the FBI, other factors were suggested to
the committee to explain the Director's deep-seated hostility. They include
"qualities of racism" in Hoover's character; (23) Dr. King's violation of the
Director's strict, almost puritanical, standards for behavior by members of the
clergy; (24) and Dr. King's philosophy of nonviolence, thought to stand at odds
with the Director's personal belief in the ultimate importance of power. (25) In
addition, it was suggested to the committee that Hoover, whose opposition to
communist was answering, was convinced that Dr. King and his movement were
susceptible to Communist influence, (26) even though a contrary assessment had
been made by FBI experts.
(1) Hoover's dislike for Dr. King.--The committee concluded, based on an
exhaustive review of FBI files and on the sworn testimony of former FBI and
Justice Department officials, that the campaign to discredit Dr. King, up to the
time of his death and beyond, (27) continued as long as it did and as intensely
as it did only because of Hoover's deep personal dislike for Dr. King. Evidence
obtained by the committee indicated that the allegation that Dr. King posed a
threat to national security was merely a convenient rationalization used by the
Director to justify his personal vendetta against the civil rights leader. For
example, in April 1962, the Atlanta "office of origin" (28) submitted to
headquarters a report on Dr. King that concluded there was no significant
Communist influence being exerted on him. (29) Nevertheless, Hoover ordered that
Dr. King's name be added to section A of the reserve index.4 (30) And, by
October 1960, a fullscale security investigation of Dr. King and the SCLC had
begun.(32) The initiation of these investigations, however, cannot be attributed
wholly to the personal animosity of Hoover. They also stemmed from a general
concern by the FBI about Communist infiltration of the civil rights movement
that was prompted by influential people, including Congressmen, who claimed that
pending civil rights legislation was inspired by a Communist conspiracy.
The investigations that followed, on the other hand, revealed there was little
basis in fact for this concern. (33) In August 1963, the Domestic intelligence
Division coinpleted a synopsis of the Communist Party's effort to exploit the
American Negro. (34) It concluded that while the party had expended enorinous
effort and resources to influence and control Black Americans, it had been
largely unsuccessful.(35) In sworn testimony before the committee agents from
the Domestic Intelligence Division insisted that their conclusion of
insignificant infiltration into the civil rights movement reflected their
professional judgment then as well as in 1978.
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Director Hoover's reaction, reflected in notes appended to the synopsis, was
sharply critical:
This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when Castro took over Cuba. You
contended then that Castro and his cohorts were not Communists and not
influenced by Communists. Time alone proved you wrong * * *. (37)
Hoover's irritation resulted in a sharp and immediate change in the position of
the Domestic Intelligence Division. Reacting to Dr. King's famous "I Have a
Dream" address, Sullivan wrote in a memorandum to Assistant to the Director Alan
Belmont:
The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the evidence
was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a
Communist or under Communist influence. In investigating and writing about
communist and the American Negro, we had better remember this and profit by the
lesson it should teach.
* * * Personally, I believe in the light, of King's powerful demagogic speech
yesterday he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together
when it comes to influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now, if
we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this
Nation from the standpoint of communist, the Negro, and national security. (38)
By the end of 1963, FBI files reflected a marked difference in the Bureau's
approach toward Dr. King and the beginning of a campaign to discredit him. On
December 23, 1963, a conference was held in Washington,(39) with members of the
Atlanta field office and the headquarters Domestic Intelligence Division in
attendance. A memorandum written by Sullivan the following day summarized the
results of the meeting:
Recognizing the delicacy of this entire situation because of the prominence of
King, the primary purpose of the conference was to explore how best to carry on
one investigation to produce the desired results without embarrassment to the
Bureau. Included in the discussion was a complete analysis of the avenues of
approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader and developing
evidence concerning King's continued dependence on Communists, for guidance and
direction. (40)
Less than 2 weeks later, the direction of the Bureau's developing course of
action became clear Assistant Director Sullivan authorized a proposal that the
FBI consider promoting a new leader for the Black community who would alleviate
the confusion expected once Dr. King had been "taken off his pedestal."(41)
Hoover attached a note to Sullivan's memo:
I am glad to see that light has finally, though dismally delayed, come to the
DID. I struggled for months to get over the fact that the Communists were taking
over the racial movement but our experts here couldn't and wouldn't see it.(42)
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(2) Electronic surveillance of Dr. King.--From October 24, 1963, to June 21,
1966,(43) the FBI also engaged in an extensive program of electronic
surveillance of Dr. King. The committee found it was conducted in a particularly
abusive fashion. FBI agents who monitored the devices, although they were
initially instructed to be especially alert for contacts between Dr. King and
Communist connections, (44) exercised little discretion in deciding what to
overhear and record. Private and personal conversations were recorded, as were
conversations between Dr. King and Government officials.5 In fact, the
development of personal information that, might be derogatory to Dr. King became
a major objective of the surveillance effort.(45) The committee found that the
Department of Justice shared responsibility for the surveillance, since it was
initially authorized by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.6 (46)
The nature of the Bureau's campaign against Dr. King is vividly illustrated by
one incident. Shortly after Director Hoover's press conference in November 1964,
in which he referred to Dr. King as the country's "most notorious liar," (50) a
package was mailed to Dr. King. It contained an anonymous diatribe against. the
civil rights leader and a copy of an electronic surveillance tape, apparently to
lend credence to threats of exposure of derogatory personal information made in
the letter. (51) The committee was unable to locate the original letter, but an
apparently authentic copy was found in the files of Assistant Director Sullivan.
The final paragraph clearly implied that suicide would be a suitable course of
action for Dr. King:
King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have
just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific
reason, it, has definite practical significance). You are done. There is but one
way out for you. You better take it before your filthy fraudulent self is bared
to the Nation. (52)
In addition to Sullivan's admission of involvement in the scheme in testimony
before the Senate select committee.7 (53) the committee received evidence
raising the possibility that the package was delivered to Assistant to the
Director Belmont prior to mailing.(55) If this was the case, the committee
considered it highly likely that Director Hoover had before-the-fact knowledge
of the action.
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In the final analysis, the committee was unable to fix personal responsibility
for the threatening letter to Dr. King, but it noted that it did reflect the
extent of the hostility in the Bureau toward Dr. King. The FBI campaign against
Dr. King extended beyond the invasion his privacy. Efforts were made to
interfere with SCLC fundraising and with the awarding of degrees and other
honors to Dr. King. (56) Further, an extensive effort was made to smear his name
through the dissemination of derogatory information,(57) and attempts were made
to create ill feeling between Dr. King and his associates, as well as his wife.
(58)
The FBI effort to smear Dr. King by the dissemination of derogatory information
was targeted at two general audiences. One was officials of the Government in
Washington--congressional leaders, White House personnel, and Federal agency
staff members, all of whom were briefed regularly about Dr. King's personal life
and the alleged Communist connections and sympathies of his advisers. Lengthy
monographs were distributed to Government officials in November 1964,(59) April
1967,(60) and March 1968,(61) and certain key persons were from time to time
given personal briefings by the Bureau. (62)
(3) Manipulation of the media.--Of far greater significance to the committee,
for the purpose of assessing any responsibility of the FBI for the
assassination, was the Bureau's program to achieve public awareness of
derogatory information about Dr. King. By using friendly media
outlets--newspaper and other sources who published material favorable to or
supplied by the Bureau--the FBI had potential access to a vast audience. (63)
The committee was able to document this COINTELPRO technique from FBI files and
from the testimony of Bureau personnel assigned to the Crime Records Division.
(64) It was apparent that the FBI's manipulation of the media contributed to a
hostile attitude toward Dr. King and what he represented. As an illustration,
the committee selected a case that raised difficult and complex questions with
respect, to the bearing this sort of COINTELPRO activity might have had on the
assassination. The committee found the case to be particularly significant,
since it occurred in St. Louis, where the committee conducted an extensive
conspiracy investigation.8
The case involved the relationship between the FBI and the St. Louis
Globe-Democrat, 9 as it was uncovered by a rival newspaper, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. In a series of articles published in 1977, the Post-Dispatch
identified the publisher of the Globe-Democrat and a reporter on the paper's
staff as individuals who "were looked upon by the St. Louis FBI office as key
outlets in the mid-1960's for news the Bureau wanted published. * * *" (65) The
Post-Dispatch series was the result of a review of FBI documents the paper had
obtained in a Freedom of Information Act request. (The documents were also
reviewed by the committee.) The publisher was identified as Richard H. Amberg,
who died in 1967, and the reporter as Denny
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Walsh, who had since left the paper. (66) The name of the publisher of the
Globe-Democrat in 1968, G. Duncan Bauman, had been deleted from certain
documents the FBI provided to the post-Dispatch.
The committee obtained copies of internal documents referred to in the
post-Dispatch series, and they revealed the ease with which the Bureau had been
able to use the newspaper for its counterintelligence initiatives. For example,
a memorandum from the St. Louis special agent-in-charge to Director Hoover on
May 28, 1968,(67) discussed activities to disrupt "new left" organizations:
The feeding of well chosen information to the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, a local
newspaper, whose editor and associate editor are extremely friendly to the
Bureau and the St. Louis Office, has also been utilized in the past and it is
contemplated that this technique might be used to good advantage in connection
with this program.
Then, on October 18, 1968,(68) the St. Louis field office received a memorandum
from FBI headquarters giving permission to provide a source on the
Globe-Democrat with information to disrupt organizing activities by Students for
a Democratic Society at area high schools. A note appended to the memorandum
praised the newspaper and its staff:
The St. Louis Globe-Democrat has been especially cooperative with the Bureau in
the past. Its publisher [name deleted] is on the Special Correspondents List.
Denny Walsh, a Globe-Democrat reporter named in the released FOIA documents, was
interviewed by the post-Dispatch and by committee. He verified that the
Globe-Democrat, as well as he personally, had enjoyed a close working
relationship with the FBI. (69) Knowledge of the presence of a willing news
media outlet for I he FBI in St. Louis led the committee to scrutinize carefully
a COINTELPRO initiative from FBI headquarters and Globe-Democrat editorial, both
of which preceded the assassination of Dr. King by less than a week.10 The
editorial addressed a march on Washington that Dr. King had scheduled for the
spring of 1968.
In late 1967, Dr. King had announced plans to lead a massive march on Washington
in the spring of 1968. Alternately called the Washington Spring Project and the
Poor People's Campaign, it generated a great deal of interest as well as
considerable concern among the hierarchy of the FBI. Following the sanitation
workers march in Memphis, led by Dr. King on March 28, 1968, the Bureau decided
to seize upon the violence that had erupted as evidence that Dr. King was
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unable to conduct a peaceful demonstration by a large number of people. The
theory behind the strategy was to call into question the peaceful intentions of
the Washington Spring Project. On the very day of the ill-fated march, a
memorandum was circulated outlining an FBI-authored editorial to be placed with
"cooperative news media sources."11 (70) It took Dr. King to task for Setting
involved in the Memphis strike and for not being able to control the march,
suggesting that Memphis was merely a prelude to what was coming in Washington.
(72) The editorial was "handled" that same day. (73)
On March 30 an editorial appeared in the Globe-Democrat,(74) accompanied by a
disparaging cartoon of Dr. King. The editorial's similarities to the one
outlined in the FBI memorandum were too close, in the view of the committee, to
have occurred by chance. The memorandum and the editorial reflected the same
basic argument. King called for a strike that he knew would get violent and then
King fled. Language in the editorial was virtually plagiarized from the FBI
memorandum:
Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capitol
[sic].--FBI memorandum, March 28, 1968 Memphis could be only the prelude to a
massive bloodbath in the Nation's Capitol [sic] * * * --Globe-Democrat
editorial, March 30, 1968
In light of the past relationship between the Bureau and the paper the committee
found that there was sufficient evidence in the editorial itself to conclude
that it had been inspired by the FBI memorandum, although the only written
documentation of this was the notation, "handled." on the memorandum.
Independent testimony to the committee indicated that the normal method the
Bureau used to place material with a friendly news source was by telephone. (75)
The committee deduced that the placing probably occurred the same day the
memorandum was circulated, which would account for its prompt appearance in the
Globe-Democrat.12
(4) Analysis of the impact of the FBI-inspired editorial.--The committee
carefully considered the possibility that the FBI's actions were more than
defamatory and that they might have placed Dr. King's life in danger by
exacerbating anti-King emotions and by seemingly justifying violent action to
remove Dr. King from his position of prominence. The committee was not able to
determine, however, that James Earl Ray read the Globe-Democrat, editorial. Ray
testified to the committee, that he had been in the habit of purchasing a daily
newspaper;(76) the evidence established, however, that he was in Birmingham on
March 30, purchasing the rifle he used to assassinate Dr. King, so it is
unlikely that he read the Globe-Democrat that day.
Even if Ray had read the editorial, he had, the committee noted, already begun
to stalk Dr. King when it was published. Thus, at worst, the editorial might
have reinforced a plan that had already
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been set in motion. On the other hand, the editorial had illustrative
significance. If there had been other editorials or articles discrediting Dr.
King that had been planted by the Bureau prior to the assassination, their
potential significance might have been great. To evaluate this significance,
however, would, as noted, require detailing all the COINTELPRO activities in St.
Louis, attempting to determine if these activities had come to the attention of
Ray or others residing in St. Louis who might have been involved in an
assassination conspiracy-John Ray, John Sutherland, or John Kauffmann, as
examples-and attempting to assess the impact, if any, of these activities on
these individuals.
The committee did obtain evidence that John Ray read and absorbed the editorial.
On June 13, 1972, he wrote to author George McMillan the following description
of Dr. King:
* * * King was not a saint, as these try to picture him. There are millions of
Rays in the United States with the same background and beliefs, who know that
King not only was a rat but with his beaded eyes and pin ears look like one. A
piece in the editorial sections of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat said that King
led marches until he got, them stir [sic] up, then used a excuse to leave, while
the dumb Blacks got their head beat in by police. A week before he was kill
[sic], it also said he ran down the alley and jump into a waiting cadiliac
[sic].
The letter was written over 4 years after the assassination. It cannot be
reliably determined when John Ray first. read the editorial--before the
assassination or later in prison--though his failure to reflect its content
accurately indicates he may not have had it to refer to when he wrote to
McMillan. What is indicated, however, is that the editorial made a significant
impression on him.
The committee did not obtain evidence to indicate that any of the other
individuals who the committee believes may have been involved in a conspiracy to
kill Dr. King read the Globe-Democrat editorial prior to the assassination. The
committee was only able to determine, therefore, that the Bureau-inspired
editorial was used to rationalize the assassination.
The committee could find no evidence that the Bureau ever specifically
considered the possibility that planting derogatory editorials might encourage
certain parties to cause bodily harm to Dr. King. In its review of FBI
COINTELPRO operations against a wide variety of targets, the Senate committee
did note that the dangerous character of some of its COINTELPRO initiatives was
however, recognized by the Bureau. Those techniques that were seen as likely to
cause physical, emotional, or economic harm to the target, "were scrutinized
carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance the
'great good' to be achieved by the proposal against the known or risked harm to
the target. If the 'good' was sufficient, the proposal was approved. (78)
The Bureau also recognized that some of their COINTELPRO activities would entail
the risk of murder of the target. It realized that falsely labeling someone as
an informant in a group that was the target of a COINTELPRO operation always
carried the risk that the informant
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would be killed by the target group. (79) Apparently, the Bureau would not run
the risk if it "had information that the [target] group was, at that time
actually killing suspected informants." (80)
Apparently, similar caution was not observed in the implementation of COINTELPRO
activities against Dr. King. Given the highly charged and emotional atmosphere
surrounding Dr. King's activities, the committee concluded that the FBI should
have considered the real possibility that its activities might encourage an
attack on Dr. King.
Willie the evidence was insufficient to link COINTELPRO to the assassination,
the committee obtained ample evidence to warrant strong condemnation of FBI
efforts that were directed against Dr. King and SCLC for the risk they created
for Dr. King. The editorial writers at the Globe-Democrat were exercising first
amendment freedoms, so their conduct was constitutionally privileged. There was,
however, no similar privilege covering the conduct of the FBI. Not only did this
conduct contribute to the hostile climate that surrounded Dr. King, it was
morally reprehensible, illegal, felonious, and unconstitutional. There is no
place in a free society for such governmental conduct. It deserves the strongest
condemnation.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PERFORMED A
THOROUGH INVESTIGATION INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JAMES EARL RAY FOR THE
ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING, AND CONDUCTED A THOROUGH FUGITIVE INVESTIGATION, BUT
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE ADEQUATELY THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSPIRACY IN THE
ASSASSINATION; THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MANIFESTED A LACK OF CONCERN
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE MANNER IN WHICH IT CONDUCTED PARTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION
The extensive FBI effort against Dr. King in both its security investigation and
COINTELPRO operations posed for the committee the additional troubling question
of whether the agency had been either willing or able to conduct a thorough and
far-reaching criminal investigation of the assassination. It was the committee's
task to determine, therefore, whether the FBI had been able to abandon its
adversary posture vis-a-vis Dr. King and carry out an aggressive and objective
investigation of the person or persons responsible for the murder.13
In order to answer this ultimate question, the committee undertook, as its first
step, a thorough review of pertinent investigative files of the Department of
Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of primary importance were the
files of MURKIN (for Murder-King, the official designation of the Martin Luther
King assassination investigation) at both FBI headquarters and the Memphis field
office, the office of origin. In addition, the committee reviewed field office
reports from 16 FBI districts, including those covering the key cities of
Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans, St. Louis, Kansas City, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. It also looked at Justice Department files on the investigation, a
separate department file on Ray's extradition, and
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the 1977 Justice Department Task Force Report, entitled "Martin Luther King,
Jr., Security and Assassination Investigations Report."
The file review was followed by a series of lengthy, in-person interviews with
former officials of both the Justice Department and the FBI who played
significant roles, either as supervisors or field agents, in the assassination
investigation. The interviews were supplemented by the executive session and
public hearing testimony of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark; former
Assistant Attorney General (for Civil Rights) Stephen Pollak; former Assistant
to the Director of the FBI Cartha DeLoach; and former Memphis Special
Agent-in-Charge Robert Jensen.
With the exception of J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director in 1968; Clyde Tolson, FBI
Associate Director; and Thomas Robinson, U.S. attorney in Memphis in 1968, all
of whom were deceased, the committee was able to interview all individuals whose
testimony was considered necessary for a thorough examination of the quality of
the performance of the FBI and the Justice Department in the assassination
investigation.
(a) The FBI chain of command
In 1968, the FBI was divided into 10 internal divisions. (81) Division Six, the
General Investigative Division, headed by Assistant Director Alex Rosen, had
overall responsibility for investigation of Federal crimes, including civil
rights violations. Following Dr. King's assassination, Federal investigative
jurisdiction was predicated on a possible violation of 18 U.S.C. 241, the
Federal civil rights statute barring conspiracies to interfere with or impede
the constitutional rights of an individual. (82) Thus, the General Investigative
Division assumed responsibility for the King investigation.
Within the division, the investigation was managed by the Civil Rights Section.
A headquarters "case agent" was appointed and information on developments in the
investigation passed up through the chain of command to Cartha DeLoach,
Assistant to the Director; Clyde Tolson, the Associate Director; and Director
Hoover. In a case of such magnitude, major case developments were summarized and
passed upward at least once daily.
In the field, the Memphis FBI office, which initiated an investigation shortly
after the assassination, was designated "office of origin" and assumed major
administrative and coordination functions. While direction of the case was a
responsibility of FBI headquarters in Washington--reflecting the national and
international scope of the investigation Memphis received copies of most of the
reports from the 57 other domestic offices assigned to the case. In addition,
Memphis coordinated and at times initiated investigative leads.
Because the FBI was only one of several component agencies of the Department of
Justice, conduct of the MURKIN investigation was ultimately the responsibility
of Attorney General Clark and attorneys he assigned to supervise it. The Civil
Rights Division was formally responsible for the conduct of the investigation
and for any Federal prosecutions that might develop. (83)
Outside of Washington, the Department. of Justice was, represented by U.S.
attorneys, one for each Federal district. Although
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the actual prosecution of a Federal criminal case is the responsibility of a
U.S. attorney, subject only to supervision by the appropriate division of the
Justice Department, this was not the practice in civil rights prosecutions in
1968. Political considerations and the need to maintain working relations with
local law enforcement agencies often made it awkward for a U.S. attorney to
bring Federal civil rights cases local authorities. At the time, therefore,
Federal civil rights investigations and prosecutions were, with very few
exceptions, the responsibility of the Civil Rights Division in Washington. (84)
This was the practice in the investigation of the King assassination. The
committee's review of investigative files indicated that while the FBI's
investigation was carried out by offices throughout the country, local U.S.
attorneys in important cities--Atlanta, Memphis, New Orleans, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and St. Louis--were excluded from the chain of information and
necessarily, therefore, from decision-making.(85)
(b) The fugitive investigation
In light of James Earl Ray's ability to elude authorities for over months
subsequent to the assassination of Dr. King, the committee examined the FBI's
post-assassination fugitive investigation. The purpose was to determine whether
all available resources had been committed to the task of identifying and
locating the assassin.
As first step, the committee pieced together a detailed chronology of the
investigation that preceded Ray's apprehension. Dr. King had been shot at 6:01
p.m. on April 4, 1968, at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tenn. Within moments,
members of the Memphis Police Department were at the scene. The Memphis field
office of the FBI was notified, and Special Agent-in-Charge Robert Jensen
contacted Washington headquarters. Jensen recalled that he was put through to
DeLoach. (86) who in turn notified Director Hoover. (87)
As the news of the assault on Dr. King was moving through the FBI's command
structure, Attorney General Clark was first contacted, he believed, by a Justice
Department community relations specialist who was with Dr. King at the time.
(88) A short time later, Clark was in telephone contact with DeLoach and
thereafter with Hoover. A decision was made, apparently almost automatically, to
involve the FBI immediately in the investigation. Later that evening a
memorandum was sent from the Justice Department to the FBI ordering "a full
investigation" into the possible violation of 18 U.S.C. 241. (89)
The committee's inquiry revealed that the FBI had no specific written guidelines
in 1968 for the conduct of an assassination investigation. FBI files as well as
committee interviews reflect, however, that the investigation was treated from
the beginning as a "major case" or "special" investigation. Additional
administrative personnel and agents were assigned to Memphis during the initial
stages, including an accountant to maintain nationwide cost figures on the
investigation.(90)
A 24-hour deadline was imposed on all field offices for checking leads, and a
reminder system was set up at headquarters to monitor compliance with the
deadlines.(91) On April 7, 1968, an "All SAC" memo was issued from headquarters
with instructions similar to those normally issued in "major cases"
investigations:
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All investigations must be handled under the personal direction of the SAC.
Leads are to be afforded immediate, thorough investigative attention. You must
exhaust all possibilities from such leads as any one lead could result in the
solution of this most important investigation. SAC will be held personally
responsible for any failure to promptly and thoroughly handle investigations in
this matter. (92)
Finally, in further recognition of the special nature of the MURKIN
investigation, the FBI sent an inspector from headquarters to oversee progress
in key field offices. (93)
Following these initial administrative steps, there was, according to FBI files,
a widespread and extensive effort to identify and apprehend the assassin of Dr.
King. Exhaustive field interviews and record checks were performed with every
conceivable source of information--banks, telephone companies, audit agencies,
and police departments, as well as motor vehicle bureaus, motels and hotels,
even dry cleaning establishments, and dancing schools.
Many early investigative breaks resulted from a thorough analysis by the Bureau
of physical evidence, much of which had been found shortly after the
assassination in a bundle that had been left in the doorway of Canipe's
Amusement Co. on South Main Street, Memphis. Both a pair of binoculars and a
.30-06 rifle were traced to their respective places of purchase. The binoculars
had been bought in Memphis itself, (94) while the suspected murder weapon was
traced to the Aeromarine Supply Co. in Birmingham, Ala.(95) Early ballistics
tests on the rifle and the bullet taken from Dr. King's body during the autopsy
revealed that while "the bullet could have been fired from the rifle found near
the scene," the mutilation of the bullet made it impossible to state "that it
was actually fired from this one rifle." (96)
Interviews with clerks at Aeromarine established that the rifle had been
purchased on March 30, 1968, by an individual using the name of Harvey Lowmeyer.
Lowmeyer was generally described as a "white male, 36 years old, 5 feet, 8
inches tall, 150 to 160 pounds, black or dark brown hair.(97) Finally, in a
clear example of both the skill and detail of the Bureau's fugitive
investigation, laundry marks found pair of undershorts and an undershirt in the
bundle were traced specific machine model, and ultimately to a particular
laundry. Within 1 week of the assassination, the as-yet unidentified suspect's
use of the Home Service Laundry in Los Angeles had been estabished.(98)
Nevertheless, despite the extensive FBI effort, the suspect continued to elude
authorities. On April 17, in order to secure an arrest warrant and additional
publicity in the fugitive search, the Government filed a complaint with the U.S.
Commissioner in Birmingham. It charged Eric S. Galt 14 "and an individual
alleged to be his brother" with conspiracy to interfere with the constitutional
rights of Martin Luther King, Jr. (99) A fugitive press release was issued with
the complaint, and media distribution of the information and accompanying
photograph was encouraged. (100)
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While the Department of Justice and the FBI were trying to identify Galt" by
issuing a press release asking for public assistance, a finger tint project was
in progress at FBI headquarters. Almost immediately after the assassination, the
Bureau had obtained unidentified latent prints of value from the rifle,
binoculars, beer cans, and a copy of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, all of which
were found in the bundle thought to have been dropped by the assassin shortly
after the murder. An additional latent print was obtained from a map of Mexico
discovered in an Atlanta roominghouse used by Galt shortly before the
assassination. Comparisons revealed that prints on the Mexico map, the rifle,
and binoculars were identical. Apparently made by a left thumb, the print was
identified as "an ulner loop with 12 ridge counts." (101)
(1) James Earl Ray identified.--This and other prints taken from the evidence
were compared unsuccessfully with known prints of approximately 400 suspects
whose names were drawn from the FBI's single fingerprint file and from
outstanding FBI identification orders. (102) Then, a systematic manual search of
fingerprints records of fugitives was initiated, concentrating on a group with
similar left thumb print characteristics. Shortly after the initiation of this
process, and 15 Says after the assassination, a positive match was made with the
prints of James Earl Ray, a fugitive from Missouri State Penitentiary. (103)
The length of time it took the FBI to match the evidence prints to those of Ray
has been the subject of public concern, so the committee closely examined the
procedures that were used. The committee found the FBI's performance in the
fingerprint check to have been thorough, professional and without defect. (104)
It is apparent from the review of FBI files that the identification of James
Earl Ray was the termination point of a major phase of the Bureau's
investigation. An inspector from headquarters who had been assigned to
coordinate activities in the Memphis and Atlanta field offices was taken off the
case; (105) and the Memphis field office was directed to phase out 15 agents and
three stenographic clerks who had been assigned to it at the beginning of the
investigation. (106)
With the positive identification of Ray, a number of investigative steps were
repeated. A new press release was issued, with directions to all field offices
to insure "repeated and widespread distribution. (107) Three days later, a
directive was sent to all offices reemphasizing the 24 hour lead deadline and
directing additional contact with criminal, racial and security informants to
determine whether any possessed information on James Earl Ray.
For only the second time in Bureau history, approval was given for special
addition to the Ten Most Wanted List.(108) Short appeals for public assistance
in the fugitive investigation were drafted and approved for use on the April 21
and April 28 installments of The FBI" on television. (109) And within a week of
the positive identification, various institutions and officials had offered a
total of $150,000 for information leading to the apprehension and conviction of
Ray. (110)
Finally, the positive identification prompted additional field investigation at
banks, telephone companies, credit agencies, police departments, car rental
agencies, motor vehicle departments, dance schools,
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hotels and motels, laundries, libraries, utility companies, selective service
bureaus and labor unions. (111)
Despite the extensive nationwide effort, FBI files indicated a belief within the
Bureau that the best chance for success in the fugitive investigation lay with
Ray's family. Instructions were sent to the four field offices responsible for
areas inhabited by key members of his family:
Full coverage is to be afforded relatives of subject residing in your respective
territories. This will include a spot, surveillance of these persons as well as
a determination of their associates and individuals making frequent contact with
them. You should also obtain all long distance telephone calls from their
residences for period April 23, 1967 to the present time. You should make this a
continuing project until otherwise advised by the Bureau * * * You should insure
that each relative is adequately covered to possibly assist in the subject's
location and apprehension. (112)
In the weeks that followed Ray's identification, dozens of interviews with Ray's
family members, including his brothers, occurred. A close examination of these
interviews indicated, however, that their primary purpose (consistent with the
directive quoted above) was to secure information on the whereabouts of the
suspect, not to investigate the possibility of family involvement in the
assassination.
(2) Surveillance of Ray family considered.--On May 9, 1968, the FBI, clearly
concerned about its. inability to locate Ray,(113) began to consider microphone
and technical surveillance (bugs and wiretaps) of John Ray and Carol Pepper,
Ray's brother and sister, at their homes and at the Grapevine; Tavern, a St.
Louis business they jointly owned and operated. The justification used in the
authorization request 15 transmitted to the Justice Department on May 13 read as
follows:
These installations could assist in the early apprehension of the subject, which
could possibly be instrumental in reducing the stresses and tension placed on
our national security subsequent to the death of Martin Luther King Jr.(114)
The committee, after a thorough consideration of circumstances surrounding the
surveillance request, was concerned about several aspects of the surveillance
proposal.
First, the national security justification seemed, at best, to have been
insubstantial, since the rioting that had been triggered by Dr. King's
assassination had subsided. In addition, it is clear that the requested
electronic surveillance, if installed, would almost certainly have been judged
illegal under 1968 constitutional standards. The purpose stated explicitly in
FBI memorandums, was to surveil the family in hopes of apprehending Ray and not
to gather evidence of the commission of a crime by Carol Pepper or John Ray.
(115) Moreover, as to Carol Pepper at least, there was no significant evidence
in FBI files to indicate her involvement in any criminal activity. Absent a
clear threat
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to national security or probable cause as to the commission of a crime that
might have justified an effort to secure a judicial warrant, no constitutional
basis existed for the surveillance. Finally, a clear statutory basis for such
surveillance did not become law until June 19, 1968.
It is clear that the FBI recognized these legal difficulties. In an internal FBI
memorandum analyzing the legality of the proposed surveillance, it is stated:
The worst that could happen [if the proposed electronic surveillance were
implemented] * * * is that we illegally learn where the subject is located and
thus are able to arrest, him on that knowledge * * * The Court would not allow
the prosecution to use as evidence any information obtained through the illegal
surveillance but the illegal surveillance would not taint the use of any other
evidence obtained either before or after and which was gotten in a legal manner.
Nor, to repeat, would the illegality of the arrest alone resulting from
whereabouts disclosed by unlawful surveillance, prevent the Court from trying
the subject for the offense.16 (116)
The memorandum continued and warning:
* * * that since this search and seizure is unconstitutional as to the Peppers,
they have at least a theoretical cause of action for damages against those who
installed the devices by trespass * * *. Moreover, in any such case the
Government of the United States should surely be willing to pick up the tab for
any judgment had against those who installed the microphones. (117)
The initials of Assistant to the Director DeLoach and Associate Director Tolson
appear on this memorandum.
The committee found that the willingness of the FBI to proceed with this
investigative approach in the face of an internal legal analysis recognizing its
unconstitutional nature reflected an absence of concern for the fundamental
rights of the surveillance targets. In addition, the proposal was a clear
indication either of the Bureau's failure to consider seriously the possibility
of conspiratorial involvement by members of Ray's family, or of its reckless
disregard for the damage that this investigative approach could have done to any
later prosecution of Ray's brothers. Assuming, as FBI officials clearly did, the
illegality of the proposed electronic surveillance, any evidence of conspiracy
intercepted by the tap would have been inadmissable against individuals with
standing to contest, that illegality; in addition, the installation of an
illegal tap or bug would have raised significant taint problems17 and seriously
jeopardized the. ability to use any subsequently developed evidence in a later
conspiracy prosecution.
The problems that could have been created by the FBI's proposal never
materialized. While Attorney General Clark had no recollection
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of receiving or acting on the request, it seems clear from the files and from
interviews that the proposal sent to the Justice Department was neither
authorized nor implemented. The FBI case agent for the assassination
investigation in St. Louis field office, which had jurisdiction for the area of
the proposed electronic surveillance, told committee investigators he authorized
no electronic surveillance in the MURKIN investigation. He stated specifically
there were no surreptitious entries into the Ray family residences or the
Grapevine. (118) In addition, the committee's review of the St. Louis field
office files and of the FBI headquarters MURKIN files produced no evidence of
implementation of the electronic surveillance.
In a June 11, 1968, memorandum to Attorney General Clark, Director Hoover
withdrew the May 13 request for electronic surveillance in light of Ray's
apprehension in London. (119)
When questioned in public hearings, former Assistant to the Director DeLoach
stated that the opinion of the Division and the attorney who provided the legal
analysis of the proposed electronic surveillance was apparently that this
investigative step would have been illegal. (120) He also acknowledged that his
initials appeared on that memorandum (121) and that he had reviewed the
memorandum at the time.(122) When asked by staff counsel to explain this attempt
by the FBI to use what was analyzed and recognized by FBI headquarters as
unconstitutional and illegal electronic surveillance in the assassination
investigation, DeLoach responded:
DELOACH. My only answer * * * is that I did not recall these memoranda. You have
given me the opportunity of reviewing them. I recall none of the circumstances
surrounding them. The Department of Justice makes the legal determination
insofar as the FBI is concerned. The FBI was following an investigative lead
through the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice had the
responsibility of either accepting it or turning it down in accordance with the
rules of the United States as understood by the Attorney General.
STAFF COUNSEL. Would it be fair to conclude from these memos that the FBI in
recommending this investigative step was willing to engage in what it recognized
as a violation of constitutional rights of the Peppers and perhaps of other
people in order to achieve the investigative ends of the proposal?
DELOACH. The conclusion I draw from it is the FBI was very seriously concerned
about the national security of the United States by the incident I mentioned
previously and the fervent desire to apprehend the man responsible for the
assassination of Dr. King. They followed an investigative lead to the Attorney
General, and the Attorney General would make a decision as to whether or not
this would be productive. (123)
Efforts to secure precise, information on Ray's location from the family did not
meet with immediate results. Nevertheless, in a May 9 interview in St. Louis,
John Ray reported that James had mentioned an intention to leave the country if
he escaped and that he had
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indicated, on one occasion, admiration for Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian
Smith.(124) On May 10, based on the interview as well as on other independent
evidence of Ray's interest in African countries,(125) FBI headquarters initiated
a passport review in the Washington field office. (126) It was directed
initially at the 2,100,000 applications that had been filed since April 1967,
the month of Ray's escape. from Missouri State Penitentiary. Washington
requested Canadian authorities to review Canadian passports records. (127)
(3) Ray arrested in London.--On June 1, a break occurred when possible
photographic match of Ray turned up in the Canadian passport of George Ramon
Sneyd. RCMP officials determined from the Kennedy Travel Bureau in Toronto that
"Sneyd" had purchased a Toronto-London-Toronto airlines ticket, with a scheduled
departure of May 6, and return on May 21, 1968. Meanwhile the FBI ascertained
through fingerprint comparisons that Ray and "Sneyd" were, in fact, the same
person. (128) One week later, at 11:11 a.m. on June 8, 1968, Ray was arrested in
Heathrow Airport in London.
(c) The conspiracy investigation
The conclusion reached by the Justice Department and the FBI following their
investigation was that James Earl Ray, acting alone, killed Martin Luther King,
Jr. In interviews conducted and testimony taken by the committee, no dissent
from this conclusion was voiced.
Director Hoover's views on the question of conspiracy were clearly stated in a
memorandum he wrote on June 20, 1968, summarizing a discussion with Attorney
General Clark. At one point during the conversation, Hoover said, "* * * in
Ray's case, we have not found a single angle that would indicate a conspiracy."
Later in the discussion, he added his personal opinion that "he [Ray] acted
entirely alone," but then assured the Attorney General that "we are not closing
our minds that others might be associated with him and we have to run down every
lead." (129)
Clark, in an interview with the committee, indicated his agreement with Hoover's
views, adding that the Bureau was probably more inclined to view the
assassination in conspiratorial terms than he was. As Clark explained, he
believed instinctively that Dr. King's death was the act of an eccentric racist
loner. He said he believed that Ray's reference to a brother with respect to the
rifle exchange in Birmingham the week before the assassination (a, remark that
was to provide the factual basis for a Federal conspiracy complaint filed in
that city approximately 2 weeks after the assassination) was merely an excuse
created by the assassin on the spur of the moment, rather than sound evidence of
conspiracy. (130)
Clark characterized the evidence developed during the investigation in the
following manner:
I don't recall any presentation of evidence as distinguished from the
circumstances that ever implied direct involvement of another person, and
simultaneously I believe I saw an enormous amount of evidence of the direct
participation of single person whose identity was fairly consistently
established because I felt I should go on the facts available rather than the
circumstances. (131)
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Despite the ultimate conclusion of officials in both the Justice Department and
the FBI that no conspiracy existed in the assassination, FBI investigative files
reflect throughout a consciousness of the possibility of a conspiracy. For
example, on April 26. 1968, 3 weeks after that assassination and subsequent to
Ray's identification, the FBI documented from a complete review of the King
security file some 50 prior threats on Dr. King's life. These threats were set
out in investigative leads and transmitted to the appropriate field office for
resolution, accompanied by the following instructions:
The main file on King has been reviewed at the Bureau and leads are being sent
out concerning persons involved in prior threats against King. These leads as
well as leads concerning any other suspects developed from any source must be
given immediate and thorough handling on a top priority basis. Process has been
obtained against James Earl Ray and extensive investigation is continuing to
locate Ray and to establish motive of crime. You have been and will be furnished
information relating to other possible conspirators. These must all be
thoroughly resolved no matter how remote. (132)
Moreover, a review of FBI investigative efforts following Ray's arrest revealed
that while there was a significant overall reduction in Bureau expenditures at
about this time,18 a limited number of additional conspiracy leads were still
pursued. The major, postarrest effort, an attempt to determine the source of
Ray's funds through an intensive reinvestigation of the July 1967 bank robbery
in Alton, Ill.,19 stemmed almost entirely from the Bureau's awareness that Ray's
extensive expenditures during 14 months of freedom strongly suggested his
association with unidentified individuals.
In addition, FBI files reflected efforts over the months following Ray's arrest:
(1) to identify possible criminal associates through rechecking the
registrations at the New Rebel Motel in Memphis just before the assassination
and at motels, hotels and roominghouses in Birmingham for the time period of the
rifle purchase; (133) (2) to investigate the possibility that a Louisiana State
policeman was the mysterious Raoul; (134) and (3) to interview Ray himself on
the issue of conspiracy. Thus, while officials in both the Justice Department
and the FBI were rapidly reaching a unanimous no-conspiracy conclusion, at least
a limited amount of conspiracy investigation continued after Ray's arrest.
Despite these efforts, the committee found serious defects in both the method
and focus of the FBI's conspiracy investigation.
(1) The method.--First, conspiracy leads were at times resolved simply by
establishing a potential coconspirator's alibi during the period of March 29 to
April 4, 1968. designated by the FBI as the "pertinent period" of the
assassination investigation.(135) The inadequacy of this approach is
demonstrated by the FBI's own case
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against Ray, which had produced evidence that his plan to kill Dr. King had
begun to take form before March 17, 1968, while he was still a resident of
California. The notion that a conspiracy suspect can be absolved by establishing
his absence from the scene of a crime or his nonparticipation in an overt act
(the rifle purchase) reflects an erroneous view of the law of conspiracy. In
1968, as in 1978, conspiracy prosecution requires only an agreement and one
subsequent overt act by any of the parties in furtherance of that agreement.
Proximity to the scene of the crime, while clearly relevant and significant is
not the ultimate issue.
Second while there was a general canvass of "all racial, criminal and security
reformants" at various stages of the investigation, (136) FBI files indicate
only limited efforts, independent of specific leads, to investigate the possible
involvement of extremist organizations such as the White Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan of Mississippi or the Minutemen, even though they had demonstrated both a
propensity for violence and a clear antagonism toward Dr. King.
For example, the Bureau received evidence of Ray's possible involvement with the
United Klans of America when Ray, after his arrest in London, chose Arthur
Hanes, St., as his defense counsel. Hanes was well known for his defense in 1965
of Klansmen charged with the murder of civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo. In
addition, informant information was subsequently received indicating that the
UKA might become involved in the funding of Roy's defense. Nevertheless, no
concerted effort was made to pursue the conspiratorial implications of this
information. Additional steps might have included a cross check of Bureau
hate-group indexes against Ray's known or possible associates or taking of sworn
testimony from Klan officials through the use of a grand jury subpena and
immunity grants. 20
Third, FBI and Department of Justice files reflect almost total reliance on
field interviews as a means of resolving issues relevant to the overall
conspiracy investigation. At no time was a grand jury used to supplement the
investigation of numerous conspiracy allegations, despite circumstances which
the committee believed may have been appropriate for grand jury investigation.
Some examples:
Ray's possible association with a Missouri State penitentiary inmate
organization was left essentially unresolved. Extensive field interviews with
MSP associates and former associates of Ray confirmed the existence of the
group, but "failed to ascertain information concerning the principles or
membership or the extent of its network."(137) The use of a grand jury to
explore this lead--a logical step following the unsuccessful interview
process--was apparently never considered.
Similarly, the FBI's investigation of a CB radio broadcast heard in Memphis
shortly after the assassination, thought by some to have been an effort to
divert, police attention and facilitate the flight of the assassin, was
terminated with attention focused on one individual who flatly denied
involvement in the incident. Authorities evidently. never considered placing
this individual before a grand jury for testimony under oath.21
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Also, the possibility of Ray family involvement in the assassination could have
been explored by a grand jury and the judicious use of immunity grants.
Nevertheless, the FBI and the Justice Department were satisfied to resolve the
issue solely through field investigation.22 (138)
When questioned concerning the failure to use the grand jury during the
assassination investigation, Assistant to the Director DeLoach offered the
following opinion concerning its usefulness:
[T]he grand jury would be laborious, inefficient, might perhaps slow down the
investigation, when we were looking throughout the world as intensively as we
could for James Earl Ray and would be of little usage * * * I think [if] we had
established the grand jury investigation during the fugitive investigation, [it]
would have taken the time of officials of the Department of Justice, and I doubt
very seriously whether it would have been productive, as later investigation has
more or less established.(139)
* * * the matter of an establishment of a grand jury is entirely up to the
Department of Justice. Based upon the facts furnished to them by the FBI, the
FBI could not in my opinion, to the best of my recollection. go to the
Department of Justice and say we want a grand jury. It is not up to the FBI to
do that. We are an investigative agency. We determine the facts, the Department
handles the prosecution, they determine whether or not a grand jury is to be
established.(140)
The committee found DeLoach's remarks well taken.
When asked further, however, why this technique had not been used following
Ray's arrest, "in order to determine whether * * * there might have been
associates of Mr. Ray involved in the assassination," (141) DeLoach responded
that after the justice Department turned down an FBI request to use a grand jury
subpena to secure the notes of author William Bradford Huie, the feeling must,
have been that. the Justice Department was opposed to the use of the grand jury
generally in the investigation.
I am testifying strictly based on opinion. But I would certainly think that,
after a turndown by the Department of Justice in this one instance. this spread
the philosophy that would have kept the FBI from making further requests for
grand jury investigation. It would appear the philosophy of the Department of
Justice was there should be no grand jury investigation. (142)
In light of the specific legal grounds for the Department's decision, however,
the committee found DeLoach's explanation for the absence of further FBI
proposals for grand jury work to be inadequate.23
Former Attorney General Clark testified there was simply; no situation in the
investigation which warranted grand jury investigation:
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* * * I do not recall any suggestion that a grand jury would have utility, any
proposal that a certain person be put before a grand jury. The impression I had
was that we had hundreds, maybe even thousands, of FBI agents trying * * * to
see whether they could pick up a trace of the guy who led us to believe he might
be in hippie areas of different towns, of hundreds of agents looking through
millions of passport applications, and things like that. I didn't see a grand
jury utility. It never--nothing I ever heard or saw or have seen indicates it
would have had any utility. (143)
The committee noted that on June 19, 1968, after several years of uncertainty
concerning the legality of electronic surveillance as a criminal investigative
tool, Congress passed title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Acts of 1968. It permitted the use of court-authorized electronic surveillance
by law enforcement officers in certain enumerated crimes, including murder.24
Nevertheless, in signing title III into law, President Johnson announced that
the administration's established policy of confining wiretapping to national
security cases would continue in force. (144) Ironically, a law which was passed
in part because of Dr. King's assassination (145) could not be considered by the
FBI during the investigation of that crime.
The committee, in making this observation, did not take a position on the
desirability of the use of electronic surveillance generally in society. It
merely noted that President Johnson's decision, as implemented by Attorney
General Clark, (146) placed one more potentially crucial limitation on the
investigation of conspiracy in Dr. Ding's assassinations.
(2) The focus.--Of far greater potential significance than the defects that have
been noted was the failure of the FBI and the Justice Department to focus a
concerted effort on Ray's family, specifically his brothers, during the
conspiracy investigation. Absent any extrinsic evidence, family members of the
suspected triggerman deserved at least some investigative attention, given the
significant amount of direct and circumstantial evidence received by the FBI
during the months following the assassination that strongly suggested a great
deal more contact among the three brothers than they were willing to admit. The
failure to pursue this area more aggressively constituted a serious defect in
the overall investigative effort.
Because the evidence implicating the brothers has been reviewed previously,25 no
effort will be made to repeat the specifics. It is adequate to say simply that
within a relatively short time after Dr. King's assassination, the FBI had
collected evidence of possible family involvement from a number of separate
sources including:
Reference by James Earl Ray to a brother being involved in the critical
preassassination activities, most significantly the purchase of the rifle;
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Strong signs of racism exhibited by both John and Jerry Ray,
The probable involvement of John in James' escape from the Missouri State
Penitentiary;
The probable involvement of James, John and possibly Jerry in the Alton bank
robbery; and
Statements by Jerry indicating his knowledge of a possible $100,000 payoff for
the assassination.
Finally, with publication of Huie's Look magazine articles in November 1968 and
his book, "He Slew the Dreamer," striking coincidences appeared between the
timing of Ray's claimed involvement with Raoul and his preassassination dealings
with a brother, raising the strong possibility that Raoul was created to conceal
Ray's association with one or both of his brothers.
Clearly this evidence warranted a major and concerted effort by the FBI and the
Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department to determine the extent and the
nature of Ray's actual preassassination contact with his brothers. In fact no
such concerted effort was made.
It cannot be said that the Bureau ignored the Ray family in its investigation.
As has been indicated previously, an intense effort was made to secure
assistance and information from various family members during the prearrest
fugitive investigation, and during this period the brothers were interviewed on
numerous occasions concerning the suspect's location.26 In fact, at one point
the Bureau's preoccupation with the fugitive investigation became so great that
a recommendation was made for the use of illegal electronic surveillance on John
Larry Ray and Carol Pepper in an effort to locate the subject. Had such a tactic
been implemented, any subsequent conspiracy case against family members could
have been seriously jeopardized.
Nevertheless, with the exception of comparisons of the fingerprints(147) and
palm prints of the two brothers with unidentified latent prints, an effort to
verify Jerry Ray's alibi for April 4, 1968, (148) and the posing of some
interview questions arguably connected to a conspiracy investigation,
investigative files reflected no significant efforts to determine the extent of
their involvement with James in the assassination.
No effort was made, for example, to determine if the 1967-68 travels of either
brother coincided with those of Raoul, as Ray related them. Such an effort might
have included motel and airline canvasses for Ray brother aliases and employment
verifications for appropriate periods.
Similarly, no effort was made, other than through direct questioning of the
brothers themselves, to establish the alibis of either Jerry or John during the
time of the rifle purchase. John's alibi, even for the day of the assassination,
went. unchecked. The Bureau did cover this ground routinely with other
conspiracy suspects. Further, Jerry Ray's statements in June 1968 27 and again
in March 1969, indicating knowledge of a conspiracy were not adequately pursued.
He made his March-1969 remarks to Kent Courtney, publisher of the Conservative
Journal in Louisiana. He indicated that he would discuss the "conspiracy"
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with Courtney in a meeting on March 20, 1969.(149) Despite Courtney's apparent
willingness to cooperate with the Bureau,(150) no consideration was given to the
use of consensual electronic surveillance or of an undercover FBI agent during
Jerry's discussion with Courtney. Rather, a decision was made--based on
"background data" on Courtney and a consequent fear of Bureau embarrassment--to
conduct yet another field interview with Jerry Ray. (151) However, when Jerry
Ray refused to be interviewed, Bureau efforts to pursue the lead ceased.
FBI files revealed no efforts to investigate the associates of Ray's brothers
either through direct, saturation interviews, or through the development of an
informant apparatus. Thus, Ray's possible connection with a conspiracy through
one of his brothers was not thoroughly investigated. Given the criminal nature
of many of John's associates, this might well have required the use of a grand
jury and immunity grants, investigative tools which might have been useful in
the additional areas of John's probable involvement in the MSP escape and in the
Alton bank robbery in July 1967. Some of this grand jury and immunity work could
have been accomplished without violating a Justice Department policy against
compelling testimony of a family member or facing the issue of immunity with
either of the brothers.
The committee also sought to evaluate the performance of the FBI in
investigating a St. Louis conspiracy involving John Sutherland and John
Kauffmann that subsequently came to light.28 The object was to determine if the
information should have been uncovered by the Federal authorities during the
original investigation. The findings were as follows:
There was credible evidence developed from a police informant in St. Louis in
the 1960's, a man who holds a respectable position with a major manufacturing
company that an offer of money for the murder of Dr. King was in fact known in
the 1966-68 period. Specifically, it was circulating among individuals who spent
considerable time during the period at a motel owned by John Kauffmann. (152)
Circumstantial evidence also indicated that the offer may have been communicated
to a person who did undercover work for several Federal agencies.29
Nevertheless, information about the conspiracy was not developed by the FBI
until 1974, and then, apparently due to an agent's error, the information was
mistled and not actively pursued.30
Had a more rigorous conspiracy investigation been conducted in 1968, the
existence of the St. Louis based conspiracy might have come to the attention of
the Bureau and the Department of Justice at the time when it could have been
successfully investigated. The ability of the committee to investigate the St.
Louis conspiracy and Ray's possible connection with it was severely hampered by
the passage of so much time and the deaths of principals.
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(d) Investigative excesses
As was discussed, the FBI's attempt to use electronic surveillance during the
fugitive investigation reflected a lack of concern for tile constitutional
rights of persons targeted by the proposed surveillance. FBI files reflected a
similar lack of respect for the constitutional rights of the defendant, James
Earl Ray, in two separate incidents following his arrest and return to Tennessee
to stand trial for murder.
Prior to his return to the United States, Ray retained Arthur Hanes, Sr., to
represent him. Hanes was Ray's primary attorney until November 10, 1968, when
Ray replaced him with Percy Foreman.
On September 18, Hanes filed a motion before Judge W. Preston Battle seeking to
modify various aspects of his client's conditions of confinement. During an
evidentiary hearing on September 30 to determine the facts underlying the
motion, testimony was taken on various subjects, including the methods used to
monitor Ray's mail. A representative of the Shelby County Sheriff's Department
stated that Ray's general mail was read and censored, but he then assured the
court that written material passing between Ray and his attorney was perused for
security purposes only, and was not read to determine the contents. (153)
Following the hearing, Judge Battle memorialized this procedure in the form of a
judicial order, and in a teletype sent from the FBI's Memphis field office to
Washington, the essence of the court's ruling was conveyed as follows:
Judge Battle ruled that written notes exchanged between Ray and his attorney are
privileged. However, the Shelby County sheriff or his designated agent has the
authority to peruse these notes to determine if there is any attempt to breach
security of the jail. These notes should not be perused for the purpose of
ascertaining the full contents of the message.31 (154)
Despite the FBI's clear understanding of Judge Battle's order, however, within a
month of its issuance, three letters from Ray to Hanes had been intercepted,
photocopied, passed to the FBI's Memphis field office and transmitted to FBI
headquarters in Washington.32 (155) On one occasion, the covering-memorandum
sent to Washington directed the reader's attention to particularly interesting
parts of the letter:
Of significance, Ray in his letter to Hanes requests that Mr. Huie not go to any
of the addresses in Miami until after the trial. In this connection, Ray also
states "that part of the story just covers a few days anyhow and is not too
important."(156)
Robert Jensen, SAC in Memphis at the time, conceded in interviews and executive
session testimony that his signature or initials were on memoranda transmitting
two of the three letters (157) and speculated, although he could not recall
definitely, that the source of the letters
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was Shelby County Sheriff William N. Morris. (158) When interviewed by the
committee, Morris did not deny the mail photocopying had occurred, but stated he
had no recollection of specific details surrounding the situation. (159) Jensen
testified further that he believed the letters were volunteered to him, rather
than having been solicited by the Bureau. (160) He had no recollection of
informing the State prosecutor or defense counsel of his receipt of the letters,
(161) and he did not consider the possibility that receipt of privileged
information might taint the prosecution. (162) He explained the situation as
follows:
Where the U.S. Government or the FBI or the Justice Department has an interest
in a matter and I am volunteered information relative to the matter, I am afraid
that I would accept it, and I think this is what happened in this case. (163)
During his testimony before the committee, Assistant to the Director DeLoach
stated that while he had no personal knowledge of the mail interception, he
believed the intent of the Memphis office was to peruse the documents for
security reasons only,(164) as allowed by the court order.
The committee found DeLoach's explanation completely unsatisfactory. First, such
an explanation was not offered by Memphis SAC Jensen, who was directly involved
in the mail interception. Second, as DeLoach conceded during his testimony, the
FBI "had no responsibility * * * for the custody of Ray at the time." (165)
Third, if the Memphis office was interested solely in detecting breaches of
prison security, there would seem to be no reason to highlight portions of Ray's
letters in which he wrote of "addresses in Miami," or in fact to photocopy and
transmit the correspondence to FBI headquarters in Washington.
The inherent confidentiality of communications between a defendant and his
attorney is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence. It stems from
fundamental individual rights established in the Constitution. The FBI's Memphis
office was aware of a specific court order reinforcing the significance of the
principle. Even if the FBI did not initiate the mail interception process, its
willing and repeated receipt of letters sent by the defendant to his attorney
showed a total disregard for Ray's right to privacy during the preparation of
his trim defense and encouraged an activity by local officials that was both
illegal and unconstitutional. The committee found no justification for such
conduct by Federal agents.
On October 31, one month after Judge Battle's order, FBI headquarters, using a
carefully worded directive initiated by Associate Director Tolson, Assistant to
the Director DeLoach, Assistant Director Rosen and others, instructed the
Memphis office as follows:
In view of the above order of W. Preston Battle [referring to Sept. 30, 1968
order, you should not accept any written communication from the sheriff
regarding correspondence between Ray and other individuals. If it is not in
violation of the court order you may accept information from the sheriff if he
volunteers this information and it is on an oral basis only. (166)
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With the receipt of this directive, the Burcau's practice of receiving
photocopies of Ray's correspondence apparently ceased. There was no evidence in
files reviewed by the committee that knowledge of the operation, or of
information found in the intercepted mail, spread beyond the Memphis field
office and FBI headquarters in Washington. 33
Another illustration of the Bureau's lack of concern for the constitutional
rights of James Earl Ray, as well as insensitivity to legal issues that may have
arisen in subsequent trials, occurred after James Earl Ray had entered his
guilty plea on March 10, 1969. Immediately following the plea, Assistant
Attorney General Jerris Leonard of the Civil Rights Division (who had replaced
Stephen Pollak with the change of Presidential administrations in January 1969)
instructed the Bureau to consider various approaches to obtain information Ray
might possess on conspiracy. Alternatives considered included an immediate
interview,(167) an interview at some later date, and testimony under oath before
a Federal grand jury. The action was being taken in light of President Nixon's
reported plan "to take the position in a future press conference that the
Federal Government was continuing to give intensive interest to the possibility
of the existence of a conspiracy." (168)
Following some discussion, a decision was made to attempt an immediate interview
of Ray. The Memphis field office contacted Shelby County District Attorney Phil
N. Canale, Ray's attorney, Percy Foreman,34 and Harry Avery, Commissioner of the
Tennessee Department of Corrections. Foreman approved the interview of his
client, (169) and neither Canale nor Avery raised objections.
The interview itself was conducted by Memphis SAC Jensen. Authority for the FBI
to conduct the interview was given by D. Robert Owen, (170) Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division. In an
interview with the committee, Owen recalled no consideration of the possibility
of having a Department attorney present during the interview. Director Hoover
gave specific instructions that results of the interview be given to him prior
to dissemination to the Department. (171)
Jensen's interview with Ray lasted 50 minutes. It covered a variety of topics,
including Ray's dissatisfaction with his attorneys, his plans to reopen his
case, Charles Stephens, Charles Stein. "The FBI" television show, fingerprints
on the rifle and Inspector Thomas Butler of Scotland Yard. Ray provided no
evidence supporting the possibility of a conspiracy.
Ray was not accompanied by an attorney during the interview, nor was he informed
specifically of his right to have a lawyer present; his right to terminate the
interview at will; his right to remain silent; to have the Government pay for a
lawyer if he could not afford one; or the Government's ability to use his
statements against him at a later date (Miranda rights). In an interview with
the committee, Jensen
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confirmed that he did not advise Ray formally of his Miranda rights, explaining
that surrounding circumstances, including Ray's extensive criminal record,
indicated that he was aware of his rights without formal notification. Moreover,
Jensen stated that the interview was not a hostile one, that he had called the
guard to terminate the interview when Ray stated he wished to leave, and that he
changed the subject matter of the interview when Ray refused to continue along a
specific line. (173)
Accepting the accuracy of Jensen's recollection, the committee was disturbed by
his failure to consider the implications of interviewing Ray without prior
advice of his Miranda rights, as well as by the lack of concern for the
defendant's constitutional rights as evidenced by this interview procedure. This
interview of Ray was the first official effort to gain information on the
possibility of conspiracy from the self_confessed assassin. The ability to use
any of Ray's statements in a conspiracy case against him would have depended on
the Government's ability to survive a motion to suppress the statements that
would automatically be filed by a defense counsel.
The committee recognized that many law enforcement officials believed the
administration of Miranda rights inhibit, a person from freely divulging
information he may possess. Jensen may well have believed that he would be able
to establish a more productive rapport if he omitted the formal warnings. While
this argument is not without merit, the committee believed that the fundamental
protections designed to be achieved by the administration of Miranda warnings
required that they be given to Ray in this case, regardless of competing
strategic considerations. (174)
(e) Conclusion
The FBI's investigation of Dr. King's assassination exemplified, at times, the
best of police work. Efforts first to identify and then to locate and apprehend
Ray represented the work of thousands of agents on a national and international
scale. In addition, close coordination was required with law enforcement
authorities in Mexico, Canada, and Europe. At times the work was meticulous and
tedious; ultimately, the fugitive investigation only can be categorized a
success.
The committee received testimony indicating that the major effort made by the
Bureau in the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of Ray may well have
reflected Director Hoover's concern that failure might be. attributed to his
well-publicized animosity for Dr. King. In executive session testimony before
the committee, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated:
I had the strongest, clearest conviction that the FBI would do everything in its
power to investigate this case quickly, effectively, and successfully, and it
wasn't just logic. It was, I mean, my total being, told me that the thing Mr.
Hoover really loved most, the Bureau was on the line here, and that if they
couldn't preduce here where many would suspect their concern that their failure
would do more damage to them in the minds of the people than any other case they
had worked on. (175)
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Similar sentiments were voiced by other officials from both the Justice
Department and the FBI. (176)
Ironically, this explanation for the best in the investigation may also explain
the worst. The disturbing investigative "excesses" detailed above--including the
proposal of illegal electronic surveillance, FBI participation in an ongoing
process of mail interception at the Shelby County jail, and the failure to
administer Miranda rights prior to Ray's post-guilty plea interview--may well
also reflect the importance placed on the case by Director Hoover. While the
committee stresses that it had no direct evidence to this effect, it is clear
that in all three incidents a priority was placed on investigative breaks with a
simultaneous tendency to overlook the constitutional rights of the parties
involved. It seemed reasonable to assume that this reflected, at least in part,
pressure from above.
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations
Page 461
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS
In 1968 the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence the Eisenhower
Commission--conducted an extensive study which dealt, in part, with
assassination. Reports prepared for the Commission concluded that the level of
assassination in America was high,(1) particularly in relation to other Western
democracies and populous countries. (2) Indeed, nine U.S. Presidents, one in
four, have been the targets of assassins (table 1), and four died as a
result.(3) In addition, between 1835 and 1968, 81 other public officials or
candidates, Federal, State, and local were assaulted, some fatally. (4)
The Eisenhower Commission did not offer a definition of assassination, although
its basic elements were specified in papers prepared for the Commission.
Assassination was seen as a murder whose target was a prominent political
figure; there was a political motive for the murder; or the murder would have a
political impact. (5) The existence of any one of the three elements, it was
pointed out, would qualify a murder as an assassination.
The Eisenhower Commission also identified five broad categories of
assassination. It noted that not all of them had historical precedents in the
United States. (6) The categories were based on objectives:
(1) assassination as a means by which one political elite replaces another
without effecting systemic or idealogical change;
(2) assassination whose purpose is to destroy. the legitimacy of the ruling
elite and to effect systemic or ideological change;
(3) assassination ordered by the ruling elite to counteract political challenge;
(4) assassination for propaganda purpose--to promote an ideology; and
(5) assassination to satisfy the pathological needs of abnormal individuals
acting under an ideological guise.
The Eisenhower Commission found the typical assassination in the United States
to be the act of a deranged, self-appointed savior.(7) In contrast to worldwide
patterns, assassination by an organized political group was thought to be rare
in this country. Only in the years immediately following the Civil War was
assassination undertaken by organized groups to alter government through terror.
Further, while the Commission identified as many as 11 public officials who had
been targeted for assassination by organized criminal elements, it characterized
the victims as low-level officeholders who had either threatened the criminal
elements or had been involved with them. (8) The classic form of assassination,
therefore, did not generally apply to the United States.
(461)
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TABLE 1.--ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PRESIDENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
Source: Task Force Report, Assassination and Political Violence (National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, October 1969).
The legitimacy of achieving change by extralegal actions has long been a subject
of debate among philosophers and political and legal scholars.(9) Historically,
illegitimate authorities have been overthrown by forces acting outside the legal
process, with the rationale being natural law, customs, or belief in the primacy
of spiritual scriptures. In ancient Greece, for example, it was considered
acceptable to murder usurpers. Likewise, medieval Christian thought acceptable
assassination of usurpers, but not of oppressive tyrants, although that
distinction eventually disappeared. During the Reformation and
Counterreformation, the Jesuit theologian Mariana and the Scottish Calvinist
Buchanan held assassination of a tyrant to be acceptable under certain
circumstances. In recent history, the experience of Nazi Germany--and of this
country, as well--in which certain groups have suffered indignities and
inequities has served to raise the question once again. But, generally,
arguments for justified assassination have applied only to cases of totalitarian
rule, illegitimate leadership, or the unjust suppression of certain groups
within a society, although many foremost thinkers accept no justification
whatsoever for assassination.
The Eisenhower Commission, nevertheless, asked the question: Had assassination
become a part of political life in the United States? It noted that violence
seemed interwoven with American history--the
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fight for independence, the Indian wars, slavery and the secession of the South,
agrarian reform, the emergence of organized labor, the civil rights movement and
conflicts based on religious and ethnic, even political, grounds. (10) The
Commission also cited factors present at times of assassinations in other
countries,(11) finding them to be increasingly evident in the United States: The
publication of extremist rhetoric and vilification of political leaders and
Government institutions, rapid socioeconomic change, widespread belief that
legitimate demands of Government are. not being met, urban guerrilla warfare,
social group confrontations, a belief in the efficiency of violence, all leading
to a general atmosphere of violence.
Since publication of the Eisenhower Commission's report in 1968, its concern has
been underscored ,by a rash of assassinations or attempted assassinations:
Governor George Wallace of Alabama in 1972, President Ford, twice, in 1975,
California Congressman Leo Ryan and San Francisco Mayor George Moscone in 1978.
These acts of assassination, this committee noted, had a disturbing effect on
society that goes beyond their immediate impact, which is the deplorable
destruction of human life. These results flow not just from the act of
assassination itself, but also from the responses it provokes from citizens and
from government. The committee found that assassination is more than a deadly
assault:
It is an attack on the foundations of democracy--majority rule, due process of
Law, consensual decisionmaking, individual rights and liberties;
It undermines the political system by deterring qualified people from seeking
public office or exercising leadership;
It produces fear among the citizenry, a "siege. mentality," and often leads to
the creation of vigilante groups, civil disorder and other counterterrorist
activities;
It results in a feeling that the President and other national leaders should be
isolated for their protection;
It leads to demands that Government cut short conventional legal processes in
bringing assassins to justice and for stronger measures to deal with violence,
i.e., increased surveillance, security checks at public facilities, capital
punishment and so on;
It exerts pressure on law enforcement agencies that can lead to abuse of
authority.
The committee also discovered that assassinations in the United States have
seldom achieved the end of causing or preventing change. In fact, in many
instances the opposite effect has occurred. Change that an act of assassination
was designed to prevent has been hastened, and responsible citizens have been
bound closer together in working to achieve objectives for the good of
society.(12) The two-party system has been remarkably stable, and the process
for the transfer of the Presidency has been effective.
Assassination in the United States has, however, caused serious, destructive
upheavals, such as the riots that followed the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. Further, the committee recognized that an act of assassination may, in times
of strife, result, in fundamental change, and a recurrent pattern of such acts
might, in time, undermine the social and political systems of the country.
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The act of assassination and its threat demand response by both the citizenry
and Government. Historically, this response has ranged from the imposition of
totalitarian rule to capitulation to the demands of dissidents. In the United
States, there has generally been a balanced response. Recognizing that
grievances that lead to violence are often legitimate, Government has attempted
to eliminate inequitable conditions, but it has also prosecuted those who have
circumvented legal processes to achieve change. In addition, the Government has
sought legislative and administrative means to prevent recurring violence and to
provide more protection for those who are threatened by it.
The committee was acutely aware of the problem of insuring that civil liberties
are preserved, while affording adequate protection to the institutions of
democratic society and to public figures.1 It recognized the difficulty in
finding a balance between liberty and order. In carrying out its mandate
requiring it to address the question of legal and administrative responses to
assassination, the committee was mindful of the need to weigh the costs that
could accrue the individual privacy, group protest, legitimate dissent,
political competition and social change against the benefits of stronger
protective measures.
While the committee addressed itself to legal and administrative measures
primarily, it was fully cognizant that they can account only partially for the
solution to the problem of violence and assassination. It is equally important
that society deal with the fundamental problems that underlie violence and that
it always adhere to legal reponses. As the Eisenhower Commission aptly observed:
[I]f measures of control were this society's only response, to violence, they
would in the long run exacerbate the problem. The pyramiding of control measures
could turn us into a repressive society, where peace is kept primarily through
official coercion rather than through willing obedience to law. That kind of
society, where law is more feared than respected, where individual expression
and movement are curtailed, is violent, too and it nurtures within itself the
seeds of its own violent destruction. (13)
The recommendations that follow are addressed to legislative and administrative
issues as well as the conduct of congressional investigations. They are
presented in a logical order that does not reflect relative priorities:
Legislative Recommendation on Issues Involving the Prevention of Assassinations
Page 464
I. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES INVOLVING THE PROHIBITION, PREVENTION
AND PROSECUTION OF ASSASSINATIONS AND FEDERALLY COGNIZABLE HOMICIDES
(a) Prohibition and prevention
1. The Judiciary Committee should process for early consideration by the House
legislation that would make the assassination of a Chief of State of any
country, or his political equivalent, a Federal offense,
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if the offender is an American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen,
or if the offender can be located in the United States.
Evidence received by the committee indicated that the CIA, in conjunction with
criminal elements in the United States, plotted the death of foreign
leaders.(14) These plots gave rise to widespread speculation that the death of
president Kennedy may have been an act taken in retaliation. It was conceded by
those involved in the plots that they were. without moral justification.(15)
Federal law today gives uneven protection to foreign leaders. While
assassination is contrary to executive order, (16) it is criminal only under
limited circumstances. (17) Proposed legislation would make it criminal. (18)
Testimony before the committee supported that legislation. (19) The committee
has no hesitancy in recommending that legislation be enacted embodying a
prohibition against the assassination of a foreign leader by those subject to
Federal criminal jurisdiction.
2. The Judiciary Committee should process, far early consideration by the House,
comprehensive legislation that would codify, revise and reform the Federal law
of homicide, paying special attention to assassinations. The Judiciary Committee
should give appropriate attention to the related offenses of conspiracy,
attempt, assault, and kidnapping in the context of assassinations. Such
legislation should be processed independently of the general proposals for the
codification, revision or reform of the Federal criminal law. The Judiciary
Committee should address the following issues in considering the legislation:
(a) Distingushing between those persons who should receive the protection of
Federal law because of the official positions they occupy and those persons who
should receive protection of Federal law only in the performance of their
official duties;
(b) Extending the protection of Federal law to persons who occupy high judicial
and executive positions, including Justices of the Supreme Court and Cabinet
officers;
(c) The applicability of these laws to private individuals in the exercise of
constitutional rights;
(d) The penalty to be provided for homicide and the related offenses, including
the applicability and the constitutionality of the death penalty;
(e) The basic for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction, includ ing domestic and
extraterritorial reach;
(f) The precemption of State jurisdiction without the necessity af any action on
the part of the Attorney General, where the President is assassinated;
(g) The circumstances under which Federal jurisdiction should preempt State
jurisdiction in other cases;
(h) The power of Federal investigative agencies to require autopsies to be
performed;
(i) The ability of Federal investigative agencies to secure the assistance of
other Federal ar State agencies, including the military, other laws
notwithstanding;
(j) The authority to offer rewards to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime;
(k) A requirement of forfeiture of the instrumentalities of the crime;
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(l) The condemnation of personal or other effects of historical interest;
(m) The advisability of providing, consistent with the firstamendment, legal
trust devices to hold for the benefit of victims, their families, or the General
Treasury, the profits realized from books, movie rights, or public appearances
by the perpetrator of the crime; and
(n) The applicability of threat and physical zone of protection legislation to
persons under the physical protection of Federal investigative or law
enforcement agencies.
Federal law prohibiting homicide has grown in response to particular events or
circumstances. (20) The process has been piecemeal. On November 22, 1963, there
was no general Federal statute that prohibited the assassination of the
President. (21) One recommendation of the Warren Commission was that such a
statute be enacted. (22) Public Law 89-141, signed on August 28, 1965, enacted
18 U.S.C. 1751, prohibited the killing, kidnapping, conspiracy, assaults or
attempt to kill or kidnap the President or Vice President. Similarly, when
Senator Robert F. Kennedy was killed in June 1968, there was no general Federal
statute that prohibited the assassination of Members of Congress. Public Law
91-644, signed on January 2, 1971, enacted 18 U.S.C. 351, which extended the
protection of the Federal criminal law to Members of Congress, paralleling that
extended to the President and the Vice President. Next, after an attack on the
Israeli Olympic team in Munich, Germany in 1972, Public Law 92-539 was enacted.
It extended the protection of Federal criminal law to foreign guests in the
United States.
While the committee heard no testimony on issues surrounding the general
codification, revision and reform of the Federal criminal code, its study of
Federal law of homicide led it to the conclusion that comprehensive legislation
in this area is needed. The piecemeal approach should be abandoned. In this
connection, the committee identified a number of policy questions which should
be resolved in the course of processing the legislation:
(a) Traditionally, the general Federal murder statute applicable to Federal
officials has been limited to homicide of designated officials killed "while
engaged in the performance of ... official duties or on account of the
performance of . . . official duties .... . (23) When 18 U.S.C. 1751 (President
and Vice President) and 18 U.S.C. 351 (Members of Congress) were enacted, no
similar limitation was placed on their coverage. This reflected the
recommendations of the Warren Commission(24) and the Senate Judiciary
Committee.(25) While all categories at their outer edges seem arbitrary (even
though the policy behind the classification may readily be conceded to be
valid), it can be argued that a line ought to be drawn between those who,
because of the nature of their office, ought to receive the protection of
Federal criminal law without limitation. that is, the President, Vice President,
Members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, Cabinet officers, et cetera, and
those who ought to receive such protection only when the threat of homicide is
related to their work. Since the committee did not take testimony on where the
line should be drawn, it only recommends some category be specifically set
forth.
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(b) Current Federal law does not extend to high judicial positions or to Cabinet
officers the protection of the Federal criminal law, (26) although it is
proposed in legislation that has been recently introduced in the Congress. (27)
It would seem logical that such protection be so extended.
(c) The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was not a Federal offense,
since he was not a public official whose assassination was covered by Federal
law. The basis for an FBI investigation was the theory that Dr. King's right to
travel had been abridged under 18 U.S.C. 242,(28) it was described in testimony
to the committee as "a pretty tenuous basis for asserting jurisdiction." (29)
This illustrates the difficult public policy issues associated with extending
protection of Federal criminal law beyond "officials" to "public figures." (30)
While a general Federal homicide statute raises the specter of a Federal agency
to enforce it, FBI Director William Webster testified:
[A]ll of us have, today, intense sensitivity to people who are injured or killed
in the exercise of civil rights or in the assertion of civil rights or in
encouraging others to assert legitmate civil rights. It Is a special kind of
area where we think the Federal Government has such an interest in seeing that
constitutional rights are protected * * *. (31)
The committee recognized that there could be homicides that go unpunished, at
least to the degree that the Federal Government might wish, because of differing
local policies and investigative capabilities. This is the price of a Federal
system, since appropriately drafted and specific language is required for a
Federal homicide statute to cover private individuals. That coverage cannot be
comprehensive and the statute still constitutional. The committee recommends,
therefore, that careful attention be given to the reach of Federal criminal laws
when new legislation is enacted.
(d) The penalty structure of Federal criminal statutes is not uniform or
appropriate. Each statute tends to carry with it its own penalty provision,
which may or may not be consistent with similar statutes. The need for a
rational, just and equitable penalty structure is manifest.
Discussion of the penalty structure of homicide statutes necessarily raises the
delicate issue of capital punishment. (32) The testimony of law enforcement
officials before the committee supported it. (33) The committee noted, too, that
testimony before it recognized that provisions of current law are most likely
constitutionally infirm.(34) The committee, however, conducted no independent
study of capital punishment. As a committee, therefore, it had no special
expertise with which to judge the merits of the arguments that had been made
over the years.
(e) Testimony before the committee addressed the jurisdictional reach of Federal
homicide statutes. (35) Traditionally, Federal statutes do not reach overseas,
although the question is one of congressional intent and power under
international law. In light, of evidence before the committee, as noted, of
efforts by a U.S. Government agency to assassinate foreign leaders, it would be
appropriate to give careful attention to the extraterritorial reach of any
comprehensive legislation.
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(f) (g) Federal and State criminal laws generally operate side by side, and a
Federal criminal statute does not automatically preempt State jurisdiction. But
since there was confusion in Dallas following President Kennedy's assassination
over who should exercise certain responsibilities (in the absence of a Federal
statute), the Warren Commission was led to suggest Federal legislation. (36)
Further, Congress placed specific language in 18 U.S.C. 1751(h), the
Presidential-Vice Presidential statute, suspending State action until Federal
action is terminated, if "Federal investigative or prosecutive jurisdiction is
asserted * * .. Similar language appears in 18 U.S.C. 351, the Member of
Congress statute. Testimony before the committee raised a number of problems
with the language in these statutes. It is not clear, for example, how and by
whom Federal action is to be asserted--by a statement of the Attorney General
(37) or by actions (38) of the Federal investigative agencies, such as the
Secret Service in a Presidential assassination. (39) Questions were also raised
about whether Federal action should be optional,(40) and about situations where
State law ought to control if the target of the assassin is the President.
Because of these questions, the committee recommends careful attention to
Federal and State issues in drafting comprehensive new legislation.
(h) Considerable controversy surrounded the autopsy of President Kennedy.
Questions arose over the removal of the body from Dallas, over the nature of the
autopsy and the manner in which it was performed.
No doubt exists that the President should receive in life the finest medical
attention available. Similarly, in death, particularly by unnatural means, the
President should receive the best attention by forensic pathologists.
Arrangements must also be made to perform forensic autopsies in federally
cognizable deaths.
Curiously, no Federal statute explicitly designated who is to perform such
autopsies, although authority to perform them in the case of the President's
death may be implied from 18 U.S.C. 1751 (h). The committee recommends that any
question not answered by existing law(41) be cleared up in any new legislation.
(i) When Public Law 89-141, the Presidential-Vice Presidential statute, was
enacted in 1964, language was added to it in 18 U.S.C. 1751 (i) that authorizes
the use, in the investigations of the assistance of the "Army, Navy, and Air
Force, and statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding."
Similar language appears in 18 U.S.C. 351 (g), the Member of Congress statute.
In all likelihood, (42) this language was added to these two statutes to set
aside the effect of 18 U.S.C 1385, which makes it a crime to use the military as
a "posse comitatus." Nevertheless, questions were raised before the committee as
to what extent this language might apply to recently passed legislation
restricting law enforcement access to certain kinds of Federal records. (43)
Questions were also asked relating to who (44) had to request the assistance and
whether it had to be rendered. (45) The committee recommends that attention be
given to resolving these questions in the processing of comprehensive new
legislation.
(j) When Public Law 89-141, the Presidential-Vice Presidential statute, was
enacted in 1965, language was added to it in 18 U.S.C. 1751 (g) authorizing the
offer of a reward, not to exceed $100,000. to be paid
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for information given or services rendered in connection with a violation of the
statute. This provision had the effect of raising from $5,000 the amount
authorized for reward in general Federal criminal matters.(46) The policy
question remains whether these amounts adequately reflect the full range of
federally cognizable homicides, a question the resolved in new legislation.
(k) (l) Following the assassination of President Kennedy, two issues arose with
reference to the personal property of the alleged assassin. (47) Was any of it
subject to forfeiture as the instrumentalities of a crime? Could any of it be
condemned as of historical interest? This second question also related to the
personal property of the President himself, as well as that of others in some
way involved.
Forfeiture proceedings were, in fact, initiated with respect to Lee Harvey
Oswald's rifle. (48) They were unsuccessful, since under the law at that time
the rifle was not used to commit a Federal offense. (49) A special statute,
Public Law 89-318, was passed "for the acquisition and preservation by
condemnation of evidence relative to the President's assassination." (50) A
variety of personal items have been held to have been validly transferred to the
National Archives under the statute. (51)
(m) The assassination of a public official or public figure naturally attracts a
great deal of public attention that may be converted into revenue through
personal appearances, books, movie rights, etc. Testimony before the committee
demonstrated that this is what followed the assassination of Dr. King.(52)
The committee, while it made no special study in this area, noted that
legislation had been enacted at the State level to curb what may be fairly
described as crass commercialization of macabre situations.(53) Such a provision
should be considered in the drafting of any new comprehensive legislation at the
Federal level.
(n) The committee heard testimony that it would be advisable to extend the
protection of Federal threat legislation(54) and Federal zone of protection
statutes(55) to individuals occupying offices other than the President. (56)
Mindful that there may be significant difference in the scope of protection
required for these other officials, the committee recommends that consideration
be given to these suggestions.
3. The appropriate committees of the House should process for early
consideration by the House charter legislation for the Central Intelligence
Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The committees should address the
following issues in considering the charter legislation:
(a) the proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the intelligence
and investigative agencies of the United States,
(b) the relationship between the domestic intelligence functions and the
interference with the exercise of individual constitutional rights,
(c) the delineation of proper law enforcement functions and techniques
including:
(i) the use of informants and electronic surveillance,
(ii) guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance
to gather intelligence on, or investigate, groups that may be exercising first
amendment freedoms, and
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(iii) the proper response of intelligence or investigative agencies where
information is developed that an informant has committed a crime.
(d) guidelines to consider the circumstances, if any, when an investigative
agency or a component of that agency should be disqualified from taking an
active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety growing
out of a particular intelligence or investigative action,
(e) definitions of the legislative scope and extent of "sources and methods" and
the "informant privilege" as a rationale for the executive branch withholding
information in response to congressional or judicial process or other demand for
information,
(f) institutionalizing efforts to coordinate the gathering, sharing, and
analysis of intelligence information,
(g) insuring those agencies that primarily gather intelligence perform their
function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in
physical protection, and
(h) implementing mechanisms that would pemit interagency tasking of particular
functions.
The committee did not conduct a general inquiry into the operations of the
intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, its examination of the
performance of the agencies with respect to the deaths of President Kennedy and
Dr. King afforded it a unique perspective from which to view their operations.
In effect, the committee conducted case studies of the FBI and CIA, an
experience that led the committee to make a number of recommendations.
The most important single recommendation the committee can make in this regard
is that the proposals for charter legislation be processed for early
consideration by the House. Law enforcement without law is a contradiction in
terms. Those who enforce our law must be able to look with confidence to a basic
charter. Otherwise, their power will not be legitimate; they will not know their
duties, and they will not know their constraints. All too often the pressure of
the moment will dictate their actions. Just as important, there must be
limitations on those who exercise power to protect those over whom the power is
exercised. Freedom is made possible by power limited by law. There are a variety
of reasons for the abuses of power uncovered by the committee, particularly the
harassment of Dr. King. One may be clearly identified and must be remedied: It
is the lack of basic charter legislation. In a society that prides itself on the
rule of law, it is remarkable that so important an area has been left lawless
for so long.
(a) Charter legislation must go to the root of the role that intelligence and
law enforcement agencies play in a free society. It, should clearly delineate
the difference between the foreign and domestic roles of the agencies. Society
must not permit the morals of war to become the routine policy of domestic
agencies. Citizens at home must not be treated as enemies abroad.
(b) Close attention must also be paid to the relation between intelligence
functions and first amendment rights. The first amendment seeks to assure those
out of Dower that they can still participate in the shaping of policy. The cry
for change must not be misunderstood as a call for violent revolution. Nowhere
did the committee find this
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confusion more clearly demonstrated than in the FBI's efforts to "neutralize"
Dr. King in his efforts to secure social and economic justice.
(c) Particular attention, too, must be paid to the proper role in law
enforcement of such potentially abusive information-gathering techniques as
informants, electronic surveillance, and the infiltration of groups. Abuses or
misuses of these techniques characterized the work of the FBI in its
investigation of Dr. King. Charter legislation offers hope of assisting in the
effort to control such abuses in the future.
(d) Propriety--and the appearance of propriety--must be the mark of the
enforcement of law. Power alone is never sufficient to hold the allegiance of a
people. Obedience to law is best secured not through it threat of sanctions but
through respect for legitimate authority. Appearances, therefore, may sometimes
be as important as underlying reality. The processes of justice must not only be
just; they must appear to be just.
This issue was sharply delineated by the FBI's investigation not only of Dr.
King, but of his assassination. Understandably, many people questioned whether
an agency that undertook to discredit Dr. King could be relied upon to seek out
his murderer.
Existing guidelines promise that such campaigns to discredit will not occur
again. (57) Nevertheless, it is possible to foresee that an individual
legitimately under investigation would be an assassination target. To what
degree should the agency--or the investigators immediately involved in the
investigation--be disqualified from conducting the assassination investigation?
It is a difficult issue, one that charter legislation ought to address and,
hopefully, resolve.
(e) The intelligence and law enforcement agencies' relationship with Congress
must also be spelled out. Individual citizens must be protected against those
who would harm our society or violate the laws; they must also be protected
against those whose job it is to protect our society and enforce the law. Yet,
there is little an individual can do by himself. The courts and the Congress,
therefore, play an important role in assuring effective performance and
protecting civil liberties. Nevertheless, in order to act, the courts and the
Congress must have access to information.
One of the most delicate problems that faced the committee in examining the CIA
and the FBI had to do with access to restricted information, some of it
classified to protect the national security. some that was confidential to
protect the identity of informants. The CIA sought to rely on the National
Security Act of 1947, section 102 (a) to uphold its position: (58) the
Department of Justice cited the informant's privilege. (59) While the committee
never conceded that either basis was legally valid to withhold information from
Congress, the committee was generally able to negotiate with the agencies the
necessary access. On one occasion. the committee voted a subpena for certain
materials, but a confrontation was avoided through compromise. Nevertheless, the
committee recommends that charter legislation be applied to the security issue
so there can be a fixed system for obtaining access and at the same time
protecting confidentiality.
(f) (g) (h) Finally, the committee noted that as long as the functions of the
various intelligence and law enforcement agencies are separated
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between agencies and assigned to sections within agencies, there must be
institutionized efforts made to compensate for that separation. 2
(b) Prosecution
1. The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provision of law
dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy trial as it applies to both
the investigation and prosecution of federally cognizable homicides.
Testimony before the committee raised questions about such recent legislation as
that dealing with third-party records,(60) bail (61) and speedy trial (62) as it
might affect the investigation and prosecution of assassination cases or other
federally cognizable homicides. Concern was expressed that such legislation
might have unforeseen adverse consequences.
The testimony indicated that recent third-party records legislation had made the
acquisition of records in the course of investigation "more difficult than in
the past."(63) "Informal access" had been largely ended. (64) The effect
extended beyond the records covered in the legislation. Other holders of such
records are apparently concerned and they are granting access only with
"increasing difficulty"(65) because of a fear of "personal liability."(66) To
the degree that some recent legislation recognized the special responsibilities
of the Secret Service, it was supported. (67)
As for speedy trial legislation, while testimony before the committee was not
explicit in its treatment of special problems that might arise in an
assassination prosecution, the legislation was thought to be adequate.(68)
Nevertheless, it was termed "hastily drawn,"(69) and it was observed that the
"public would be outraged"(70) if it interfered with the prosecution of an
assassin.
While the committee recognizes that it is not possible to draft legislation with
all problems in mind, it is possible to review it periodically in terms of
special problems, making modifications when they are in order. Nevertheless, the
committee agrees with FBI Director William Webster who advised that special
rules can raise troublesome issues,(71) and it would be preferable if special
cases could be handled without radically altering the system. Declaring "martial
law" is not "acceptable;" (72) Webster stated:
While it is a traumatic experience for anyone to live through the assassination
of a President, it ought not to be the predicate for an investigative conduct
which in essence is the declaration of martial law. I just simply do not believe
that we ought to * * * suspend everything that was put in place to protect the
rights of citizens. (73)
------------------------------
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That such legislation ought to be reviewed, nonetheless, seems appropriate in
the opinion of the committee.
2. The Judiciary Committee should examine recently passed special prosecutor
legislation to determine if its provisions should be modified to extend them to
residential assassinations and the circumstances, any, under which they should
be applicable to other federally cognizable homicides.
Recognizing the special problems associated with the investigation improprteties
by a President, Vice President and certain other officials, special prosecutor
legislation was enacted in 1978.(74) Testimony before the committee considered
the wisdom of extending the legislation to Presidential assassinations uniformly
and to other federally cognizable homicides on a case-by-case basis. The point
most often raised in favor of such legislation was the appearance of impropriety
in having the Attorney General, the new President's lawyer, conduct the
investigation into the former President's death. (75). Generally, however, the
witnesses who appeared before the committee--high Government officials, for the
most part--tended to prefer the established system that relies on Federal
investigative and prosecutive agencies that are in place, in the absence of
specific questions about the suitability of the Attorney General or the
Department of Justice. (76)
The committee recommends, nevertheless, as part of comprehensive legislation
dealing with Federal homicides, that special prosecutor legislation be carefully
considered.
Administrative Recommendations to the Executive
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE
The Department of Justice should reexamine its contingency plans for the
handling of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides in light of the
record and findings of the committee. Such an examination should consider the
following issues:
A. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of inter- and intra-agency
task forces and the strike force approach to investigations and prosecutions;
B. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of the advances at science
and technology, and determining when it should secure independent panels of
scientists to review or perform necessary scientific, tasks, or secure qualified
independent forensic pathologists to perform a forensic autopsy;
C. Insuring that its fair trial/free press guidelines, consistent with an
alleged offender's right to a fair trial, allow that information about the facts
and circumstances surrounding an assassination promptly be made public and
promptly be corrected when erroneous information is mistakenly released: and
D. Entering at the current time into negotiations with representatives of the
media to secure voluntary agreements providing that photographs, audio tapes,
television tapes and related matters. made in and around the site of
assassinations be available to the Government by consent immediately following
an assassination.
Testimony before the committee indicated that many of the lessons learned in the
months after the tragic events in Dallas in 1963 have
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been incorporated into the contingency plans of the various Federal intelligence
and law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, there is much that can be learned
for the future in reviewing the record of the past, particularly with the
perspective that the passage of time affords. Four lessons stand out: The need
to integrate investigative and prosecutive efforts; to take advantage of the
advances of science and technology, particularly in such a fashion as its
independence will not only exist, but be seen to exist; to insure that accurate
information is immediately given out, consistent with any alleged assassin's
right to a fair trial; and to obtain, as soon as possible and with as little
difficulty as is possible, as much hard evidence as is possible.
(A) One of the most troubling aspects of the investigations of the deaths of
President Kennedy and Dr. King was the failure of Federal agencies to share and
use information, and to bring to bear on problems the array of talents,
expertise and legal tools available. Even from the point of view that it was not
reasonable to do everything, all that could have been done was not done. The
need for a task force approach was, according to testimony before the committee,
a point well taken. (77) There should also be a requirement for the use of the
strike force approach, with particular respect to conspiracy issues not settled
by forensics and field interviews. (78) For the future, contingency plans should
be written with flexibility in mind.(79)
(B) The most significant new knowledge the committee was able to develop about
events in Dallas on November 22, 1963, stemmed from the work of the committee's
scientific panels. (In the case of the assassination of Dr. King, to the regret
of the committee, there was not as much scientific evidence that could be
subjected to scientific analysis and thus cast new light on the assassination.)
The lesson for the future is, therefore, very clear: The potential benefits of
science in an investigation must be better realized. The committee noted that
science was used to advantage in 1964 and 1968. Nevertheless, its recommendation
is designed to insure that the promise of science and technology not be
overlooked in the event of another tragedy.
The committee also found reason to comment on the approach that is contemplated
for scientific analysis in the future, particularly in the case of a
Presidential assassination. The issue was raised before the committee of the use
of nongovernmental experts to achieve not only the greatest degree of expertise,
but also the ultimate in propriety. (80) It was noted, for example, that in its
major case operations plan the FBI contemplates using forensic pathologists from
the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. (81) While not wishing to call into
question the competency or the integrity of doctors associated with the
institute, the committee posed this question: In a society in which liberty has
traditionally depended on civilian control of the military, should not
efficiency (82) be set aside in favor of symbolism? (83) The committee thought
it should.
(C) The handling of public information in Dallas in November 1963 was criticized
by the Warren Commission (84) for reasons this committee considered valid.
Public comments by officials of the Department of Justice at the time of Dr.
King's death also seemed to emanate without careful attention to a set of public
information principles. The Department of Justice has guidelines for public
information policy
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in criminal cases,(85) which were being reviewed at the time this committee
completed its investigation.(86) But since the impact of such policy pervades
all of government, all interested individuals and agencies should participate in
the review. (87) It seems important that one objective of this review would be
to formulate a procedure for distinguishing between a routine case and one of
urgent Importance. (88) Beyond that, the committee hopes the Department of
Justice's new guidelines will take into account the public information problems
that have been exposed by its investigation.
(D) While it is vitally important that the best scientific experts be retained
in an assassination investigation, it is equally essential that they be given
the best evidentiary materials to examine. This committee demonstrated in its
investigation, as did the Warren Commission in the case of the Kennedy
assassination, that access to high quality materials is crucial. Thus, the
committee sought the best ways to achieve such access. In testimony before the
committee, it became clear that the best approach would be to make an immediate
effort to negotiate agreements with various news organizations, so that right
after an assassination law enforcement agencies can have access to the product
of news coverage. (89) These news organizations are understandably concerned
with first amendment freedoms. At the same time, law enforcement must have the
access. It would be unfortunate if a confrontation occurred over a search
warrant or a subpena. So the time to act is now. Negotiations started at this
time would be "very, very useful,"(90) according to testimony before the
committee. The process may turn out to be a "long, ongoing dialog which . . .
ought to be underway."(91) Because the witness from the Department of Justice
who testified in this regard indicated the Department would favor discussions
with the news media, (92) the committee is hopeful this recommendation will be
acted upon forthwith.
General Recommendations For Congressional Investigations
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III. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
The founders of the American system divided the Government into three branches.
The purpose of the separation of the branches was not to enhance efficiency but
promote liberty. Each branch was to check the others. Together, they would
govern the new Nation under the Constitution, realizing, it was hoped, the
promise of its preamble.
The balance of power between the executive and legislative branches has always
been fluid, although the trend in modern times has been for the executive branch
to be dominant. That trend was sharply reversed in 1974, principally because of
Congress power to investigate the allegations of wrongdoing by the President.
The exercise of the power to investigate, first in the Senate and then in the
House, eventually led to the resignation of the President. Ironically, the power
that may have done the most to return the Nation to the values of the
Constitution in 1974 was not explicitly recognized in the Constitution when it
was drafted in 1787.
The investigative authority of Congress is not expressly written into the
Constitution, but the precedent for that power is longstanding, both in theory
and practice. The British Parliament and the Assemblies of the American colonies
frequently exercised it.(93)
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Political scientists and parliamentarians have long argued that inherent in the
power to make laws must be the Dower to investigate before they are enacted and
later to see that they are carried out. In "Consideration on Representative
Government," John Stuart Mill wrote that the legislature was best fitted, not
for administration or lawmaking, but for the review of the public's business:
* * * to watch and control the Government; to throw the light of publicity on
its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any
one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable.(94)
In more modern times, Woodrow Wilson propounded a similar viewpoint in
"Congressional Government":"Quite as important as legislating is vigilant
oversight of administration."(95) He felt that a self-governing. people
discusses and interrogates its administration. For him, Congress power to inform
was as important as its power to legislate. (96) Congress was, he thought, the
"eyes and voice" of the Nation. Like the British Parliament, Congress was, in
the words of William Pitt the Elder, the "Grand Inquest of the Nation."(97)
The power of Congress to investigate has been challenged a number of times, not
only by the executive branch, but also by recalcitrant witnesses who were
private citizens and others. The grounds for the challenges have been many,
ranging from questions about Congress right to review the executive branch or
private organizations and citizens, to doubts about various procedures
committees have used in conducting investigations. Since the first congressional
investigation in 1792 into the humiliating defeat of General St. Clair by a
small band of Indians, in which the House asserted its right to call for persons
and papers,(98) the basic power of the Congress to investigate has been
acknowledged. The Supreme Court has always upheld that power, although
recognizing that it was subject to certain limitations.
At first, Congress attention focused on government itself. Subsequently,
however, the laws became broader. The first instance in which Congress requested
that private citizens appear before it and provide documents was in 1827, when
the Committee on Manufacturers was considering tariff legislation.(99) Since
that time, in areas where business activities or behavior of private individuals
are subject to congressional regulation, Congress power to investigate has
always been recognized.
The investigative charter of the committee was narrow--to examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King, and, if
necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for the future. Nevertheless,
because of the nature of the lives and the deaths of these two great men, the
scope of what was pertinent to the mandate of the committee was wide. In a real
sense, it encompassed the history of the United States in a turbulent and
violent decade. Consequently, the appropriate limitations on the scope of a
congressional investigation were ever in the minds of the committee,
particularly as that investigation touched on private groups or individuals,
raising, however indirectly, questions of their possible connection to the death
of either man. How ironic it would have been had
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the committee, a major concern of which was unlawful Government intrusion into
the life of Dr. King, been reckless with the lives of others.
Traditionally, two constitutional limits on the power of congressional inquiry
have been raised to circumscribe congressional investigations. Assuming that the
subject matter is itself one on which legislation may be enacted and the proper
procedural steps have been followed, the first and fifth amendments have been
the main shields raised to protect individual liberties, having as a consequence
the effect of blocking the inquiry.
The committee looked into the conduct of a variety of groups whose activities,
however personally objectionable, were protected by the first amendment. In all
situations, it was possible to conduct the inquiry without subjecting the groups
to unnecessary publicity or to invade their privacy beyond that which was
essential to a search for the truth. None of the subjects of the investigation
felt it necessary to try to block the investigation by contemptuously resisting
the committee's processes or questioning.
The committee also looked into the conduct of a variety of individuals whose
activities were such that they could legitimately claim this privilege against
self-incrimination. While this area of the committee's work is not the subject
of a specific recommendation, a comment about it is appropriate.
In 1970, Congress passed legislation changing the character of the immunity it
could grant in compelling a witness' testimony over fifth amendment
objections.(100) The use immunity concept, reflected in the provisions of the
1970 act,(101) respects comity between State and Federal jurisdictions, limits
interference between congressional and executive functions, and does not disrupt
administrative remedies of a civil character. For these reasons, the general
reluctance that has traditionally accompanied immunity grants by congressional
committees is no longer applicable. If the grant is coordinated with the
necessary executive officials and the testimony is safeguarded until it is
suitable for release, grants of immunity can be made without causing objections.
The 1970 act was first used in a more than token fashion in the Watergate
hearings in the Senate; it was first used extensively by this committee. Indeed,
it constituted a centerpiece in the committee's investigative strategy. The
committee found the 1970 act to be a powerful tool in finding the truth. But,
while the committee recognized the essential application of the act in future
investigations, it cautions that it must be used carefully. The promise of the
act in uncovering the truth is only fulfilled by its power to compel reluctant
witnesses to speak. A society that ranks individual privacy among its more
precious values must recognize that a price is paid for attaining the truth. It
may be necessary to pay that price in important matters, such as determining the
truth in the deaths of two great leaders. Nevertheless, it ought to be paid only
when necessary.
In the course of the investigation, the committee learned a great deal about
congressional investigations and came to certain conclusions about them. There
are a variety of issues that ought to be addressed by one or more committees of
the House to strengthen and increase the fairness of investigations in the
future.
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A. The appropriate committees of the House should consider amending the rules of
the House to provide far a right to appointive counsel in investigative hearings
where a witness is unable to provide from private funds.
A witness before a congressional committee has no general right to counsel, but
the rules of the House recognize that witnesses may be accompanied by counsel at
investigative hearings to advise them of their constitutional rights.(102)
Nevertheless, there is no provision for paying for a counsel in the event a
witness is unable to afford one. The committee, in its rules,(103) made an
effort to find a solution by arranging with the District of Columbia Bar
Association to provide counsel on certain occasions. The arrangement worked
well, and the committee believes that an amendment to the rules of the House
incorporating such an arrangement should be considered by the appropriate
committees.
B. The appropriate committees of the House should examine the the House
governing the conduct of counsel in legislative and investigative hearings and
consider delineating guidelines for professional conduct and ethics, including
guidelines to deal with conflicts of interest in the representation of multiple
witnesses before a committee.
The rules of the House provide that the chairman of a committee may punish
breaches of decorum or professional ethics on the part of counsel by exclusion
from the hearing. (104) This committee read this rule to deal with the ethical
problems of multiple representation. Not all multiple representation presents a
conflict of interest. Some conflicts that exist may be cured by full disclosure
to the clients and informed consent. Nevertheless, disclosure and consent cannot
cure all conflict. Those that touch on the integrity of the factfinding process
may not be waived. Consequently, the committee did not follow a blanket rule; it
waited until a conflict was ripe on the record. It held a hearing to establish
the conflict. It then appropriately disqualified the offending attorney, if
disclosure and waiver did not constitute an adequate cure. The standard employed
for disqualification was that of professional societies (105) and the courts.
(106) Like the Watergate special prosecutor,(107) the committee must express its
concern with the conduct of the bar that represented witnesses in its executive
sessions. Too often, the lawyers seemed insensitive to their duty to their
clients to represent them as individuals and not part of a group. It was
necessary for the committee to disqualify more than one attorney to preserve the
integrity of the committee's processes. In addition, the committee experienced
tactics on the part of several lawyers who represented individuals before the
committee that can only be described as efforts to disrupt or obstruct the work
of the committee as it labored to determine the truth. There is a need for
clearer guidance to investigative committees to deal with
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these problems. The appropriate committee of the House should look into what, if
anything, may be done to assure the integrity of Congress factfinding processes.
C. The Judiciary Committee should examine the adequacy of Federal law as it
provides far the production of Federal and State prisoners before legislative or
investigative committees under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
On more than one occasion, the committee heard testimony from witnesses who were
incarcerated. Usually, a subpena will guarantee the presence of a witness.
Nevertheless, a subpena is unavailing when the witness is incarcerated. Then, a
writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is usually employed. Such writs may be
issued by Federal courts under the current law. (108) During its tenure, the
Watergate committee obtained 20 such writs.(109) The language of current law,
however, does not explicitly grant Federal courts the right to issue such writs
in behalf of congressional committees. It is necessary to read the current
statute in light of its extensive history to arrive at its proper meaning.(110)
The committee was able to secure the writ it sought, but the process was not
without difficulty, since the matter of jurisdiction had to be litigated. It
would be helpful if clarifying amendments were added to present law if after
careful study they are thought essential.
D. The appropriate committees of the House should examine and clarify the
applicability to congressional subpenas of recently enacted legislative
restrictions on access to records and other documents.
During the course of its investigation, the committee sought access to or
subpenaed numerous documents. In one instance, the committee's subpena was
challenged. Usually, congressional subpenas can only be resisted through the
contempt process. The speech and debate clause of the Constitution precludes
court litigation. (111) Nevertheless, it was argued that by virtue of an act of
Congress,(112) the speech and debate clause had been waived. Ultimately, the
committee thought it inappropriate to subject those involved to the contempt
process, and it submitted the issue to the only court that apparently had
jurisdiction, the Probate Court of Shelby County, Tenn. The verdict of the court
was favorable to the committee. The committee believed that this
result--Congress submitting its processes for review to a State court not of
record--was an unintended consequence. The committee, therefore, recommends that
the appropriate committee of the House undertake a survey of similar restrictive
legislation to determine to what degree it was intended to apply to
congressional process. Where necessary, clarifying legislation should be enacted
to resolve ambiguous language. If such legislation is to be made applicable to
congressional process, provisions should be made for a suitable forum in which
to hear pertinent cases.
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E. The appropriate committees of the House should consider legislation that
would authorize the establishment of a legislative counsel to conduct litigation
on behalf of committees of the House incident to the investigative or
legislative activities and confer jurisdiction on the U.S. District Court far
the District of Columbia to hear such lawsuits.
The committee found itself in court on a variety of occasions to secure immunity
grants, to enforce its process, and, on occasion, to defend its work or to
secure the assistance of the Department of Justice. It was necessary to amend
the committee's resolution to authorize these appearances in court, (113) and it
was necessary to devote to this litigation resources of the committee that would
have been better used if devoted to the investigation. The committee recommends,
therefore, that the appropriate committees of the House give careful
consideration to the establishment of an office of legal counsel for the House,
similar to that established for the Senate. (114) The committee recommends,
further, the conferring of appropriate jurisdiction on the District Court of the
District of Columbia in such cases.
F. The appropriate committees of the House should consider if rule XI of the
House should be amended, so as to restrict the current access by all Members of
the House to the classified information in the possession of any committee.
Rule XI(e)(2) of the House provides that committee "records shall be the
property of the House and all Members of the House shall have access thereto* *
*." Access does not include the right to copy or to use the records, even on the
floor of the House; provision for release or access may be regulated by
committee rules. (115) The committee adopted special rules governing access to
classified documents.(116) Nevertheless, the existence of rule XI posed a
sensitive and delicate problem in dealing with governmental agencies from whom
the committee sought access or delivery of classified materials. Concern was not
expressed with granting access or delivery of material to members of the
committee. No problem was raised with disclosure based on a need to know to
members of the staff of the committee, each of whom had received an appropriate
clearance. Fear was expressed, however, that under rule XI any Member of the
House and possibly personal staff members might gain access to the materials.
Obviously, the larger the circle of individuals who had access, the greater the
danger of intended or inadvertent disclosure. While the committee was able to
work around these concerns, it would facilitate cooperation between agencies and
committees, given the task of oversight, if the degree of disclosure could be
kept within reasonable bounds. Consequently, the committee recommends that
appropriate committees of the House carefully study the issue.
Recommendations For Further Investigation
Page 480
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
A. The Department of Justice should contract for the examination taken by
Charles £. Bronson to determine its significance, if any, to the assassination
of President Kennedy.
Toward the end of the committee's investigation, the existence of film taken by
Charles L. Bronson in Dealey Plaza approximately
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5 minutes prior to the assassination was brought to the attention of the
committee. It was suggested that the movie, an 8-millimeter color film that
focused on the area around the sixth floor window of the Texas School Book
Depository, showed a figure walking behind the window. The film was forwarded to
the committee's photography panel. The panel was unable to discern a figure, and
it was unable to say conclusively whether apparent motion behind windows on the
fifth and sixth floors was due to film artifacts or real motion. (117)
Nevertheless, because the Bronson film was of a quality superior to that of
another motion picture film that the panel had subjected to computer processing,
the panel recommended that similar work be done on the Bronson film. (118) In
light of the recommendations of the panel, the committee recommends to the
Department of Justice that it contract for appropriate research to be done to
determine what, if any significance, the Bronson film may have to the
assassination of the president.
B. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the
Department of Justice and the National Science Foundation should make a study of
the theory and application of the principles of acoustics to forensic questions,
using the materials available in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
as a case study.
It would be difficult to understate the significance of the acoustical analysis
done by the committee in its investigation of the death of President Kennedy. As
the committee noted, it can be expected that the opportunity and necessity to do
similar work will arise in the future. Consequently, it would seem judicious to
study the theory and application of the principles of acoustics to forensic
issues. The best case study available for such testing is the assassination of
President Kennedy, not only for what additional light it might east on that
investigation, but also for the benefit of future investigations. Consequently,
the committee recommends that the National Science Foundation and the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice
undertake appropriate studies and publish the results, so that they may be
widely known and used. The committee notes that it would be appropriate for NSF
and LEAA to take advantage of the considerable expertise in the private sector
and in Federal law enforcement, particularly the FBI, in making the study.
C. The Department of Justice should review the committees findings and report in
the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and after completion of the recommended investigation enumerated in sections A
and B, analyze whether further official investigation is warranted in either
case. The Department of Justice should report its analysis to the Judiciary
Committee.
All the obstacles this committee. faced in its investigation of the death of
President Kennedy and Dr. King stand in the way of any institution that would
continue its work. As even more time has passed since this committee was formed,
the trail is colder, and it has been trod upon one more time. The difficulties
are formidable, and it may be that little more can be profitably done.
In 1964, it was indicated that the file in the assassination of President
Kennedy would remain open, and the same is true in the case
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of Dr. King's murder. But in light of this committee's investigation, more is
required than keeping open files. It would seem only appropriate for the
Department of Justice to perform the scientific studies recommended herewith and
to analyze the committee's record. Then the Department could assess the wisdom
of taking additional steps that might move one or both of these cases toward
final resolution.
The choice is not between a full-scale reopening of both investigations and
doing nothing, since there are in each case limited areas that lend themselves
to further exploration. What the committee found that had not been known before
should be applied to a reconsideration by the Justice Department of its original
investigations. Whatever the Department decides is the preferable course of
action, it should report to the Judiciary Committee, so that its determination
may be reviewed by an appropriate congressional body.
Separate Remarks, Views and Dissent of Members of the Committee
Page 483
IV. SEPARATE REMARKS, VIEWS AND DISSENT OF
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Separate Remarks of Christopher J. Dodd
Page 483
SEPARATE REMARKS OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD DISSENTING FROM
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
I voted against the adoption of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendations" by
the Select Committee on Assassinations. I did so because I could not agree with
the committee's first finding which reads,
Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F. Kennedy. The second and
third shots he fired struck the President. The third shot he fired killed the
President.
On December 29, 1978, I was called upon to decide whether Oswald fired three
shots from the Texas School Book Depository. The acoustical evidence showed that
the second shot was fired approximately 1.66 seconds after the first shot.1 The
committee had two pieces of evidence available to it that indicated how fast
Oswald might have fired his rifle. First, there was a test conducted by the FBI
in 1964, using Oswald's rifle, which was a bolt-action rifle manufactured by
Mannlicher-Carcano. The results showed that this rifle could not be aimed and
fired using the telescopic sights in less than 2.25-2.3 seconds. 2 Second, two
committee staff members conducted a preliminary test in September, using a
Mannlicher-Carcano similar to Oswald's. The results of this test showed that,
using the open iron sights, the fastest that the rifle could be fired was
somewhere between 1.65 and 1.75 seconds. 3
On the basis of these tests, I could not conclude that Oswald fired both the
first and second shots. The FBI test did not show that it was possible for
Oswald to have aimed and fired in 1.66 seconds, and the committee's test was
only preliminary. 4 I dissented.
It was the committee's original plan to conduct a final test before voting on
the report, and in expressing my concern over this issue in the weeks prior to
the vote, I repeatedly requested that a final test be done. Unfortunately, it
was not possible to bring together all of the elements required for the final
test before the December vote.
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(483)
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On March 29, 1979, a final test was conducted. In this test Mannlicher-Carcano
was repeatedly fired using the open iron sights. This test was conducted by four
expert marksmen from the District of Columbia Police Department and two
relatively inexperienced committee staff members.5 None of the expert marksmen
were able to and fire two consecutive shots within 1.66 seconds. The committee
staff members were able to fire two consecutive shots in less than 1.66 seconds
by "point" aiming, that is, not aiming through the telescopic or iron sights.
These results have not allayed my concern over this issue. When I consider all
the available evidence on this problem, I find myself no more near a solution
than I was on December 29.
The available evidence, as I see it, presents three options. If the acoustical
evidence on this issue is valid, then two shots were fired within 1.66 seconds
of one another.6 This leads to the first two options: either one person fired
both shots in 1.66 seconds; or one person fired the first shot, and 1.66 seconds
later another person fired the second shot. The third option is that the shots
were spaced more than 1.66 seconds apart, allowing ample time for one person to
have fired both shots. This third option necessitates a conclusion that the
acoustical evidence is invalid on this point. I will discuss these three options
in turn.
Option one.--Oswald fired the first two shots within 1.66 seconds of one
another.---To believe that this option is correct, one must accept that Oswald
was more proficient, with a rifle than any of the committee's four expert
marksmen or that like the committee start members who participated in the test,
Oswald "point" aimed and did not take the time necessary to line up his target
in the iron sights or the telescopic sight on his rifle. Despite the fact, that
Oswald may have been more familiar with a Mannlicher-Carcano than any of the
committee's expert marksmen, his record as a rifleman makes it hard for me to
accept that he was able to fire faster than the experts and still hit both
President Kennedy and Governor Connally.
It is even more difficult for me to believe that, having missed with his first
shot, as the committee finds, he did not take the time necessary to properly aim
his second shot. This becomes almost impossible to believe in that Oswald, by
merely pointing the rifle from 165 feet, would have had to hit a target that was
moving at 11 miles an hour.7 It should be noted that the second shot referred to
here struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. This is the foundation
the single-bullet theory.
There is circumstantial evidence, however, that tends to indicate that Oswald
did fire all three shots. Three cartridge cases were found on the sixth floor of
the Texas School Book Depository, and ballistics evidence establishes that all
three came from Oswald's rifle. In that there is no evidence to suggest that
more than three shots came from the
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Texas School Book Depository, the cartridge cases support the theory that Oswald
fired both the first and second shots.
The cartridge cases are not, however, conclusive proof that Oswald fired both of
the first two shots. The ballistics evidence merely shows that the cartridge
cases were fired in Oswald's rifle at some point in time; there is no way to
tell when they were in the rifle or when the bullets that they encased were
fired. In other words, one of the cartridge cases could have been from a bullet
fired from Oswald's rifle a day, a week or a month earlier. That cartridge case
could then have been ejected from the rifle before firing on November 22, 1963,
or in some other way dropped on the floor.
At first glance, it seems easier to believe that the three cartridge cases mean
that Oswald fired all three shots than to believe the "ejection" theory.
Nevertheless, as this requires me to accept that Oswald fired within 1.66
seconds, the "ejection" theory appears more likely than it does at first glance.
Option two.--An unidentified person fired the first shot, and Oswald fired the
second shot 1.66 seconds later. 8--There is one major problem with this option;
there is no other evidence of a second gunman in the Texas School Book
Depository, which, according to the acoustical evidence, was the origin of both
of the first two shots. This brings me to the first two of my recommendations
for further study.
First, a detailed photographic analysis should be made of the Bronson film to
determine whether it shows more than one figure in the sixth floor windows of
the Texas School Book Depository.9
Second, further mathematical calculations should be performed on the data
developed by the acoustical experts to determine more precisely the location
from which each of the first two shots was fired. The acoustical experts
testified that they were able to pinpoint within a few feet the location of the
gunman on the grassy knoll. They did so by a series of geometric computations
based on the original data developed in the reenactment of the shooting. This
more complete analysis was only undertaken for the third shot in a sequence of
four. If a similarly fine-tuned analysis were conducted for the first two shots,
it might be determined whether or not they both came from the same window.
Option three.--Oswald fired both the first two shots and took longer than 1.66
seconds between the shots, giving himself adequate time to properly aim.--On its
face, this option seems very attractive; however, it means that the acoustical
evidence is invalid, at least on this issue.
The acoustical testimony before the committee is most renowned the portion of it
that indicates that a second gunman fired at the President from the grassy
knoll. The validity of this evidence has been widely debated in the short time
since it was first presented to the committee and the public, and I suspect that
it will remain the subject of debate for years to come.
The acoustical evidence came in two phases. The first time Dr. Barger testified,
he indicated the time sequence between the shots but did not state any firm
conclusion about the existence of a shot from the
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grassy knoll.10 The reaction of the committee and the public was one of
frustration with the indefinite conclusions with regard to existence of a shot
from the grassy knoll, but the nature of the evidence itself and the expertise
of the witness were generally accepted. I do not recall any challenges at that
time to an "arcane" science.
The second phase of the acoustics testimony was received quite differently. This
time, Barger, Weiss, and Aschkenasy all testified that there was a 95-percent
probability that a shot was fired from the grassy Knoll.11 This time the
reaction of the public and committee members was much more skeptical. And
rightly so, since this conclusion had much greater significance.
When I first learned of the "new" acoustical evidence and before I heard the
testimony, I was very doubtful that it would prove convincing. Nevertheless,
after listening to the experts in closed session and going over the data. which
they presented, I found myself slowly coming to believe that they might be
right. Realizing the significance of their conclusion, I determined to withhold
belief until I had another chance to question them, this time in open session. I
spent a great deal of time preparing myself for the next round of questioning. I
decided that the most useful role I could play would be to act as attorney for
the opposition. I would look for the weaknesses in their theory so that I could
better judge its strengths, its accuracy. I believe that I succeeded in holding
to my plan to be as tough with my questions and as difficult to convince as
possible. Yet, after listening to the testimony, I was persuaded.12
I remain convinced that the preponderance of the evidence supports the finding
of the committee that a gunman fired from the grassy knoll. Yet, I believe that
further study of the acoustical evidence is necesessary. The acoustical evidence
of a gunman on the grassy knoll has enormous significance for our Nation. This
by itself makes real the idea of a conspiracy to kill the President. The data
upon which the experts base their conclusion should, therefore, be reviewed by
other noted experts in this field. If further study would resolve any lingering
doubts as to the conclusion, failure to pursue the answers would be inexcusable.
On the issue of a President's death we should not deal in shadows of suspected
truths when we might have light. In its report, the committee criticizes the
Government for ifs failure in 1963-64 to diligently pursue the truth on the
question of conspiracy; our Government should not make the same mistake today.
In addition to the need for continued study of the "grassy knoll shot," further
study of the acoustical evidence is necessary to answer the questions
surrounding the first two shots. As discussed in option 3 above, the answer may
be that the time sequence provided by the acoustical evidence is invalid. This
possibility should be explored. Another explanation, discussed in option 2
above, is that the acoustics' time sequence is correct, and that some
unidentified gunman fired the first shot while Oswald fired the second. Further
work on the acoustics data, as described previously, could conceivable prove the
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existence of a second gunman in the Texas School Book Depository or elsewhere in
the plaza.
Therefore, I recommend that a general review of the acoustical evidence and all
other scientific evidence bearing on these questions, be conducted by the
National Science Foundation or some other appropriate body.13 Specifically, I
recommend that:
1. A photographic analysis of the Bronson film be conducted.
2. The detailed analysis that was done with regard to the third shot be done
with regard to shots one, two, and four.
3. An attempt be made to ascertain the source of the carillon bell which appears
on the dictabelt.
4. A thorough review of the tape be conducted in an effort to discover whether
shots might have originated from locations other than the grassy knoll and the
Texas School Book Depository.
5. An analysis of the various other sounds (for example, the siren) be made to
test the tape's authenticity. 14
I agree with paragraph II. B. on its face which reads,
The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence available to
it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin
Luther King as a result of a conspiracy.
After analyzing all the evidence, particularly the testimony of James Earl Ray,
his demeanor and his actions prior to the crime, I am persuaded that he did not
act alone in planning the death of Dr. King. Therefore, I agree with the
committee's finding in this paragraph.
I cannot, however, agree to all of the underlying commentary. Specifically, I
dissent from any and all parts of the King section of the report which identify
particular coconspirators. The evidence which the committee musters may suggest
the outlines of a conspiracy, but, in my opinion, it falls short. After
reviewing all the evidence, I am unable to say with any degree of certainty who
conspired with James Earl Ray or under what plan they were acting.
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
I offer the following comment on paragraph III. B (1) which reads,
The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provisions of law
dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy trial as it applies to both
the investigation and prosecution of federally cognizable homicides.
COMMENT
The third-party record statutes were enacted to protect an individual's right to
privacy in a society which requires that in a variety
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of situations individuals divulge personal information and place that
information in the hands of third parties and institutions. Individuals must put
aside their interests in privacy in order to share in many of the benefits of
modern society, and to comply with Government regulation of certain activities.
With increasingly sophisticated means of maintaining records, the threat of
misuse has grown, and in the last decade the American public has become more
aware of the ease with which individual rights of privacy may be violated by the
keepers of the files and the seekers of information.
In a series of statutes Congress has acted to protect the right of privacy from
undue infringement. These statutes were not enacted in a void; they were drafted
to protect privacy rights, but other societal interests were recognized as well.
Chief among these interests was the need for adequate law enforcement. Without
exception the privacy acts adopted by Congress provide the means for law
enforcement agencies to obtain information needed to conduct lawful prosecutions
and investigations of criminal conduct.
It may be true, as the testimony before this committee indicated, that informal
access to third-party records has ended, that acquisition of records in the
course of an investigation is more difficult than in the past, and that holders
of third-party records are more reluctant to grant access because of potential
civil liability for invasion of privacy. If these results are in fact present,
the privacy acts are working to protect those rights which they were intended to
protect. "Informal access" is a dangerous tool, and prior to the enactment of
the privacy statutes it was grossly abused. The power to acquire records in the
course of an "investigation" was so liberally construed that the requirement
that there be an ongoing lawful investigation was for practical purposes
nonexistent. And the irresponsible manner in which some third-party
recordkeepers shared information with others showed little or no recognition of
the rights of the individuals involved. Therefore, this affirmative testimony on
the "need" to reconsider the privacy acts is unpersuasive and is the same sort
of testimony considered by the committees which recommended the adoption of the
privacy acts.
The testimony of the witnesses before this committee is most striking for its
failure to identify any unique problems that might arise in an assassination
case or other federally cognizable homicide case which would justify a
recommendation that the privacy acts be reexamined with a special eye to these
crimes.
I have carefully examined the Speedy Trial Act and am convinced that its
provisions are drawn with adequate breadth to allow ample time for the
prosecution to prepare its case in the event of an assassination or other
federally cognizable homicide, as well as to allow ample time for the Federal
agencies to investigate any such crime. Under the act, in setting a date for
trial, the court may consider the unique factors which might be present in the
event of an assassination.
The witnesses who testified before this committee, while voicing some general
complaints about the act, agreed that in the event of an assassination the act
would provide the Government with adequate time to prepare for trial. Responding
to general complaints about the Speedy Trial Act is not properly within the
scope of this committee's mandate, nor did this committee attempt to take
testimony on whether
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the Speedy Trial Act was in general a good thing. I do not believe that such
gratuitous complaints are sufficient basis for recommending that the Speedy
Trial Act be reevaluated, especially in light of the fact that witnesses,
including the representative of, the Department of Justice found the act
adequate to deal with an assassination.
The Federal bail statutes were the subject of limited testimony and
consideration by this committee. They. were considered only in an effort to
determine whether the unconstitutionality of the Federal death penalty, 18
U.S.C. 1111 et seq., would in effect classify Federal homicide as a noncapital
crime for purposes of bail. I think it is appropriate for this committee to
recommend that the Judiciary Committee examine the bail statutes in considering
the Federal death penalty. I do not feel any further recommendation on the bail
statutes is warrented.
All of the statutes in this section which the committee recommends be
reconsidered are designed with a delicate balance in mind, the balance between
individual rights and the state's police power. Disturbing that balance can lead
to disastrous results. While individual situations must be considered in
striking this balance, without clear and compelling justification new exceptions
should not be made and the overall balance should not be shifted. Undoubtedly,
assassination is a heinous crime and society demands that the perpetrators of
such a crime be brought to justice, but we must not lose sight of other societal
values in our eagerness to see justice done. Justice is never served when, in
moving toward it, we blindly trample on rights which in calmer moments we
earnestly fight to preserve.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I would like to make some general comments regarding my service on this
committee, and in doing so discuss an issue which deserves particular attention.
My service on the House Select Committee on Assassinations was a painful
experience. For 2 years my colleagues and I listened to the circumstances
surrounding the death of two men: One, an inspired individual who gave this
Nation a special understanding of the meaning and importance of freedom; the
other, a President who transferred his hope, his ideals, and his youth to a
Nation growing old before its time. While they lived the shoulders of a Nation
were sturdier, its back was stronger, and its heart a little greater. And
although what they gave will remain with this country for all time, with their
death we lost forever the glowing promise of their tomorrow.
Thus, my service on the committee was a painful one. But hearing of the conduct
that was engaged in by various agencies of our Government in the name of
security, in the name of law enforcement, not only added to that pain, but
caused me to feel shame and anger in a way in which I can only bode I will never
feel again.
The evidence before this committee an some of the activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency consisted of story
after story of abusive practices. The FBI, an arm of our Government, engaged in
what was tantamount to a private war against one individual--not a criminal,
just a man who spoke out
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against injustice. The. FBI's conduct toward Dr. King not only dishonors that
agency, but dishonors each and every one of us.
The CIA, an arm of our Government, locked Mr. Nosenko in a cell, a "vault" for 3
years. For 3 years this agency kept a man in solitary. confinement without
resort to legal process and under conditions designed to break his mind and his
spirit. In addition, the CIA made a number of efforts to kill the leader of a
foreign nation and joined forces with organized crime so that they might better
accomplish their goal. We must never permit these agencies to dishonor us in
like manner again.
This committee heard over and over again from both these agencies that the
abuses of the past would never be repeated. Heartening as these assurances are,
they are not enough. Now that these abuses have been publicly aired, we have a
responsibility to do everything we can to see to it that they are not repeated.
Ignorance of the danger can never again be an excuse.
The only means of fulfilling our responsibility to insure that the abuses which
occurred in the 1960's do not occur again is to pass legislation restricting the
activities in which these agencies may lawfully engage. I, however, am not
confident that charter legislation is enough. In addition, I think Congress
should consider imposing criminal liability on officers and employees of these
agencies who engage in wrongful activities which may now be technically outside
the reach of criminal statutes.
These two agencies need the rule of law. The attitude that they were free to
function outside or above the law allowed these abuses to occur. There must be
no question that Congress intends for these agencies to operate within the law
and that the American public demand that they do so. I believe that even today
the attitude of being in some way above the law lingers in these agencies. It
was apparent in the CIA's choice of a witness to appear before this committee in
a public hearing. The CIA sent someone who had an agreement with that agency not
to speak about the primary subject of this committee's work, Lee Harvey Oswald.
Upon what meat doth this our Caesar, feed,
That he is grown so great?
"Julius Caesar."' William Shakespeare.
Perhaps it is the meat of our indifference. If so, we can afford to be
indifferent no longer.
Separate Views of Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar
Page 491
SEPARATE VIEWS OF HONS. SAMUEL L. DEVINE AND ROBERT W. EDGAR
Although seldom achieved, unanimity is often sought in reaching decisions in
matters of controversy. Such is the case with the final report of the Select
Committee on Assassinations.
Members present in a rather hasty session on December 29, 1978, discussed a
draft summary of findings and recommendations. Wording was changed and revised
in some portions, and although most members were in agreement with most of the
provisions, not all members present totally agreed with all of the findings
and/or recommendations.
It is the opinion of the undersigned that Chairman Louis Stokes, members of the
select committee, Chief Counsel Robert Blakey and his staff did an outstanding
job in an extremely difficult situation. Professionalism dominated the
performance of the investigation and hearings, and the congressional mandate has
been met with dignity and efficiency, free of political manipulation or personal
grandstanding.
The fact all members of the select committee do not totally agree with all of
the conclusions should not be construed as any suggestion of dissention or
conflict, but merely an indication of a respected maxim:"Reasonable minds can
reach different conclusions from the same set of facts."
Was there really a conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy in
Dallas? This is the question that many people ask since the U.S. House Select
Committee on Assassinations released its preliminary report stating the
President "was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy."
The report raised nearly as many questions as it answered, and the public
understandably wants to know what was the basis for the startling conclusion.
The release of the full report offers information on this important point.
How did the committee arrive at its conclusion pointing to a conspiracy? A
premature leak of technical evidence from acoustics experts was overemphasized
in the national media, although this evidence was only one facet of a very
comprehensive investigation.
As a result, the committee arranged a previously unscheduled public hearing at
the 11th hour to clarify the acoustical evidence.
The testimony of acoustical experts was given such weight that most committee
members were persuaded that a fourth shot was fired at Kennedy. This shot,
actually the third in a sequence of four, apparently came from a "shooter" on
the grassy knoll.
Was there actually another "shooter" at another location, and did this person
conspire with Lee Harvey Oswald?
Evidence for this view rests on a tape recording made in the dispatcher's radio
room of the Dallas Police Department.
(491)
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An open microphone on a police radio inadvertently recorded the events during
the time period immediately before, during, and after the assassination.
Experiments with this tape have produced varying conclusions.
Although acoustical study techniques are not new or novel, and were available at
the time of the Warren Commission investigation, scientific advances permitted
experts to separate noises, distinguishing the sound of a motorcycle from street
noises. The acoustical experts believed they could identify gunfire.
The experts told the committee they were 95 percent certain--beyond reasonable
doubt--there was a second "shooter."
Based on this evidence and testimony, a majority of the select committee
concluded there was a "high probability of a conspiracy." This is a conclusion
that must be rejected.
First, standing alone, the opinion of acoustics experts that a third shot came
from the grassy knoll is simply their opinion. Unless supported by other
evidence, it is not sufficient to establish conslusively there was indeed
another shot, another shooter, or a conspiracy.
Committee Chairman Louis Stokes, Democrat of Ohio, has said he felt his
conclusion was supported by "eye and ear witnesses." Some do not share this
view. The ear witnesses were people in the area to watch the Kennedy
motorcade--and they disagreed about what they heard.
Less than 12 percent said they heard shots from the grassy knoll. But over 27
percent said the shots came from the Texas School Book Depository.
Another group (17 percent) of ear witnesses believed the shots came from still
another building to the rear of the President's limousine.
And nearly 49 percent simply did not know or could not tell.
In short, the ear witnesses disagreed among themselves.
Among the eyewitnesses, there was one who thought he saw a "puff of smoke" in
the grassy knoll area. But, a "puff of smoke" is not necessarily evidence there
was another shooter, particularly with smokeless powder generally used, or
indeed a conspiracy.
The acoustics experts are top men in their special field and there is no
question as to their integrity or credibility. However, any experienced trial
lawyer would apply the same basic legal maxim: "Reasonable minds can reach
different conclusions from the same set of facts."
Assuming for the sake of argument there was actually another "shooter," this
would simply be circumstantial, not conclusive, evidence of a possible
conspiracy.
Apparently, the majority of the select committee dismissed the idea more than
one person in the tens of thousands gathered in Dallas that day might have
independently desired to kill the President.
There is another reason to doubt the open-microphone evidence. Officer H.B.
McLain of the Dallas Police Department was identified by the acoustics experts
as being the operator of a motorcycle with an open mike to the left rear of the
President's limousine.
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But, apparently the officer himself rejects the assumption, which led to the
test and re-enactments. He asks a very simple, but important, question: "If it
was my radio on my motorcycle, why did it not record the revving up at high
speed plus my siren when we immediately took off for Parkland Hospital?"
The investigation, testimony, and evidence established the facts that Lee Harvey
Oswald fired at least three shots from, his rifle, from the sixth-floor window
of the book depository.
It established the facts that two of these three shots hit the President, first
in the lower neck, upper back, exiting from the front of the throat of the
necktie knot.
This bullet, the evidence shows, then struck Gov. John B. Connally, passing
through his chest cavity from the rear, then emerging and entering his thigh and
right wrist.
Also, the investigation established the fact that the next shot hit the
President in the right skull and brain area, resulting in nearly instantaneous
death.
There were important results the investigation of the death of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., too.
Here the possibility of a conspiracy is somewhat more plausible because of the
direct evidence and testimony involving specific persons with plans or plots to
kill King and thousands of dollars being suggested as a payoff.
The committee concluded that James Earl Ray fired the fatal shot, with his
rifle, from a roominghouse in Memphis and then escaped.
His apprehension in London and apparent admissions to Inspector Eist of Scotland
Yard, together with his decision to plead guilty, assisted the committee, to
draw this conclusion.
However, evidence of a successful conspiracy to murder King is not conclusive.
Plots, plans, and designs to commit murder, separate and apart from the actual
murder, do not necessarily amount to a murder conspiracy.
Although some members of the select committee felt a climate was created where
the natural consequence of a U.S. Government agency's conduct may ultimately
have resulted in the murder of King, the committee found no evidence, direct or
indirect, that the FBI had any part in, or engineered, this assassination.
All members did not agree with all findings, conclusions, and recommendations,
but they did conscientiously seek answers to murders 10 and 15 years old.
Any further action in these matters should be pursued in the Justice Department,
since the select committee has concluded its work.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE.
ROBERT W. EDGAR.
Dissent of Robert W. Edgar
Page 494
DISSENTING VIEWS BY HON. ROBERT W. EDGAR TO THE FINAL REPORT
An Introduction
It was 10:30 p.m. on Friday, December 29, 1978, when I was faced with one of the
most difficult decisions of my congressional career. Chairman Louis Stokes of
Ohio challenged those of us on the Select Committee on Assassinations to come to
grips with over 2 years of investigative evidence and to decide on what we had
found. The mood was somber and sobering, each member weighing months of
deliberations. There were a number of important questions to be answered: Did
Lee Harvey Oswald act alone? Was it possible for the second shot fired from the
Texas Book Depository to pass cleanly through president President Kennedy and
Governor Connally in near perfect condition? Were there signs of involvement by
the Russians, the Cubans, the underworld? What happened in the King case? Did
James Earl Ray have help? Who is the mysterious Raoul? How did Ray finance
himself during the period from April 23, 1967, when he escaped from the Missouri
State penitentiary until June 8, 1968, when he was captured in England? These
and thousands of other important questions had been the subject matter of our
committee's efforts.
The select committee came into being in September 1976, in response to a
perceived need in the Nation to look again into the deaths of Dr. Martin Luther
King and President John F. Kennedy. At that time, it was clear that many people
were dissatisfied with the investigations conducted by the Warren Commission and
the FBI. The Gallup Poll revealed that over 80 percent of the American people
believed that, despite the findings to the contrary, some kind of conspiracy
lurked behind both deaths. A host of speculative and often bizarre theories had
been promulgated in book and article form, and people calling themselves
"assassinologists" had diligently kept alive their pet theories. Thus Congress,
responding to continued interest and pressure from the American people for
further investigation, established our controversial committee.
Almost immediately, we fell into disfavor. Part of the problem was uncertainty
about the leadership of the committee and our task. Congressman Tom Downing from
Virginia, the first chairman, served only from October 1976 to early January
1977, when he retired. Then Representative Henry Gonzalez, an outspoken
Congressman from Texas, became the chairman, and immediately came into conflict
with the equally outspoken new chief counsel, Richard Sprague, from
Philadelphia. Congressman Gonzalez and Richard Sprague spent a good deal of time
from January through March struggling over budgets and funding measures. Little
time was spent in actual investigations. In March 1977 Representative Gonzalez
resigned his chairmanship of the committee; Richard Sprague left shortly
thereafter. I took Henry Gonzalez' place as a member of the committee.
(494)
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Our first priority was to find a new chief counsel. We were able to secure the
services, by June 1977, of Professor Robert Blakey of Cornell University, who
had extensive experience in the Justice Department as well as some Capitol Hill
experience working with the Senate. As a result of these early problems, the
actual investigations did not start until July 1977. Mr. Blakey began work by
reviewing the staff and making some immediate changes, and by trying to put
together a complete investigative plan. We divided our staff into two separate
groups: one focused primarily on the death of Dr. King, the other primarily on
the death of President Kennedy.
The 12 Members of the House who served on the committee separated into two task
forces. The Dr. King task force was led by the Delegate from the District of
Columbia, Walter Fauntroy. The task force looking into the death of President
Kennedy was led by Congressman Richardson Preyer from North Carolina. In the
fall of 1977 we began months of executive session hearings, receiving testimony
privately in order to protect the rights of the individuals from whom we heard.
In August 1978, after completing almost a year of executive session testimony,
we opened the hearings to public scrutiny. James Earl Ray was brought in for a
week of testimony. He and others were crossexamined regarding their involvement
in Dr. King's death. In September we had 27 days of hearings into all phases of
the death of President Kennedy. In November, 2 days after the congressional
elections, the committee reviewed during 17 days of public sessions the events
surrounding the death of Dr. Martin Luther King. Finally in December, a month
before the committee was scheduled to go out of existence, we began considering
in great detail what we had discovered.
The vote that was to be taken on the evening of December 29 followed 2 weeks of
extensive review by the committee of some lastminute information that was
troubling to all of us. I voted "No" on the committee findings. I voted "No" on
that evening after reviewing the evidence and the material very carefully. I
voted "No" because I could not accept such a rapid change from the finding that
Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone to the new finding that there were two gunmen
involved in a conspiracy. The following is a discussion of my reasons for this
dissent.
A. Was there a conspiracy?
I agree with the December 13, 1978, first draft of our final report which states
on page 64:
The committee finds that the available scientific evidence is insufficient to
find that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.
Up to that moment in the life of the committee, we were prepared to go to the
American people with this conclusion. Only after the report of Mark R. Weiss and
Ernest Aschkenasy, in the 11th hour of our investigation, was the majority
persuaded to vote for two gunmen and a conspiracy. I respectfully dissented.
The use of the term conspiracy does a disservice to the understanding of the
American public. As was again noted in our draft report on page 51:
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined conspiracy as "a partnership
in criminal purposes? A conspiracy
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cannot be said to exist unless evidence is found from which such a partnership
may be inferred.
We found no evidence to suggest a conspiracy. We found no gunmen or evidence of
a gunman. We found no gun, no shells, no impact of shots from the grassy knoll.
We found no entry wounds from the front into any person, including President
John Kennedy and Gov. John Connally. We found no bullets or fragments of bullets
that did not belong to the Oswald weapon. And we found little, if any, evidence
of partnership with Lee Harvey Oswald. Few credible ear-witness accounts back up
the marginal findings of our acoustics experts.
According to the committee's own investigation of the statements taken from 178
persons in Dealey Plaza that were available to the Warren Commission, we found
the following:
Forty-nine of them (27.5 percent) believed the shots had come from the Texas
School Book Depository; 21 (11.8 percent) believed the shots had come from the
grassy knoll; 30 (16.9 percent) believed the shots had originated elsewhere; and
78 (43.8 percent) were unable to tell which direction the shots were fired from.
Only four individuals believed shots had originated from both the grassy knoll
and the Texas School Book Depository. (P. 32, draft final report of the House
Select Committee on Assassinations.)
One of the eyewitnesses referred to in the committee's final report as
illustrative of those present in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, who believed
a shot came from the grassy knoll was the late S.M. Holland, a signal supervisor
for the Union Terminal Railroad. Holland was standing on top of the overpass
above Elm Street, looking down on Elm Street. The committee will quote from a
deposition by Mr. Holland given to the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964, to
substantiate its theory of a fourth shot. For the record let me share part of
S.M. Holland's affidavit taken shortly after the assassination:
I am signal supervisor for the Union Terminal and I was inspecting signal and
switches and stopped to watch the parade. I was standing on top of the triple
underpass and the President's car was coming down Elm Street and when they got
just about to the arcade I heard what I thought for the moment was a firecracker
and he slumped over and I looked over toward the arcade and trees and saw a puff
of smoke come from the trees and I heard three more shots after the first shot
but that was the only puff of smoke I saw. I immediately ran around to where I
could see behind the arcade and did not see anyone running from there. But the
puff of smoke I saw definitely came from behind the arcade through the trees.
After the first shot the Secret Service man raised up in the seat with a
machinegun and then dropped back down in the seat. And they immediately sped
off. Everything is spinning in my head and if I remember anything else later I
will come back and tell Bill. (P. 387, "November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury," by
David W. Belin, Esquire, affidavit by S.M. Holland.)
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Notice the confusion of his account. First, he hears what he believes is
firecracker, then sees a "puff of smoke" coming from the trees, then three more
shots. But he sees only one "puff of smoke" after the first shot, not the third.
He runs around behind the arcade and sees no one. Notice also the reference to
the Secret Service man rising up within the car itself with a machinegun. I
doubt that we should place much accuracy on this witness 1.
I saw little evidence of a conspiracy. I saw little evidence of a second
shooter. And until further study of the acoustics work is undertaken, I will
stand by my belief that Lee Harvey Oswald acted as the lone assassin.
B. How accurate is the 95 percent or better probability of the alleged grassy
knoll shot?
I agree with the words of Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, professor of sociology and
law, University of Pennsylvania, in his letter dated January 2 1979:
I think the works of Barger and of Weiss and Aschkenasy have been exciting from
a scientific perspective. I hope their studies will be published in traditional
scientific journals where they will receive the usual form of scrutiny. However,
I think it is premature and inappropriate for a Federal group, like your
committee, to make a major policy decision on the basis of their findings.
I also agree with the words of Dr. Francis K. Davis, dean of science, Drexel
University, in his letter dated January 8, 1979:
Lacking something like that [a scientific report] to look at critically, I
certainly think that the 95 percent confidence claim is grossly exaggerated, and
it would take considerably more scientific, evidence to convince me and most
other scientists that their conclusions were-valid. As it is, I believe that
their chi-square probability test indicates a 95 percent probability that
certain events on the tape could not occur by chance, but not that there is a 95
percent probability that a shot came from the grassy knoll.
Probabilities are based on history. While the acoustics study is a
scientifically derived body of data, there is little precedence as to how to
contextualize the acoustics study. Further, the test firings in Dallas, which
are the basis for the comparison study, failed to fully utilize all possible
shot directions and/or locations. Many, many questions remain, such as:
(1) On what universe of data are the 95 percent. probabilities based?
(2) How adequate were their consideration of temperature and temperature
gradients in their findings?
(3) Could strong thermal gradients in Dealey Plaza markedly change the direction
of sound waves? Even to the point of producing an acoustical mirage?
(4) Was the same analysis done on shots 1, 2 and 4, that was done on apparent
shot 3?
----------------------
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(5) Should an echo pattern history be developed by looking at other locales and
other positions in Dealey Plaza to establish the uniqueness of the pattern or
apparent shot number 3?
(6) How certain are we of the identity of the other sounds on the tape? The bell
sound? The sirens?
(7) Are we 95 percent confident that we have the right motorcycle in the right
location at the right time?
(8) Could there have been more than one motorcycle police microphone receiving
sounds at the same time and making an acoustical collage?
(9) Was the December 13, 1978, report of Anthony J. Pellicano carefully reviewed
prior to our December 29, 1978, finding?
(10) Do we know enough to make our judgment on conspiracy accurate?
To the last question, I say no. I call upon the Congress of the United States to
immediately request a full and proper restudy of the acoustics project. I
suggest that this be the first step toward completing our investigation. This
restudy must involve a full review of the work of James E. Barger, Mark R.
Weiss, and Ernest Aschkenasy. After more analysis, we may be able to better
judge what level of merit we should place on this piece of evidence. As
indicated by Dr. Wolfgang:
That shot was made from the grassy knoll is not ruled out by any of the
acoustical testimony. But neither is it confirmed by the testimony I have read
or heard. (Letter to Congressman Edgar, dated January 2, 1979.)
C. Did we rush to a conspiratorial conclusion?
I believe that exhibit "A" will clearly demonstrate a rush to conspiratorial
conclusions. You will note three sets of black letter findings. The first in
column 1, was presented to the committee for its consideration on Monday,
December 18, 1978 (the date of the draft was December 13, 1978). It was on that
Monday that we met in executive session to discuss our findings and come to our
final conclusions. It was also that Monday when Weiss and Aschkenasy interrupted
our session to share their final report. Less than 2 weeks later, on December
29, 1978, we met in public session to review the report finding. That evening at
approximately 6 p.m., we began to consider draft No. 2, dated December 29, 1978,
and found in column 2 of exhibit "A." The final released document appears in
column 3. Note the changes within such a short span of time.
I believe the Members of Congress did not have sufficient time or expertise to
ask the tough questions. I believe the committee failed to properly consider how
much weight to assign this evidence due to our own limitations of time and
familiarity with the science. I believe we rushed to our conclusions and in
doing so, overshadowed many important contributions which other aspects of our
investigation will have on history. We did a great job up to the last moment,
when in our focus on the acoustics, we failed to give proper weight to other
findings of the investigation.
In the King case:
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D. Should James Earl Ray have been brought back before the committee for
questioning in the area of conspiracy?
Yes. One of the major holes left open in the final days of our investigation
into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King was our failure to bring James Earl Ray
back before our panel in the November public session. Our final report will be
filled with important information taken from hours of extensive private sessions
with Mr. Ray at Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary in Tennessee. But, in August
when he first appeared in public, we had implied strongly to him and his
attorney, Mark Lane, that he would be given an additional opportunity to appear
in public session to respond to questions in areas such as conspiracy and his
activities after the assassination and before his capture in London.
While I believe that James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr. King, and while I
agree that our committee did an extensive investigation into all aspects of the
crime, and while I believe that our conclusions would not have been altered by
whatever Mr. Ray would have shared in additional public session, I think we
failed to give the American public full access to the key actor in what I
believe was an assisted effort to kill Dr. King.
E. Where do we go from here?
1. I recommend that the Congress immediately order a full and detailed restudy
of the acoustics work, perhaps through the National Science Foundation. Included
in this restudy, a panel of scientific experts with knowledge of acoustics
should be employed to monitor the methodology used in the study to insure
accuracy and determine the level of weight which should be given to this
evidence.
2. I recommend an immediate meeting with the President and the Attorney General
by all members of our committee to outline in detail our findings.
3. If after restudy, the science of acoustics is confirmed along the lines of
Barger, Weiss, and Aschkenasy's report, I recommend the appointment of a special
investigator to pursue the leads developed by our committee in the Kennedy case.
4. I recommend that the Justice Department immediately reopen its investigation
into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King and focus on the possible St. Louis
conspiracy and the possible involvement of others in this death.
5. I recommend that the appropriate committees of Congress which have
jurisdiction over science and criminal justice immediately begin to explore the
value of acoustics as a forensic science and possible new fool in the criminal
investigation field.
6. I recommend that the Congress weigh carefully the experience of the House
Select Committee on Assassinations in order to evaluate the pros and cons of the
use of special committees for the purpose of criminal justice investigations. Do
we have the tools to fully handle all legal rights?
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my appreciation to the following individuals whose
sacrifice of time and energies made a significant contribution to this report:
Dr. Francis K. Davis, Dean of Science Drexel University, College of Science,
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 (215-895-2620)
Dr. Arthur E. Lord, Jr., Professor of Physics, Drexel University, Philadelphia,
Pa. 19104.
Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor of Sociology and Law, University of
Pennsylvania, Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, 3718 Locust
Walk CR, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.
Mr. Shanin Specter, 3417 Warden Drive, Philadelphia, Pa. 19129 (student at
Haverford College in Haverford, Pa.).
David W. Belin, Esquire, Belin, Harris, Helmick & Lovrien, 2000 Financial
Center, Des Moines, Iowa 50309 (515-243-7100).
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EXHIBIT A-(BLACK LETTER FINDINGS)
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EXHIBIT A-(BLACK LETTER FINDINGS)-Continued
Dissent of Harold S. Sawyer
Page 503
DISSENT AND ADDITIONAL REMARKS OF HON. HAROLD S. SAWYER TO
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As filed December 29, 1978
The summary of findings and recommendations of the Select Committee on
Assassinations having been set forth in summary outline form, this dissent
follows the same form adopting the numerical and alphabetical paragraph
designations of the report, to which a dissent and disagreement is intended to
apply.
I disagree with the following designated sections of the summary report:
Kennedy
(1) Paragraph IB.
(2) Paragraph IC.
(3) That portion of subparagraph IC3 which reads "but that the available
evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been
involved."
(4) That portion of IC4 where it is stated on the fifth line "as a group" and
its concluding clause "but that the available evidence does not preclude the
possibility that individual members may have been involved."
(5) That portion of subparagraph ID wherein said subparagraph states (a)
"varying degrees of," (b) "President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate
protection" and (c) "The investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the
assassination was inadequate. The conclusions of the investigations were arrived
at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too definitive."
(6) That portion of subparagraph ID1 wherein it states "The Secret Service was
deficient in the performance of its duties."
(7) Subparagraph ID1 (a).
(8) Subparagraph ID2.
(9) Subparagraph ID3 (c).
(10) That portion of subparagraph ID5 in that it uses the phrase "varying
degrees of."
(11) Paragraph ID5(b). I agree, however, that information relating to the
attempted assassination of Premier Castro which could have been a relevant
consideration was withheld from the Warren Commission by the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(12) Paragraph ID5 (d).
King
(1) Paragraph IIB.
(2) Paragraph IIE2 insofar as it states "but failed to investigate adequately
the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination. The
(503)
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Federal Bureau of Investigation manifested a lack of concern for constitutional
rights in the manner in which it conducted parts of the investigation."
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
(1) Section IV in its entirety.
Attached hereto are additional remarks together with my originally submitted
proposed findings and recommendations which I continue to urge.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS
Having dissented from the committee's apparent acceptance of the validity and
reliability of the expert acoustical testimony presented to the committee and
essentially those other portions of the findings and recommendations flowing
directly from such acceptance, I find it incumbent to explain (or perhaps in
this context "amplify" would be a more appropriate word) the reasons for my
disagreement.
As a threshold premise, it should be noted that I believe it is important that
despite the lapse of 15 years and at least two independent investigations, one
by the Warren Commission and the other by this committee, which by any
investigatory standards were exhaustive, no other evidence or even what might be
termed a "scintilla" of evidence has been uncovered which would substantiate a
conspiracy or which tends to negate the fact that Oswald operated alone. Those
facts, which have been highly exploited by the cult of assassinologists and
writers, namely errors and inadequacies in original autopsy testimony, the
alleged invalidity of the "single-bullet" theory, the alleged "cropping" of the
so-called backyard pictures, and the apparent backward motion of the president's
head as shown in the Zapruder film, have been, in my opinion, totally
discredited or explained beyond any reasonable doubt by evidence developed by
this committee.
There were a number of witnesses present in Dealey Plaza who believed that they
heard one or more shots from the direction of the grassy knoll. There were a
larger number who believed that all of the shots came from this School Book
Depository, and there were others who just did not have an opinion as to the
point of origin of the shots. One witness believed he saw a puff of smoke in the
area of the grassy knoll. If it is borne in mind that none of these listeners
were anticipating a shot and in fact, few if any recognized the initial shot or
shots as such, small weight can be given to those beliefs. This weight is
further diminished by the echo potentials of Dealer Plaza, being ringed on three
sides by tall buildings, and the wide divergence of beliefs expressed by those
present. The so-called puff of smoke is in my opinion of little or no
evidentiary value in that rifles using modern smokeless powder do not under
normal conditions emit visible smoke puffs when fired.
The committee is therefore in a position of being asked on the sole basis of the
opinion of three experts, all of whom are presently of the same view and
persuasion, to make the momentous decision to disregard everything else and
conclude that a second gunman was situated on and fired at the President from
the grassy knoll. This I do not find it possible to do.
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The tape, or more properly, the dictabelt which is the basis of the expert
acoustical testimony is now 15 years old, its chain of custody is less than
certain and it has been played a wholly indeterminate number of times. To the
unaided ear, the dictabelt appears to contain only the noise of a motorcycle, at
one point the faint noise of sirens and at another the faint ringing of chimes.
Nowhere on it is there any noise or series of noises even suggesting gunfire. No
acoustical expert has testified that even his trained ear had detected such. All
of the acoustical expert opinions are based upon the tape or print-out of a
computer showing three groupings of oscilloscope-like stylus amplitude markings
which remain after the filtering out of the motorcycle noise from the dictabelt.
The acoustical experts acknowledged that because of the "cutoff point" of a
radio transmitter, the full amplitude of loud sounds would not have been
transmitted to and recorded an the dictabelt. For this reason, Dr. James E.
Barger, the committee's initial acoustical expert was unable to say with either
certainty or any degree of conviction whatever, that the bursts of amplitude
shown on the computer tape were in fact, either gunshots or even sounds similar
to gunshots.
Other difficulties also exist. The transmitter which was stuck on "open"
position, the transmissions of which are recorded on the dictabelt, were on
Dallas police channel 1, whereas the entire motorcade, including of course all
of its escorting police, were guarding and transmitting on the specially
assigned Dallas police channel 2, so we must make the initial assumption in
accepting the validity of the acoustical testimony, that the officer on whose
motorcycle the transmitter was located was tuned to the wrong channel. In light
of the known possibilities of human error, this would perhaps be acceptable if
the transmission in question had occurred in the early stages of the motorcade.
The transmission with which we are concerned, however, occurred virtually at its
end and therefore one is required not only to accept the occurrence of such
human error, but also its tenacious persistence throughout the entire motorcade
during which time the officer on whose motorcycle it was located would for some
reason have to remain oblivious to the fact that he was not receiving the rather
continuous talk on the motorcade channel and also remain oblivious to the fact
that he was receiving constant and totally extraneous communications which were
continuously being sent over channel 1, the regular Dallas police channel.
The officer who has been identified by the committee staff as the rider of the
motorcycle on which the stuck transmitter was located has testified that he was
in fact guarding the correct channel, namely channel 2, and denies that he was
equipped with the stuck transmitter.
The same officer, together with other police officials located near the
Presidential limousine at the time the shots were fired in Dealey Plaza all
agree that sirens were activated, and motorcycles and other vehicles were
subjected to emergency acceleration within not more than a few seconds following
the shots having been fired. No change in the rhythm or intensity of the
motorcycle noise appears anywhere an the relevant dictabelt. There is no audible
sound even resembling sirens until a full 2 minutes following the last of what
is interpreted by the acoustical experts as the shots. When this faint noise of
sirens first
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becomes audible, approximately 2 full minutes following the so-called shots,
they seem to be approaching, cresting, and then receding. These several facts
would, therefore, be more consistent with the transmitter being situated on a
motorcycle located somewhere between Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital, which
motorcycle would incidently have been properly guarding channel 1.
As stated earlier, the dictabelt also contains the faint sound of chimes.
Despite a search by our staff and despite a wide ranging check with others who
were familiar with the Dealey Plaza area and environs 15 years ago, no chimes
have been discovered or were found to have existed 15 years ago which were
audible in Dealey Plaza. On the other hand; they located one set of known chimes
which were regularly used and did exist 15 years ago and do now exist in the
area between Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital.
It is also worthy of note that the police radio monitor or dispatcher within
minutes following the shots having been fired in Dealey Plaza, called a squad
car on police channel 1 and requested that the car go to an area lying between
Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital and have a motorcycle officer in that
vicinity turn off his transmitter which was stuck in the transmit position on
channel 1 and was interfering with central police communications on that
channel.
Laying aside the physical and circumstantial items of evidence alluded to above,
the testimony of the experts themselves is somewhat disturbing. When Dr. Barger
first presented to the committee, in executive session, the computer tape
purporting to show three spaced amplitude bursts or groupings, he stated that he
did not know whether or not these groupings represented gunshots and explained
the problems of the volume cutoff point or limitations of transmitters. He
observed that the third or last amplitude grouping on the tape sequence consumed
approximately one and one-half again the time span of each of the earlier two
which puzzled him, but on which he could not express an opinion whatever as to
whether or not it represented the noise of two partially overlapping shots. He
stated that to answer this question it would be necessary to locate the position
of the motorcycle with the offending transmitter at the time of the shots. He
stated that if this could be accomplished, he could then specifically answer the
question as to whether this third burst represented one or two shots.
On this basis, the committee authorized Dr. Barger to conduct live firing tests
in Dealey Plaza. To accomplish this, live ammunition was fired from a
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle from the sixth floor window of the Texas School
Depository aimed at sandbags which approximated the position of the President at
each of the three known shots. A series of microphones with recorders were
spaced at intervals along the parade route as it entered and traversed Dealey
Plaza.
My next information on the results of these tests was when Dr. Barger, some
months later, appeared before the committee in public testimony. He stated then
that he thought the amplitude bursts shown the tape were gunshots (but could not
be certain), and he thought there was a "50-50 chance" that the third and last
burst was either one or two shots. Dr. Barger testified that through his firing
tests he had satisfied himself that he had located the approximate position of
the motorcycle; namely, 120 feet behind the President's limousine. I found
507
the uncertainty of his public testimony very disappointing and at variance with
what I had understood to be the assurance given by him in executive session. I
felt impelled at that time to comment on the record at that time that as a
lawyer, I could not even commence a civil suit based on such vague testimony,
let alone institute criminal proceedings.
The committee, to my knowledge, received no further information on the
acoustical evidence until during the closing weeks of the committee's existence,
Dr. Barger reappeared in conjunction with two colleagues from the faculty of
Queens College, N.Y.; Dr. Mark Weiss and Dr. Ernest Aschkenasy. Dr. Weiss acted
as spokesman for the two and testified that he and his colleagues had accepted
as a "given" the motorcycle's location as established by Dr. Barger in his
Dealey Plaza test. That such data taken together with the other raw data earlier
developed by Dr. Barger was further developed with the use of simple
mathematics; namely, algebra and geometry. This exercise evolved from this same
data, predicated on which Dr. Barger had been unable to arrive at any firm
conclusion, a 95 percent or greater degree of certainty not only that the third
amplitude burst constituted two separate noises but that they were in fact two
shots, high-power supersonic rifle, and that the first of the two was fired from
point on the grassy knoll from a point determined within plus or minus 10 feet.
Dr. Barger then, without reservation endorsed these conclusions and stated that
he concurred in them. All three experts appearing en banc stated in response to
a question I asked that we would not be able to find a qualified acoustics
expert who would disagree with either their conclusions or the degree of
certainty of these conclusions.
In weighing this testimony, laying aside questions of physical or circumstantial
evidence alluded to earlier in these remarks, I find it very difficult to accept
the fact that a gentleman of Dr. Barger's scientific qualifications would have
appeared for public testimony with ample time to review and study the results of
his tests in Dealey Plaza without having applied all of the techniques that a
qualified acoustics expert would or could apply to all of the various data in
his possession; after all, at that time he was under oath giving what was then
his final expert opinion on the matter.
In his testimony, Dr. Weiss said that all of his mathematical computations which
resulted in his positive conclusions were predicated upon the position of the
motorcycle with the stuck transmitter as determined by Dr. Barger in his tests
in Dealey Plaza.
Dr. Weiss when asked, however, as to whether all of his conclusions were then
dependent upon the accuracy of this given location, stated that unless he were
shown an exact replica of Dealey Plaza elsewhere in Dallas that his computations
had confirmed or independently verified the correctness of Dr. Barger's
motorcycle location.
While I am acquainted with "bootstrap" scientific analytical procedure, it would
appear to me that there are far too few, if any, established or verifiable facts
in this entire acoustical scenario to permit the use of bootstrap analysis to
determine or sufficiently verify a given predicate to permit even reasonable
reliability of the conclusions.
Page 508
508
As a committee, we were presented with the expert acoustical testimony which I
have described by three experts who were all in agreement with each other, one
of whom had somewhat inexplicably drastically modified his earlier testimony to
conform with that of the other two on the basis of merely an exercise in simple
mathematics.
The committee did not have the benefit of either a wholly independent consultant
knowledgeable in the science of acoustics or the testimony of a qualified
acoustics expert who disagreed with the expert testimony and conclusions which
were presented (which despite the statement of the acoustics witness that did
appear, I cannot, from long experience, believe are not available or could not
easily be found).
Under the foregoing circumstances and giving due weight to both items of
physical and circumstantial evidence which I deem to be contradictory to the
expert opinions, and what I find to be a less than satisfactory series of
presentations by Dr. Barger, and the unpersuasive conclusions of Dr. Weiss and
his colleague from Queens College I do not accept the acoustical testimony and
the conclusions flowing from it. Instead, I remain persuaded of the accuracy of
my earlier submitted proposed findings of facts and recommendations, a copy of
which for reference I attach hereto.
HAROLD S. SAWYER
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., December 6, 1978.
To: Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Select Committee on Assassinations.
From: Hon. Harold Sawyer.
I am prepared to vote for the following findings of fact:
Kennedy
1. Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin of President Kennedy, firing three
shots from the sixth story window of the School Book Depository. The first shot
missed completely. The second shot (the media dubbed "pristine bullet") entered
the President's back to the right of his spine and below the shoulder line and
emerged at the center base of the neck, the same bullet continued to enter the
right back of Governor Connally traversing his chest, shattering one rib and
emerging approximately one inch below the right nipple, then shattering his
right wrist and coming to rest beneath the skin of his right thigh. This was the
bullet found on the stretcher used to transport Governor Connally at the
hospital. This so-called single bullet theory has been conclusively established
in my opinion by the testimony using still photographs taken at the scene
showing the lateral positions and vertical elevation differential of the
president and Governor Connally in the limousine.
It also was established by the neutron analysis of the bullet fragments and the
estimates of the velocity of the bullet at various points, including its
estimated velocity when it struck Governor Connally's wrist, such velocity being
substantially below its impact distortion level and very substantially above the
velocity impact required to shatter bone.
Page 509
509
The third bullet entered the rear top of the president's head and shattered the
entire right hemisphere of the brain and skull and the several pieces of it were
found in the limousine. No other shots were fired from any other place. The
origin of the shots that struck the president were established conclusively by
the reverse projection from the wounds developed by the NASA expert and the
characteristics of the wounds, including the beveling in the skull wound,
definitely established that both bullets struck from the upper right rear of the
president. The Army film taken in 1948 of the goat shooting episodes
convincingly explained the rearward reaction of the president's head as seen in
the Zapruder film and very convincingly demonstrates that it could not have been
caused by the frontal impact of a bullet, and equally convincingly demonstrates
that it was caused by the convulsion of upper dorsal musculature receiving false
signals from an exploding brain.
2. Oswald acted alone. There is no evidence of any coconspirators. His trip to
Mexico and visit to the Cuban and/or Soviet Embassies were not shown to have any
significance vis-a-vis the assassination and the so-called "mystery man"
photograph was merely the product of compounded mistakes.
3. Oswald was probably stopped by Officer Tippit because of suspicious demeanor
and behavior to which an officer such as Tippit would be extremely sensitive.
The probabilities are that at the tune of his prehension by Tippit, Oswald was
en route to the home of the person identified by the Dallas press as being the
Communist defector or informant who through information provided by the FBI, had
destroyed the Communist Party in Texas, which story appeared on the same page as
the story making reference to the New York lawyer who was defending Communists
in New York and who Oswald requested be retained as his attorney immediately
following his arrest, and which page also contained the announcement and
description of the President's projected visit to Dallas. The home of this
informant was only two short blocks further up the street, on which Oswald was
proceeding when apprehended by Tippit. The fact that Oswald left his wedding
ring in a teacup at the Payne home when he left on the morning of the
assassination would be indicative of a total and determined suicidal effort.
4. Oswald's motive was psychotically proportioned egomania and drive for
recognition and importance.
5. As to agency performance, Oswald's presence in Dallas should have been made
known to the Secret Service and more effective use should have been made of
local police and/or screened volunteers in being present on the floors of such
buildings as the School Book Depository and particularly in such areas as the
so-called grassy knoll which was a perfect sniper location with ready escape
routes.
A further comment on agency performance is in order on the Yuri Nosenko (the KGB
defector) episode. The taking into custody of Mr. Nosenko within the State of
Virginia without resort to a court and only under the most tenuous color of
authority was itself surprising. The then building of a special cell described
as a "vault" by the CIA themselves and holding him there in solitary confinement
subjected to
Page 510
510
continuous mental, psychological, and actual physical torture for a period of
over 3 years would have been absolutely unbelievable had not the CIA themselves
together with its then Director, Richard Helms, fully and in horrible detail
admitted it. Mr. Nosenko was paid off with stipend of about $35,000 per year all
surreptitiously with taxpayers' funds, as opposed to either killing him or
destroying his brain with a drug ministration which were alternatives that were
considered. I believe there is a need for the availability of criminal
prosecution to prevent this intoleralble type conduct by agencies of the U.S.
King
1. James Earl Ray was the lone assassin of Martin Luther King, Jr. He stalked
King for a number of days prior to the assassination.
2. James Earl Ray obtained his financing through participation by him in a
series of bank robberies, the modus operandi of which and his presence at the
times and places, are quite circumstantially persuasive. Raoul was a ficticious
character, and based on the sequence of numerous meetings, was used as a
substitute identity to some degree for one or both of James' two brothers.
3. I do not accept as reliable the testimony of Byers with respect to the
$50,000 offer for the killing of King. I feel this story was totally fabricated
by Byers and when first used by him, some years after the assassination, was
used to "smoke out" the identity of one of his associates as an FBI informant.
It had nothing to do with the assassination.
4. The motivation of James Earl Ray for the assassination was racial hatred and
bias reinforced and made respectable in his mind in part by the COINTEL program
waged publicly (but covertly as to source) by the FBI against King. This, I
believe, reinforced his perception that he would become a national hero with
much of the power structure of the country and particularly the South, would
serve a rewards of various kinds and from various sources in the future for his
deed.
5. I believe that consciously or subconsciously, Ray deliberately dropped the
plastic bag of evidence adjacent to the scene for the purpose of assuring his
identification with the commission of the crime.
6. Ray's trips into Mexico involved smuggling and were unrelated to the
assassination and he had no other assistance in planning, execution, or escape
from the assassination.
7. The testimony of the young man in executive session who claimed he had been
hired to kill James Earl Ray is totally without credibility.
8. Ray's esaped from prison was not planned or executed with the assassination
of King in mind.
9. Ray obtained his Canadian passport by stealing the identification of Canadian
citizens through a methodology he had probably heard described in prison and
with the exercise of no more cunning and ability than the ordinary criminal
would be capable of.
Page 511
511
10. The failure of the Memphis police to institute roadblocks and other
shortcomings of which they have been accused were merely the probable
foreseeable fallout of the much greater concern of destructive rioting and
general civil disobedience that they were immediately faced with upon news of
King's assassination in the city.
11. The behavior of the FBI throughout the extended preassassination period
vis-a-vis King was shocking and unbelievable for an agency the U.S. Government,
and I believe it lent its contribution to the twisted perception of James Earl
Ray that he would become something of a national or at least a regional hero if
he carried out the dictate or inclinations of his racial hatred of King by an
assassination.
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
1. I think any employee of any agency of the United States should be subject to
conviction of a felony carrying a maximum term of 5 years and $10,000 fine if
acting under the color of the authority of his position, he either orders,
carries out, or participates in the carrying out of depriving any person within
the United States of their freedom without due process of law.
2. I believe it should be made a Federal crime carrying a 5 year maximum
sentence and a $10,000 fine for any member of an agency of the Federal
Government to either order, carry out, or participate in the carrying out of any
program designed to discredit, humiliate, or harass any person in the United
States who is not a fugitive from justice.
Page 512
512
(blank page)
Appendix I
Page 513
APPENDIX I. STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE 1
Chief counsel and staff director: G. Robert Blakey.
Administrative assistant: Dawne C. Miller.
Special counsel: I. Charles Mathews.
Secretary: Joyce A. Larkin.
Deputy chief counsel, legal office: James L. Wolf.
Secretary: Caryl M. Emanuel.
Deputy staff director and budget office: Thomas Howarth.
Staff assistants: Elizabeth B. Norris and Anne P. Wilander.
Chief clerk: Elizabeth Berning.
Deputy chief clerk: Olive E. Wagner.
Director of security: Robert C. Morrison.
Assistant director of security:William H. Cross.
Security assistants: Paul Golden and Lance W. Svendsen.
Editorial chief:Richard N. Billings.
Assistants: Paul A. Di Paolo, Robin D. Lindley, and Helen Whitney
Watriss.
Administrative clerical: Nancy P. Schultz and Beverly A. Smith.
Printer: Larry Stickler.
Assistant printer: George R. Stephens.
FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL
Chief counsel and staff director: Richard A. Sprague.
Acting chief counsel and staff director : Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting staff director: Thomas W. Lambeth.
Deputy director/administration:E. M. Hutton, Jr.
Assistant director: Richard J. Feeney.
Deputy chief counsel: Stephen J. Fallis.
Special counsel:Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr.
Counsel/legal office: Jeffrey Facter and Jan R. Schlichtmann.
Legal assistant: Sari Mordano.
Chief clerk: Rebecca W. Martin.
Deputy chief clerk: Marion H. Wills.
Director of security: Francis J. Kelly.
Office managers: Edyth H. Baish and Dorothy R. Tinajero.
Chief researcher:Donovan Gay.
Public information officer: Burton A. Chardak.
Assistant public informat, ion officer: Antoinette "Ty" Roberts.
Editor/historian:Linda M. Connor.
Special assistant: Joan T. Thornell.
Executive assistant: Vivian L. McPherson.
----------------------------
(513)
Page 514
514
Administrative clerical Carol H. Amato, Giulia M. Barrow,
Oliver Champion, Kevin Sean Doyle, Dorothy W. Kuhn, Billie Gay
Larson, Denise L. McCray, Cecelia T. Morton, Mary E.C. Ponder,
Patricia Lynn Price, Miriam Rudder, and Betty Lou Sisson.
Summer interns: John J. Farmer, Jr., Charlotte Green, and Lisa
Saunders.
JOHN F. KENNEDY TASK FORCE
Attorneys
Deputy chief counsel: Gary T. Cornwell.
Assistant deputy chief counsel:Kenneth D. Klein.
Senior staff counsel: S. Jonathan Blackmer, SureIl Brady, Robert W.
Genzman, Michael Goldsmith, Belford L. Lawson III, Leodis C.
Matthews, and Donald A. Purdy, Jr.
Former deputy chief counsel: Robert K. Tanenbaum.
Former counsel: Howard M. Gilbert, John W. Hornbeck, James E.
McDonald, William K. Triplett, and Paul A. Zevnick.
Research attorneys
Research attorneys: Charles M. Berk, Jane Lind Downey, and
Howard Shapiro.
Investigators
Chief investigator: Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.
Staff investigators: Gaeton J. Fonzi, James P. Kelly, Albert Maxwell,
and John J. Moriarty, Jr.
Former investigators: Joseph J. Basteri, William Brown, Robert
C. Buras, Jr., Martin J. Daly, Clarence J. Day, Lawrence J. Delsa,
Albert Gonzales, Kenneth G. Grant, Harold Leap, and Harold
A. Rose.
Researchers
Deputy chief researcher:Jacqueline Hess.
Staff researchers: James Conzelman, Eileen G. Dinneen, Michael
Ewing, T. Mark Flanagan, Jr., Dan L. Hardway, Margo E.
Jackson, Edwin J. Lopez, Patricia M. Orr, Elizabeth J. Palmer,
Johanna L. Smith, Leslie H. Wizelman, and Elizabeth A. Wolf.
Former researchers: Colleen Boland, Margaret. Chellie Mason, Ann
Furnald Taylor, and Kevin Walsh.
Administrative
Office manager:Jane E. Godfrey.
Clerical: Ida Jane Ross, Anne B. Misita, Rebecca A. Rife, and Con-
stance C. Smith.
Former clerical: Sheryl L. Bonifer, Alice E.J. Hamlin, Nancy S.
Jenkins, Lillian B. Johnson, and Rita LaVerna Morton.
Document clerks: Cynthia S. Cooper and Beth Anne Lichtenfels.
MARTIN LUTHER KING TASK FORCE
Attorneys
Deputy chief counsel: Gene R. Johnson.
Assistant deputy chief counsel: Peter G. Beeson.
Senior staff counsel: Ronald Adrine, Jeremy R. Akers, Alan B. Haus-
man, Kenneth S. McHargh, Mark Alan Speiser, and William A.
Webb.
Page 515
515
Former deputy chief counsel: Robert L. Lelmer.
Former assistant deputy chief counsel: Michael C. Eberhardt.
Former staff counsel: Thomas M. Gannon, Cornish F. Hitchcock,
Laura M. Holt, Joseph Kiel, Melvin Kreidman, Terry W. Lazin,
Sheila Jackson Lee, and Robert C. Ozer.
Research attorneys
Research attorneys: Wendy S. Collins, Gale Lynn Oppenberg, and
Thomas W. Sacco.
Former research attorney: Dean B. Webb.
Investigators
Chief investigator: Edward M. Evans.
Staff investigators: Conrad E. Baetz, Jerome A. Cullings, Alfred S.
Hack, Ernestine G. Johnson, Louis Parisi, and Mel Waxman.
Former investigators: James H. Chenoweth, Frank L. Eccles, Dom-
inick K. Giangrasso, Maurice Israel, Floyd Reeves, Elizabeth K.
Selleck, Joseph A. Thomas, Robert J. Walker, and Richard C.
Wrase.
Researchers
Deputy chief researcher: Gerald P. Hamilton.
Staff researchers: Lisa M. Berlow, Mary Susan Grimes, Phoebe C. Orr,
Barbara J. Robinson, and Brenda L. Welburn.
Former researchers: Claire Brown, Judith R. Burford, Ralph C.
Locke, Gina I. Resnick, Marlin Risinger, Merete Muff Rosen, and
Mitchell A. Mars.
Administrative
Office manager: Louis H. Hindle.
Clerical: Beverly Jackson and Barbara L. Mosley.
Former clerical: Yvonne Briggs, Marjorie Eagle, Diana N. Jones,
Elizabeth A. Kilker, and Anne T. Strickland.
Research document analyst: Elizabeth C. Feeley.
Appendix II
Page 516
APPENDIX II:CONSULTANTS TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS
Photo analysis and enhancement
Richard J. Blackwell, B.S., M.S., Jet propulsion Laboratory, Pasa-
denena, Calif.
Thomas N. Canning, B.S., M.S., National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Moffet Field Calif.
David B. Eisendrath, B.A, Consultant in Technical and Scientific
Photography, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Robert J. Groden, freelance photographer, Hopelawn, N.J.
William K. Hartmann, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., Planetary Science Institute,
Tucson, Ariz.
Bobby R. Hunt, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., associate professor, University
of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. chairman Department of Anthropol-
Ellis Kerley, B.S., MS, Ph.D., chairman, Department of Anthropology,
University of Maryland, College Park, M.D.
Sgt. Cecil Kirk, Mobile Crime Laboratory, Metropolitan Police De-
partment, District of Columbia
C.S. McCamy, B.C.E., M.S., vice president, science and technology
Macbeth Division, Kollmorgen Corp., Newburgh, N.Y.
Gerald M. McDonnel, M.D., Department of Radiology, the Hospital
of the Good Samaritan, Los Angeles, Calif.
Everett Merritt, retired scientist in Analytical photogrammetry,
Geodesy and Astrophysics, Ridge, Md.
Paul G. Roetling, B.A, Ph.D., principal scientist, Image processing
Area, Xerox Corp., Rochester, N.Y.
Frank Scott, B.S, M.S., the Perkin-Elmer Corp., West Redding, Conn.
Robert H. Seizer, B.S., M.S., M.A., Jet propulsion Laboratory, Pasa-
dena, Calif.
Bennett Sherman, B.S., M.S.,Consultant on the Optics and Allied Sci-
ences, Elmburst, N.Y.
Philip N. Slater, B.S., Ph.D., professor, Optical Sciences, Univer-
sity of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
Clyde C. Snow, B.S., M.C., Ph D., chief, Physical Anthropology Divi-
sion, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration,
Oklahoma City, Okla.
Richard E. Sprague, B.S.E.E., National Commission on Electronic
Funds Transfer, Washington, D.C.
George W. Stroke, B.S, Ph.D., professor of Medical Biophysics and
Electrical Sciences, State University of New York, Stony Brook,
N.Y.
Jack White, B.A., Witherspoon and Associates, Fort Worth, Tex.
Organized crime
Ralph F. Salerno, consultant and advisor on law enforcement and
organized crime, Woodside, N.Y.
(516)
Page 517
517
Pathology
Michael M. Baden, M.D., chief medical examiner, New York, N.Y.
John I. Coe, M.D., medical examiner, Hennepin County, Minneapolis,
Minn.
Joseph H. Davis, M.D., district medical examiner, Miami, Fla.
George S. Loquvan, M.D., director, Institute of Forensic Sciences,
Oakland, Calif.
Charles S. Petty, M.D., chief medical examiner, Dallas County, Dal-
las, Tex.
Earl F. Rose, M.D., LL.B, professor of pathology, University of Iowa,
Iowa City, Iowa.
Werner U. Spitz, M.D., chief medical examiner, County of Wayne,
Detroit, Mich.
Cyril H. Wecht, .D., J.D., coroner, Allegheny County, Pittsburgh,
Pa.
James T. Weston, M.D., medical investigator and professor of path-
ology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N. Mex.
Firearms
John S. Bates, Jr., firearms examiner, New York State Police, Albany,
N.Y.
Donald E. Champagne, firearms examiner, Florida Department of
Criminal Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, Fla.
Monty C. Lutz, B.S., firearms examiner, State of Wisconsin, New Ber-
lin, Wis.
Andrew M. Newquist, firearms examiner, Iowa Bureau of Criminal
Investigation, Des Moines, Iowa.
Russell M. Wilhelm, firearms examiner, Maryland State Police, Bal-
timore, Md.
George R. Wilson, firearms examiner, Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, Washington, D.C.
Medical illustrations
Ida Dox, B.F.A, Georgetown University Schools of Medicine and
Dentistry, Washington, D.C.
Handwriting analysis
Joseph P. McNally, B.S., M.S, examiner of questioned documents,
Valley Cottage, N.Y.
David J. PurteIl, Ph. B., examiner of questioned documents, Chicago,
Ill.
Charles C. Scott, J.D, examiner of questioned documents, Kansas
City, Mo.
Fingerprint analysis
Ray H. Holbrook, fingerprint specialist, Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, Washington, D.C.
Darrell D. Linville, fingerprint specialist, Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, Washington, D.C.
Vincent J. Scalice, president, .Forensic Control Systems, Inc., New
York, N.Y.
Police procedures
Charles H. Rogovin, B.A, LL.B., visiting professor of law, Temple
University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pa.
Page 518
518
Polygraph testing
Richard O. Arther, B.S., M.A, A.C.P., Certified polygraphist, New
York, N.Y.
Warren D. Holmes, B.S., licensed polygraphist, .Miami, Fla.
Charles R. Jones, B.S., licensed polygraphist, Old Bridge, N.J..
Benjamin F. Malinowski, licensed polygraphist, Savannah, Ga.
Methodology
Gerald Gordon, B.A., M.A.., Ph.D., director, Center for Applied
Social Science, Boston University, Boston, Mass.
Neutron activation
Vincent P. Guinn, A.B., M.S., Ph. D, professor of radiochemistry,
University of California, Irvine, Calif.
Dentistry
Lowell J. Levine, D.D.S, consultant to the chief medical examiner,
New York, N.Y.
Appendix III
Page 519
APPENDIX III: CONTRACTORS FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS
Photo analysis and enhancement
The Aerospace Corp., Los Angeles, Calif.
Drommer & Associates, Dallas, Tex.
Ronald Francis, Ph.D., School of Photographic Sciences, Rochester
Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y.
U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior, Reston, Va.
Robert J. Groden, Slides, Unlimited, freelance photographer, Hope-
lawn, N.J.
Image Processing Institute, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, Calif.
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, University of California, Los
Alamos, N. Mex., Stanford Research Institute International, Menlo
Park, Calif.
Acoustical
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., Cambridge, Mass.
Mark R. Weiss, B.E.E., M.S.; Ernest Aschkenasy, B.E.E., M.S, De-
partment of Computer Sciences, Queens College of the City Uni-
versity of New York, New York, N.Y.
Richard L. Cole, B.A, M.A., Ph.D., department of political science;
John P. Dirkse III, B..S., .M.S., Ph.D., department of statistics,
George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Simulated gun test
Police department, department of street and sanitation services, city
of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.
Engineering survey
Koogle & Pouls Engineering, Inc., Albuquerque, N. Mex.
Other
Walter C. McCrane Associates, Inc., Chicago, Ill.
Clyde C. Snow, Ph.D., Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma
City, Okla.
(519)
Appendix IV
Page 520
APPENDIX IV-STATISTICAL DATA AND EXPENDITURES
(520)
Page 521
521
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
STATITICAL DATA
1977 and 1978
95th CONGRESS
Page 522
522
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
ANALYSIS OF TRAVEL PERFORMED
FOR THE YEAR 1977
Page 523
523
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
ANALYSIS OF TRAVEL PERFORMED
FOR THE YEAR 1978
Page 524
524
NUMBER OF AREAS VISITED/MONTH
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978
Page 525
525
NUMBER OF MAN DAYS TRAVELED/MONTH
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978
Page 526
526
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
ANALYSIS OF CONSULTANTS UNDER CONTRACT
1977 AND 1978
95TH CONGRESS
Page 527
527
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
CONSULTANTS UNDER CONTRACT
FOR THE YEAR 1977
Page 528
528
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
CONSULTANTS UNDER CONTRACT
FOR THE YEAR 1978
Page 529
529
CONSULTANTS UNDER CONTRACT/MONTH
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978
Page 530
530
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS
1977 AND 1978
95th CONGRESS
Page 531
531
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
NUMBER OF STAFF
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978
Page 532
532
NUMBER OF STAFF
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978
Appendix V
Page 533
APPENDIX V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM
The committee made a successful effort to meet its affirmative action goals in
the employment of minority members on its staff. Of the staff attorneys, for
example, 11 of them, 35 'percent of the total, were minority, including a
special counsel, deputy chief counsel, two senior staff attorneys, six staff
attorneys and a research attorney.
Of 27 investigators, 11, or 41 percent, were minority, including two chief
investigators.
Of 29 researchers, seven, or 24 percent, were minority, including one chief
researcher and one deputy chief researcher.
Of 34 administrative or clerical personnel, 11, or 32 percent, were minority.
In summary, of 121 staff members employed during the period of July 1977 to
January 1979, 30, or 33 percent, were minority.
The committee's record in the employment of minority personnel was not achieved
without considerable effort. The recruitment of 11 minority attorneys, for
example, required 67 interviews and 8,000 miles of travel. The committee had to
make these efforts because of a relatively small number of available minority
attorneys who had the required experience, owing in turn to the traditional
educational disadvantage of minority Americans.1 The committee experienced
difficulty in identifying many minority attorneys with criminal investigative
backgrounds. In addition, many who had excellent credentials were reluctant to
take a position of short duration and relatively low salary.
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Appendix VI
Page 534
APPENDIX VI. ENABLING RESOLUTIONS
House Calendar No. 468
94TH CONGRESS
2d Session H. RES. 1540
[Report No. 94-1566]
----------------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 14, 1976
Mr. GONZALEZ (for himself, Mr. DOWNING of Virginia, and Mr. FAUNTROY) submitted
the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules
SEPTEMBER 15, 1976
Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
------------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That there is hereby created a select commit-
2 tee to be composed of twelve Members of the House of Rep-
3 resentatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom
4 he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in
5 the membership of the select committee shall be filled in the
6 same manner in which the original appointment was made.
7 The select committee is authorized and directed to con-
8 duct a full and complete investigation and study of the cir-
9 cumstances surrounding the death of John F. Kennedy and
10 the death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any others
11 the select committee shall determine.
12 For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the select
(534)
Page 535
535
2
1 committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the
2 select committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and
3 act during the present Congress at such times and places
4 within the United States, including any Commonwealth or
5 possession thereof, whether the House is in session, has re-
6 cessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to re-
7 quire, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony
8 of such witnesses and the production of such books, records,
9 correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as it
10 deems necessary; except that neither the select committee
11 nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the House is
12 meeting under the five-minute rule unless special leave to sit
13 shall have been obtained from the House. The chairman of
14 the select committee may establish such subcommittees of the
15 select committee as he considers appropriate. A majority of
16 the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum
17 for the transaction of business, except that the select com-
18 mittee may designate a lesser number as a quorum for the
19 purpose of taking testimony. The select committee may em-
20 ploy and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, con-
21 sultants, technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and
22 stenographic assistants as it considers necessary to carry out
23 the purposes of this resolution. The select committee may re-
24 imburse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence, and
25 other necessary expenses incurred by them in the perform-
Page 536
536
3
1 ance of the duties vested in the select committee, other than
2 expenses in connection with meetings of the select commit-
3 tee or any subcommittee thereof held in the District of
4 Columbia. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of
5 the chairman of the select committee or any member of the
6 select committee designated by him, and may be served by
7 any person designated by such chairman or member.
8 The select committee shall report to the House as soon
9 as practicable during the present Congress the results of its
10 investigation and study, together with such recommendations
11 as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when
12 the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of
13 the House.
Page 537
537
94th CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ( REPORT
2d Session ) (No. 94-1566
========================================================
CREATING A SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE DEATH OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JUNIOR, AND OF ANY OTHERS THE SELECT COMMITTEE SHALL DETERMINE
----------------------
SEPTEMBER 15, 1976.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
---------------
Mr. MADDEN, from the Committee on Rules,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H. Res. 1540]
The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House Resolution 1540, by
a record vote of 9 yeas, 4 nays. and 1 voting "present," report the same to the
House wIth the recommendation that the resolution do pass.
SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS
H. Res. 1540 provides for a select committee to be composed of 12 members to be
appointed by the Speaker. The select committee is directed to conduct a full and
complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the death of
John F. Kennedy and the death of Martin Luther King, Junior and of and others
the select committee shall determine.
II. Res. 1540 provides that the select committee is authorized to sit and meet
throughout the remainder of the 94th Congress whether or not the House is in
session and also provides that the select committee shall have subpoena power.
H. Res. 1540 provides that the Chairman of the select committee may establish
such subcommittees as he considers appropriate and that the select committee may
designate a lesser number than a majority as a quorum for the purpose of taking
testimony.
H. Res. 1540 provides that the select committee may employ and fix the
compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants. technicians, attorneys,
investigators, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it considers
necessary to carry out the purposes of this resolution, that the select
committee may reimburse its staff members for travel and other necessary
expenses and that the select committee shall report to the House the results of
its investigation and study together with such recommendations as it deems
advisable.
Page 538
538
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMITTEE ACTION
The Committee on Rules held one day of hearings on similar resolutions on March
31, 1976. The Committee ordered reported H. Res. 1540 by a record vote of 9 yeas
and 4 nays and 1 "present" on September 15, 1976.
STATEMENT UNDER CLAUSE 2 AND CLAUSE 2(1)(3)(4) OF RULE XI OF THE
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A. Oversight statement
The Committee made no special oversight findings on this resolution.
B. Budget statement
No budget statement is submitted.
C. Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office
No estimate or comparison was received from the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office as referred to in subdivision (C) of Clause 2 (1) (3) of the House
Rule XI.
D. Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Operations
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Operations were
received as referred to in subsection (d) of clause 2(1) (3) of House Rule XI.
Page 539
539
Funding
House Calendar No. 493
94TH CONGRESS H.RES. 1557
2D SESSION
[Report No. 94-1685]
----------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 21, 1976
Mr. DOWNING of Virginia submitted the following resolution; which was referred
to the Committee on House Administration
SEPTEMBER 24, 1976
Reported with an amendment, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered
to be printed
[Strike out all after the word "Resolved," and insert the part printed in
italic].
-----------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That (effective September 17, 1976) ex-
2 penses of investigatinos and studies to be conducted by the
3 Select Committee on Assassinations, acting as a whole or by
4 subcommittee, not to exceed $207,500, including expendi-
5 tures for the employment of investigators, attorneys, and
6 clerical and other assistants, and for the procurement of
7 services of individual consultants or organizations thereof
8 pursuant to section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization
9 Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)), shall be paid
10 out of the contingent fund of the House on vouchers author
11 ized by such committee, signed by the chairman of such com-
12 mittee, and approved by the Committee on House Admin-
V
Page 540
540
2
1 istration. Not to exceed $30,000 of the total amount pro-
2 vided by this resolution may be used to precure the tem-
3 porary or intermittent services of individual consultants or
4 organizations thereof pursuant to section 202(i) of the Leg-
5 islative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C.
6 72a(i)); but this monetary limitation on the procurement
7 of such services shall not prevent the use of such funds for
8 any other authorized purpose.
9 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
10 tion shall be availble for expenditure in connection with the
11 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi-
12 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
13 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas-
14 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra-
15 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
16 intended to be financed from such funds.
17 SEC. 3. Funds authorized by this resolutino shall be
18 expended prsuant to regulations established by the Com-
19 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
20 law.
21 That (effective September 17, 1976) expenses of invistiga-
22 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on
23 Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, not to
23 exceed $150,000, including expenditures for the employment
Page 541
541
3
1 of investigators, attorneys, and clerical and other assistants,
2 and for the procurement of services of individual consultants
3 or organizations thereof pursuant to section 202(i) of the
4 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2
5 U.S.C. 72a(i) ), shall be paid out of the contingent fund of
6 the House on vouchers authorized by such committee, signed
7 by the chairman of such committee, and approved by the
8 Committee on House Administration. Not to exceed $30,000
9 of the total amount provided by this resolution may be used to
10 procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual
11 consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to section 202
12 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as
13 amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i) ); but this monetary limitation of
14 the procurement of such services shall no prevent the use of
15 such funds for any other authorized purpose.
16 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resol-
17 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
18 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi-
19 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
20 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assassi-
21 nations shall furnish the Committee on House Administration
22 information with respect to any study or investigation in-
23 tended to be financed from such funds.
Page 542
542
4
1 SEC. 3. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
2 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com-
3 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
4 law.
Page 543
543
95th CONGRESS H. RES. 9
1st Session
------------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 4, 1977
Mr. Wright submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Rules
----------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That, effective January 3, 1977, there is
2 hereby created a Select Committee on Assassinations to be
3 composed of twelve Members and Delegates of the House of
4 Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of
5 whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occur-
6 ring in the membership of the select committee shall be filled
7 in the same manner in which the original appiontment was
8 made.
9 The select committee or a subcommittee thereof is
10 authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete in-
11 vestigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the
12 assassination, murder, homicide, and death of President John
V
Page 544
544
2
1 F. Kennedy and the assassination, murder, homicide, and
2 death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any other per-
3 sons the select committee shall determine in order to ascer-
4 tain whether the existing laws of the United States, in-
5 cluding but not limited to laws relating to the safety and
6 protection of the President of the United States, assassi-
7 nations of the President of the United States, deprivation
8 of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as well as
9 the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and
10 departments of the United States Government, are adequate,
11 either in their provisions or in the manner of their enforce-
12 ment; and shall make recommendations to the House, if
13 the select committee deems it appropriate, for the amend-
14 ment of existing legislation or the enactment of new
15 legislation.
16 For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the select
17 committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the
18 select committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and
19 act during the present Congress at such times and places
20 within the United States, including any Commonwealth
21 or possession thereof, or in any other country, whether the
22 House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold
23 such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the
24 attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the produc-
25 tion of such hooks, records, correspondence, memorandums,
Page 545
545
3
1 papers, and documents as it deems necessary; to take testi-
2 mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any
3 other country and to authorize designated counsel for the
4 select committee to obtain statements from any witness who
5 is placed under oath by an authority who is authorized to ad-
6 minister oaths in accordance with the applicable laws of the
7 United States or of any State; except that neither the select
8 committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the
9 House is reading a measure for amendment under the five-
10 minute rule unless special leave to sit shall have been ob-
11 tained from the House. The chairman of the select commit-
12 tee may establish such subcommittees of the select committee
13 as he considers appropriate. One-third of the Members of the
14 select committee shall constitute a quorum for the trans-
15 action of business as permitted by the rules of the House,
16 except that the select committee may designate a lesser
17 number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony,
18 but not less than two. The select committee may employ
19 and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants,
20 technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and steno-
21 graphic assistants as it considers necessary to carry out the
22 purposes of this resolution. The select committee may reim-
23 burse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence, and
24 other necessary expenses incurred by them in the perform-
25 ance of the duties vested in the select committee, other than
Page 546
546
4
1 expenses in connection with meetings of the select commit-
2 tee or any subcommittee thereof held in the District of
3 Columbia.
4 Subpoenas may be authorized by the select committee,
5 or any subcommittee thereof, or the chairman of the select
6 committee, and issued under the signature of the chairman
7 of the select committee or any member of the select commit-
8 tee designated by him, and may he served by any persons
9 designated by such chairman or member.
10 The select committee shall be considered a committee of
11 the House of Representatives for all purposes of law, includ-
12 ing but not limited to section 102 of the Revised Statutes of
13 the United States (2 U.S.C- 1921; and sections 6002 and
14 6005 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of
15 Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses,
16 The-select committee shall adopt written rules govern-
17 ing its procedures, which rules shall not be inconsistent with
18 this resolution and the Rules of the House of Representatives.
19 The select committee shall report to the House as soon
20 as practicable during the present Congress the results of its
21 investigation and study, together with such recommendations
22 as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when
23 the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of
24 the House.
Page 547
547
95th CONGRESS H. RES. 11
1st SESSION
------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1977
Mr. THOMPSON submitted the following resolution; which was considered
and agreed to
-------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That (a) there shall be paid out of the con-
2 tingent fund of the House of Representatives, in accord-
3 ance with subsection (b), for the period beginning Janu-
4 ary 3, 1977, and ending at the close of March 31, 1977,
5 such sums as may be necessary for the continuance of the
6 same necessary projects, activities, operations, and services,
7 by contract or otherwise (including payment of staff salaries
8 for services performed), and for the accomplishment of the
9 same necessary purposes, undertaken in calendar year 1976
10 by each standing or select committee established in the Rules
11 of the House of Representatives.
12 (b) Each standing committee or select committee re-
13 ferred to in subsection (a) shall be entitled, for each month
Page 548
548
2
1 or portion of a month occurring during the period specified
2 in subsection (a), to payments out of the contingent fund
3 of the House of Representatives in amounts equal to one-
4 twelfth of the total amount authorized for use by the stand-
5 committee or select committee involved during calendar
6 year 1976.
7 SEC. 2. (a) In the case of any select committee of the
8 House of Representatives which--
9 (1) was established by resolution during the
10 Ninety-fourth Congress;
11 (2) did not complete the functions assigned to it by
12 such resolution, or any subsequent resolution, before the
13 close of the Ninety-fourth Congress; and
14 (3) is reestablished by resolution during the
15 Ninety-fifth Congress before the close of March 31,
16 1977, to carry out functions substantially similar to func-
17 tions assigned to such select committee during the
18 Ninety-fourth Congress;
19 such select committee shall be entitled, for each month or
20 portion of a month occurring during the period beginning on
21 the effective date of the resolution reestablishing such select
22 committee and ending at the close of March 31, 1977, to
23 payments out of the contingent fund of the House of Rep-
24 resentatives, for the expenses and purposes specified in
Page 549
549
3
1 subsection (a) of the first section of this resolution, in
2 amounts equal to the greater of-
3 (A) one-twelfth of the amount determined under
4 subsection (b); or
5 (B) the total amount of expenditures made by the
6 select committee involved during December 1976;
7 except that the entitlement of such select committee for the
8 month during which such select committee is reestablished
9 shall be prorated based upon that portion of such month
10 during which such select committee is in existence.
11 (b) The amount which shah be the basis for an entitle-
12 ment under subsection (a) shall be the amount which bears
13 the same ratio to the total amount authorized for use by the
14 select committee involved during calendar year 1976 as 12
15 months bears to the number of months during which such
16 select committee was in existence during such year. For
17 purposes of the preceding sentence, any portion of a month
18 in calendar year 1976 which is 15 days or more and during
19 which any such select committee was in existence shall be
20 considered to be a complete month.
21 SEC. 3. The entitlement of any standing committee or
22 select committee of the House of Representatives to pay-
23 ments out of the contingent fund of the House of Repre-
24 sentatives pursuant to the provisions of this resolution shall
Page 550
550
4
1 cease to be effective on the effective date of the primary
2 expense resolution adopted with respect to the standing
3 committee or select committee involved.
4 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
5 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com-
6 mittee on House Administration in accordance with law.
Page 551
551
H. Res. 222
In the House of Representatives, U.S.,
February 2, 1977.
Resolved, That effective January 3, 2977, and until March 31, 1977, there is
hereby created a Select Committee on Assassinations to be composed of twelve
Members and Delegates of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in
the membership of the select committee shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
The select committee or a subcommittee thereof is authorized and directed to
conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances
surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy and the
assassination and death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any other persons
the select committee shall determine might be related to either death in order
to ascertain (1) whether the existing laws of the United States, including but
not limited to laws relating to the safety and protection of the President of
the United States, assassinations of the President of the United States,
deprivation of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as well
Page 552
552
2
as the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments of
the United States Government, are adequate, either in their provisions or in the
manner of their enforcement; and (2) whether there was full disclosure and
sharing of information and evidence among agencies and departments of the United
States Government during the course of all prior investigations into those
deaths; and whether any evidence or information which was not in the possession
of any agency or department of the United States Government investigating either
death would have been of assistance to that agency or department, and why such
information was not provided to or collected by the appropriate agency or
department; and shall make recomendations to the House, if the select committee
deems it appropriate, for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment
of new legislation.
For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the select committee, or any
subcommittee thereof authorized by the select committee to hold hearings, is
authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places
within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or
in any other country, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has
adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpena or otherwise, the
attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence,
Page 553
553
3
memoranda, papers, documents, tangible objects, and other things of any kind as
it deems necessary; to take testimony on oath-anywhere within the United States
or in any other country and to authorize designated counsel for the select
committee to obtain statements from any witness who is placed under oath by an
authority who is authorized to administer oaths in accordance with the
applicable laws of the United States or of any State; except that neither the
select committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the House is reading
a measure for amendment under the five-minute rule unless special leave to sit
shall have been obtained from the House. The chairman of the select committee
may establish such subcommittees of the select committee as he considers
appropriate. One-third of the members of the select committee shall constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business as permitted by the rules of the House,
except that the select committee may designate a lesser number as a quorum for
the purpose of taking testimony, but not less than two. The select committee may
employ and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants,
technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and stenographic assistants
as it considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this resolution. The
select committee may reimburse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence,
and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties
vested in the select committee,
Page 554
554
4
other than expenses in connection with meetings of the select committee or any
subcommittee thereof, held in the District of Columbia.
The procedure for the select committee or any subcommittee to authorize and
issue a subpena shall be that provided for in clause 2 (m) (2) (A) of rule XI of
the Rules of the House of Representatives. Subpenas may be served by any persons
designated by the chairman or any member.
The select committee shall be considered a committee of the House of
Representatives for all purposes of law, including but not limited to section
102 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192); and sections
6002 and 6005 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress
regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses, except that the select
committee shall not be considered a standing committee of the House of
Representatives for the purpose of Clause 6 (a) and Clause 6(b) of Rule X][ of
the Rules of the House of Representatives.
The select committee shah adopt the Rules of the House of Representatives as
part of the rules governing its procedures. It shall adopt additional written
rules governing its procedures, which rules shall-not-be inconsistent with this
resolution or the Rules of the House of Representatives, and which rules shall
be public.
Page 555
555
5
The select committee shall report to the House as soon as practicable during the
present Congress, but not later than March 31, 1977, the results of its
investigation and study, together with such recommendations as it deems
advisable. Any such report which is made when the House is not in session shall
be filed with the Clerk of the House.
The provisions of H. Res. 11, Ninety-fifth Congress, shall apply to the select
committee.
Attest:
Clerk.
Page 556
556
H. Res. 433
In the House of Representatives, U.S.,
March 30, 1977.
Resolved, That the Select Committee On Assassinations (hereinafter referred to
in this resolution as the "select committee"), established by H. Res. 222,
Ninety-fifth Congress, adopted February 2, 1977, shall continue in operation for
the duration of the Ninety-fifth Congress.
SEC. 2. The select committee shall report to the House as soon as practicable
during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together
with such recommendations as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made
when the House is not in session shah be filed with the Clerk of the House.
SEC. 3. The provisions of H. Res. 222, Ninety-fifth Congress, adopted February
2, 1977, shall apply to the select committee during the period of its operation
under this resolution, except to the extent such provisions are inconsistent
with any provision of this resolution.
Page 557
557
2
SEC. 4. The provisions of clause 6 (a)(3) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives shall apply to the select committee.
Attest:
Clerk.
Page 558
558
House Calendar No. 79
95th CONGRESS
1st SESSION H. RES. 465
[Report No. 95-223]
--------------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 31, 1977
Mr. STOKES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on House Administration
April 26, 1977
Reported with an amendment, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered
to be printed
[Strike out all after the word "Resolved," and insert the part printed in
italic]
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That, effective January 3, 1977, the expenses
2 of investigations and studies to be conducted by the Select
3 Committee on Assassination, acting as a whole or by sub-
4 committee, not to exceed $2,796,650, including expenditures
5 for the employment of investigators, attorneys, and clerical,
6 and other assistants, and for the procurement of services of
7 individual consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to
8 section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
9 1946 , as amended (2 U.S.C. 72a (i), shall be paid out of
10 the contingent fund of the House on vouches authorized
11 by such committee, signed by the chairman of such com-
12 mittee, and approved by the Committee on House Adminis-
V
Page 559
559
2
1 tration. Not to exceed $ 108,750 of the total amount pro-
2 vided by this resolution may be used to procure the tem-
3 porary or intermittent services of individual consultants or
4 organizations thereof pursuant to section 202(i) of the Leg-
5 islative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C.
6 72a (i)); but this monetary limitation of the procurement
7 of such services shall not prevent the use of such funds for
8 any other authorized purpose.
9 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
10 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
11 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi-
12 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
13 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas-
14 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra-
15 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
16 intended to be financed from such funds.
17 SEC. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution shall
18 expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1978.
19 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
20 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com-
21 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
22 law.
23 That, effective January 3, 1977, the expenses of investiga-
24 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee
25 on Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee,
Page 560
560
3
1 not to exceed $2,514,400, including expenditures for the
2 employment of investigators, attorneys, and clerical, and
3 other assistants, and for the procurement of services of in-
4 dividual consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to
5 section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
6 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i) ), shall be paid out
7 of the contingent fund of the House on vouchers authorized
8 by such committee, signed by the chairman of such com-
9 mittee, and approved by the Committee on House Adminis-
10 tration. Not to exceed $108,750 of the total amount pro-
11 vided by this resolution may be used to procure the tem-
12 porary or intermittent services of individual consultants or
13 organizations thereof pursuant to section 202(i) of the Leg-
14 islative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C.
15 72a(i)); but this monetary limitation of the procurement
16 of such services shall not prevent the use of such funds for
17 any other authorized purpose.
18 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
19 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
20 study of investigation of any subject which is being investi-
21 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
22 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas-
23 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra-
24 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
25 intended to be finished from such funds.
Page 561
561
4
1 SEC. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution shall
2 expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1978.
3 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
4 expended pursuant to regualations established by the Com-
5 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
6 law.
Page 562
562
HOUSE CALENDAR NO. 171
95th CONGRESS
1st Session H. RES. 760
[Report No. 95-606]
---------------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 13, 1977
Mr. STOKES (for himself, Mr. PREYER, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mrs. BRUCE of California Mr.
DODD, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. FITHIAN, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. DEVINE, Mr. McKINNEY,
Mr. THONE, and Mr. SAWYER) submitted the following resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Rules.
September 16, 1977
Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
----------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That for the purpose of carrying out H. Res.
2 222, Ninety-fifth Congress, when authorized by a majority
3 of the committee or subcommittee members voting, a ma-
4 jority being present, the Select Committee on Assassinations,
5 or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to make applica-
6 tions to courts; and to bring and defend lawsuits arising out
7 of subpenas, orders immunizing witnesses and compelling
8 them to testify, testimony or the production of evidence,
9 and the failure to testify or produce evidence.
V
Page 563
563
HOUSE CALENDAR NO. 206
95th CONGRESS
1st Session H. RES. 879
[Report No. 95-786]
---------------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
October 27, 1977
Mr. THOMPSON submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on House Administration
November 1, 1977
Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
---------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That, (a) there shall be paid out of the
2 contingent fund of the House of Representatives, in accord-
3 ance with subsection (b), for the period beginning January
4 3, 1978, and ending at the close of March 31, 1978, such
5 sums as may be necessary for the continuance of necessary
6 projects, activities, operations, and services, by contract or
7 otherwise, including payment of staff salaries for services
8 performed by each standing or select committee established
9 in the Rules of the House of Representatives.
10 (b) Each standing committee or select committee
11 referred to in subsection (a) shall be entitled, for each
12 month or portion of a month occuring during the period
V--O
Page 564
564
2
1 specified in subsection (a), to payments out of the contin-
2 gent fund of the House of Representatives in amounts equal
3 to one-twelfth of the total amount authorized for use by the
4 standing committee or select committee involved during the
5 first session of the Ninety-fifth Congress.
6 SEC. 2. (a) In the case of any select committee of
7 the House of Representatives which-
8 (1) was established or reestablished by resolution
9 during the first session of the Ninety-fifth Congress; and
10 (2) did not complete the functions assigned to it
11 by such resolution, or any subsequent resolution, before
12 the close of the first session of the Ninety-fifth Congress;
13 such select committee shall be entitled, for each month
14 during the period January 3, 1978, and ending at the close
15 of March 31, 1978, to payments out of the contingent fund
16 of the House of Representatives, for the expenses and pur-
17 poses specified in subsection (a) of the first section of this
18 resolution, in amounts equal to-
19 (A) one-twelfth of the amount determined under
20 subsection (b); or
21 (B) the total amount of expenditures made by
22 the select committee involved during December 1977;
23 except that the entitlement of such select committee for
24 the month during which such select committee is restab-
Page 565
565
3
1 lished shall be prorated based upon that portion of such
2 month during which such select committee is in existence.
3 (b) The amount which shall be the basis for an entitle-
4 ment under subsection (a) shall be the amount which bears
5 the same ratio to the total amount authorized for use by the
6 select committee involved during the first session of the
7 Ninety-fifth Congress as twelve months bears to the number
8 of months during which such select committee was in exist-
9 ence during such session. For purposes of the preceding sen-
10 tence, any portion of a month in calendar year 1977 which
11 is fifteen days or more and during which any such select
12 committee was in existence shall be considered to be a
13 complete month.
14 SEC. 3. The entitlement of any standing committee or
15 select committee of the House of Representatives to pay-
16 ments out of the contingent fund of the House of Representa-
17 tives pursuant to the provisions of this resolution shall cease
18 to be effective on the effective date of the primary expense
19 resolution adopted with respect to the standing committee or
20 select committee involved.
21 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
22 expended pursuant to regualations established by the Commit-
23 tee on House Administration in accordance with law.
Page 566
566
95th CONGRESS
2d Session H.RES. 1276
--------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 18, 1978
Mr. STOKES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on House Administration
----------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That for the further expenses of investigations
2 and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on
3 Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, not to
4 exceed $790,000, including expenditures for employment of
5 investigators, attorneys, and clerical, and other assistants,
6 shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House on
7 vouchers authorized by such committee, signed by the chair-
8 man of such committee, and approved by the Committee on
9 House Administration.
10 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
11 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
12 study or investigation of any subject which is being inves-
V
Page 567
567
2
1 tigated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
2 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas-
3 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra-
4 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
5 intended to be financed from such funds.
6 SEC. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution
7 shall expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1979.
8 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
9 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com-
10 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
11 law.
Page 568
568
HOUSE CALENDAR NO. 250
95th CONGRESS
2d Session H. RES. 956
[Report No. 95-898]
------------------------------
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 19, 1978
Mr. STOKES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on House Administration
February 23, 1978
Reported with an amendment, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to
be printed
[Strike out all after "Resolved," and insert the part printed in italic]
-------------------------------------------
RESOLUTION
1 Resolved, That, effective January 3, 1978, the expenses
2 of investigations and studies to be conducted by the Select
3 Committee on Assassinations, acting as a whole or by sub-
4 committee, not to exceed $2,978,000, including expendi-
5 tures for the emploment of investigators, attorneys, and
6 clerical and other assistants, and for the procurement of
7 services of individual consultants or organizations thereof
8 pursuant to section 202(i) of Legislative Reorganization
9 Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)), shall be paid
10 out of the contingent fund of the House on vouchers au-
11 thorized by such committee, signed by the chairman of such
12 committee, and approved by the Committee on House Ad-
V
Page 569
569
2
1 ministration. Not to exceed $132,000 of the total amount
2 provided by this resolution may be used to procure the tem-
3 porary or intermittent services of individual consultants or
4 organiazations thereof pursuant to section 202(i) of the Leg-
5 islative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C.
6 72a (i)); but this monetary limitation of the procurement
7 of such services shall not prevent the use of such funds for
8 any other authorized purposes.
9 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
10 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
11 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi-
12 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
13 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas-
14 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra-
15 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
16 intended to be financed from such funds.
17 SEC. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution
18 shall expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1979.
19 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
20 expended pursuant to regulations established by he Com-
21 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing
22 law.
23 That, effective January 3, 1978, the expenses of investiga-
24 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on
25 Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, not to
Page 570
570
3
1 exceed $2,500,000, including expenditures for the employ-
2 ment of investigators, attorneys, and clerical and other as-
3 sistants, and for the procurement of services of individual
4 consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to section
5 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as
6 amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)), shall be paid out of the con-
7 tingent fund of the House on vouchers authorized by such
8 committee, signed by the chairman of such committee, and
9 approved by the Committee on House Administration. Not to-
10 exceed $132,000 of the total amount provided by this reso-
11 lution may be used to procure the temporary or intermittent
12 services of individual consultants or organizations thereof
13 pursuant to section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization
14 Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)); but this mone-
15 tary limitation of the procurement of such services shall not
16 prevent the use of such funds for any other authorized
17 purposes.
18 SEC. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu-
19 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the
20 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi-
21 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the
22 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Administra-
23 tion information with respect to any study or investigation
25 intended to be financed from such funds.
Page 571
571
4
1 SEC. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution
2 shall expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1979.
3 SEC. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be
4 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com-
5 mittee on house Administration in accordance with existing
6 law.
Page 572
572
(blank page)
Appendix VII
Page 573
APPENDIX VII: INDEX FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
Public Hearings of the Committee
Page 573
A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
(1978) Volume/Page
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Statements by members of the committee:
Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes: Issues in the Investigation
---------------------- 9-6 I-1
Opening Statement by Representative Richardson Preyer
------------------------------- 9-6 I-3
Statement of Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Cooperation Received by the
9-18 III-193
Committee on its Trip to Cuba.
Statement by Representative Richard Preyer Concerning Activities of the Central
9-22 IV-250
Intelligence Agency.
Opening Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Possibility of
Conspiracy-9-25 IV-251
Special Acknowledgment by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Dallas Police
9-26 IV-607
Department.
Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Hearings and Investigation
9-28 V-486
into the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Closing Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes
-------------------------------------------------- 12-29 V-697
2. Narrations by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director:
President Kennedy's Decision To Visit Dallas
------------------------------------------ 9-6 I-5
Testimony by Critics: Robert Groden
--------------------------------------------------- 9-6 I-61
The Autopsy of President Kennedy
----------------------------------------------------- 9-7 I-141
Analysis of the Kennedy X-Rays
--------------------------------------------------------- 9-7 I-148
Introduction of Capt. James J. Humes, M.D.
------------------------------------------- 9-7 I-323
Introduction of Dr. Cyril H. Wecht
------------------------------------------------------- 9-7 I-332
Introduction of Dr. Charles S. Petty
------------------------------------------------------ 9-8 I-375
Analysis of the Wound Ballistics Evidence
---------------------------------------------- 9-8 I-381
Analysis of the Forensic Firearms Evidence
--------------------------------------------- 9-8 I-442
Neutrons Activation Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------- 9-8 I-489
Number of Shots: Startle Reaction Analysis
--------------------------------------------- 9-11 II-2
Acoustics Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-11
II-16
Bullet Trajectory Analysis
---------------------------------------------------------------- 9-12 II-139
Marina Oswald Porter
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-13/14
II-205
Authenticity of the Backyard Photographs
--------------------------------------------- 9-14 II-319
Other Analysis of the Backyard Photographs
------------------------------------------ 9-14 II-347
Photographic Analysis
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-14
II-348
Yuri Nosenko
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-15 II-436
Oswald: Cuba and Mexico
----------------------------------------------------------------- 9-18 III-1
Interview with President Fidel Castro
---------------------------------------------------- 9-19 III-195
Elena Garro Paz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-19 III-285
Performance of the Secret Service
---------------------------------------------------------- 9-19 III-319
Investigation by the FBI
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-19
III-457
The FBI's Performance in the Oswald Security Case
------------------------------------ 9-20 III-512
Performance of the Warren Commission
--------------------------------------------------- 9-21 III-559
Performance of the CIA
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-22 IV-1
Anthropological Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-25 IV-365
Gunmen in Dealey Plaza: Photographic Analysis
-------------------------------------- 9-25 IV-386
The Umbrella Man
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-25 IV-429
Conspiracy Theories
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-26
IV-469
Earl Ruby
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-26 IV-539
Lewis J. McWillie
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-27 V-1
Jack Ruby Associates
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-27
V-240
Acoustics Analysis-The Fourth Shot
----------------------------------------------------- 12-29 V-499
Dallas Police Department Tape
----------------------------------------------------------- 12-29 V-553
Firing Time of a Mannlicher-Carcano Rifle
-------------------------------------------- 12-29 V-617
Closing Comments
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12-29
V-690
3. Witnesses:*
Aleman, Jose
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-27 V-301
Aschkenasy, Ernest (vii)
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 12-29 V-555
Azcue Lopez, Eusebio
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-18
III-126
Baden, Dr. Michael (ii)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-7
I-180
Barger, Dr. James E.(vii)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-11 II-17
Bates, John S., Jr.(iii)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-8
I-444
Canning, Thomas(i)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-12
II-154
Champagne, Donald E.(iii)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-8 I-444
Connally, Governor John B
------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-6 I-11
Connally, Mrs. John B
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-6
I-11
Cooper, Senator John Sherman
------------------------------------------------------------- 9-21 III-561
Dox, Ida
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-7 I-146
Ford, President Gerald R
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-21
III-561
Gale, James H
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-20 III-513
Green, Dr. David (vii)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-11
II-111
Griffin, Judge Burt W. (xi)
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-28 V-471
*See footnote at the end of table, p.574.
(573)
Page 574
574
A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE--Continued
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
(1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Witnesses:*--Continued
Groden,
Robert(i)--------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-6 I-62
Guinn, Dr. Vincent
P---------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-8
I-491
Hart,
John-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-15 II-487
Hartmann, Dr.
William(i)----------------------------------------------------------------- 9-11
II-4
Helms, Richard
M------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-22
IV-5
Hess,
Jacqueline---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-25 IV-454
Humes, Capt. James J.,
M.D.(ii)-------------------------------------------------------- 9-7 I-323
Hunt, Dr. Bob
R.(i)-----------------------------------------------------------------------
9-25 IV-387
Katzenbach, Nicholas
deB--------------------------------------------------------------- 9-21 III-642
Kelley, Insp.
Thomas-------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-19
III-323
Kirk, Sergeant Cecil
W.(i)--------------------------------------------------------------- 9-14/15
II-349
9-25 IV-362
Levine, Dr.
Lowell(ii)--------------------------------------------------------------------
9-7 I-149
Lutz, Monty
C.(iii)----------------------------------------------------------------------
9-8 I-444
McCaghren,
Paul-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-11 II-107
McCamy, Calvin
S.(i)-------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-7
I-149
9-12 II-142
9-14/15 II-349
McCloy, John
J---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-21 III-599
McClain,
H.B.(iii)-------------------------------------------------------------12-29
V-617
McNally, Joseph
P----------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-14
II-372
9-25 IV-254
McWillie, Lewis
J------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-27
V-2
Malley, James
R---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-20 III-462
Mirabal Diaz,
Alfredo-------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-18
III-173
Newquist, Andrew
M.(iii)--------------------------------------------------------------- 9-8 I-444
Petty, Dr. Charles
S.(ii)------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-8
I-375
Porter, Marina
Oswald(xviii)------------------------------------------------------------
9-13/14 II-206
Rankin, J.
Lee(xi)--------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-21 III-612
Revill, Capt.
Jack--------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-26 IV-568
Rowley, James
J---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-19 III-356
Ruby,
Earl----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-26 IV-500
Salerno,
Ralph(viii)------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-28 V-378
Snow, Dr. Clyde
Collins(i)--------------------------------------------------------------- 9-25
IV-367
Sturdivan,
Larry----------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-8 I-383
Trafficante,
Santos-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-28 V-346
Wecht, Dr. Cyril
H.(ii)-------------------------------------------------------------------- 9-7
I-332
Weiss,
Mark(viii)--------------------------------------------------------------------------
12-29 V-555
White, Jack
D.(i)---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-14 II-322
Witt, Louie
Steven-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-25 IV-429
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibits John F. Kennedy Public Hearings
Page 574
B. EXHIBITS1--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-1*--------Deposition of Nosenko
5/30/78------------------------------------------- 6/19
F-2*--------Visa application of Lee Harvey Oswald 12/29/59----------------------
6/20
F-3*--------Articles "New York Times" dated 9/5/59, Dateline Moscow---------
6/20
F-4*--------Medical Records of Lee Harvey Oswald, Russian Hospital-----------
6/20
F-5*--------FBI Report of Yuri Nosenko dated
3/5/64------------------------------- 6/20
F-6*--------Transcript of Nosenko testimony to CIA dated
7/3/64------------------- 6/20
F-7*--------Tape Recording (2 reels) dated 7/3/64 and
7/27/64---------------------- 6/20
F-8---------Film of
Motorcade-------------------------------------------------------- 9/6 I-39
F-9---------Map of Dallas showing motorcade
route---------------------------------- 9/6 I-37
F-10A-----Aerial views of Dealey
Plaza------------------------------------------------- 9/6 I-38
F-10B-----Aerial views of Dealey
Plaza------------------------------------------------- 9/6 I-38
F-11-------Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. 9/6 I-34
Connally in Fort Worth
F-12-------Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. 9/6 I-35
Connally at the Dallas airport.
F-13-------Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. 9/6 I-36
Connally in the motorcade.
F-15-------Aerial view of Dealey
Plaza------------------------------------------------ 9/6 I-38
F-16-------Not used.
F-17-------Article, "Kennedy to Visit Texas
11/21-22"---------------------------------- 9/6 I-20
F-19-------List of materials examined by the
doctors------------------------------------- 9/7 I-182
F-20-------Drawing showing back entrance of wound of President John F.
Kennedy------9/7 I-186
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 575
575
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-21------Photograph of the back entrance
wound---------------------------------------------9/7 I-187
F-22------Photograph of portion of back wound photograph
--------------------------------9/7 I-188
F-23------Diagram of principle of abrasion collar perpindicular
entry-----------------------9/7 I-190
F-24------Diagram of principle of abrasion collar--angular
entry-----------------------------9/7 I-191
F-25------President Kennedy's
shirt--------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-193
F-26------President Kennedy's
jacket------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-194
F-27------President Kennedy's
tie----------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-195
F-28------X-ray of path through back of Kennedy (#8
Ebersoll)-----------------------------9/7 I-196
F-29------X-ray of path through back of Kennedy (#9
Ebersoll)-----------------------------9/7 I-196
F-30------Photograph of X-ray of path of missile through
back------------------------------9/7 I-197
F-31------Photograph of X-ray of path of missile through
back------------------------------9/7 I-198
F-32------Report of Dr. David O. Davis,
8/23/78----------------------------------------------9/7 I-200
F-33------Report of Dr. G.M. McDonnel,
8/4/78----------------------------------------------9/7 I-204
F-34------Outside Contact Report with Dr. Norman Chase, 2/27/78, Hearings of the
9/7 I-209
Select Committee on Assassinations
F-35------Outside Contact Report with Dr. William B. Seaman
2/27/78--------------------9/7 I-212
F-36------Drawing of the neck wound of John F.
Kennedy-----------------------------------9/7 I-215
F-37------Photograph of the neck wound of John F.
Kennedy-------------------------------9/7 I-215
F-38------Photograph of portion of the neck wound
photograph----------------------------9/7 I-216
F-42------Autopsy Protocol
Report--------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-218
F-43------Autopsy supplemental report,
12/6/63----------------------------------------------9/7 I-225
F-44------Autopsy descriptive
sheet-------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-228
F-45------Photographic enlargement of autopsy descriptive
sheet---------------------------9/7 I-217
F-46------Photograph of drawing of path of bullet through John F. Kennedy's
back------9/7 I-231
F-47------Warren Commission drawing of path through neck showing entry and exit
9/7 I-232
paths (CE 385)
F-48------Drawing of back of John F. Kennedy's head, with
ruler---------------------------9/7 I-234
F-49a-----Detail of cowlick
area----------------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-235
F-49b-----Area of
head---------------------------------------------------------------------------9/7
I-235
F-50------Photograph of wound in back of
head----------------------------------------------9/7 I-236
F-51------Photograph of brain tissue in back of
head------------------------------------------9/7 I-237
F-52------Photograph of lateral skull
X-ray-----------------------------------------------------9/7 I-239
F-53------Photograph of lateral skull X-ray
enhancement-------------------------------------9/7 I-240
F-54------Lateral skull
X-ray----------------------------------------------------------------------9/7
I-238
F-55------Photograph of front skull
X-ray------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-243
F-56------Photograph of front skull X-ray
enhancement--------------------------------------9/7 I-244
F-57------Front skull
X-ray-------------------------------------------------------------------9/7
I-242
F-58------Drawing of the front head
wound---------------------------------------------------9/7 I-245
F-59------Photograph of JFK's neck
wound--------------------------------------------------9/7 I-246
F-60------Enlargement of the photograph of the head
wound----------------------------------9/7 I-247
F-61------Diagram of
beveling----------------------------------------------------------------9/7
I-314
F-64------Photograph of X-ray of three skull
fragments---------------------------------------9/7 I-249
F-65------Drawing of bullet path through head (intact
view)----------------------------------9/7 I-251
F-66------Photograph of drawing of bullet path through head (exploded
view)---------------9/7 I-252
F-67------Enlargement of Zapruder frame
312----------------------------------------------9/7 I-253
F-68------Warren Commission diagram of path of bullet through head
(CE388)-------------9/7 I-255
F-70------Warren Commission testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw,
4/21/64---------------------9/7 I-257
F-71------Interview of Dr. Shaw, 11/9/77, Hearings of the Select Committee on
Assas- 9/7 I-295
sinations, with diagram.
F-73------Diagram of Connally body, front
view-----------------------------------------------9/7 I-295
F-74------Governor Connally's shirt (CE 394), front and
back-------------------------------9/7 I,278-279
F-75------Governor Connally's jacket (CE 393), front and
back-----------------------------9/7 I-280-281
F-76------Photograph of Connally chest
X-ray-------------------------------------------------9/7 I-283
F-77------Photograph of Connally chest
X-ray-------------------------------------------------9/7 I-284
F-81------Diagram of Connally body-both sides showing bullet path through
body------------9/7 I-286
F-84------Photograph of right wrist
X-ray------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-288
F-85------Photograph of right wrist
X-ray------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-289
F-88------Governor Connally's
trousers---------------------------------------------------------9/7 I-291
F-89------Photograph of Connally's thigh
X-ray-----------------------------------------------9/7 I-292
F-90------Photograph of Connally thigh
X-ray-------------------------------------------------9/7 I-293
F-95------Bullet found on connally's
stretcher--------------------------------------------------9/7 I-297
F-96------Composite photograph of six rifles with similar characteristics of the
Mann- 9/8 I-448
licher-Carcano.
F-97------Composite photograph of six rifles, with
identification---------------------------9/8 I-448
F-98------Composite of three photograph of cartridge case found in TSBD,
CE543------9/8 I-456
case found in TSBD, CE543
F-99------Composite of two photographs of CE543 and Panel Tests 1 and
3-------------9/8 I-457
F-100-----Composite of two photograph of Panel Tests 1, 2, 3, and
4---------------------9/8 I-458
F-101-----Composite of two photographs of CE141 and Panel Test
#4--------------------9/8 I-461
F-102-----Composite of four photographs of various views of
CE399---------------------9/7 I-334
F-103-----Composite of three photographs of various test-fired bullets and
CE572------9/8 I-465
F-104-----Composite of three photographs showing photomicrograph of land and 9/8
I-466
groove comparisons of CE399 and CE572 KIA
F-105-----Composite of eight photographs of CE567; CE569; CE840; CE842 and 9/8
I-472
CE843
F-106-----Composite of two photographs-photo micrographs of land and groove im-
9/8 I-473
pressions on CE567, 569 and 572 K1-A and K1-B.
F-107-----Photograph of Walker
bullet-CE573------------------------------------------------9/8 I-474
F-108-----Composite of two photographs of Oswald's
revolver-CE573--------------------9/8 I-477
F-109-----Composite of two photograph of CE594, Q74, Q77 and Panel Test #1 9/8
I-478
photomicrograph of firing pin impressions.
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 576
576
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-110-----Jack Ruby's
revolver-------------------------------------------------------------------9/8
I-480
F-111-----Photograph of bullet in flight, showing
N-wave------------------------------------9/8 I-387
F-112-----Composite of four photographs of Spark shadowgraph of 30 caliber
bullet 9/8 I-389
in air and gelatin.
F-113-----Composite of two photographs of M-16 bullet exploding in
gelatin------------9/8 I-389
F-114-----Composite of two photographs of M-193 bullet exploding in
gelatin-----------9/8 I-390
F-115-----Drag force
formula---------------------------------------------------------------------9/8
I-396
F-116-----Photograph of permanent cavities left in gelatin by 6.5 mm, 7.62 mm,
and 9/8 I-392
.257 caliber bullets.
F-117-----Film of gelatin
experiment------------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-397
F-118-----Drawing of the three views of bullets CE399 and two test
bullets--------------9/8 I-411
F-121-----Composite of two photographs by Hughes, TSBD
window---------------------9/6 I-102
F-122-----Photograph by Dillard, TSBD
window--------------------------------------------9/12 I-103
II-169
F-123-----Composite of two photographs by Powell,
TSBD--------------------------------9/12 I-104
F-124-----Photograph by Altgens of motorcade Milteer in crowd
allegation-------------9/12 I-116
F-125-----Composite of two photographs of J.A.
Milteer-----------------------------------9/12 I-117
F-126-----Photograph by Altgens, TSBD
doorway-------------------------------------------9/12 I-107
F-127-----Composite of four photographs of Oswald-Billy
Lovelady---------------------9/12 I-122
F-128-----Photograph by Altgens, fire escape
image-----------------------------------------9/19 I-108
F-129-----Photograph of wall image by
Moorman-------------------------------------------9/6 I-109
9/25 IV-416
F-130-----Composite of four photographs of the umbrella
man------------------------------9/6 I-114
F-131-----Composite of four photographs of the "3
tramps"--------------------------------9/6 I-119
F-132-----Composite of three photographs of Oswald--"two Oswald"
theory------------9/6 I-130
F-133-----Topographic survey map of Dealey
Plaza-----------------------------------------9/12 II-148
F-134-----Zapruder frame
312------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 II-160
F-135-----Photograph by Croft (161) of limousine and
occupants-------------------------9/12 II-174
F-136-----Composite of four photographs-Betzner and
limousine-------------------------9/12 II-182
F-137-----Diagram-location of head wounds in President
Kennedy------------------------9/12 II-159
F-138-----Diagram-line of sight from Zapruder's camera to John F.
Kennedy/direction 9/12 II-166
of bullet causing head wound.
F-139-----Diagram-line of sight from Zapruder's camera to John F. Kennedy/slope
of 9/12 II-167
bullet causing head wound.
F-140-----Diagram-direction of bullet causing John F. Kennedy back-neck
wound-----9/12 II-177
F-141-----Photograph of anthropological head based on Zapruder frame 312
likeness 9/12 II-163
of Kennedy
F-142-----Diagram-slope of bullet causing John F. Kennedy back-neck
wound---------9/12 II-177
F-143-----Diagram-relative positions of Kennedy and
Connally---------------------------9/12 II-183
F-144-----Diagram-direction of single bullet theory
trajectory------------------------------9/12 II-189
F-145-----Diagram-slope of single bullet theory
trajectory----------------------------------9/12 II-189
F-146-----Diagram-elements to determining trajectory of Kennedy to Connally
bullets-9/12 II-161
F-147-----Diagram-location of head wounds in President
Kennedy------------------------9/12 II-159
F-148-----Zapruder film-rotoscope
copy--------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-68
F-149-----Diagram of computer scan of
image------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-390
F-150-----Composite of two photographs-example of computer contrast
enhancement-9/25 IV-393
F-151-----Composite of two photographs-example of computer image
deblurring-------9/25 IV-393
F-152-----Composite of two photographs-example of unsuccessful image
deblurring---9/25 IV-396
F-153-----Composite of two photographs by Dillard of TSBD (original and RIT en-
9/25 IV-399
hancement).
F-154-----Composite of two photographs-SRI demonstration of autoradiographic
9/25 IV-397
image enhancement.
F-155-----Photograph-full frame enlargement of Willis slide #5,
motorcade---------9/6, 9/12 I-109
9/25 II-175,
IV-417
12/29 V-509
F-156-----Composite of two photographs-SRI enhancement of Dillard
photographs----9/25 IV-407
F-157-----Composite of two photographs-Powell slide of TSBD (original and USC
9/25 IV-400
computer enhancement).
F-159-----Diagram-Huges film, motion analysis #1, changes in shape and
position-----9/25 IV-403
F-159A----Chart/graph-Hughes film, motion analysis #2, near beginning/near
end------9/25 IV-403
F-160-----Photograph-computer enhancement of Willis
#5---------------------------------9/25 IV-409
F-161-----Photograph Aerospace enhancement of
segments--------------------------------9/25 IV-418
F-162-----Photograph-USC enhancement of Nix film of classic
gunman-----------------9/25 IV-412
F-163-----Photograph-Aerospace enhancement of Nix
film---------------------------------9/25 IV-419
F-164-----Photograph-LASL enhancement of Zapruder frame 413, head in
bush--------9/25 IV-414
F-166-----Photograph-Oswald Marine
photograph-------------------------------------------9/6 I-131
9/25 IV-388
F-172-----Composite of four photographs of three tramps--Tramp A, Vallee and
Cars- 9/25 IV-374
well.
F-173-----Composite of two photographs-Sturgis and Tramp
B-----------------------------9/6 I-119
9/25 IV-375
F-174-----Composite of three photographs of Tramp C, Hunt and
Chrisman-------------9/6 I-120
9/25 IV-376
F-175-----Hartman measurement chart-blur
analysis-----------------------------------------9/11 II-9
F-176-----Scott measurement chart-frame to frame departure from smooth
panning-----9/11 II-13
F-177-----Combined blur analysis
chart-------------------------------------------------------9/11 II-14
F-177A----Acoustics overlay for
F-177--------------------------------------------------------9/11 II-133
F-178-----Composite of seven photographs of prints and negatives examined(133
A,B 9/14 II-350
and C).
F-179-----Composite of two photographs, CE133A and
B-----------------------------------9/6 I-124
9/13 II-245
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 577
577
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-180-----Photograph by dee, print
133-C-----------------------------------------------------9/13 II-246
F-182-----Photograph of the reverse sides of 133A and
B-----------------------------------9/14 II-352
F-183-----Photograph-DeMohrenschildt original print 133 A
front------------------------9/13 II-245
F-184-----Photograph-DeMohrenschildt original print 133 A
reverse--------------------9/13 II-245
F-185-----Photograph-Stovall copy of
133A--------------------------------------------------9/14 II-357
F-187-----Photograph of inside view of Oswald Imperial Reflex
camera------------------9/14 II-362
F-188-----Photograph-133 B negative showing edge
marks/scratches---------------------9/14 II-367
F-189-----Photograph-Oswald baby picture showing edge
marks/scratches--------------9/14 II-370
F-190-----Photograph-edge marks/scratches on picture of the
Capitol--------------------9/14 II-364
F-191-----Photograph-RIT test camera edge
marks/scratches-------------------------------9/14 II-366
F-192-----Composite of six photographs-133 A contact
prints-----------------------------9/15 II-403
F-193-----Composite of six photographs-133 B contact
prints-----------------------------9/15 II-404
F-194-----Composite of four photographs-line across Oswald's chin(2
parts)----------- 9/15 II-401
F-196-----Composite of four photographs-Stovall 133 A and close-ups of the water
9/15 II-399
mark
F-197-----Composite of four photographs-USC computer enhanchement
#1-------------9/15 II-406
F-198-----Composite of two photographs-USC computer enhanchement
#2-------------9/15 II-406
F-203-----Diagram of stereo view
concept-----------------------------------------------------9/7 I-178
9/15 II-417
F-206-----Photograph of the rifle display-comparison of identification
marks-----------9/15 II-425
F-207----Photograph of the rifle display-Archives rifle from five different
perspectives-9/15 II-435
F-208-----Photograph of the rifle display-Jack White exhibits
a-g---------------------------9/6 I-127
F-209-----Zapruder frame
139--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-69
F-210-----Zapruder frame
154--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-69
F-211-----Zapruder frame
160--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-71
F-212-----Zapruder frame
158--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-70
F-213-----Zapruder frame
159--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-70
F-214-----Zapruder frame
162--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-71
F-215-----Zapruder frame
165--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-72
F-216-----Zapruder frame
166--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-72
F-217-----Zapruder frame
169--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-73
F-218-----Zapruder frame
175--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-73
F-219-----Zapruder frame
178--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-74
F-220-----Zapruder frame
180--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-74
F-221-----Zapruder frame
183--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-75
F-222-----Zapruder frame
186--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-75
F-223-----Zapruder frame
187--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-76
9/12 II-186
F-224-----Zapruder frame
188--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-76
9/11 II-6
F-225-----Zapruder frame
189--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-77
9/11 II-7
F-226-----Zapruder frame
190--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-77
9/11 II-7
9/12 II-172
F-227-----Zapruder frame
191--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-78
9/11 II-8
F-228-----Zapruder frame
192------------------------------------------------------------------9/11 I-78
F-229-----Zapruder frame
193--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-79
9/12 II-186
F-230-----Zapruder frame
194--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-79
F-231-----Zapruder frame
195--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-80
F-232-----Zapruder frame
196--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-80
9/12 II-187
F-233-----Zapruder frame
197------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-81
F-234-----Zapruder frame
198------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-81
F-235-----Zapruder frame
199------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-82
F-236-----Zapruder frame
200--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-82
9/12 II-187
F-237-----Zapruder frame
201--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-83
F-238-----Zapruder frame
202--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-83
F-239-----Zapruder frame
203--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-84
F-240-----Zapruder frame
204--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-84
9/12 II-188
F-241-----Zapruder frame
205------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-85
F-242-----Zapruder frame
206------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-85
F-243-----Zapruder frame
221------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-86
F-244-----Zapruder frame
225------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-87
F-245-----Zapruder frame
230------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-87
F-246-----Zapruder frame
237------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-88
F-247-----Zapruder frame
238------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-88
F-249-----Zapruder frame
274------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-89
F-250-----Zapruder frame
288------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-89
F-251-----Zapruder frame
289----------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-90
F-252-----Zapruder frame
290------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-90
F-253-----Zapruder frame
291------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-91
F-254-----Zapruder frame
312------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-91
F-255-----Zapruder frame
313------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-92
F-256-----Zapruder frame
314-----------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-92
F-257-----Zapruder frame
315------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-93
F-258-----Zapruder frame
316------------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-93
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 578
578
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-259-----Zapruder frame
317-----------------------------------------------------------------9/12 I-94
F-260-----Zapruder frame
318--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-94
F-261-----Zapruder frame
319--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-95
F-262-----Zapruder frame
320--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-95
F-263-----Zapruder frame
321--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-96
F-264-----Zapruder frame
335--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-96
F-265-----Zapruder frame
337--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-97
F-267-----Nix frame-corresponds to Zapruder frame
313-------------------------------------9/6 I-110
F-270-----Composite of two photographs of Oswald's chin
---------------------------------9/6 I-125
F-271-----Composite of four photographs-RIT-nose
shadow-------------------------------9/15 II-413
F-272-----Zapruder frame
222--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-86
F-273-----Diagram of single bullet
theory-------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-65
F-274-----Zapruder frame
413--------------------------------------------------------------------9/6 I-97
F-275-----Report of firearms panel to HSCA four
volumes-----------------------------------9/8 I-444
F-276-----6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifle,
CE139------------------------------------------9/8 I-445
F-277A-C--Cartridge case found on 6th floor TSBD
CE543-------------------------------9/8 I-451-452
F-277B
F-277C
F-278-----Cartridge case found on 6th floor, TSBD
CE544----------------------------------9/8 I-452
F-279-----Cartridge case found on 6th floor, TSBD
CE545--------------------------------9/8 I-453
F-280-----4 Panel test cartridge cases-Mannlicher-Carcano Western
C.C------------------9/8 IV-454
F-281-----Unfired cartridge-CE141 found in chamber
CE139-------------------------------9/8 I-459
F-282-----FBI test-fired bullets K1-A and K1-B
CE572-----------------------------------9/8 I-463
F-284-----Bullet fragments found on front seat of Presidential
limousine-CE567-------------9/8 I-467
F-285-----Bullet fragments found on front seat of Presidential
limousine--CE569------------9/8 I-467
F-286-----Bullet fragments recovered from under left jump seat
CE840---------------------9/8 I-468
F-287-----Bullet fragments recomered from Governor Connally's arm
CE842---------------9/8 I-468
F-288-----Bullet fragments removed from Kennedy's
brain-CE843-------------------------9/8 I-469
F-289-----Bullet removed from General Walker's
residence-CE573-------------------------9/8 I-471
F-290-----Oswald's
revolver-CE143--------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-474
F-292-----Four cartridge cases found at the scene of the Tippit
murder-CE594-------------9/8 I-475
F-293-----4 Panel Test
cartridges-----------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-475
F-294-----Composite photograph-CE399, CE572, CE853, and
CE856---------------------9/7 I-335
F-295-----Photograph-composite of eight X-rays dental comparison
#1-------------------9/7 I-150
F-296-----Photograph-composite of eight X-rays-dental comparison
#2-------------------9/7 I-151
F-297-----Photograph of skull X-ray taken one year before
assassination------------------9/7 I-241
F-302-----Drawing of John F. Kennedy's
brain------------------------------------------------9/7 I-328
F-303-----Momentum, velocity and energy equation for Mannlicher-Carcano
bullet-----9/8 I-414
F-304-----Film of tomato can shoot
experiment------------------------------------------------9/8 I-403
F-305-----Film of skull shoot
experiment-------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-403
F-306-----Composite of two photographs of
skulls--------------------------------------------9/8 I-405
F-307-----Drawing of the rear view of John F. Kennedy's head and location of
entry 9/8 I-406
wounds
F-309-----Film of goat shoot
experiment--------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-416
F-310-----Photograph of bullet track in
gelatin-------------------------------------------------9/8 I-391
F-311-----Transcript of HSCA interview of Jose Verdacia,
8/26/78------------------------9/27 V-327
F-312-----Affidavit of Tadeusz Sadowski,
9/12/78-------------------------------------------9/14 II-388
F-320-----Diagram illustrating position of occupants of the Presidential
limousine--------9/7 I-341
F-323-----Report of Dr. lowell J. Levine, D.D.S.,
9/7/78--------------------------------------9/7 I-153
F-328-----Two graphs showing
antimony-------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-499
F-329-----Two graphs showing
silver------------------------------------------------------------9/8 I-501
F-330-----Chart of table
values-------------------------------------------------------------------9/8
I-503
F-331-----Report of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, Neutron Activation Analysis,
9/8/78----------9/8 I-506
F-332-----Letter from Hoover to Rankin,
7/8/64-----------------------------------------------9/8 I-558
F-333-----Firearms panel test
cartridge---------------------------------------------------------9/11 I-459
F-334-----Diagram of triangulation principles (echo
patterns)------------------------------9/11 II-24
F-335-----Photograph of waveforms recorded with stuck microphone (DPD
tae)--------9/11 II-28
F-336A--Photographs of adaptive filtered waveforms recorded with stuck
microphone-9/11 II-30
and B. (showing over 5 seconds between shots).
F-337-----Drawing of dealey Plaza showing microphone locations for
test---------------9/11 II-49
12/29 V-646
F-338---Photograph of comparison test echo patterns showing Winchester vs.
Norma-9/11 II-57
F-339---Photograph of test site from TSBD
window----------------------------------------9/11 II-52
F-340-----Photograph of test site-Elm street from north
------------------------------------9/11 II-52
F-341-----Photograph of test site-Elm Street from
south------------------------------------9/11 II-53
F-342-----Photograph of test site-rifleman in
window---------------------------------------9/11 II-53
F-344-----Chart of the sequence of test shots-array
1----------------------------------------9/11 II-50
F-347-----Chart of the test pattern for shot 2 (DPD
tape)-----------------------------------9/11 II-62
F-349-----Chart, test pattern for shot
8--------------------------------------------------------12/29 V-561
F-351-----Tape recordings of muzzle
blast----------------------------------------------------9/11 II-116
F-352-----Tape recordings of sound of N
wave-----------------------------------------------9/11 II-116
F-353-----Sound recordings of rifle shots in
Plaza-------------------------------------------9/11 II-88
F-355-----Chart of energy spectrum of tape segment containing the bell
sound----------------9/11 II-34
F-356--Chart of spectrograms from waveforms recorded from Channel 1 showing 9/11
II-32
heterodyne tones.
F-357-----Chart with overlay showing loci of muzzle blast and shock
waves---------------------9/11 II-20
F-358-----Aerial photograph of Dealey
Plaza-1978----------------------------------------------9/11 II-55
F-359-----Aerial photograph of Dealey
Plaza-1978----------------------------------------------9/11 II-55
F-360-----Chart-number of shots
reported-------------------------------------------------------9/11 II-122
12-29 V-502
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 579
579
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-361-----Aerial photograph of Dealey Plaza, 1972------------
-----------------------------9/11 II-121
12/29 V-501
F-362-----Chart of the reported origin of
sound-----------------------------------------------9/11 II-127
F-363-----Diagram showing shock
wave--------------------------------------------------------9/11 II-114
F-364-----Chart-muzzle blast and shock waveforms for Mannlicher-Carcano and M-1
9/11 II-22
rifles.
F-365-----Graph-least squares fit to Channel
1-------------------------------------------------9/11 II-41
F-366-----Graph-least squares fit to Channel
2-------------------------------------------------9/11 II-38
F-367-----Chart of 15 best
correlations---------------------------------------------------------9/11 II-63
12/29 V-648
F-368-----Chart of muzzle blasts and shock waveforms transmitted by similar
police 9/11 II-44
transmitted by similar police radio.
F-369-----Graph-level of transmitted waveforms as a function of waveform level
at the--------9/11 II-46
microphone.
F-370-----Chart of the correlation of best matches to determine motorcycle
location-------9/11 II-65
F-371-----Chart of the paning or jiggle record of the Zapruder film-Scott
technique---------9/11 II-11
illustration.
F-372-----Chart of Scott example of Zapruder frames
139-208---------------------------------9/11 II-11
F-373-----Chart-full Scott panning or jiggle record of Zapruder
film---------------------------9/11 II-12
F-376-----Drawing of Kennedy's wound location as from the pathology panel's
report----9/12 II-170
F-377-----Drawing-location of inshoot wound of Connally in
back----------------------------9/12 II-181
F-381-----Oswald's Imperial Reflex
camera--------------------------------------------------------9/13 II-248
F-382-----Photograph-de Mohrenschildt print
133A-front--------------------------------------9/13 II-247
F-383-----Photograph-de Mohrenschildt print
133A-back--------------------------------------9/13 II-247
F-386-----Composite of six photographs of
Oswald---------------------------------------------9/15 II-408
F-387-----Photograph-133A vanishing
point----------------------------------------------------9/15 II-410
F-388-----Photograph-133B vanishing
point------------------------------------------------------9/15 II-411
F-389-----Diagram-photographic effect of rifle
tilt-----------------------------------------------9/15 II-427
F-390-----Photograph-133C Stovall original
print------------------------------------------------9/14 II-354
F-391-----Photograph-three sections of everlays of CE133A and
B---------------------------9/14 II-326
F-392-----Photograph-full overlays of CE133A and
B-------------------------------------------9/14 II-329
F-393-----Photograph-overlay of heads in cE 133A and
B--------------------------------------9/14 II-330
F-394-----Photograph-four faces of Lee Harvey Oswald and two chin
lines------------------9/14 II-332
F-395-----Photograph-side-by-side comparisons of 133A, B and
C----------------------------9/14 II-334
F-396-----Photograph-composite of four
rifles--------------------------------------------------9/14 II-342
F-397-----Photograph-de Mohrenschildt print showing edge
marks----------------------------9/14 II-368
F-398-----Photograph-133A stovall original
print-----------------------------------------------9/14 II-356
F-399-----Index of materials viewed by questioned documents panel
members---------------9/25 IV-255
F-400-----Oswald's fingerprint card-New Orleans Police Department, August
1963--------9/14 II-379
F-401A----Copy of Oswald's passport application,
6/24/63-front-----------------------------9/14 II-374
F-401B----Copy of Oswald's passport application,
6/24/63-reverse---------------------------9/14 II-375
F-402A----Copy of Oswald's
self-questionnaire---------------------------------------------------9/14 II-381
F-402B----Copy of Oswald's
self-questionnaire---------------------------------------------------9/14 II-382
F-402C----Copy of Oswald's
self-questionnaire---------------------------------------------------9/14 II-383
F-402D----Copy of Oswald's
self-questionnaire---------------------------------------------------9/14 II-384
F-403-----Memorandum of Charles Thomas, with attachment, 7/25/69, and cover
letter 9/19 III-288
to Stokes from Bennet, 9/20/78.
F-404-----Photograph of two men sitting on curb in Dealey
Plaza------------------------------9/25 IV-435
F-405-----Black
umbrella------------------------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-430
F-406-----Drawing-Cutler diagram of "The
Piece"-------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-437
F-407-----Copy of Oswald's visa application, Warren Commission
version-------------------9/18 III-137
F-408-----Copy of Oswald's visa application, from Cuba,
1978---------------------------------9/18 III-129
F-409-----Jack Anderson column, "Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder," The
Washington 9/28 V-365
Post, 9/7/76.
F-410-----Statement of the Cuban government re American
gamblers---------------------------9/27 V-325
F-411-----Immunity order for Santos
Trafficante---------------------------------------------------9/28 V-347
F-412-----Letter from Watson Clinic re Trafficante's health,
11/23/77---------------------------9/28 V-349
F-413A----Memorandum for the record, 4/3/64, from Houston re
Nosenko--------------------9/22 IV-26
F-413B----Memorandum for director of Security from Houston, 4/3/64, re parole
status 9/22 IV-27
of defectors.
F-414-----Report of Stewart Stout,
4/14/61----------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-399
F-415-----Report of Secret Service,
11/30/62---------------------------------------------------------9/11 III-401
F-416-----Report of Secret Service,
12/19/62---------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-425
F-417-----Report of Secret Service,
11/30/62---------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-433
F-418-----Report of Secret Service,
12/14/62---------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-436
F-419-----Report of Secret Service re Quinlin Pino Machado,
11/29/63---------------------------9/19 III-361
F-420-----Report of SA Robert J. Jamison,
11/12/63-----------------------------------------------9/19 III-363
F-421-----Memorandum of SA William A. Patterson,
11/25/63-----------------------------------9/19 III-366
F-422-----Report of Secret Service re Mosley Echeverria investigation,
12/9/63-------------------9/19 III-371
F-423-----Organization chart, Secret Service,
1964--------------------------------------------------9/19 III-324
F-424-----Photograph of Rolanda
Cubela------------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-285
F-425-----Staff report on Yuri Nosenko, HSCA
9/15/78------------------------------------------9/15 II-439
F-426-----Results of Weschler test given to
Nosenko----------------------------------------------9/15 II-530
F-427-----Portion of notes from Hart citing alternative actions, p.
23-------------------------------9/15 II-536
F-428-----Article by Comer Clard, "National
Enquirer,"-------------------------------------------9/19 III-282
F-429A----Photograph of Castro
conference--------------------------------------------------------9/19 III-196
F-429B----Tape of Castro
interview------------------------------------------------------------------9/19
III-196
F-429C----Transcript of Castro interview,
9/18/78-------------------------------------------------9/19 III-197
F-430-----Photograph of Betty
Serratos--------------------------------------------------------------9/18
III-125
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 580
580
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-431-----Photograph of Ruben
Duran------------------------------------------------------------9/18 III-124
F-432-----Photograph of Horatio
Duran-----------------------------------------------------------9/18 III-123
F-433-----Photograph of Sylvia D.
Tirado--------------------------------------------------------9/18 III-5
F-434-----Copy of page from Oswald's
passport------------------------------------------------9/18 III-138
F-436-----Copy of sketch of Trescornia prison by
Verdacia-----------------------------------9/27 V-166
F-437-----Photograph of E.
Azcue-----------------------------------------------------------------9/18
III-146
F-438-----Composite of five photographs provided by Cubans re surveillance of
9/19 III-318
apartment house.
F-439-----Tape of Silvia Duran Tirado
interview-------------------------------------------------9/18 III-6
F-440A----Transcript of Silvia Druan Tirado
interview-----------------------------------------9/18 III-6
F-440B----Diagram of Cuban Consulate, and drawn by
Duran---------------------------------9/18 III-121
F-441-----Memorandum from DeLoach to Moore, subject, assassination of the
President,9/21 III-594
12/12/63
F-442-----Memorandum from Deloach, 12/17/63, subject, LHO-internal security
Presi- 9/21 III-596
dential Commission
F-443-----Memorandum from Evans to Belmont 11/25/63, with attached memorandum
9/21 III-566
from Katzenbach to Moyers.
F-446-----Statement of Nosenko to Hearings of the Select Committee on
Assassinations 9/22 IV-106
8/7/78, 3 p.
F-447-----Memorandum from Coleman and Slawson to Warren Commission re Nosenko,
9/21 III-634
6/24/64.
F-448-----Memorandum form Hubert and Griffin to Willens re telephone records,
9/21 III-656
2/24/64 9/26 IV-540
F-449A,B,-Three charts depicting monthly progress of the Warren
Commission---------- (2) (2)
C
F-450-----Excerpts of Sommersett-Milteer conversation,
11/9/63-------------------------------9/19 III-447
F-451-----Secret Service-Principles of Protection of the President; January 4,
1954----------9/19 III-451
F-452-----Affidavits of Secret Service agents, 6/1/64 and
7/30/64--------------------------------9/19 III-454
F-456-----FBI functional organizational chart,
1964------------------------------------------------9/20 III-478
F-457-----Memorandum from Jendins to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 11/24/63 "Mr.
J. 9/20 III-468
Edgar Hoover said as follows:"
F-458-----Memorandum from Evans to Belmont,
11/26/63----------------------------------------9/20 III-474
F-459-----Excerpt from p. 34, Book V, Senate Report re Hoover memorandum of
11/29/63--9/20 III-474
F-460-----FBI memorandum to Tolson from Gale,
12/10/63---------------------------------------9/20 III-476
F-461-----FBI memorandum to Tolson from Gale,
9/30/64----------------------------------------9/20 III-531
F-462-----FBI memorandum from Donahue to Belmont,
11/22/63--------------------------------9/21 III-665
F-463-----FBI memorandum from Belmont to Tolson,
11/24/63----------------------------------9/21 III-666
F-464-----CIA memorandum to Chief, with/attached memorandum, 11/25/68, re using
9/21 III-571
Oswald
F-465-----FBI memorandum from Belmont to Sullivan,
11/25/63---------------------------------9/21 III-668
F-466-----FBI memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr,
11/25/63-----------------------------------9/21 III-670
F-467-----Memorandum from Hoover to Department of State, 6/3/60, re Oswald
imposter 9/21 III-573
theory.
F-471-----FBI memorandum form Belmont to Tolson,
12/3/63-----------------------------------9/21 III-672
F-472-----Letter from Katzenback to Warren,
12/8/63---------------------------------------------9/21 III-674
F-473-----FBI memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr,
12/20/63----------------------------------9/21 III-677
F-476-----Organizational chart of the Warren
Commission----------------------------------------9/21 III-611
F-477-----Photograph of warren Commission
members--------------------------------------------9/21 III-611
F-478-----Record of emergency
data-Oswald--------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-260
F-479-----USMC enlistment contract,
10/24/56----------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-262
F-479A----USMC enlistment contract,
10/24/56---------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-263
F-480-----USMC examination of Oswald, 10/24/56, 2
p.------------------------------------------9/25 IV-264
F-481-----Oswald's loyalty certificate for Armed Services
personnel----------------------------9/25 IV-266
F-482-----USMC master fingerprints,
10/15/56-----------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-269
F-483-----Oswald, miscellaneous information and index form
------------------------------------9/25 IV-271
F-484-----Oswald, Security termination statement and
inddex------------------------------------9/25 III-159,
IV-272
F-485-----Notice of Obligated Service
Discharge----------------------------------------------------9/25 III-179,
IV-273
F-486-----Passport #1733242
(copy)-----------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-274
F-487-----Selective Service registration
form---------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-284
F-488-----Declaration requesting revocation of U.S. citizenship (C.E.
244)---------------------9/25 IV-285
F-489-----Account of interview with A. Mosby by Oswald,
11/15/59--------------------------9/25 IV-286
F-490A----Script writing on Holland-American Line
stationery----------------------------------9/25 IV-287
F-490B----Script writing on Holland-American Line
stationery----------------------------------9/25 IV-298
F-491-----Historical diary
(CE24)---------------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-302
F-492-----Affidavit of support to U.S. Embassy
1/17/62(CE775)-------------------------------9/25 IV-314
F-493-----Note from "Alek" to Marine and June, in Russian
language---------------------------9/25 IV-315
F-494-----Letter to "The
Worker"--------------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-316
F-495-----Application for rental of post office box, 3,
p.----------------------------------------9/25 IV-319
F-496-----Post office box rental
application----------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-320
F-497-----Letter to Fair Play for Cuba
Committee---------------------------------------------9/25 IV-321
F-498-----Letter to Communist Party of USA,
8/28/63----------------------------------------9/25 IV-323
F-499-----Photoreproduction of page from hotel
registry--------------------------------------9/25 IV-326
F-500-----Letter to Russian Embassy
(CE103)-----------------------------------------------9/25 IV-327
F-501-----W-4
form-------------------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-329
F-502-----Letter to Russian Embassy,
11/9/63-----------------------------------------------9/25 IV-330
F-503-----Application for employment-L. Welding
Co.---------------------------------------9/25 IV-331
F-504-----Microfilm reproduction of rifle
order-Klein's---------------------------------------9/25 IV-332
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583.
Page 581
581
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-505A-D--Photograph of four cards from Oswald's
wallet-----------------------------------9/25 IV-333-336
F-505B
F-505C
F-505D
F-506-----"Dear Mr. Hunt"
letter--------------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-337
F-507-----"Alek," writing in
Russian------------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-338
F-508-----Speech
(CE97)--------------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-339
F-509-----Postal money order to Klein's-front and
reverse-----------------------------------9/25 IV-348-349
F-510-----Walker note (in
Russian)------------------------------------------------------------9/25 IV-350
F-512-----Affidavit of Joseph H. Langosch,
9/14/78--------------------------------------------9/22 IV-192
F-513-----FOIA 5-1A, 10/9/63, IN
36017----------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-212
F-514-----Coleman memorandum,
3/26/64-----------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-213
F-515-----Rocca note to Helms,
3/5/64------------------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-215
F-516-----FOIA 7-2, 10/10/63, DIR
74830------------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-216
F-517-----FOIA 6-3, 10/10/63, DIR
74673------------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-219
F-518-----Memorandum, undated, Comments of Luisa Calderon
Carralero------------------9/22 IV-181
F-519-----FOIA 680-290, memorandum, 5/5/64, re debriefing on Oswald's
case------------9/22 IV-221
F-520-----Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 5/11/64, FOIA 687-295, 9/22
IV-162
subject: information on Lee Harvey Oswald, w/attachments.
F-521-----FOIA 739-319, memorandum, 6/19/64, with
attachments--------------------------9/22 IV-224
F-522-----Handwritten notes-Project AZZIFLE, with/attached
memorandums-------------9/22 IV-197
F-523-----Form 201-CIA Personality file request 12/9/60, FOIA
1-1b.----------------------9/22 IV-206
F-524-----Letter to Blakey from Breckinridge, 9/19/78 with/attached memorandum
of 9/22 IV-207
2/20/64 re documents available in Oswald's 201 file, FOIA 563-810.
F-525-----Memorandum from Stern to rankin,
3/27/64------------------------------------------9/22 IV-231
F-526-----FOIA 435-173A, dispatch
12/12/63---------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-209
F-527-----Excerpts from 1967 CIA inspector General's report re plotting against
Castro, 9/22 IV-126
with cover letter.
F-528-----FOIA 657-831, memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans,
4/13/64------------9/22 IV-232
F-529-----Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 7/8/64, Nosenko information
on 9/22 IV-14
Oswald
F-530-----Memorandum of conversation, 7/28/64, re use of Nosenko information in
9/22 IV-236
Warren Commission report.
F-531-----Five documents re Nosenko from Office of
Security---------------------------------9/22 IV-36
F-532-----Seven documents re Nosenko,
CIA-----------------------------------------------------9/22 IV-65
F-533-----Memorandum to Rankin, 7/31/64, re tourist visa application time, FOIA
9/22 IV-240
781-341.
F-534-----State Department telegram from Moscow,
10/31/59---------------------------------9/22 IV-187
F-536A----Letter to Helms, 9/21/78, re testimony from Anthony Lapham,
CIA------------9/22 IV-6
F-536B----Letter to Helms, 9/21/78, re testimony from John D. Morrison, Jr.,
CIA-------9/22 IV-7
F-537-----CIA response to Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassinations re
inter- 9/22 IV-109
rogatories re Nosenko.
F-538-----Excerpt from Church report on alleged assassination plots against
foreign 9/22 IV-156
leaders, p. 92.
F-539-----Excerpt from Church report, pp.
99-100----------------------------------------------9/22 IV-153
F-541-----Article, London "Sunday Times,"
2/26/67---------------------------------------------9/25 IV-463
F-542-----Letter from Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassinations to
London 9/25 IV-464
"Sunday Times," 4/25/78.
F-543-----Letter from London "Sunday Times" to Hearings of the Select Committee
on 9/25 IV-464
Assassinations, 5/19/78
F-544-----Advertisement for movie "Executive
Action"------------------------------------------9/25 IV-455
F-545-----Chart of Jack Ruby's toll calls,
1963----------------------------------------------------9/26 IV-561
F-546-----Computer printout of toll
calls-----------------------------------------------------------9/26 IV-563
F-547A----Map of U.S. with Apalachin meeting
delegates---------------------------------------9/28 V-382
F-547B----Map of U.S. with La Cosa Nostra
families--------------------------------------------9/28 V-416
F-548-----Chart, organized crime family
organization---------------------------------------------9/28 V-429
F-550-----Chart, seating arrangement at La Stella
Restaurant------------------------------------9/28 V-418
F-551-----Chart-Organized crime Indictments and
Convictions---------------------------------9/28 V-435
F-552-----Graphs-organized crime program
statistics--------------------------------------------9/28 V-435
F-553-----Affidavit from FBI Special Agent
Kahoe----------------------------------------------9/28 V-388
F-554-----Letter from Earl Ruby to HSCA re "Cuba" Alabama,
8/17/78----------------------9/26 IV-516
F-555-----BBC film clip re Jack's statement "No one will ever know..."(2
reels))------------9/26 IV-513
F-556-----Composite of six photographs of
Oswald---------------------------------------------9/25 IV-369
F-557-----Composite of five photographs of Oswald one of
Lovelady------------------------9/25 IV-369
F-558-----Diagram-shape, distance and size
comparison-----------------------------------------9/25 IV-370
F-559-----Photograph of motorcade with red circle
Altgens-------------------------------------9/25 IV-372
F-560-----Composite of two photographs by Altgens and
Milteer----------------------------9/25 IV-377
F-561-----Composite of three photographs, one by Altgens and two by
Milteer------------9/25 IV-378
F-562-----Diagram of Altgens photograph-analysis of
height-----------------------------------9/25 IV-378
F-563-----Photograph of crowd on Houston Street by
Altgens---------------------------------9/25 IV-379
F-564-----Composite of three photographs-height chart
display-------------------------------9/25 IV-388
F-565-----IRS audit case report of Earl Ruby,
12/19/63.-----------------------------------------9/26 IV-522
F-567-----Letter from Jones to curry on security transfer of Oswald, 12/19/63
with at- 9/26 IV-575
tached letter of 12/16/63.
F-568-----Diagram of basement of the Dallas Police
Department-------------------------------9/26 IV-574
F-569-----HSCA interview of Don Flusche,
6/7/78-----------------------------------------------9/26 IV-593
F-572-----Transcript of mcWillie deposition,
4/4/78---------------------------------------------9/27 V-7
F-573-----Report of FBI on McWillie interview,
11/27/63--------------------------------------9/27 V-152
F-574-----Report of FBI on interview of Mcwillie,
6/9/64--------------------------------------9/27 V-155
F-575-----Segment of Zoppi letter
-----------------------------------------------------------------9/27 V-168
F-576-----HSCA interview of Tony Zoppi,
3/31/78---------------------------------------------9/27 V-169
F-577-----FBI interview report on Ruby,
12/25/63-----------------------------------------------9/27 V-174
F-578-----FBI interview report on S.J. Braun,
11/25/73-----------------------------------------9/27 V-190
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 582
582
B. EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-579-----FBI interview report on Jay Bishov,
11/25/63---------------------------------------9/27 V-191
F-580-----FBI interview report on Jack Marcus,
12/2/63---------------------------------------9/27 V-192
F-581-----Postcard from ruby to Alice Nichols,
9/8/59------------------------------------------9/27 V-195
F-582-----FBI interview report on Clarence A. Rector,
11/30/63------------------------------9/27 V-194
F-583-----Ruby's tourist
cards-front------------------------------------------------------------9/27
V-196
F-584-----Ruby's tourist
cards-reverse---------------------------------------------------------9/27 V-197
F-585-----FBI report re Jack Ruby's bank deposit records.
11/29/63--------------------------9/27 V-202
F-586-----Report re Jack Ruby, potential criminal
informant-----------------------------------9/27 V-206
F-587-----FBI interview report on Meyer R. Panitz,
1/14/64-----------------------------------9/27 V-223
F-588-----Charles C. Scott letter to HSCA re Jack Ruby signature identification,
9/22/78 9/27 V-199
F-589-----INS letter and documents to HSCA,
5/11/78------------------------------------------9/27 V-226
F-590-----Warrren commission memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Wollens,
4/4/64 9/26 IV-546
F-591-----Warren Commission staff memorandum from Hubert and Griffin, 5/14/64,
re 9/26 IV-548
adequacy of Ruby investigation
F-592-----Warren commission staff memorandum to Hubert and Griffin from Willens,
9/26 IV-559
6/1/64, re adequacy of Ruby investigation.
F-593-----Warren Commission memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Willens,
6/1/64. 9/26 IV-560
F-594-----Film of Ruby shooting
Oswald------------------------------------------------------9/26 IV-485
F-595-----Photograph of "Hands Off Cuba"
literature-------------------------------------------9/26 IV-481
F-596-----Photograph of Oswald distributing FPCC
literature----------------------------------9/26 IV-482
F-597-----Photograph of "The Crime Against Cuba"pamphlet, 544 Camp
Street------------9/26 IV-481
F-598-----Map of
Louisiana-------------------------------------------------------------------9/26
IV-483
F-599-----Photograph of David
Ferrie---------------------------------------------------------9/26 IV-484
F-600-----Sworn statement of CIA support Chief,
9/25/78-------------------------------------9/27 V-241
F-601-----Excerpts of Aleman interview by Gaeton Fonzi, HSCA staff,
3/12/77------------9/27 V-314
F-602-----Article by George Crile III, "The Mafia, the CIA and Castro," "the
Washinton 9/27 V-308
Post," 5/16/76
F-603-----HSCA staff memorandum, 3/14/77, from Purdy to Tanenbaum re Miami trip
of 9/27 V-317
3/10/77.
F-604-----ELSUR-1/31/62, Giancana, Alex and
Vogel-----------------------------------------9/28 V-437
F-605-----ELSUR-January 1962, giancana and
D'Arco----------------------------------------9/28 V-437
F-606-----ELSUR-2/27/62, Ferraro and
Godfrey-----------------------------------------------9/28 V-438
F-607-----ELSUR-1/15/63, Airtel,
English-------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-438
F-608-----ELSUR-1/31/63, LCN
summary------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-438
F-609-----NYPD Intelligence Bulletin #10,
6/7/63----------------------------------------------9/28 V-439
F-610-----ELSUR-6/11/63, stefano
Magaddino-------------------------------------------------9/28 V-439
F-611-----ELSUR-8/7/63, airtel,
alex-----------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-440
F-612-----ELSUR-8/8/63, DiPalermo and
Genovese-------------------------------------------9/28 V-440
F-613-----ELSUR-10/15/63, Jacobson and
Marcy---------------------------------------------9/28 V-400
F-614-----ELSUR-10/24/63,
Costello-----------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-441
F-615-----ELSUR-1963,
Trafficante-------------------------------------------------------------9/28
V-441
F-616-----ELSUR-1963, Palisano and
Petillo--------------------------------------------------9/28 V-442
F-617-----ELSUR-1963, Burno and
Catena-----------------------------------------------------9/28 V-442
F-618-----ELSUR-2/8/62, Burno and
Weisburg-------------------------------------------------9/28 V-443
F-619-----Photograph of Santos
Trafficante----------------------------------------------------9/28 V-384
F-620-----ELSUR-2/17/62, Bruno and M. and P.
Maggio-------------------------------------9/28 V-445
F-621-----FBI memorandum, 4/22/62, re celano and
Pierce-----------------------------------9/28 V-445
F-622-----ELSUR-5/2/62, Profaci, Clements and
"Bob"---------------------------------------9/28 V-446
F-625-----ELSUR-10/23/62, Marcy, D'Arco and Representative
Libonati--------------------9/28 V-446
F-626-----ELSUR-1/17/63, Patriarca, Angiulo and
Limone-----------------------------------9/28 V-447
F-627-----ELSUR-2/28/63,
Giancana----------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-447
F-628-----ELSUR-10/14/63, Giancana, English, Accardo and
Blasi----------------------------9/28 V-447
F-629-----ELSUR-5/23/63, stefano
Magaddino-----------------------------------------------9/28 V-448
F-630-----ELSUR-10/31/63, stefano and Peter
Maggaddino------------------------------------9/28 V-448
F-631-----Memorandum from Evans to Belmont, 5/22/63, re
Valachi-------------------------9/28 V-448
F-632-----ELSUR-8/12/63, Lanza and
Bruno-------------------------------------------------9/28 V-449
F-633-----ELSUR-9/17/63,
Magaddino-------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-449
F-634-----ELSUR-9/27/63, J.S. LaRocca re
Valachi------------------------------------------9/28 V-449
F-635-----ELSUR (NYPD)-9/27/63, Masiello and
DiLorenzo----------------------------------9/28 V-450
F-636-----ELSUR-9/28/63, Magaddino, Magaddino and
Rangatore----------------------------9/28 V-451
F-637-----ELSUR-10/1/63,
Palmisano---------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-451
F-638-----LCN file--10/9 and 10/16/63,
Giancana--------------------------------------------9/28 V-452
F-639-----FBI teletype-10/10/63, Giancana and
English---------------------------------------9/28 V-452
F-640-----LCN file--10/25/63,
Zerilli------------------------------------------------------------9/28 V-452
F-641-----Autumn 1963, live informant
information----------------------------------------------9/28 V-453
F-642-----Hoover to Senator McClellen, letter and call, 3/2/64 and 3/6/64
--------------------9/28 V-453
F-643-----FBI intelligence bulletin, 3/11/64,
Locicero-----------------------------------------9/28 V-453
F-644-----Testimony of Bobby W. Hargis, 4/8/64, Warren
Commission----------------------12/29 V-504
F-645-----Statement of William Newman, 11/22/63, to Sheriff's Department,
Dallas, Tex--12/29 V-508
F-646-----Testimony of Abraham Zapruder, 7/22/64, Warren
Commision--------------------12/29 V-510
F-647-----Statement of SA Paul E. Landis, Jr.
11/22/63--------------------------------------12/29 V-519
F-648-----Statement of S.M. Holland, 4/8/64, Warren
Commission----------------------------12/29 V-527
F-649-----Statement of R.G. Skelton, 11/22/63, Sheriff's Department, Dallas,
Tex.----------12/29 V-537
F-650-----Testimony of Royce G. Skelton, 4/8/64, Warren
Commission----------------------12/29 V-539
F-651-----Statement of Virgie Rackley, 11/25/63,
FBI----------------------------------------12/29 V-543
F-652-----Testimony of Mrs. Donald Baker, 7/22/64, Warren
Commission-------------------12/29 V-545
F-653-----Cuba book-Report of Cuban Government to
HSCA----------------------------------9/27 V-259
F-654-----Translation of Cuba
book------------------------------------------------------------9/27 V-294
F-661-----Photograph--people on grassy
knoll------------------------------------------------12/29 V-507
F-666-----Zapruder film with sound of four shots
added----------------------------------------12/29 V-694
F-667-----Charts of waveforms from tape recording of the Dallas Police
Department-------12/29 V-563
See footnotes at end of table, p. 583
Page 583
583
B. EXHIBIT--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
Exhibit Entered
No. Description (1978) Volume/Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-668-----Photograph of motorcade on Main
Street--------------------------------------------12/29 V-626
F-669-----Photograph of motorcade on Houston
Street----------------------------------------12/29 V-626
F-670-----Photograph of motorcade on Houston
Street----------------------------------------12/29 V-627
F-671-----Photograph of motorcade on Houston
Street----------------------------------------12/29 V-627
F-672-----Survey map of Dealey
Plaza-------------------------------------------------------12/29 V-562
F-673-----Gun Digest,
1963-------------------------------------------------------------------12/29
V-573
F-674-----Photograph showing motorcycles at Parkland Hospital with clip holders
on 12/29 V-633
windshield.
F-675-----Photograph showing motorcycled being driven down Elm
Street-----------------12/29 V-632
F-676-----Photograph showing motorcycle and cars parked at emergency room, Park-
12/29 V-633
land Hospital.
F-677-----Photograph showing crowd, cars and motorcycles at emergency room,
Park- 12/29 V-634
land Hospital
F-678-----Photograph showing motorcycle and other cars parked at emergency room,
12/29 V-634
Parkland Hospital
F-679-----Letter to Chief of Police Curry from Deputy Cheif of Police Lundy,
11/21/63, 12/29 V-617
submitting plans for parade route.
F-680-----Report of Anthony J. Pelicano to Hearings of the Select Committee on
Assas- 12/29 V-652
sinations on DPD tapes, 12/13/78.
F-681-----Composite of four photographs (F-668, F-669, F-670,
F-671)--------------------12/29 V-628
F-682-----Photograph showing temperature above TSBD of 66 degrees (Murray
1-19)---12/29 V-643
F-683-----Photograph showing time over TSBD of 12:40 (Murray
1-15)--------------------9/29 V-644
F-684-----Two speeches by Fidel
Castro----------------------------------------------------9/18 III-159
F-685-----Three articles by Jean
Daniel-------------------------------------------------------9/18 III-179
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supplemental Exhibits--John F. Kennedy Public Hearings
Page 583
C. SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS--JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
entered Volume/
(1978) Page
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Letter from Ralph W. Yarborough to Congressman Richardson Preyer
12/27/78---------- 12/29 V-698
Letter and exhibits from Robert
Groden----------------------------------------------------------12/29 V-703
Memorandum from G. Robert Blakey to HSCA members, 2/22/79, re fine points of
12/29 V-722
correlation of tape to film.
Article, "A Physicist Examines the Kennedy Assassination Film" Luis W.
Alvarez-------9/8 I-428
Photograph of black
umbrella-open----------------------------------------------------------------9/25
IV-444
Transcript of deposition of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 8/4/78, Hearings of the
Select 9/21 III-680
Committee on Assassinations.
Letter to HSCA from Katzenbach re testimony,
9/25/78---------------------------------------9/21 III-749
Appendices to the John F. Kennedy Public Hearings
Page 583
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. APPENDICES TO THE JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Scientific Reports:
(i) Report of the Photographic Evidence
Panel----------------------------------------------------------VI
(ii) Report on the Medical Evidence and Related Issues Pertaining to the
Assassination
of President John F.
Kennedy-------------------------------------------------------------------------VII
(iii) Report of the Firearms
Panel-------------------------------------------------------------------------VII
(iv) A Study of the Acoustics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President
John F.
Kennedy--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIII
(v) Report of the Polygraphy Panel on the Subject of the Analysis of Jack Ruby's
Polygraph
Examination----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIII
(vi) Report of the Polygraphy Panel of the Subject of the Analysis of Yuri
Nosenko's
Polygraph
Examination---------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIII
(vii) Report on the Subject of the Examination of the Handwriting and
Fingerprint evidence
in the investigation of the Assassination of John F.
Kennedy-------------------------------------VIII
2. Staff reports:
(viii) Organized
Crime---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IX
(ix) Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New
Orleans-----------X
(x) The Evolution and implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination
Conspiracies Against
Fidel
Castro------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
(ix) The Warren
Commission-------------------------------------------------------------------------------XI
(xii) Analysis of the Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the central
Intelligence
Agency-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XI
(xiii) Politics and Presidential Protection: The
Motorcade---------------------------------------------XI
(xiv) Possible Military Investigation of the
Assassination----------------------------------------------XI
(xv) Conspiracy Witness in Dealey
Plaza-----------------------------------------------------------------XII
(xvi) Oswald-Tippit
Associates----------------------------------------------------------------------------XII
(xvii) George de
Mohrenschildt-----------------------------------------------------------------------------XII
(xviii) Deposition of Marina Oswald
Porter--------------------------------------------------------------XII
(xix) The Defector
Study------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XII
(xx) Oswald in the Soviet Union: An investigation of Yuri
Nosenko---------------------------------XII
3. Bibliographies:
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: An Alphabetical
Bibliography----------------------XII
Assassination of President John f. Kennedy: A Chronological
Bibliography-----------------------XII
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix VIII
Page 584
584
APPENDIX VIII: INDEX FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
Public Hearings of the Committee
Page 584
A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
Page 585
585
A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE--Continued
Exhibits--Martin Luther King Public Hearing
Page 585
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARING
Page 586
586
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--CONTINUED
Page 587
587
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
Page 588
588
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
Page 589
589
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
Page 590
590
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
Page 591
591
B. EXHIBITS--MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS--Continued
Page 592
592
B. EXHIBITS---MARTIN LUTHER KING HEARINGS---Continued
Appendices to the Martin Luther King Public Hearings
Page 592
C. APPENDICES TO THE MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS
Appendix IX
Page 593
APPENDIX IX. INDEX FOR THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Volume/Page
(1978)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Statements by Chairman Louis Stokes:
Opening
Statement----------------------------------------------------------------------12/11
I-1
Closing
Remarks-------------------------------------------------------------------------12/12
I-559
B. Witnesses:
Frank C.
Carlucci-------------------------------------------------------------------------12/11
I-47
Benjamin R.
Civiletti---------------------------------------------------------------------12/12
I-111
H.S.
Knight--------------------------------------------------------------------------------12/12
I-91
William H.
Webster-----------------------------------------------------------------------12/11
I-3
C. Supporting
Documentation-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(593)
Page 594
594
(blank page)
References For the:
Introduction
Page 595
REFERENCES INTRODUCTION
(1) J. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 137 (1927).
(2) W. Wilson, Congressional Government (Meridan Books, 1963, 1885 ed.),
p. 195.
(3) See, e.g., 123 Congressional Record E1703 (daily ed. March 22, 1977).
(4) See 124 Congressional Record H7455 (daily ed. July 27, 1978)
(remarks of Chairman Stokes).
(595)
Page 596
596
(blank page)
Report on the Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
Page 597
I. FINDINGS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
REFERENCES: INTRODUCTION
(1) Arthur M. schlesinger, Jr., "A Thousand Days: John f. Kennedy in the White
House: (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 116 (hereinafter "A Thousand
Days").
(2) "World Leaders Voice Sympathy and Shock--A Flame Went Out," The New York
times, nov. 23, 1963, p. 8.
(3) Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., Political Profiles: The Kennedy Years (New York:
facts on File, Inc., 1976), p. xvi.
(4) See generally, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "History
of Presidential Assassinations in the United States Preceding the Assassination
of John F. Kennedy," JFK Project No. 7, July 5, 1978, prepared for the
committee.
(5) See Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "An Analysis of
Congressional Investigations into the Lincoln Assassination," Nov. 16, 1978. The
U.S. house of Representatives authorized two separate investigations into the
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. In the first, established by
resolutions passed on Apr. 9 and Apr. 30, 1866, the House Judiciary Committee
was directed to determine whether President Jefferson Davis and other officials
of the former Confederate government had been involved in the conspiracy to
assassinate Lincoln and other leading Federal officials, including Vice
President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of State William Seward and General Ulysses
S. Confederate officials and to report whether special legislation was needed to
bring them to trial if they were conspirators. A special committee was formed,
chaired by Representative James Wilson. Its most vigorous member, and the author
of the final report, was Representative George S. Boutwell.
The second investigation was authorized by a resolution, passed July 8, 1867,
that established a special House committee to make a comprehensive examination
of the facts surrounding the assassination and report its findings and
recommendations to the House. It was chaired by Representative Benjamin F.
Butler.
The committees were established and largely controlled by radical Republicans
who had grown increasingly alienated from President Andrew Johnson as a result
of his lenient treatment of the defeated South. Republican antipathy culminated
in the impeachment trial of President Johnson.
The Boutwell committee reported that Confederate President Jefferson Davis
probably took steps to implement proposals to assassinate the President.
Boutwell could make no stronger statement against Davis given the lack of
substantive evidence tying him to an assassination conspiracy. A hoax
perpetrated by a key witness had deprived the committee's majority of its case
against Davis, and it was unable to set forth a convincing case against him.
Representative Andrew Rogers filed a strongly worded minority report that took
issue with the majority conclusion, denouncing the indictment of Davis and other
Confederate official as co-conspirators with Booth.
The Butler committee, in particular the outgrowth of radical Republican reaction
to President Johnson's policy of leniency toward the South, attempted to
investigate further allegations linking Confederate officials and others in a
conspiracy with assassin John Wilkes Booth. The committee interviewed, among
others, convicted conspirators Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, Edward Spangler, and Samuel
B. Arnold. It appears that after December 1967, the Butler committee took no
further action. Butler, however, was one of the most vigorous proponents of
Johnson's impeachment during 1867. His involvement and that of other committee
members in the impeachment proceedings may in part explain the committee's
failure to continue its work.
(597)
Page 598
598
The Butler committee uncovered little new information on the assassination of
President Lincoln and was unable to establish any link between President Johnson
and the conspirators. The body of evidence the Butler committee assembled argued
against the charge that has reemerged on occasion since the 1860's that Andrew
Johnson was a participant in, or had knowledge of, the conspiracy to assassinate
Abraham Lincoln.
(6) See generally, "A Thousand Days"; and Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele
Commager and William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Growth of the American Republic" (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977), volume II, chapter XXX (hereinafter
"Growth of the American Replubic").
(7) Id., "Growth of the American Republic," at p. 762.
(8) "A Thousand Days," p. 635.
(9) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Robert Kennedy and His Times" (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1978), Chapter 13.
(10) Id. at 278.
(11) Id. at 281.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Much of this account of President Kennedy's trip to Texas is based on the
testimony of Governor and Mrs. John B. Connally. See testimony of Governor and
Mrs. John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, Hearings Before the Select Committee on
Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I,
pp. 11-60.
(14) "A Thousand Days," p. 755.
(15) Id. at 98.
REFERENCES: SECTION A
(1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 18-19
(hereinafter Warren Report).
(2) Id. at 86-92.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations hearing, pp. 75-78 (JFK Document 014027) (for a copy of the
deposition, see "The Warren Commission," staff report, Appendix to the Hearings
before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives,
95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979), vol. XI (hereinafter WC report, -- Appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings.--)).
(5) Id. at 75.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Testimony of Robert Groden, Sept. 7, 1978, Hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Volume I, p.
99 (hereinafter Groden testimony, -- HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(8) Ibid.
(9) JFK Document 002498.
(10) Report to the President by the Commission on Central Intelligence
Activities within the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975).
(11) I HSCA-JFK hearings, 145.
(12) Testimony of Michael Baden, Sept. 7, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 185
(hereinafter baden testimony).
(13) Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, in "Report on the Medical Evidence
and Related Issued Pertaining to the Assassination of President John F.
Kennedy," report VII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter forensic
pathology report).
(14) Id. at 151ff.
(15) Report of Photographic Evidence Panel, VI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings, para. 512-610 (hereinafter photographic evidence report).
(16) Forensic pathology report, para. 181ff.
(17) Photographic evidence report, para. 512-610.
(18) See JFK Exhibit F-19, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 182, and forensic pathology
report, para. 205-235.
(19) Id., forensic pathology report, at 461-557.
Page 599
599
(20) Testimony of Larry Sturdivan, Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 383ff.
(21) Id. at 414-416.
(22) JFK exhibit F-309, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 416.
(23) Forensic pathology report, para. 363-414.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Id. at 415-460.
(26) Ibid.; see also 364-376 and Addendum G.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Warren Report, pp. 97-109.
(29) Warren Report, pp. 97-109.
(30) Id. at 105.
(31) Id. at 97.
(32) Id. at 19.
(33) Testimony of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
weight of the materials examined by the FBI and Dr. Guinn. This attributable
samples examined after the tests.
(34) Warren Report, pp. 79-81.
(35) See, e.g., Mark Lane, "Rush to Judgment" (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1966), p. 80.
(36) Guinn testimony, p. 533.
(37) Sturdivan testimony, pp. 407-412, 420-424; see also testimony of Dr. Cyril
H. Wecht, Sept. 7, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 350-352 (hereinafter Wecht
testimony).
(38) Id., Sturdivan testimony, at 395.
(39) Id., Sturdivan testimony, 407-412, 420-424, and Baden testimony, 298.
(40) JFK exhibit F-331, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 533.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Photographic evidence report, para. 52ff.
(43) Id. at 57-80.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) ID. at 156ff.
(47) Id. at 95-103, inter alia.
(48) Testimony of Dr. James Barger, Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy,
Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 645ff., 555ff., and 556ff. respectively
(hereinafter Barger, Weiss, or Aschkenasy testimony).
(49) See memorandum of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, V HSCA-JFK hearings
723ff.
(50) Report of Dr. William K. Hartmann and Dr. Frank Scott, in the photographic
evidence report, para. 92-103.
(51) Warren Report, p. 18.
(52) Ibid., pp. 18-19.
(53) Forensic pathology report, para. 461ff.
(54) Photographic evidence report, para. 110-168.
(55) Testimony of Thomas Canning, Sept. 12, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 161.
(56) Id. at 161-179.
(57) ID .at 179-191.
(58) Photographic evidence report, para. 127-168.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Id. at 272-287.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Id. at 247-251.
(63) Id. at 257-271.
(64) Id. at 247-251.
(65) See letter of Charles Leontis (JFK document 014205).
(66) JFK documents 014744 and 014833.
(67) Testimony of Luke Mooney, hearings before the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office 1964), vol. III, p. 284 (hereinafter Warren Hearings).
(69) Ibid.
(70) Id. at 287.
Page 600
600
(71) Testimony of Eugene Boone, III Warren Hearings, 293.
(72) Ibid.
(73) Id. at 294.
(74) Report of the Firearms Panel, VII appendix to the HSCA-JFK
para. 135-146 (hereinafter firearms report); Warrent Report, p. 85.
(75) Id., firearms report, at 131-134.
(76) Guinn testimony, p. 533.
(77) Sylvia Meagher, "Accessories After the Fact" (New York:
1967) pp. 95-100.
(78) See e.g., testimony of Jack D. White, Sept. 14, 1978, II HSCA hear-
ings, 322ff.
(79) Photographic evidence report, para. 186ff.
(80) Testimony of Calvin S. McCamy and Sgt. Cecil W. Kirk, Sept. 15,
1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 425-430 (hereinafter McCamy or Kirk testimony
(81) Warren Report, pp. 118-121.
(82) Ibid.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Id. at 128-129, 130-131.
(85) Id. at 125-126.
(86) Id. at 122-124.
(87) Id. at 129-137.
(88) Id. at 136.
(89) Meagher, "Accessories After the Fact," pp. 104-105, supra.
(90) Id. at 120-127, 200-209.
(91) JFK Exhibit F-399, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 255.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Report of Vincent J. Scalice, in the Report on the Subject of the
Examination of the Handwriting and Fingerprint Evidence in the Investigation of
the Assassination of John F. Kennedy by the Questioned Documents Panel, VIII
appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 147ff. (hereinafter questioned
documents report).
(94) Id. at 27.
(95) I Warren Hearings, 117-118.
(96) Warren Report, pp. 180-181.
(97) Id. at 125-128.
(98) Groden testimony, pp. 124ff.
(99) Photographic evidence report, para. 347ff.
(100) Id. at 366-376.
(101) See, e.g., photographic evidence report, para. 439.
(102) Id. at 377.
(103) Id. at 196, 237.
(104) JFK Exhibits F-396, F-207 and F-208 and related testimony, HSCA-
JFK hearings, II-p. 342, II-p. 435 and l-p. 127 respectively.
(105) Photographic evidence report, para. 196.
(106) JFK Exhibits F-183, F-184 and F-312, II-p. 245, II-p. 245 and II-p. 388
HSCA-JFK hearings respectively.
(107) JFK Documents 001198 and 001197.
(108) Photographic evidence report, para. 377.
(109) Questioned documents report, para. 27.
(110) Warren Report, pp. 137ff.
(111) Id. at 143.
(112) Testimony of Roy Truly. March 24, 1964. III Warren Hearings. 215.
(113) See, e.g., testimony of Danny Arce, Bonnie Ray Williams, Charles Givens,
Billy Lovelady and Harold Norman, Warren Report, vol. Vl, pp. 363-367, vol. III,
pp. 161-184, vol. VI, pp. 345-356, vol. Vl, pp. 336-341, and vol. III, p.
186-198, respectively.
(114) Questioned documents report, para. 147ff.
(115) Interview of James Jarmen. Sept. 25, 1977, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 003347); testimony James Jarmen, III War-
ren hearings, 201.
(116) See JFK exhibit F-126 and related Groden testimony, I HSCA-JFK
hearings. 107 inter alia.
(117) Warren Report, pp. 147-149.
(118) J. Gary Shaw and Larry R. Harris, Cover-Up (publisher, 5. Gary Shaw,
Cleburne, Tex., 1976), p. 39.
Page 601
601
(119) Photographic evidence report, para. 759ff.
(120) Interview of Billy lovelady, May 9, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK document 009188).
(121) Testimony of roy Truly and M.L. Baker, Mar. 24, 1964, and Mar. 25, 1964,
III Warren hearings, 212-241, 242-270.
(122) Testimony of Mrs. Robert A. Reid, Mar. 25, 1964, III Warren hearings,
270-281.
(123) The committee is not unaware of arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., P.
D. Scott, P. L. Hoch and r. Stetler, eds., The Assassination: Dallas and Beyond
(New York: vingage Boods, 1976), pp. 93-100. The committee traveled to Dallas
and toured the Texas state book Depository building. During those visits, the
times required to reach the second floor from both the street and the sixth
floor were determined. The committee found that the testimony of Truly and Baker
does not preclude a finding the Oswald was on the sixth floor at the time the
shots were fired.
(124) Warren Report, p. 157.
(125) Id. at 160, 163-165.
(126) Id. at 165.
(127) Id. at 176-180.
(128) Firearms report, para. 198.
(129) See, e.g., JFK Documents 006905, 003533 and 010905.
(130) Warren Report, pp. 650-651.
(131) Interview of Jack Ray Tatum, Feb. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 006905).
(132) Warren Report, pp. 176-180; testimony of James W. Bookhout, VII Warren
hearings, 312.
(133) Warren Report, p. 404.
(134) See, e.g., Meagher, Accessories After the fact, pp. 283-292, supra.
(135) Firearms report, para. 149-150.
(136) Neutron activation analysis report, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 528.
(137) Testimony of Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 13, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings;
see also deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, XII appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings.
(138) Questioned documents report, para. 27.
(139) JFK exhibit F-510, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 350.
(140) Warren Report, p. 423.
(141) Id. at 375-424.
(142) Id. at 390-394.
(143) Id. at 393.
(144) Id. at 391-392.
(145) ID. at 392.
(146) Id. at 406-412.
(147) JFK exhibit F-178, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 350.
(148) Warren Reprot, pp. 406-415.
(149) Ibid.
(150) Testimony of Carlos Bringuier, X Warren hearings, 35-36.
(151) JFK staff reprots, House Select Committee on Assassinations (classified
JFK Documents 014972, 014973, 014974 and 014975).
REFERENCES: SECTION B
(1) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, June 10, 1964 (JFK Document
014512).
(2) FBI interview of Samuel Pate, Mar. 10, 1964 (JFK Document 014513).
(3) Letter from L.G. Kersta to J. Lee Rankin, July 17, 1964 (JFK Document
002892).
(4) Outside contact report, Dr. James E. Barger, May 30, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 008926).
(5) "Analysis of Recorded sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy," Bolt Beranek and newman Inc., in "A Study of the Acoustics Evidence
Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,' appendix to the
hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), Vol VIII, sec. 1 (hereinafter BBN report, --appendix to
the HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
Page 602
602
(6) Id. at sec. 3.
(7) Id. at Foreword.
(8) Testimony of Paul McCaghren, Sept. 11, 1978, hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, u.S. House of Representatives. 95th Cong. 2d sess.
(Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Vol. II, p. 108
(hereinafter McCaghren testimony. -- HSCA-JFK hearings,--)
(9) Id. at 109-110.
(10) BBN report, sec. 4.1.
(11) Id. at sec 3.
(12) Id. at sec. 3.3.
(13) Id. at sec. 4. As explained in sec. 5.3 of the BBN report, the number of
sequences tested may be listed at differing points in the committee's record as
4,5, or 6, depending upon the stage of analysis the acoustical project was at
(14) Ibid. An additional, less precise screening test was referred to in the the
hearings on the acoustical project. This screening test was to determine whether
the number of impulses in each of the impulse sequences on the Dallas Police
Department tape approximated the number of impulses in the expected echo pattern
of Dealey Plaza.
(15) Id. at sec. 5.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Id. at sec. 5.1, step 3.
(19) Id. at sec. 5.
(20) Testimony of Prof. Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, Dec. 12, 1978, V
HSCA-JFK hearings, 556.
(21) BBN report, sec. 5.2(3)
(22) Ibid.
(23) Id. at sec. 5.2(2)
(24) Ibid.
(25) Id. at sec. 5.2(1)
(26) Testimony of Dr. James E. Barger, Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 649
(hereinafter Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978.
(27) BBN report, sec. 5.1, step 3.
(28) Id. at sec. 5.2(1)
(29) Ibid.
(30) Id. at sec. 5.1, step 5.
(31) Id. at sec. 5.1, steps 5 and 6.
(32) Id. at section 5.1, step 6. A technical term for an "invalid match" is a
"False alarm"; this term was used during the hearings on the acoustical project
and in the BBN report.
(33) Id. at section 5.3.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Ibid.
(36) ID. at section 5.4.
(37) Ibid. During his Sept. 11, 1978, testimony before the committee, before the
probability estimate was refined for the BBN report, Barger estimated the
probability that this would occur at random as 5 percent. Testimony of Dr. James
E. Barger, Sept. 11, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 67 (hereinafter Barger
testimony, Sept. 11, 1978).
(38) BBN report, sec. 5.4
(39) Ibid.
(40) ID. at sec. 1.4.
(41) Barger testimony, Sept. 11, 1978, p. 94.
(42) BBN report, sec. 1.4.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 556.
(46) Id. at 559.
(47) BBN report, section 1.5.
(48) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 566.
(49) An Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, section 14, Professor Mark R. Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, in
"A study of the Acoustics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy," VII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter
Weiss-Aschkenasy report).
Page 603
603
(50) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, pp. 558-559.
(51) Weiss-Aschkenasy report, section 4.14.
(52) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 605.
(53) Id. at 568-569.
(54) Ibid.; Weiss-Aschkenasy report, section 5.3.
(55) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, pp. 581-582.
(56) Id. at 556, 605.
(57) BBN report, section 1.5.
(58) Barger testimony, December 29, 1978, p. 684.
(59) Id. at 581.
(60) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 586.
(61) Barger testimony, December 29, 1978, p. 681.
(62) Ibid.
(63) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 571.
(64) Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978, pp. 680-681.
(65) Id. at 681.
(66) Id. at 682.
(67) Interview of H.B. McLain, Sept. 26, 1977, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 002378) (hereinafter McLain interview).
(68) Interview of Sergeant Jimmy Wayne Courson, Sept. 26, 1977, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 002381) (hereinafter Courson
interview).
(69) Capt. P.W. Laurence Exhibit, hearings before the President's Commission on
the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1964), volume XX, p. 489 (hereinafter -- Warren Hearings, --).
(70) Dallas Cinema Association film (JFK document 005011).
(71) Courson interview.
(72) Dallas Cinema Association film (JFK document 005011).
(73) JFK Exhibits F-668, 669, 670, 671, and 681, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 703.
(75) Testimony of H.B. McLain, Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 625
(hereinafter McLain testimony).
(76) Id. at 629.
(77) Id. at 630.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Id. at 637.
(80) Id. at 630.
(81) Id. at 635.
(82) Daily assignment sheet for Solo motors (JFk document 014391), V HSCA-JFK
hearings, 652.
(85) See, e.g., transcript of CBS television interview of H. B. McLain with Eric
Enberg, Jan. 4, 1979 (JFK document 014387).
(86) See, e.g., JFK exhibit F-680 (paper submitted by Anthony Pellicano), V
HSCA-JFK hearings, 652.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Transcript of november 22, 1963, channel 2 police transmissions (JFK
document 006996).
(89) Interview of Gerald D. Henslee, Aug. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK document 013886).
(90) Mclain testimony, p. 630.
(91) Transcript of CBS television interview of H. b. McLain with Eric Enberg,
Jan. 4, 1979 (JFK document 014387).
(92) Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978, pp. 650-651; BBN report, section 5.4.
(93) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 592.
(94) McLain testimony, p. 640.
(95) BBN report, section 6.1.
(96) Id. at section 2.1.
Page 605
604
(97) See section I A of the Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations:
Findings and Recommendations.
(98) Report of the Photographic Evidence Panel VI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings, paragraphs 64 to 80 (hereinafter photographic evidence report).
(99) BBN report, section 4.1.
(100) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 3, 1964 (JFK Document
014514).
(101) For a detailed memorandum on the process of synchronizing the tape to the
film, see the memorandum of G. Robert Blakey, Feb. 22, 1979, V HSCA-JFK
hearings, 723.
(102) Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, in "Report on the Medical Evidence
and Related Issues pertaining to the Report on the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy," VII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, pars, 461 to 494
(hereinafter forensic pathology report).
(103) JFK Exhibit F-331, section 5 (neutron activation analysis report of Dr.
Vincent P. Guinn), I HSCA-JFK hearings, 506.
(104) Ibid.
(105) See section I A 3 of the Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations
Findings and Recommendations.
(106) Dr. Baden acknowledged this extraordinarily remote possibility in
discussions with the staff (memorandum of Donald A. Purdy, Dec. 20, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014996)). He was prepared to
respond ot questions concerning this theoretical possibility during the Dec.
29th, 1978, hearing, but because of the time spent on the acoustical evidence
during that hearing, Dr. Baden's scheduled appearance before the committee was
canceled. His opinion, and that of the forensic pathology panel, remains that
there is not medical evidence that the President was struck by a bullet fired
from the grassy knoll.
(107) See Blakey memorandum, Feb. 22, 1979, p. 723.
(108) Photographic evidence report, pars. 182-185.
(109) Testimony of Governor John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK
hearings, 42.
(110) Photographic evidence report, par. 68.
(111) Id. at 70.
(112) Id. at 71.
(113) Id. at 72, 74-80.
(114) Forensic pathology report, par. 487.
(115) Photographic evidence report, par. 153.
(116) Id. at 164-166.
(117) Warren Report, p. 117.
(118) Testimony of Robert A. Frazier, hearings before the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. III, pp. 403-412 (hereinafter Frazier
testimony, -- Warren hearings, --).
(119) Testimony of Monty C. Lutz, Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 484.
(120) See memorandum of Chief counsel G. Robert Blakey, printed as an addendum
to "A Study of the Acoustics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy," VIII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings.
(121) See section I A 3 of the "Report of the Select Committee on
Assassinations; Findings and Recommendations."
(123) Photographic evidence report, pars. 10-38, 42.
(124) Testimony of Dr. William Hartmann, Sept. 11, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings,
137.
(125) Photographic evidence report, pars. 10-38, 42.
(126) Id. at 40.
(127) Id. at 41.
(128) Id. at 292.
(129) Id. at 303-04.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Id. at 305.
(132) Id. at 306.
(133) Ibid.; and outside contact report with Bob Hunt, Jan. 15, 1979, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014736).
(134) Photographic evidence report, pars. 321-322.
(135) Id. at 324-327.
(136) Id. at 328-329.
Page 605
605
(137) Id. at 328-331.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Id. at 331.
(140) Id. at 279-301.
(141) Id. at 302.
(142) Id. at 307-309.
(143) Id. at 315-317.
(144) Id. at 251.
(145) Id. at 282.
(146) Id. at 283-285.
(147) Id. at 286.
(148) Id. at 287.
(147) Id. at 288.
(148) Id. at 287.
(149) Id. at 288.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Id. at 263.
(152) Id. at 265-266.
(153) "Analysis of Earwitness Reports Relating to the Assassination of President
Kennedy, " prepared by D.M. Green, consultant to bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.,
VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter BBN-Green report).
(154) Ibid.
(155) This possibility was also recognized by the Warren Commission in its
discussion of the number of shots that were fired (Warren Reprot, p. 111). The
testimony of Emmett Joseph Hudson may illustrate the difficulty of finding facts
based on the recollections of witnesses, especially these who have had the
opportunity to read about the events in newspapers or who may have been led to
change their testimony by the manner in which they were questioned at the time
of the assassination. Hudson was located in front of the stockade fence on the
grassy knoll, in a position where he may have been expected to have heard
distinctly any shot fired from the knoll. (See JFK exhibit F-129 I, HSCA-JFK
hearings, 109). Hudson gave as sworn statement to the Sheriff's Department of
Dallas County on November 22, 1963. He said he was in Dealey Plaza, sitting on
the steps in front of the stockade fence, facing Elm Street, during the time of
the assassination. He heard three shots. They came "from behind and above me."
(Emphasis added.) (XIX Warren hearings, 481.)
Hudson's testimony would seem to mean "from behind the fence," and his statement
has been so understood (J. Thompson, "Six Seconds in Dallas" (Berkeley, Calif.:
Berkeley Medallion Books, 1976), appendix A, witness No. 75.
Hudson gave a depositon to the Warren Commission on July 22, 1964; he told
counsel the third "shot was coming from above and kind of behind." (VII Warren
hearings, 560.) Counsel then asked: "You heard it come from sort of behind the
motorcade and then above?" (Emphasis added.) Hudson answered, "Yes." (Ibid.)
Hudson answered, "Well, it sounded like it was high, you know, from above and
kind of behind like--in other words, to the left" (Ibid.) Counsel asked, "And
that would have fit in with the Texas School Book Depository, wouldn't it?'
(Ibid.) Hudson replied, "Yes." (Ibid.)
Hudson also indicated that he saw the second shot hit the President in the head
"a little bit behind the ear and a little bit above the ear" on the right side.
(Id. at 560.) According to his testimony, he was lying on the ground facing Elm
when the third shot was fired. (Ibid.) He also felt that the first shot was
fired shortly after the motorcade had turned off houston onto Elm at about the
first lightpost on Elm on the right (id. at 559); the second--that hit the
President in the head--came a little later, near the second lightpost on Elm on
the right (id. at 560); and the third occurred at about the steps leading down
to Elm Street that he was standing on (id. at 561). According to Hudson, the
third shot must have hit the President in the neck. (Ibid.)
If the scientific evidence summarized in the text is correct, Hudson must be
wrong in some aspects of his testimony. According to the scientific evidence,
the first sho missed, and it was fired shortly after the President's limousine
turned onto Elm. The scientific evidence indicated, moreover, that the second
shot hit
Page 606
606
the President in the neck, not the head, when the limousine was between the
first and second lightposts; it also indicated the President was hit in the head
not by the second, but by the fourth shot, at the point when the limousine was
between the third and fourth shots, Hudson is seen still stanking, not lying
down as he remembers.
In summary, Hudson was wrong about which shots hit the President in the ead and
neck, the location of the limousine at each shot and his own body position at
the time of the shooting.
It may will be that Hudson's understanding of what happened was influenced by
the newspapers after he had given his November statement to the Sheriff's
Department. At two points during the July deposition, he indicated in answers
that he had rad newspapers that said that the President had been hit twice (id.
at 561) and that had carried Hudson's pictures in them (id. at 563).
He may also have been led to alter his first statement by the way in which he
was questioned by counsel, who have him an interpretation of his prior statement
to the Sheriff's Department and of his own testimony in the deposition that led
him to testify in a fashion consistent with what was then generally will known:
Oswald had fired three shots from the depository. When Hudson was contacted by
the committee, he told his story in words virtually identical to those he had
used in his deposition 15 years ago. He added, "Everything I told the Warren
Commission was correct." (Outside contact report with Emmett Joseph Hudson, Feb.
3, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014458).)
Hudson, now 71, had heard for years about the controversy about a shot from the
knoll; he does not think that one was fired from behind the stockade fence.
(Ibid.)
Hudson himself also recognized the other key factor that affects most of the
testimony of the witnesses in Dealey Plaza-he noted that "it was just such an
exciting time...", Warren hearings, VII p. 465.
In dissent, Congressman Edgar questions the testimony, quoted in the text, of S.
M. Holland. He correctly noted that there are, asin the case of Hudson,
differences between what he told the Dallas county Sheriff's Department and the
Warren Commission. He also notes that Holland said he saw a machinegun, using it
as a basis to call into question Holland's credibility. In fact, Special Agent
Ed Hickey had an AR-15, an automatic rifle, in the followup car, and he did have
it raised; Holland's testimony about the machinegun, therefore, can be
corroborated (XVII Warren hearings, 735). A photograph of the gun is published
in "The Torch Is Passed" (A.P. 1964), p. 17.
Congressman Edgar also noted that Holland reported seeing a "puff of smoke" and
questioned whether smoke could be seen when "smokeless' powder is used, as it is
in modern firearms. As it was explained by the firearms panel, modern weapons do
in fact emit smoke when fired (I HSCA-JFK hearings, 485 (Sept. 8, 1978)).
(156) Warren report, p. 110.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Id. at 111.
(159) Id. at 19.
(160) JFK Exhibit 644 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 504). The committee did not attempt
to interview Hargis because of his medical history.
(161) Ibid.
(162) JFK Exhibit 645 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 508). Newman conrfirmed to the
committee the accuracy of his statement to the Warren Commission. Outside
contact report, William Eugene Newman, February 10, 1979, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK document 014572).
(163) JFK Exhibit 646 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 510)
(164) JFK Exhibit 647 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 519). Landis confirmed to the
committee the accuracy of his statement to the Warren Commission. Outside
contact report with Paul Landis, February 17, 1979, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK document 014571).
(165) Ibid.
(166) JFK Exhibit 648 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 527). See reference 155, supra.
(167) Ibid.
(168) Ibid.
(169) BBN-Green report, section 4.
Page 607
607
(170) Id. at section 5.
(171) Ibid.
(172) Id. at appendix A.
(173) Id. at section 3.1.
(174) Ibid.
(175) "Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza," staff report, XII appendix to the
HSCA-JFK hearings.
(176) Photographic evidence report, para. 539-560.
(177) Id. at 612-613.
(178) Id. at 617-618.
(179) Id. at 673, 721-731.
(180) Ibid.
(181) During 1963-1964, Chrisman was employed at Rainier Union High School in
Rainier, Oreg. The committee obtained the affidavits of three teachers at that
school, Marva Haris, Norma Chase, and Stanley Perloom, that Chrisman was
teaching school in Rainier on November 22, 1963 (JFK document 013925).
(182) Deposition of E. Howard Hunt, Nov. 3, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 5-10 (JFK document 014506).
(183) See Section I A # of the Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations:
Findings and Recommendations; photographic evidence report, para. 188-197,
347-511.
(184) M. Eddowes, "The Oswald File" (New York: Clarkson n. Potter, Inc., 1977).
(185) Photographic evidence report, para. 732-748.
(186) Id at 749-755.
(187) Id. at 756-757.
(188) Id. at 757.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Report on the subject of the examination of the handwriting and
fingerprint evidence in the investigation of the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy, VIII appendix to the hearings.
REFERENCES: SECTION C
(1) United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610 (1910).
(2) See Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), chapter VI.
(3) Id. at 245-252.
(4) Id. at 376.
(5) Id. at 374.
(6) Id. at 780.
(7) Id. at 785.
(8) Id. at 333-373.
(9) Id. at 370-371.
REFERENCES: SECTION C 1
(1) See generally Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp.
655-658 (hereinafter warren Report).
(2) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Soviet-American
Relations During the Kennedy Years," June 1, 1978, prepared for the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-6 (JFK Document 008899).
(3) Id. at 9.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Warren Report, pp. 21-22, 254-280.
(6) Id. at 255, 374; Commission exhibit (CE) 3138.
(7) Id. at 254-280, and related Commission exhibits; see also testimony of
Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 13, 1978-Sept. 14, 1978, Hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing office, 1979), vol. II, pp.
206-319 (hereinafter Porter testimony, ---HSCA_JFK hearings,---); see also
"Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter," staff report, appendix to the hearings
before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives,
95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing
Page 608
608
Office, 1970), vol. XII (hereinafter Porter deposition, -- appendix to the
HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(8) Warren report, CE985-986.
(9) See generally "Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri
Nosenko," staff report, XII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter
Nosenko report).
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) CE 24, 180-198, 294-295, 297-322.
(13) CE 985, 986.
(14) CE 984.
(15) CE 985, 986.
(16) Ibid. (The suspicious nature of the consistently illegible signatures was
discussed in a memorandum of Warren Commission Counsel W. David Slawson to J.
Lee Rankin, June 4, 1964.)
(17) Nosenko report, secs. 3, 4.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Unpublished classified staff summary of review of CIA files on U.S.
defectors to Russia.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Staff report on Yuri Nosenko, Sept. 15, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 443.
(24) Id. at 449.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Id. at 460-464.
(29) ID. at 464.
(30) See generally Nosenko report, secs. 3,4, 7.
(31) Undated memorandum of W. David Slawson, Warren Commission counsel (1964),
p. 84ff.; executive session testimony of W. david Slawson, nov. 15, 1977, House
Select committee on Assassinations Exhibit 22 (JFK Document 014668).
(32) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 67-68, attachment G, para. 284, in "The Warren Commission,"
(33) See generally Nosenko report.
(34) Id. at sec. 1.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Testimony of John Hart, Sept. 15, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 487; see also
JFK exhibit F-427, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 536; Nosenko report, sec. 2.
(38) Id., Nosenko report at sec. 3.
(39) Compare Nosenko report, sec. 3, with secs, 4,7.
(40) See generally Nosenko report, sec. 1.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.; Porter testimony, p. 206.
(43) JFK document 014873.
REFERENCES: SECTION C 2
(1) "Report on the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 658-659
(hereinafter Warren report).
(2) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "United States-Cuban
Relations, 1959-64: An Analysis," May 1978 (JFK Document 010426), pp. 7-8
(hereinafter "United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-64").
(3) Id. at 8.
(4) Id. at 9-16.
(5) Id. at 9.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Id. at 10.
(9) Id. at 12.
Page 609
609
(10) Ibid.
(11) Id. at 17-25.
(12) Id. at 20.
(13) Id. at 33.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Id. at 35.
(17) Id. at 36.
(18) Id. at 39.
(19) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "A Selected Chronology
on Cuba and Castro, March 10, 1952-October 22, 1962," p. 29 (JFK Document
013100).
(20) Id. at 30.
(21) "United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-64," pp. 37ff.
(22) Id. at 45, inter alia.
(23) Id. at 48-49.
(24) Id. at 52.
(25) Id. at 53.
(26) Id. at 54.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Id. at 72-74.
(31) Id. at 70-71.
(32) Id. at 71-72.
(33) Id. at 72.
(34) "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United states: John F. Kennedy"
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 872-877 (JFK
document 013574).
(35) Warren report, pp. 406-414.
(36) Id. at 299-311.
(37) Id. at 658-659, 374.
(38) See, e.g., Washington Post article of Mar. 7, 1967 by Drew Pearson and Jack
Anderson, "Castro Counter Plot," and Miami Harald article of Mar. 3, 1967 by
Jack Anderson, "Did Plot by CIA to Kill Castro backfire on United States?"
(39) So "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim
Report," Senate Select committee to Sturdy Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 20, 1975 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) (S. Rept. 94-755) (hereinafter book
V).
(40) Senate interim report, pp. 71-180.
(41) Id. at 86-90.
(42) Id. at 74-85.
(43) Book V, p. 68.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid.
(48) Id. at 2.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Comments on book V, SSC final report, CIA classified document, August 30,
1977, tab C (hereinafter T.F.R.).
(51) Ibid.
(52) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA Sponsored Assassination
Conspiracies Against Fidel castro," staff report, app. to the hearings before
the Select Committee on Assassination, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X, para. 54 (hereinafter CIA-castro
staff report, --appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, --).
(53) CIA-Castro staff report, para. 46.
(54) Book V, pp. 6-7.
Page 610
610
(55) T.F.R., p. 10
(56) Warren report, pp. 308-309.
(57) Book V, pp. 6-7.
(58) T.F.R., tab B.
(59) CIA-Castro staff report, par. 35ff.
(60) See, e.g., T.F.R., tab B, C, D.
(61) T.F.R., tab B, p. 5.
(62) T.F.R., tab D.
(63) T.F.R., p. 10.
(64) T.R.R., tab B, p. 8.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid.
(68) CIA-Castro staff report, pars. 58-61.
(69) Id.at 63.
(70) Id. at 54.
(71) T.F.R., tab D, p. 4.
(72) Ibid. see also 1967 CIA Inspector General's Report, p. 84 (hereinafter
IGR).
(73) Ibid.
(74) T.F.R., tab D, p. 5.
(75) IGR, pp. 89-95.
(76) Id. at 85.
(77) Id.at 86-87.
(78) T.F.R., tab D, p.11.
(79) Ibid.
(80) Id. at at tab p. 12.
(81) Id. at 13.
(82) Id.at 16.
(83) IGR, p. 93a
(84) CIA-Castro staff report, par. 64.
(85) Id. at 65.
(86) Id. at 64.
(87) Transcript of conversations and interviews, trip to Cuba, Aug. 25, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 012208).
(88) Ibid. See also interview with President Fidel Castro, reprinted at III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 239-240.
(89) Book V, p. 68.
(90) JFK Document 012208, ref. 87 supra.
(91) CIA-Castro staff report, pars. 160-172. See also, generally, pars. 80-201.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Id. at 157-159.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Id. at 157-163.
(96) Ibid. See also pars. 17-22, 30. See also Book V for details on the
anti-Castro activities of Maheu, Roselli, Hiancan, etc.
(97) Id., CIA-Castro staff report, 17-19.
(98) Ibid.
(99) Id. at 20.
(100) Id. at 21-22.
(101) Id. at 176-177.
(102) Id. at 23-26, 176-177.
(103) See, e.g., testimony of Ralph Salerno, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK
hearings, 468.
(104) See section c 4 and pp. xx of this section, C 2, supra, for details.
(105) See section C 3 for details.
(106) Ibid.
(107) The method of operation was to contact syndicate figures who had contacts
in cuba. See IGR, pp. 16-19.
(108) T.F.R., tab C, p. 2.
(109) Id. at 5.
(110) Senate interim report, p. 104, fn. 1.
(111) CIA classified file review: Robert Maheu, Office of Security file.
(112) T.F.R., tab C, p. 2.
(113) Book V, pp. 60-61.
(114) Ibid.
(115) Ibid.
Page 611
611
(116) Unpublished staff report on the Nov. 22, 1963, Cubana flight, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4-5 (JFK Document 015047).
(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Book V. pp. 61ff.
(120) Id. at 61-62.
(121) Id. at 62.
(122) Classified staff summary: The Cuban-American, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (Ed Lopez), (JFK Document 014858) (hereinafter Cuban-American).
(123) Id.at 2.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Ibid.
(126) Id. at 3.
(127) Id. at 4.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Id. at 5.
(130) Id. at 4.
(131) T.F.R., tab B, p. 16.
(132) Cuban-American, p.5.
(133) Id. at 6.
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid.
(136) Id. at 6-14; see also JFK Document 014519.
(137) Cuban-American, p. 7.
(138) Id. at 7-8.
(140) Id. at 9.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Id. at 10.
(143) Ibid.
(144) Id. at 10-11.
(145) T.F.R., tab B, pp. 16-17.
(146) Deposition of Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Nov. 15, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, pp. 14-16 (JFK Document 013095).
(147) Id. at 16-29.
(148) Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Costro's Red Hot Hell (unpublished) (JFK Document
005134).
(149) Executive session testimony, Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Apr. 11, 1978, House
Select Committe on Assassinations (JFK Document 014674).
(150) Id. at 26-27.
(151) See JFK Documents 006940, 006975, 007000, 007078, 007079, 007080, 007132,
007136, 007278, and 007476.
(152) JFK exhibit F-428; III HSCA-JFK hearings, 282.
(153) Ibid.
(154) JFK exhibits F-429B and F-429C, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 196, 197.
(155) Id. at 274.
(156) See, e.g., classified staff summary of Silvia Duran's statements (JFK
Document 014862), pp. 9, 12; testimony of Eusebio Azcue, Sept. 18, 1978, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 133; and statements of Silvia Duran, JFK exhibit F-440a, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 6ff.
(157) Comments by Chief Counsel G. Blakey, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA-JFK
hearings, 283.
(158) Ibid.
(160) JFK exhibit F-518, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 181.
(161) Staff summary of Aug. 25, 1978 trip to cuba, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 014859).
(162) Interrogatories of Anna Luisa Calderon Carralero, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Document 014421).
(163) See, generally, JFK Documents 014974 and 014975.
(164) See JFK exhibit F-403, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 300.
(165) Unpublished staff report, Mexico City, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 52-53 (JFK Document 014856).
Page 612
612
(166) Interview of Horacio Duran Navarro, June 5, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Document 011683); interview of Lydia Duran, June 5, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document 011681); interview of
Ruben Duran Navarro, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 011680); interview of Bettey Serratos, June 6, 1978, House Select
committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014413), inter alia. A summary of the
investigative efforts relating to Oswald's trip to Mexico is contained in the
classified staff report of Dan Hardway and Ed Lopez (JFK Documents 014974 and
014975).
(167) JFK exhibit F-403, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 300.
(168) See JFK exhibit 440a, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 69 and Azcue testimony, 136.
(169) Id. at 24-25, 112.
(170) Azcue testimony, pp. 135-139.
(171) Id. at 95-96.
(172) Id. at 59.
(173) Unpublished staff report on Elena Garro do Paz, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 47 (JFK Document 014856).
(174) Id. at 49-52.
(175) JFK Document 014975, supra, p. 420; Duran statements, III HSCA-JFK
hearings, 100.
(176) Id, JFK Document 014975, p. 421; Duran statements, III HSCA-JFK hearings,
at 106-107.
(177) Ibid., JFK Document 014975, p. 421; staff summary of Mexico City trip,
Aug. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 3, 7, 8, 10 (JFK
Document 012210).
(178) The details of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico
city are contained in a 300-page classified staff report, "Lee harvey Oswald ***
and Mexico City," prepared by HSCA staff Dan Hardway and Ed Lopez (JFK Documents
014974 and 014975).
(179) JFK exhibit F-414, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 399.
(180) JFK exhibit F-419, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 361; memoranda, FBI Miami field
office, CD 770.
(181) Testimony of Secret Service Inspector Thomas J. Kelley, Sept. 19, 1978,
III HSCA-JFK hearings, 343.
(182) JFK exhibits F-415, 416, 417, and 418, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 401, 425,
433, and 436 respectively.
(183) Narration of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 319.
(184) Azcue testimony, pp. 126-178.
(185) JFK exhibit F-429C, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 212-213.
(186) Id. at 214-215.
(187) Id. at 216-217.
(188) Id. at 221ff.
(189) Id. at 222.
(190) See JFK exhibit F-685, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 179, and "United
States-Cuban Relations, 1959-1954," p. 72.
(191) JFK exhibit F-429C, supra, pp. 223-224.
(192) Id. at 224-225.
(193) See sec. D 5 of this report.
(194) See sec. D 3 of this report.
(195) "Anti-Castro Organizations and Activists and Lee Harvey Oswald in
New Orleans," staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 109
(hereinafter anti-Castro organizations).
(196) Id. at 110.
(197) Tape of interview with the defector, Dec. 13, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015049).
(198) T.F.R., tab B, p. 9.
(199) See executive session testimony of Richard M. Helms, Aug. 9, 1978,
House Select Committee on assassinations, and public session testimony of
Richard M. Helms, September 22, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, for further accounts
of Helms' relationship with the Warren Commission. See generally CIA
performance, par. 47-68; as explained in sec. D, while Richard Helms and other
CIA officials may not have overtly diverted the investigation, this does not
mean they fully acknowledged all details to the Warren Commission that might
have been pertinent to the investigation.
(200) See generally ref. 191 in sec. C3 anti-Castro organizations, pars.
205-388.
Page 613
613
REFERENCES : SECTION C 3
(1) "Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New
Orleans," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on
Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X, par. 23
(hereinafter Anti-Castro Cuban report,--- appendix to the hearings,---).
(2) Id. at 64-65, 460-463.
(3) Id. at 12.
(4) Id. at 13.
(5) Id. at 15.
(6) Id. at 17ff.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Id. at 18ff.
(9) Id. at 21.
(10) Id. at 23.
(11) See generally Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "United
States-Cuban Relations, 1959-64: Analysis," May 1978, pp. 17ff. (JFK Document
010426) (hereinafter United States-Cuban Relations).
(12) Id. at 20.
(13) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 25-26.
(14) Id. at 27.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Id. at 28.
(17) Id. at 29.
(18) Id. at 28.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Id. at 30.
(22) E. Howard Hunt, "Give Us This Day" (New York: Popular Library),
pp. 220-221 (hereinafter Hunt, "Give Us This Day"; see generally Haynes Johnson,
"The Bay of Pigs," (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964); and Miami Herald,
Dec. 30, 1962.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Hunt, "Give Us This Day," p. 221.
(26) Anti-Castro Cuban report, par. 31.
(27) Id. at 33-42.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Id. at 43.
(32) Id. at 44-45.
(33) "United States-Cuban Relations," pp. 54-55.
(34) Id. at 46-47.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Id. at 48.
(37) Tape recording of a meeting of anti-Castro Cubans in Dallas, Tex. Oct. 1,
1963 (JFK Document 010210).
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid.; upon listening to the tape, it is apparent that the state- ments by
Castellanos -- "we're waiting for Kennedy" and "we're going to see
him * * * to give him the works"-- which comes just after Castellanos relates an
unsuccessful effort to have a parade or march in downtown Dallas to promote the
cause of the anti-Castro Cubans, is only a proposal to demonstrate against
President Kennedy during his trip to Dallas. After reviewing the entire tape,
the staff concluded that Castellanos' statements were not meant as a threat of
physical violence against the President.
(40) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 59ff.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) U.S. Secret Service, blank letterhead memorandum, Nov. 27, 1963, Secret
Service 2-1-611.0, p. 1 (JFK Document 007601).
(44) Id. at 3.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
Page 614
614
(47) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 3, 1963, file CO-2-34,000, Chicago field
office, p. 1; U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 19, 1963, file No. CO-2-34,104,
pp. 1-6; U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, file No. CO-2-34,030, pp.
1-3.
(48) U.S. Secret Service report, Nov. 27, 1963, file 2-1-611.0, Chicago field
office, p.2 (JFK Document 007601).
(49) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 3, 1963, Chicago field office, file
CO-2-34,030, p. 4.
(50) The Secret Service continued the investigation despite the FBI's opinion
that the group was not involved in illegal activity. U.S. Secret Service report,
Dec. 3, 1963, Chicago field office, file CO-2-34,030.
(51) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. ix
(hereinafter Warren report).
(52) Deposition of James J. Rowley, Aug. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 23, 38, 39 (JFK Document 014240).
(53) Id. at 26-29, 38, 39.
(54) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 19, 1963, file CO-2-34,104, p. 7.
(55) Letter to James B. Rhoads, Archivist of the United States, from J. Edgar
Hoover, FBI, Dec. 28, 1970, Bureau 62-109060-6979. This letter states: "A review
of the this material indicates it pertained to a matter investigated by the U.S.
Secret Service. No investigation was conducted by the FBI with respect to the
allegations concerning Echevarria."
(56) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 347-348.
(57) See generally material on the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio in
the anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 342-388.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Id. at 351, 365.
(60) See generally Warren report, pp. 321-325.
(61) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 129ff.
(62) Id. at 114.
(63) Id. at 131.
(64) Id. at 181, 131.
(65) Id. at 114.
(66) Id. at 115.
(67) Id. at 142.
(68) Ibid.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Id. at 146.
(71) Id. at 152.
(72) Id. at 129.
(73) Id. at 194, 202, 203.
(74) Id. at 171ff.
(75) Id. at 172-173.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Id. at 181-183.
(78) Id. at 184.
(79) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 173-192.
(80) Id. at 177, 186-192.
(81) Id. at 197.
(82) Ibid.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Id. at 186-190.
(85) Id. at 195.
(86) Id. at 196.
(87) Id. at 198.
(88) Id. at 200-201.
(89) Ibid.
(90) Ibid.
(91) Id. at 64.
(92) Id. at 94ff.
(93) Id. at 95-96.
(94) Id at 64-65.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Ibid.
Page 615
615
(98) Id. at 64.
(99) Ibid.
(100) Ibid.
(101) Id. at 65.
(102) Id. at 93.
(103) Id. at 65.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Id. at 66.
(106) Id. at 67-68.
(107) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, July 24, 1964 (JFK Document
002442). Rankin asked Hoover to have the Bureau interview Silvia Odio's sister,
Annie Laurie Odio, to investigate this matter further.
(108) Id. at 2.
(109) Memorandum from J. Wesley Liebeler to Howard P. Willens, Warren
Commission, Sept. 14, 1964, pp. 4-6 (JFK Document 002539) (hereinafter
Liebeler-Willens memorandum).
(110) Warren report, p. 323.
(111) Liebeler-Willens memorandum, p.5.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Liebeler-Willens memorandum, pp. 4-6.
(114) Id. at 6.
(115) Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964),
volume 26, p. 595 (hereinafter Warren hearings).
(116) Ibid.
(117) Ibid.
(118) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Nov. 9, 1064, Warren
Commission exhibit (CE) 1553 (JFK Document 002448).
(119) The report was completed and sent to President Johnson on Sept. 24, 1964
(Warren report, p. v).
(120) Anti-Castro Cuban report, par. 68.
(121) Id. at 71c.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Id. at 68.
(126) Id. at 85ff.
(127) Id. at 85aff.
(128) Id. at 103.
(129) Memorandum to W. David Slawson from Burt W. Griffin, Apr. 16, 1964 (JFK
Document 002969). Dr. Einspruch stated that "she is given to exaggeration but
that all the basic facts which she provides are true" and that "he had great
faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswald."
(130) Memorandum to file from Gaeton Fonzi,, June 17, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009368).
(131) Id. at 1-2.
(132) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 74, 75.
(133) Summary of the testimony of Leon Brown, May 15, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassination (JFK Document 008343). Leon Brown appeared before the
committee on Nov. 16, 1977.
(134) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 107-109.
(135) Id. at 109.
(136) Id. at 110.
(137) Ibid.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Warren Report, p. 730.
(140) This evidence consists of statements to the committee and the Warren
Commission by Silvia Odio regarding when Oswald allegedly visited her and other
statements and evidence establishing Oswald's location at certain times (see
Warren Report, pp. 323-24, for more details). While the committee agreed that
Oswald would have had to have traveled by private transportation if he had
visited Odio on the 25th, 26th or 27th, the committee did not agree with the
Warren Commission conclusion that the evidence was "persuasive" that Oswald did
not visit Odio at the time she said he did.
(141) Warren Report, p. 377.
Page 616
616
(142) Id. at 402-404, 713-725
(143) Id. at 725.
(144) Id. at 726.
(145) Id. at 728-729.
(146) Id. at 406-412, 728, 729.
(147) Id. at 407.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 220.
(150) Id. at 218.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Warren Report, p. 408.
(153) ID. at 726.
(154) Id. at 727.
(155) Id. at 728.
(156) X Warren hearings, 34-35.
(157) Id. at 37.
(158) Warren Report, p. 728.
(159) Testimony of Carlos Bringuier, April 7, 1964, X Warren hearings, 34-36;
deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations,
p. 61 (JFK Document 009084) (hereinafter Bringuier deposition).
(160) Ibid.
(161) Warren Report, p. 729; Bringuier deposition, pp. 61-62.
(162) X Warren hearings, 37.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Warren Report, pp. 728-729.
(165) Ibid.
(166) Id. at 729.
(167) Ibid.
(168) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 226-230.
(169) Ibid.
(170) Ibid.
(171) Ibid.
(172) Warren Report, p. 729.
(173) Id. at 39-42.
(174) Ibid.
(175) Ibid.
(176) Id. at 729.
(177) Ibid.
(178) Warren hearings, 44.
(179) Warren Report, p. 730.
(180) CIA chronology on Lee Harvey Oswald, p. 126 A. & B.
(181) Id. at 120, 126a.
(182) Deposition of Reeves Morgan, Apr. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 008501) (hereinafter Morgan deposition).
(183) Id. at 10-12.
(184) Outside contact report with Frances Fruge, Dec. 19, 1978 (JFK Document
015044).
(185) Bernard Fensterwald, "Coincidence or Conspiracy," 1st ed. (New York:
Kensington Publishing Corp., 1977), pp. 279-298, 451-457.
(186) Memorandum from Patricia Orr re Clinton, Feb. 3, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005003).
(187) Deposition of Henry Earl Palmer, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 4, 5 (JFK Document 008499) (hereinafter Palmer deposition).
(188) Deposition of Bobbie Dedon, May 19, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassination, pp. 4-5 (JFK Document 008498).
(189) Palmer deposition, pp. 10-13.
(190) Id. at 11; affidavit of Corrie Collis, Nov. 7, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 013007).
(191) Ibid.; testimony of John Manchester, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 12 (JFK Document 008503); deposition of William Dunn, Apr.
18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 12 (JFK Document 008497)
(192) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 448.
(193) Id. at 432.
(194) Id. at 448.
Page 617
617
(195) FBI interview of Jack Martin, No. 89-69, Nov. 25, 1963.
(196) Ibid.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 428-438.
(199) Id. at 429ff.
(200) Ibid.
(201) Id. at 439-437.
(202) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 441; immunized testimony of Carlos
Marcello, Jan. 11, 1978, pp. 58-63.
(203) Id. at 430.
(204) Id. at 431.
(205) Ibid.
(206) Testimony of Guy Banister, Aug. 5, 1963, FAA grievance hearing, p. 840
(JFK Document 014904).
(207) Id. at 218.
(208) Id. at 218ff.
(209) Ibid.
(210) Id. at 224.
(211) Id. at 225.
(212) Id. at 226ff.
(213) Id. at 431.
(214) Ibid.
(215) Id. at 418ff.
(216) Id. at 451; FBI document, interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, New
Orleans field office, No. 89-69, p. 2
(217) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 7.
(218) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 450ff.
(219) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 7.
(220) Ibid.
(221) Id. at 8.
(222) Ibid.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Ibid.
(225) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 27, 1963, pp. 1-2.
(226) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 3.
(227) Ibid.
(228) Ibid.
(229) Id. at 9.
(230) U.S. Secret Service report, New Orleans, Dec. 13, 1963, file CO-2-34,030,
p. 5 (JFK Document 003840).
(231) Id. at 1.
(232) Id. at 5.
(233) FBI document, Nov. 25, 1963, New Orleans office, No. 89-69, interview of
Jack Martin.
(234) Id. at 5.
(235) Bringuier deposition; deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009394); deposition of Luis
Rabel, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
009080).
(236) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para, 491.
(237) Outside contact report with Delphine Roberts, Sept. 1, 1978 (JFK Document
011196).
(238) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 491.
(239) Id. at 504ff.
(240) Id. at 505.
(241) Ibid.
(242) Ibid.
(243) Deposition of Adrian T. Alba, May 5, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 19 (JFK Document 009964) (hereinafter Alba deposition); see
also interview of Jack Mancuso, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 2 (hereinafter Mancuso interview). Mancuse recognized a
photograph of Oswald as someone who frequented his premises, Mancuso's
Restaurant.
Page 618
618
(244) Alba deposition, p. 52; he remembered that Banister frequented Mancuso's.
Mancoso interview; he recognized Banister and Ferrie as persons that frequented
his restaurant.
(245) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 488.
(246) "The Persecution of Clay Shaw," Look magazine, Aug. 29, 1969.
REFERENCES: SECTION C 4
(1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 333
(hereinafter cited as Warren report).
(2) Id. at 333-365.
(3) Id. at 374.
(4) Id. at 357.
(5) Id. at 796-797, 370-371.
(6) Id. at 359-365.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Id. at 369-371, 801-802.
(9) Id. at 370-371, 801.
(10) Id. at 370-371.
(11) Id. at 790.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Id. at 801.
(14) Id. at 373.
(15) "Organized Crime: Staff and Consultant Reports," appendix to the hearings
before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives,
95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979), vol IX, para. 603-655 (hereinafter HSCA report on organized
crime,--appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Warren report, pp. 792-793.
(20) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 620ff.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Warren report, pp. 792-793.
(24) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 620ff.
(25) Id. at 1195-1270.
(26) Id. at 1244-1268.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Id. at 1208-1209.
(30) Id. at 1210ff.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Id. at 1244-1268.
(34) Id. at 829-830.
(35) Id. at 1153-1196.
(36) Id. at 656-793, 1153-1176.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Testimony of Lewis McWillie, Sept. 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 2ff.
(39) Warren report, pp. 801-802.
(40) Id. at vol. XXII, p. 859, Commission Exhibits 1442, 1443.
(41) HSCA staff report on organized crime, para. 665-04.
(42) Id. at 721ff.
(43) Id. at 737-738.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
(46) See FBI memorandum Nov. 6, 1959 on Ruby as a PCI, JFK Document 003040;
executive session testimony of Charles W. Flynn, Nov. 16, 1977 (JFK Document
014669).
(47) HSCA report on organized crime, pp. 737-738.
(48) Testimony of Jack Ruby, June 7, 1964, V Warren hearings, 202 (hereinafter
Ruby testimony).
Page 619
619
(49) See HSCA report on organized crime, para. 741.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Id. at 665-676.
(54) Id. at 741ff. inter alia.
(55) Ibid; Ruby testimony, pp. 205-208.
(56) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 678.
(57) Id. at 743ff, 1105-1152.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Warren report, p. 369.
(60) Ibid.
(61) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1144-1152.
(62) Id. at 663.
(63) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination
Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro" staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings.
(64) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 685-712, inter alia.
(65) Id. at 685.
(66) Outside contact report with Judge Burt W. Griffin, Sept. 27, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015111).
(67) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 710-712, 724-725.
(68) Ibid.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Ibid.
(73) Id. at 695-696, 704.
(74) Ibid.
(75) Ibid.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Id at 724.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 371.
(80) Id. at 370.
(81) Testimony of Ralph Salerno, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 430
(hereinafter Salerno testimony).
(82) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 794-830; narration on Ruby telephone
calls, Sept. 26, 1976, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 496-499.
(83) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1341ff and 794-830.
(84) Id. at 887-907, 794-830.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid.; see also pars. 1153-1176.
(88) Ibid.
(89) Ibid.; see also pars. 1195-1270.
(90) Id. at 829-830.
(91) Id. at 831-864, 794-830; see also, Sept. 26, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings,
496-499.
(92) Id. at 833-834.
(93) Ibid.
(94) Id. at 844-857.
(95) Id. at 863.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Id. at 1356.
(98) Id. at 1358.
(99) Id. at 1359ff.
(100) Ibid.
(101) Id. at 822-823.
(102) Id. at 827-828.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Id. at 818-821.
(105) Ibid.
(106) Ibid.
Page 620
620
(107) Id. at 954-958.
(108) Id. at 960-961.
(109) Id. at 958.
(110) Id. at 859.
(111) Id. at 499-602.
(112) Id. at 499-513, 516-522.
(113) Id. at 523ff.
(114) Id. at 525.
(115) Id. at 523-602.
(116) Ibid.
(117) Id. at 526ff.
(118) Id. at 597.
(119) Id. at 523ff. and 581-582.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Id. at 1367.
(126) Id. at 599-600.
(127) Id. at 547-566, 1367, inter alia.
(128) Id. at 583-588.
(129) Id. at 1367.
(130) Id. at 547-566.
(131) Ibid.
(132) Id. at 558-559.
(133) Ibid.
(134) Ruby testimony, pp. 188-189.
(135) Id. at 205.
(136) Id. at 181-213.
(137) Newsweek, March 27, 1967.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Warren report, pp. 336-337; XV Warren hearings, 71-96.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Interview of Burt W. Griffin, Nov. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations; statemetn of Burt W. Griffin, prepared for Seth Kantor, "Who Was
Jack Ruby?" (New York: Everest House, 1978), pp. 201-202.
(142) "Report of the Polygrapahy Panel on the Subject of the Analysis of Jack
Ruby's Polygraph Examination," VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings
(hereinafter polygraphy panel report).
(143) Warren Report, pp. 807-816.
(144) Id., XIV Warren hearings, 584, 598 (testimony of Special Agent Herndon).
(145) Polygraphy panel report.
(146) Ibid.
(147) See, e.g., JFK Document 005089, 007359, 010450, 004770, 007421, and
015112.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Ibid.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Interview of Earl Ruby, Jan. 2, 1979, House Select Committee on
Assassinations.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Interview of Irwin S. Weiner, Jan. 2, 1979, House Select Committee on
Assassination.
(155) Salerno testimony, p. 385.
(156) Consultant's report on organized crime (hereinafter Salerno report), in
"Organized Crime: Staff and Consultant Reports," para. 14-17.
(157) Salerno testimony, p. 385.
(158) Ibid.
(159) Id. at 386.
(160) Ibid.
(161) See generally Salerno report, para. 30.
(162) Salerno testimony, pp. 386-426, 437-453.
Page 621
621
(163) Task Force Report: Organized Crime, 1967, President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Washington, D.c.: U.S. Government Printing
office, 1967), pp. 1-3.
(164) Salerno testimony, pp. 434-436.
(165) Salerno report, para. 84.
(166) Id. at 85-115, 154-176.
(167) Salerno testimony, pp. 415-416.
(168) Salerno report, para. 12.
(169) Id. at 13.
(170) Id. at 85, 154-176.
(171) Id. at 248.
(172) Id. at 186-201.
(173) Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st sess., Sept.
25 to Oct. 9, 1963, p. 23.
(174) Salerno report, pars. 186-201.
(175) Ibid.
(176) Id. at 247.
(177) Id. at 186-201.
(178) Ibid.
(179) Ibid.
(180) See generally Salerno testimony, pp. 453-464.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Ibid.
(183) Ibid.
(184) Salerno report, para. 203-224.
(185) Ibid.
(186) Ibid.
(187) Ibid.
(188) Id. at 232-245.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Id. at 225-231.
(191) Ibid.
(192) Id. at 246.
(193) Ibid.
(194) Ibid.
(195) Ibid.
(196) Ibid.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Ibid.
(199) Id. at 247.
(200) Id. at 248.
(201) Ibid.
(202) Ibid.
(203) Ibid.
(204) Ibid.
(205) Id. at 250; for a review of legal issues relating to electronic
surveillance programs during that period, see hearings of the National
Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), Volume 2, pp. 1637-1646.
(206) Salerno testimony, pp. 428-429.
(207) Id. at 427.
(208) Salerno report, pars. 76, 251ff.
(209) Ibid.
(210) Id. at 118-176.
(211) Id. at 157 (JFK Exhibit F-622, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 446).
(212) Id. at 161 (JFK Exhibit F-629, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings 448).
(213) Id. at 177.
(214) Id. at 118-176.
(215) JFK exhibit 618, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 443.
(216) Cf. Salerno testimony, p. 458.
(217) Ibid.
Page 622
622
(218) Id. at 448 (JFK Exhibit F-630).
(219) Ibid.
(220) Id. at 177-178.
(221) See ref. 205, supra, pp. 1596-1636 for a detailed discussion of the nature
of conversations recorded by electronic surveillance programs. The commission
provided a detailed overview of the structure, operation, and violent crimes of
a well-know La Cosa Nostra family, as disclosed through an electronic
surveillance program.
(222) Salerno testimony, p. 454.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Salerno report, para. 166-176.
(225) Ibid.
(226) Id. at 170.
(227) Id. at 169.
(228) Id. at 170.
(229) Id. at 174.
(230) Id. at 178, 247, 294-295.
(231) Id. at 251-285.
(232) Ibid.
(236) Ibid.
(237) Id. at 262.
(238) Id. at 255-256, 266-269.
(239) Ibid.; see also, para. 135.
(240) Salerno testimony, pp. 454-455.
(241) Salerno report, para. 269.
(242) Salerno testimony, 454-346.
(243) Ibid.
(244) Id. at 31-43, 257-258.
(245) Ibid.
(246) Ibid.
(247) Ibid.
(248) Id. at 252-255.
(249) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin co., 1978), pp. 615-616; interview with former Labor Department
official, July 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
010423).
(250) Ibid.
(251) "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings, para. 277, inter alia.
(252) Id. at 283.
(253) Ibid.; see also para. 284; interview with J. Lee Rankin, Nov. 20, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013218).
(254) Executive session testimony of Burt W. Griffin, Nov. 17, 1977, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, XI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK Hearings, para.
283.
(255) Deposition of Courtney Evans, sept. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 014003.
(256) Ibid.
(257) Ibid.
(258) Interview of Al Staffeld, Aug. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 011096); deposition of Al Staffeld, sept. 7, 1978
(JFK Document 014929).
(259) Salerno report, para. 173.
(260) Ibid.
(261) Id. at 281-284.
(262) Id. at 288-294, inter alia.
(263) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 300-427.
(264) Id. at 428ff. 817-821.
(265) Id. at 333-369.
(266) Ibid.
(267) Id. at 345; see also, immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, Jan. 11,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 37-38, 55-77.
Page 623
623
(268) Id. at 431-479; see also, "Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee
Harvey Oswald in New Orleans"; staff report, X Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings
(hereinafter anti-Castro Cuban report).
(269) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 431-443.
(270) Ibid.
(271) Id. at 442.
(272) Id. at 491-497.
(273) Id. at 431-440.
(274) Id. at 457-490.
(275) Id. at 461; see also, Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 489-516.
(276) Id. at 464.
(277) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 390.
(278) Immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, Jan. 11, 1978, pp. 64-65.
(279) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 460ff.
(280) Warren Reprot, p. 292.
(281) Ibid., HSCA report on organized crime, pars. 817-821, 908-923.
(282) Ibid., HSCA report on organized crime; see also interview with Ovid
Demans', Oct. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
012587); FBI interview with Joseph Civello, Jan. 14, 1964, FBI file No.
92-2824-101.
(283) Id. HSCA report on organized crime, at 908-923.
(284) Id. at 370-418.
(285) Ibid.
(286) Ibid.
(287) Id. at 376-389.
(288) Ibid.
(289) Ibid.
(290) Ibid.
(291) Id. at 390-398.
(292) Ibid.
(293) Id. at 331, 416-418.
(294) Id. at 288.
(295) Id. at 338-341.
(296) Interview with Al Staffeld, Aug. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 011096).
(297) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 321-322.
(298) Ibid.
(299) Id. at 284; see also Salerno testimony, p. 381ff.
(300) Salerno testimony, pp. 415, 419.
(310) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination
Conspiracy Against FIdel Castro," staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings.
(311) Ibid.
(312) JFK Exhibit F-601, interview of Jose Aleman, Mar. 12, 1977, V HSCA-JFK
hearings, 314.
(313) Ibid.
(314) JFK Exhibit F-602, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 311.
(315) JFK Exhibit F-601, see ref. 312, supra.
(316) JFK Exhibit F-602, see ref. 314, supra.
(317) JFK Exhibit F-603, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 317.
(318) Ibid.
(319) Ibid.
(320) Testimony of Jose Aleman, Sept. 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 301-324.
Page 624
624
(321) Testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings,
373-377.
(322) Ibid.
(323) Ibid.
(324) See JFK document 012007.
(325) Salerno report, par. 85-176.
(326) Ibid.
(327) Id. at 288.
(328) Salerno testimony, p. 386.
(329) Ibid.
(330) HSCA staff review of FBI files on Edward G. Partin (JFK document 012218).
(331) Ibid.
(332) Ibid.
(333) Ibid.
(334) Ibid.
(335) Interview of Edward Grady Partin, July 20, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassination (JFK document 011314) (hereinafter Partin interview).
(336) Ibid.
(337) See ref. 330, supra.
(338) Ibid.
(339) Ibid.
(340) Ibid.
(341) Ibid.
(342) Partin interview; HSCA staff review of FBI files on Edward G. Partin,
supra.
(343) Ibid.
(344) Ibid.
(345) Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New york: Pocket Books,
1976), pp. 125-126.
(346) Ibid.
(347) Interview of Walter Sheridan, July 10, 1978 and Aug. 24, 1978 (JFK
documents 009777 and 010423)
(348) Ibid.
(349) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 794-831; IV HSCA-JFK hearings,
497-499.
(350) Ibid.; see also, HSCA reporting organized crime, para. 887-907.
(351) Id., HSCA report on organized crime, at 814-816, 822-828.
(352) Interview with Walter Sheridan, Oct. 26, 1978 (JFK Document 012184).
(353) "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings, para. 277; HSCA report on organized crime, 794-795.
(354) Memorandum from Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin to Deputy
Director Richard M. Helms, March 12, 1964, "Jack Ruby, Activities and
ssociates."
(355) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1267; interviews with Allen Dorfman,
July 14, 1978 and July 19, 1978 (JFK Document 009918 and 010043.)
(356) House Select Committee on Assassinations staff review of FBI and Justice
Department files on Frank Chavez; interview with Walter Sheridan, July 10, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009777)
(357) Ibid.
(358) Playboy Magazine, December 1975, pp. 83, 96.
REFERENCES: SECTION C 5a
(1) Testimony of John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 11 (hereinafter Connally
testimony,--HSCA-JFK hearings,--); see "Politics and Presidential Protection:
The Motorcade," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume XI,
par 12 (hereinafter staff report, The motorcade),--appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings,--.
Page 625
625
(2) Id., Connally testimony, at 14-18; id., staff report, The Motorcade, at 13.
(3) Id., staff report, The Motorcade, at 4.
(4) Deposition of Jerry Bruno, Aug. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 27 (JFK Document 014025) (hereinafter Burno deposition);
testimony of Kenneth P. O'Donnell, May 18, 9164, hearings before the President's
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965), vol. 7, p. 443 (hereinafter O'Donnell
testimony,--Warren Hearings,--); see staff report, The Motorcade, para. 4.
(5) Connally testimony, 28; see staff report, The Motorcade, para. 4.
(6) Staff summary of interview of Frank Erwin, july 29, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 10 (JFK Document 010696); see staff report, The
Motorcade, para. 4.
(7) See Connally testimony p. 28.
(8) Bruno depositon, p. 31.
(9) Id. at 39-42; see staff report, The Motorcade, para. 34.
(10) Testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, May 7, 1964, VIII Warren hearings, pp.
334-335 (hereinafter Sorrels testimony). See Bruno deposition, p. 35.
(11) Id., Bruno deposition, at 31-32; Jerry Bruno diary entries, Oct. 31, 1963,
p. 7 (JFK Document 011337); O'Donnell testimony, p. 443.
(12) See Connally testimony, . 51; see also Bruno deposition, p. 49.
(13) Ibid., Bruno depositon, p. 49; see Sorrels testimony, p. 337; see also
Connally testimony.
(14) O'Donnell testimony, p. 443; Jerry bruno diary entries, supra ref. 11, p.
9; interview of Winston G. lawson, Apr. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 007066); see staff report, The Motorcade,
pars. 45-46.
(15) Deposition of Bill Moyers, Aug. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 23 (JFK Document 014018); deposition of Elizabeth F. Harris,
Aug. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 14 (JFK Document
013152).
(16) Id., deposition of Elizabeth F. Harris, at 28.
(17) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2
(hereinafter Warren report).
(18) See staff report, The Motorcade, para. 46, 48, 52, 58.
(19) See e.g., preliminary special Dallas report No. 3 (interview with lee
Harvey Oswald by Captain Will Fritz), Nov. 29th 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document
013921); testimony of Joseph M. Smith, July 23, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 535;
testimony of D. V. Harkness, Apr. 9, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 312.
(20) See e.g., testimony of Ronald B. Fischer, Apr. 1, 1964, VI Warren hearings,
196; testimony of Seymour Weitzman, VII Warren hearings, p. 106.
(21) See e.g., J.G. Shaw and L. Harris, "Cover-up--The Government Conspiracy To
Conceal the Facts about the Public Execution of John Kennedy" (privately
published, 1976), pp. 98-99.
(22) See, e.g., interview of Seymour Weitzman, July 25, 1978. House Select
committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 006646); interview of D.V.
Harkness, Feb. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK
Document 005884); outside contact report with Ronald Fischer, July 18, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 010560).
(23) Interview of Thomas Lem Johns, Aug. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 010695).
(24) Interview of Forrest V. Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 4-5 (JFK Document 007062).
(25) See e.g., interview of Seymour Weitzman, July 25, 1978. House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 006646); interview of D.V.
Harkness, Feb. 7, 1978, p. 1, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 005884); outside contact report with Ronald Fischer, July 18, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 010560).
(26) CE 768, IV Warren hearings, 320, 322, 346.
(27) Testimony of Joseph M. Smith, VII, Warren hearings, p. 535; see interview
of Joseph M. Smith, Feb. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 005886).
(28) Outside contact report with James P. Hosty, Nov. 8, 1977, House Select
Committee on Assassination (JFK Document 005886).
(29) Deposition of Frank Leslie Ellsworth, Jr., July 25, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 91-92 (JFK Document 010903).
Page 626
626
(30) Executive session testimony of Robert E. Jones, Apr. 20, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-25 (JFK Classified Document 014643).
(31) Letter from Department of Defense ot House Select Committee on
Assassinations, June 22, 1978, p. 6 (JFK Document 009383).
REFERENCES: SECTION C 5b.
(1) "Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 327
(hereinafter Warren report).
(2) See FBI retrieval, preliminary draft of affidavits (JFK Document 011943).
(3) Warren report, p. 327.
(4) R.S. Anson, "They've Killed the President--The Search for the Murders of
John F. Kennedy" (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 42, 48, 154-156, 165-166,
180-189; P.B. Scott, P.L. Hoch, and R. Stetler, eds., "The Assassination: Dallas
and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Boods, 1976), pp. 466-468.
(5) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
Performance of the Intellegence Agencies," Book V, Final Report of the Select
Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 95-97 (hereinafter Book V).
(6) Harold Feldman, "Oswald and the FBI," The Nation, Jan 27, 1964, p. 86;
Joseph C. Goulden, "Ruby Posed As TV Cameraman's Helper to get at Oswald,"The
Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 8, 1963, p. 22, col. 1; Lonnie Hudkins, "Oswald
Rumored As informant for U.S.," Houston Post, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 1.
(7) Interview of Alonze Hudkins, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 007998).
(8) Ibid.; interview of Joseph Goulden, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 006452).
(9) Warren report, p. 327.
(10) Warren Commission Document 205.
(11) Executive session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, Nov. 9, 1977,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 101 (classified JFK Document
014666).
(12) Id. at 119-128, 137-138.
(13) Id. at 107, 120-121.
(14) Executive session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, Nov. 10, 1977,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 8, 16 (JFK Document 014637)
(15) Id. at 26, 32.
(16) Warren Commission Document 205.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.; executive session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, ref. 14,
p. 19.
(19) Id. at 23.
(20) Warren Commission Document 205.
(21) FBI report to the House Select Committee on Assassinations re inquiry
concerning page 696 of FBI Dallas Division report of special agent of the FBI,
dated Dec. 23, 1963, July 12, 1978, pp. 9, 16 (JFK Document 010154) (page 696 of
Warren Commission Document 205 corresponded with page 25 of the notebook report
contained therein).
(22) Ibid.
(23) Id. at 10-11.
(24) Id. at 16-17.
(25) Id. at 16-17.
(26) Id. at 18-39.
(27) Hosty deposition, p. 5.
(28) Id. at 7.
(29) Id. at 34.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Id. at 34-35.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Id. at 36.
(34) Id. at 37-38.
Page 627
627
(35) Commission exhibit 823, hearings of the President's commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1964) (hereinafter 17 Warren hearings, 728); vol. 17, CE 824, Warren
hearings 736 (exhibit 824); vol 26, p. 143 (exhibit 2758).
(36) Administrative coversheets to 1962 FBI field report (JFK Document 006032).
(37) Interview of John Fain, June 25, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009973) (hereinafter Fain interview).
(38) See CE 825 XVII Warren hearings, 741-752.
(39) Fain interview.
(40) Interview of B. Tom Carter, Dec. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 013542).
(41) Fain interview.
(42) Interview of Arnold J. Brown, Dec. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 013922)
(43) Interview of Harry G. Maynor, Mar. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 006901) (hereinafter Maynor interview); see ref. 38
supra.
(44) Interview of Milton Kaack, Dec. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 013674).
(45) CE 826, XVII Warren hearings, 758-762.
(46) Deposition of William S. Walter, Mar. 23, 1978, House Select committee on
Assassinations, pp. 3-6, 55-58 (JFK Document 006847) (hereinafter Walter
deposition.
(47) See ref. 38 supra.
(48) Interview of John L. Quigley, Mar. 12, 1978, House Select committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009914).
(49) Walter deposition, pp. 7-9.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Id. at 25-26.
(52) Id. at 30-36.
(53) Id. exhibits 85-86.
(54) Id. exhibit 84.
(55) Id. at 38.
(56) Outside contact report with Sharon Covert, Mar. 6, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006032).
(57) Maynor interview.
(58) Deposition of Orest Pena, June 23, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 010136) (hereinafter Pena deposition).
(59) Id. at pp. 11-13, 16-18.
(60) Id. at 10, 18-20.
(61) Executive session testimony of Warren C. deBrueys, May 31, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 28-30 (JFK Classified Document 014716).
(62) Id. at 8-9.
(63) Id. at 32-33.
(64) Id. at 68-69.
(65) Pena deposition, pp. 9-10, 12, 15-16, 21-22, 27-28.
(66) Deposition of Adrian Alba, May 5, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 009964) (hereafter Alba deposition).
(67) Id. at 10-12, 20-30.
(68) Testimony of Adrian Alba, Apr. 6, 1964, X Warren hearings, pp. 219-229.
(69) Alba deposition, pp. 21, 24-25.
(70) Interview of Adrian alba, Feb. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document 005961).
(71) FBI memorandum from Cartha DeLeach to Mr. Mohr, Apr. 30, 1964, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013858).
(72) Interview of Will Hayden Griffin, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009916) (hereinafter Griffin interview).
(73) See ref. 38 supra.
(74) Interview of J. Gordon Shanklin, June 26, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 009746) (hereinafter Shanklin interview).
(75) Hosty deposition, pp. 6-9, 34, 54, 61-65.
(76)
Page 628
628
(77) Id. at 64-65.
(78) Shanklin interview, p. 4.
(79) Interview of Will Hayden Griffin, Dec. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 013543).
(80) Id. at 96.
(81) Id .at 96.
(82) Id. at 97; Hosty deposition, p. 45.
(85) Ibid.
REFERENCES: SECTION C 5c
(1) Testimony of John A. McCone, May 14, 1964, hearings before the President's
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 120-121 (hereinafter Warren
hearings).
(2) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, May 14, 1964, hearings before the President's
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.s.
Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 120-121 (hereinafter Warren
hearings).
(3) See, e.g., classified deposition of CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 29, 32 (JFK Classified Document 014863);
classified deposition of CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 31-34 (JFK Classified Document 014731); classified
deposition of CIA employee, Oct. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassination of CIA employee, June 29, 1978, House Select committee on
Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014725); and classified deposition of
CIa employee, July 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.
209-210 (JFK Classified Document 014718).
(4) See letter from Chairman Louis Stokes to Adm. Stansfield Turner, Jan. 27,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 004889).
(5) Letter from Acting Director Frank C. Carlucci to the House Select Committee
on Assassinations, Mar. 23, 1978 (JFK Document 006837).
(6) Classified staff summary of interviews with J. Maury and D. Murphy, June 14,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014884).
(7) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Russia Division CIa
personnel, Dec. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
014845).
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Executive session testimony of James Wilcott, Mar. 22, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 6-8 (JFK Classified Document 014672).
(12) Id. at 11-13.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Id. at 8-12.
(15) Id. at 13-19.
(16) Id. at 38-39.
(17) Id at 13f.
(18) Classified staff summary re the Wilcott allegation, Nov. 1, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (JFK Classified Document 014843).
(19) Ibid.
(20) Id. at 6-7.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Id. at 6.
(23) Id. at 4-7.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, Sept. 22, 1978, Hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979), vol. IV, pp. 185-188 (hereinafter Helms testimony,--HSCA-JFK
hearings.--); see JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 206.
(27) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Classified Document 014863).
(28) Ibid.
Page 629
629
(29) See classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, Dec. 15,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (Classified JFK Document 014839);
classified deposition of CIa employee, June 27, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 48 (Classified JFK Document 014863).
(30) Helms testimony, pp. 189-191.
(31) CE 910, XVIII Warren hearings, 115.
(32) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29,
pp. 1-3; see CE 917-918, XVIII Warren hearings, 115-116.
(33) Ibid.; Classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 27, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 48 (JFK Classified Document 014863); Helms
testimony, p. 186.f
(34) See text accompanying ref. 26, supra.
(35) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p.
8; CIA classified summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, March
20, 1979, p. 4226 (JFK Classified Document 015018).
(36) Id. at 14.
(37) Id. at 15.
(38) See CE 931-933, XVIII Warren hearings, 131-135.
(39) See JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 206.
(40) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p.
17; deposition of CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014731); classified staff interview of
CIA employee, Mar. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Classified Document 000077).
(41) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p.
19.
(42) Id. at 21.
(43) Id. at pp. 21-23.
(44) See JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 406.
(45) See, e.g., classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 17, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 109-112 (JFK Classified Document
014718).
(46) See, e.g. Helms testimony, pp. 188-189.
(47) Classified staff summary re 201 opening sheet "AG," Dec. 10, 1078, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Classified Document 014836); CIA
classified summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, mar. 20, 1979
(JFK Classified Document 015018).
(48) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, Oct. 10, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 15-18 (JFK Classified Document 014717).
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 406.
(52) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 50-51 (JFK Classified Document 014731).
(53) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 81-83 (JFK Classified Document 014863).
(54) See JFK exhibit F-524, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 207.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Classified CIA summary responding to HSCA request for explanations, Mar.
20, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document
015018).
(58) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, Oct. 10, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 48 (JFK Classified Document 014717).
(59) Ibid.
(60) Id. at 46-47.
(61) Id. at 45-47.
(62) See JFK exhibit F-522, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 197; ref. 30 supra.
(63) Helms testimony, p. 189; see "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders," an Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st
sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 83.
(64) Warren Commission Document 871.
(65) Ibid.; see Report to the President by the Commission on Central
Intelligence Activities within the United States (Washington, D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office, June 1975), pp. 209-210 (hereinafter Rockefeller
Commission Report).
Page 630
630
(66) Interview of Monica Kramer, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 005881); interview of Rita Newman, Feb. 2, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014431).
(67) CIA FOIA Document No. 614-261, p. 1; classified staff summary re Minsk
photograph, Nov. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK
Classified Document 014840).
(68) Id., Minsk photograph, at 7-12.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid.
(71) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual program, Dec. 1, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Classified Document 001438); see letter
from George Bush to Subcommittee on Government Information and Operations, Aug.
10, 1976.
(72) Ibid.; see Central Intelligence Exemption in the Privacy Act of 1974, Mar.
15, 1975, June 25, 1975, hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, 94th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing office, 1975), p. 153.
(73) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual program, supra ref. 71, pp. 12-13.
(74) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 20th, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 40 (JFK Classified Document 014735).
(75) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual index cards, Jan. 15, 1979, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Classified Document 014848).
(76) Ibid.
(77) Id. at 1-2.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.; classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 18, 1978, House Helect
Committee on Assassination, p. 24 (JFK Classified Document 014718).
(80) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, Oct. 10, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 20 (JFK Classified Document 014717).
(81) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual index cards, supra ref. 75, pp. 2-3.
(82) Id. at 3; see classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for
explanations, Mar. 20, 1079, pp. 4218-4219 (JFK Classified Document 015018).
(83) Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 2.
(84) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual index cards, supra ref. 75, pp. 5-7.
(85) Id. at 6; see classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for
explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, pp. 4218-4219 (JFK Classified Document 015018).
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid.
(88) See ref. 1 supra.
(89) See, e.g., Rockefeller Commission Reprot, pp. 209-210.
(90) See R. S. Anson, "They've Killed the President-The Search for the Murderers
fo John F. Kennedy" (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 172-173; see, generally,
CIA FOIA Document 961-927 A.G.
(91) See JFK Exhibit F-526, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 209.
(92) Classified staff summary re CIa Oswald memorandum, Dec. 13, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014847); classified
staff summary re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, Jan. 22, 1979, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014841).
(93) Ibid.
(94) Classified staff summary re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, supra ref.
92.
(95) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Russia division CIA
personnel, supra ref. 7.
(96) Classified staff summary re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, supra re.
92, p. 13.
(97) Id. at 13-14.
(98) Ibid.
(99) Id. at 16; see classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for
explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, pp. 4196-4198 (JFK Classified Document 015018).
(100) Classified staff summary re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, supra
ref. 92, pp. 17-23.
(101) See Warren Report, pp. 434-440.
(102) CE908, 910, 917, XVIII Warren hearings, 98, 105, 115.
Page 631
631
(103) CE931, XVIII Warren hearings,
(104) CE932, XVIII Warren hearings, 134.
(105) CE971, XVIII Warren hearings, 368.
(106) CE252, XVIII Warren hearings, 706.
(107) CE935, XVIII Warren hearings, 138, and CE909, p. 104.
(108) Ibid.
(109) CE823 and 824, XVII Warren hearings, 729, 736.
(110) Letter from Robert L. Keuch, Department of Justice, to House Select
Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 10, 1978 (JFK Document 006235).
(111) Letter from Robert L. Keuch, Department of Justice, to House Select
Committee on Assassinations, May 9, 1978 (JFK Document 008241).
(112) CE 2677, XXVI Warren hearings, 32.
(113) Warren Report, p. 258; see also CE946, XVIII Warren hearings, 162.
(114) Interview of Lewis Hopkins, Oct. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 012886).
(115) Ibid.
(116) Ibid.
(117) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, May 25, 1964 (JFK Document
003782); see generally CE2676, XXVI Warren hearings, 32.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Classified staff summary re Oswald's Soviet visa, Dec. 20, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Classified Document 014742).
(120) Ibid., p. 4.
(121) ibid., pp. 4-5
(122) Ibid.
(123) Warren Report, p. 691.
(124) See R. Anson, supra ref. 90, p. 135-137; Bernard H. Fensterwald,
"Assassination of JFK--By Coincidence or Conspiracy?" (New York: Kensington
Publishing Corp., 1977), pp. 566-567; P.D. Scott, P.L. Hoch, R. Stetler, eds.,
"The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Books, 1976)
(hereinafter "The Assassination").
(125) Deposition of John A. McVickar, May 5, 1978, Home Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 18-19 (JFK Document 008487).
(126) Id. at 3-4, 22.
(127) Executive session testimony of Priscilla Johnson McMillan, Apr. 20, 1978,
House Select committee on Assassinations, pp. 10-17 (JFK Classified Document
014676).
(128) Id. at 16.
(127) Executive session testimony of Priscilla Johnson McMillan, Apr. 20, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 10-17 (JFK Classified document
014676).
(128) Id. at 16.
(129) Id. at 16-18.
(130) Id. at 8-9, 61-62, 83-89.
(131) Id. (exhibit 95).
(132) Id. at 83-89.
(133) Id. at 31-34.
(134) Classified summary of interviews with soviet Russia division CIA
personnel, supra ref. 7.
(135) Deposition of Richard E. Snyder, June 1, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 18-19 (JFK Document 009264); CE909, 914 and 919, XVIII
Warren hearings, 100-117.
(136) See, e.g., ref. 107 and accompanying text supra.
(137) See, e.g., Bernard H. Fensterwald, supra ref. 112, pp. 221-222; M.
Canfield and A. Weberman, "Coup d'Etat in America-The CIA and the Assassination
of John F. Kennedy" (New York: The Third Press, 19750, p. 25.
(138) Deposition of Richard E. Snyder, supra ref. 123, pp. 5-7, 11-13.
(139) Id. at 13, 53-54.
(140) Letters from the HSCA to Scott Breckinridge, CIA, June 8, 1978 and July 6,
1978 (JFK Classified Document 014971).
(141) CIA FOIA Document 210-623, CE528.
(142) Classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, Mar.
20 1979, pp. 4200-4207 (JFK Classified Document 015018).
(143) Outside contact report with William Vance, Jan. 9, 1979, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014140)
(144) Interview with Dennis Flynn, June 16, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009534).
(145) Interview of Dr. Alexis H. Davidson, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Document 004686).
Page 632
632
(146) CE18, I Warren hearings, 50.
(147) CE994, XVIII Warren hearings, 616.
(148) See, e.g., Bernard H. Fensterwald, supra ref. 112, pp. 219-221.
(149) Davidson interview, supra ref. 132; see also interview of Mrs. Hal
(Natalia Alekseevna) Davison, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 004685).
(150) Davison interview, supra ref. 132.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Ibid.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Russia division CIA
personnel, supra ref. 7.
(155) For a detailed discussion of George de Mohrenschildt and his relationship
to Oswald, see "George do Mohrenschildt," staff report, appendix to the hearings
before the select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. XII, par. 3
(hereinafter de Mohrenschildt report - appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, No.--)
(156) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Apr. 23, 1964, IX Warren hearings,
235.
(157) Ibid.
(158) Ibid.
(159) See, e.g., Bernard H. Fensterwald, supra ref. 112, p. 212-214.
(160) Interview of James W. Moore, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 014893); see ref. 65 and accompanying text supra.
(161) De Mohrenschildt report, para. 33-34.
(162) Id. at 35-36.
(163) De Mohrenschildt testimony, supra ref. 143, p. 212.
(164) Outside contact report with Roger Gabrielson, CIA, Feb. 28, 1978, House
Select committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014969)
(165) De Mohrenschildt report, para. 44-45.
(166) Id. at 46-51.
(167) Warren Commission Document 75, p. 588.
(168) Ibid.; deposition of William G. Gaudet, June 15, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 13, 20 (JFK Document 010347) (hereinafter
Gaudet deposition).
(169) Warren Report, pp. 299-311.
(170) Warren Commission Document 75, p. 588.
(171) CE2123, XXIV Warren hearings, 663-691.
(172) Gaudet deposition pp. 7-8.
(173) Id. at 9.
(174) CIA memorandum for Special Assistant to Deputy Director of Operations,
subject: William George Gaudet, reference: CIA review staff memorandum 78-0110
dated Jan. 20, 1976 requesting information on William George Gaudet.
(175) Gaudet deposition, pp. 21-22.
(176) Id. at 10-13.
(177) Id. at 11-12.
(178) Id. at 13-14.
(179) See R. Anson, supra ref. 90, pp. 156-159; The Assassinations, supra ref.
112, p. 474.
(180) Folson Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 665; see also CE 1961, XXIII Warren
hearings, 795-796.
(181) Testimony of John E. Dovovan, May 5, 1964, VIII Warren hearings, 298.
(182) Outside contact report, file review of department of Defense files of
Robert Royce Augg, Richard Call, Nelson Delgado, John E. Donovan and Zack Stout,
Dec. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013677).
(183) CE 1385, XXII Warren hearings, 705; see also CE 2682, XXVI Warren
hearings, 41.
(184) Department of Defense unit diaries, Dec. 5, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations (JFK Document 013485).
(185) Id. at 183, 184.
Page 633
633
(186) Letter and attachments form Department of Defense to House Select
Committee on Assassinations, june 22, 1978, p. 20 (JFK Document 009383.
(187) Folson Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 658, 704.
(188) Unit diaries, supra ref. 187, pp. 351, 356.
(189) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 668.
(190) Warren report, p. 684.f
(191) CE 918, XVIII Warren hearings, 116.
(192) CE 196, XXIII Warren hearings, 797. Se also unit diaries, supra ref. 187.
(193) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIXI Warren hearings, 724-727.
(194) CE 1114, XXII Warren hearings, 79.
(195) Letter and enclosures from Department of Defense to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 28, 1978, p. 2 (JFK Document 006729).
(196) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 723-741.
(197) Id. at 724-727.
(198) Id. at 728-733.
(199) Letter and attachments from American Red Cross to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, Dec. 8, 1978 (JFK Document 013586).
(200) Id. at 23.
(201) Id. at 21-23.
(202) Ibid.
(203) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 740, 743.
(204) Id. at 727.
(205) Id. at 723-727.
(206) Outside contact report with Colonel William A. Cloman, Jr., Aug. 2, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013595); outside contact
report with Lt. Gen. Carles H. Hayes, Dec. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 013593).
(207) Outside contact report with Lt. Col. B. J. Kozak, Aug. 2, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013594).
(208) Executive session testimony of Col. Robert E. jones, Apr. 20, 2978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 18-19, 42 (JFK classified document
014677).
(209) See R. Anson, supra ref. 90, pp. 283-285; P. L. Hoch, "Army Intelligence,
A. J. Hidell, and the FBI," Oct. 8, 1977 (JFK Document 002538).
(210) Testimony of Col Robert E. Jones, supra ref. 211, pp. 6-7.
(211) Id. at 8.
(212) Id. at 8, 11.
(213) Id. at 8-9.
(214) Id. at 19.
(215) Id. at 17.
(216) Id. at 17-18.
(217) Id. at 18-19, 42.
(218) Id. at 20, 42.
(219) Id. at 10, 21.
(220) Id. at 25, 34-37, 49-50.
(221) Id. at 10, 50.
(222) Id. at 20-21, 24.
(223) Id. at 19-20.
(224) Id. at 21.
(225) Id. at 22-24.
(226) Letter and attachments from Department of Defense to the House Select
committee on Assassinations, July 26, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 010247); JFK classified document 000103.
(227) Letter from Department of Defense to the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, Sept. 13, 1978, House Select committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 011964).
(228) Letter and attachments from Department of Defense to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, June 22, 1978. House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009383).
(229) Ibid.
(230) Classified staff study: Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City, Dec.
15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 72-81, 124-183 (JFK
classified documents 014972-014975).
(231) Ibid. for extensive detail
(232) Ibid.
Page 634
634
REFERENCES : SECTION D 1
(1) Neal, Harry Edward, The Story of the Secret Service (New York: Grosset and
Dunlap, 1971), p. 15 (hereinafter Neal, Secret Service).
(2) Id. at 18-19.
(3) Id. at 17.
(4) Id. at 20.
(5) Id. at 22.
(6) Id. at 22-23.
(7) Id. at 23.
(8) Id. at 23-24.
(9) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The Authority of the
Secret Service ot Protect the President,' Mar. 29, 1978, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document
006845).
(10) Neal, Secret Service, p. 24.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Presidential
Protection and the Secret Service," Oct. 27, 1976, p. 2 (JFK Document 004157).
(14) Neal, Secret Service, pp. 24-25.
(15) Id. at 25.
(16) Id. at 70.
(17) Id. at 80-82.
(18) Manchester, William, The Death of a President, (New York: Penguin Books,
1977), p. 37 (hereinafter, Manchester, the Death ***).
(19) Id. at 35, 37, 131.
(20) Id. at 121.
(21) Manchester, The Death***.
(22) Letter from Chief of Secret Service James J. Rowley to J. Lee Rankin,
General Counsel, Warren Commission, June 9, 1964, p. 2 (contained in JFK
Document 012719, title of cover document: u.S. Secret Service--Protective
Information Guidelines.
(23) Id. at 2.
(24) Executive session testimony of Robert I Bouck, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7-33 (JFK Document 014669).
(25) See ref. 22, supra.
(26) See Manchester, "The Death***," p. 36. For the extent of the Secret
Service's reliance on the dallas Police Department for manpower, see Lawrence
Exhibit, hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: u.S. Government Printing Office, 1964),
volume 20, pp. 489-496 (hereinafter - Warren hearings, --). For an assessment of
manpower availability in relation to security needs, see testimony of Perdue W.
Lawrence, July 24, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 583-584, 585.
(27) U.S. Department of the Treasury Order 173-3, October 29, 1965 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965) (JFK Document 014978); see also
ref. 24, supra, for Bouck's statements on 1963 PRS procedures for analyzing and
disseminating threat data.
(28) Secret Service case files, June 5, 1978 (JFK Document 008894); see also
Secret service file re plot to kidnap Caroline Kennedy, May 10, 1978 (JFK
Document 008219).
(29) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 463, 465
(hereinafter Warren report).
(30) Id. at 443, 461, 464.
(31) Id at 445-446, 465.
(32) Id. at 463, 465.
(33) Id. at 447, 466.
(34) Id. at 449.
(35) Id. at 461, 443.
(36) Secret Service files review, Mar. 24, 1978 (JFK Document 006852).
(37) Secret Service case file summaries, June 5, 1978 (JFK Document 008894).
(38) Unpublished staff report on Secret Service files, Oct. 19, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014588).
(39) Commission Exhibit CE 767, XVII Warren hearings, 593; CE 768, p. 601.
Page 635
635
(40) Secret Service final survey report, Dec. 11, 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document
006183).
(41) Secret Service supplemental survey report, Mar. 29, 1963, pp. 1,2 (JFK
Document 014457).
(42) Secret Service supplemental survey report, nov. 5, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Document
004867).
(43) JFK Exhibit F-450, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 447; Secret Service supplemental
report, Dec. 30, 1963, pp. 106 (JFK Document 006183); see also Secret Service
memoranda of Nov. 12, 1963 and Nov. 14, 1963, Miami field office (JFK Document
008814).
(44) For the article written by the Miame journalist, see Christensen, Dan,
"JFK, King: The Dade County Links," in Miami magazine, september 1976, p. 25
(JFK Document 003360). Christensen could not document his assertion therein that
a planned motorcade was canceled, other than to say that "many people" believed
that a cancellation had taken place; see outside contact report with Dan
Christensen, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 004434). Persons cited by Christensen as sources for corroboration of
his version of the cancellation did not recall that his version was correct; see
outside contact report with the Honorable Seymour Gelber, Feb. 2, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013458); interview of Miami
field office Special Agent Talmadge Bailey, Mar. 1, 1978, House Select Committee
on office Special Agent Robert J. Jamison, Feb. 28, 1978, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 007063).
(45) Secret Service master file on that subject Thomas Arthur Vallee (JFK
Document 009581); Secret Service master file on Joseph A. Milteer (JFK Document
008814).
(46) Interview of Secret Service Special Agent David Grant, mar. 1, 1978, House
select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 005890).
(47) Interview of Presidential Appointments Secretary Pierre Salinger, May 30,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009690).
(48) Black, Edwin, "The Plot to Kill JFK in Chicago, Nov. 2, 1963," Chicago
Independent, November 1975, pp. 7-8 (JFK Document 013589).
(49) Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee, memorandum of Nov. 6,
1963, p. 2 (JFK Document 008581).
(50) Interview of 1963 Secret Service Special Agent Edward Tucker, Jan. 19,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document 004828).
(51) Interview of Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Coffey, Jan. 28, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 004831).
(52) See attachment to interview of Chicago Police Department, executive
assistant to superintendent of police, Richard Brzcek. 18, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, entitled "Arrest Reprot, Chicago Police Department"
(JFK Document 008581).
(53) Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee, memorandum of Nov. 6,
1963 by Special Agent Thomas D. Strong, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 008581).
(54) Id. at 1.
(55) Id. at 1; see also interview of former Chicago Police Officer Lawrence
Coffey, Jan. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK
Document 004831).
(56) Interview of former Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Coffey, Jan. 25, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 004831).
(57) See ref. 42, supra.
(58) For indication of receipt by PRS, see deposition of Secret Service Chief
James Rowley, Aug. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Book II,
pp. 8, 64 (JFK Document 014026); a report from a field office addressed to the
Office of the Chief would be delivered either to PRS or to the Office of the
Head of Protective Operations, Ed Wiley. For a copy of the Nov. 6, 1963
memorandum of Chicago field office Special Agent Strong, see ref. 55, supra; it
concerned the Service's final preassassination contact with Vallee and was
addressed to the Office of the Chief. For indication of nonreceipt by the agents
coordinating preparations in Dallas, see testimony of Forrest Sorrels, VII
Warren hearings,
Page 636
636
338-339; see also interview of SAIC, Dallas Field office, Forrest V. Sorrels,
Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document
007062); and interview of Secret Service Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, Jan.
31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Document 007066).
(59) Letter of Nov. 27, 1963 from ASAIC Maurice G. Martineau, Chicago, to Chief,
Secret Service, in Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthor Vallee (JFK
Document 008581).
(60) Secret Service reprot, Columbus, Ohio field office, Dec. 2, 1968 p. 2, in
Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee (JFK Document 008581).
(61) Interview of formal Chicago Field Office Special Agent Abraham W. Bolden,
Jan. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-6 (JFK Document
004825).
(62) Id. at 3-4.
(63) Id. at 4.
(64) Id. at 3.
(65) Interviews of Chicago field office ASAIC Mauice G. Martineau, Feb. 1, 1978,
House Select Committe on Assassinations (JFK Document 008483); and Chicago
Special Agent Conrad Cross, Apr. 14, 1978 (JFK Document 009370); James S.
Griffiths, Feb. 1, 1978 (JFK Document 005892); Gary McLeod, May 4, 1978 (JFK
Document 007995); Robert Motto, Dec. 30, 1977 (JFK Document 008482); Joseph
Noonan, Apr. 13, 1978 (JFK Document 009377); J. Lloyd Stocks, Apr. 12, 1978 (JFK
Document 009372); and Edward Tucker, Jan 19, 1978 (JFK Document 004828). House
Select Committee on Assassinations staff also interviewed White House Detail
Advance Agent David Grant (see ref. 46, supra), who coordinated security
preparations in advance of the President's scheduled Nov. 2, 1963 trip to
Chicago. None of these agents provided any corroboration of Bolden's version of
the Secret Service investigation of an alleged assassination team.
(66) Interview of Special Agent Robert Motto, Dec. 30, 1977, p. 2 (JFK Document
008482).
(67) Interview of former Special Agent Abraham W. Bolden, Jan 19, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-7 (JFK Document 004825).
(68) Id. at 5.
(69) The Honorable Seymour Gelber, "Diary of a Southern Prosecutor: (unpublished
manuscript), pp. 414-415, 427-428 (hereinafter Gelber, Diary); see also the
preface of this document, entitled "Summary" (JFK Document 002826).
(70) Interview of former Miami Police Officer Charles H. Sapp, February 25,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 009419); see
also interview of former Miami field office SAIC John Marshall, February 2,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 007063); and
Secret Service report, Miami field office, November 12, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Document
008814).
(71) Id., Golber, "Diary," at 426-427.
(72) Interview of former Miami SAIC John Marshall, February 2, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 007063).
(73) Secret Service report, Miami field office, November 12, 1963, p. 2 (JFK
Document 008814).
(74) Secret Service report, Miami field office, November 26, 1963, p. 2 (JFK
Document 008814).
(75) Ibid.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Id. at 1-2.
(78) Secret Service final survey report, Miami field office, December 30, 1963,
p. 7 (JFK Document 006183).
(79) Interview of Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, January 31, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4, 9 (JFK Document 007066); see also
testimony of Winston G. Lawson, April 23, 1964, IV Warren hearings, 321
(hereinafter Lawson testimony); see also interview of former SAIC, Dallas,
Forrest V. Sorrels, March 15, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.
3 (JFK Document 007062); and testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, VII Warren
hearings, 338-339.
(80) Gelber, "Diary," p. 433.
(81) See ref. 79, supra, to Winston G. Lawson.
Page 637
637
(82) See ref. 24, supra, pp. 32, 58; see also deposition of Thomas Kelley,
August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5, 54-56, 59-60,
64-65, 71-75 (JFK Document 014586).
(83) Testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, Apr. 7, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 338.
(84) Manchester, "The Death..." p. 121; see also testimony of Kennedy O'Donnell,
May 18, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 456.
(85) Warren Report, pp. 447, 448. There is a discrepancy between Dallas Field
Office SAIC Forrest V. Sorrels' 1963 protective policy toward traditionally
used, publicly known parade routes and the policy of Secret Service Chief Rowley
on that subject as set forth on p. 447 of the report. Sorrels testified before
the Warren Commission that Main Street in Dallas was always used for parades
(VII, Warren hearings, 337), yet Rowley stated to the Commission that, under
such circumstances, extra caution was required in inspecting and securing
buildings along the route.
(86) Id. at 448.
(87) Lawson testimony, pp. 327, 330.
(88) Warren Report, p. 448, note 173.
(89) Lawson testimony, p. 328; testimony of Perdue W. Lawrence, July 24, 1964,
VII Warren hearings, 580; see also statement of Perdue W. Lawrence to House
Select Committee on Assassinations, Nov. 4, 1977, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 003102).
(90) Outside contact report with Mrs. Ina Davidson, Aug. 11, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 010677); see also outside contact
report re Ms. Mary Vallee, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 014490).
(91) Outside contact report with Leonora Reddehase, Apr. 14, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 007494).
(92) One or more representatives from each of the committee staff specialized
investigative groups was consulted. None of Milteer's associates was identified
by staff members as an associate of Jack Ruby, Lee Harvey Oswald or any of their
associates.
(93) Memorandum of conversation between Bernard Fensterwald and Bill Sommersett,
June 5, 1978, p. 1 (JFK Document 014488).
(94) JFK Exhibit F-124, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 116.
(95) Testimony of Clyde Snow, July 25, 1978, HSCA-JFK hearings, IV 379-382.
(96) Abraham Zapruder film for example, c. frames 160-313, JFK Exhibits F-211 to
F-255, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 71-92; Orville nix film, for example, JFK Exhibit
F-267, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 110, and JFK Document 011265; and James Altgens
photograph, JFK Exhibit F-559, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 372.
(97) U.S. Secret Service School, "Principles of Protection of the President and
Foreign Dignitaries" (training manual in outline form) (publicher not stated,
1954), p. 48 on chauffeurs, especially (2) (a) ; pp. 51-53 on mounting and
dismounting moving automobiles, especially p. 55, section (12) on the lead car
(JFK Document 006730).
(98) Unpublished staff report on the Secret Service training facility at
Beltsville, Md., Sept. 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.
1-2 (JFK Document 012888). HSCA staff observed current members of the White
House and Vice Presidential details react protectively in a variety of simulated
attack situations. The task difficulty, degree of physical danger to the agents
during the simulations, and realism of the 1978 training contrasts sharply with
the "on-the-job" training which was standard in 1963; see also interview of
Winston G. Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, House Select committee on Assassinations, p. 2
(JFK Document 007066); and testimony of James J. Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 395.
(99) Testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, II Warren Hearings, 104. For
the standard applicable in 1963, see U.S. Secret Service School, "Principles of
Protection of the President and Foreign Dignitaries" (training manual in outline
form) (publisher not stated, 1954), p. 98 at (g). Shielding a protectee with an
agent's body during gunfire attacks is described as a "last resort" measure.
(100) Testimony of Secret Service Inspector Thomas Kelley, Sept. 19, 1978, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 328; see also Lawson testimony, p. 321.
Page 638
638
(101) Interview of William R. Greer, Feb. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 2, 8 (JFK Document 014059); see also testimony of Thomas
Kelly, Sept. 9, 1978, III HSCA--JFK Hearings, 328.
(102) Interview of William R. Greer, Feb. 28, 1978 House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 014059); see also U.S. Secret Service,
"Principles of Protection of the President and Other Dignitaries" (training
manual in outline form) (publisher not stated, 1954), p. 50 at (2)(a) : "The
Driver of the President's car should be alert for dangers and be able to take
instant action when instructed or otherwise made aware of an emergency."(JFK
Document 006730).
(103) Report No. 3947, Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination
of President John F. Kennedy, Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., Appendix to the
Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979, vol. VIII (hereinafter BBN report, -- appendix to the
HSCA--JFK hearings,--).
(104) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 9, 1964, II Warren Hearings, 136-137;
see also Lawson testimony, p. 338.
(105) Warren Report, p. 445. The Warren Commission emphasized the lack of
adequate definition, within the Secret Service, of the functions and
responsibilities of the advance agents who arrive at the Presidential
destination days or weeks beforehand in order to coordinate all protective
aspects of the Presidential trip. Too much discretion was left to the individual
advance agent, whose superiors ordinarily gave him only general instructions and
no checklist.
(106) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 9, 1964, II Warren Hearings, 138-140.
(107) Interview of Thomas Lem Johns, Aug. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pp. 2,3 (JFK Document 010695).
(108) JFK exhibit F-559, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 372; see also statement of Chief
Counsel G. Robert Blakey at testimony of James J. Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 397.
(109) Warren Reprot, p. 450.
(110) Ibid.
(111) Ibid.
(112) Testimony of Thomas J. Kelley, Sept. 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 327,
328.
(113) See refs. 96 and 108, supra.
(114) Testimony of Tomas J. Kelley, Sept. 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings 327, 328.
(115) Letter to ASAIC (Chicago), Maurice G. Martineau to Deputy Chief Paul
Paterni, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Document 007601).
(116) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 1(JFK
Document 003668).
(117) Id. at 1, 2.
(118) Id. at 1, 2.
(119) Id. at 4.
(120) Id. at 4-5.
(121) Id. at 2, 3, 4, 7.
(122) Id. at 2-3.
(123) Id. at 8 (distribution list, bottom left).
(124) ID. at 3.
(125) Secret Service memorandum, Miami Field Office, Dec. 13, 1963, pp. 1-3 (JFK
Document 003842); see also deposition of Edward Tucker, July 18, 1978. House
Select Committee on assassinations, pp. 38-39 (JFK Document 010902).
(126) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 7 (JFK
Document 003668).
(127) Id. at 6. A later phase of the Secret Service's investigation of Paulino
Sierra is recorded in Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 19,
1963, p. 5 (JFK Document 008429).
(128) See, generally, "Anti-Castro Organizations and Activities and Lee Harvey
Oswald in New Orleans," staff report, X Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para.
342-388.
(129) Id. at 350.
(130) Id. at 351-365.
(131) Id. at 376.
(132) Id. at 379.
Page 639
639
(133) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 7 (JFK
Document 003368).
(134) Id. at 4.
(135) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Hon. James B. Rhoads, Dec.
28, 1970, pp. 1-2 (FBI-JFK File 109060, section 1744 at 6979).
(136) Ibid.; see also deposition of Chicago Field Office SA Edward Tucker, Aug.
22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 42-43 (JFK Document
010902).
(137) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 5 (JFK
Document 003668).
(138) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 19, 1963, p. 6 (JFK
Document 008429); see also deposition of Joseph Noonan, July 14, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 21-23 (JFK Document 013260).
(139) Testimony of James Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA-JFK Hearings, 392.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Id at 329.
(142) Id. at 353.
REFERENCES: SECTION D 2
(1) Staff analysis of FBI file on the investigation of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, House Select Committee on Assassinations; "The Warren
Commission," staff report, XI appendix to the hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1979), vol. XI,
par. 4-21, 201-203 (hereinafter W. C. report).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records, documents, hearings and
exhibits, House Select Committee on Assassinations; WC report, para. 1-21.
(4) Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the
Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th
Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1979),
vol.,pp. 644-645.
(5) Ibid.
REFERENCES : SECTION D 3
(1) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The History of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation," prepared for the committee.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Staff analysis of FBI file on the investigation of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter
FBI-JFK assassination file); staff analysis of Warren Commission records,
documents, hearings, and exhibits, House Select Committee on Assassinations;
"The Warren Commission," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the
Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th
Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979),
volume XI, para. 44-70, 113-227 (hereinafter WC report,--appendix to the
HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file; staff analysis of testimony before the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect ot
Intelligence Activities by FBI supervisors of the investigation on the Kennedy
assassination, House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter FBI
supervisors testimony); WC reprot, para. 113-227.
(13) FBI-JFK assassination file; testimony of James Malley, September 20, 1978,
hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), volume III, pp. 462-512 (hereinafter Malley testimony;
--HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
Page 640
640
(14) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) FBI supervisors testimony; Malley testimony, pp. 462-512.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff interview with former
Assistant FBI Director William C. Sullivan, April 21, 1976; House Government
Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee staff interview with former
Assastant FBI Director William C. Sullivan, May, 2, 1976.
(21) FBI-JFK assassination file; FBI supervisors testimony; Malley testimony,
pp. 462-512.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Testimony of former Assistant FBI Director Alex Rosen before the Senate
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Operations, April 30, 1976.
(24) Ibid.
(25) FBI-JFK assassination file; FBI supervisors testimony.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Interview of former Assistant FBI Director Courtney Evans, August 24, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations; deposition of former Assistant FBI
Director Courtney Evans, September 6, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations.
(28) Ibid.
(29) FBI-JFK assassination file; FBI supervisors testimony.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file; "The Investigation of the Assassination
of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," book V,
Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 32-43 (hereinafter book V).
(32) Ibid.
(33) Id. at 6.
(34) FBI-JFK assassination file; WC report, para. 113-227; Malley testimony, pp.
466-476.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid.
(39) FBI-JFK assassination file; WC report, para. 163-205.
(40) Staff analysis of the activities of FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty in
connection with the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, House Select Committee
on Assassination; deposition of James P. Hosty, Auguse 25, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations; book V, pp. 95-97.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations; for a copy of the deposition, see "The Warren Commission," staff
report, XI appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, 54.
(45) Testimony of former FBI Inspector James Gale, September 20, 1978, III
HSCA-JFK hearings, 513-557; FBI-JFK assassination file; book V, pp. 53-56,
87-93.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Ibid.
(48) Ibid.
(49) FBI-JFK assassination file.
(50) "The Evolution and Implicatons of CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies
Against Fidel Castro," X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, 80-86.
(51) "B. Carlos Marcello" in "Organized Crime: Staff and Consultant Reports," IX
appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings.
(52) Ibid.
Page 641
641
REFERENCES: SECTION D 4
(1) For a detailed history of the CIA and an explanation of the development of
its organizational structure, see "Supplementary Detailed Staff Report on
Foreign and Military Intelligence," book IV, "Final Report of the Senate Select
Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities," 94th Congress, 2d session, Senate Rept. No. 94-755 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1976).
(2) Walter Trohan, "Donovan Proposes Super Spy System for Post War New Deal,"
Washington Times Herald, Feb. 19, 1945.
(3) Testimony of Allen Dulles, Apr. 25, 1947, hearings before the committee on
S. 758, National Defense Establishment (Unification of Armed Services), Senat
Committee on Armed Services, 80th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing office, 1947), pp. 525-527.
(4) Report to the President by the Commission on Central Intelligence Activities
within the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
June 1975).
(5) Letter from Acting Director Frank C. Carlucci to House Select Committee on
Assassinations, Mar. 23, 1978 (JFK Document 096837).
(6) Letter from Chairman Louis Stokes to Admiral Sansfield Turner, DCI, Jan. 27,
1978 (JFK Document 004889).
(7) Classified staff study, "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City," Dec.
15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 122-150 (JFK Documents
014972-75) (hereinafter "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City"); see executive
Assassinations, pp. 103-107 (JFK Classified Document 014739A); see generally
deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Classified Document 014733).
(8) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 115-122; see deposition of CIA employee,
May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 33-34 (JFK
classified document 014730); deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 84-89 (JFK Classified Document 014732);
deposition of a CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Classified Document 014733).
(9) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 142-143, 160-161; see deposition of CIA
employee, Apr. 19, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 29 (JFK
Classified Document 014737); deposition of a CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 78-79 (JFK Classified Document 014731);
deposition of a CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014733); deposition of a cIA employee,
May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 37 (JFK Classified
Document 014730).
(10) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 124-177.
(11) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 304
(hereinafter Warren report); see P.D. Scott, P.L. Hoch and R. Stetler, eds.,
"The Assassination: Dallas and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 452.
(12) "LHO, CIA and Mexico City," p. 137.
(13) Id. at 137-141.
(14) Letterhead memorandum rom J. Edgar Hoover, FBI, to James J. Rowley, Secret
Service Nov. 23, 1963 (JFK Classified Document 000169).
(15) FBI material delivered to the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
Nov. 30, 1978 (JFK Classified Document 00169).
(16) Interview of J. Gordon Shanklin, June 26, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009746).
(17) Interview of John Fain, June 25, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations (JFK Document 009973); outside contact reprot with James P.
Hosty, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015035); interview
of Arnold J. Brown, Dec. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK
Document 013922); interview of B. Tom Carter, Dec. 6, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013542).
Page 642
642
(18) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 180-184.
(19) Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Sept. 18, 1978, hearings before the house
Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume III, pp. 127-139 (hereinafter
Lopez testimony, -- HSCA-JFK hearings, -- ; see interviews of Eusebio Azcue
Lopez, April 1, 1978, Aug. 25, 1978, House Select committee on Assassinations
(JFK Document 007005).
(20) JFK Exhibit F-440A, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 25, 69-70, 102-105.
(21) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 206-234.
(22) Id. at 246-247.
(23) Ibid.; see JFK Exhibit F-440A, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 49-50.
(24) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 76-78, 240-247.
(25) JFK Exhibit F-438, III HSCA-JFK Hearings, 317, 319.
(26) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 93-114.
(27) Ibid.
(28) III HSCA-JFK hearings, 24-25, 112.
(29) Id. at 69-70.
(30) Id. at 33.
(31) Testimony of alfredo Mirabal Diaz, Sept. 18, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings,
173-175.
(32) Lopez testimony, p. 134.
(33) Testimony of Joseph P. McNally, Sept. 25, 1978, IV CREDIBLE at of
(34) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 73-79.
(35) Executive sess ion testimony of Richard M. Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, pp. 10,
17-18 (JFK Classified Document 014719); see generally testimony of Richard M.
Helms, Sept. 22, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 9-12 (hereinafter Helms testimony).
(36) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," Book V, Final Report of the Senate
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligene
Activities, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.s. Government
Printing Office, 1976), pp. 676-76 (hereinafter Book V).
(37) "Analysis of the the Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the
Central Intelligence Agency," Apendix to the Hearings Before the House Select
Committee on Assassinations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979), volume XI, pars. 3-11 (hereinafter CIA support of Warren Commission,
--Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(38) Id. at 24-28.
(39) Id. at 28-32.
(40) Id. at 40-43.
(41) Id. at 60; see also para. 44-45.
(42) Id. at 49, 57-59.
(43) Id. at 56; Helms testimony, p. 12; see Book V, p. 70.
(44) CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 63; but see Helms testimony,
121-177.
(45) Book V, pp. 6-7.
(46) Id. at 7.
(47) CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 133-162.
(48) Id. at 69-132.
(49) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 178-183.
(50) CIA support of Warren commission, para. 88-109.
(51) Id. at 107-108.
(52) Id. at 109.
(53) See ref. 12 and accompanying text, supra.
(54) Ibid.
(55) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," p. 179; see CIA support of Warren
Commission, para. 122-123.
(56) Id. CIA support of Warren Commission, at 127-132.
(57) Id. at 116-117.
(58) Id. at 119.
(59) See ref. 6 and accompanying text, supra.
(60) CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 112-115.
Page 643
643
REFERENCES : D 5
(1) "Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy" (Washington, D.C.: U.s. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. ix
(hereinafter Warren report).
(2) Id. at x-xi.
(3) Ibid.
(4) "The Warren Commission," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the
Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th
Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.c.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979),
volume XI, para. 113-276 (hereinafter WC report, -- appendix to the HSCA-JFK
hearings,--).
(5) Ibid.
(6) Id. at 113-187.
(7) Id. at 113-276.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Id. at 113-187.
(10) WC report, para. 113-276; staff analysis of Warren Commission records,
documents, hearings and exhibits, House Select Committee on Assassinations
(hereinafter analysis of Warren Commission records).
(11) WC report, para. 1-112.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15) WC report, para. 265-277.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Analysis of Warren Commission records, para. 1-112.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Analysis of Warren Commission records; "The Investigation of the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy; Performance of the Intelligence
Agencies," Book V, Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operation With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976) (hereinafter Book V); WC report, para. 1-112.
(20) Id., WC report at 265-277.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Id. at 271.
(23) Id. at 277.
(24) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records; id, WC report, at 1-277.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Testimony of Burt W. Griffin, Sept. 28, 1978, hearings before the Select
Committee on Assassinations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979), Volume V, p. 478 (hereinafter Griffin testimony, --HSCA-JFK hearings,--).
(27) WC report, para. 44-70; Griffin testimony, p. 478.
(28) Id., Griffin testimony, at 478.
(29) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Warren report, p. 18.
(32) Id. at 24.
Report on the Investigation of the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Page 644
644
II. FINDINGS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
Page 645
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II. FINDINGS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (cont.)
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II. FINDINGS IN THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (cont.)
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Recommendations of the Committee
Page 683
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
(1) "Assassination and Political Violence," a report to the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government
Printing Office, 1969), vol. 8, p. 45 (hereinafter Assassination Report).
(2) Id. at 124.
(3) "To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquillity," final report of the
National commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. xxiii (hereinafter Violence
Commission Report).
(4) Assassination Report, p. 10.
(5) Id. at 1.
(6) Id.at 2-5.
(7) Violence commission Report, p. 125.
(8) Assassination report, p. 11.
(9) See generally Charles H. Whittier, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress, "Assassination in Theory and practice: A Historical Survey of the
Religious and Philosophical Background of the Doctrine of Tyrannicide," Apr. 12,
1978 (JFK Document 007559).
(10) Violence Commission Report, pp. 2-16.
(11) Ed. at 127-28.
(12) See generally R. Rothman, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress,
The Social and Political Implications of t he Assassinations of John F. Kennedy
and Martin Luther King, Jr." (MLK Document 260029).
(13) Violence Commission Report, p. xix.
(14) See testimony of Richard M. Helms, sept. 22, 1978, hearings before the
Select committee on Assassinations, u.S. House of Representatives, 95th
Congress, 2d session (Washington, d.c.: U.s. Government printing Office, 1979),
vol. IV, pp. 118-161 (hereinafter Helms testimony, --HSCA-JFK hearings,--);
testimony of Santos Trafficante, Jr., Sept. 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings,
357-364.
(15) Id., Helms testimony at 180-81.
(16) Executive Order 12036, sec. 2.305 (Jan. 24, 1978).
(17) As enacted by Public Law 92-539 in 1972, 18 u.S.c. 1116 extended the
protection of Federal law to foreign official or guests in the United States.
Public Law 94-467, enacted in 1976, broadens that protection to include an
"internationally protected person," defined to include a Chief of State whenever
he was "in a country other than his own." Even though the offender might be
subject to Fideral criminal jurisdiction, if the assassination occurred in the
Chief of State's own country, it would not fall within the scope of the statute.
(18) S. 1437, 15th Congress, 1st session 1202 (1977).
(19) Testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, "Legislative and Administrative
Reform," hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, u.S. House of
Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, pp. 112-136 (hereinafter Reform).
(20) See generally Murl Larkin, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, "Federal Homicide: Public Figures," May 15, 1978 (JFK Document 008417)
(hereinafter Larkin).
(21) If the President had been killed as a result of a conspiracy, it would have
violated 18 U.S.C. 372; if the murder had occurred within the special maritime
or territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it would have violated 18
U.S.C. 1111 (b), 1112 (b). Other statutes that might have been involved include
18 U.S.C. 241,242.
(22) Report of the President's commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 455
(hereinafter Warren Report).
(23) 18 U.S.C. 1114.
(24) Warren Report, pp. 455-56.
(683)
Page 684
684
(25) Larkin, pp. 10-11.
(26) See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. 1114.
(27) S. 1437, 95th Congress, 1st session 1601 (e) (A) (1977).
(28) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 4.
(29) Id.at 31.
(30) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, pp. 134-35.
(31) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 31.
(32) See Larkin, pp. 15-19.
(33) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, . 108; testimony of William Webster,
Reform, p. 32.
(34) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, reform, p. 128.
(35) Id. at 112, 122, 129-30.
(36) Warren Report, pp. 455-56.
(37) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 126; testimony of William
Webster, Reform, p. 25.
(38) Testimony of Stuart Knight, reform, p. 97.
(39) See also testimony of Stuart Knight, reform, p. 97; testimony of William
Webster, reform, p. 25.
(40) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 97; should be presumption of
exercise); testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, reform, p. 132 (should be
automatic); testimony of William Webster, reform, p. 25 (automatic).
(41) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 22; see Kent M. Ronhoude,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Disposition of the Remains
of Victims of Federally Cognizable Homicides," Dec. 18, 1978 (JFK Document
015785).
(42) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 133; testimony of William
Webster, Reform, p. 7.
(43) Testimony of William Webster, reform, p. 28 (concern expressed possible
extension of language).
(44) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 105 (Director of FBI); testimony of
William Webster, Reform, p. 25 (Attorney General).
(45) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 106.
(46) 18 U.S.C. 2509.
(47) See generally Kent M. Ronhoude Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, "Government Acquisition of Evidence Pertaining to the Assassination of
President Kennedy and Related Matters," Dec. 11, 1978.
(48) United States v. One 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano Military Rifle, 250 F. Supp.
410 (N.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd, Ding v. United States, 364 F. 2d 235 (5th Cir.
1966). See King v. United States, 292F Supp. 767 (D. Colo. 1968).
(49) See 15 U.S.C. 905 (b) for the relevant statute then in effect. the relevant
statute today is 18 U.S.C. 924(d)
(50) See Porter v. United states, 335 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Tex. 1971) rev'd,
Porter v. United States, 473 F. 2d 1329 (5th 1973) (entitled to realized value
related to assassination).
(51) Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kans. 1971), aff'd 460 F. 2d
671 (10th Cir. 1972). See testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 145-146
(need for general legislation).
(52) Testimony of Percy Foreman, Nov. 13, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 297-298.
(53) See generally Nancy Lee Jones, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, "Constitutional Analysis of a New York Statute Requiring Funds
Received by Alleged Criminals for Certain Purposes ot be Given to Their
victims," sept. 8, 1977.
(54) 18 U.S.C. 871.
(55) 18 U.S.C. 1752.
(56) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, pp. 96-97.
(57) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 12. On the other hand, testimony
before the committee raised quetions that these guidelines might be too
restrictive. Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, pp. 93-94 (too restrictive);
testimony of William Webster, reform, p. 11 (tight, but "one of the assumed
risks that we take in a free society"); testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, reform,
pp. 119-120 (quality if not quantity is sufficient).
(58) 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3). see Heine v. Raus, 399 F. 2d 785 (4th ed. 1968).
(59) See VIII J. Wigmore evidence 237Y (ed ed. 1940).
(60) See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.
Page 685
685
(61) 18 U.S.C. 3146.
(62) 18 U.S.C. 3161.
(63) Testimony of William Webster, Reform.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Id. at 18.
(67) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, pp. 109-110.
(68) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 37.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid.
(71) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 19.
(72) Id. at 22.
(73) Id. at 28.
(74) 28 U.S.c. 591-98.
(75) See, e.g., the questioning of Chairman Louis Stokes, Reform, pp. 42-43.
(76) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 109; testimony of Benjamin
Civiletti, Reform, pp. 131-132; testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 43;
testimony of Frank Carlucci, Reform, p. 87.
(77) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 41.
(78) Id., at 42.
(79) Testimony of Frank Carlucci, Reform, p. 52.
(80) See, e.g., questioning of Chairman Louis Stokes, Reform, p. 23.
(81) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 6.
(82) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 23.
(83) Testimony
(84) Warren Report, pp. 231-240.
(85) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 34.
(86) Testimony of benjamin Civiletti, reform, p. 139.
(87) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, pp. 106-108.
(88) See e.g., questioning of Congressman Richardson Preyer, Reform, p. 106.
(89) Testimony of William webster, Reform, p. 35; testimony of Benjamin
Civiletti, Reform, p. 142.
(90) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 35.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 142.
(93) See generally "The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis
and Interpretation," Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 79 (hereinafter Analysis); Arthur S.
Schlesinger and Roger Bruns, eds., "Congress Investigates: A Documented History
1792-1974" (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975), vol. I, pp. xvii-xviii
(hereinafter Investigations).
(94) John Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," (South Bend,
Ind.: Gateway edition, 1962), p. 11.
(95) Woodrow Wilson, "Congressional Government" (Magnolia, Mass.: Peter Smith
Publishers, Inc., 1958), p. 303.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Quoted in Investigations, p. xix.
(98) See generally Investigations, pp. 3-101.
(99) Analysis, p. 83.
(100) See 123 Congressional Record H 10256 (daily edl, Aug. 28, 1977) for an
extended discussion of the implications of that statute for congressional
investigations.
(101) 18 U.S.C. 6001-05.
(102) House rule XI, cl. 2, K(3)
(103) Committee rule 3.7.
(104) House rule XI, cl 2(K) (4)
(105) Code of Professional Responsibility ABA, Canon 5, DR5-105.
(106) See, e.g., United States v. Dolan, 22 Crim. L. Reprt. 93d Cir. Jan. 23,
1978).
(107) "Watergate Special Prosecution Force Report" 140-41 (1975) (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 140-141.
(108) 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c) (5)
(109) Legal Document Relating to the Select Committee Hearings, Appendix to the
Hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Page 686
686
Activities, 93d Congress, 1st and 2d sessions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974), pp. 2156-2157.
(110) See Carbo v. United States, 314 U.S. 611 (1961).
(111) Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
(112) The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Preventive Treatment and
Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. 4582.
(113) See 112 Congressional Record H 10255 (daily ed., Sept. 28, 1977).
(114) See S. Rept. No. 95-127, 95th Congress, 2d session 80 (1978).
(115) Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of
Representatives, H. Doc. 94-663, 94th Congress, 2d session 427-28 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.
(116) Rule 13.11, Select Committee on Assassinations.
(117) Letter of C.J. Leontes to Michael Goldsmith, Sept. 11, 1978, House Select
Committee on assassinations (JFK Document 014205).
(118) Ibid.