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Soon after the Fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA's own Inspector General conducted an Internal investigation to determine exactly WHY it resulted in a Fiasco. This internal investigation resulted in a 232 page report Blaming the CIA ONLY for the fiasco. There were 25 copies of this I_G report which were Ordered Burned. 24 copies WERE Burned. The lone remaining copy was "Secreted Away" for 38 Years. I will start this page by posting a few pertinent pages from that report. When time allows I will post every page of that I G Report.
From CIA website>>> http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp
That will give you a pretty good idea as to why General Cabell was Fired by JFK.
Here's what Alan Dulles said about the Report>>>
Here's McCone's Reply>>>
Inspector General's Report FEEDBACK 24 February 1998: National Security Archives has withdrawn the JPEG images of the CIA Cuban Operation documents and is in the process of preparing HTML versions. The 25 images of the pages transcribed below are offered here in Zipped format: http://jya.com/cia-co.zip (1.5MB) 23 February 1998 Special thanks to the National Security Archives
JYA Note: the following documents are the opening memorandum and index and the concluding letters and memorandum addressing two CIA 1962 Top Secret critiques of the "Cuban Operation", more popularly known as the failed Bay of Pigs operation of April 1961. The first critique, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," by the CIA Inspector General, provided a detailed, highly critical assessment of CIA performance in the operation. The second, "An Analysis of the Cuban Operation," by the CIA Deputy Director (Plans), strongly disagreed with the IG survey. These declassified documents were obtained recently by the National Security Archives and are available at: http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchives See related news report: http://jya.com/cia-pigs.htm John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1962, replaced Allen Dulles, who was DCI during the Cuban Operation. Richard Bissell was Deputy Director (Plans) or DD/P. Tracy Barnes was Bissell's associate. Lyman Kirkpatrick was CIA Inspector General. WH designates the Western Hemisphere Division. WH/4 was the branch set up to run the Cuban Operation. The President was Dwight Eisenhower when the operation was initiated and John Kennedy when it was executed. The Attorney General was Robert Kennedy.
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
and
ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
Part 1 of 2 Parts
16 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Inspector General Survey of the Cuban Operation
(dated October 1961)
It is my understanding that you have requested information con-
cerning the distribution of the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation and
the DD/P comments on it. At the time the report was written it was
understood that copies of the report would be sent to the President's
Board and consequently 20 copies were made. However, the only
distribution made of the report is as follows:
Copy 1 - Mr. McCone - 21 November 1961
2 - DCI (then Mr. Dulles) - 24 November
3 - DDCI (then Gen. Cabell) - 24 November
4 - DD/P (then Mr. Bissell) - 24 November
5 - IG (Mr. Kirkpatrick)
6 - On file in the office of Acting IG (Mr. McLean)
7 - C/WH (Col King) - 24 November
8 - Mr. Esterline (WH Division) via Col. King - 24 November
9 - On file in my office
10 - President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via
Mr. Earman at request of DCI, 18 January 1962
11 through 20 - On file in my office
S/
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
rcm
chrono [by hand; with check]
simling [by hand; illegible]
C O P Y
[XXXXXX indicates document redaction.]
[Some 400 intervening pages omitted]
C O P Y
[Tab] 9 [Balance of page blank]
SECRET EYES ONLY
19 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT : Survey of Cuban Operation
1. My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban
Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care
the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely,
the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, October
1961".
2. My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach
certain conclusions which I feel that I must record. I do so
in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of
sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written
expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me
should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may
choose to make to specific identifiable comments.
3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum
was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long
deliberation. The deciding factor was my belief that the
suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile
and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless
without the reasons set forth in earlier paragraphs. The
views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.
4. In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for
three reasons:
a. It is an incompetent job. The authors
never understood the problems with which they were deal-
ing and failed to express their views with any precision
or proper use of relevant facts.
b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence
on vital issues was not only left out but never even
mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those
items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These
items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false
picture was given. Admittedly, an I.G. must expose fault
but it is also his job to do accurately.
SECRET EYES ONLY
-2-
c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively,
it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious
charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. I
can only say that I hold such opinion firmly. In my view
it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's
total omission in many places of significantly relevant
evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided
as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been
intentional. In addition, however, I would like to mention
four other points:
1) The fact that the inspectors, in making
their investigation, omitted any discussions
of their findings with the senior officers
responsible for the project. Although, techni-
cally, the I.G. can accurately state that he
talked to the DD/P and the then A/DDP/A about
the Survey, the fact is that these discussion[sic]
were exceedingly brief and covered none of the
real issues of the Survey. The AC/DPD was not
spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WH/4
was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers,
such as C/WH and C/WH/4, were never given an
opportunity to express their views in relation
to statements in the Survey.
2) Some officers with whom the inspectors
had discussions felt after they had a chance to
see the Survey, that it did not impartially ex-
press the information which they had provided
and left out much of the relevant information
given. Moreover, some officers have reported
that the attitude of the inspectors and their
line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain
facts or views to support judgments already
formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments
were not only disregarded but resisted.
3) The distribution of the final Survey
was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice
that it raises an inference of intended partiality.
The method of distribution is known and will not
be repeated here. It might be added that there
SECRET EYES ONLY
-3-
were other facts with respect to the distribution
of the Survey worthy of mention. C/WH/4 was
called one day and asked if he wanted to read the
Survey. He said that he would like to do so but
since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not
leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division.
Particularly, he could not meet the requirements
of the offer which were that he would only have
an hour from the time of the telephone call to
see the Survey (including travel time) since it
then had to be sent to the printer. Why the
urgency was so great is not clear. As far as is
known, only one individual outside of the I.G.
Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially
final form before it was distributed, namely, an
officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4
during the project. Why he was selected instead
of one of his superiors who was connected with the
project is not known.
4) Since this particular operation, without
question, involved more political interest and
dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever
participated, there was every reason for following
regular procedures meticulously. In addition to
the distribution point mentioned above, it seems
relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney
General knew of the Survey's existence so as to
request a copy.
5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the fore-
going, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G. The information
reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my
work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional
evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not
plan to do so.
6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the
reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the sub-
mission of the following recommendations for action.
SECRET EYES ONLY
-4-
a. The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction
the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.'s Survey and
your Analysis. Since both these documents are internal to
the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban opera-
tion unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the
importance of and the continuing interest in the operation
at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems
essential. Such a position is also important for the
future. The operation is bound to be studied for various
reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as
to what happened, what were the mistakes and what were the
lessons. Moreover, the DCI, having assumed office after
the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for
wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.
b. If the DCI agrees with a. above each recipient
of the Survey and Analysis (and it is understood that they
will only be distributed together) should be advised of the
fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This
might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the
Agency being reached first.
c. The following requirements should be imposed
on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the
DD/P area of responsibility.
1) No survey shall be undertaken without
specific written terms of reference approved by
the DCI.
2) The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each
future survey covering any portion of his area of
responsibility the I.G. or his stall will inter-
view at least all officers having had responsibility
for any part of the activity inspected by the
I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey
the DD/P and each such officer will be given an
opportunity to express his views on points in-
cluded in the Survey. Obviously the I.G. need not
accept these views. Such procedure, however, will
save an enormous amount of time required to answer
SECRET EYES ONLY
-5-
surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present
a full factual picture regardless of the conclu-
sions reached.
7. I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate
superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request
that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration.
I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or
any part of it merely because you transmit it.
/S/C.T.B.
C. TRACY BARNES
Original & 1 - DD/P
[Tab] 10 [Balance of page blank]
C O P Y
S E C R E T
inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automat-
ically. I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation
that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an
inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply
was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know.
Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick
should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the
President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had
not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with
taking the Taylor Report, our report and your comments and all
background material and writing a truly national and detailed
report. I believe that would be a far better solution than trying
to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical
inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this
operation.
/s/ Kirk
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
[Tab] 11 [Balance of page blank]
C O P Y
[Tab] 12 [Balance of page blank]
C O P Y
S E C R E T
5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on
at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles.
This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For
example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and
misleading. Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it
was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in
the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala.
The PM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November
1960, rather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies
suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it
deals with events on the working level of the project.
6. The IG investigators centered their inquiry on certain
phases which are significant to the success or failure of any
operation and of the Agency's over-all mission itself. They
cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions
made outside the Agency.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
/s/
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
/s/
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
/s/
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
[Tab] 13 [Balance of page blank]
C O P Y
T O P S E C R E T
b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the
fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of
one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A. Opinions based
on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to
provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by
him.
c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this
matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor
Committee, of actions of all the participating elements in
the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of
the Agency which affected the operation. This applies partic-
ularly to the participation of the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain
elements of the Executive Department of the Government.
d. At no time during the preparation of his report
did the Inspector General request any information from me and
he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct
responsibility was clearly involved.
5. Two major area of criticism in the I.G. report cover
(1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training,
transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the
relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their
political organization. As to these points, I submit the
following:
a. First, while certain organizational matters, in
the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the
Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached
the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which
achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area
was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelli-
gence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition
and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the Brigade commander or its personnel.
b. Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban
emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would
point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition
of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was
realized.
These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A.
responsibility.
T O P S E C R E T
6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in
view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities
within the Agency for the day-to-day management of the operation,
and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military
personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full
responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept
currently advised of all important developments. During the con-
cluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by
the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961,
relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A
to Chapter IV of DDP report).
7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if
the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment
is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military
experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does
not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the
Inspector General's report.
8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed
out in the Taylor Reports. These Reports, I believe, should be
taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions
in support of the operation.
/s/ Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
[Tab] 14 [Balance of page blank]
C O P Y
Here is the CIA link to the whole Inspector General's Report (232 pages) http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp
Contact Information tomnln@cox.net
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