HERE ARE WITHHELD INFORMATION FILES THAT WE KNOW ABOUT

WHEN MORE FILES ARE RELEASED IN 2017 THESE BETTER BE THRE OR, WE INSIST THAT GOV'T PEOPLE GO TO PRISON FOR 'OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE".

1100 CIA JFK Assassination Records Withheld

On November 21, 2008, in response to the Morley FOIA case, the CIA

released a 75 page declaration in which they acknowledged that they

have withheld 1100 assassination records, and may seek to keep them

secret after the scheduled 2017 release date.

In the course of the long and drawn out legal document the CIA

official, Delores Nelson also noted that among the 1100 documents, 13

of them could be related to Joannides, the subject of Jeff Morley's

FOIA case, which is now extending from years into decades.

Those 13 documents alone, says Ms. Nelson, run over 1100 pages, so the

rest of the JFK assassination records still being withheld by the CIA

must run into the tens of thousands of pages, not including those

documents that were released with redactions.

In addition, this legal document also gives an interesting account of

the "GLOMAR" response to FOIA requests, which is the now routine

"neither confirm nor deny" response, which is what the Israel

government and MOSSAD are now doing in response to questions regarding

the Dubai assassination hit squad.

The document, which is titled, JFFFERSON MORLEY Plantiff v. CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Defendant - DECLARATION OF DELORES M. NELSON

includes a section:

IV. SEARCH OF RECORDS RELEASED TO NARA

40. The Dorn Declaration describes the JFK Act and the Assassination

Records Review Board (“ARRB”) created there under. See Exhibit A PP

26-30. With the exception of approximately 1,100 documents withheld in

their entirety until 2017, all of the CIA’s JFK-related documents were

released in full or in part to NARA. 7.

7. The approximately 1,100 documents are located in NARA’s protected

collection and will be released in 2017 unless the CIA appeals to the

President to withhold their disclosure. On such an appeal, the CIA

would need to argue, and the President would need to certify, that

“(i) continued postponement is made necessary by an identifiable harm

to the military defense, intelligence operations, law enforcement, or

conduct of foreign relations; and (ii) the identifiable harm is of

such gravity that it outweighs the public interest in disclosure.”

President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992, 44 U.S.C. S 2107 note (2000)

page 20 Nelson

page 22 “…The index search yielded thirteen documents that were

potentially responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. These thirteen

documents totally 1,112 pages…..

59. As noted above, in conjunction with its production of the JFK-

related recordspursuant to the JFK Act, the CIA previously

acknowledged Joannides’ participationin two specific covert projects,

operations, or assignments: JM/WAVE or JMWAVE from 1962 through 1964

and Joannides’ service as a CIA representative to the U.S. House of

Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations from 1978 through

1979. Joannides had been undercover during both of these

assignments.”

B. The CIA’s Failure to Assert a GLOMAR Response Would Damage National

Security.

61. In a typical response to a FOIA request, the CIA’s answer, either

to provide or not provide records sought, in effect confirms the

existence or non-existence of CIA records. Typically, this

confirmation neither threatens the national security nor reveals

intelligence sources and methods. The response focuses on releasing or

withholding specific substantive information and the fact that the CIA

possesses or does not possess records is not itself a classified fact.

However, when the fact that the CIA possesses or does not possess

records is itself classified and reasonably could reveal intelligence

sources, methods and activities, the CIA cannot confirm that it

possesses such information. On the other hand, the CIA also may not

deny the Court or in legal proceedings that it does not have

responsive records when it in fact does. Thus, the CIA’s only

permissible alternative is to neither confirm nor deny the existence

or nonexistence of responsive records. Such a “neither confirm nor

deny” response is called a GLOMAR response. 10.

10. The CIA asserted a GLOMAR response over the unacknowledged time

periods in this case because Joannides’ participation in covert

projects, operations, or assignments during these unacknowledged time

periods would itself be classified.

George E. Joannides (pronounced "Joe-uh-NEE-deez") is a new and

important character in the Kennedy assassination story

The CIA succeeded in keeping the Joannides information secret Why is

the CIA trying to block the release of Joannides Documents?

George Joannides

He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1951 and later became

chief of the Psychological Warfare branch of the CIA's JM/WAVE station

in Miami. Joannides was appointed as the agency's liaison to the HSCA.

The CIA did not reveal to the committee that Joannides had played an

important role in the events of 1963. Some critics believe that

Joannides was involved in a conspiracy to link Lee Harvey Oswald with

the government of Fidel Castro.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKjoannides.htm

Joannides died in 1990,

Footnote: 10. The “GLOMAR” term comes from the case Phillippi v. CIA.

546 F.2d 1009(DC Cir. 1976, which upheld the CIA’s use of the “neither

confirm nor deny” response to a FOIA request for records concerning

the CIA’s reported contacts with the media regarding the Hughes GLOMAR

Explorer.

Page 32

21 November 2008

Delores M. Nelson

Chief Public Information Programs Division

Central intelligence Agency

by tomnln