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RICHARD HELMS-CIA

PERJURY-HELMS

 

"The people will recognize that the CIA was behaving during those years like a rogue elephant rampaging out of control . . ."
-Sen. Frank Church, Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence, July 1975

Rogue Elephant
The Drug Trade, the Kennedy Assassination, and the War in Vietnam
Kent Heiner

For almost forty years, the circumstances surrounding the death of President John F. Kennedy have been the subject of controversy. From time to time scholars, witnesses, and commentators have come forth offering some sort of sweeping explanation, as if to settle the controversy once and for all. Rather than offering a final analysis of the assassination, I will endeavor only to show how a particular perspective on the event may be the best starting point in understanding it.

Though a few authors have written about the assassination from a broader perspective, many "pet theories" have been offered which blame the assassination singly on the Mafia, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Cuban exiles, the Dallas police, or Texas oil interests. There is certainly evidence to support each of these hypotheses but, by the argumentative nature of the proponents, I am reminded of the story of the "learned men" who, though blind, were asked to examine an elephant. One, feeling the elephant’s leg, said that an elephant is best likened to a tree. Another, examining the tail, argued that an elephant is not at all like a tree, but rather like a rope. The sage holding the elephant’s trunk exclaimed that an elephant is very much akin to a snake, as if to settle the matter.

When trying to describe the true nature of the conspiracy against President Kennedy, the question that we, also being somewhat blind in the matter, might most profitably ask ourselves is this: what kind of elephant is part Mafia, part CIA, part Cuban exile, part Dallas police, and part Texas oil? This metaphorical elephant represents the slain president’s political rivals, with whom the Kennedy administration was in a life-and-death power struggle. This essay will examine the elephant’s sources of power, its conflicts of interest with the Kennedy administration, and the administration’s specific efforts to destroy it.

Not included herein will be a chronology of events, a discussion of the untimely deaths of many witnesses in the case, a complete study of the facts discrediting the "lone assassin" theory, or a thorough explanation of how the true nature of the assassination was covered up. For such, other works suffice. The significance of the illegal drug trade to the assassination will be shown in the following respects:

          1. One of the more significant common interests of the key players in the assassination conspiracy was drug smuggling;

          2. The President and Attorney General were not only standing in the way of the expansion of this smuggling enterprise into new territory, but were also prosecuting many of the ring leaders;

          3. The assassination conspiracy had as one of its major objectives the protection and growth of this enterprise.

This is not to say that drug smuggling was the full extent of the conspiracy, but it may very well have been the essence of it; recognizing this aspect of the conspiracy is perhaps the best place to begin. The connection to this activity of all the parties known to have had a hand in the president’s death provides a motive for the murder, as well as a common ground and motive for cooperation among these parties; to this end, any one of the many illegal activities engaged in by all these groups might suffice as a good starting point for analysis. For instance, arms smuggling also is a commonality among many of the conspirators, but the author chooses drug smuggling in particular because of its greater prevalence among the key figures in the conspiracy as well as its relevance to the present day and its effect on administrations since Kennedy’s.

All of the above-mentioned interest groups, namely the Mafia, CIA, Cuban exiles, Dallas law enforcement, and Texas oil interests, conspired to assassinate John F. Kennedy. More specifically, the conspirators probably included the following parties:

          o From the mob: bosses Sam Giancana, Carlos Marcello, and Santos Trafficante of Chicago, New Orleans, and Miami respectively; Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa; lesser figures Richard Cain and Charles Harrelson.

          o Military, CIA and ex-CIA officers: Most notably, CIA officers E. Howard Hunt, David Atlee Phillips, Charles Cabell, and William Harvey. General Edward G. Lansdale.

          o CIA "assets" and contract employees: Jack Ruby, Dave Ferrie, Clay Shaw, Frank Sturgis, Jim Hicks, Gordon Novel, and others.

          o Cuban exiles: Felix Rodriguez, Eladio del Valle and Bernard Barker, among others. Possibly Orlando Bosch and the brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampol.

          o Local law enforcement: Dallas County Sheriff Bill Decker and Assistant District Attorney Bill Alexander as well as several members of the Dallas police force.

          o From the Texas oil industry: Texas oil baron Clint Murchison, contractor George Brown (of Brown and Root), and others unknown. Possibly future president George H. W. Bush.

Others who knew of the true nature of the assassination either before or immediately after the fact and who, either by their silence or by conscious efforts, conspired to cover it up include:

          o President Lyndon Johnson

          o President Richard Nixon

          o President Gerald Ford

          o FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

          o Senator Arlen Specter

 THE NATURE OF THE BEAST

The origins of the outlaw group which eliminated the Kennedys could be traced to the wartime alliance of U.S. intelligence with organized crime. In 1942, in an effort to protect New York harbors from acts of sabotage by Axis agents, naval intelligence enlisted the help of Joseph Lanza, mafia boss of the East Side docks, to mobilize dock workers. Later in 1943, seeking to expand the operation to the West Side, they contacted the boss of bosses, Charles "Lucky" Luciano, then in prison. The West Side docks were controlled at the time by the heavily Italian longshoremen's union; through "Operation Underworld," partly arranged by Luciano's associate Meyer Lansky, the Mob's union contacts were mobilized in this wartime effort (Scott 1993:145; McCoy 1991:31-32). The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) also contacted Luciano, through Lansky and Luciano's deputy August del Gracio. The OSS, which was the precursor of the CIA, wanted Luciano to use his contacts in the "old country" to pave the way for the U.S. invasion of Sicily (Marks 1979:7-8). American military officials could presumably have pursued similar cooperation with the Italian anti-Fascist underground, but fears of potential Communist advances in postwar Italy led them to favor the mafia, cutting back support to the leftist underground. The Mafia arranged enthusiastic welcomes for the allied liberators and provided guides for General Patton's troops. After the invasion, Mafia heads in western Sicily were installed in mayoral posts by the American occupation force (McCoy 1991:35). The OSS also plotted with the Mafia against the Italian Communist party. It was as a direct result of his cooperation with the intelligence services that Luciano was paroled from a U.S. prison in 1946 and deported to Sicily (Marks 1979:7).

The arrangement with the Sicilians was by no means unique; the pattern was repeated with French organized crime. The CIA used Corsican gangsters to break up labor strikes in Marseilles on at least two occasions, once in 1947 and again in 1950. That murders resulted in the first instance did not seem to deter the CIA from calling on the Mob for a second time (Scheim 1983:191). Marseilles at the time housed the world’s most productive heroin laboratories. While the OSS and the other wartime intelligence services were being replaced in 1947 by the CIA, Luciano had become a central figure in the trade of opium (and hence heroin) from Indochina via Marseilles and the French Corsicans in Saigon. A renewed flow of heroin through Marseilles accompanied the CIA's anti-Communist efforts there in 1950-51 (Scott 1993:176). The Indochina-CIA-heroin connection would continue at least into the next two decades as the U.S. took over the anti-Communist war in Vietnam from the French.

As in Operation Underworld, the Mob's union connections were again used for purposes of "national security" in 1947. Fear of Socialism as a path to Communism outweighed any concerns regarding criminal control of the unions, and the United States government again allied itself with organized crime to defend the country from foreign threats, re-establishing Meyer Lansky's syndicate in the postwar battle for control of the American unions between the Mob and the socialists. With the protection of the CIA, some mobsters gained a competitive advantage trafficking in drugs. In the far east, Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's chief of intelligence from 1941 to 1951, hired Japanese mobsters to take action against groups such as the Japanese Communist Party. Army Intelligence in Japan "used Japan's dope-dealing yakuza gangs to break up left-wing strikes and demonstrations." (Russell 1992: 126,169,178)

As America gained hegemony over the world economy, the State Department and CIA worked to protect and expand this dominance. Under the pretext of safeguarding democracy abroad, the agencies supported business-friendly right-wing dictatorships and brought down governments who threatened American business interests. By the mid-1950s the Syndicate (as the American crime network was sometimes called) had begun to play a key role in such efforts, in close partnership with the covert action staff of the CIA. Indeed, the partnership could almost be described as a "merger," with both parties cooperating in the smuggling of guns and drugs, the laundering of money, the overthrow of governments, and the rigging of elections in Latin America, East Asia, and the Near East. Oil and banking tycoon David Rockefeller served as Eisenhower’s liaison with the CIA. Richard Nixon is known to have had extensive contacts in organized crime and was said by some on Capitol Hill to have "run the CIA" as Vice President, probably meaning that he was heavily involved in the covert operations of the agency (Groden and Livingstone 1989:252). By early 1954, Chicago mob boss Sam Giancana was boasting that his "Outfit" and the CIA were "two sides of the same coin." The following Giancana quotation, an excerpt from the biography written by his brother, is revealing of the mob boss’s perspective on his relationship with the CIA if not reflective of the true nature of the relationship:

Sometimes our government can't do s--- on the up and up. Sometimes they need a little trouble somewhere or they need some bastard taken care of. . . . they can't get caught doin' s--- like that. What if people found out? But we can. Guns, a hit, muscle . . . whatever dirty work needs to be done. Right now, we're workin' on Asia, Iran, and Latin America. . . . we got this deal all sewn up. Ike [President Eisenhower], all he does is play golf . . . it's [Vice President] Nixon that's got the power. He's the one with the backing of the big money, like [Howard] Hughes and the [mafia] guys in California and the oilmen in Texas. . . . Hump [Mob ambassador Murray Humphreys] says Nixon's gonna call us if he needs a little hardball behind the scenes (Giancana 1992:215).

The CIA became increasingly involved in its mafia partners’ drug smuggling operations. Indeed, by 1960, it had become impossible to make a clear distinction between the two organizations. Many CIA operatives were also foot-soldiers for organized crime. A significant faction in the CIA had taken upon itself the responsibility of reorganizing the international drug traffic to its own advantage. Henceforth, the term "CIA" should be understood to have two possible meanings: either this faction within the CIA, or the agency as a whole. Due to the size and influence of this faction, a clear distinction between the two meanings is hard to make, but analysts in the agency’s Directorate of Intelligence would rightly be offended to be "lumped in" with their more seditious colleagues. No matter how much honest work is done at the CIA, however, the fact remains that for more than fifty years it has served as a front for what is now the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in the western hemisphere. During the time period currently under discussion, the faction referred to resided mostly in the Agency’s Directorate of Operations and consisted of unofficial "agents" and "assets" as well as career officers.

During the mid-1950s, the CIA and mafia fought a heroin turf war against the French in far-away Saigon; this fight is key to understanding the origins of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and will be discussed shortly. Under the CIA program code-named ZRRIFLE, foreign heads of state who stood in the way of American control of the drug traffic were targeted for assassination; this program is essential to understanding the origins of the plot against President Kennedy.

The intention of this corrupt faction in the U.S. government of the 1950s was to commandeer the strategic positions in the international heroin trade then held by French interests. Part of this plan necessitated a large U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. The French heroin labs in the CIA-Luciano network got some of their raw material from the poppy fields of Indochina. The Corsicans' connections to the Indochinese heroin trade (via the French colonial presence in Southeast Asia) and their connections to American and French intelligence gave them a competitive edge over the Sicilians, who had also trafficked in heroin before the war and resumed doing so afterward. The Corsicans used their intelligence connections as a cover for their heroin trafficking, and the French used the trade as a way to fund their war in Southeast Asia, then known as French Indochina:

The French military's Operation X . . . involved collecting opium from Indochinese mountain tribes, transporting it to Saigon, and transmitting it to the Corsican underworld. Clandestine laboratories in Saigon processed the base into morphine, and the Corsicans arranged for its shipment to Marseilles for further refinement into heroin (Blumenthal 1988:94-95).

Schemers in Washington may have felt that the French were reaping drug profits that were rightfully theirs, because the United States had been carrying the majority of the financial burden of the French Indochina war in the early 1950s and had also supplied hundreds of advisers. One such advisor was the CIA’s Colonel Edward G. Lansdale. Lansdale had been the American most responsible for the victory of Ramon Magsaysay over President Quirino in the Philippines; the CIA man had bolstered his client's popularity with the use of "psychological warfare" and counterinsurgency campaigns. Lansdale and Magsaysay had staged mock attacks and liberations on Philippine villages. The destruction was real, but the deception lay in the fact that the attacks were not initiated by the Communist guerillas but by the same faction who heroically came to the villagers’ "rescue." (Prouty 1992:35) Lansdale was named by Sam Giancana as one of the many political connections of Harry Stonehill, a Chicago-affiliated businessman in the Philippines, where Lansdale was proconsul. Stonehill later made moves to set up trade in opium (Giancana 1992:135,176-77). This is important to note because so much of Lansdale’s later career was spent in the periphery of the drug trade. On an investigative tour of Indochina in the summer of 1953, Lansdale flew to the Plain of Jars in Laos, where he learned some of the details of the French opium operations, including the fact that General Salan, the Commander in Chief of the French Expeditionary Corps, had ordered his officers to buy up the 1953 opium harvest. The opium was subsequently shipped to Saigon for sale overseas (McCoy 1991:140)

In the winter of 1953-54, the French faced defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh at Dienbienphu. As the French fought off the attack, they informed President Eisenhower that unless U.S. forces came to their aid, the war would be lost. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended sending U.S. troops; Vice-President Nixon concurred. But Eisenhower declined to involve U.S. forces directly, much to the rage of many French military men. Eisenhower thought that Indochina was a lost cause and that there was not enough domestic support for a second Asian war so soon after Korea. As the president had said in a January 8th National Security Council meeting,

The key to winning this war is to get the Vietnamese to fight. There is just no sense in even talking about the United States forces replacing the French in Indochina. If we did so, the Vietnamese could be expected to transfer their hatred of the French to us. I cannot tell you how bitterly opposed I am to such a course of action. This war in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions! (Prouty 1992:51)

Unable to get the president’s approval for direct military involvement, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed that the U.S. should carry on guerilla operations against the Viet Minh in the event of French defeat. The Council decided that Allen Dulles was to develop this contingency plan. On the 29th of January, the President's Special Committee on Indochina met (in the absence of the president himself) to discuss possible aid to the desperate French. "At the end of the meeting," writes Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty, "Allen Dulles, then the director of central intelligence, suggested that an unconventional-warfare officer, Col. Edward G. Lansdale, be added to the group of American liaison officers that General Henri Navarre, the French commander, had agreed to accept in Indochina." (Prouty 1992:38-39,349) The absence of the President for this critical decision was not atypical of the administration’s Southeast Asia policy (Scott 1972).

The battle at Dienbienphu was lost by May 1954. Because the U.S. would not become directly involved, the conflict was taken to the conference table, and a peace settlement was reached that year in Geneva, creating separate administrations in northern and southern Vietnam. The north was to be Communist, led by Ho Chi Minh, and the south non-Communist, until an all-Vietnam election in 1956 could unify the country. The elections never took place; Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam sponsored by the U.S. and managed by Lansdale, declared that the terms of the Geneva Accords were unacceptable and that there would be no elections as therein specified.

Colonel Lansdale went to Vietnam and established the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), chiefly a CIA covert warfare office, and immediately set about destabilizing the country as a pretext for increased U.S. involvement. The SMM's damage to the meager existing order in Vietnam was incalculable. Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty, the Pentagon's chief of special operations in the early 1960s, writes,

By midsummer more men had joined the SMM, and its mission was broadened. Its members were teaching "paramilitary" tactics - today called "terrorism" - and doing all they could to promote the movement of hundreds of thousands of "Catholic" Vietnamese from the north with promises of safety, food, land, and freedom in the south and with threats that they would be massacred by the Communists of North Vietnam and China if they stayed in the north.

This movement of Catholics - or natives whom the SMM called "Catholics" - from the northern provinces of Vietnam to the south, under the provisions of the Geneva agreement, became the most important activity of the Saigon Military Mission and one of the root causes of the Vietnam War. The terrible burden these 1,100,000 destitute strangers imposed upon equally poor native residents of the south created a pressure on the country and on the Diem administration that was overwhelming. . . . It is easy to understand that within a short time these strangers became bandits, of necessity, in an attempt to obtain the basics of life. The local uprisings that sprung up wherever these poor people were dumped on the south were given the name "Communist insurgencies" and much of the worst and most pernicious part of the twenty years of warfare that followed was the direct result of this terrible activity that had been incited and carried out by CIA's terroristic Saigon Military Mission (Prouty 1992:66-67).

By mid-year, Lansdale was raising the specter of "Communist insurgency" just as he did in the Philippines. This destabilization became one of the root causes of the Vietnam War and "had more to do with the scope, severity, and duration of the American-made war in Vietnam than anything else." (Prouty 1992:71) On the advice of the U.S., Diem exacerbated the situation by the ejection of the French law enforcement authorities who had helped to keep what little peace there was, and of the Chinese merchants who were crucial to South Vietnamese trade. This resulted in a temporary absence of police power and in the collapse of the system by which rice farmers obtained goods in exchange for their crops. When economic and social chaos resulted in hunger and civil strife, U.S. intelligence was quick to cry "Communist insurgency." The geography of the "insurgency" should have made it plain that there was more to the problem than ideology or politics. It was the southern districts, where the refugees were, that were the most volatile, not the northern areas bordering on enemy territory. This is evidenced in the 1963 McNamara-Taylor report to the president, which became the administration's plan for gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. The report projected a completion of the campaign in the northern and central areas by 1964, and in the southern delta by the end of 1965 (Prouty 1992:260-64).

Why would the United States deliberately create chaos in Southeast Asia? As a pretext for greater involvement. Why become involved? The military-industrial complex's interest in Vietnam cannot be discounted. Billions of dollars in armaments were used in the Vietnam War and related military campaigns. Hundreds of bombing sorties went out every day. Bell's helicopters were used to excess and to the point of wasting both equipment and lives. Based in Texas, Bell Helicopter was likely to have had influence over Lyndon Johnson. Dow Chemical produced a defoliant called Agent Orange for the war and was associated with the powerful Rockefeller family. President Lyndon Johnson’s sponsoring company, Brown and Root, was awarded large contracts in Vietnam. In addition to military interests, the cooperation of the CIA with organized crime in the Southeast Asian drug trade and the profits that this operation eventually reaped also deserve consideration as a motivation for increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s one major aspect of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia was to take over the drug trade from the faltering French.

By the early 1950s, the CIA had solidified its contacts in Marseilles, where heroin was made from Indochinese morphine. In the mid-1950s, the CIA established a presence in Saigon, where the opium from the region’s poppy fields was refined into morphine and shipped overseas under the supervision of French intelligence. By 1960, the CIA was supporting the indigenous peoples in Laos who had supplied the opium crop to the French.

Lansdale began his investigation of France’s "Operation X" soon after he came to Saigon in June 1954, hoping to assess his opponent's strength. He quickly aroused the antipathy of the 2eme Bureau, France’s military intelligence agency; his investigation ended when a local Chinese banker who was helping him was murdered. Lansdale openly allied himself and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem with an army of 2,500 whose leader had murdered a French general in 1951 and was responsible for a 1953 bombing in downtown Saigon. In February 1955, when the French handed over the Vietnamese army to the Americans, Lansdale also used Saigon Military Mission funds to buy out the religious sects under French control and placed the sectarian armies under the command of Diem. The Binh Xuyen, a Vietnamese organized crime syndicate, controlled Saigon. By the time fighting broke out between Diem's forces and the organized- crime-supported United Front in March 1955, the U.S. and France had already chosen opposing sides. In fact, the two sides were "pawns in a power struggle between the French 2eme Bureau and the American CIA." Diem's forces prevailed after a month of skirmishes and six days of heavy and destructive fighting; the Binh Xuyen were pushed back into the swamp areas from which they had come. In retaliation, some of the French started a terrorist bombing campaign against Americans in Saigon. This ended when Lansdale determined "who the ringleaders were (many of them were intelligence officers) [and] grenades started going off in front of their houses in the evenings." (McCoy 1972:119-25)

Working their way further up the supply chain, U.S. forces moved into Laos. Opium was the main cash crop of the Hmong (or "Meo") tribesmen in northern Laos. The Hmong had long been fighting the Communist forces in that area, the Pathet Lao, and had sold their opium crops with the aid of the French. In 1960, the Hmong gained the support of the CIA, which facilitated the sale of their opium by cultivating a relationship with the local heroin traffickers and their associates in local government. The Agency called upon one Vang Pao to lead the CIA-trained Hmong as their General. The Agency built landing strips in outlying areas for the delivery of supplies by its airline Air America, and allowed the Corsican traffickers to use the strips for the pickup of the Hmong opium (McCoy 1972:277).

In 1959, the CIA’s campaign to claim a major strategic position in the world’s drug traffic was progressing in Southeast Asia, despite Eisenhower’s refusal to send in combat troops. But that year, American interests lost control of Cuba, an island nation only 90 miles from Florida which was also an important transit point for narcotics. It is well-established that beginning some time around 1959, the CIA contracted with organized crime to assassinate particular foreign heads of state. What is not generally recognized is that, not at all coincidentally, those foreign heads of state were often in countries key to the CIA-Mafia drug traffic. Prime targets were Cuba’s Fidel Castro, who survived numerous attempts on his life, and the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, killed in 1961.

In the late 1950s, the Havana underworld was controlled by Florida mob boss Santos Trafficante. Among the many vices run by Trafficante was the cocaine trade, which used Cuba as a transit point for Peruvian cocaine destined for the U.S. (U.S. Treasury 1961). Sam Giancana was in on the action too. According to Giancana, the CIA (or at least a faction therein) took ten percent of the proceeds from the Havana drug pipeline in return for ignoring the traffic (Giancana 1992:259). Before Castro's 1959 overthrow of the Batista regime, Havana had been the single greatest source of revenue for organized crime in the western hemisphere. The Havana casinos, drug dealers, and abortion clinics brought the mob hundreds of millions of dollars every year. But when Castro came to power, he closed the casinos and imprisoned Trafficante. The common account of the origin of the CIA-mafia assassination plots against Castro is that CIA representative (and Howard Hughes aide) Robert Maheu contacted John Roselli, the Las Vegas representative of the Chicago Mob. Roselli introduced Maheu to Chicago boss Sam Giancana, and then on Giancana's behalf Roselli contacted Trafficante. Trafficante and Carlos Marcello of the New Orleans mob both had extensive Cuban connections and became involved in the CIA assassination plot, part of a larger program known as ZRRIFLE. Trafficante and Marcello supplied the CIA with Cuban hit men to take Castro out in a military-style ambush. When it became apparent that subtler methods were needed, poison pills and other, more bizarre schemes were attempted; they never succeeded.

After Castro took over Cuba and closed the island to mafia activity, the Dominican Republic became a staging point for a CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba, as well as a new transit point for Trafficante’s narcotics traffic. Henrik Krüger writes: "Furthermore, the CIA, according to agents of the BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs], helped organize the drug route by providing IDs and speed boats to former Batista officers in the Dominican Republic in charge of narcotics shipments to Florida." (Krüger 1980:145) President Rafael Trujillo may have done something to get in the way of the drug traffic, for the CIA-mafia alliance marked him for death and he was assassinated in May 1961, just after the CIA's failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa and Santos Trafficante cooperated in smuggling drugs into the United States, with Teamsters Local 320 in Miami being one of the fronts for the business (Krüger 1980:143). Chicago mobster David Yaras, who answered to Sam Giancana, had assisted Hoffa in organizing Local 320, where Trafficante kept an office (Scott 1993:175). Jack Ruby of Dallas reported to Yaras and was another of Giancana’s men, involved in drug trafficking as well as gambling, arms smuggling, and operating a strip club. The CIA was aware of Ruby’s drug smuggling activities, according to former anti-Castro operative Robert Morrow, who worked under the CIA’s Tracy Barnes. Barnes was one of the Bay of Pigs planners, perhaps the most high-ranking one to have survived the Kennedy post-invasion firings. According to Morrow, Barnes said that one of Ruby’s arms smuggling partners was also one of the Agency’s ZRRIFLE assassins and that Ruby was taking advantage of that fact, counting on the CIA to remain silent on the smuggling for fear of exposing the assassination program (Morrow 1992). As one of the CIA-connected men who had supplied Castro with arms before he came to power and subsequently fell from favor with the U.S., Ruby is thought to have negotiated Trafficante’s release from Castro’s prison (Giancana 1992:279; Marrs 1989:394-98).

Though, after the assassination, the government would later try to portray Jack Ruby as a small-time hustler, Ruby was an influential man in Dallas, almost an unofficial mayor. Ruby came from Chicago to Dallas in 1947 at about the same time the Chicago mob was establishing itself in Dallas (Scott 1993:160) Though Jack Ruby’s associate Joseph Civello was eventually identified by the House of Representatives as the "boss" of the Dallas mob from 1956 onward (Scott 1993:129), Ruby himself was reputed to be in control of many of the local vices. He knew everyone in a position of influence, and was particularly careful to cultivate good relationships with the police force, sheriff’s department, and district attorney’s office. Ruby is estimated to have been on speaking terms with 700 of the 1200 officers on the Dallas police force. Hundreds of officers came to Ruby’s night club; some came for conversation, some to get the free food and drinks he offered all officers. Ruby alone could give consent to a new gambling operation in the city. As a police narcotics informant, he was also "in a position to say which [drug] deals will go through and not be arrested. Those deals he doesn't approve of, he tells the police, and there's an arrest. Three or four Dallas policemen have told us Ruby was their informant on narcotics matters." (Tarby 1996) Ruby supplied prostitutes to Dallas businessmen and visiting VIPs as well as to some police officers (Scott 1993:233,342).

Thanks to Ruby and many others like him, the Dallas authorities were so compromised by the vices that many of them were not in a position to refuse to cooperate when called upon to frame the innocent, intimidate witnesses, falsify reports, and destroy evidence in the Kennedy murder. Sheriff Bill Decker was described by peers as "an old-time bootlegger" and a "payoff man" for the local rackets (Scott 1993:161). Decker ordered many of his subordinates to take "no part whatsoever" in the security of the presidential motorcade, and eventually fired one deputy for showing too much interest in the case (Craig). In 1937 Decker had testified as a character witness for Joseph Civello, who was seeking a pardon on a narcotics conviction (Scheim 1983:184).

But there were honest men among the Dallas authorities; the chief homicide detective, Will Fritz, had received numerous phone calls after the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald urging him to terminate his investigation into the murder of President Kennedy because, "You have your man." Despite these promptings, Fritz continued until late the next day, when he got a personal telephone call from new president Lyndon Johnson, who "ordered the investigation stopped," to the officer’s dismay (Groden and Livingstone 1989:245). Dr. Charles Crenshaw, who was treating the dying Oswald, also received a personal telephone call from Johnson, who pressed the doctor for a deathbed confession from Oswald. Furthermore, it was Johnson who derailed the Texas investigations into the President's murder by forming a presidential commission to handle the matter.

Ruby had been the subject of investigation by federal narcotics agents as early as 1947, for suspected involvement in a scheme to fly opium over the border from Mexico (Scheim 1983:117). It may have been as a result of this investigation that Ruby first became a federal informant. In 1947, an FBI staff assistant in Congressman Richard Nixon’s office wrote a memo asking Ruby to be excused from testifying before congress on the grounds that Ruby was "performing information functions" for the Congressman’s staff (Marrs 1989:269). By 1956, another FBI informant reported that Ruby was "Mister Big" in "a large narcotics setup operating between Mexico, Texas, and the East" (Scheim 1983:117-118). One infers from the informant’s report that Ruby had some sort of recruiting film for the operation which demonstrated the operation’s efficiency and immunity from border guards and narcotics agents. This immunity is likely to have derived from Ruby’s status as an FBI informant himself. This status is sometimes accorded to criminals of great influence in order to protect them; when thus conferred, it often amounts to a federally-issued "never-go-to-jail-unless-you-murder-someone-on-camera" card. From such a position, Ruby was able to give his FBI handlers valuable tips while eliminating his own criminal competition by informing on them.

Among the wealthy Texans that Sam Giancana counted as business associates were oil magnates Syd Richardson, Clint Murchison, and H.L. Hunt, some of whom had been introduced to Giancana by oil-company geologist and Dallas-area resident George DeMohrenschildt, one of Lee Harvey Oswald’s CIA handlers (Giancana 1992:322). The Murchison family fortune was based partly on loans from the corrupt Teamsters Pension Fund (Scott 1993:218). Murchison's other political and business connections included mob boss Carlos Marcello and Bobby Baker, whose dealings with organized crime on Lyndon Johnson's behalf nearly ruined LBJ's political career when they came to light in 1963. Murchison was a common friend of both FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and New Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello (North 1991:56). In the early 1960s, Sam Giancana confided in his younger brother that a cocaine smuggling ring which he ran with Marcello and Trafficante also had the CIA and wealthy Texas oilmen as partners; the group used offshore oil rigs to bypass U.S. Customs inspection (Giancana 1992:350). This operation apparently survived until the later 1970s, even after Giancana’s death. In New Orleans in the summer of 1977, CIA and military personnel were discovered using offshore oil rigs to smuggle drugs into the U.S. in cooperation with the Marcello crime family (Ruppert 2000). Some of the rigs were owned by George H. W. Bush’s own Zapata Offshore company (Bush was CIA director until 1977) and were serviced by Brown and Root, the Houston-based contracting company which sponsored Lyndon Johnson’s political career. Brown and Root is currently owned by Halliburton, for which current Vice President Dick Cheney was CEO. Bush was involved in CIA Cuban operations in the early 1960s, according to an FBI memo of the time and was also acquainted with DeMohrenschildt. At the time of DeMohrenschildt’s 1977 death, his address book contained George Bush’s name with the words "Zapata Petroleum Midland" (which places the entry at a pre-1959 date), and George’s college nickname, "Poppy" (Tarpley and Chaitkin 1992).

In 1948, at around the same time that Jack Ruby was settling in and cultivating the Dallas rackets for the Chicago and New Orleans crime organizations, George Bush graduated from Yale University, where he had enjoyed membership in the secret "Skull and Bones" society, an organization founded in 1833 by a member of the Russell family, which owned the largest opium-trading company in the United States (Tarpley and Chaitkin 1992). Following Russell & Company and Skull and Bones throughout their long histories, one finds several family names of great significance, among them Delano (as in Franklin Delano Roosevelt), Luce (owners of the Time-Life publishing empire), and Dulles (the brothers who led the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy). The number of influential families and figures to emerge from the "old China trade" is a fascinating subject in itself and too large a subject to be treated here. It was from this social environment that George H. W. Bush came to Odessa, Texas. At this time, the so-called Eastern Establishment would have been seeking to incorporate the growing southwest oil industry into their plans before the new Texas rich became a serious threat. With family money behind him, "Poppy" went into the oil business and built partnerships with Texan powerhouses like Brown and Root, possibly introducing them to the CIA-mafia network and initiating them in the mysteries of government-protected drug trafficking. He was tremendously successful, building a Texas power base which took him from the vice presidency of Zapata Petroleum to the presidency of Zapata Offshore (1959), the U.S. House of Representatives (1967), the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee (1972), the directorship of the CIA (1976), the Vice Presidency (1981), and finally the Presidency (1989).

According to Joseph McBride of The Nation, "a source with close connections to the intelligence community confirms that Bush started working for the [Central Intelligence A]gency in 1960 or 1961, using his oil business as a cover for clandestine activities." The earliest operations of Zapata Offshore coincided in time with the victory of Fidel Castro and coincided in geography with the three centers of power in the assassination conspiracy: Texas, Louisiana, and Florida:

1959 was the year that Bush started operating out of his Zapata Offshore headquarters in Houston; it was also the year that Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba. Officially, as we have seen, George was now a businessman whose work took him at times to Louisiana, where Zapata had offshore drilling operations. George must have been a frequent visitor to New Orleans. . . . And then, there were Zapata Offshore drilling operations in the Florida Strait (Tarpley and Chaitkin 1992).

Bush is thought to have had a role in the Bay of Pigs invasion, as he was involved with the CIA and Cuban exile politics even in this early time. Many of the names associated with the invasion represent the things dearest to Bush. Zapata, the code name for the invasion, was the name of the Cuban peninsula where the invasion was originally planned and coincidentally the name of Bush’s oil company. One of the ships used in the invasion was named "Houston," which was Bush’s new home, and another was the "Barbara J." Barbara was, of course, his wife but one would have to explain the "J" to suppose that she was the ship’s namesake. More interesting than Bush’s possible involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion are his activities around the time of the assassination. A 1963 FBI memo informs us that "George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency" was briefed by the FBI on the reaction of Cuban exiles to the assassination of President Kennedy..

According to journalist Daniel Hopsicker, records have recently come to light showing that Felix Rodriguez, a CIA cocaine smuggler during the Iran-Contra years and an associate of George Bush, was a member of the CIA's Operation 40 Cuban death squad in the 1960s and was recruited into the CIA in 1961 by a man named Bush, presumably George. Rodriguez was one of Fulgencio Batista’s policemen in pre-Castro Cuba, participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and eventually went to work at the CIA’s station in Miami, which was code-named JMWAVE. Rodriguez fits Sam Giancana’s vague description of one of the Kennedy gunmen as a "crooked former Batista cop." Both Bush and Rodriguez, and Richard Nixon are among the few men of their respective generations who deny being able to recall the exact circumstances in which they learned of the President’s murder (Hopsicker 167-68, Prouty 1992:119-120).

John F. Kennedy’s vice president and successor was also closely linked to the narcotics smuggling interests. Lyndon Johnson's political career was built on fraud and graft and thrived on its continuation. The U.S. Senate seat that he took in the 1948 election was stolen (Scheim 1983:233). While serving as Senate majority leader, Johnson did favors for Carlos Marcello, the New Orleans crime boss whose territory extended into Johnson's home state of Texas. In exchange for shooting down anti-racketeering bills and steering congressional investigations clear of Texas, Johnson got hundreds of thousands of dollars from Marcello in the form of campaign contributions (Scott 1993). Johnson and FBI Director Hoover may have used evidence of Kennedy’s extramarital sexual escapades to blackmail JFK into taking Johnson as his running mate (Summers 1993:271-73). Acting as the illegal drug industry’s most highly-placed "mole" in the White House, LBJ fed information to the President’s enemies, including telling CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell of JFK’s plans to eviscerate the CIA (Morrow 1976:22). Cabell was close to Ed Lansdale and his brother, Earle Cabell, also happened to be the mayor of Dallas.

Using John Newman’s JFK and Vietnam as a basis for commentary, Professor Peter Dale Scott discusses in Deep Politics and the Death of JFK one of Johnson’s early diplomacy efforts as vice president, which was to encourage Ngo Dinh Diem to request an increased U.S. troop presence in Vietnam:

. . . Johnson had been, since 1961, the ally of the Joint Chiefs (and in particular Air Force General Curtis LeMay) in their unrelenting efforts, against Kennedy’s repeated refusals, to introduce U.S. combat troops into Asia. In May 1961 . . . LBJ had briefly been a "linchpin" in an attempted end-run around Kennedy’s reluctance. On May 10 the Joint Chiefs sent a recommendation to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that [Diem] be "encouraged to request" U.S. combat troops. . . . Johnson acted on the unapproved recommendation . . .and obtained from Diem the response that he "did want an increase in U.S. training personnel." Moments later, Diem had accepted the compromise . . . that U.S. combat troops be introduced "for direct training purposes." . . . [This] compromise "parallels precisely" a formula inserted into policy documents two weeks earlier in Washington by General Lansdale, saying that 16,000 U.S. combat troops were required in Vietnam as trainers (Scott 1993:30-31).

Newman himself had this to say:

Lansdale was not a combat troops man, yet the very first piece of paper ever in the history of the Vietnam War where an American officer recommends a U.S. troop commitment to Vietnam, Lansdale was the one who authors it. It's right in that critical time frame right after the failure at the Bay of Pigs; right before the crucial decision Kennedy has to make on going into Laos. His Vietnam Task Force paper is coming in through the door. The night, the very night that the Joint Chiefs figure out that Kennedy is going to say no on Laos, Lansdale, late at night in the Pentagon, slips in this combat troop proposal in the Vietnam Task Force report.

Thus we have the loosely-connected association of General Edward Lansdale, his Air Force superior Curtis LeMay, Lyndon Johnson, and others unknown acting in concert to pressure the new president to send combat troops into Vietnam, a commitment that President Eisenhower had adamantly refused to make.

Dave Ferrie was a CIA pilot, a close associate of Carlos Marcello, and much more. Ferrie is said to have flown Marcello back into the United States after his deportation by Robert Kennedy. As well as making clandestine flights into Cuba, Ferrie also flew drugs and guns out of Central America for Marcello (Giancana 1992:331). As an instructor in the Civil Air Patrol, Ferrie recruited Lee Harvey Oswald and Barry Seal into his clandestine world. Much has been written about all three men. Oswald, of course, is best known as the fall guy in the Kennedy assassination. Seal was Ferrie’s successor as manager of the CIA’s Louisiana air fleet after Ferrie’s 1967 murder during the prosecution of Clay Shaw, a New Orleans businessman who ran the International Trade Mart, where Seal is known to have had an office in 1969 (Hopsicker 2001). Seal was also the CIA’s most flamboyant drug trafficker until his own death in Baton Rouge in 1986 (Reed and Cummings 1993).

Also working closely with Ferrie was Guy Banister, a former FBI agent who had resigned the Bureau as Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago office in 1955 and come to New Orleans. In the early 1960s it was not uncommon for Banister’s office to contain crates of ammunition or Cuban paramilitary men (Hinckle and Turner 1992:229-236).

Dave Ferrie worked closely with Clay Shaw. One of Seal’s CIA handlers, Dave Dixon, was Shaw’s close friend (Hopsicker 2001). Shaw remains the only man ever indicted in connection with the Kennedy assassination. Shaw was also on the board of Permindex and Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC), two CIA front companies involved in illegal arms transfers. Permindex and CMC had many officers in common. The Centro was originally formed in Montreal before moving to Rome in 1961. One of the CMC’s major stockholders was Major L. M. Bloomfield, formerly of the American OSS, who also was the Chairman of Permindex’s Montreal branch (Garrison 1988:100-101). Montreal is a significant city for many reasons, one of the lesser-known reasons being its role as a major North American hub for narcotics trafficking during this period. The Montreal syndicate was run by French Corsicans and was of great significance to the American traffic, described as "dominant" by one expert (Chambliss 1978). Major Bloomfield was also the attorney for the Bronfman family, which owned the Seagrams liquor company. The Canadian Bronfmans had made enormous amounts of money selling alcohol to America during the prohibition era. Criminologist William Chambliss has pointed out that the bootleggers of the 1920s were in many cases among the major heroin wholesalers of the decades to follow (Chambliss 1978). One Jules Kimble told New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison that he had accompanied Dave Ferrie and Clay Shaw to Montreal some time around 1962 (Garrison 1988:136-138).

Jack Ruby also worked with Ferrie and Shaw to buy guns for the Cuban exile underground on behalf of the CIA (Morrow 1992). The OAS, a French terrorist group of the time, also figures heavily in this milieu. The OAS, or Secret Army Organization, was financed in large part by drug money and was determined to assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle (Krüger 1980). There is evidence to suggest that one or more OAS terrorists were on hand at the assassination of President Kennedy (Twyman 1997:411). Permindex funded the OAS; de Gaulle in 1962 publicly accused Permindex of doing so (Marrs 1989:499; Garrison 1988:88-89). DA Jim Garrison discovered that Guy Banister had sent an associate to Paris with a suitcase containing between $100,000 and $200,000 in cash for the OAS (Marrs 1989:499). Ruby’s arms smuggling partner, Thomas Eli Davis, worked with the OAS (Twyman 1997:421-22). The Schlumberger Corporation, which is Brown and Root’s (that is to say, Halliburton’s - Brown and Root is now owned by Halliburton ) biggest competitor in the oil well services business even today, also supported the OAS (Garrison 1988:53); its president, Jean de Menil, was also on Permindex’s board of directors (DiEugenio 1993:213). Schlumberger was begun by a Houston family into which de Menil married; the de Menils were contributors to the arts and respected members of Houston society. George DeMohrenschildt counted de Menil as a close friend. The CIA also supported the OAS in the early 1960s and supplied Schlumberger with anti-personnel ammunition (Garrison 1988:53). After the apparent demise of the OAS, Dave Ferrie and several anti-Castro Cubans in the employ of Guy Banister removed explosives from a Schlumberger bunker at Houma, Louisiana for use in anti-Castro operations. Several crates of the munitions were seen at his office by a visiting friend (Hinckle and Turner 1992:230).

Surveying the entire sordid mess from his Washington, DC office was J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover was a careful man who had not openly defied any President or Attorney General (his nominal superiors) but who doggedly pursued his own agenda, namely the protection and accumulation of his own power. No one has claimed to have been close to him, and none of those closest to him claim to have understood him.

Hoover denied the existence of a national crime syndicate until the 1960s, when bureaucratic pressures from the White House became too great to withstand. How do we explain the reluctance of the nation's top law enforcement officer to prosecute organized crime? One possible reason is that Hoover practiced homosexuality and the mafia knew it and threatened to expose him. A 1993 biography would seem to establish as fact Hoover's deviant sexual behavior and presents evidence that Hoover protected mob boss Meyer Lansky because Lansky had photos of Hoover in compromising sexual behavior (Summers 1993:243-45). Such photographs are reported by more than one source to have been in the possession of CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton (Hopsicker 2001:119; Summers 1993:244-45). It is believed that Hoover's second-in-command and constant companion Clyde Tolson was also his lover; this was something of an "open secret" in Washington (Summers 1993). A man of otherwise good character who was thus vulnerable to blackmail would find it difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute the crimes of those who held his weakness over his head at all times like Damocles' sword. For a man already inclined toward graft, such blackmail was the most common form of insurance against a sudden attack of conscience. But there are still those who insist that Hoover was not homosexual. Cartha DeLoach, one of Hoover's top assistants, ridiculed the research of Hoover biographer Anthony Summers on this subject as "gossip" and attacked the credibility of his sources. But could one truly expect "respectable" citizens to be firsthand witnesses to such behavior and thus to be available as sources? Contrary to the impression given by DeLoach in his book Hoover’s FBI, these allegations have been around for decades. Even in the 1940s, FBI agents were squelching rumors of Hoover’s alleged homosexuality (Theoharis 1995:346-356).

Another explanation, one based on more common knowledge, is Hoover's affiliation with right-wing individuals who were connected to organized crime. He was a very close friend of Del Webb, the owner of the New York Yankees baseball team whose finances had been entangled with those of organized crime figures the likes of Meyer Lansky and Bugsy Siegel, and of right-wing oil baron Clint Murchison, whose Murchison Oil Lease Company was found by the U.S. Senate to be 20 percent owned by the Genovese crime family of New York (Summers 1993:231-33). Murchison arranged for the FBI director to lend his name to the famous anti-Communist book Masters of Deceit, which he arranged to be published through his own company (Scott 1993:207). Hoover was sighted on several occasions meeting with mob boss Frank Costello.

Hoover's retirement in January of 1965 was eventually waived by his old friend and neighbor, President Lyndon Johnson, with whom he had at least two things in common: an intense resentment of the Kennedys and little or no chance of staying in office if JFK had been reelected. The two men allegedly shared complicity in the assassination, having had foreknowledge of the shooting in Dallas. Madeleine Brown, Johnson’s mistress, recalled the following from a party on the evening before the assassination, hosted by Clint Murchison and attended by J. Edgar Hoover, Clyde Tolson, Richard Nixon, John McCloy, George Brown (of Brown and Root) and H.L. Hunt:

The group . . . went behind closed doors. A short time later Lyndon, anxious and red-faced, re-appeared. I knew how secretly Lyndon operated. Therefore I said nothing . . . not even that I was happy to see him. Squeezing my hand so hard, it felt crushed from the pressure, he spoke with a grating whisper, a quiet growl, into my ear, not a love message, but one I'll always remember: "After tomorrow those g—d--- Kennedys will never embarrass me again - that's no threat - that's a promise." (Brown 1997)

There had been credible death threats against the Kennedys which had come to the attention of the FBI for several months prior to the assassination. Designed as the FBI was, only Hoover, and possibly some of his men at the top, could have seen the "big picture" which was being formed from bits of information passed on by the various field offices. It appears that Hoover sat on the information rather than passing it on to the Secret Service, and sat rather aloof from the developing conspiracy until it came to its climax in Dallas (North 1991).

Hoover’s actions after the assassination were not consistent with his office. Not only did he mislead and withhold information from the presidential commission appointed to investigate the event, he publicly demanded that the Warren Commission agree with his declaration that Lee Harvey Oswald bore sole responsibility for the murder (North 1991:14). As soon as the commission’s seven members had been chosen, Hoover "ordered his aides to compile secret dossiers on each member . . . so he would have adequate dirt in his files, if a need arose." (North 1991:448) Congressman Hale Boggs, one of the seven commissioners, complained years later that Hoover had "lied his eyes out" on several points relevant to the case and accused Hoover of using "Gestapo tactics" to intimidate him. Boggs disappeared on a plane flight in 1972. (Groden and Livingstone 1989:116; Marrs 1989:562).

Not all of the commissioners were disposed to complain about Hoover’s behavior. Former CIA director Allen Dulles was on the commission, and had no desire for an investigation that would expose the CIA’s proximity to the conspiracy. Future president Gerald Ford was Hoover’s active accomplice on the commission. According to the William Sullivan, then an Assistant Director at the FBI,

Hoover was delighted when Ford was named to the Warren Commission. The Director wrote in one of his internal memos that the Bureau could expect Ford to "look after FBI interests" and he did, keeping us fully advised of what was going on behind closed doors. He was our . . . informant on the Warren Commission (North 1991:448-49)

Ford altered the wording of a report describing the deceased president’s wounds to make a single-gunman explanation plausible (Feinsilber 1997). Ford, along with commission counsel and future U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, was among the chief authors of the so-called "magic bullet" theory, which proposed that three shots were fired and that one of the bullets caused an impossible series of wounds, later to emerge from two men’s bodies showing no signs of impact. It was an implausible theory, but it was the best that could have been done, and in those days fewer people thought to question the government. The year after the Commission released its report, Ford authored Portrait of the Assassin, which supported the Commission’s conclusions. Though the book used materials that had been ordered sealed, Ford suffered no legal consequences.

These details might be worth forgetting were it not for events in Ford’s later career. In the middle of Richard Nixon’s second term as president, Ford was appointed by Nixon to replace Vice President Spiro Agnew due to legal proceedings against Agnew. When the Watergate cover-up caught up with Nixon, he resigned and left Ford to take over the office; Ford immediately pardoned Nixon in advance of any Watergate-related charges which might be brought against the ex-president.

Fifteen months after Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, Gerald Ford chose George Bush to head the CIA. It was in these circumstances that the National Security Council, over which Ford had direct oversight, made a deliberate and secret decision to use drug profits to fund the arming of the Kurds. As part of this program, the CIA used offshore oil rigs, some of which were owned by Bush’s Zapata Offshore company, to smuggle the contraband past U.S. Customs (Ruppert 2000).

THE KENNEDYS’ WAR FOR CONTROL

The Kennedy Justice Department’s targeting of the Teamsters Union and other persons affiliated with organized crime is well-known. The Teamsters were at the time aligned with the Republican party and thus represented a source of power and revenue to the Kennedys’ opposition. The Kennedy administration’s war on organized crime had earlier roots in the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, also known as the McClellan Committee. The committee was formed in 1957; Robert Kennedy was Chief Counsel and his brother John was a member. The McClellan Committee’s most notorious target was Jimmy Hoffa, president of the Teamsters Union. The committee reported that Teamsters Local 320 in Miami was a front for narcotics smuggling and identified the Marcello organization as the "key distribution point for drug shipments entering the United States" (Morrow 1993:39). The committee also put Sam Giancana in the hot seat; America watched on television as he pled the fifth on all questions and was ridiculed by Bobby Kennedy. After the 1961 inauguration, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, appointed by his brother the president, formed a "Get Hoffa" squad in the Justice Department to take down the powerful leader of the Teamsters.

New Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello was aligned with Hoffa, the anti-Castro Cubans, and other Republican interests, particularly anti-Communist organizations, and was summarily deported by Robert Kennedy to Guatemala in 1961. After what Marcello described as an ordeal in a remote Guatemalan jungle, Dave Ferrie flew him back to the states. Ferrie was with Marcello in court on the day of the assassination and had to make a hasty trip to Dallas, where he and Barry Seal are reputed to have flown getaway planes for the conspirators (Hopsicker 2001: 164-65).

In addition to cleaning up organized crime – at least where it was serving rival interests – the Kennedy administration angered its enemies by seeking to replace the mafia-favored Cuban exiles with others more to its liking. Even before JFK’s inauguration, he had been warned by his Cuban confidants that former Batista cronies, those allied with Marcello and other underworld figures, were now in positions of prominence in the CIA’s Cuban "government-in-exile." There was a split in the CIA over which sort of Cubans ought to be leading the exile movement. A right-wing faction in the Agency had gained Vice President Nixon’s approval in creating "Operation Forty," a Cuban hit team with the mission of eliminating supposed leftists from the exile movement. Nixon and Charles Cabell, the deputy director of the CIA, created the squad in October 1960 with Mario Kohly, an exile financier and the CIA-mafia alliance’s Cuban President-designate. Operation Forty, presumably named after the National Security Council committee (the "Forty Committee") responsible for the approval of covert operations, was to execute the leftist leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council – the Cubans favored by the new administration – in connection with the Cuban invasion (Morrow 1993:26). A half dozen of these leaders were indeed put under house arrest by the CIA during the Agency-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs the following spring and would likely have been left as martyrs dead on the beach if the invasion had succeeded and put Kohly in power.

Although his reappointment of CIA Director Allen Dulles and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover were Kennedy’s first official acts as President, circumstances quickly changed to show that these two powerful men would not remain in those positions. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, President Kennedy was determined to reorganize the intelligence community in a way that would neutralize his opposition in the CIA. Kennedy fired the top leadership responsible for the invasion, including Director Allen Dulles, his deputy Charles Cabell, and Dick Bissell, the deputy director in charge of the CIA’s covert action wing. Enraged with the Agency's apparent pursuit of an independent agenda, the President threatened to "smash the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." On June 28, 1961 Kennedy signed National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) 55,56, and 57, which placed the responsibility for covert operations – traditionally the CIA’s – in the hands of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These memos sent shock waves through the defense establishment, but they were only the beginning. The Kennedy Administration created the Defense Intelligence Agency in October 1961. By year's end, Bobby Kennedy had become the cabinet officer in charge of Cuban operations. If his brother had had a second term as president, Bobby would likely have been made head of the CIA. In a series of meetings, memos, and telephone calls, he hounded the "Special Group" of Cuban operations officers to do more to undermine Fidel Castro in a new NSC operation dubbed "MONGOOSE." When RFK discovered the CIA/mafia joint effort to assassinate Fidel Castro, he was outraged and "turned it off." (David and David 1986:228) The Kennedys were determined to overthrow Castro, but on their own terms and in their own way and with people of their own choosing. Warren Hinckle and William Turner, authors of Deadly Secrets, described the Kennedys’ anti-Castro efforts this way:

They would pick their own people, Kennedy people, and the second act of the Cuban drama would be directed from the White House, not Langley, not Miami. This was how the Kennedys saw it; but in their patrician manner, they didn’t tell it that way. They continued to wave before all the exiles the flag of a free Cuba while simultaneously cutting away many exile groups, and conversely anointing others to participate in the secret agenda (Hinckle and Turner 1992:170).

If Cuba were to be made free, the Kennedys vowed, it would not be allowed to return to its former status as a cash cow for their rivals. Despite their aggressiveness, however, the Rogue Elephant had its revenge. President Kennedy made the serious mistake of making Ed Lansdale the administration’s right-hand man in Cuban operations, in charge of Operation MONGOOSE.

Lansdale had been one of those who had challenged Allen Dulles’ claim that the Bay of Pigs invasion would succeed without direct U.S. military support. He did not believe that a popular uprising would follow, as Dulles claimed (Wyden 1979:71-73). This opposition, as well as Lansdale’s well-known service in Vietnam and the Philippines, may have contributed to Lansdale’s merit in Kennedy’s eyes and vouched for his fitness as a key figure in a new Cuba campaign. But, as we have seen, Lansdale may have been serving in Vietnam the very domestic interests the Kennedys were combating. And, as we shall see later, Lansdale’s position in MONGOOSE afforded him access to information and personnel which he may have used to organize the 1963 assassination and cover-up.

At its heart, MONGOOSE was a series of air and sea raids against Cuba aboard small, non-military planes and watercraft. It was absolutely enormous, and was all coordinated by a secret CIA station at the University of Miami, code-named JMWAVE. If all the boats had belonged to another country, it has been said, it would have been one of the largest fleets in the western hemisphere.

Since the raids on Cuba were in violation of the neutrality act, MONGOOSE was illegal on its face. In order to put a cloak of secrecy around the project, numerous other laws were broken. The south Florida business world was turned upside down by the arrival of hundreds of CIA front companies for which phony incorporation papers were filed.

Income tax returns gave bogus sources of income. FAA regulations were violated by the filing of spurious flight plans and the taping over of registration numbers. The transportation of explosives on Florida highways transgressed state law. Possession of illegal explosives and war materiel contravened the Munitions Act, and acquisition of automatic weapons defied the Firearms Act. Every time a boat left for Cuba the Neutrality Act was broken; every time it returned Customs and Immigrations laws were skirted (Hinckle and Turner 1992:129-30).

The CIA made arrangements with law enforcement at all levels – from the Dade County Sheriff’s Office to the FBI and Coast Guard – to look the other way and to release any of its people who got themselves into trouble. Pilots working for CIA fronts would be fed information from Agency contacts in the military on how to time their flights to pass through temporary holes in U.S. radar systems (Hinckle and Turner 1992:129-30). Of course, a transnational undertaking that is already illegal in nature and has neutralized all possible threats from law enforcement will create rampant drug smuggling. This has been proven to be the case not only with respect to Cuba but with every similar project since then. Where there is a protected smuggling pipeline, there is great wealth; and where there is wealth of that enormity, there is great power. And when that power is threatened, it will do anything to preserve itself.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Kennedys began what seemed to be a complete dismantling of the Cuba project. The exile training camps were shut down and where paramilitary activity persisted, the camps were raided by federal authorities. Counterfeiters involved in a CIA-sponsored program to flood Cuba with bogus currency were apprehended by U.S. Treasury agents. MONGOOSE was shut down; this meant that many of the most active exile Cubans were left out in the cold, and perhaps most traumatic of all to the administration’s deadliest enemies, there could be no more MONGOOSE-protected drug flights. In reality, the administration had not given up on ridding Cuba of Castro but was merely moving its anti-Castro operations overseas and purging certain exile elements. This purge was aimed chiefly at removing the administration’s enemies from the Cuba project and creating an exile Army with which the administration could cooperate both during the anti-Castro campaign and after its anticipated success. The exile factions excluded from the administration’s new Cuba operations included many who were angry with Kennedy’s performance during the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile crises and those who were allied with the Gulf States crime syndicates – the syndicates hoping to re-establish their criminal power bases in a Castro-free Cuba. As a result of the purge, these exile factions could only have become more dependent on mob patronage and even more anti-Kennedy.

At the height of the missile crisis, as the American and Soviet navies faced off in the Caribbean, CIA officer William Harvey was dispatching commando teams into Cuba, in an attempt to precipitate a full-scale invasion into Cuba. This move enraged the Attorney General and got Harvey dismissed from the Cuba project. Harvey had designed many aspects of the CIA's ZRRIFLE assassination program, was in charge of Task Force W, the CIA’s Cuban section, and answered to Ed Lansdale. Bobby Kennedy sent him to Rome, where he embarrassed the diplomatic corps by his public drunkenness and by engaging in diatribes against the Kennedys. However, Harvey continued to be a key player in the Agency’s ZRRIFLE program, for which he managed and recruited assassins. He was in touch with underworld figures such as Johnny Roselli throughout 1963. He and Roselli had multiple visits with David Morales, the JMWAVE station’s chief of "dirty work," who later made a drunken boast of having had a hand in JFK’s assassination. That summer, Harvey also made contact with David Atlee Phillips, another CIA officer and prime suspect in the assassination (Twyman 1997:307). Phillips’ role will be described shortly. In short, Harvey was the wrong sort of person for the Kennedys to have alienated. It was around the time of the missile crisis that plans to assassinate JFK reached a new intensity. Some staff members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations rightly concluded that Harvey was likely to have played a high-level role in engineering and coordinating the assassination of the president.

By November 1963, the Kennedy Justice Department was hot on the trail of the Vice President. Johnson faced not only political ruin, but the strong possibility of going to prison if any of the matters being pursued developed into a viable case against him. Johnson had been getting enormous sums of gambling profits from Carlos Marcello through a Dallas gangster named Jack Halfen - $500,000 over a ten-year period. In return, Johnson had used his influence in the Senate to kill anti-racketeering bills, take the teeth out of the bills he couldn’t stop, and slow down investigations of organized crime (Marrs 1989:293; Twyman 1997:799) Another conduit for the Marcello money was LBJ's secretary Bobby Baker, and that sordid story was beginning to come to light in 1963. Baker was forced to resign on October 8th, and on the day of Kennedy's fateful motorcade in Dallas, Richard Nixon was quoted in the newspapers predicting that the Baker scandal would result in Johnson being dropped from the 1964 ticket. Kennedy did in fact indicate to one of his secretaries that he intended to cut Johnson loose. Johnson had long since realized that his next destination after leaving the White House would likely be prison. This, of course, was not to be. On the day after the assassination, the FBI stopped sending Robert Kennedy reports on the Baker matter (Russell 1992:523). Though the issue did not die immediately, and Baker went to jail, Johnson ultimately survived it. Nearly hysterical, he ordered subordinates to make payoffs:

[Baker] is going to ruin me. If that [deleted] talks, I'm gonna land in jail. . . . I practically raised that [deleted], and now he's gonna make me the first President of the United States to spend the last days of his life behind bars. . . . Nat can get to Bobby. . . Tell Nat to tell Bobby that I will give him a million dollars if he takes this rap. Bobby must not talk. I'll see to it that he gets a million dollar settlement (Scheim 1983:224).

The "Nat" referred to was a Mob "fixer," or bribe broker. Several years later, biographer Robert Caro would write:

For years, men came into Lyndon Johnson's office and handed him envelopes stuffed with cash. They didn't stop coming even when the office in which he sat was the office of the Vice President of the United States. Fifty thousand dollars (in hundred-dollar bills in sealed envelopes) was what one lobbyist - for one oil company - testified that he brought to Johnson's office during his term as Vice President. (Scheim 1983:248-49)

Johnson's political career was not only advanced by the assassination of President Kennedy, it was saved by it. Johnson may not have had foreknowledge of the killing, but he was at least manipulated into helping to cover it up. This manipulation would have been possible for J. Edgar Hoover, who of course was aware of all the evidence building against Johnson in the famous scandals involving Bobby Baker and Billie Sol Estes.

There was no love lost between Hoover and the Kennedys. Because of Hoover's incompatibility with the administration, President Kennedy had planned to let the FBI Director go when his mandatory retirement came up at age seventy. A battle of rhetoric was afoot between the left and right over the nature of the Communist threat to America; Hoover and the Kennedys were on opposite sides and at the forefront of this battle. President Kennedy asserted that "our peril . . . comes from without, not within." Several days later, Hoover rebutted: "The communist threat from without must not blind us to the communist threat from within." Turning Hoover's words against him, Senator Mike Mansfield suggested that the right-wing idea that the greater communist threat is from within indicated a lack of confidence in Hoover and his FBI. In the same month, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy added his opinion to the debate, saying, "If we think that the great problem in the United States now is the fact that there are 10,000 communists here, if we think that that's what's going to destroy our country, we are in very bad shape . . ." (North 1991:113-120)

When Jack Kennedy took office and appointed his brother Bobby as Attorney General, Bobby broke with a long tradition in the Justice Department by asserting the authority of his office over the FBI. Hoover, who as FBI director had enjoyed relative autonomy for decades, now had to answer to this young upstart, who was leading a crusade against a crime syndicate whose very existence up to that point Hoover had denied. Not only had Hoover refuted allegations of the existence of a national crime syndicate, he had caused the disbanding of a federal task force and hindered the work of his agents who tried to investigate it. As Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy constantly jibed at and prodded Hoover to do more. He went out of his way to point out his authority over Hoover, going as far as having a hotline and buzzer installed in Hoover’s office to summon him on a moment’s notice (North 1991:68). After being snubbed by the Director during his first weeks in office, he tried to make a point by behaving distractedly and throwing darts during their first meeting (North 1991:65-66). RFK threw a monkey-wrench into Hoover’s religiously-observed routine by visiting FBI headquarters on Saturdays to demand direct access to particular Bureau files. In the past, Hoover had been able to control what other Attorneys General had been allowed to see; Hoover began working Saturdays to keep an eye on him (North 1991:70).

Though he publicly spoke of a commitment to winning the war, John F. Kennedy's private opposition to further U.S. involvement in Vietnam was unpopular in some powerful circles. In the spring of 1963 the president told White House aide Kenneth O'Donnell,

In 1965, I'll become one of the most unpopular Presidents in history. I'll be damned everywhere as a Communist appeaser. But I don't care. If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy scare on our hands, but I can do it after I'm reelected. So we had better make damned sure that I am reelected (O’Donnell and Powers 1972:16).

In a CBS interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2nd 1963, Kennedy emphasized the Vietnamese government's domestic failings and placed final responsibility for the success of the war on the Vietnamese: "In the final analysis, it's their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it." In the early days of that month, advisers returned from a fact-finding mission in Vietnam. Based on their information, the President endorsed a plan for the reduction of the U.S. presence in Vietnam, caused this to be written as a report, and sent Defense Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on a second "fact-finding" mission to Vietnam. McNamara and Taylor made this tour during the last days of September 1963 and returned from the country with the ready-made report in hand (Prouty 1992:263). The report's contents were the seeds of National Security Action Memorandum #263 of October 1963. In its final months, with NSAM 263, the Kennedy administration announced its plans to withdraw 1,000 military personnel from Vietnam by the end of the year and to have the bulk of the approximately 15,000 such personnel out of Vietnam by 1965. It wasn't just the military personnel that Kennedy intended to remove from the area. According to an Air Force officer who worked under General Ed Lansdale, Kennedy wanted all CIA officers and agents out of Vietnam as well (Lane 1991: 105).

This was unwelcome news for military contractors and suppliers who were counting on escalation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. One example of such a supplier was Bell Helicopter of Fort Worth, Texas. In 1960, the CIA moved twenty H-19 "Huey" helicopters from a base in Udorn, Thailand (where they were being used for operations in Laos) to the Saigon area. This move resulted from a telephone call by Charles Cabell, the CIA's deputy director, to the Office of Special Operations (OSO) in the Defense Department in December 1960. Col. Fletcher Prouty, who worked in the OSO at that time, notes that this telephone call

. . . came shortly after the First National Bank of Boston had arranged for the Textron Corporation to acquire the Bell Helicopter Company. The CIA had arranged a meeting in the Pentagon in order for a vice president of the Boston bank to discuss Cold War uses of, and demand for, helicopters before it recommended the merger to the officers of Textron. It was the Bell-built "Huey" that became the most-used helicopter in Vietnam (Prouty 1992: 109).

Prouty also says that by the end of the war, some 5,000 helicopters lay destroyed in various parts of Southeast Asia, accounting for one third of all U.S. fatalities. General Moshe Dayan, the hero of Israel’s 1967 Six-Day War, noted in that year that "Helicopters may be first-class equipment, but the way they are being used in Vietnam, they are wasted." (Prouty 1992:108)

Bell took a significant share of the hundreds of billions of dollars that the U.S. poured into the Vietnam war effort; foreseeing such profits, they and others like them thus had reason to dislike the Kennedy administration's announcement of planned withdrawal from the area.

There were other factors that bred resentment of the administration among members of the military-industrial complex. The president and his Secretary of Defense had craftily awarded an immense defense contract on the basis of its foreseen effects on the 1964 presidential vote. The contract for the TFX (Tactical Fighter, Experimental) appeared sure to go to Boeing of Seattle and involved $6.5 billion, an unprecedented amount for a peacetime contract. The Source Selection Board had deliberated over the contract, and the general impression was that Boeing would be selected to build the 1,700 aircraft. Yet on November 24th, 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the contract would go to General Dynamics and Grumman. Though the administration wished the public to believe otherwise, this announcement was the result of a detailed study by McNamara's staff of the voting districts populated by the workers and dependents of Boeing and its competitors.

McNamara's rejection of the Source Selection Board's recommendation, and the administration posture that accompanied it, sent shock waves through the military-industrial machine and the finance community. In an April announcement, McNamara's deputy Roswell Gilpatric spoke about the decision and noted: "We can try to make a special effort to give work where it can be done effectively and efficiently, to depressed areas." Perhaps some listeners saw the political motivation behind the awarding of the contract (Prouty 1992:143-49).

With both the Justice Department and the Defense Department being used as political instruments, inside observers might have wondered what might come next. Would the emerging space program, led by Kennedy, be used similarly? Might traditional defense spending be cut in favor of the recently-approved Apollo space program (which admittedly had major defense implications), a more humane (and possibly more Kennedy-controlled) way to stimulate the economy?

The potential loss of military-industrial revenue resulting from withdrawal from Vietnam does not seem sufficient alone to inspire a serious plot against the President. Powerful interests might for this reason give an approving nod to such a conspiracy but would not have sufficient motive to instigate one. But Vietnam involved more than just weapons. It was also strategically important for the heroin supply. If abandoned, the area's resources would be lost. Though by 1961 the CIA had positioned itself at all points in the French heroin supply chain, it was not yet in a position to muscle them out of the business. That would require more personnel; personnel which would only be supplied in the type of conflict that men like Edward Lansdale and Lyndon Johnson had been so busy creating and promoting. If Kennedy had his way, the American inroads into the Southeast Asian drug trade would be lost before they reached fruition. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy refused to send combat troops to Vietnam. By the end of his administration, though the number of American soldiers there had grown from 1,000 to 16,000 – as a result of bureaucratic pressures outside the White House, the recommendations of Ed Lansdale and others, and the diplomatic efforts of Vice President Johnson – the president had made clear his determination to reduce the American role in the conflict. He determined in the fall of 1963 to remove 1,000 advisors. By 1962 he was cracking down on crooked CIA operatives in Southeast Asia and secured an indictment against at least one of the major players:

When President John F. Kennedy in 1962 attempted a crackdown on the most hawkish CIA elements in Indochina, he sought the prosecution of Willis Bird, who had been charged with the bribery of an aid official in Vientiane. But Bird never returned to the U.S. to stand trial (Krüger 1980:130; see also McCoy 1991:168-69).

If Kennedy survived much longer, many drug profiteers and their henchmen – including Vice President Johnson – would be facing indictments and prison terms. But the assassination of November 1963 was a turning point in American policy; we will shortly see Lyndon Johnson’s reversal of Kennedy’s policies, the escalation of the war, and the transfer of several American mobsters and "black ops" personnel from Cuba to Southeast Asia, where they will continue to develop America’s market share in the drug economy.

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

Over the years, the individuals involved in the assassination and the roles they played have been revealed in various ways. Some of them are merely implicated by the testimony of others; some have privately confessed to their own involvement or are on record plotting against the president. A select few were caught on film; fewer still were photographed in Dealey Plaza, the site of the Dallas shooting, during the very hour of the assassination.

Antonio Veciana, the head of the Cuban exile organization Alpha 66, captured the attention of investigators of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) during the late 1970s by saying that his CIA case officer, using the name "Maurice Bishop," introduced him to Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas in October 1963. Veciana then tantalized the HSCA staff by all but identifying "Bishop" as David Atlee Phillips, a well-known CIA officer who had masterminded the propaganda aspects of the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 (Fonzi 1993). During the HSCA investigation a film surfaced – and later disappeared – showing Phillips, Veciana, Lee Harvey Oswald, Dave Ferrie, and several Cubans on a training exercise in Louisiana in September 1963 (Hopsicker 2001:153-54).

Phillips was an actor as well as a propagandist and was capable of masterful deceit both in person and on a much larger scale. Phillips was without a doubt the mind behind one cover story for the assassination, namely that Oswald was an agent of Castro. Setting up an enemy government to make it appear responsible for CIA-organized assassinations was standard practice in the ZRRIFLE program as outlined by William Harvey: "Planning should include provisions for blaming Sov[iet]s or Czechs . . ." (Twyman 1997:397-404) Phillips had no doubt done so in the past and certainly continued to do so in the future. Phillips was probably behind some or all of the many "false Oswalds" appearing in Mexico City, Dallas, and other places, who were behaving ostentatiously in ways that would suggest Oswald was planning to kill the president and/or was under Communist control.

In attempting to establish Oswald’s ties to Castro as fact, Philips had the aid of the Mexican Gobernacion, or ministry of the interior, which oversaw the DFS, the Mexican equivalent of the FBI (Scott 1993:104-105). The DFS was so deeply involved in the drug traffic that in later years DEA agents would regard a DFS badge as a "license to traffic." Through the DFS, Gobernacion issued cards to major drug traffickers identifying them as agents of the government. The DFS’ chief, Miguel Nazar Haro, was a close friend of Win Scott, the CIA’s Mexico City Station Chief, and it was through this station that false reports came from Gobernacion regarding Lee Harvey Oswald’s alleged attempts to acquire visas at the Cuban and Soviet embassies just prior to the assassination. In further effort to paint the assassination as a Communist conspiracy, Phillips attempted to bribe one of Antonio Veciana’s relatives, a Cuban official in Mexico City, to say that Oswald had contacted him while there (Twyman 353).

There is fascinating evidence that at least one faction within the CIA was aware of the assassination plot and tried to foil it, whether to prevent an international incident or to save the life of the President, it is not clear. Though he feared for his safety and would not speak straightforwardly about it, CIA agent Richard Case Nagell implied over many years that a Soviet "mole" in the CIA - along with CIA officer Tracy Barnes - sent Nagell first to infiltrate the Banister-Ferrie organization in New Orleans and then to assassinate Oswald and thus stall the plot against JFK. Nagell indeed investigated the Louisiana team which was setting Oswald up, but ultimately refused to kill Oswald. Nagell's handlers could only do so much to compensate without risking exposure; thus the plot went forward. The evidence that Nagell was able to produce is compelling. His story is extremely complicated and cannot be done justice in any less than several pages, which space is not available here. The fullest account ever assembled and published is Dick Russell's The Man Who Knew Too Much.

The New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was at the center of Oswald's New Orleans activities, during which his credentials were established as a Castro supporter. The CRC was crucial to setting up Oswald as the fall guy. The CRC's New Orleans chapter was led by the Cuban exile Sergio Arcacha-Smith and received funding from local mob boss Carlos Marcello through David Ferrie, Arcacha-Smith's partner and Marcello's legal researcher (North 1991:56). Their office was at 544 Camp Street, which was also in the same building as Guy Banister’s offices and by no coincidence also the address which Oswald once had printed on his pro-Castro leaflets.

Carlos Bringuier, a Cuban who picked a street fight with Oswald and later debated with him on WDSU-TV, had been the CRC's secretary for publicity. For Bringuier, the CRC’s propagandist, Oswald was not in fact an adversary, but a public image project. With the help of Banister and Bringuier, Oswald raised the public profile of what was in reality a one-man, unauthorized chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). The FPCC was at the time a national organization regarded as subversive in some circles in the federal government. It is likely that Oswald thought he was building an intelligence "legend" that would enable him to infiltrate the FPCC, when he was in fact being set up as a pro-Castro patsy. After his pro-Castro credentials were established in New Orleans, Oswald moved into the Dallas orbit of Jack Ruby, a member of the weapons-smuggling network with which Ferrie and Banister were associated.

Another of Tracy Barnes' agents was Robert Morrow, who was instructed by Barnes to purchase four 7.35 mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifles and modify them so that they could be easily broken down and reassembled. Morrow did so and delivered three of them to David Ferrie, who said they were for use against a "head of state." Morrow is certain that they were used in Dallas, as were the radios he created for Ferrie's compatriot Eladio del Valle. Some time after receiving the equipment, del Valle phoned Morrow to tell him that it would be put to use soon: Kennedy was about to "get it" in Dallas (Morrow 1993).

An FBI informant had overheard a discussion earlier that year in which Cuban exiles discussed that there would be "snipers firing from several different points [and] a main signal would have to be given. . . .What you do is have something - a street sign, anything - and a guy standing beside it takes his hat off. He's telling you that your target's right on the money." (Russell 1992:410-415) Movies and photos of the assassination scene show that at the time of the first shot, a man is standing next to the presidential limousine and under a sign reading "Stemmons Freeway - Keep Right." The man does not remove a hat, but instead waves an open umbrella. After the shooting, two men were photographed sitting on the sidewalk nearby. One appears to be holding a radio and the other has the unmistakable profile of CIA anti-Castro operative Gordon Novel (DiEugenio 1992).

Immediately after the shooting in Dealey Plaza, some of the witnesses had rushed to the grassy knoll in pursuit of a gunman there. Deputy Sheriff Seymour Weitzman was the first officer to scale the fence, and he encountered Cuban Revolutionary Council member and Cuban exile leader Bernard Barker, who showed phony Secret Service credentials and told him that everything was under control. Beginning in June 1972, Weitzman ended up in at least three federal rest homes after having a nervous breakdown, possibly as a result of recognizing Barker in news coverage of the Watergate break-ins. Barker, a long-time associate of Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis from the anti-Castro operations of the early 1960s until the Watergate arrests of 1972, was identified by Weitzman from photographs shown to him (Weberman and Canfield 1992:56-57).

About one half-hour after the shooting, men in Dallas Police uniforms pulled three tramps from a railcar behind the Texas School Book Depository. Though they were presumably booked by the police, there was no record of their arrest. But several photographs of the three men, commonly known as the "tramp photos," remain. It is difficult to imagine that one of the three is any other than CIA officer Howard Hunt, a close associate of David Atlee Phillips, with whom he worked in the both the CIA’s Guatemalan campaign of 1954 and the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. Hunt would later be arrested for his role in the Watergate affair. Though the identity of the "tramps" remains a controversy, this author believes that the other two are Texas hit man Charles Harrelson (father of actor Woody Harrelson) and Sam Giancana’s assistant Richard Cain. High on cocaine while being arrested for the murder of a federal judge several years later, Harrelson confessed to having been involved in the assassination of the president (Marrs 1989:333-337). In one photograph, a man is shown walking past the three in the opposite direction. This man was independently identified as Edward Lansdale by two men who knew Lansdale well (Twyman 1997:540).

Howard Hunt has denied being in Dallas on the day of the assassination and has even brought suit against those who have published literature identifying him as one of the tramps. But he has been unable to establish a credible alibi, and one witness placed Hunt in Dallas on the previous day. In one of Hunt's libel suits, one Marita Lorenz gave sworn testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, American mercenaries Frank Sturgis and Gerry Patrick Hemming, and Cuban exiles including Orlando Bosch, Pedro Diaz Lanz, and the brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampol, had met one November midnight in 1963 at the Miami home of Orlando Bosch and had studied Dallas street maps. She also swore that she and Sturgis were at that time in the employ of the CIA and that they received payment from Howard Hunt under the name "Eduardo," an alias which Hunt is known to have used in his dealings with Cuban exiles. After studying the maps, she and the men departed for Dallas in two cars, taking a load of handguns, rifles, and scopes in the follow-up car. They arrived in Dallas on November 21, 1963 and stayed at a motel, where the group met Howard Hunt. Hunt stayed for about forty-five minutes and at one point handed an envelope of cash to Sturgis. About an hour after Hunt left, Jack Ruby came to the door. Lorenz says that this was the first time she had seen Ruby. By this time, she said, it was early evening. In her testimony, Lorenz identified herself and her fellow passengers as members of Operation Forty, the CIA-directed assassination team formed in 1960 in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. She described her role as that of a "decoy." The group blamed Kennedy for the failure at the Bay of Pigs and conspired to kill him, she said. Knowing that something more sinister than gun-running was involved, she left the group about two hours after Ruby's visit and returned to Miami. Sturgis, she said, later told her that she had missed out on the group's killing of Kennedy (Lane 1991).

An article written by former CIA officer Victor Marchetti appeared in the 14 August 1978 edition of The Spotlight, a Washington newspaper. In this article, Marchetti alleged that a decision had been made that March by the CIA to make a limited admission of CIA involvement in the assassination. According to "sensitive sources in the CIA and on HSCA [House Select Committee on Assassinations]," some of the minor figures in the conspiracy were to be exposed. Chief among these was to be Howard Hunt, then a major figure in the relatively recent Watergate scandal. Also allegedly marked for exposure were Gerry Hemming, a long-time Cuba mercenary, and Frank Sturgis, one of Hunt's fellow Watergate burglars.

If, as Charles Harrelson once claimed, he did fire a shot at President Kennedy, it would not have been inconsistent with what is known of his later career. Harrelson is now serving time for killing federal judge John Wood. If the Kennedy conspiracy centered on the protection of a CIA-connected drug ring, it would have that in common with the Wood assassination, as shown in the following excerpts of an article which appeared in From the Wilderness:

[Gary] Eitel [former CIA pilot in Laos during the Vietnam War] says a man by the name of Bill Branson (not his real name), a former employee approached him with a lucrative offer of CIA contract work. He was offered a chance to make more in one day than he could make all month. While Eitel clearly told Branson he would play no part in illegal activities, Branson told Eitel he'd be contacted again in the future.
At a baseball game in the spring of 1973, Eitel says a man in a ball cap, blue jeans and dark glasses sat beside him in the stands.
'Do you like baseball?' Eitel remembers the unidentified man's opening line.
Eitel says was not about to run drugs for anyone, but when the contact wanted expertise on how to set up a dummy aviation company, he agreed to give advice, he says.
The contact pressed a roll of $100 bills into his hand, and at a subsequent meeting Eitel described in detail how to set up a dummy aviation proprietary that would offer cover and deniability.
Again, Eitel says he declined to actually participate in anything illegal.
'I had no problem flying for the CIA (during his Army tour), but I had a lot of problems breaking federal law to fly for the CIA,' says Eitel.
In early 1979 Eitel says Branson called to congratulate him for his wise decision to refuse the drug-hauling contract.
. . .

Eitel says that Branson told him that the drug hauling operation had been unplugged because a federal judge in San Antonio, Texas, John Wood Jr., had gotten wind of the operation and was furious.
'I didn't think a lot about it until later,' says Eitel, 'then it (the call) all made sense.'
Later that year Judge John Woods was assassinated outside his San Antonio home.

Jim Hicks told New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison that he had been at Dealey Plaza as the radio coordinator for the gunmen (Groden and Livingstone 1989:213). Corroborating Hicks' own claims, CIA contract agent Robert Morrow recognized one of four radios he bought for Cuban exile Eladio del Valle in a photograph taken at Dealey Plaza that day. Though he did not name Hicks, Morrow described a photograph similar to one in which a small radio is seen protruding from the back pocket of a man fitting Hicks' description (Russell 1992:537). The Giancana biography also supports Hicks' story that the communications center for the assassination was in the Adolphus Hotel, across the street from Jack Ruby's night club, where high-level CIA officials were present (Giancana 1992:335). Hicks was taken to a military mental institution after talking to the authorities about his role and was kept there until his 1988 release, shortly after which he was murdered (Groden and Livingstone 1989:213).

Critics of conspiracy theories regarding Kennedy's death point to the difficulty of getting the cooperation of several local and federal agencies in any undertaking; such critics reason that the orchestration of a criminal cover-up in such a manner would be nearly impossible. Ironically, it may have been not a criminal conspiracy but rather the efforts of JFK's own brother Bobby which provided the means for one element of the cover-up. As a contingency plan for possible violence against high-level U.S. officials as retaliation by Castro for plots on his life, Bobby and those close to him had decided that all information and evidence in an assassination of a public figure should be tightly controlled to reduce the possibility of speculation of Cuban responsibility. Such speculation could, of course, have sparked an international incident and this was something the Kennedys became increasingly wary of after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This well-documented contingency plan, discussed by researchers Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann on the A&E video production The Men Who Killed Kennedy, goes a long way to explain some of the events immediately following Kennedy's death, such as the illegal pre-autopsy removal of the president's body from Parkland Hospital and the manner in which the autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. After that, the Dallas authorities and conspiratorial or misguided elements in Hoover's FBI, led by Hoover himself, buried whatever evidence came up to threaten the official story.

Thus we see that allegations of an official cover-up do not have to be as simple (and implausible) as to suppose that the conspiracy had to have been coordinated from the beginning by unified FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and Dallas authorities. Oswald's pro-Castro cover as an FBI informant and his former espionage mission to Russia were exploited to paint him as a subversive; this image of Oswald, along with attempts by the conspirators to link the assassination to Castro, was a deliberate ploy. The presence of Cuban gunmen at Dealey Plaza and Oswald's alleged trip to the Russian and Cuban embassies in Mexico City in September were meant to point in Castro's direction. This ruse was meant - by the extreme right-wing element among the conspirators - to place the blame on the Communists (particularly Castro) and to provoke a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Theories that the assassination was really an act of revenge masterminded by Castro persist to this day; it is possible that the cover-up will continue as long as Castro is alive. It is only in recent years that the Assassination Records Review Board (created largely in response to public pressure which followed the release of Oliver Stone's film, JFK) has released documents several decades old which show that Castro's military went on alert following the assassination; apparently Castro was caught off-guard and feared that the assassination would be blamed on Cuba and that the U.S. would invade (Lewis 1997).

In addition to having spent a year and a half at the controls of the CIA’s Cuban assassination machine, Edward Lansdale had proven himself in the Philippines and Vietnam to be a master magician, able to stage deceptive events on the grandest scale. He, more than anyone else, would have been the man able to organize the assassination and the diversion of blame in Dallas. It may have been his sleight-of-hand that caused the President’s body to disappear long enough for military surgeons to alter it prior to the official autopsy (Lifton 1980). As the Kennedys’ man in charge of all Cuba operations, Lansdale would have known about the contingency plans which Robert Kennedy had put in place and which would have provided for just such an arrangement; William Harvey was likely to have known as well. In fact, such plans would have been difficult to prepare without word leaking to the administration’s enemies in the CIA, who had informants among the Secret Service. Once the plans were discovered, they would have been easy to exploit.

Jack Ruby’s complicity in the assassination could not be hidden. As well as shooting Lee Harvey Oswald, Ruby had many other roles that weekend. After having been observed dropping off a gunman at the grassy knoll and possibly remaining to witness the assassination from the Dealey Plaza offices of the Dallas Morning News, he was seen at Parkland Hospital not long after the arrival of Kennedy's body, where someone planted a rifle slug on President Kennedy’s stretcher (Groden and Livingstone 1989:102,228,339).

Ruby's next destination after the hospital may have been the Texas Theatre. Local resident George Applin sat six rows from the rear of the theater and was present as the Dallas Police made their arrest of Oswald. Applin told the Dallas Morning News in 1979 that he had seen Jack Ruby sitting in the back row that day watching as Oswald was arrested, though Applin suggested to Ruby that it would be safer for Ruby to move away (Marrs 1989:352). As the police closed in on Oswald, Assistant District Attorney Bill Alexander waited with several others at the back door, hoping to shoot Oswald in an attempt to flee the theater (Craig; Groden and Livingstone 1989:204). They were disappointed, for Oswald did not try to run. Two witnesses, including the one who had tipped off the police to Oswald's conspicuous entrance into the theater, insisted that they heard the authorities clearly indicate that Oswald was the President's assassin, though less than an hour had passed since the shooting (Marrs 1989:352).

Some time during the day, Ruby made a trip to the bank, having suddenly freed himself from chronic financial troubles. He had owed the IRS almost $40,000, but he had $7000 in cash, half of which was found on him the Sunday morning following the Friday assassination. Some reports said that the trunk of his car was full of money (Groden and Livingstone 1989:241). At a midnight press conference at Dallas Police headquarters twelve hours after the assassination, he shouted out a correction to a statement identifying Oswald as a member of the "Free Cuba Committee," an anti-Castro organization. Ruby called out, "That's [the] Fair Play for Cuba [Committee], Henry," identifying Oswald with the pro-Castro organization in the name of which Oswald had distributed leaflets and made television appearances in New Orleans that summer (Scott 1993:161). Ruby knew Oswald, despite the government’s denials that this was the case, and even more significantly, he knew that Oswald’s part in the conspiracy was to be the pro-Castro patsy.

The following day, Ruby met with Bill Alexander, whose task force at the Theatre had failed to dispose of Oswald (Groden and Livingstone 1989:120). The responsibility had now fallen to Ruby, who would have to kill Oswald during the transfer from police headquarters to the jail, or else there would be consequences coming from his Syndicate superiors which would be more terrible than a court-administered death penalty. That night, Ruby made an anonymous call to Dallas Police Officer Billy Grammer, threatening that if Oswald were moved as planned the next morning, "we will kill him." Ruby was either trying to get out of the assignment, hoping that the anonymous threat would result in a change of plans, or perhaps he was trying to manipulate the police into a situation that would somehow simplify the job (Marrs 1989:417).

On the morning of November 24th, 1963, Ruby went to wire some money to Karen Bennett Carlin, an employee who was out of town and hard up. He then showed up at the nearby Dallas Police Headquarters one hour after Oswald's scheduled transfer, but apparently the police had delayed the transfer while waiting for him. He shot Oswald at the police station on live national television; he was immediately arrested and jailed. When Officer Don Archer brought him the news that Oswald was dead, and that Ruby would probably get the electric chair for it, Ruby seemed greatly relieved at the news, as though his life had depended on it (Marrs 1989:423-24).

Rose Cheramie, a heroin addict, had been thrown from a moving vehicle by two men while on a drug pickup for Jack Ruby. On a trip from Florida to Texas in November 1963, she was left for dead in Louisiana and told hospital staff about the President’s impending assassination in Dallas (DiEugenio 1992:25-26). Jack Ruby, as mentioned previously, was a major figure in the drug trade, operating from both Dallas and Miami. But the Warren Commission, the 1964 panel appointed by President Johnson to issue an official report on Kennedy’s death, actively assisted Hoover’s FBI in obscuring Ruby’s organized crime connections, particularly with regard to narcotics trafficking.

The Warren Commission had in its possession an FBI report linking Ruby to convicted narcotics trafficker Joseph Civello. In Contract on America, David Scheim points out a significant difference between the FBI report as it appears in the Commission’s published exhibits (Commission Exhibit 1536) and the report as originally written and stored among the Commission’s documents in the National Archives (Commission Document 84). The field report, filed by Special Agents Donald F. Hallahan and Thomas G. McGee on November 27, 1963 records the statement of one Bobby Gene Moore, a man then living in Oakland who had known Ruby in Dallas. Moore had seen a television interview in which one of Ruby’s associates asserted that Ruby had no connections to any gangsters. Moore wanted to go on record as having observed Ruby frequenting a gambling operation which took place in the liquor store attached to Moore’s rooming house. This much appears in Commission Exhibit 1536. The next three paragraphs of the report, however, were blanked out in CE 1536 in a way that one would not have known that those three paragraphs were even missing. The copy of the report as seen in Commission Document 84 – the version withheld from the public – goes on to say that Mr. Moore also worked for Joseph "Cirello" and Frank La Monte, handling imported Italian cheese. Based on the fact that Moore was not allowed to open certain shipments, he suspected that "Cirello" was importing narcotics. Furthermore, Jack Ruby was a frequent visitor and associate of Moore’s bosses, "Cirello" and La Monte. Moore then goes on to name two law officers who were regular patrons at the liquor store and were probably involved in the gambling operation and a municipal judge into whose car Moore was frequently requested by "Cirello" and La Monte to "put hams and other food stuffs." "Cirello" was of course Joseph Civello, who had been convicted on narcotics charges in the 1930s and was suspected by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to been a major trafficker in 1957 (Scott 1993:129). This incident of censorship not only demonstrates dishonesty by the Warren Commission but also shows the FBI’s habit of misspelling sensitive names (see also Scott 1993:207,341).

The HSCA’s official investigation of the President’s murder made note that Jack Ruby was in contact with Teamster hit men Lenny Patrick and David Yaras throughout late 1963; the Warren Commission was aware that in the weeks before the assassination Ruby contacted convicted Teamster organizer Barney Baker, who in turn had called David Yaras in Florida on the night before the assassination (Scott, 1993:163). Ruby’s sister told the FBI of Ruby’s strong connections to Patrick and Yaras, but the Bureau misspelled Yaras’ name as "YERES." (Groden and Livingstone 1989:254).

Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa had dreamed of assassinating Robert Kennedy to relieve the pressure brought on him by the Justice Department (Scheim 1983:86-87). Records of the FBI and the House Select Committee on Assassinations record that Hoffa discussed an assassination plan remarkably similar to the one eventually perpetrated in Dallas.

Having been unceremoniously dumped in the Central American wilderness by immigration officials, New Orleans mob boss Carlos Marcello was infuriated and swore revenge on Bobby Kennedy. However, he spoke aloud his belief that the only way to stop Bobby Kennedy was to get rid of Jack. In September 1962, he made known his intention to assassinate the President. He was still facing deportation in 1963 and was in a court hearing with his legal assistant Dave Ferrie on the morning of the assassination.

On his deathbed, Santos Trafficante expressed disagreement with Marcello’s solution. He told his lawyer, "Carlos f---ed up. . . . We shouldn't have killed Giovanni [Italian for 'John']. We should have killed Bobby." (Ragano and Raab 1994:348)

Sam Giancana confided in his brother that his fellow crime bosses and elements in the CIA and military worked together to assassinate the President, with Texas oilmen paying for the murder (Giancana 1992: 329-332). This is corroborated by Lyndon Johnson’s mistress, Madeline Brown, who said that after she confronted LBJ about the rumors of his guilt in the assassination, Johnson became very angry and said that it had been done by the "oil people" and the CIA (Twyman 1997:851). The assassination’s ties to the oil industry go beyond the oil barons who paid for the hit. One of Lee Harvey Oswald’s CIA handlers was oil-company geologist George DeMohrenschildt, who had many influential contacts and friends in the industry, including George Herbert Walker Bush and Jean De Menil, as mentioned previously. DeMohrenschildt was also familiar with Sam Giancana.

The Texas wells services contractor Brown and Root (a large contractor involved in clandestine warfare, narcotics trafficking and offshore drilling) is a firm known to cooperate with the CIA; the Kennedy threat to the CIA-Mafia-Oil industry smuggling ring was a threat to Brown and Root. Brown and Root clearly benefited from the assassination, having been the number one power behind Lyndon Johnson’s political ascent and one of the greatest beneficiaries of his continued power and his escalation of the Vietnam conflict as soon as he was reelected in 1964 (Caro 1982). Brown and Root was awarded the contract for the dredging of Camh Rahn Bay. George Brown was also named by Madeleine Brown (see above) as having been at the alleged gathering on the eve of the assassination.

Gary Underhill was one of many former intelligence personnel who was "suicided" after proving unable to bear the strain of carrying the Agency’s dark secrets. He was close to many high officials in the military and CIA and was a former military affairs editor for Life magazine. On the day of the assassination and a few months before his own death, he frantically told friends that his life was in danger:

Charlene Fitzsimmons realized something was wrong with the usually rational and objective Underhill. But Underhill insisted he had not been drinking. It was the Kennedy assassination, he explained. It was not what it seemed to be. "Oswald is a patsy. They set him up. It’s too much. The bastards have done something outrageous. They’ve killed the President! I’ve been listening and hearing things. I couldn’t believe they’d get away with it, but they did!"

Charlie did not know what he was talking about. Who were "they"?

"We, I mean the United States. We just don’t do that sort of thing! They’ve gone mad! They’re a bunch of drug runners and gun runners – a real violence group. God, the CIA is under enough pressure already without that bunch in Southeast Asia. Kennedy gave them some time after the Bay of Pigs. He said he’d give them a chance to save face."

He could tell that Charlie did not believe him. "They’re so stupid," he continued. "They can’t even get the right man. They tried it in Cuba and they couldn’t get away with it. Right after the Bay of Pigs. But Kennedy wouldn’t let them do it. And now he’d gotten wind of this and he was really going to blow the whistle on them. And they killed him!" (DiEugenio 1992:28)

This account echoes Sam Giancana’s description of the involvement of American "military brass" from Asia and reinforces the suspicion that the assassination was carried out with a view toward clearing the way for greater U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and thereby the restructuring of that region’s drug trade.

The Underhill account identifies the Kennedy conspirators with both the Agency’s ZRRIFLE assassination program and its Southeast Asian operations. One man involved at the highest levels in both areas was Edward Lansdale. Another was Desmond Fitzgerald, who in 1962 left his assignment as the CIA’s head of Far Eastern operations to replace William Harvey as head of the Cuba task force. Fitzgerald took many members of his Far Eastern staff with him on the Cuba assignment. On the day of the Kennedy assassination, Fitzgerald was in Paris meeting with a Cuban agent, code-named AMLASH, whose mission was to assassinate Castro. Desmond Fitzgerald was personally close to Winston Scott, the CIA station chief in Mexico City, where Fitzgerald often traveled in 1962-63 (Russell 1992:241-42).

The first National Security Action Memorandum issued by President Johnson was finalized only two days after President Kennedy’s death and had probably been drafted before that time in anticipation of the President’s demise. NSAM 273 of November 24, 1963, according to General Maxwell Taylor, "ma[de] clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory." But Johnson would not escalate the conflict until making it past the next November’s elections: "At a White House reception on Christmas eve, a month after he succeeded to the presidency, Johnson told the Joint Chiefs: ‘Just get me elected, and then you can have your war.’" (Scott 1993:32)

Johnson’s first full term of office began in January 1965. That year, Ed Lansdale went to Vietnam as Senior Liaison Officer of the U.S. Mission to South Vietnam. The years 1965 and 1966 were enormous landmarks for CIA involvement with Southeast Asian heroin. The CIA-mafia alliance moved many of its former Cuba operatives to Southeast Asia. By 1965, a power-hungry Laotian general named Ouane Rattikone was "on a big move . . . to consolidate the opium business" and had cut the Corsican transport pilots out of the picture, leaving Air America as the only alternative (McCoy 1972:301,362-63). From that point on, General Ouane was "the principal overseer of the shipment of opium out of the Golden Triangle via Air America" (Chambliss 1988a) as the CIA-owned airline began picking up the Hmong opium in the hills and flying it to Long Tieng and Vientiane, the political capital of Laos. The business developed, and as time went on the opium was transported aboard Air America from remote airfields in Laos, Burma, and Cambodia to marketplaces and refineries in cities such as Bangkok, Hong Kong, Vientiane, and Saigon. The CIA headquarters for secret operations in northern Laos came to share the city of Long Tieng with a heroin-refining laboratory which General Vang Pao opened in 1970 (McCoy 1972).

Russell Bintliff, former special agent of the Army's Criminal Intelligence Command, discovered that with U.S. government financing, Pepsi-Cola set up a plant in Vientiane which "never produced a single bottle. . . . It was for processing opium into heroin." (Scheim 1983:274). Other sources say the plant (which began construction in 1965 and stood for several years unfinished) was used as a cover for purchases of chemicals vital to heroin processing (McCoy 1972:186). From there, the CIA's mafia associates took over and shipped the end product, heroin, into the U.S. for sale. Pepsi-Cola had other peripheral links to the drug trade:

The major organizer of the opium and heroin traffic in Southeast Asia was a Chinese businessman from Laos by the name of Huu Tin Heng, who organized the Chiu Chow syndicate. Huu was, among other things, the Laotian manager of the Pepsi-Cola company. The president of Pepsi-Cola has been one of Richard Nixon’s long-time and most important friends and supporters. In return, Pepsi-Cola has received substantial help from Nixon, such as monopoly franchises in foreign countries, including a franchise on the Soviet Union market (Chambliss 1979).

In the early 1960s, Pepsi-Cola had interest in removing Fidel Castro from Cuba due to his disruption of the company’s business in buying Cuban sugar. Richard Nixon cited business with Pepsi-Cola as being the reason for his presence in Dallas on the day of President Kennedy’s murder, but his alibi did not check out (Marrs 1989:270).

Ted Shackley had been the CIA’s JMWAVE station chief in Miami from 1962-65 and had directed the Cuban Bay of Pigs veterans against Castro; through Shackley's JMWAVE station, the CIA had a close relationship with mafia figures Santos Trafficante and Johnny Roselli. William Harvey, chief of Task Force W, the CIA’s Cuban task force, worked with Shackley and Roselli. Together, they schemed to undermine Castro, using sabotage and assassinations. There is as yet no proof that Shackley himself was acquainted with Roselli, and it is not uncommon for even higher-level officials involved in top-secret projects to be denied information which they do not have a "need to know." However, both Shackley's immediate superior and subordinate were known to have direct contact with Roselli. Shackley was present with his CIA superior William Harvey when the CIA passed Roselli a truckload of armaments; Shackley's JMWAVE operations chief, David Morales, also knew Roselli. As noted previously, Morales once implicated himself in the assassination ("We took care of that son of b----, didn’t we?"); he worked with David Atlee Phillips many times during his career.

Shackley became the CIA’s Deputy Chief of Station in Laos 1965 and brought in some of his former Miami CIA colleagues (including case officer Thomas Clines); Trafficante was not far behind. In Vietnam, subordinates of Trafficante arrived not long after the first U.S. combat troops (Scott 1993:8). Frank Furci, the son of Trafficante's Tampa lieutenant, arrived in Saigon in 1965, soon taking over the military club racket (McCoy 1972:213). Miami syndicate representative John Pullman made a long stop in Hong Kong that year (Scott, et al 1987:36). After his release from prison in 1966 and before his departure for Mexico, Sam Giancana told his younger brother, "Overseas is where it’s all headin’, Chuck . . . " and shared how Trafficante was "on board for Asia." He continued, "The Vietnam War is gonna make a lot of guys rich" (Giancana 1992:328). Trafficante himself met with prominent Corsican gangsters in Saigon and other gangsters in Hong Kong as early as 1968. One DEA informant said that Trafficante brought "untold millions" to Southeast Asia that year, distributing it to important figures in the region's heroin industry, including the CIA's Hmong leader, Vang Pao. Trafficante was ensuring himself of a steady heroin supply, doing as Meyer Lansky had done by bringing six million dollars on similar trip to Marseilles in the late 1950s (Chambliss 1978:153,185). In the 1980s, Opium warlord Khun Sa named Trafficante as the man to whom he had sold his product in years past. Khun Sa also named Richard Armitage (George W. Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State) as the "money man" for the arrangement (Gritz 1991:369-373).

A Special Forces colonel who was in Laos in early 1965 told Journalist Daniel Hopsicker that up until that time, the opium bought from the Laotian hill tribesmen was disposed of in a monthly bonfire. He noted that the arrival of Ted Shackley, Oliver North, and Richard Secord coincided with a change in procedures; orders were given to store the opium for removal to another site instead of burning it. Secord sent his Air Force planes to bomb Vang Pao’s rivals. Barry Seal at some point became a part of the Southeast Asian enterprise, piloting personnel and contraband (Hopsicker 2001:183-88).

The loose association between Seal, North, Shackley, Clines, Secord, a handful of their anti-Castro Cuban associates from Miami - Felix Rodriguez, Rafael Quintero, and Luis Posada - and the pilots from Air America would survive the Southeast Asian years and come again to prominence during the Iran-Contra affair of the 1980s. The Christic Institute, a public interest law firm, charged that Shackley and others helped sell Laotian guerrillas' opium to Santos Trafficante in return for a "piece of the action." Shackley is alleged to have had an account in an Australian Nugan Hand bank where his percentage of the proceeds was deposited. Frank Nugan and Michael Hand, a CIA agent from Long Tieng, had founded the bank with four Air America officials. Indeed, from Watergate to the Chilean assassinations to the Nugan Hand banking scandal to Iran-Contra, and in many of the scandals in between, the JMWAVE Cubans were always there. The antics of the Christic Institute's head lawyer and publicist in the case, Tom Sheehan, brought no small amount of ridicule upon their case. A 1994 biography of Shackley paints Sheehan as a rumor-monger and reckless opportunist, and his case as a "grand unified theory" of all conspiracies, portraying Shackley as a modern Professor Moriarty pulling all the strings (Corn 1994). In fairness to Sheehan, it must be pointed out that in nearly every place in which the CIA was involved in large-scale dirty deeds over a period of several years, one does not have to look far to find a connection to Shackley. Ted Shackley rose to the post of Associate Deputy Director of Operations (an office with Agency-wide responsibilities to which he was appointed by Director George Bush) before officially retiring from the CIA in 1979 after the Carter Administration had been doing some "housecleaning" in the Agency by dismissing hundreds of covert operatives.

The heroin trade from Southeast Asia was affecting the lives of many Americans who bought it as an import, but it had more immediate effect among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, eleven percent of whom were smoking the ultra-pure grade available there. Not long after Trafficante's 1968 visit to Hong Kong, opium refineries in the Golden Triangle were producing this high grade of heroin, 90 to 99 percent pure, with the help of master chemists brought in from Hong Kong and Bangkok. Of these, one of General Ouane's several refineries became the largest. By late 1969, they were producing limited supplies for the GIs. Trafficante's Florida syndicate had followed the army into Vietnam in 1965 and had several military club managers "on the take." Such places would seem ideal outlets for some of the narcotics that the Mob was smuggling through the area. Heroin was almost as common among GIs in Vietnam as cigarettes were in the States. After suffering withdrawal long enough to pass their home-going medical exam, they carried this addiction back to the states, where the habit was much more expensive and often required criminal activity for support. In other words, some GI addicts became dealers, using overseas contacts as suppliers (McCoy 1972). Alfred McCoy (1991) suggests that the addiction of the GIs in Vietnam represented a "consumer test" for the U.S. market.

From 1968 until 1972 there was a major change in the pattern of heroin smuggling into the U.S. Near Eastern opium refined and processed by the Corsicans comprised 90 percent of the heroin entering the U.S. in 1968 (Chambliss 1978:153). This "French Connection" peaked in 1971 at an estimated annual import of ten tons into the U.S. but began to dry up in 1972, when U.S. law enforcement began to catch up with the traffickers (Blumenthal 1988:94-96). As U.S. forces took over and supercharged the opium and heroin sources in Southeast Asia, the Nixon White House worked through diplomatic channels to cut off the French Connection's major heroin supply in Turkey (Mills 1986:1118). At that point, the Sicilian-American mafia's share of the market grew to equal the French Corsican share. CIA-trained Cuban exiles became prevalent among traffickers; in one major bust, seventy percent of those arrested were members of Operation Forty. By the early 1970s, American organizers had supplanted the Corsicans in the heroin trade (Krüger 1980).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blumenthal, Ralph. 1988. The Last Days of the Sicilians: The FBI's War Against the Mafia. New York: Times Books.

Brown, Madeleine. 1997. Texas In The Morning. (out of print)

Caro, Robert. 1982. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path To Power. New York: Knopf .

Chambliss, William. 1988a. "State-Organized Crime." 1988 Presidential Address to American Society of Criminology. Criminology, 27:183-208 (1989).

--------. 1988b. On the Take (second ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988

--------. 1978. "The Political Economy of Smack: Opiates, Capitalism, and Law." Research in Law and Sociology Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 115-141

Corn, David. 1994. Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Craig, Roger. When They Kill A President. Unpublished manuscript.

David, Lester, and Irene David. 1986. Bobby Kennedy: The Making of a Folk Hero. New York: Dodd, Mead.

Davis, John H. 1989. Mafia Kingfish. New York: McGraw-Hill.

DeLoach, Cartha D. 1995. Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc.

DiEugenio, James. 1992. Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case. New York: Sheridan Square Press.

Epstein, Edward Jay. 1966. Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of the Truth. New York: Viking Press.

Fonzi, Gaeton. 1993. The Last Investigation. New York: Thunder's Mouth.

Garrison, Jim. 1991. On the Trail of the Assassins. New York: Warner Books.

Giancana, Sam and Chuck Giancana. 1992. Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America. New York: Warner Books.

Gritz, Col. James "Bo." 1991. Called To Serve. Sandy Valley, NV: Lazarus Publishing Company.

Groden, Robert. 1994. The Killing of a President: The Complete Photographic Record of the JFK Assassination, the Conspiracy, and the Cover-up. New York: Viking Studio Books.

--------. 1995. The Search for Lee Harvey Oswald: The Complete Photographic Record. New York: Penguin Studio.

Groden, Robert and Harrison Livingstone. 1989. High Treason: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy and the New Evidence of Conspiracy. New York: Berkley Books.

Hinckle, Warren and William Turner. 1992. Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War Against Castro and the Assassination of J.F.K. New York: Thunder's Mouth.

Hopsicker, Daniel. 2001. Barry and ‘the Boys’: The CIA, the Mob, and America’s Secret History. Noti, OR: Mad Cow Press.

Krüger, Henrik. 1980. The Great Heroin Coup. Boston: South End Press.

Kwitny, Jonathan. 1987. The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the CIA. New York: W. W. Norton.

Lane, Mark. 1991. Plausible Denial. New York: Thunder's Mouth.

Lifton, David. 1980. Best Evidence: Disguise and Deception in the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York: Macmillan.

Marks, John. 1979. The Search For The "Manchurian Candidate." New York: W. W. Norton.

Marrs, Jim. 1989. Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy. New York: Carroll & Graf.

Mason, Eric. "Backlash: The Gary Eitel Story." From the Wilderness. http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/hall/exclusive.shtml  

McCoy, Alfred W. 1972. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

--------. 1991. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill Books.

Mills, James. 1986. The Underground Empire. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Morrow, Robert D. 1976. Betrayal. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.

--------. 1992. First Hand Knowledge: How I Participated in the CIA-Mafia Murder of John F. Kennedy. New York: S.P.I. Books.

Newman, John. 1992. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York: Warner Books.

North, Mark. 1991. Act of Treason: The Role of J. Edgar Hoover in the Assassination of President Kennedy. New York: Carroll & Graf.

O’Donnell, Kenneth P. and David F. Powers. 1972. Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. Boston: Little, Brown

Prouty, L. Fletcher. 1992. JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy. New York: Carol Pub. Group.

Ragano, Frank and Selwyn Raab. 1994. Mob Lawyer: Including the Inside Account of Who Killed Jimmy Hoffa and JFK. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Reed, Terry and John Cummings. 1993. Compromised: Clinton, Bush and the CIA. New York: Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.

Russell, Dick. 1992. The Man Who Knew Too Much. New York: Carroll & Graf.

Scheim, David E. 1983. Contract on America: The Mafia Murder of President John F. Kennedy. Silver Spring, MD: Argyle Press.

Scott, Peter Dale. 1993. Deep Politics and the Death of JFK. Berkeley: University of California Press.

--------. 1972. The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Scott, Peter Dale with Jane Hunter, and Jonathan Marshall. 1987. The Iran-Contra Connection. Boston: South End Press.

Shaw, Gary with Larry Harris. 1992. Cover-Up: The Governmental Conspiracy to Conceal the Facts About the Public Execution of John Kennedy. Second edition. Austin, TX: Collector's Editions.

Summers, Anthony. 1980. Conspiracy. New York: McGraw-Hill.

--------. 1993. Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Tarby, Russ. 1996. "Sex, Drugs, and JFK." (Interview with Professor Peter Dale Scott). Syracuse New Times, Nov. 20, 1996. Syracuse, NY. http://newtimes.rway.com/1996/112096/cover.htm

Tarpley, Webster Griffin and Chaitkin, Anton. 1992. George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography. Washington DC: Executive Intelligence Review.

Theoharis, Athan. 1995. J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.

Twyman, Noel. 1997. Bloody Treason. Rancho Santa Fe, CA: Laurel Publishing.

United States Government. 1964. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington, D.C.: United States Govt. Printing Office.

U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics. 1961. Profile of Santo Trafficante Jr. http://www.cuban-exile.com/doc_126-150/doc0126.htm .

Weberman, A. J. and Michael Canfield. 1992. Coup D'Etat In America: The CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. San Francisco: Quick American Archives.

Wise, David, and Thomas B. Ross. 1964. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House.

Wolfe, Jane. 1989. The Murchisons: The Rise and Fall of a Texas Dynasty. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wyden, Peter. 1979. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon & Schuster.

ARTICLES

Feinsilber. Mike. "Ford altered crucial JFK report." Associated Press article appearing in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3 July 1997, p. A3.

Lewis, Neil A. "Castro feared U.S. invasion after JFK assassination." New York Times article appearing in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 20 August 1997, p. A3.

Myers, Laura. "CIA wanted to pay mob for Castro hit." Associated Press article appearing in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 2 July 1997, p. A1.

Ruppert, Mike. 2000. "The Bush-Cheney Drug Empire." See http://www.copvcia.com/ .

TAPES/BROADCASTS

The Assassination of JFK. Oak Forest, IL: MPI Home Video, 1992.

Best Evidence: The Research Video. Santa Monica, CA: Rhino Video, 1990.

Jack Anderson: JFK, the Mob, and Me. New York: A & E Home Video, 1994.

The Men Who Killed Kennedy. New York: A & E Home Video

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Richard Helms

AKA Richard McGarrah Helms

Born: 30-Mar-1913
Birthplace: St. Davids, PA
Died: 22-Oct-2002
Location of death: Washington, DC
Cause of death: Cancer - Bone
Remains: Cremated, Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, VA

Gender: Male
Race or Ethnicity: White
Sexual orientation: Straight
Occupation: Government

Nationality: United States
Executive summary: CIA Director, 1966-73

Military service: US Navy (1942-46)

Father: Herman Helms
Sister: Betty Helms Hawn
Brother: Pearsall Helms
Brother: Gates Helms
Wife: Julia Bretzman Shields (sculptor, m. 1939, div. 1968, one son)
Son: Dennis Helms
Wife: Cynthia Ratcliff McKelvin (m. 1968)

    High School: Carteret School, Orange, NJ
    University: Williams College (1935)

    US Ambassador to Iran 1973-76
    CIA Director 1966-73
    CIA Deputy Director 28-Apr-1965 to 30-Jun-1966
    OSS Agent
    The Indianapolis Times
    Alfalfa Club 1971
    Chi Psi Fraternity Williams, 1935
    Phi Beta Kappa Society Williams
    National Security Medal
    Perjury Pleaded guilty, 1977
    Contempt of Congress

Rotten Library Page:
Richard Helms

Author of books:
Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (2003, autobiography, with William Hood)

 

 

 

 

 

Path: news2.east.cox.net!news1.east.cox.net!east.cox.net!peer01.cox.net!cox.net!cyclone1.gnilink.net!wn12feed!worldnet.att.net!204.127.198.203!attbi_feed3!attbi.com!rwcrnsc53.POSTED!not-for-mail From: "Dr. Truth" Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy.jfk References: <2b29c281.0306111543.30a30c06@posting.google.com> Subject: Re: Helms learns of the assassination Lines: 6455 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Message-ID: NNTP-Posting-Host: 12.233.119.209 X-Complaints-To: abuse@attbi.com X-Trace: rwcrnsc53 1055376679 12.233.119.209 (Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT Organization: AT&T Broadband Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT Xref: east.cox.net alt.conspiracy.jfk:265004 X-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 20:11:21 EDT (news2.east.cox.net) "Ed Dolan" <74030.3022@compuserve.com> wrote in message news:2b29c281.0306111543.30a30c06@posting.google.com... > "Dr. Truth" wrote in message news:... > > Pardon me, but is not Mr. Helms the gentleman that lied to the Senate > > Committee in the 1970s? > > And was caught? > No. I don't know where you get your information. He was not like Files. Gosh Ed - looks like I caught you lying again...I'm so sorry...but you old CIA agents are all alike....it's getting too easy to catch you in lies now... 1st of all: Files never appeared before a congressional committee and 2nd: Richard McGarrah Helms Lieutenant, United States Navy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Courtesy of the New York Times May 4, 2003 'A Look Over My Shoulder': Secrets of the Spymaster By JOSEPH E. PERSICO A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. By Richard Helms with William Hood. Illustrated. 478 pp. New York: Random House. $35. Has Richard Helms, the famously closemouthed director of central intelligence -- called ''the man who kept the secrets'' in the apt title of Thomas Powers's biography -- finally decided to spill all? Almost, but selectively, judiciously and, it turns out, posthumously (he died last year). One of Helms's best-kept secrets is that he was writing this autobiography, with his C.I.A. colleague William Hood, after fending off writers who had tried unsuccessfully for years to pry loose his story. Helms finally broke his silence, he tells us in ''A Look Over My Shoulder,'' because the end of the cold war freed him from his self-imposed omerta. In his six and a half years leading the C.I.A., he became the very model of a modern major spymaster -- urbane, impeccably attired, affable yet impenetrable, a man who could charm and chill in the same one-minute cycle. His early life reads like a pre-spook course: born on Philadelphia's Main Line, educated at the same Swiss prep school attended by the future shah of Iran, early fluency in French and German, a magna cum laude scholar at Williams College, a first job as a reporter in prewar Europe, during which time, at the age of 23, he had an interview with Hitler. Helms was briefly diverted from his true path by a desire to make money, and thus became an unlikely advertising salesman for The Indianapolis Times. World War II got him back on track. Helms went into the Navy and then into the Office of Strategic Services, parent of today's Central Intelligence Agency. When the war ended, ''I was hooked on intelligence,'' Helms confesses. He was present at the creation and never left, pursuing a 30-year career that culminated in his rise to director of central intelligence from 1966 to 1973. The reader is irresistibly drawn first to the two most incendiary events in that career, Watergate and Chile, the high and low, as it were. President Nixon's attempt to insulate his administration from Watergate by enmeshing the C.I.A. was brazen even by Nixonian standards. First, Nixon's strong-arm man, H. R. Haldeman, threatened that any C.I.A. investigation of Watergate would expose sensitive agency operations, particularly the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba of 11 years before. Helms responded, ''The Bay of Pigs hasn't got a damned thing to do with this.'' More brazen still, Nixon had his counsel, John Dean, order the C.I.A. to come up with bail money to spring the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms writes, ''I had no intention of supplying any such money, or of asking Congress for permission to dip into funds earmarked for secret intelligence purposes to provide bail for a band of political bunglers.'' Nixon backed down. Three cheers for Helms this time. However, on the Chilean affair, Helms emerges as rather less sterling. He states at first that C.I.A. secret operations in Chile were designed solely ''to preserve the democratic constitutional system.'' Yet in 1970, when the leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, was democratically elected president, Nixon ordered Helms to do whatever it took, with a free hand to spend $10 million, to see that Allende never took office. Nixon warned Helms to reveal nothing of this plotting even to the secretary of state, secretary of defense or United States ambassador to Chile. This time Helms knuckled under to presidential pressure, which was eventually to produce the great trauma of his career. In February 1973, seven months before Allende was overthrown by a right-wing coup in which he died, Helms testified under oath before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the C.I.A. had never aided Allende's opponents. Soon after, he testified before a Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Frank Church that the C.I.A. had had no dealings with the Chilean military. These untruths would lead, in 1977, to Helms's plea of no contest on two misdemeanor counts, resulting in a fine of $2,000 and a two-year suspended prison sentence. Helms's willingness to take the heat reflects a core difference between the ordinary American's conception of citizenship and the culture inculcated by the C.I.A. Helms had long ago sworn to keep the agency's secrets. He had also sworn before the Senate committees to tell the truth. To Helms, exposing sources and methods to headline-hunting senators ranked well below his vow to keep secrets upon which, in his judgment, the security of the nation hung. Helms claimed to wear his conviction for misleading Congress like a badge of honor. The intelligence fraternity concurred, giving him a standing ovation at a lunch after the trial and passing the hat to cover his fine. Tales of derring-do enliven Helms's readable story throughout, but its real significance is likely to surprise spy-thriller aficionados and conspiracy theorists: the C.I.A. is, first and foremost, simply a government agency. No differently than the Department of Agriculture, it executes White House policy. Helms's professional life is essentially the story of undercover operations ordered by presidents. Standout examples: Eisenhower's decisions to topple Prime Ministers Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba (continued by Kennedy), and Nixon's clandestine war against Allende. In the 1960's, at the peak of racial upheaval and demonstrations against the Vietnam War, President Johnson ordered Helms ''to track down the foreign Communists who are behind this intolerable interference in our domestic affairs.'' This demand led Helms to start up a covert snooping operation that he admits involved ''a violation of our charter'' not to spy on Americans at home. On the big stuff, Helms makes a convincing case that rather than being a ''rogue elephant,'' an ''invisible government'' as often charged, the C.I.A. is a president's political weapon of last resort, the keeper of the bag of dirty tricks. If agency acts appear roguish, Helms says, it is when government policy is roguish. He describes the dilemma when a president orders his intelligence chief to step out of bounds: ''What is the D.C.I. to do? . . . Has he the authority to refuse to accept a questionable order on a foreign policy question of obvious national importance?'' At this point, the spy chief's choices are to sign on or resign. Helms offers telling instances of the uselessness of even the keenest intelligence if its message is unwelcome at the top. In analyzing the domino theory, which held that if Vietnam fell, the whole non-Communist world would teeter, Helms sent Johnson a secret assessment that concluded, ''The net effects would probably not be permanently damaging to this country's ability to play its role as a world power.'' Johnson ignored the report's existence and pressed on with the war. During the cold war debate over the Soviet Union's capacity to deliver a first-strike knockout punch to the United States, the C.I.A. found that the Kremlin had neither the intention nor the weaponry to do so. The Nixon administration told Helms, in effect, to get on the team or shut up. Dick Helms remained throughout his career a thoroughgoing company man, albeit with spine-tingling job descriptions. His loyalty to old C.I.A. hands could be uncritical. The most egregious example involved his counterintelligence chief, James Jesus Angleton. The paranoid Angleton practically paralyzed the C.I.A.'s Soviet division by a long, fruitless hunt for a mole inside the agency. Over a hundred loyal officers fell under investigation; some were forced to resign. In implementing the dismissals, Helms says, ''I had no choice but to accept a decision that in effect said each was innocent, but that the innocence could not be proved.'' In this post-9/11 age of anxiety one looks for lessons in the life of a man who spent his career in the intelligence end of national security. The lesson here is how totally changed the present amorphous threats are from the comparatively clear-cut cold war battles Helms fought for a generation. By the time he died at the age of 89, with those battles long behind him, Helms's blemishes had been washed away. In 1983 President Reagan awarded him the National Security Medal. Upon his death he was buried with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery. Whether one likes or loathes the furtive world in which Helms lived, whether one sees him as a patriot or compliant careerist, this surprise autobiography provides an unsurpassed insider look into how American intelligence actually operates. It's a view offering more than enough ammunition for admirers and antagonists alike. Joseph E. Persico's latest book is ''Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage.'' -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reviewed by James Bamford Sunday, April 27, 2003 A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency By Richard Helms with William Hood Random House. 478 pp. $35 Richard Helms was back among friends. On a crisp and tranquil late November morning, tinged with the musty scent of dried leaves and old bark, the man who was arguably America's most famous spy since Nathan Hale descended into eternal darkness. Buried with him, beneath a gently sloping hill at Arlington National Cemetery, was a lifetime of mystery, secrets and controversy. Nearby, sharing the same hallowed ground, were the graves of his old friend Frank Wisner, a specialist in covert action, and General Walter Bedell Smith, a mentor and fellow former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But before he made his final exit last year at the age of 89, Helms left behind a packet of long-held secrets, like a spy loading a dead drop and then disappearing into the cold. They are contained not in a moldy tree trunk but in his posthumous autobiography, A Look Over My Shoulder. Over the years, I occasionally shared a meal with the legendary spymaster at one of his favorite haunts, Washington's Sulgrave Club, where his wife, Cynthia, was a member. Tall and lanky, with thin lips pursed together as if sealed with a zipper, he once told me that he had always vowed never to write about his life in the shadows. He even refused to read books he perceived as biased against him or the agency, such as Thomas Powers's well-received The Man Who Kept the Secrets, published in 1979. Then, while on vacation once during the mid-1990s, he brought along Powers's book and finally began turning the pages. Pleasantly surprised by the author's accuracy and fairness, he gradually made the decision to at last unseal a bit of his cipher-locked past. It is too bad he did not make the decision much earlier, when many of the words, the events, the emotions, the colors and the details would still have been fresh in his mind. Writing at such a long remove in time is a little like looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Compounding his difficulty was the lack of access to still-classified documents and a rigid agency review process. The result is a book with too much flat history and too few new insights and revelations. Nevertheless, the opportunity to at last see much of the 20th century through Helms's probing eyes is well worth the price. While offering few new details in recounting some of the major events of his long tenure at the CIA -- he saw no indications of conspiracy during the Kennedy assassination, for example -- Helms sometimes does come up with surprises. One involves the deadly Israeli attack on the American electronic surveillance ship USS Liberty during the Six Day War in 1967. Thirty-four American sailors were killed, and 171 were wounded in the incident. Although at the time Israel claimed it was a mistake, and an "interim" CIA intelligence memorandum agreed, that view later changed. "I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed," Helms writes, "or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the Liberty. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack." This is consistent with the views of some members of the administration at the time, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the director and deputy directors of the National Security Agency, which was in charge of the ship. Overshadowing all else during Helms's years as director were the Vietnam War and the domestic protests it spawned. Among the operations Helms was most proud of was the CIA's very secret paramilitary role in Laos, attempting to resist a government takeover by communist forces. Until America pulled out of Vietnam, the operation succeeded in fighting back the guerrillas and largely maintaining the status quo. "We had fulfilled our mission and we remain proud of it," he writes. "We had won the war!" Vietnam, however, was a different story. But it was the war at home that long haunted Helms. "Nothing in my thirty-year service brought me more criticism," he wrote, "than my response to President Johnson's insistence that the Agency supply him proof that foreign agents and funds were at the root of the racial and political unrest that took fire in the summer of 1967." The agency's response was given the apt cryptonym CHAOS. "CHAOS," he admits, "was my responsibility." In the process of giving Johnson the answer he was not expecting -- there was "no trace" of foreign involvement -- the agency for the first time began secretly treading on domestic soil, "a violation of our charter," Helms confesses. If Helms is remembered for the controversy of CHAOS, he should also be remembered for the courage of standing up to President Nixon's attempt to tar the CIA with the brush of Watergate. Shortly after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and the arrest of those involved, Nixon had his White House lawyer, John Dean, put pressure on Helms's deputy, Vernon Walters. "Dean had one request," Helms writes. "The White House wanted money from CIA to make bail for the burglars." Helms refused, telling Walters, "There was no way that the [CIA] could furnish secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency." Five months later, Helms got the boot. If Helms thought that he was finally out of harm's way once he turned in his cloak and dagger, he couldn't have been more mistaken. Nominated to become ambassador to Iran, he was called before an open Senate committee for confirmation and was asked whether the CIA played a role in a coup in Chile that brought down the government of Salvador Allende. Rather than tell the truth and expose the CIA's involvement or ask to answer the question in closed session, Helms simply lied and said no. Years later the answer came back to haunt him. He was charged with failing to testify "fully and completely" before the committee and pleaded no contest. Following a sharp tongue-lashing by the judge, who told Helms he stood before the court "in disgrace and shame," he was sentenced to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The judge then suspended the jail time. Helms turned ashen. But upon leaving the courthouse he claimed that the conviction represented a "badge of honor" for having lied to protect an agency operation. Six years later, he received the National Security Medal, the highest award in the intelligence community, from President Ronald Reagan for "exceptional meritorious service." As the horse-drawn caisson waited to carry Richard Helms to his final resting place on that chilly fall morning, the man who must now keep the secrets paid tribute. "Wherever American intelligence officers strive to defend and extend freedom," said George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, "Richard Helms will be there." . James Bamford is the author, most recently, of "Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency." -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From contemporary press reports: 20 November 2002: Buried with military honors, former CIA Director Richard Helms was remembered on Wednesday as a man "who knew the value of a stolen secret" and became one of the great heroes of America's clandestine intelligence operations. "In Richard Helms, intelligence in service to liberty found an unsurpassed champion," said George Tenet, the CIA's current director. Helms, who died at 89 on October 23, 2002, began his intelligence career during World War II and rose through the ranks during the Cold War. He served as CIA director for six years before President Nixon fired him for refusing to block an FBI probe into the 1972 Watergate break in. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery before a large group of mourners that included members of the intelligence and defense establishments of several presidential administrations. At a memorial service at Fort Myer, Virginia, following Helms' burial, Tenet called Helms "one of our greatest heroes." "He came to know, as few others ever would, the value of a stolen secret, and the advantage that comes to our democracy from the fullest possible knowledge of those abroad determined to destroy it," Tenet said. Beginning in the 1930s as an enterprising reporter for United Press, for whom he interviewed Adolf Hitler, Helms found his way to wartime service with the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. intelligence agency that was the forerunner of the CIA. At the OSS, Tenet said, "Richard Helms found the calling of his lifetime." "In its Secret Intelligence Branch, he mastered the delicate, demanding craft of agent operations," Tenet said. "He excelled at both the meticulous planning and the bold vision and action that were - and remain today __ the heart of our work to obtain information critical to the safety and security of the United States __ information that can be gained only through stealth and courage." Tenet called Helms' later CIA career "the stuff of legend," praising his "sound operational judgment, his complete command of facts (and) his reputation as the best drafter of cables anywhere ..." "In an organization where risk and pressure are as common as a cup of coffee, he was unflappable," Tenet said. Tenet said Helms' legacy is the American intelligence agents he taught and who carry on in his place. Helms himself addressed the profession of an intelligence officer in a 1996 speech quoted in the program for his memorial service. "Military conflicts and terrorist attacks have not gone out of style," he said then. "An alert intelligence community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward. A military honor guard escorts the horse-drawn carriage carrying the remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. A U.S. Navy honor guard prepares to remove the cremated remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms from a ceremonial flag-draped casket on a caisson at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia November 20, 2002. Members of a naval honor guard carry a flag and a box containing the ashes of former CIA Director Richard Helms during ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery CIA Director George Tenet, right, awaits the flag that draped the casket of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Helms, the spymaster who led the CIA through some of its most difficult years and was later fired by President Nixon when he refused to block an FBI probe into the Watergate scandal, died last month. Afterward, Tenet presented the flag to Helms' widow. Family members of former CIA Director Richard Helms hold the flag that draped his casket during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery , Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Cynthia Helms, widow of former CIA Director Richard Helms, pauses over a container with the remains of Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Former CIA Director Helms Dead at 89 Wed Oct 23, 2002 7:17 PM ET Former CIA Director Richard Helms, who led the spy agency during the height of the Vietnam War and resisted attempts by President Richard Nixon to involve the CIA in Watergate, has died. He was 89. Helms was in declining health and died at his home on Tuesday (22 October 2002). The cause of death was not immediately available. "The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend," CIA Director George Tenet said in a statement on Wednesday. He ordered flags at the agency's headquarters in Virginia flown at half-staff. "As director of central intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk," Tenet said. Helms led the spy agency from June 1966 to February 1973 during one of the most contentious periods of American history with both the Vietnam War and Watergate. He was the first career CIA officer to reach the agency's top position. Helms was first appointed by President Lyndon Johnson and in 1969 was reappointed by Nixon. After the controversial break-in at Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 1972, Helms resisted attempts by Nixon to involve the CIA in the ensuing cover-up, which ultimately brought down his presidency. The CIA chief was not reappointed to his post. Helms' name also emerged in the guessing game of who was "Deep Throat," the confidential source that helped Washington Post reporters break open the Watergate scandal. After leaving the CIA, Helms went on to become U.S. ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977. In 1977, he was charged with perjury for denying the CIA had tried to overthrow the government in Chile in testimony to Congress. Helms was given a suspended jail sentence. 'PAINFUL PERIOD' "I think he remembered that as a painful period in his life. Dick always believed that he was seeking a higher good there in protecting the sources who had worked with the agency at risk to themselves and our own people in the field," said John Gannon, former National Intelligence Council chairman and friend of Helms. "History will judge his performance there." A CIA report released two years ago said in September 1970 Nixon told Helms that a Salvador Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million for the CIA to prevent him from reaching power. Allende was elected, so then the CIA was directed to instigate a coup but those efforts also failed. Three years later in September 1973, a bloody coup put Gen. Augusto Pinochet in power and Allende killed himself. The CIA has maintained it did not instigate that coup. Helms worked for years in the CIA's clandestine service which conducts covert operations and became deputy director for plans in 1962. During that time, the CIA tried unsuccessfully to remove President Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. Helms, a private consultant since 1977, remained a helping hand of experience to the CIA, Gannon said. "He was almost a folk hero at CIA because he actively worked to stay engaged and to be useful and helpful to people in the agency," he said. Helms had a quiet, reserved manner that could intimidate subordinates and was known as a dapper dresser. "Dick was a man you had to work to get to know. He had a certain reserve about him and he had a patrician air," Gannon said. "But if you cut through that and got to know Dick he was an extremely warm man with a really great capacity for friendship," he said. Helms started out as a journalist for the predecessor to United Press International in Europe, covered the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin and interviewed German leader Adolf Hitler. He joined the Navy in 1942 and was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA. He worked in Washington, London, Paris and Luxembourg, running espionage operations against Germany. Helms will be buried at Arlington National Cemetery on November 20, 2002. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Richard M. Helms, 89, the quintessential intelligence and espionage officer who joined the Central Intelligence Agency at its founding in 1947 and rose through the ranks to lead it for more than six years, died Tuesday night (23 October 2002) at his home, the CIA announced today. No immediate cause of death was reported. Mr. Helms was the first career intelligence professional to serve as the nation's top spymaster, and he was among the last of the remaining survivors of the CIA's organizing cadre, operatives who earned their espionage stripes as young men during World War II. His years at the agency covered a period in which CIA service was widely honored as a noble and romantic calling in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But much of this mystique had dissolved in the national malaise that accompanied the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. At his retirement in 1973, Mr. Helms left an organization viewed with suspicion by many and about to undergo intense scrutiny from an unfriendly Congress for activities ranging from assassination plots against foreign leaders to spying on U.S. citizens. As a veteran of the craft of espionage, he had always followed a code that stressed maximum trust and loyalty to his agency and colleagues; maximum silence where outsiders were concerned. "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," was the title chosen by author Thomas Powers for his biography of Mr. Helms. In the judgment of Richard Helms, the CIA worked only for the president. He did not welcome congressional inquiry or oversight. In 1977 he pleaded no contest in a federal court to charges of failing to testify fully before Congress about the CIA role in the covert supply of money to Chilean anti Marxists in 1970 in an effort to influence a presidential election. "I found myself in a position of conflict," Mr. Helms said. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets." He received a suspended two-year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine, which was paid in full by retired CIA agents. Six years later at a White House ceremony, Mr. Helms received the National Security Medal from President Reagan for "exceptionally meritorious service." He said he considered this award "an exoneration." His career at the CIA covered periods of searching for communists in the U.S. government and the Red Scare tactics of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.); the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and plots against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. It included the rending of the American social fabric and the antiwar protests of the Vietnam era, and it ended during the the Watergate crisis that ultimately ended the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. On leaving the CIA, Mr. Helms served three years as ambassador to Iran, then in 1976 ended his government service. As one of its ranking officers for most of the CIA's first 25 years, Mr. Helms helped form and shape the agency, and he recruited, trained, assigned and supervised many of its top agents. During the 1950s and early 1960s he held high positions in the division responsible for clandestine operations. " . . . He was a kind of middle man between the field and Washington policymakers, approving and even choosing the wording of cables to the field describing 'requirements'; and passing on concrete proposals for operations from the local CIA stations," Powers wrote in his biography of Mr. Helms. By 1958 he was second in command of covert operations when he was passed over for the directorship of that activity in favor of Richard M. Bissell Jr., who in 1961 would plan and direct the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. In this operation, a force of 1,200 CIA trained and equipped Cuban exiles attempted to retake the island from Castro, but the effort failed and most of the invaders were killed or captured. Mr. Helms, who by nature had been cool and skeptical toward covert operations on such a large scale, had kept his distance from the Bay of Pigs. But the fiasco proved to be Bissell's undoing and he retired amid the political fallout that followed. Mr. Helms replaced him in 1962, winning at last the position that had eluded him four years earlier. He became the CIA's deputy director for plans, the innocuous sounding title of covert action chief. With his new assignment he inherited a pressure campaign from the White House to get rid of Castro by other means. During the next several months the agency would contemplate schemes for Castro's overthrow or assassination, but none ever materialized. In 1965 Mr. Helms was named to the number two job at the agency, deputy director of Central Intelligence. Retiring CIA chief John A. McCone had campaigned to have Mr. Helms succeed him, but President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose Navy Vice Adm. William F. Raborn, who lasted only 14 months in the job. In 1966 the president named Mr. Helms CIA director. He would serve longer as Director of Central Intelligence than anyone except Allen Dulles, the legendary spymaster who led the CIA from 1953 to 1961. As America's top spymaster, Powers wrote in his biography, Mr. Helms "is remembered as an administrator, impatient with delay, excuses, self-seeking, the sour air of office politics. Asked for an example of Helms' characteristic utterance, three of his old friends came up with the same dry phrase, 'Let's get on with it.' . . . Helm's style was cool by choice and temperment; his instinct was to soften differences, to find a middle ground, to tone down operations that were getting out of hand, to give faltering projects one more chance rather than shut them down altogether, to settle for compromise in the interests of bureaucratic peace." He tended to work regular hours, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., and his desk was always cleared when he left the office at night. Mr. Helms kept a low public profile as CIA director, and he avoided publicity. But he lunched occasionally with influential figures in the media, and he was assiduous in cultivating the congressional support he needed to manage his agency. He made only one public speech during his years as CIA leader, telling the nation's newspaper editors that "the nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men, devoted to her service." Richard McGarrah Helms was born in St. Davids, Pa., to a family of financial means. His father was an Alcoa executive and his maternal grandfather a leading international banker. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and attended high school in Switzerland for two years. While there he became proficient in French and German. In 1935 he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams College, where in his senior year he was president of his class, editor of the campus newspaper and the yearbook and president of the honor society. His life's ambition on leaving college was to own and operate a daily newspaper. In pursuit of that goal he paid his own fare to London where he became a European reporter for United Press. His assignments included coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The following year he was one of a group of foreign correspondents to interview Adolf Hitler. Shortly thereafter he returned to the United States and took a job with the Indianapolis Times newspaper, where by 1939 he had become national advertising director. With the entry of the United States into World War II he joined the Navy, and in 1943 was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. wartime espionage agency that antedated the CIA. There he had desk jobs in New York and Washington and later in London. At the end of the war he was posted in Berlin, where he worked for Allen Dulles. Discharged from military service in 1946, he continued doing intelligence work as a civilian. When the U.S. wartime intelligence forces merged into the CIA in 1947, Mr. Helms became one of the architects of the new organization. During the 1950s, Dulles gave him special assignments from time to time. At the height of Sen. McCarthy's fervid hunts for communists inside the government, Mr. Helms headed a CIA committee to protect the agency against McCarthy's efforts to infiltrate the CIA with his own informers. The committee's job was to monitor reports of covert approaches to CIA officers by McCarthy agents and to plug any leaks. During the years there would be more assignments with domestic political implications. Early in Mr. Helms' directorship, as the war in Vietnam and the antiwar protests were both escalating, Johnson asked the CIA to determine whether antiwar activity in the United States was being financially or otherwise backed by foreign countries. In response to this request, the agency in 1967 launched a domestic surveillance program known as "Operation Chaos," which became the focus of intense controversy when it was disclosed publicly by The New York Times in 1975. With the election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968, White House involvement with the CIA only intensified. Even before the 1972 Watergate break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, the White House had demanded and received CIA files on agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These included Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. But the relationship between Mr. Helms and Nixon was never smooth, and in November of 1972, shortly after he had been elected to his second term, the president summoned his CIA chief to a meeting at Camp David and asked him to resign. Nixon's reasons were never made public, but Power said in his biography that Mr. Helms was convinced "that Nixon fired him for one reason only - because he had refused wholeheartedly to join the Watergate cover-up." At the Camp David meeting, the president had asked Mr. Helms if he'd like to be an ambassador, and the two men had agreed on Iran. But during his three years in Iran, Mr. Helms would make more than a dozen trips back to Washington to testify before Senate committees investigating CIA activities during his directorship. Links between unsavory Nixon White House activities and the CIA, including the agency's lending of disguises to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt and the CIA backgrounds of many of the Watergate burglars prompted an internal examination ordered by Mr. Helm's successor at the agency, James R. Schlesinger. This resulted in a 693-page compendium of agency misdeeds, including assassination attempts, burglaries, electronic eavesdropping and LSD testing of persons without their knowledge. William R. Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger as director of Central Intelligence, quietly briefed House and Senate overseers on the contents of the report, which became known in the agency as "the family jewels." The substance of the briefing did not surface publicly for two years, but it eventually did become known through a combination of press accounts, a presidential commission and congressional committees bent on public disclosure. Ultimately, the result was creation of permanent House and Senate oversight committees to monitor the CIA and all other U.S. intelligence agencies. In 1976 Mr. Helms returned from Tehran, retired from government service and became an international consultant. In 1939 Mr. Helms married Julia Bretzman Shields of Indianapolis. They separated in 1967 and divorced in 1968. They had one son, Dennis. In 1968 he married Cynthia McKelvie. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- October 24, 2002 Richard Helms, Ex-C.I.A. Chief, Dies at 89 Mr. Helms (left) in 1966 and (right) in 1973 with President Richard Nixon Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence who defiantly guarded some of the darkest secrets of the cold war, died of multiple myeloma today. He was 89. An urbane and dashing spymaster, Mr. Helms began his career with a reputation as a truth teller and became a favorite of lawmakers in the late 1960's and early 70's. But he eventually ran afoul of Congressional investigators who found that he had lied or withheld information about the United States role in assassination attempts in Cuba, anti-government activities in Chile and the illegal surveillance of journalists in the United States. Mr. Helms pleaded no contest in 1977 to two misdemeanor counts of failing to testify fully four years earlier to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His conviction, which resulted in a suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine, became a rallying point for critics of the Central Intelligence, Agency who accused it of dirty tricks, as well as for the agency's defenders, who hailed Mr. Helms for refusing to compromise sensitive information. In the title of his 1979 biography of Mr. Helms, Thomas Powers called him "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" (Pocket Books). Mr. Helms's memoir, "A Look Over My Shoulder: a Life in the C.I.A.," is to be released in the spring by Random House. After he left the C.I.A. in 1973, Mr. Helms served until 1977 as the American ambassador to Iran, whose ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was supported by the United States. He later became an international consultant, specializing in trade with the Middle East. Born on March 30, 1913, in St. Davids, Pa., Richard McGarrah Helms - he avoided using the middle name - was the son of an Alcoa executive and grandson of a leading international banker, Gates McGarrah. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and studied for two years during high school in Switzerland, where he became fluent in French and German. At Williams College, Mr. Helms excelled as a student and a leader. He was class president, editor of the school newspaper and the yearbook, and was president of the senior honor society. He fancied a career in journalism, and went to Europe as a reporter for United Press. His biggest scoop, he said, was an exclusive interview with Hitler. In 1939 he married Julia Bretzman Shields, and they had a son, Dennis, a lawyer in Princeton, N.J. The couple were divorced in 1968, and Mr. Helms married Cynthia McKelvie later that year. She and his son survive him. When World War II broke out, Mr. Helms was called into service by the Naval Reserve and because of his linguistic abilities was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the C.I.A. He worked in New York plotting the positions of German submarines in the western Atlantic. From the beginning, he worked in the C.I.A.'s covert operations, or "plans" division, and by the early 1950's he was serving as deputy to the head of clandestine services, Frank Wisner. In that capacity, in 1955, Mr. Helms impressed his superiors by supervising the secret digging of a 500-yard tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin to tap the main Soviet telephone lines between Moscow and East Berlin. For more than 11 months, until the tunnel was detected by the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. was able to eavesdrop on Moscow's conversations with its agents in the puppet governments of East Germany and Poland. Over the next 20 years, Mr. Helms rose through the agency's ranks, and in 1966 he came the first career official to head the C.I.A. He served under such men as Allen W. Dulles, Richard M. Bissell, John A. McCone and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn. During most of his tenure as C.I.A. chief, Mr. Helms received favorable attention from lawmakers and the press, who remarked on his professionalism, candor, and even his dark good looks. That reputation grew after 1973, when Mr. Helms clashed with President Richard M. Nixon, who sought his help in thwarting an F.B.I. investigation into the Watergate break-in. When Mr. Helms refused, Mr. Powers wrote, Mr. Nixon forced him out and sent him to Iran as ambassador. But Mr. Helms soon found himself called to account for his own actions when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence delved into the agency's efforts to assassinate world leaders or destabilize socialist governments. The committee, which was led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, accused Mr. Helms of failing to inform his own superiors of efforts to kill the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, which the Senate panel called "a grave error in judgment." A separate inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission also faulted Mr. Helms for poor judgment for destroying documents and tape recordings that might have assisted Watergate investigators. But the most contentious criticism of Mr. Helms centered on Chile. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms insisted that the C.I.A. had never tried to overthrow the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens or funneled money to political enemies of Mr. Allende, a Marxist. Senate investigators later discovered that the C.I.A. had run a major secret operation in Chile that gave more than $8 million to the opponents of Mr. Allende, using the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation as a conduit. Mr. Allende was killed in a 1973 military coup, which was followed by more than 16 years of military dictatorship. In 1977, Mr. Helms stepped down as ambassador to Iran and returned to Washington to plead no contest to charges that in 1973 he had lied to a Congressional committee about the intelligence agency's role in bringing down the Allende government. "I had found myself in a position of conflict," he told a federal judge at the formal proceeding after entering a plea agreement with the Justice Department. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets. I didn't want to lie. I didn't want to mislead the Senate. I was simply trying to find my way through a difficult situation in which I found myself." The judge responded, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and shame," and sentenced him to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The prison term was suspended. Mr. Helms said outside the courtroom that he wore his conviction "like a badge of honor," and added: "I don't feel disgraced at all. I think if I had done anything else I would have been disgraced." Later that day he went to a reunion of former C.I.A. colleagues, who gave him a standing, cheering ovation, then passed the hat and raised the $2,000 for his fine. For a man who considered himself a genuine patriot, it was a bleak note on which to end his professional career. Mr. Helms believed he had performed well in a job that, although many Americans considered it sinister and undemocratic, was nevertheless a cold-blooded necessity in an era of cold war. Mr. Helms, who was allowed to receive his government pension, put his intelligence experience to use after his retirement. He became a consultant to businesses that made investments in other countries. He was known as a charming conversationalist, a gregarious partygoer and an accomplished dancer, and he and his wife continued to be familiar figures on the capital party scene. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 23 October 2002 STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET ON THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS With the deepest sadness, I have learned of the death of Ambassador Richard Helms. My thoughts and prayers are with his family at this time of grief. The United States has lost a great patriot. The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend. His service to country spanned more than half a century. But his career and contributions are not simply measured in history, they changed it. As a young Naval officer in the Second World War, Richard Helms found his place in American espionage. From that moment on, in posts of increasing responsibility, in times of conflict and in peace, he shaped the intelligence effort that has helped keep our country strong and free. As Director of Central Intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk. Clear in thought, elegant in style, he represents to me the best of his generation and profession. To the very end of his life, Ambassador Helms shared his time and wisdom with those who followed him in the calling of intelligence in defense of liberty. His enthusiasm for this vital work, and his concern for those who conduct it, never faltered. I will miss his priceless counsel and his warm friendship. But the name and example of Richard Helms will be treasured forever by all who work for the safety and security of the United States. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- HONORABLE RICHARD M. HELMS (Age 89) On Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Dear husband and friend of Cynthia R. Helms at his residence in Washington, DC. Father of Dennis and grandfather of Julia and Alexander; brother of Betty Helms Hawn, Pearsael Helms and Gates Helm; stepfather of Didi Anderson, Jill McKelvie Neilsen, Roderick McKelvie, Allan McKelvie and Linsday McKelvie Eakin and step-grandfather of 15. Service and burial at Arlington Cemetery mid-November, date and time to be announced. In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to CIA Memorial Foundation, created to provide benefits to the families of agents of the CIA killed in the line of duty, c/o Jeffrey H. Smith, Esq., Arnold & Porter, 555 12th Street, NW, Washington, DC or Community Hospices, Hospice of Washington, 4200 Wisconsin Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20016. Richard McGarrah Helms Lieutenant, United States Navy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Courtesy of the New York Times May 4, 2003 'A Look Over My Shoulder': Secrets of the Spymaster By JOSEPH E. PERSICO A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. By Richard Helms with William Hood. Illustrated. 478 pp. New York: Random House. $35. Has Richard Helms, the famously closemouthed director of central intelligence -- called ''the man who kept the secrets'' in the apt title of Thomas Powers's biography -- finally decided to spill all? Almost, but selectively, judiciously and, it turns out, posthumously (he died last year). One of Helms's best-kept secrets is that he was writing this autobiography, with his C.I.A. colleague William Hood, after fending off writers who had tried unsuccessfully for years to pry loose his story. Helms finally broke his silence, he tells us in ''A Look Over My Shoulder,'' because the end of the cold war freed him from his self-imposed omerta. In his six and a half years leading the C.I.A., he became the very model of a modern major spymaster -- urbane, impeccably attired, affable yet impenetrable, a man who could charm and chill in the same one-minute cycle. His early life reads like a pre-spook course: born on Philadelphia's Main Line, educated at the same Swiss prep school attended by the future shah of Iran, early fluency in French and German, a magna cum laude scholar at Williams College, a first job as a reporter in prewar Europe, during which time, at the age of 23, he had an interview with Hitler. Helms was briefly diverted from his true path by a desire to make money, and thus became an unlikely advertising salesman for The Indianapolis Times. World War II got him back on track. Helms went into the Navy and then into the Office of Strategic Services, parent of today's Central Intelligence Agency. When the war ended, ''I was hooked on intelligence,'' Helms confesses. He was present at the creation and never left, pursuing a 30-year career that culminated in his rise to director of central intelligence from 1966 to 1973. The reader is irresistibly drawn first to the two most incendiary events in that career, Watergate and Chile, the high and low, as it were. President Nixon's attempt to insulate his administration from Watergate by enmeshing the C.I.A. was brazen even by Nixonian standards. First, Nixon's strong-arm man, H. R. Haldeman, threatened that any C.I.A. investigation of Watergate would expose sensitive agency operations, particularly the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba of 11 years before. Helms responded, ''The Bay of Pigs hasn't got a damned thing to do with this.'' More brazen still, Nixon had his counsel, John Dean, order the C.I.A. to come up with bail money to spring the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms writes, ''I had no intention of supplying any such money, or of asking Congress for permission to dip into funds earmarked for secret intelligence purposes to provide bail for a band of political bunglers.'' Nixon backed down. Three cheers for Helms this time. However, on the Chilean affair, Helms emerges as rather less sterling. He states at first that C.I.A. secret operations in Chile were designed solely ''to preserve the democratic constitutional system.'' Yet in 1970, when the leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, was democratically elected president, Nixon ordered Helms to do whatever it took, with a free hand to spend $10 million, to see that Allende never took office. Nixon warned Helms to reveal nothing of this plotting even to the secretary of state, secretary of defense or United States ambassador to Chile. This time Helms knuckled under to presidential pressure, which was eventually to produce the great trauma of his career. In February 1973, seven months before Allende was overthrown by a right-wing coup in which he died, Helms testified under oath before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the C.I.A. had never aided Allende's opponents. Soon after, he testified before a Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Frank Church that the C.I.A. had had no dealings with the Chilean military. These untruths would lead, in 1977, to Helms's plea of no contest on two misdemeanor counts, resulting in a fine of $2,000 and a two-year suspended prison sentence. Helms's willingness to take the heat reflects a core difference between the ordinary American's conception of citizenship and the culture inculcated by the C.I.A. Helms had long ago sworn to keep the agency's secrets. He had also sworn before the Senate committees to tell the truth. To Helms, exposing sources and methods to headline-hunting senators ranked well below his vow to keep secrets upon which, in his judgment, the security of the nation hung. Helms claimed to wear his conviction for misleading Congress like a badge of honor. The intelligence fraternity concurred, giving him a standing ovation at a lunch after the trial and passing the hat to cover his fine. Tales of derring-do enliven Helms's readable story throughout, but its real significance is likely to surprise spy-thriller aficionados and conspiracy theorists: the C.I.A. is, first and foremost, simply a government agency. No differently than the Department of Agriculture, it executes White House policy. Helms's professional life is essentially the story of undercover operations ordered by presidents. Standout examples: Eisenhower's decisions to topple Prime Ministers Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba (continued by Kennedy), and Nixon's clandestine war against Allende. In the 1960's, at the peak of racial upheaval and demonstrations against the Vietnam War, President Johnson ordered Helms ''to track down the foreign Communists who are behind this intolerable interference in our domestic affairs.'' This demand led Helms to start up a covert snooping operation that he admits involved ''a violation of our charter'' not to spy on Americans at home. On the big stuff, Helms makes a convincing case that rather than being a ''rogue elephant,'' an ''invisible government'' as often charged, the C.I.A. is a president's political weapon of last resort, the keeper of the bag of dirty tricks. If agency acts appear roguish, Helms says, it is when government policy is roguish. He describes the dilemma when a president orders his intelligence chief to step out of bounds: ''What is the D.C.I. to do? . . . Has he the authority to refuse to accept a questionable order on a foreign policy question of obvious national importance?'' At this point, the spy chief's choices are to sign on or resign. Helms offers telling instances of the uselessness of even the keenest intelligence if its message is unwelcome at the top. In analyzing the domino theory, which held that if Vietnam fell, the whole non-Communist world would teeter, Helms sent Johnson a secret assessment that concluded, ''The net effects would probably not be permanently damaging to this country's ability to play its role as a world power.'' Johnson ignored the report's existence and pressed on with the war. During the cold war debate over the Soviet Union's capacity to deliver a first-strike knockout punch to the United States, the C.I.A. found that the Kremlin had neither the intention nor the weaponry to do so. The Nixon administration told Helms, in effect, to get on the team or shut up. Dick Helms remained throughout his career a thoroughgoing company man, albeit with spine-tingling job descriptions. His loyalty to old C.I.A. hands could be uncritical. The most egregious example involved his counterintelligence chief, James Jesus Angleton. The paranoid Angleton practically paralyzed the C.I.A.'s Soviet division by a long, fruitless hunt for a mole inside the agency. Over a hundred loyal officers fell under investigation; some were forced to resign. In implementing the dismissals, Helms says, ''I had no choice but to accept a decision that in effect said each was innocent, but that the innocence could not be proved.'' In this post-9/11 age of anxiety one looks for lessons in the life of a man who spent his career in the intelligence end of national security. The lesson here is how totally changed the present amorphous threats are from the comparatively clear-cut cold war battles Helms fought for a generation. By the time he died at the age of 89, with those battles long behind him, Helms's blemishes had been washed away. In 1983 President Reagan awarded him the National Security Medal. Upon his death he was buried with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery. Whether one likes or loathes the furtive world in which Helms lived, whether one sees him as a patriot or compliant careerist, this surprise autobiography provides an unsurpassed insider look into how American intelligence actually operates. It's a view offering more than enough ammunition for admirers and antagonists alike. Joseph E. Persico's latest book is ''Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage.'' -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reviewed by James Bamford Sunday, April 27, 2003 A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency By Richard Helms with William Hood Random House. 478 pp. $35 Richard Helms was back among friends. On a crisp and tranquil late November morning, tinged with the musty scent of dried leaves and old bark, the man who was arguably America's most famous spy since Nathan Hale descended into eternal darkness. Buried with him, beneath a gently sloping hill at Arlington National Cemetery, was a lifetime of mystery, secrets and controversy. Nearby, sharing the same hallowed ground, were the graves of his old friend Frank Wisner, a specialist in covert action, and General Walter Bedell Smith, a mentor and fellow former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But before he made his final exit last year at the age of 89, Helms left behind a packet of long-held secrets, like a spy loading a dead drop and then disappearing into the cold. They are contained not in a moldy tree trunk but in his posthumous autobiography, A Look Over My Shoulder. Over the years, I occasionally shared a meal with the legendary spymaster at one of his favorite haunts, Washington's Sulgrave Club, where his wife, Cynthia, was a member. Tall and lanky, with thin lips pursed together as if sealed with a zipper, he once told me that he had always vowed never to write about his life in the shadows. He even refused to read books he perceived as biased against him or the agency, such as Thomas Powers's well-received The Man Who Kept the Secrets, published in 1979. Then, while on vacation once during the mid-1990s, he brought along Powers's book and finally began turning the pages. Pleasantly surprised by the author's accuracy and fairness, he gradually made the decision to at last unseal a bit of his cipher-locked past. It is too bad he did not make the decision much earlier, when many of the words, the events, the emotions, the colors and the details would still have been fresh in his mind. Writing at such a long remove in time is a little like looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Compounding his difficulty was the lack of access to still-classified documents and a rigid agency review process. The result is a book with too much flat history and too few new insights and revelations. Nevertheless, the opportunity to at last see much of the 20th century through Helms's probing eyes is well worth the price. While offering few new details in recounting some of the major events of his long tenure at the CIA -- he saw no indications of conspiracy during the Kennedy assassination, for example -- Helms sometimes does come up with surprises. One involves the deadly Israeli attack on the American electronic surveillance ship USS Liberty during the Six Day War in 1967. Thirty-four American sailors were killed, and 171 were wounded in the incident. Although at the time Israel claimed it was a mistake, and an "interim" CIA intelligence memorandum agreed, that view later changed. "I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed," Helms writes, "or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the Liberty. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack." This is consistent with the views of some members of the administration at the time, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the director and deputy directors of the National Security Agency, which was in charge of the ship. Overshadowing all else during Helms's years as director were the Vietnam War and the domestic protests it spawned. Among the operations Helms was most proud of was the CIA's very secret paramilitary role in Laos, attempting to resist a government takeover by communist forces. Until America pulled out of Vietnam, the operation succeeded in fighting back the guerrillas and largely maintaining the status quo. "We had fulfilled our mission and we remain proud of it," he writes. "We had won the war!" Vietnam, however, was a different story. But it was the war at home that long haunted Helms. "Nothing in my thirty-year service brought me more criticism," he wrote, "than my response to President Johnson's insistence that the Agency supply him proof that foreign agents and funds were at the root of the racial and political unrest that took fire in the summer of 1967." The agency's response was given the apt cryptonym CHAOS. "CHAOS," he admits, "was my responsibility." In the process of giving Johnson the answer he was not expecting -- there was "no trace" of foreign involvement -- the agency for the first time began secretly treading on domestic soil, "a violation of our charter," Helms confesses. If Helms is remembered for the controversy of CHAOS, he should also be remembered for the courage of standing up to President Nixon's attempt to tar the CIA with the brush of Watergate. Shortly after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and the arrest of those involved, Nixon had his White House lawyer, John Dean, put pressure on Helms's deputy, Vernon Walters. "Dean had one request," Helms writes. "The White House wanted money from CIA to make bail for the burglars." Helms refused, telling Walters, "There was no way that the [CIA] could furnish secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency." Five months later, Helms got the boot. If Helms thought that he was finally out of harm's way once he turned in his cloak and dagger, he couldn't have been more mistaken. Nominated to become ambassador to Iran, he was called before an open Senate committee for confirmation and was asked whether the CIA played a role in a coup in Chile that brought down the government of Salvador Allende. Rather than tell the truth and expose the CIA's involvement or ask to answer the question in closed session, Helms simply lied and said no. Years later the answer came back to haunt him. He was charged with failing to testify "fully and completely" before the committee and pleaded no contest. Following a sharp tongue-lashing by the judge, who told Helms he stood before the court "in disgrace and shame," he was sentenced to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The judge then suspended the jail time. Helms turned ashen. But upon leaving the courthouse he claimed that the conviction represented a "badge of honor" for having lied to protect an agency operation. Six years later, he received the National Security Medal, the highest award in the intelligence community, from President Ronald Reagan for "exceptional meritorious service." As the horse-drawn caisson waited to carry Richard Helms to his final resting place on that chilly fall morning, the man who must now keep the secrets paid tribute. "Wherever American intelligence officers strive to defend and extend freedom," said George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, "Richard Helms will be there." . James Bamford is the author, most recently, of "Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency." -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From contemporary press reports: 20 November 2002: Buried with military honors, former CIA Director Richard Helms was remembered on Wednesday as a man "who knew the value of a stolen secret" and became one of the great heroes of America's clandestine intelligence operations. "In Richard Helms, intelligence in service to liberty found an unsurpassed champion," said George Tenet, the CIA's current director. Helms, who died at 89 on October 23, 2002, began his intelligence career during World War II and rose through the ranks during the Cold War. He served as CIA director for six years before President Nixon fired him for refusing to block an FBI probe into the 1972 Watergate break in. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery before a large group of mourners that included members of the intelligence and defense establishments of several presidential administrations. At a memorial service at Fort Myer, Virginia, following Helms' burial, Tenet called Helms "one of our greatest heroes." "He came to know, as few others ever would, the value of a stolen secret, and the advantage that comes to our democracy from the fullest possible knowledge of those abroad determined to destroy it," Tenet said. Beginning in the 1930s as an enterprising reporter for United Press, for whom he interviewed Adolf Hitler, Helms found his way to wartime service with the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. intelligence agency that was the forerunner of the CIA. At the OSS, Tenet said, "Richard Helms found the calling of his lifetime." "In its Secret Intelligence Branch, he mastered the delicate, demanding craft of agent operations," Tenet said. "He excelled at both the meticulous planning and the bold vision and action that were - and remain today __ the heart of our work to obtain information critical to the safety and security of the United States __ information that can be gained only through stealth and courage." Tenet called Helms' later CIA career "the stuff of legend," praising his "sound operational judgment, his complete command of facts (and) his reputation as the best drafter of cables anywhere ..." "In an organization where risk and pressure are as common as a cup of coffee, he was unflappable," Tenet said. Tenet said Helms' legacy is the American intelligence agents he taught and who carry on in his place. Helms himself addressed the profession of an intelligence officer in a 1996 speech quoted in the program for his memorial service. "Military conflicts and terrorist attacks have not gone out of style," he said then. "An alert intelligence community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward. A military honor guard escorts the horse-drawn carriage carrying the remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. A U.S. Navy honor guard prepares to remove the cremated remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms from a ceremonial flag-draped casket on a caisson at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia November 20, 2002. Members of a naval honor guard carry a flag and a box containing the ashes of former CIA Director Richard Helms during ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery CIA Director George Tenet, right, awaits the flag that draped the casket of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Helms, the spymaster who led the CIA through some of its most difficult years and was later fired by President Nixon when he refused to block an FBI probe into the Watergate scandal, died last month. Afterward, Tenet presented the flag to Helms' widow. Family members of former CIA Director Richard Helms hold the flag that draped his casket during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery , Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Cynthia Helms, widow of former CIA Director Richard Helms, pauses over a container with the remains of Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Former CIA Director Helms Dead at 89 Wed Oct 23, 2002 7:17 PM ET Former CIA Director Richard Helms, who led the spy agency during the height of the Vietnam War and resisted attempts by President Richard Nixon to involve the CIA in Watergate, has died. He was 89. Helms was in declining health and died at his home on Tuesday (22 October 2002). The cause of death was not immediately available. "The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend," CIA Director George Tenet said in a statement on Wednesday. He ordered flags at the agency's headquarters in Virginia flown at half-staff. "As director of central intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk," Tenet said. Helms led the spy agency from June 1966 to February 1973 during one of the most contentious periods of American history with both the Vietnam War and Watergate. He was the first career CIA officer to reach the agency's top position. Helms was first appointed by President Lyndon Johnson and in 1969 was reappointed by Nixon. After the controversial break-in at Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 1972, Helms resisted attempts by Nixon to involve the CIA in the ensuing cover-up, which ultimately brought down his presidency. The CIA chief was not reappointed to his post. Helms' name also emerged in the guessing game of who was "Deep Throat," the confidential source that helped Washington Post reporters break open the Watergate scandal. After leaving the CIA, Helms went on to become U.S. ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977. In 1977, he was charged with perjury for denying the CIA had tried to overthrow the government in Chile in testimony to Congress. Helms was given a suspended jail sentence. 'PAINFUL PERIOD' "I think he remembered that as a painful period in his life. Dick always believed that he was seeking a higher good there in protecting the sources who had worked with the agency at risk to themselves and our own people in the field," said John Gannon, former National Intelligence Council chairman and friend of Helms. "History will judge his performance there." A CIA report released two years ago said in September 1970 Nixon told Helms that a Salvador Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million for the CIA to prevent him from reaching power. Allende was elected, so then the CIA was directed to instigate a coup but those efforts also failed. Three years later in September 1973, a bloody coup put Gen. Augusto Pinochet in power and Allende killed himself. The CIA has maintained it did not instigate that coup. Helms worked for years in the CIA's clandestine service which conducts covert operations and became deputy director for plans in 1962. During that time, the CIA tried unsuccessfully to remove President Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. Helms, a private consultant since 1977, remained a helping hand of experience to the CIA, Gannon said. "He was almost a folk hero at CIA because he actively worked to stay engaged and to be useful and helpful to people in the agency," he said. Helms had a quiet, reserved manner that could intimidate subordinates and was known as a dapper dresser. "Dick was a man you had to work to get to know. He had a certain reserve about him and he had a patrician air," Gannon said. "But if you cut through that and got to know Dick he was an extremely warm man with a really great capacity for friendship," he said. Helms started out as a journalist for the predecessor to United Press International in Europe, covered the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin and interviewed German leader Adolf Hitler. He joined the Navy in 1942 and was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA. He worked in Washington, London, Paris and Luxembourg, running espionage operations against Germany. Helms will be buried at Arlington National Cemetery on November 20, 2002. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Richard M. Helms, 89, the quintessential intelligence and espionage officer who joined the Central Intelligence Agency at its founding in 1947 and rose through the ranks to lead it for more than six years, died Tuesday night (23 October 2002) at his home, the CIA announced today. No immediate cause of death was reported. Mr. Helms was the first career intelligence professional to serve as the nation's top spymaster, and he was among the last of the remaining survivors of the CIA's organizing cadre, operatives who earned their espionage stripes as young men during World War II. His years at the agency covered a period in which CIA service was widely honored as a noble and romantic calling in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But much of this mystique had dissolved in the national malaise that accompanied the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. At his retirement in 1973, Mr. Helms left an organization viewed with suspicion by many and about to undergo intense scrutiny from an unfriendly Congress for activities ranging from assassination plots against foreign leaders to spying on U.S. citizens. As a veteran of the craft of espionage, he had always followed a code that stressed maximum trust and loyalty to his agency and colleagues; maximum silence where outsiders were concerned. "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," was the title chosen by author Thomas Powers for his biography of Mr. Helms. In the judgment of Richard Helms, the CIA worked only for the president. He did not welcome congressional inquiry or oversight. In 1977 he pleaded no contest in a federal court to charges of failing to testify fully before Congress about the CIA role in the covert supply of money to Chilean anti Marxists in 1970 in an effort to influence a presidential election. "I found myself in a position of conflict," Mr. Helms said. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets." He received a suspended two-year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine, which was paid in full by retired CIA agents. Six years later at a White House ceremony, Mr. Helms received the National Security Medal from President Reagan for "exceptionally meritorious service." He said he considered this award "an exoneration." His career at the CIA covered periods of searching for communists in the U.S. government and the Red Scare tactics of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.); the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and plots against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. It included the rending of the American social fabric and the antiwar protests of the Vietnam era, and it ended during the the Watergate crisis that ultimately ended the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. On leaving the CIA, Mr. Helms served three years as ambassador to Iran, then in 1976 ended his government service. As one of its ranking officers for most of the CIA's first 25 years, Mr. Helms helped form and shape the agency, and he recruited, trained, assigned and supervised many of its top agents. During the 1950s and early 1960s he held high positions in the division responsible for clandestine operations. " . . . He was a kind of middle man between the field and Washington policymakers, approving and even choosing the wording of cables to the field describing 'requirements'; and passing on concrete proposals for operations from the local CIA stations," Powers wrote in his biography of Mr. Helms. By 1958 he was second in command of covert operations when he was passed over for the directorship of that activity in favor of Richard M. Bissell Jr., who in 1961 would plan and direct the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. In this operation, a force of 1,200 CIA trained and equipped Cuban exiles attempted to retake the island from Castro, but the effort failed and most of the invaders were killed or captured. Mr. Helms, who by nature had been cool and skeptical toward covert operations on such a large scale, had kept his distance from the Bay of Pigs. But the fiasco proved to be Bissell's undoing and he retired amid the political fallout that followed. Mr. Helms replaced him in 1962, winning at last the position that had eluded him four years earlier. He became the CIA's deputy director for plans, the innocuous sounding title of covert action chief. With his new assignment he inherited a pressure campaign from the White House to get rid of Castro by other means. During the next several months the agency would contemplate schemes for Castro's overthrow or assassination, but none ever materialized. In 1965 Mr. Helms was named to the number two job at the agency, deputy director of Central Intelligence. Retiring CIA chief John A. McCone had campaigned to have Mr. Helms succeed him, but President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose Navy Vice Adm. William F. Raborn, who lasted only 14 months in the job. In 1966 the president named Mr. Helms CIA director. He would serve longer as Director of Central Intelligence than anyone except Allen Dulles, the legendary spymaster who led the CIA from 1953 to 1961. As America's top spymaster, Powers wrote in his biography, Mr. Helms "is remembered as an administrator, impatient with delay, excuses, self-seeking, the sour air of office politics. Asked for an example of Helms' characteristic utterance, three of his old friends came up with the same dry phrase, 'Let's get on with it.' . . . Helm's style was cool by choice and temperment; his instinct was to soften differences, to find a middle ground, to tone down operations that were getting out of hand, to give faltering projects one more chance rather than shut them down altogether, to settle for compromise in the interests of bureaucratic peace." He tended to work regular hours, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., and his desk was always cleared when he left the office at night. Mr. Helms kept a low public profile as CIA director, and he avoided publicity. But he lunched occasionally with influential figures in the media, and he was assiduous in cultivating the congressional support he needed to manage his agency. He made only one public speech during his years as CIA leader, telling the nation's newspaper editors that "the nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men, devoted to her service." Richard McGarrah Helms was born in St. Davids, Pa., to a family of financial means. His father was an Alcoa executive and his maternal grandfather a leading international banker. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and attended high school in Switzerland for two years. While there he became proficient in French and German. In 1935 he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams College, where in his senior year he was president of his class, editor of the campus newspaper and the yearbook and president of the honor society. His life's ambition on leaving college was to own and operate a daily newspaper. In pursuit of that goal he paid his own fare to London where he became a European reporter for United Press. His assignments included coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The following year he was one of a group of foreign correspondents to interview Adolf Hitler. Shortly thereafter he returned to the United States and took a job with the Indianapolis Times newspaper, where by 1939 he had become national advertising director. With the entry of the United States into World War II he joined the Navy, and in 1943 was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. wartime espionage agency that antedated the CIA. There he had desk jobs in New York and Washington and later in London. At the end of the war he was posted in Berlin, where he worked for Allen Dulles. Discharged from military service in 1946, he continued doing intelligence work as a civilian. When the U.S. wartime intelligence forces merged into the CIA in 1947, Mr. Helms became one of the architects of the new organization. During the 1950s, Dulles gave him special assignments from time to time. At the height of Sen. McCarthy's fervid hunts for communists inside the government, Mr. Helms headed a CIA committee to protect the agency against McCarthy's efforts to infiltrate the CIA with his own informers. The committee's job was to monitor reports of covert approaches to CIA officers by McCarthy agents and to plug any leaks. During the years there would be more assignments with domestic political implications. Early in Mr. Helms' directorship, as the war in Vietnam and the antiwar protests were both escalating, Johnson asked the CIA to determine whether antiwar activity in the United States was being financially or otherwise backed by foreign countries. In response to this request, the agency in 1967 launched a domestic surveillance program known as "Operation Chaos," which became the focus of intense controversy when it was disclosed publicly by The New York Times in 1975. With the election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968, White House involvement with the CIA only intensified. Even before the 1972 Watergate break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, the White House had demanded and received CIA files on agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These included Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. But the relationship between Mr. Helms and Nixon was never smooth, and in November of 1972, shortly after he had been elected to his second term, the president summoned his CIA chief to a meeting at Camp David and asked him to resign. Nixon's reasons were never made public, but Power said in his biography that Mr. Helms was convinced "that Nixon fired him for one reason only - because he had refused wholeheartedly to join the Watergate cover-up." At the Camp David meeting, the president had asked Mr. Helms if he'd like to be an ambassador, and the two men had agreed on Iran. But during his three years in Iran, Mr. Helms would make more than a dozen trips back to Washington to testify before Senate committees investigating CIA activities during his directorship. Links between unsavory Nixon White House activities and the CIA, including the agency's lending of disguises to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt and the CIA backgrounds of many of the Watergate burglars prompted an internal examination ordered by Mr. Helm's successor at the agency, James R. Schlesinger. This resulted in a 693-page compendium of agency misdeeds, including assassination attempts, burglaries, electronic eavesdropping and LSD testing of persons without their knowledge. William R. Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger as director of Central Intelligence, quietly briefed House and Senate overseers on the contents of the report, which became known in the agency as "the family jewels." The substance of the briefing did not surface publicly for two years, but it eventually did become known through a combination of press accounts, a presidential commission and congressional committees bent on public disclosure. Ultimately, the result was creation of permanent House and Senate oversight committees to monitor the CIA and all other U.S. intelligence agencies. In 1976 Mr. Helms returned from Tehran, retired from government service and became an international consultant. In 1939 Mr. Helms married Julia Bretzman Shields of Indianapolis. They separated in 1967 and divorced in 1968. They had one son, Dennis. In 1968 he married Cynthia McKelvie. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- October 24, 2002 Richard Helms, Ex-C.I.A. Chief, Dies at 89 Mr. Helms (left) in 1966 and (right) in 1973 with President Richard Nixon Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence who defiantly guarded some of the darkest secrets of the cold war, died of multiple myeloma today. He was 89. An urbane and dashing spymaster, Mr. Helms began his career with a reputation as a truth teller and became a favorite of lawmakers in the late 1960's and early 70's. But he eventually ran afoul of Congressional investigators who found that he had lied or withheld information about the United States role in assassination attempts in Cuba, anti-government activities in Chile and the illegal surveillance of journalists in the United States. Mr. Helms pleaded no contest in 1977 to two misdemeanor counts of failing to testify fully four years earlier to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His conviction, which resulted in a suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine, became a rallying point for critics of the Central Intelligence, Agency who accused it of dirty tricks, as well as for the agency's defenders, who hailed Mr. Helms for refusing to compromise sensitive information. In the title of his 1979 biography of Mr. Helms, Thomas Powers called him "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" (Pocket Books). Mr. Helms's memoir, "A Look Over My Shoulder: a Life in the C.I.A.," is to be released in the spring by Random House. After he left the C.I.A. in 1973, Mr. Helms served until 1977 as the American ambassador to Iran, whose ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was supported by the United States. He later became an international consultant, specializing in trade with the Middle East. Born on March 30, 1913, in St. Davids, Pa., Richard McGarrah Helms - he avoided using the middle name - was the son of an Alcoa executive and grandson of a leading international banker, Gates McGarrah. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and studied for two years during high school in Switzerland, where he became fluent in French and German. At Williams College, Mr. Helms excelled as a student and a leader. He was class president, editor of the school newspaper and the yearbook, and was president of the senior honor society. He fancied a career in journalism, and went to Europe as a reporter for United Press. His biggest scoop, he said, was an exclusive interview with Hitler. In 1939 he married Julia Bretzman Shields, and they had a son, Dennis, a lawyer in Princeton, N.J. The couple were divorced in 1968, and Mr. Helms married Cynthia McKelvie later that year. She and his son survive him. When World War II broke out, Mr. Helms was called into service by the Naval Reserve and because of his linguistic abilities was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the C.I.A. He worked in New York plotting the positions of German submarines in the western Atlantic. From the beginning, he worked in the C.I.A.'s covert operations, or "plans" division, and by the early 1950's he was serving as deputy to the head of clandestine services, Frank Wisner. In that capacity, in 1955, Mr. Helms impressed his superiors by supervising the secret digging of a 500-yard tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin to tap the main Soviet telephone lines between Moscow and East Berlin. For more than 11 months, until the tunnel was detected by the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. was able to eavesdrop on Moscow's conversations with its agents in the puppet governments of East Germany and Poland. Over the next 20 years, Mr. Helms rose through the agency's ranks, and in 1966 he came the first career official to head the C.I.A. He served under such men as Allen W. Dulles, Richard M. Bissell, John A. McCone and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn. During most of his tenure as C.I.A. chief, Mr. Helms received favorable attention from lawmakers and the press, who remarked on his professionalism, candor, and even his dark good looks. That reputation grew after 1973, when Mr. Helms clashed with President Richard M. Nixon, who sought his help in thwarting an F.B.I. investigation into the Watergate break-in. When Mr. Helms refused, Mr. Powers wrote, Mr. Nixon forced him out and sent him to Iran as ambassador. But Mr. Helms soon found himself called to account for his own actions when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence delved into the agency's efforts to assassinate world leaders or destabilize socialist governments. The committee, which was led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, accused Mr. Helms of failing to inform his own superiors of efforts to kill the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, which the Senate panel called "a grave error in judgment." A separate inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission also faulted Mr. Helms for poor judgment for destroying documents and tape recordings that might have assisted Watergate investigators. But the most contentious criticism of Mr. Helms centered on Chile. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms insisted that the C.I.A. had never tried to overthrow the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens or funneled money to political enemies of Mr. Allende, a Marxist. Senate investigators later discovered that the C.I.A. had run a major secret operation in Chile that gave more than $8 million to the opponents of Mr. Allende, using the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation as a conduit. Mr. Allende was killed in a 1973 military coup, which was followed by more than 16 years of military dictatorship. In 1977, Mr. Helms stepped down as ambassador to Iran and returned to Washington to plead no contest to charges that in 1973 he had lied to a Congressional committee about the intelligence agency's role in bringing down the Allende government. "I had found myself in a position of conflict," he told a federal judge at the formal proceeding after entering a plea agreement with the Justice Department. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets. I didn't want to lie. I didn't want to mislead the Senate. I was simply trying to find my way through a difficult situation in which I found myself." The judge responded, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and shame," and sentenced him to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The prison term was suspended. Mr. Helms said outside the courtroom that he wore his conviction "like a badge of honor," and added: "I don't feel disgraced at all. I think if I had done anything else I would have been disgraced." Later that day he went to a reunion of former C.I.A. colleagues, who gave him a standing, cheering ovation, then passed the hat and raised the $2,000 for his fine. For a man who considered himself a genuine patriot, it was a bleak note on which to end his professional career. Mr. Helms believed he had performed well in a job that, although many Americans considered it sinister and undemocratic, was nevertheless a cold-blooded necessity in an era of cold war. Mr. Helms, who was allowed to receive his government pension, put his intelligence experience to use after his retirement. He became a consultant to businesses that made investments in other countries. He was known as a charming conversationalist, a gregarious partygoer and an accomplished dancer, and he and his wife continued to be familiar figures on the capital party scene. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 23 October 2002 STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET ON THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS With the deepest sadness, I have learned of the death of Ambassador Richard Helms. My thoughts and prayers are with his family at this time of grief. The United States has lost a great patriot. The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend. His service to country spanned more than half a century. But his career and contributions are not simply measured in history, they changed it. As a young Naval officer in the Second World War, Richard Helms found his place in American espionage. From that moment on, in posts of increasing responsibility, in times of conflict and in peace, he shaped the intelligence effort that has helped keep our country strong and free. As Director of Central Intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk. Clear in thought, elegant in style, he represents to me the best of his generation and profession. To the very end of his life, Ambassador Helms shared his time and wisdom with those who followed him in the calling of intelligence in defense of liberty. His enthusiasm for this vital work, and his concern for those who conduct it, never faltered. I will miss his priceless counsel and his warm friendship. But the name and example of Richard Helms will be treasured forever by all who work for the safety and security of the United States. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- HONORABLE RICHARD M. HELMS (Age 89) On Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Dear husband and friend of Cynthia R. Helms at his residence in Washington, DC. Father of Dennis and grandfather of Julia and Alexander; brother of Betty Helms Hawn, Pearsael Helms and Gates Helm; stepfather of Didi Anderson, Jill McKelvie Neilsen, Roderick McKelvie, Allan McKelvie and Linsday McKelvie Eakin and step-grandfather of 15. Service and burial at Arlington Cemetery mid-November, date and time to be announced. In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to CIA Memorial Foundation, created to provide benefits to the families of agents of the CIA killed in the line of duty, c/o Jeffrey H. 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Path: news2.east.cox.net!news1.east.cox.net!east.cox.net!peer01.cox.net!cox.net!cyclone1.gnilink.net!wn12feed!worldnet.att.net!204.127.198.203!attbi_feed3!attbi.com!rwcrnsc53.POSTED!not-for-mail From: "Dr. Truth" Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy.jfk References: <2b29c281.0306111543.30a30c06@posting.google.com> Subject: Re: Helms learns of the assassination Lines: 6455 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Message-ID: NNTP-Posting-Host: 12.233.119.209 X-Complaints-To: abuse@attbi.com X-Trace: rwcrnsc53 1055376679 12.233.119.209 (Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT Organization: AT&T Broadband Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:11:19 GMT Xref: east.cox.net alt.conspiracy.jfk:265004 X-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 20:11:21 EDT (news2.east.cox.net) "Ed Dolan" <74030.3022@compuserve.com> wrote in message news:2b29c281.0306111543.30a30c06@posting.google.com... > "Dr. Truth" wrote in message news:... > > Pardon me, but is not Mr. Helms the gentleman that lied to the Senate > > Committee in the 1970s? > > And was caught? > No. I don't know where you get your information. He was not like Files. Gosh Ed - looks like I caught you lying again...I'm so sorry...but you old CIA agents are all alike....it's getting too easy to catch you in lies now... 1st of all: Files never appeared before a congressional committee and 2nd: Richard McGarrah Helms Lieutenant, United States Navy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Courtesy of the New York Times May 4, 2003 'A Look Over My Shoulder': Secrets of the Spymaster By JOSEPH E. PERSICO A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. By Richard Helms with William Hood. Illustrated. 478 pp. New York: Random House. $35. Has Richard Helms, the famously closemouthed director of central intelligence -- called ''the man who kept the secrets'' in the apt title of Thomas Powers's biography -- finally decided to spill all? Almost, but selectively, judiciously and, it turns out, posthumously (he died last year). One of Helms's best-kept secrets is that he was writing this autobiography, with his C.I.A. colleague William Hood, after fending off writers who had tried unsuccessfully for years to pry loose his story. Helms finally broke his silence, he tells us in ''A Look Over My Shoulder,'' because the end of the cold war freed him from his self-imposed omerta. In his six and a half years leading the C.I.A., he became the very model of a modern major spymaster -- urbane, impeccably attired, affable yet impenetrable, a man who could charm and chill in the same one-minute cycle. His early life reads like a pre-spook course: born on Philadelphia's Main Line, educated at the same Swiss prep school attended by the future shah of Iran, early fluency in French and German, a magna cum laude scholar at Williams College, a first job as a reporter in prewar Europe, during which time, at the age of 23, he had an interview with Hitler. Helms was briefly diverted from his true path by a desire to make money, and thus became an unlikely advertising salesman for The Indianapolis Times. World War II got him back on track. Helms went into the Navy and then into the Office of Strategic Services, parent of today's Central Intelligence Agency. When the war ended, ''I was hooked on intelligence,'' Helms confesses. He was present at the creation and never left, pursuing a 30-year career that culminated in his rise to director of central intelligence from 1966 to 1973. The reader is irresistibly drawn first to the two most incendiary events in that career, Watergate and Chile, the high and low, as it were. President Nixon's attempt to insulate his administration from Watergate by enmeshing the C.I.A. was brazen even by Nixonian standards. First, Nixon's strong-arm man, H. R. Haldeman, threatened that any C.I.A. investigation of Watergate would expose sensitive agency operations, particularly the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba of 11 years before. Helms responded, ''The Bay of Pigs hasn't got a damned thing to do with this.'' More brazen still, Nixon had his counsel, John Dean, order the C.I.A. to come up with bail money to spring the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms writes, ''I had no intention of supplying any such money, or of asking Congress for permission to dip into funds earmarked for secret intelligence purposes to provide bail for a band of political bunglers.'' Nixon backed down. Three cheers for Helms this time. However, on the Chilean affair, Helms emerges as rather less sterling. He states at first that C.I.A. secret operations in Chile were designed solely ''to preserve the democratic constitutional system.'' Yet in 1970, when the leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, was democratically elected president, Nixon ordered Helms to do whatever it took, with a free hand to spend $10 million, to see that Allende never took office. Nixon warned Helms to reveal nothing of this plotting even to the secretary of state, secretary of defense or United States ambassador to Chile. This time Helms knuckled under to presidential pressure, which was eventually to produce the great trauma of his career. In February 1973, seven months before Allende was overthrown by a right-wing coup in which he died, Helms testified under oath before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the C.I.A. had never aided Allende's opponents. Soon after, he testified before a Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Frank Church that the C.I.A. had had no dealings with the Chilean military. These untruths would lead, in 1977, to Helms's plea of no contest on two misdemeanor counts, resulting in a fine of $2,000 and a two-year suspended prison sentence. Helms's willingness to take the heat reflects a core difference between the ordinary American's conception of citizenship and the culture inculcated by the C.I.A. Helms had long ago sworn to keep the agency's secrets. He had also sworn before the Senate committees to tell the truth. To Helms, exposing sources and methods to headline-hunting senators ranked well below his vow to keep secrets upon which, in his judgment, the security of the nation hung. Helms claimed to wear his conviction for misleading Congress like a badge of honor. The intelligence fraternity concurred, giving him a standing ovation at a lunch after the trial and passing the hat to cover his fine. Tales of derring-do enliven Helms's readable story throughout, but its real significance is likely to surprise spy-thriller aficionados and conspiracy theorists: the C.I.A. is, first and foremost, simply a government agency. No differently than the Department of Agriculture, it executes White House policy. Helms's professional life is essentially the story of undercover operations ordered by presidents. Standout examples: Eisenhower's decisions to topple Prime Ministers Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba (continued by Kennedy), and Nixon's clandestine war against Allende. In the 1960's, at the peak of racial upheaval and demonstrations against the Vietnam War, President Johnson ordered Helms ''to track down the foreign Communists who are behind this intolerable interference in our domestic affairs.'' This demand led Helms to start up a covert snooping operation that he admits involved ''a violation of our charter'' not to spy on Americans at home. On the big stuff, Helms makes a convincing case that rather than being a ''rogue elephant,'' an ''invisible government'' as often charged, the C.I.A. is a president's political weapon of last resort, the keeper of the bag of dirty tricks. If agency acts appear roguish, Helms says, it is when government policy is roguish. He describes the dilemma when a president orders his intelligence chief to step out of bounds: ''What is the D.C.I. to do? . . . Has he the authority to refuse to accept a questionable order on a foreign policy question of obvious national importance?'' At this point, the spy chief's choices are to sign on or resign. Helms offers telling instances of the uselessness of even the keenest intelligence if its message is unwelcome at the top. In analyzing the domino theory, which held that if Vietnam fell, the whole non-Communist world would teeter, Helms sent Johnson a secret assessment that concluded, ''The net effects would probably not be permanently damaging to this country's ability to play its role as a world power.'' Johnson ignored the report's existence and pressed on with the war. During the cold war debate over the Soviet Union's capacity to deliver a first-strike knockout punch to the United States, the C.I.A. found that the Kremlin had neither the intention nor the weaponry to do so. The Nixon administration told Helms, in effect, to get on the team or shut up. Dick Helms remained throughout his career a thoroughgoing company man, albeit with spine-tingling job descriptions. His loyalty to old C.I.A. hands could be uncritical. The most egregious example involved his counterintelligence chief, James Jesus Angleton. The paranoid Angleton practically paralyzed the C.I.A.'s Soviet division by a long, fruitless hunt for a mole inside the agency. Over a hundred loyal officers fell under investigation; some were forced to resign. In implementing the dismissals, Helms says, ''I had no choice but to accept a decision that in effect said each was innocent, but that the innocence could not be proved.'' In this post-9/11 age of anxiety one looks for lessons in the life of a man who spent his career in the intelligence end of national security. The lesson here is how totally changed the present amorphous threats are from the comparatively clear-cut cold war battles Helms fought for a generation. By the time he died at the age of 89, with those battles long behind him, Helms's blemishes had been washed away. In 1983 President Reagan awarded him the National Security Medal. Upon his death he was buried with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery. Whether one likes or loathes the furtive world in which Helms lived, whether one sees him as a patriot or compliant careerist, this surprise autobiography provides an unsurpassed insider look into how American intelligence actually operates. It's a view offering more than enough ammunition for admirers and antagonists alike. Joseph E. Persico's latest book is ''Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage.'' -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reviewed by James Bamford Sunday, April 27, 2003 A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency By Richard Helms with William Hood Random House. 478 pp. $35 Richard Helms was back among friends. On a crisp and tranquil late November morning, tinged with the musty scent of dried leaves and old bark, the man who was arguably America's most famous spy since Nathan Hale descended into eternal darkness. Buried with him, beneath a gently sloping hill at Arlington National Cemetery, was a lifetime of mystery, secrets and controversy. Nearby, sharing the same hallowed ground, were the graves of his old friend Frank Wisner, a specialist in covert action, and General Walter Bedell Smith, a mentor and fellow former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But before he made his final exit last year at the age of 89, Helms left behind a packet of long-held secrets, like a spy loading a dead drop and then disappearing into the cold. They are contained not in a moldy tree trunk but in his posthumous autobiography, A Look Over My Shoulder. Over the years, I occasionally shared a meal with the legendary spymaster at one of his favorite haunts, Washington's Sulgrave Club, where his wife, Cynthia, was a member. Tall and lanky, with thin lips pursed together as if sealed with a zipper, he once told me that he had always vowed never to write about his life in the shadows. He even refused to read books he perceived as biased against him or the agency, such as Thomas Powers's well-received The Man Who Kept the Secrets, published in 1979. Then, while on vacation once during the mid-1990s, he brought along Powers's book and finally began turning the pages. Pleasantly surprised by the author's accuracy and fairness, he gradually made the decision to at last unseal a bit of his cipher-locked past. It is too bad he did not make the decision much earlier, when many of the words, the events, the emotions, the colors and the details would still have been fresh in his mind. Writing at such a long remove in time is a little like looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Compounding his difficulty was the lack of access to still-classified documents and a rigid agency review process. The result is a book with too much flat history and too few new insights and revelations. Nevertheless, the opportunity to at last see much of the 20th century through Helms's probing eyes is well worth the price. While offering few new details in recounting some of the major events of his long tenure at the CIA -- he saw no indications of conspiracy during the Kennedy assassination, for example -- Helms sometimes does come up with surprises. One involves the deadly Israeli attack on the American electronic surveillance ship USS Liberty during the Six Day War in 1967. Thirty-four American sailors were killed, and 171 were wounded in the incident. Although at the time Israel claimed it was a mistake, and an "interim" CIA intelligence memorandum agreed, that view later changed. "I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed," Helms writes, "or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the Liberty. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack." This is consistent with the views of some members of the administration at the time, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the director and deputy directors of the National Security Agency, which was in charge of the ship. Overshadowing all else during Helms's years as director were the Vietnam War and the domestic protests it spawned. Among the operations Helms was most proud of was the CIA's very secret paramilitary role in Laos, attempting to resist a government takeover by communist forces. Until America pulled out of Vietnam, the operation succeeded in fighting back the guerrillas and largely maintaining the status quo. "We had fulfilled our mission and we remain proud of it," he writes. "We had won the war!" Vietnam, however, was a different story. But it was the war at home that long haunted Helms. "Nothing in my thirty-year service brought me more criticism," he wrote, "than my response to President Johnson's insistence that the Agency supply him proof that foreign agents and funds were at the root of the racial and political unrest that took fire in the summer of 1967." The agency's response was given the apt cryptonym CHAOS. "CHAOS," he admits, "was my responsibility." In the process of giving Johnson the answer he was not expecting -- there was "no trace" of foreign involvement -- the agency for the first time began secretly treading on domestic soil, "a violation of our charter," Helms confesses. If Helms is remembered for the controversy of CHAOS, he should also be remembered for the courage of standing up to President Nixon's attempt to tar the CIA with the brush of Watergate. Shortly after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and the arrest of those involved, Nixon had his White House lawyer, John Dean, put pressure on Helms's deputy, Vernon Walters. "Dean had one request," Helms writes. "The White House wanted money from CIA to make bail for the burglars." Helms refused, telling Walters, "There was no way that the [CIA] could furnish secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency." Five months later, Helms got the boot. If Helms thought that he was finally out of harm's way once he turned in his cloak and dagger, he couldn't have been more mistaken. Nominated to become ambassador to Iran, he was called before an open Senate committee for confirmation and was asked whether the CIA played a role in a coup in Chile that brought down the government of Salvador Allende. Rather than tell the truth and expose the CIA's involvement or ask to answer the question in closed session, Helms simply lied and said no. Years later the answer came back to haunt him. He was charged with failing to testify "fully and completely" before the committee and pleaded no contest. Following a sharp tongue-lashing by the judge, who told Helms he stood before the court "in disgrace and shame," he was sentenced to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The judge then suspended the jail time. Helms turned ashen. But upon leaving the courthouse he claimed that the conviction represented a "badge of honor" for having lied to protect an agency operation. Six years later, he received the National Security Medal, the highest award in the intelligence community, from President Ronald Reagan for "exceptional meritorious service." As the horse-drawn caisson waited to carry Richard Helms to his final resting place on that chilly fall morning, the man who must now keep the secrets paid tribute. "Wherever American intelligence officers strive to defend and extend freedom," said George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, "Richard Helms will be there." . James Bamford is the author, most recently, of "Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency." -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From contemporary press reports: 20 November 2002: Buried with military honors, former CIA Director Richard Helms was remembered on Wednesday as a man "who knew the value of a stolen secret" and became one of the great heroes of America's clandestine intelligence operations. "In Richard Helms, intelligence in service to liberty found an unsurpassed champion," said George Tenet, the CIA's current director. Helms, who died at 89 on October 23, 2002, began his intelligence career during World War II and rose through the ranks during the Cold War. He served as CIA director for six years before President Nixon fired him for refusing to block an FBI probe into the 1972 Watergate break in. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery before a large group of mourners that included members of the intelligence and defense establishments of several presidential administrations. At a memorial service at Fort Myer, Virginia, following Helms' burial, Tenet called Helms "one of our greatest heroes." "He came to know, as few others ever would, the value of a stolen secret, and the advantage that comes to our democracy from the fullest possible knowledge of those abroad determined to destroy it," Tenet said. Beginning in the 1930s as an enterprising reporter for United Press, for whom he interviewed Adolf Hitler, Helms found his way to wartime service with the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. intelligence agency that was the forerunner of the CIA. At the OSS, Tenet said, "Richard Helms found the calling of his lifetime." "In its Secret Intelligence Branch, he mastered the delicate, demanding craft of agent operations," Tenet said. "He excelled at both the meticulous planning and the bold vision and action that were - and remain today __ the heart of our work to obtain information critical to the safety and security of the United States __ information that can be gained only through stealth and courage." Tenet called Helms' later CIA career "the stuff of legend," praising his "sound operational judgment, his complete command of facts (and) his reputation as the best drafter of cables anywhere ..." "In an organization where risk and pressure are as common as a cup of coffee, he was unflappable," Tenet said. Tenet said Helms' legacy is the American intelligence agents he taught and who carry on in his place. Helms himself addressed the profession of an intelligence officer in a 1996 speech quoted in the program for his memorial service. "Military conflicts and terrorist attacks have not gone out of style," he said then. "An alert intelligence community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward. A military honor guard escorts the horse-drawn carriage carrying the remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. A U.S. Navy honor guard prepares to remove the cremated remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms from a ceremonial flag-draped casket on a caisson at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia November 20, 2002. Members of a naval honor guard carry a flag and a box containing the ashes of former CIA Director Richard Helms during ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery CIA Director George Tenet, right, awaits the flag that draped the casket of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Helms, the spymaster who led the CIA through some of its most difficult years and was later fired by President Nixon when he refused to block an FBI probe into the Watergate scandal, died last month. Afterward, Tenet presented the flag to Helms' widow. Family members of former CIA Director Richard Helms hold the flag that draped his casket during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery , Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Cynthia Helms, widow of former CIA Director Richard Helms, pauses over a container with the remains of Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Former CIA Director Helms Dead at 89 Wed Oct 23, 2002 7:17 PM ET Former CIA Director Richard Helms, who led the spy agency during the height of the Vietnam War and resisted attempts by President Richard Nixon to involve the CIA in Watergate, has died. He was 89. Helms was in declining health and died at his home on Tuesday (22 October 2002). The cause of death was not immediately available. "The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend," CIA Director George Tenet said in a statement on Wednesday. He ordered flags at the agency's headquarters in Virginia flown at half-staff. "As director of central intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk," Tenet said. Helms led the spy agency from June 1966 to February 1973 during one of the most contentious periods of American history with both the Vietnam War and Watergate. He was the first career CIA officer to reach the agency's top position. Helms was first appointed by President Lyndon Johnson and in 1969 was reappointed by Nixon. After the controversial break-in at Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 1972, Helms resisted attempts by Nixon to involve the CIA in the ensuing cover-up, which ultimately brought down his presidency. The CIA chief was not reappointed to his post. Helms' name also emerged in the guessing game of who was "Deep Throat," the confidential source that helped Washington Post reporters break open the Watergate scandal. After leaving the CIA, Helms went on to become U.S. ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977. In 1977, he was charged with perjury for denying the CIA had tried to overthrow the government in Chile in testimony to Congress. Helms was given a suspended jail sentence. 'PAINFUL PERIOD' "I think he remembered that as a painful period in his life. Dick always believed that he was seeking a higher good there in protecting the sources who had worked with the agency at risk to themselves and our own people in the field," said John Gannon, former National Intelligence Council chairman and friend of Helms. "History will judge his performance there." A CIA report released two years ago said in September 1970 Nixon told Helms that a Salvador Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million for the CIA to prevent him from reaching power. Allende was elected, so then the CIA was directed to instigate a coup but those efforts also failed. Three years later in September 1973, a bloody coup put Gen. Augusto Pinochet in power and Allende killed himself. The CIA has maintained it did not instigate that coup. Helms worked for years in the CIA's clandestine service which conducts covert operations and became deputy director for plans in 1962. During that time, the CIA tried unsuccessfully to remove President Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. Helms, a private consultant since 1977, remained a helping hand of experience to the CIA, Gannon said. "He was almost a folk hero at CIA because he actively worked to stay engaged and to be useful and helpful to people in the agency," he said. Helms had a quiet, reserved manner that could intimidate subordinates and was known as a dapper dresser. "Dick was a man you had to work to get to know. He had a certain reserve about him and he had a patrician air," Gannon said. "But if you cut through that and got to know Dick he was an extremely warm man with a really great capacity for friendship," he said. Helms started out as a journalist for the predecessor to United Press International in Europe, covered the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin and interviewed German leader Adolf Hitler. He joined the Navy in 1942 and was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA. He worked in Washington, London, Paris and Luxembourg, running espionage operations against Germany. Helms will be buried at Arlington National Cemetery on November 20, 2002. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Richard M. Helms, 89, the quintessential intelligence and espionage officer who joined the Central Intelligence Agency at its founding in 1947 and rose through the ranks to lead it for more than six years, died Tuesday night (23 October 2002) at his home, the CIA announced today. No immediate cause of death was reported. Mr. Helms was the first career intelligence professional to serve as the nation's top spymaster, and he was among the last of the remaining survivors of the CIA's organizing cadre, operatives who earned their espionage stripes as young men during World War II. His years at the agency covered a period in which CIA service was widely honored as a noble and romantic calling in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But much of this mystique had dissolved in the national malaise that accompanied the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. At his retirement in 1973, Mr. Helms left an organization viewed with suspicion by many and about to undergo intense scrutiny from an unfriendly Congress for activities ranging from assassination plots against foreign leaders to spying on U.S. citizens. As a veteran of the craft of espionage, he had always followed a code that stressed maximum trust and loyalty to his agency and colleagues; maximum silence where outsiders were concerned. "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," was the title chosen by author Thomas Powers for his biography of Mr. Helms. In the judgment of Richard Helms, the CIA worked only for the president. He did not welcome congressional inquiry or oversight. In 1977 he pleaded no contest in a federal court to charges of failing to testify fully before Congress about the CIA role in the covert supply of money to Chilean anti Marxists in 1970 in an effort to influence a presidential election. "I found myself in a position of conflict," Mr. Helms said. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets." He received a suspended two-year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine, which was paid in full by retired CIA agents. Six years later at a White House ceremony, Mr. Helms received the National Security Medal from President Reagan for "exceptionally meritorious service." He said he considered this award "an exoneration." His career at the CIA covered periods of searching for communists in the U.S. government and the Red Scare tactics of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.); the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and plots against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. It included the rending of the American social fabric and the antiwar protests of the Vietnam era, and it ended during the the Watergate crisis that ultimately ended the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. On leaving the CIA, Mr. Helms served three years as ambassador to Iran, then in 1976 ended his government service. As one of its ranking officers for most of the CIA's first 25 years, Mr. Helms helped form and shape the agency, and he recruited, trained, assigned and supervised many of its top agents. During the 1950s and early 1960s he held high positions in the division responsible for clandestine operations. " . . . He was a kind of middle man between the field and Washington policymakers, approving and even choosing the wording of cables to the field describing 'requirements'; and passing on concrete proposals for operations from the local CIA stations," Powers wrote in his biography of Mr. Helms. By 1958 he was second in command of covert operations when he was passed over for the directorship of that activity in favor of Richard M. Bissell Jr., who in 1961 would plan and direct the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. In this operation, a force of 1,200 CIA trained and equipped Cuban exiles attempted to retake the island from Castro, but the effort failed and most of the invaders were killed or captured. Mr. Helms, who by nature had been cool and skeptical toward covert operations on such a large scale, had kept his distance from the Bay of Pigs. But the fiasco proved to be Bissell's undoing and he retired amid the political fallout that followed. Mr. Helms replaced him in 1962, winning at last the position that had eluded him four years earlier. He became the CIA's deputy director for plans, the innocuous sounding title of covert action chief. With his new assignment he inherited a pressure campaign from the White House to get rid of Castro by other means. During the next several months the agency would contemplate schemes for Castro's overthrow or assassination, but none ever materialized. In 1965 Mr. Helms was named to the number two job at the agency, deputy director of Central Intelligence. Retiring CIA chief John A. McCone had campaigned to have Mr. Helms succeed him, but President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose Navy Vice Adm. William F. Raborn, who lasted only 14 months in the job. In 1966 the president named Mr. Helms CIA director. He would serve longer as Director of Central Intelligence than anyone except Allen Dulles, the legendary spymaster who led the CIA from 1953 to 1961. As America's top spymaster, Powers wrote in his biography, Mr. Helms "is remembered as an administrator, impatient with delay, excuses, self-seeking, the sour air of office politics. Asked for an example of Helms' characteristic utterance, three of his old friends came up with the same dry phrase, 'Let's get on with it.' . . . Helm's style was cool by choice and temperment; his instinct was to soften differences, to find a middle ground, to tone down operations that were getting out of hand, to give faltering projects one more chance rather than shut them down altogether, to settle for compromise in the interests of bureaucratic peace." He tended to work regular hours, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., and his desk was always cleared when he left the office at night. Mr. Helms kept a low public profile as CIA director, and he avoided publicity. But he lunched occasionally with influential figures in the media, and he was assiduous in cultivating the congressional support he needed to manage his agency. He made only one public speech during his years as CIA leader, telling the nation's newspaper editors that "the nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men, devoted to her service." Richard McGarrah Helms was born in St. Davids, Pa., to a family of financial means. His father was an Alcoa executive and his maternal grandfather a leading international banker. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and attended high school in Switzerland for two years. While there he became proficient in French and German. In 1935 he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams College, where in his senior year he was president of his class, editor of the campus newspaper and the yearbook and president of the honor society. His life's ambition on leaving college was to own and operate a daily newspaper. In pursuit of that goal he paid his own fare to London where he became a European reporter for United Press. His assignments included coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The following year he was one of a group of foreign correspondents to interview Adolf Hitler. Shortly thereafter he returned to the United States and took a job with the Indianapolis Times newspaper, where by 1939 he had become national advertising director. With the entry of the United States into World War II he joined the Navy, and in 1943 was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. wartime espionage agency that antedated the CIA. There he had desk jobs in New York and Washington and later in London. At the end of the war he was posted in Berlin, where he worked for Allen Dulles. Discharged from military service in 1946, he continued doing intelligence work as a civilian. When the U.S. wartime intelligence forces merged into the CIA in 1947, Mr. Helms became one of the architects of the new organization. During the 1950s, Dulles gave him special assignments from time to time. At the height of Sen. McCarthy's fervid hunts for communists inside the government, Mr. Helms headed a CIA committee to protect the agency against McCarthy's efforts to infiltrate the CIA with his own informers. The committee's job was to monitor reports of covert approaches to CIA officers by McCarthy agents and to plug any leaks. During the years there would be more assignments with domestic political implications. Early in Mr. Helms' directorship, as the war in Vietnam and the antiwar protests were both escalating, Johnson asked the CIA to determine whether antiwar activity in the United States was being financially or otherwise backed by foreign countries. In response to this request, the agency in 1967 launched a domestic surveillance program known as "Operation Chaos," which became the focus of intense controversy when it was disclosed publicly by The New York Times in 1975. With the election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968, White House involvement with the CIA only intensified. Even before the 1972 Watergate break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, the White House had demanded and received CIA files on agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These included Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. But the relationship between Mr. Helms and Nixon was never smooth, and in November of 1972, shortly after he had been elected to his second term, the president summoned his CIA chief to a meeting at Camp David and asked him to resign. Nixon's reasons were never made public, but Power said in his biography that Mr. Helms was convinced "that Nixon fired him for one reason only - because he had refused wholeheartedly to join the Watergate cover-up." At the Camp David meeting, the president had asked Mr. Helms if he'd like to be an ambassador, and the two men had agreed on Iran. But during his three years in Iran, Mr. Helms would make more than a dozen trips back to Washington to testify before Senate committees investigating CIA activities during his directorship. Links between unsavory Nixon White House activities and the CIA, including the agency's lending of disguises to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt and the CIA backgrounds of many of the Watergate burglars prompted an internal examination ordered by Mr. Helm's successor at the agency, James R. Schlesinger. This resulted in a 693-page compendium of agency misdeeds, including assassination attempts, burglaries, electronic eavesdropping and LSD testing of persons without their knowledge. William R. Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger as director of Central Intelligence, quietly briefed House and Senate overseers on the contents of the report, which became known in the agency as "the family jewels." The substance of the briefing did not surface publicly for two years, but it eventually did become known through a combination of press accounts, a presidential commission and congressional committees bent on public disclosure. Ultimately, the result was creation of permanent House and Senate oversight committees to monitor the CIA and all other U.S. intelligence agencies. In 1976 Mr. Helms returned from Tehran, retired from government service and became an international consultant. In 1939 Mr. Helms married Julia Bretzman Shields of Indianapolis. They separated in 1967 and divorced in 1968. They had one son, Dennis. In 1968 he married Cynthia McKelvie. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- October 24, 2002 Richard Helms, Ex-C.I.A. Chief, Dies at 89 Mr. Helms (left) in 1966 and (right) in 1973 with President Richard Nixon Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence who defiantly guarded some of the darkest secrets of the cold war, died of multiple myeloma today. He was 89. An urbane and dashing spymaster, Mr. Helms began his career with a reputation as a truth teller and became a favorite of lawmakers in the late 1960's and early 70's. But he eventually ran afoul of Congressional investigators who found that he had lied or withheld information about the United States role in assassination attempts in Cuba, anti-government activities in Chile and the illegal surveillance of journalists in the United States. Mr. Helms pleaded no contest in 1977 to two misdemeanor counts of failing to testify fully four years earlier to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His conviction, which resulted in a suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine, became a rallying point for critics of the Central Intelligence, Agency who accused it of dirty tricks, as well as for the agency's defenders, who hailed Mr. Helms for refusing to compromise sensitive information. In the title of his 1979 biography of Mr. Helms, Thomas Powers called him "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" (Pocket Books). Mr. Helms's memoir, "A Look Over My Shoulder: a Life in the C.I.A.," is to be released in the spring by Random House. After he left the C.I.A. in 1973, Mr. Helms served until 1977 as the American ambassador to Iran, whose ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was supported by the United States. He later became an international consultant, specializing in trade with the Middle East. Born on March 30, 1913, in St. Davids, Pa., Richard McGarrah Helms - he avoided using the middle name - was the son of an Alcoa executive and grandson of a leading international banker, Gates McGarrah. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and studied for two years during high school in Switzerland, where he became fluent in French and German. At Williams College, Mr. Helms excelled as a student and a leader. He was class president, editor of the school newspaper and the yearbook, and was president of the senior honor society. He fancied a career in journalism, and went to Europe as a reporter for United Press. His biggest scoop, he said, was an exclusive interview with Hitler. In 1939 he married Julia Bretzman Shields, and they had a son, Dennis, a lawyer in Princeton, N.J. The couple were divorced in 1968, and Mr. Helms married Cynthia McKelvie later that year. She and his son survive him. When World War II broke out, Mr. Helms was called into service by the Naval Reserve and because of his linguistic abilities was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the C.I.A. He worked in New York plotting the positions of German submarines in the western Atlantic. From the beginning, he worked in the C.I.A.'s covert operations, or "plans" division, and by the early 1950's he was serving as deputy to the head of clandestine services, Frank Wisner. In that capacity, in 1955, Mr. Helms impressed his superiors by supervising the secret digging of a 500-yard tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin to tap the main Soviet telephone lines between Moscow and East Berlin. For more than 11 months, until the tunnel was detected by the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. was able to eavesdrop on Moscow's conversations with its agents in the puppet governments of East Germany and Poland. Over the next 20 years, Mr. Helms rose through the agency's ranks, and in 1966 he came the first career official to head the C.I.A. He served under such men as Allen W. Dulles, Richard M. Bissell, John A. McCone and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn. During most of his tenure as C.I.A. chief, Mr. Helms received favorable attention from lawmakers and the press, who remarked on his professionalism, candor, and even his dark good looks. That reputation grew after 1973, when Mr. Helms clashed with President Richard M. Nixon, who sought his help in thwarting an F.B.I. investigation into the Watergate break-in. When Mr. Helms refused, Mr. Powers wrote, Mr. Nixon forced him out and sent him to Iran as ambassador. But Mr. Helms soon found himself called to account for his own actions when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence delved into the agency's efforts to assassinate world leaders or destabilize socialist governments. The committee, which was led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, accused Mr. Helms of failing to inform his own superiors of efforts to kill the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, which the Senate panel called "a grave error in judgment." A separate inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission also faulted Mr. Helms for poor judgment for destroying documents and tape recordings that might have assisted Watergate investigators. But the most contentious criticism of Mr. Helms centered on Chile. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms insisted that the C.I.A. had never tried to overthrow the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens or funneled money to political enemies of Mr. Allende, a Marxist. Senate investigators later discovered that the C.I.A. had run a major secret operation in Chile that gave more than $8 million to the opponents of Mr. Allende, using the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation as a conduit. Mr. Allende was killed in a 1973 military coup, which was followed by more than 16 years of military dictatorship. In 1977, Mr. Helms stepped down as ambassador to Iran and returned to Washington to plead no contest to charges that in 1973 he had lied to a Congressional committee about the intelligence agency's role in bringing down the Allende government. "I had found myself in a position of conflict," he told a federal judge at the formal proceeding after entering a plea agreement with the Justice Department. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets. I didn't want to lie. I didn't want to mislead the Senate. I was simply trying to find my way through a difficult situation in which I found myself." The judge responded, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and shame," and sentenced him to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The prison term was suspended. Mr. Helms said outside the courtroom that he wore his conviction "like a badge of honor," and added: "I don't feel disgraced at all. I think if I had done anything else I would have been disgraced." Later that day he went to a reunion of former C.I.A. colleagues, who gave him a standing, cheering ovation, then passed the hat and raised the $2,000 for his fine. For a man who considered himself a genuine patriot, it was a bleak note on which to end his professional career. Mr. Helms believed he had performed well in a job that, although many Americans considered it sinister and undemocratic, was nevertheless a cold-blooded necessity in an era of cold war. Mr. Helms, who was allowed to receive his government pension, put his intelligence experience to use after his retirement. He became a consultant to businesses that made investments in other countries. He was known as a charming conversationalist, a gregarious partygoer and an accomplished dancer, and he and his wife continued to be familiar figures on the capital party scene. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 23 October 2002 STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET ON THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS With the deepest sadness, I have learned of the death of Ambassador Richard Helms. My thoughts and prayers are with his family at this time of grief. The United States has lost a great patriot. The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend. His service to country spanned more than half a century. But his career and contributions are not simply measured in history, they changed it. As a young Naval officer in the Second World War, Richard Helms found his place in American espionage. From that moment on, in posts of increasing responsibility, in times of conflict and in peace, he shaped the intelligence effort that has helped keep our country strong and free. As Director of Central Intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk. Clear in thought, elegant in style, he represents to me the best of his generation and profession. To the very end of his life, Ambassador Helms shared his time and wisdom with those who followed him in the calling of intelligence in defense of liberty. His enthusiasm for this vital work, and his concern for those who conduct it, never faltered. I will miss his priceless counsel and his warm friendship. But the name and example of Richard Helms will be treasured forever by all who work for the safety and security of the United States. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- HONORABLE RICHARD M. HELMS (Age 89) On Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Dear husband and friend of Cynthia R. Helms at his residence in Washington, DC. Father of Dennis and grandfather of Julia and Alexander; brother of Betty Helms Hawn, Pearsael Helms and Gates Helm; stepfather of Didi Anderson, Jill McKelvie Neilsen, Roderick McKelvie, Allan McKelvie and Linsday McKelvie Eakin and step-grandfather of 15. Service and burial at Arlington Cemetery mid-November, date and time to be announced. In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to CIA Memorial Foundation, created to provide benefits to the families of agents of the CIA killed in the line of duty, c/o Jeffrey H. Smith, Esq., Arnold & Porter, 555 12th Street, NW, Washington, DC or Community Hospices, Hospice of Washington, 4200 Wisconsin Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20016. Richard McGarrah Helms Lieutenant, United States Navy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Courtesy of the New York Times May 4, 2003 'A Look Over My Shoulder': Secrets of the Spymaster By JOSEPH E. PERSICO A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. By Richard Helms with William Hood. Illustrated. 478 pp. New York: Random House. $35. Has Richard Helms, the famously closemouthed director of central intelligence -- called ''the man who kept the secrets'' in the apt title of Thomas Powers's biography -- finally decided to spill all? Almost, but selectively, judiciously and, it turns out, posthumously (he died last year). One of Helms's best-kept secrets is that he was writing this autobiography, with his C.I.A. colleague William Hood, after fending off writers who had tried unsuccessfully for years to pry loose his story. Helms finally broke his silence, he tells us in ''A Look Over My Shoulder,'' because the end of the cold war freed him from his self-imposed omerta. In his six and a half years leading the C.I.A., he became the very model of a modern major spymaster -- urbane, impeccably attired, affable yet impenetrable, a man who could charm and chill in the same one-minute cycle. His early life reads like a pre-spook course: born on Philadelphia's Main Line, educated at the same Swiss prep school attended by the future shah of Iran, early fluency in French and German, a magna cum laude scholar at Williams College, a first job as a reporter in prewar Europe, during which time, at the age of 23, he had an interview with Hitler. Helms was briefly diverted from his true path by a desire to make money, and thus became an unlikely advertising salesman for The Indianapolis Times. World War II got him back on track. Helms went into the Navy and then into the Office of Strategic Services, parent of today's Central Intelligence Agency. When the war ended, ''I was hooked on intelligence,'' Helms confesses. He was present at the creation and never left, pursuing a 30-year career that culminated in his rise to director of central intelligence from 1966 to 1973. The reader is irresistibly drawn first to the two most incendiary events in that career, Watergate and Chile, the high and low, as it were. President Nixon's attempt to insulate his administration from Watergate by enmeshing the C.I.A. was brazen even by Nixonian standards. First, Nixon's strong-arm man, H. R. Haldeman, threatened that any C.I.A. investigation of Watergate would expose sensitive agency operations, particularly the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba of 11 years before. Helms responded, ''The Bay of Pigs hasn't got a damned thing to do with this.'' More brazen still, Nixon had his counsel, John Dean, order the C.I.A. to come up with bail money to spring the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms writes, ''I had no intention of supplying any such money, or of asking Congress for permission to dip into funds earmarked for secret intelligence purposes to provide bail for a band of political bunglers.'' Nixon backed down. Three cheers for Helms this time. However, on the Chilean affair, Helms emerges as rather less sterling. He states at first that C.I.A. secret operations in Chile were designed solely ''to preserve the democratic constitutional system.'' Yet in 1970, when the leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, was democratically elected president, Nixon ordered Helms to do whatever it took, with a free hand to spend $10 million, to see that Allende never took office. Nixon warned Helms to reveal nothing of this plotting even to the secretary of state, secretary of defense or United States ambassador to Chile. This time Helms knuckled under to presidential pressure, which was eventually to produce the great trauma of his career. In February 1973, seven months before Allende was overthrown by a right-wing coup in which he died, Helms testified under oath before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the C.I.A. had never aided Allende's opponents. Soon after, he testified before a Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Frank Church that the C.I.A. had had no dealings with the Chilean military. These untruths would lead, in 1977, to Helms's plea of no contest on two misdemeanor counts, resulting in a fine of $2,000 and a two-year suspended prison sentence. Helms's willingness to take the heat reflects a core difference between the ordinary American's conception of citizenship and the culture inculcated by the C.I.A. Helms had long ago sworn to keep the agency's secrets. He had also sworn before the Senate committees to tell the truth. To Helms, exposing sources and methods to headline-hunting senators ranked well below his vow to keep secrets upon which, in his judgment, the security of the nation hung. Helms claimed to wear his conviction for misleading Congress like a badge of honor. The intelligence fraternity concurred, giving him a standing ovation at a lunch after the trial and passing the hat to cover his fine. Tales of derring-do enliven Helms's readable story throughout, but its real significance is likely to surprise spy-thriller aficionados and conspiracy theorists: the C.I.A. is, first and foremost, simply a government agency. No differently than the Department of Agriculture, it executes White House policy. Helms's professional life is essentially the story of undercover operations ordered by presidents. Standout examples: Eisenhower's decisions to topple Prime Ministers Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba (continued by Kennedy), and Nixon's clandestine war against Allende. In the 1960's, at the peak of racial upheaval and demonstrations against the Vietnam War, President Johnson ordered Helms ''to track down the foreign Communists who are behind this intolerable interference in our domestic affairs.'' This demand led Helms to start up a covert snooping operation that he admits involved ''a violation of our charter'' not to spy on Americans at home. On the big stuff, Helms makes a convincing case that rather than being a ''rogue elephant,'' an ''invisible government'' as often charged, the C.I.A. is a president's political weapon of last resort, the keeper of the bag of dirty tricks. If agency acts appear roguish, Helms says, it is when government policy is roguish. He describes the dilemma when a president orders his intelligence chief to step out of bounds: ''What is the D.C.I. to do? . . . Has he the authority to refuse to accept a questionable order on a foreign policy question of obvious national importance?'' At this point, the spy chief's choices are to sign on or resign. Helms offers telling instances of the uselessness of even the keenest intelligence if its message is unwelcome at the top. In analyzing the domino theory, which held that if Vietnam fell, the whole non-Communist world would teeter, Helms sent Johnson a secret assessment that concluded, ''The net effects would probably not be permanently damaging to this country's ability to play its role as a world power.'' Johnson ignored the report's existence and pressed on with the war. During the cold war debate over the Soviet Union's capacity to deliver a first-strike knockout punch to the United States, the C.I.A. found that the Kremlin had neither the intention nor the weaponry to do so. The Nixon administration told Helms, in effect, to get on the team or shut up. Dick Helms remained throughout his career a thoroughgoing company man, albeit with spine-tingling job descriptions. His loyalty to old C.I.A. hands could be uncritical. The most egregious example involved his counterintelligence chief, James Jesus Angleton. The paranoid Angleton practically paralyzed the C.I.A.'s Soviet division by a long, fruitless hunt for a mole inside the agency. Over a hundred loyal officers fell under investigation; some were forced to resign. In implementing the dismissals, Helms says, ''I had no choice but to accept a decision that in effect said each was innocent, but that the innocence could not be proved.'' In this post-9/11 age of anxiety one looks for lessons in the life of a man who spent his career in the intelligence end of national security. The lesson here is how totally changed the present amorphous threats are from the comparatively clear-cut cold war battles Helms fought for a generation. By the time he died at the age of 89, with those battles long behind him, Helms's blemishes had been washed away. In 1983 President Reagan awarded him the National Security Medal. Upon his death he was buried with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery. Whether one likes or loathes the furtive world in which Helms lived, whether one sees him as a patriot or compliant careerist, this surprise autobiography provides an unsurpassed insider look into how American intelligence actually operates. It's a view offering more than enough ammunition for admirers and antagonists alike. Joseph E. Persico's latest book is ''Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage.'' -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reviewed by James Bamford Sunday, April 27, 2003 A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency By Richard Helms with William Hood Random House. 478 pp. $35 Richard Helms was back among friends. On a crisp and tranquil late November morning, tinged with the musty scent of dried leaves and old bark, the man who was arguably America's most famous spy since Nathan Hale descended into eternal darkness. Buried with him, beneath a gently sloping hill at Arlington National Cemetery, was a lifetime of mystery, secrets and controversy. Nearby, sharing the same hallowed ground, were the graves of his old friend Frank Wisner, a specialist in covert action, and General Walter Bedell Smith, a mentor and fellow former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But before he made his final exit last year at the age of 89, Helms left behind a packet of long-held secrets, like a spy loading a dead drop and then disappearing into the cold. They are contained not in a moldy tree trunk but in his posthumous autobiography, A Look Over My Shoulder. Over the years, I occasionally shared a meal with the legendary spymaster at one of his favorite haunts, Washington's Sulgrave Club, where his wife, Cynthia, was a member. Tall and lanky, with thin lips pursed together as if sealed with a zipper, he once told me that he had always vowed never to write about his life in the shadows. He even refused to read books he perceived as biased against him or the agency, such as Thomas Powers's well-received The Man Who Kept the Secrets, published in 1979. Then, while on vacation once during the mid-1990s, he brought along Powers's book and finally began turning the pages. Pleasantly surprised by the author's accuracy and fairness, he gradually made the decision to at last unseal a bit of his cipher-locked past. It is too bad he did not make the decision much earlier, when many of the words, the events, the emotions, the colors and the details would still have been fresh in his mind. Writing at such a long remove in time is a little like looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Compounding his difficulty was the lack of access to still-classified documents and a rigid agency review process. The result is a book with too much flat history and too few new insights and revelations. Nevertheless, the opportunity to at last see much of the 20th century through Helms's probing eyes is well worth the price. While offering few new details in recounting some of the major events of his long tenure at the CIA -- he saw no indications of conspiracy during the Kennedy assassination, for example -- Helms sometimes does come up with surprises. One involves the deadly Israeli attack on the American electronic surveillance ship USS Liberty during the Six Day War in 1967. Thirty-four American sailors were killed, and 171 were wounded in the incident. Although at the time Israel claimed it was a mistake, and an "interim" CIA intelligence memorandum agreed, that view later changed. "I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed," Helms writes, "or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the Liberty. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack." This is consistent with the views of some members of the administration at the time, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the director and deputy directors of the National Security Agency, which was in charge of the ship. Overshadowing all else during Helms's years as director were the Vietnam War and the domestic protests it spawned. Among the operations Helms was most proud of was the CIA's very secret paramilitary role in Laos, attempting to resist a government takeover by communist forces. Until America pulled out of Vietnam, the operation succeeded in fighting back the guerrillas and largely maintaining the status quo. "We had fulfilled our mission and we remain proud of it," he writes. "We had won the war!" Vietnam, however, was a different story. But it was the war at home that long haunted Helms. "Nothing in my thirty-year service brought me more criticism," he wrote, "than my response to President Johnson's insistence that the Agency supply him proof that foreign agents and funds were at the root of the racial and political unrest that took fire in the summer of 1967." The agency's response was given the apt cryptonym CHAOS. "CHAOS," he admits, "was my responsibility." In the process of giving Johnson the answer he was not expecting -- there was "no trace" of foreign involvement -- the agency for the first time began secretly treading on domestic soil, "a violation of our charter," Helms confesses. If Helms is remembered for the controversy of CHAOS, he should also be remembered for the courage of standing up to President Nixon's attempt to tar the CIA with the brush of Watergate. Shortly after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and the arrest of those involved, Nixon had his White House lawyer, John Dean, put pressure on Helms's deputy, Vernon Walters. "Dean had one request," Helms writes. "The White House wanted money from CIA to make bail for the burglars." Helms refused, telling Walters, "There was no way that the [CIA] could furnish secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency." Five months later, Helms got the boot. If Helms thought that he was finally out of harm's way once he turned in his cloak and dagger, he couldn't have been more mistaken. Nominated to become ambassador to Iran, he was called before an open Senate committee for confirmation and was asked whether the CIA played a role in a coup in Chile that brought down the government of Salvador Allende. Rather than tell the truth and expose the CIA's involvement or ask to answer the question in closed session, Helms simply lied and said no. Years later the answer came back to haunt him. He was charged with failing to testify "fully and completely" before the committee and pleaded no contest. Following a sharp tongue-lashing by the judge, who told Helms he stood before the court "in disgrace and shame," he was sentenced to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The judge then suspended the jail time. Helms turned ashen. But upon leaving the courthouse he claimed that the conviction represented a "badge of honor" for having lied to protect an agency operation. Six years later, he received the National Security Medal, the highest award in the intelligence community, from President Ronald Reagan for "exceptional meritorious service." As the horse-drawn caisson waited to carry Richard Helms to his final resting place on that chilly fall morning, the man who must now keep the secrets paid tribute. "Wherever American intelligence officers strive to defend and extend freedom," said George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, "Richard Helms will be there." . James Bamford is the author, most recently, of "Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency." -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From contemporary press reports: 20 November 2002: Buried with military honors, former CIA Director Richard Helms was remembered on Wednesday as a man "who knew the value of a stolen secret" and became one of the great heroes of America's clandestine intelligence operations. "In Richard Helms, intelligence in service to liberty found an unsurpassed champion," said George Tenet, the CIA's current director. Helms, who died at 89 on October 23, 2002, began his intelligence career during World War II and rose through the ranks during the Cold War. He served as CIA director for six years before President Nixon fired him for refusing to block an FBI probe into the 1972 Watergate break in. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery before a large group of mourners that included members of the intelligence and defense establishments of several presidential administrations. At a memorial service at Fort Myer, Virginia, following Helms' burial, Tenet called Helms "one of our greatest heroes." "He came to know, as few others ever would, the value of a stolen secret, and the advantage that comes to our democracy from the fullest possible knowledge of those abroad determined to destroy it," Tenet said. Beginning in the 1930s as an enterprising reporter for United Press, for whom he interviewed Adolf Hitler, Helms found his way to wartime service with the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. intelligence agency that was the forerunner of the CIA. At the OSS, Tenet said, "Richard Helms found the calling of his lifetime." "In its Secret Intelligence Branch, he mastered the delicate, demanding craft of agent operations," Tenet said. "He excelled at both the meticulous planning and the bold vision and action that were - and remain today __ the heart of our work to obtain information critical to the safety and security of the United States __ information that can be gained only through stealth and courage." Tenet called Helms' later CIA career "the stuff of legend," praising his "sound operational judgment, his complete command of facts (and) his reputation as the best drafter of cables anywhere ..." "In an organization where risk and pressure are as common as a cup of coffee, he was unflappable," Tenet said. Tenet said Helms' legacy is the American intelligence agents he taught and who carry on in his place. Helms himself addressed the profession of an intelligence officer in a 1996 speech quoted in the program for his memorial service. "Military conflicts and terrorist attacks have not gone out of style," he said then. "An alert intelligence community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward. A military honor guard escorts the horse-drawn carriage carrying the remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. A U.S. Navy honor guard prepares to remove the cremated remains of former CIA Director Richard Helms from a ceremonial flag-draped casket on a caisson at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia November 20, 2002. Members of a naval honor guard carry a flag and a box containing the ashes of former CIA Director Richard Helms during ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery CIA Director George Tenet, right, awaits the flag that draped the casket of former CIA Director Richard Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Helms, the spymaster who led the CIA through some of its most difficult years and was later fired by President Nixon when he refused to block an FBI probe into the Watergate scandal, died last month. Afterward, Tenet presented the flag to Helms' widow. Family members of former CIA Director Richard Helms hold the flag that draped his casket during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery , Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2002. Cynthia Helms, widow of former CIA Director Richard Helms, pauses over a container with the remains of Helms during funeral services at Arlington National Cemetery -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Former CIA Director Helms Dead at 89 Wed Oct 23, 2002 7:17 PM ET Former CIA Director Richard Helms, who led the spy agency during the height of the Vietnam War and resisted attempts by President Richard Nixon to involve the CIA in Watergate, has died. He was 89. Helms was in declining health and died at his home on Tuesday (22 October 2002). The cause of death was not immediately available. "The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend," CIA Director George Tenet said in a statement on Wednesday. He ordered flags at the agency's headquarters in Virginia flown at half-staff. "As director of central intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk," Tenet said. Helms led the spy agency from June 1966 to February 1973 during one of the most contentious periods of American history with both the Vietnam War and Watergate. He was the first career CIA officer to reach the agency's top position. Helms was first appointed by President Lyndon Johnson and in 1969 was reappointed by Nixon. After the controversial break-in at Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 1972, Helms resisted attempts by Nixon to involve the CIA in the ensuing cover-up, which ultimately brought down his presidency. The CIA chief was not reappointed to his post. Helms' name also emerged in the guessing game of who was "Deep Throat," the confidential source that helped Washington Post reporters break open the Watergate scandal. After leaving the CIA, Helms went on to become U.S. ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977. In 1977, he was charged with perjury for denying the CIA had tried to overthrow the government in Chile in testimony to Congress. Helms was given a suspended jail sentence. 'PAINFUL PERIOD' "I think he remembered that as a painful period in his life. Dick always believed that he was seeking a higher good there in protecting the sources who had worked with the agency at risk to themselves and our own people in the field," said John Gannon, former National Intelligence Council chairman and friend of Helms. "History will judge his performance there." A CIA report released two years ago said in September 1970 Nixon told Helms that a Salvador Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million for the CIA to prevent him from reaching power. Allende was elected, so then the CIA was directed to instigate a coup but those efforts also failed. Three years later in September 1973, a bloody coup put Gen. Augusto Pinochet in power and Allende killed himself. The CIA has maintained it did not instigate that coup. Helms worked for years in the CIA's clandestine service which conducts covert operations and became deputy director for plans in 1962. During that time, the CIA tried unsuccessfully to remove President Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. Helms, a private consultant since 1977, remained a helping hand of experience to the CIA, Gannon said. "He was almost a folk hero at CIA because he actively worked to stay engaged and to be useful and helpful to people in the agency," he said. Helms had a quiet, reserved manner that could intimidate subordinates and was known as a dapper dresser. "Dick was a man you had to work to get to know. He had a certain reserve about him and he had a patrician air," Gannon said. "But if you cut through that and got to know Dick he was an extremely warm man with a really great capacity for friendship," he said. Helms started out as a journalist for the predecessor to United Press International in Europe, covered the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin and interviewed German leader Adolf Hitler. He joined the Navy in 1942 and was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA. He worked in Washington, London, Paris and Luxembourg, running espionage operations against Germany. Helms will be buried at Arlington National Cemetery on November 20, 2002. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Richard M. Helms, 89, the quintessential intelligence and espionage officer who joined the Central Intelligence Agency at its founding in 1947 and rose through the ranks to lead it for more than six years, died Tuesday night (23 October 2002) at his home, the CIA announced today. No immediate cause of death was reported. Mr. Helms was the first career intelligence professional to serve as the nation's top spymaster, and he was among the last of the remaining survivors of the CIA's organizing cadre, operatives who earned their espionage stripes as young men during World War II. His years at the agency covered a period in which CIA service was widely honored as a noble and romantic calling in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But much of this mystique had dissolved in the national malaise that accompanied the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. At his retirement in 1973, Mr. Helms left an organization viewed with suspicion by many and about to undergo intense scrutiny from an unfriendly Congress for activities ranging from assassination plots against foreign leaders to spying on U.S. citizens. As a veteran of the craft of espionage, he had always followed a code that stressed maximum trust and loyalty to his agency and colleagues; maximum silence where outsiders were concerned. "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," was the title chosen by author Thomas Powers for his biography of Mr. Helms. In the judgment of Richard Helms, the CIA worked only for the president. He did not welcome congressional inquiry or oversight. In 1977 he pleaded no contest in a federal court to charges of failing to testify fully before Congress about the CIA role in the covert supply of money to Chilean anti Marxists in 1970 in an effort to influence a presidential election. "I found myself in a position of conflict," Mr. Helms said. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets." He received a suspended two-year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine, which was paid in full by retired CIA agents. Six years later at a White House ceremony, Mr. Helms received the National Security Medal from President Reagan for "exceptionally meritorious service." He said he considered this award "an exoneration." His career at the CIA covered periods of searching for communists in the U.S. government and the Red Scare tactics of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.); the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and plots against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. It included the rending of the American social fabric and the antiwar protests of the Vietnam era, and it ended during the the Watergate crisis that ultimately ended the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. On leaving the CIA, Mr. Helms served three years as ambassador to Iran, then in 1976 ended his government service. As one of its ranking officers for most of the CIA's first 25 years, Mr. Helms helped form and shape the agency, and he recruited, trained, assigned and supervised many of its top agents. During the 1950s and early 1960s he held high positions in the division responsible for clandestine operations. " . . . He was a kind of middle man between the field and Washington policymakers, approving and even choosing the wording of cables to the field describing 'requirements'; and passing on concrete proposals for operations from the local CIA stations," Powers wrote in his biography of Mr. Helms. By 1958 he was second in command of covert operations when he was passed over for the directorship of that activity in favor of Richard M. Bissell Jr., who in 1961 would plan and direct the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. In this operation, a force of 1,200 CIA trained and equipped Cuban exiles attempted to retake the island from Castro, but the effort failed and most of the invaders were killed or captured. Mr. Helms, who by nature had been cool and skeptical toward covert operations on such a large scale, had kept his distance from the Bay of Pigs. But the fiasco proved to be Bissell's undoing and he retired amid the political fallout that followed. Mr. Helms replaced him in 1962, winning at last the position that had eluded him four years earlier. He became the CIA's deputy director for plans, the innocuous sounding title of covert action chief. With his new assignment he inherited a pressure campaign from the White House to get rid of Castro by other means. During the next several months the agency would contemplate schemes for Castro's overthrow or assassination, but none ever materialized. In 1965 Mr. Helms was named to the number two job at the agency, deputy director of Central Intelligence. Retiring CIA chief John A. McCone had campaigned to have Mr. Helms succeed him, but President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose Navy Vice Adm. William F. Raborn, who lasted only 14 months in the job. In 1966 the president named Mr. Helms CIA director. He would serve longer as Director of Central Intelligence than anyone except Allen Dulles, the legendary spymaster who led the CIA from 1953 to 1961. As America's top spymaster, Powers wrote in his biography, Mr. Helms "is remembered as an administrator, impatient with delay, excuses, self-seeking, the sour air of office politics. Asked for an example of Helms' characteristic utterance, three of his old friends came up with the same dry phrase, 'Let's get on with it.' . . . Helm's style was cool by choice and temperment; his instinct was to soften differences, to find a middle ground, to tone down operations that were getting out of hand, to give faltering projects one more chance rather than shut them down altogether, to settle for compromise in the interests of bureaucratic peace." He tended to work regular hours, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., and his desk was always cleared when he left the office at night. Mr. Helms kept a low public profile as CIA director, and he avoided publicity. But he lunched occasionally with influential figures in the media, and he was assiduous in cultivating the congressional support he needed to manage his agency. He made only one public speech during his years as CIA leader, telling the nation's newspaper editors that "the nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men, devoted to her service." Richard McGarrah Helms was born in St. Davids, Pa., to a family of financial means. His father was an Alcoa executive and his maternal grandfather a leading international banker. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and attended high school in Switzerland for two years. While there he became proficient in French and German. In 1935 he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams College, where in his senior year he was president of his class, editor of the campus newspaper and the yearbook and president of the honor society. His life's ambition on leaving college was to own and operate a daily newspaper. In pursuit of that goal he paid his own fare to London where he became a European reporter for United Press. His assignments included coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The following year he was one of a group of foreign correspondents to interview Adolf Hitler. Shortly thereafter he returned to the United States and took a job with the Indianapolis Times newspaper, where by 1939 he had become national advertising director. With the entry of the United States into World War II he joined the Navy, and in 1943 was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. wartime espionage agency that antedated the CIA. There he had desk jobs in New York and Washington and later in London. At the end of the war he was posted in Berlin, where he worked for Allen Dulles. Discharged from military service in 1946, he continued doing intelligence work as a civilian. When the U.S. wartime intelligence forces merged into the CIA in 1947, Mr. Helms became one of the architects of the new organization. During the 1950s, Dulles gave him special assignments from time to time. At the height of Sen. McCarthy's fervid hunts for communists inside the government, Mr. Helms headed a CIA committee to protect the agency against McCarthy's efforts to infiltrate the CIA with his own informers. The committee's job was to monitor reports of covert approaches to CIA officers by McCarthy agents and to plug any leaks. During the years there would be more assignments with domestic political implications. Early in Mr. Helms' directorship, as the war in Vietnam and the antiwar protests were both escalating, Johnson asked the CIA to determine whether antiwar activity in the United States was being financially or otherwise backed by foreign countries. In response to this request, the agency in 1967 launched a domestic surveillance program known as "Operation Chaos," which became the focus of intense controversy when it was disclosed publicly by The New York Times in 1975. With the election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968, White House involvement with the CIA only intensified. Even before the 1972 Watergate break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, the White House had demanded and received CIA files on agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These included Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. But the relationship between Mr. Helms and Nixon was never smooth, and in November of 1972, shortly after he had been elected to his second term, the president summoned his CIA chief to a meeting at Camp David and asked him to resign. Nixon's reasons were never made public, but Power said in his biography that Mr. Helms was convinced "that Nixon fired him for one reason only - because he had refused wholeheartedly to join the Watergate cover-up." At the Camp David meeting, the president had asked Mr. Helms if he'd like to be an ambassador, and the two men had agreed on Iran. But during his three years in Iran, Mr. Helms would make more than a dozen trips back to Washington to testify before Senate committees investigating CIA activities during his directorship. Links between unsavory Nixon White House activities and the CIA, including the agency's lending of disguises to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt and the CIA backgrounds of many of the Watergate burglars prompted an internal examination ordered by Mr. Helm's successor at the agency, James R. Schlesinger. This resulted in a 693-page compendium of agency misdeeds, including assassination attempts, burglaries, electronic eavesdropping and LSD testing of persons without their knowledge. William R. Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger as director of Central Intelligence, quietly briefed House and Senate overseers on the contents of the report, which became known in the agency as "the family jewels." The substance of the briefing did not surface publicly for two years, but it eventually did become known through a combination of press accounts, a presidential commission and congressional committees bent on public disclosure. Ultimately, the result was creation of permanent House and Senate oversight committees to monitor the CIA and all other U.S. intelligence agencies. In 1976 Mr. Helms returned from Tehran, retired from government service and became an international consultant. In 1939 Mr. Helms married Julia Bretzman Shields of Indianapolis. They separated in 1967 and divorced in 1968. They had one son, Dennis. In 1968 he married Cynthia McKelvie. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- October 24, 2002 Richard Helms, Ex-C.I.A. Chief, Dies at 89 Mr. Helms (left) in 1966 and (right) in 1973 with President Richard Nixon Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence who defiantly guarded some of the darkest secrets of the cold war, died of multiple myeloma today. He was 89. An urbane and dashing spymaster, Mr. Helms began his career with a reputation as a truth teller and became a favorite of lawmakers in the late 1960's and early 70's. But he eventually ran afoul of Congressional investigators who found that he had lied or withheld information about the United States role in assassination attempts in Cuba, anti-government activities in Chile and the illegal surveillance of journalists in the United States. Mr. Helms pleaded no contest in 1977 to two misdemeanor counts of failing to testify fully four years earlier to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His conviction, which resulted in a suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine, became a rallying point for critics of the Central Intelligence, Agency who accused it of dirty tricks, as well as for the agency's defenders, who hailed Mr. Helms for refusing to compromise sensitive information. In the title of his 1979 biography of Mr. Helms, Thomas Powers called him "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" (Pocket Books). Mr. Helms's memoir, "A Look Over My Shoulder: a Life in the C.I.A.," is to be released in the spring by Random House. After he left the C.I.A. in 1973, Mr. Helms served until 1977 as the American ambassador to Iran, whose ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was supported by the United States. He later became an international consultant, specializing in trade with the Middle East. Born on March 30, 1913, in St. Davids, Pa., Richard McGarrah Helms - he avoided using the middle name - was the son of an Alcoa executive and grandson of a leading international banker, Gates McGarrah. He grew up in South Orange, N.J., and studied for two years during high school in Switzerland, where he became fluent in French and German. At Williams College, Mr. Helms excelled as a student and a leader. He was class president, editor of the school newspaper and the yearbook, and was president of the senior honor society. He fancied a career in journalism, and went to Europe as a reporter for United Press. His biggest scoop, he said, was an exclusive interview with Hitler. In 1939 he married Julia Bretzman Shields, and they had a son, Dennis, a lawyer in Princeton, N.J. The couple were divorced in 1968, and Mr. Helms married Cynthia McKelvie later that year. She and his son survive him. When World War II broke out, Mr. Helms was called into service by the Naval Reserve and because of his linguistic abilities was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the C.I.A. He worked in New York plotting the positions of German submarines in the western Atlantic. From the beginning, he worked in the C.I.A.'s covert operations, or "plans" division, and by the early 1950's he was serving as deputy to the head of clandestine services, Frank Wisner. In that capacity, in 1955, Mr. Helms impressed his superiors by supervising the secret digging of a 500-yard tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin to tap the main Soviet telephone lines between Moscow and East Berlin. For more than 11 months, until the tunnel was detected by the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. was able to eavesdrop on Moscow's conversations with its agents in the puppet governments of East Germany and Poland. Over the next 20 years, Mr. Helms rose through the agency's ranks, and in 1966 he came the first career official to head the C.I.A. He served under such men as Allen W. Dulles, Richard M. Bissell, John A. McCone and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn. During most of his tenure as C.I.A. chief, Mr. Helms received favorable attention from lawmakers and the press, who remarked on his professionalism, candor, and even his dark good looks. That reputation grew after 1973, when Mr. Helms clashed with President Richard M. Nixon, who sought his help in thwarting an F.B.I. investigation into the Watergate break-in. When Mr. Helms refused, Mr. Powers wrote, Mr. Nixon forced him out and sent him to Iran as ambassador. But Mr. Helms soon found himself called to account for his own actions when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence delved into the agency's efforts to assassinate world leaders or destabilize socialist governments. The committee, which was led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, accused Mr. Helms of failing to inform his own superiors of efforts to kill the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, which the Senate panel called "a grave error in judgment." A separate inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission also faulted Mr. Helms for poor judgment for destroying documents and tape recordings that might have assisted Watergate investigators. But the most contentious criticism of Mr. Helms centered on Chile. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms insisted that the C.I.A. had never tried to overthrow the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens or funneled money to political enemies of Mr. Allende, a Marxist. Senate investigators later discovered that the C.I.A. had run a major secret operation in Chile that gave more than $8 million to the opponents of Mr. Allende, using the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation as a conduit. Mr. Allende was killed in a 1973 military coup, which was followed by more than 16 years of military dictatorship. In 1977, Mr. Helms stepped down as ambassador to Iran and returned to Washington to plead no contest to charges that in 1973 he had lied to a Congressional committee about the intelligence agency's role in bringing down the Allende government. "I had found myself in a position of conflict," he told a federal judge at the formal proceeding after entering a plea agreement with the Justice Department. "I had sworn my oath to protect certain secrets. I didn't want to lie. I didn't want to mislead the Senate. I was simply trying to find my way through a difficult situation in which I found myself." The judge responded, "You now stand before this court in disgrace and shame," and sentenced him to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The prison term was suspended. Mr. Helms said outside the courtroom that he wore his conviction "like a badge of honor," and added: "I don't feel disgraced at all. I think if I had done anything else I would have been disgraced." Later that day he went to a reunion of former C.I.A. colleagues, who gave him a standing, cheering ovation, then passed the hat and raised the $2,000 for his fine. For a man who considered himself a genuine patriot, it was a bleak note on which to end his professional career. Mr. Helms believed he had performed well in a job that, although many Americans considered it sinister and undemocratic, was nevertheless a cold-blooded necessity in an era of cold war. Mr. Helms, who was allowed to receive his government pension, put his intelligence experience to use after his retirement. He became a consultant to businesses that made investments in other countries. He was known as a charming conversationalist, a gregarious partygoer and an accomplished dancer, and he and his wife continued to be familiar figures on the capital party scene. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 23 October 2002 STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET ON THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS With the deepest sadness, I have learned of the death of Ambassador Richard Helms. My thoughts and prayers are with his family at this time of grief. The United States has lost a great patriot. The men and women of American intelligence have lost a great teacher and a true friend. His service to country spanned more than half a century. But his career and contributions are not simply measured in history, they changed it. As a young Naval officer in the Second World War, Richard Helms found his place in American espionage. From that moment on, in posts of increasing responsibility, in times of conflict and in peace, he shaped the intelligence effort that has helped keep our country strong and free. As Director of Central Intelligence for almost seven years, he steered a bold and daring course, one that rewarded both rigor and risk. Clear in thought, elegant in style, he represents to me the best of his generation and profession. To the very end of his life, Ambassador Helms shared his time and wisdom with those who followed him in the calling of intelligence in defense of liberty. His enthusiasm for this vital work, and his concern for those who conduct it, never faltered. I will miss his priceless counsel and his warm friendship. But the name and example of Richard Helms will be treasured forever by all who work for the safety and security of the United States. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- HONORABLE RICHARD M. HELMS (Age 89) On Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Dear husband and friend of Cynthia R. Helms at his residence in Washington, DC. Father of Dennis and grandfather of Julia and Alexander; brother of Betty Helms Hawn, Pearsael Helms and Gates Helm; stepfather of Didi Anderson, Jill McKelvie Neilsen, Roderick McKelvie, Allan McKelvie and Linsday McKelvie Eakin and step-grandfather of 15. Service and burial at Arlington Cemetery mid-November, date and time to be announced. In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to CIA Memorial Foundation, created to provide benefits to the families of agents of the CIA killed in the line of duty, c/o Jeffrey H. 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From: garyag@ix.netcom.com (Gary Aguilar) Newsgroups: alt.assassination.jfk Subject: Richard Helms DID lie to the US Senate Date: 24 Apr 2003 20:51:35 -0400 Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Lines: 215 Approved: jmcadams@shell.core.com Message-ID: Return-Path: X-Original-To: jmcadams@panix.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.84.1.2 X-Original-NNTP-Posting-Host: 166.84.1.2 X-Trace: 24 Apr 2003 19:57:13 -0500, 166.84.1.2 Path: news1.east.cox.net!cox.net!priapus.visi.com!news-out.visi.com!petbe.visi.com!upp1.onvoy!onvoy.com!newsengine.sol.net!mcadams.posc.mu.edu!panix2.panix.com!not-for-mail Xref: cox.net alt.assassination.jfk:241814 X-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2003 20:51:36 EDT (news1.east.cox.net) From time to time, some CIA hack trots out here to deny that Richard Helms had lied to the U.S. Senate about the role of the CIA in demolishing Chile's democracy to put in Pinochet's totalitarian, terroristic dictatorship. That question has again raised its head hereabouts, and so it's about time for a rerun on this one. A long time ago, I'd written Ed Dolan tht Helms had lied to the Senate, an act for which he pled no lo contendre, was convicted, and paid a fine and was given a stern lecture by the presiding judge and a suspended sentence. Dolan's was aggrieved, and that's where we pick it up: > What he told the Senate was true. You have no evidence otherwise. > Nothing at all, other than the fact it was widely reported that he was convicted for his Senate lie, that Time Magazine reported that Helms agreed he had misled the Senate, that the CIA's own inspectors said Helms' denials of the CIA's involvement in toppling Chile's Allende was "perjury," and that Jimmy Carter supported reports that Helms had lied. But that's nothing compared to your saying he didn't lie, is it? Helms' conviction made it the front page of The New York Times on its 5 November 1977 issue: "Helms Is Fined $2,000 and Given Two-Year Suspended Prison Term – U.S. Judge Rebukes Ex-C.I.A. Head for Misleading Panel." Time Magaziner said (on 11-14-77) that, "Asst. Attorney General, Ben Civiletti presented a 3-page, 'statement of facts' TO WHICH HELMS HAD AGREED...(which, among other things, said) that when Helms testified on 2/7/73 & 3/6/73 he was fully aware that the CIA in 1970 had secretly funded anti-Allende propaganda, financed groups opposed to Allende, applied economic pressure on Chilean military forces to thwart Allende's selection, and discussed with the ITT Corp. the support of candidates opposing Allende....But Helms had testified that the CIA had not tried to influence the election...." Thomas Powers, in "The Man Who Kept the Secrets--Richard Helms and the CIA", [New York, Alfred Knopf, 1979, p.299-] said, "With (CIA's) Colby's approval, (Inspector General William) Broe appointed a three-man team to examine Helms's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Church's subcommittee...The three men concluded that the CIA had certainly been heavily involved in Chile (which Helms had denied under oath before the Senate, and) thus establishing a discrepancy (between the truth and Helms's testimony). But when the team wrote its report it went a step further and flatly described Helms's testimony as PERJURY...". So you see, CIA investigators claimed that Helms' act was PERJURY. Imagine that! Are we to accept that The New York Times, Time Magazine and the CIA's investigators were all lying, Ed? But as expected, that "commie" rag, The Nation, fully elaborated on the fascinating affair. In the November 12, '77 'Nation' issue, it reported: "Helms was indeed in a difficult situation when he took the oath and testified to the Senate committee that the CIA he had headed had not acted to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President to which the people of Chile had elected him...if he (Helms) failed to tell the whole truth in that forum (The Senate), he would be liable under the "refusal of a witness to testify" section of the federal criminal code, EVEN IF HE ONLY MISLED THE SENATE OR EVADED THE QUESTIONS." "Helms on that day had an honorable way out of his dilemma (between violating his CIA secrecy oath and his duty to testify truthfully). He could have told the Senators that, in his view, his National Security Act oath had priority over the oath which he had just taken to tell the Senate the truth.... "That would have been an honest and forthright thing to do, but it would have spilled the beans. That action would have been taken as an admission that the CIA had in fact done the dark deeds with which it had been charged. One can only speculate about what the Senators would have done if confronted by Helms in such an upright posture...Given Congress's past record of obeisance to all the intelligence agencies whenever they breathe the term "national security," it is hard to imagine the Senators inflicting a hard rap on Helms's knuckles. "But the former CIA chief wanted it both ways. He wanted to SEEM TO TELL THE TRUTH WHILE NOT DOING SO, and of course HE WANTED TO GET AWAY WITH IT, BOTH PERSONALLY AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SYSTEM OF SECRECY WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY. He failed to get away with this straddle because too much was known about the Chile operation, and so he found himself in court on what might have been a criminal charge of PERJURY (Oh no! The "P"-word!!) BUT WAS REDUCED, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT, TO A MERE MISDEMEANOR. "Enter the question of BLACKMAIL. This in not to accuse Helms of employing that crude protective device, but it must be said that he was in a position to threaten his superious with some extremely embarrassing disclosures. For he did not act alone in the matter of Chile. It is clear from the record that Henry Kissinger and the Forty Committed of the National Security Council, which he headed, were in this up to their ears. What the CIA did in its ultimately successful effort to get rid of Allende, thus subverting representative government in Chile and making a military dictatorship inevitable, had the enthusiastic approval of the Nixon White House. Helms was just one of the agents in this operation. But if he chose to tell all he wound have pulled the temple of intelligence down around everyone's heads." "The point is that all this dirty work was done in the name of national security. The true national security, correctly defined, was never involved....Senator Frank Church who was the chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, commented on the decision to allow Helms to plead nolo on a misdemeanor that he had "thought there was to be an end to the double standard of justice for the big shots" but that "apparently Helms was too hot to handle." (The Nation, 11/12/77) And on 11/19/77, The Nation reported, "The Helms case has now been settled by a bargain that led to a no-contest plea to the reduced charge of a misdemeanor--as against the crime of Perjury before Congress (WHICH HE CERTAINLY COMMITTED-SIC)--followed by a $2000.00 fine, a 2 year jail sentence (suspended) and a year of probation..." There was, in the whole affair, a "startling contrast between the words uttered in the courtroom and the phrases that fell from the lips of Helms and his high-powered lawyer on the courthouse steps. Inside the halls of justice Edward Bennett Williams, the lawyer, had begged the court for leniency for his client on the ground that he would carry "the scar of a conviction for the rest of his days." Outside the court, a trice later, as Helms and Williams talked to reporters, that "scar" had been miraculously changed into "a badge of honor", even a "banner," as the wily attorney put it. "The decicatrization of Helms belongs in the book of miracles for its speed, if not in *The Guinness Book of World Records* for its cynicism. For the truth is that there was never any doubt--pace the vaunted independence of our judiciary and of the judge in this case, Barrington Parker--that Helms would walk out of that court with only the faintest tap on the wrist for his lies to the Senate about the CIA's sinister $8 million involvement in the corruption of Chile's politics.....The QUID the government got for the QUO of Helms's agreement to enter a nolo plea to a misdemeanor was the avoidance of a trial to which the former CIA chief could have brought a heavy load of dirty linen for judicial laundering. Among others, Henry Kissinger's splattered shirts would have been revealed for all to see. "In order t avoid such a spectacle, the government went to extraordinary lengths, EVEN MANUFACTURING A "'CRIME' FOR THE OCCASION" TO WHICH HELMS COULD PLEAD HIS NOLO as Joseph l. Rauh Jr. points out in a letter to The Washington Post (11/9/77). It was "plea-bargaining run riot," Rauh writes. To spare Helms from having to plead to the crime of perjury, which certainly exists, the Justice Department charged him with, he pleaded to, and Judge Parker sentenced him for "a crime that doesn't exist." There is no such misdemeanor as failing to testify "fully, completely and accurately" before Congress....Rauh concludes, "that the law is only peripherally for them. The true lesson of Watergate has even now not been learned." "..(Judge Parker) even found it within him to declare that "From this day forward, let there be no doubt that no one in government is above the law." That is a variation on the theme expressed by Carter at his 1976 Convention, when he said: "It is time for our government leaders to respect the law no less than the humblest citizen, so that we can end the double standard of justice in America. I see no reason why big-shot crooks should go free while the poor ones go to gail." (Do you regard this as a treasonous juxtaposition?) Astonishingly, President Carter failed to 'stand by his man', Helms. As reported in *The Nation* on 11/26/77, "Carter seems to have stripped Richard Helms of the "badge of honor" which he and his lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, had vaingloriously affixed to his breast outside the court that had just sentenced him (very lightly) for the "misdemeanor" of lying to the Senate about the dirty work in Chile. Carter put it plainly at his 11/10/77 press conference when he said, "No, it is not a badge of honor and a public official does not have a right to lie." Some, perhaps even Dolan, might take exception to my callling Helms act of perjury "Perjury." But that word, "perjury" came from the CIA itself, not me. Powers, incidentally, clarified the question of PERJURY rather neatly, and in a way that vindicated *THE NATION'S* representation: "Helms's part of the bargain was to plead nolo to two misdemeanor charges of violating a federal statute which made it an offense not to testify "fully and completely" before Congress. In addition, the Justice Dept. INSISTED THAT ITS STATEMENT WOULD CHARGE HELMS WITH HAVING "FAILED TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS (PUT TO HIM BY STUART SYMINGTON ON 2/7/73-sic) FULLY, COMPLETELY AND ACCURATELY AS REQUIRED BY LAW." THE WORD "ACCURATELY" WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATUTE GOVERNING HELMS'S PLEA. (Helms's attorney) Williams argued against its inclusion, but the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INSISTED, SINCE THE REAL CHARGE AGAINST HELMS WAS THAT HE HAD LIED. TO DESCRIBE HIS CRIME IN MILDER TERMS WOULD ONLY INVITE PUBLIC REACTION. (Powers, T. p.303-304) *The Nation* had argued that Helms's misdemeanor conviction was for a felonious crime. That is, "HAVING "FAILED TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS (PUT TO HIM BY STUART SYMINGTON BEFORE THE US SENATE ON 2//7/73) FULLY, COMPLETELY AND ACCURATELY AS REQUIRED BY LAW" is a felony charge, not a misdemeanor. (Failing to answer "fully and completely, period" CAN be charged as a misdemeanor. So when *The Nation* said that the US govt. went "to extraordinary lengths, even manufactruring a "'crime for the occasion" to which Helms could plead his nolo (plea)...It was 'plea bargaining run riot'...the Justice Department charged him with, he pleaded to, and Judge Parker sentenced him for 'a crime that doesn't exist. There is no such misdemeanor as failing to testify 'fully, completely and accurately' before Congress...Helms could have avoided all that 'anguish' by taking 'the honorable course' of refusing to discuss the CIA's role in Chile..." in his Senate testimony --but he apparently didn't do the "honorable thing", he tried to deceive Congress and, of course US citizens, on what he and the CIA had done in Chile, and he got caught. Thus it appears that Saint Richard Helms has been the innocent victim of the courts who held he had lied, of CIA agents who said his act was perjury, of the press who considered him decitful and deplorable, of the writer Powers, and even of President Jimmy Carter. Imagine that, Ed! Don't you see the makings of a real conspiracy here? Oh, but no, as you said, so it must therefore be true, that: "What he told the Senate was true. You have no evidence otherwise." Not a whit of evidence, just as you said. You win, Ed. Gary

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Richard Helms

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Richard Helms

 

8th Director of Central Intelligence

In office
June 30, 1966 – February 2, 1973

President

 Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard Nixon

Preceded by

 William Raborn

Succeeded by

 James R. Schlesinger
 

Born

 March 30, 1913(1913-03-30)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Died

 October 22, 2002 (aged 89)

Richard McGarrah Helms (March 30, 1913–October 22, 2002) was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1966 to 1973. He was the only director to have been convicted of lying to Congress over Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undercover activities. In 1977, he was sentenced to the maximum fine and received a suspended two-year prison sentence. Despite this, Helms remained a revered figure in the intelligence profession. CIA Historian Keith Melton describes Helms as a professional who was always impeccably dressed and had a "low tolerance for fools."
Contents

[hide]

· 1 Biography

o 1.1 Career in intelligence

· 2 See also

· 3 Further reading

· 4 In the Media

· 5 External links

[edit] Biography

Helms was born in Philadelphia in 1913. In 1935, after he graduated from Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts, he got a job at the United Press in London. The depression in London, however forced Helms to find work in Germany, where he covered the Berlin Olympic Games; he had spent two of his high school years at the prestigious Institut Le Rosey in Switzerland where he learned to speak French and later Realgymnasium in Freiburg, where he became fluent in German. He joined the advertising department of the Indianapolis Times; within two years he was national advertising manager.

[edit] Career in intelligence

A 23 year-old Helms interviewed Adolf Hitler for UPI during the 1936 Olympics.

During World War II Helms served in the United States Navy. In 1943, he was posted to Secret Intelligence Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) because of his ability to speak German. In the aftermath of the war, he was transferred to the newly formed Office of Special Operations (OSO), where at the age of 33 he was put in charge of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

The OSO became a division of the CIA when that organization was created by the National Security Act of 1947. In 1962 Helms became Director of Plans after the CIA's disastrous role in the attempted invasion of Cuba. After falling out with the Kennedys[citation needed], he was sent off to Vietnam where he oversaw the coup to overthrow President Ngo Dinh Diem. Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Helms was made Deputy Director of the CIA under Admiral William Raborn. A year later, in 1966, he was appointed Director.

Richard Helms, in the White House Cabinet Room, March 27, 1968.

The ease of Helms's role under President Lyndon Johnson changed with the arrival of President Richard Nixon and Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger. After the debacle of Watergate, from which Helms succeeded in distancing the CIA as far as possible, the Agency came under much tighter Congressional control. Nixon, however, considered Helms to be disloyal, and fired him as DCI in 1973. Helms then served from 1973 to 1976 as US ambassador to Iran in Tehran.

Helms's ultimate undoing was the CIA's role, at Nixon's behest, in the subversion of Chile's socialist government (Project FUBELT), and the overthrow of that country's democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, on September 11, 1973. According to Helms, Nixon had ordered the CIA to support a military coup to prevent Allende from becoming president in 1970. However, following the assassination of Army Commander-in-Chief General René Schneider by elements of the military, public support swung behind Allende, and he took office in October 1970. Subsequently, the CIA funneled millions of dollars to opposition groups and striking truck drivers in a continuing effort to destabilize the Allende government.

During his ambassadorial confirmation hearings before the Senate, Helms was questioned concerning the CIA's role in the Chilean affair. Because the operations were still secret and the hearings were public events, Helms denied that the CIA had ever aided Allende's opposition. However, later information uncovered by the Church Committee hearings showed that Helms's statements were false, and he was prosecuted and convicted in 1977. He received a two-year suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine. He wore the conviction as a badge of honor, and his fine was paid by friends from the CIA.

In 1972, Helms ordered the destruction of most records from the huge MKULTRA project, over 150 CIA-funded research projects designed to explore any possibilities of mind control. The project became public knowledge two years later, after a New York Times report. Its full extent may never be known[citation needed].

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan awarded Helms the National Security Medal. After he died of bone cancer in 2002, Richard Helms was interred in Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia.

AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00799.html

 

 

Richard Helms. With President Lyndon B. Johnson, 8 April 1965.
Courtesy of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library / National Archives and Records Administration.

 

 

Helms, Richard McGarrah (30 Mar. 1913-23 Oct. 2002), U.S. intelligence director, was born in Saint Davids, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia, the son of Herman Helms, a district manager for the Aluminum Company of America, and mother Marion McGarrah. His maternal grandfather, Gates McGarrah, was a leading international banker. Helms was educated at schools both in New Jersey and in Switzerland and Germany. As a young student in Europe, Helms became conversant in French and German. He returned to the United States to attend Williams College in Massachusetts where in 1935 he graduated magna cum laude, double-majoring in English literature and history. Elected to Phi Beta Kappa, he served as class president and as editor of the college newspaper and yearbook, and he was voted "most likely to succeed" and "most respected" by his undergraduate peers.

Upon graduation from college Helms entered the field of journalism. Employed by United Press, he traveled in Europe and wrote about the Nazis as they began to seize power in Germany. He managed to meet and interview Adolf Hitler at a rally in Nuremberg in 1936. Helms was impressed by the dictator's pleasant manner as well as the well-managed political pageantry that accompanied his speeches, but was alarmed by Hitler's conversational references to war preparations. Helms returned to the United States and in 1937 began working as an advertising manager for the Indianapolis Times. In 1939 he met and soon married his first wife, Julia Bretzman Shields, a divorcée with two children. They had a son together.



OSS and CIA

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. Naval Reserve commissioned Helms as a lieutenant in July 1942; by August 1943 his foreign-language abilities had landed him in America's premier wartime intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services. He had OSS assignments in Britain, Luxembourg, and Germany. After the war Helms became a civilian employee in the War Department. In 1947 he transferred to the newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), where he was assigned to the Directorate for Plans, the operations side of the CIA.

By the early 1950s Helms had risen to the position of deputy to the head of the Directorate for Plans. In 1955 he supervised the digging of a five-hundred-meter tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin, from which U.S. intelligence was able to wiretap the main Soviet telephone links that connected Moscow to East Berlin. This operation was eventually discovered by the Soviets and used for disinformation against the West, but Helms's superiors were sufficiently impressed by the tunnel achievement to boost him up the CIA's career ladder.

During the administration of John F. Kennedy, Helms knew about but did not plan or guide the disastrous Bay of Pigs covert operation in 1961, designed to overthrow Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba, and his Communist regime. When the presidential axe fell on those in charge of the failed operation, Helms escaped culpability and in 1962 was named head of the Directorate for Plans. He was immediately drawn into the ongoing goal of the Kennedy White House to free the Western Hemisphere from Castro's influence, either through further attempts to undermine his regime or by killing Castro himself. Although the degree to which President Kennedy is responsible for the assassination plot against Castro remains unclear, Helms returned from a visit to the White House with the belief that the president wanted Castro eliminated--the sooner the better. After initial attempts to assassinate Castro failed, Helms worked closely with the attorney general (and President Kennedy's brother) Robert Kennedy in planning covert actions by the CIA to overthrow Castro's rule in Cuba. The CIA's Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen Dulles, assigned personnel in the Directorate of Plans to carry out the assassination; they in turn hired mafia bosses to assist in the effort. Several attempts against Castro's life were tried, including the use of exploding cigars and poison pills, but all failed--in large part because Castro proved elusive and well guarded by Soviet-trained security forces. When Helms inherited these operations against Castro as the new Directorate of Plans, he discontinued the overtures to the mafia but allowed the other plots to move forward--all unsuccessfully.

In 1965 Helms was named Deputy Director of the CIA, and in 1966 he headed the agency as Director of Central Intelligence. In this capacity he kept President Lyndon B. Johnson briefed on the war in Vietnam. Despite the United States' ongoing setbacks in the war, Helms initially enjoyed a close relationship with Johnson and visited with him regularly. Ongoing turbulence related to the Vietnam War put increasing strain on this relationship, however, and their meetings became fewer and fewer.

In 1968 Helms's first marriage ended in divorce, and the next year he married Cynthia McKelvie. Tall, dashing, and impeccably dressed, the spy chief Helms became a well-known figure around Washington. He was admired as an interesting conversationalist, a competent tennis player and social dancer, and an eager partygoer despite his reputation at work for being reserved and laconic.



Nixon

The administration of Richard M. Nixon sought to clamp down on leaks within the executive branch. To this end, President Nixon signed a master spy plan in 1970, allowing use of America's intelligence agencies for domestic espionage against Vietnam War dissenters. The top figures in American espionage, including Richard Helms and J. Edgar Hoover, advocated this plan of action (known as the Huston Plan, after Tom Charles Huston, the young White House aide who drafted it). The plan's objective was to covertly gather information about student protesters who opposed the war, then employ the Federal Bureau of Information (FBI) to conduct clandestine operations to foil the protesters. These operations mostly involved harassment activities, including the use of anonymous letters designed to discredit protester groups. Hoover--at the time the FBI's director--soon grew concerned that the Huston Plan might leak to the public and undermine his standing in the intelligence community; he voiced his objections to the plan to the president, who in turn rescinded his initial approval of the domestic spy plan. Helms, for his part, had not objected to this employment of the CIA for domestic intelligence operations.

Then came the Watergate scandal. Helms's relationship with President Nixon, never close, went into a rapid downward spiral as the DCI resisted efforts by the White House to enlist the CIA in a cover-up of the Watergate affair. The president wanted the CIA to support the argument that national security interests prohibited the Federal Bureau of Investigation from tracing Watergate funds to the White House. Helms refused. In 1973, as the relationship between Nixon and the DCI soured, the president fired him, but he did grant Helms's request to become U.S. ambassador to Iran. Helms served in Tehran from March 1973 until December 1976, leaving a year before Iran became engulfed in revolution.

As DCI, at the behest of Nixon, Helms had also worked to destabilize the democratically elected regime of Salvador Allende in Chile. Allende, whose friendly relationship with the Soviet Union did not mesh with Nixon's preference for Western leaders who were "ABC"--anybody but Communists--was killed during a coup on 11 September 1973. In 1973 during the course of the confirmation hearings for Helms's ambassadorship to Iran, a member of the Senate asked Helms if the CIA had tried to overthrow Allende. Helms replied, "No, sir." When the Senate subsequently discovered that in fact the CIA had been deeply involved in anti-Allende covert actions, its members were outraged and pursued the question of Helms's perjury in court. In 1977, Helms conceded before a federal district court in Washington, D.C., that he had misled the committee. He defended himself on grounds that he had a sworn obligation to keep the nation's secrets, but this argument begged the question of why he never informed the committee members at least privately about the operations. The court convicted Helms on misdemeanor counts of lying before a congressional committee while under oath. "You stand before this court in disgrace and shame," said Judge Barrington D. Parker, who fined Helms $2,000 but suspended his two-year sentence. Outside the courtroom Helms declared that he would wear his conviction "like a badge of honor." Helms's allies inside and outside the CIA quickly raised the money to cover his fine.

In 1975, Helms drew fire from a Senate special investigative committee led by Senator Frank Church of Idaho to probe allegations of CIA intelligence abuses. This committee uncovered Helms's perjury about the Allende actions. Among other charges, the committee also accused Helms of "cooking" or politicizing intelligence to suit the policy needs of the Nixon administration, an accusation that Helms denied. With respect to the earlier administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, the Church Committee gave Helms higher marks for warning President Johnson that the war in Vietnam was going badly and was likely to fail-warnings that the president ignored, however.

When he returned to Washington, D.C., from Iran in 1976, Helms started a private consulting practice that specialized in the Middle East. It was called the Safeer Company, adopting the Farsi word for "ambassador." He also wrote a book-length memoir. Helms died in Washington, D.C., succumbing to multiple myeloma at the age of eighty-nine.

Helms is widely regarded as one of the most memorable of the people to hold the office of DCI since its creation in 1947. He is often thought of by fellow intelligence officers as the "professional's professional," having been the first career intelligence officer to make his way to the top of the intelligence establishment. Helms was a strong proponent of espionage, but during his time as DCI he remained skeptical about the likely success of large-scale covert actions meant to manipulate political and economic events abroad. He felt that the outcome of large clandestine operations, like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, was difficult to predict and could lead to unintended consequences. Although Helms's relationships with presidents Johnson and Nixon (along with Nixon's Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) were shaky and often strained, he was viewed by his peers in the intelligence community as an astute manager of espionage who was loyal to the CIA. Among intelligence officers, he remains one of the most popular figures in the history of American espionage.

 


Bibliography

Richard Helms's memoir, written with the assistance of William Hood, is entitled A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (2003). He was the central figure in a study of intelligence written by Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). His relations with the Church Committee are examined in Loch K. Johnson, Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (1985). Among the published interviews with Helms are one conducted in 1990 by Loch K. Johnson, "Spymaster Richard Helms," Intelligence and National Security 18 (September 2003): 24-44, and another conducted in 1988 by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, "Reflections of DCIs Colby and Helms on the CIA's 'Time of Troubles,' " CIA Oral History Archives, Studies in Intelligence 51 (September 2007): 11 and 21-28.



Loch K. Johnson

Posted: Sat Feb 27, 2010 7:50 pm    Post subject:

 

 

The easiest way for me to go through some of the relevant articles is to link them in the same order they were published. That is not necessarily in the correct order of events, but as the reporter Jack Anderson learned them. These revelations were coming out in the early 1970's. From a timing stand point, I first began meeting the Websters in 1977. Anderson, and other reporters' articles covered the CIA in both periods that relate to the Websters, the 1950's when they were both part of the agency, and the 1960's-70's when George was with ITT. The articles began in the 1970's when the Senate was scrutinizing both groups.

The first article deals with a memo leaked to Anderson. The article was published on 2-29-1972 His associate, Brit Hume, confirmed the validity of the document. It was written by Dita Beard. She was a tough as nails lobbyist that worked for ITT in DC. The memo indicates ITT made a substantial contribution to Nixon's renomination effort in return for favorable disposition of an anti trust suit the justice department had brought against them. ITT was buying influence and other documents do verify Nixon was instrumental in assuring a positive outcome for ITT.

Secret Memo Bares Mitchell-ITT Move



The above was an artist likeness of Dita Beard that appeared in a Harper's article.

ITT shredded documents and Dita Beard had left town by the next day. Numerous FBI offials were looking for her in multiple states. It's no surprise ITT denied any wrong doing. So did Mitchell and other members of the White House adminstration. Harold Geneen was furthering his influence and power as he continued to grow the conglomerate. Nixon makes multiple references to Geneen on the White House tapes. This was a corrupt company with a firm and inappropriate hold on the White House. McClaren was transferred out of the DOJ and had an unusual appointment to a judgeship where one wasn't needed. Cover up mentality in the part of Nixon's White House and cover up mentality on the part of ITT.


Harold Geneen ITT

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Sun Feb 28, 2010 12:19 pm    Post subject:

 

 

Anderson wrote a daily column. There were numerous pieces or references to the Dita Beard memo and the Senate hearings. I am not going to run through the whole case, but want to point out certain patterns and behaviors.

Dita Beard left DC shortly after the memo was exposed. She had acknowledged the authenticity of her memo to multiple people. On March 2, 1972, she fled to Denver with FBI agents looking for her to issue a subpoena. The tactics that surfaced initially were to discredit her. They referenced drinking and even brought witnesses to the Senate hearings to describe her mental issues.

Dita at some point was admitted to the hospital in Denver with a heart ailment. The tactics changed. The White House sent E Howard Hunt to meet with Dita. He was in the disguise that the CIA had issued him and was used in his involvement in the Watergate break ins. The former CIA agent was one of the Watergate plumbers. Dita now had a lawyer paid for by ITT. A select group of Senators travelled to Denver to question her in her hospital room. The bottom line of her testimony was that she claimed part of the memo had been forged. There was plenty of I don't remember and denials. She made a miraculous recovery and was out of the hospital in a couple of days. She was reassigned to a position in Denver.


E Howard Hunt
Watergate Plumber

The meeting with Hunt is important reinforcing the connection between the Whitehouse, CIA, and ITT. It is obvious by what transpired that these groups had the clout and muscle to pressure an outcome. George Webster was in the telecommuications division and I don't think he would have had direct involvement in these dealings. He certainly would have knowledge how ITT handled it's affairs and bought and coerced results. Geneen compelled political donations from his exeutives and then told to recover it by padding their expense accounts. The company attitude and practice was to buy influence. It is important to point out that ITT put up the reward money in Joan's case. That is verifiable.

On the personal side, I can relate to this and George's demeanor. He often indicated money should influence decisions within the family, a subtle suggestion that offended me. The letter I discovered is another comparison I can make. My daughter testified that part of the letter had been forged. She left the courtroom and boarded a plane for some fun trip. Efforts to portray me in a similar fashion to the tactics used against Dita Beard to discredit are on going.

I'll try to get the next key article up later today.

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Sun Feb 28, 2010 9:25 pm    Post subject:

 

 

The next article is the one that was released in the CIA Family Jewels through the FOIA. That copy was of poor quality and hard to read. This article was published on 3-8-1973. Joan was still in high school and residing at home at this time. The Watergate scandal had broken and of course that dominated political news. In my opinion, there were far more serious offenses going on. In a Helms document I posted some time back, he was concerned that the agency's cover firms and domestic activities might be exposed if the CIA was involved in the Watergate hearings.

Jack Anderson himself, ran into one of the Miami contingent at the airport in DC the weekend of the Chilean Embassy break in. His article reinforces the concern that the Watergate plumbers were also the culprits in the Embassy break in as well as 3 diplomats in NYC. In reading Anderson's book, he describes an incident where he may have been premature in disclosing information in a story. It involved then Sen Eagleton of Missouri who had been selected as McGovern's running mate. That incident predates this story. Anderson showed his character and credibility in that incident and reinforces how thorough and reliable he is as a source. He would not be putting his reputation on the line to print a story without due dilignce to find the facts. He was put on an "enemies" list in the White House, and was a problem for the less than scrupulous in DC.

The concept E Howard Hunt was contracted by ITT for activities spying on the Chileans is very plausible just looking on the surface. Hunt was former CIA. At the time he worked in the White House. Harold Geneen of ITT had an established relationship with the WH all the way to Nixon. John McCone, former DCI of the CIA was on the ITT board and was close to Geneen and government officials, as well as a close relationship to his successor, Richard Helms. The administration had already colluded to grant special favors to ITT in the antitrust suit, and ITT offered large sums in return. E Howard Hunt and an ITT attorney paid a visit to Dita Beard in Denver before she changed her story about the memo to the Senate hearing. ITT was really the only likely client to benefit from the break ins.

The FBI gave the Beard memo to ITT which is astounding to give them opportunity to try and discredit it. They should have been asking the questions and finding out what this corporation was doing, not give them a way out. The FBI passed the buck stating the memo was tranferred through White House staff. Another questionable FBI matter was their reported determination that the break in at the embassy was routine.

Chilean Break Ins Reflect Watergate

It's not the least bit surprising that ITT denied any connection or wrongdoing. The Allende government in Chile wanted to nationalize the telephone holdings of ITT. This was the telecommunications division where George worked. His job again was the director of the budget for the US Defense Department. Efforts to undermine the election of Allende began in the early 1960's. ITT funneled money into that effort giving the CIA cover as if they weren't involved. They were successful in keeping Allende out until 1970. Nixon was already obligated to Geneen and ITT.

Another connection was the fact that E Howard Hunt and James McCord, both former CIA and part of the group arrested for the Watergate break ins, were on the committee to re elect the president, Nixon. ITT made an enormous contribution to facilitate the convention and gained a favorable decision in the antitrust issue in return.

Another interesting detail about time to point out. There is something redacted from the Interpol Blue Notice submitted for Joan's disappearance. It is under the area of Joan's addresses and is in this time period. I don't know what it is. I knew all of the other addresses and locations.

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Mon Mar 01, 2010 3:03 pm    Post subject:

 

 

The next article was written by a Washington Post staff writer. The Senate hearings and the focus on the administrations wrong doing received enormous attention obviously. Watergate was the biggest political scandal, and still is, bringing down a presidency.

The article describes a plan for intelligence gathering that involved break ins at foreign embassies. The claim the plan wasn't implemented does not ring true since this is exactly what happened. The idea was to increase the CIA's domestic role. That is not part of the charter granted to the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947, but I don't think rules were part of the thinking.

The other department referenced for greater involvement was the Department of Defense. This was George Webster's area of responsibility with ITT. Again, these plans went all the way to the Oval Office. Nixon was already in bed with Geneen and obligated for favors. Not only was there the contribution to the reelection committee, ITT was also funneling money into Chile to oppose Allende. George Webster was a money man. The CIA kept their hands clean using a cover firm, but also provided the avenues for ITT's effort.

Nixon Aide Proposed Espionage, Burglaries

Below is the list of the actors in Watergate and also suspect in the Chilean break ins. The 5 burglars were indicted along with Liddy and Hunt. Notice the association with th CIA and/or FBI. These men were pros. I want to also point out the reference to bugging phones. This is something I will bring out later.

There were 5 burglars arrested on June 17, 1972 at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee:
Bernard L. Barker - a realtor from Miami, Florida. Former Central Intelligence Agency operative. Barker was said to have been involved in the Bay of Pigs incident in 1962.

1. Virgilio R. Gonzales - a locksmith from Miami, Florida. Gonzalez was a refugee from Cuba, following Castro's takeover.

2. James W. McCord - a security co-ordinator for the Republican National Committee and the Committee for the Re-election of the President. McCord was also a former FBI and CIA agent. He was dismissed from his RNC and CREEP positions the day after the break-in.

3. Eugenio R. Martinez - worked for Barker's Miami real estate firm. He had CIA connections and was an anti-Castro Cuban exile.

4. Frank A. Sturgis - another associate of Barker from Miami, he also had CIA connections and involvement in anti-Castro activities.

The five men were charged with attempted burglary and attempted interception of telephone and other communications.
The burglars were indicted by a Grand Jury on September 15, as were:

6. G. Gordon Liddy - from Washington, counsel to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, a former FBI agent, former Treasury official, and former member of the White House staff. During the investigation, Liddy refused to answer questions and was fired from his job.

7. E Howard Hunt Jr. - from Washington, a former White House consultant and CIA employee. Hunt was a writer of espionage novels and had worked on declassifying the Pentagon Papers.

ITT and the CIA ere components of Joan's investigation

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Mon Mar 01, 2010 9:18 pm    Post subject:

 

 

THE NEXT SHOT ACROSS THE BOW!!!

I will be giving an interview about the 1981 Joan Webster unresolved murder. The interview will be on Wednesday, March 3rd at 9PM eastern. The show's host Denny Griffin is a former police officer and investigator. He and his producer have taken time to review documents and get an understanding of the case. The 90 minute live program "Seeking Justice" can be heard on the link below at airing, or can be accessed to hear later.

www.blogtalkradio.com/dennisngriffin

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Tue Mar 02, 2010 11:43 am    Post subject:

 

 

Again, the staff writers on the post expanded on the scandal in Washington in an article on 6-10-1973 that had been exposed by Jack Anderson. The article descibes the incidents of domestic spying that were conistent with the plan Nixon approved, but denied it was implemented. The record clearly shows the plan or one like it was indeed implemented. I have left the article in total even though there are issues unrelated to the events that concern me most. It gives a good snapshot of the depth of the problem and what was going on at the time. History speaks for itself.

Bugging Said to Fit Rejected Spy Plan

The incidents begin with the situations we can all identify from Watergate. These are the break ins that show up if you search that topic. But the next string of events are related to the 4 break ins related to Chile. The beneficiary of those acivities is ITT. Again there are references to phones being bugged. James McCord contended he knew that embassy phones were tapped. McCord was one of the plumbers and he also sent 3 memos to Helms. Helms supressed those memos when the CIA was asked for documentation. That information is verified in the documents previously posted from the Helms collection in CIA papers.


James McCord

McCord was former CIA and had been hired as a security director for the committee to reelect the president. He was an electronics expert. I think it is fair to say of all of these guys that they got their skills and techniques from the CIA background whether they were still officially on that payroll or not. George and Eleanor Webster have to be viewed the same way as having unique training and background. In his position, McCord worked with E Howard Hunt, John Mitchell, and Gordon Liddy. The Chilean break ins can only be viewed as Nixon's obligation to ITT and Geneen. Geneen again pumped a sizeable sum into the reelection coffers.

It has to be repeated that George Webster was in the very division impacted by affairs in Chile. It would be derelict to ignore his CIA background in reviewing all of this. It is impossible to conceive the powers that be at ITT, Geneen and McCone, were ignorant of the "talent" and "asset" they had in their ranks. He was perfectly positioned to work with the numbers and his responsibility was the Department of Defense. George had also been there all through the 1960's during the ongoing efforts of the CIA and ITT to block Allende in Chile.

By this time Steve Webster was a college student. Anne Webster was preparing to head off to college. Joan was home still in high school.

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Tue Mar 02, 2010 10:21 pm    Post subject:

 

 

I can't resist putting another piece up by Jack Anderson dated 5-11-1972, back tracking a little. In the last column under Washington Whirl is a quote by Rep Charlie Rangel D-NY who is now under scrutiny for ethics violations. He is commenting about a million dollar offer ITT made to the CIA to support efforts in Chile. The CIA directed ITT to the conduits to funnel the money without getting their own hands dirty. It will make even more sense with the next article I will be posting. I guess the same criticisms don't apply when it benefits Rangel. What dirty business.

Washington Whirl

THANK YOU FINTAN FOR BEING A BEACON WHERE THE TRUTH CAN BE HEARD!!!

 
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bri



Joined: 16 Jun 2006
Posts: 2049
Location: Pastor Erickson's Miney Miney Tiny Time Town		 Posted: Wed Mar 03, 2010 8:16 am    Post subject:

 

 

Looking forwards to the show at 9 tonight Eve. I'll be tuning in.
_________________
"Man is what he believes."
Anton Chekhov

 
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kathy
Site Admin


Joined: 20 Jan 2006
Posts: 654
Location: On top of the world :)		 Posted: Wed Mar 03, 2010 10:12 am    Post subject:

 

 

Quote:

THANK YOU FINTAN FOR BEING A BEACON WHERE THE TRUTH CAN BE HEARD!!!



And thank you Eva for your perseverance in bringing this case to light and seeking Justice. You are an example to us all.

Kathy
_________________
IMAGINE

 
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eveknowsthetruth



Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Posts: 191		 Posted: Thu Mar 04, 2010 1:31 am    Post subject:

 

 

Thank you both. The more I learn in all of this, the more I know this case has to be exposed. Getting the word out there has not been easy by any stretch, but it is moving.

The next article goes into the CIA's involvement in the plot for domestic activities. Former DCI Richard Helms stated what would be expected, that they wouldn't have been involved if asked. That was not in their charter. Four months later, Tom Charles Huston's memo came out revaling a different story and that Helms was very helpful. Helms wasn't completely given a pass for lying to the Senate committee, but I hardly call his penalty any kind of pennance. He was found guilty of perjury regarding the involvement of the CIA with ITT in the affairs in Chile. He was given a 2 year suspended sentence and fined $2000. The fine was paid by CIA friends and it was reported he wore the perjury charge with honor. This didn't come until November 1977.


Richard Helms

When the information came out about the plan written by Nixon aide Tom Charles Huston, Helms was gone. Huston's information was clear, that Helms had been helpful in putting the plan together.


Tom Charles Huston
Nixon Counsel

The article goes on to describe a meeting where methods were discussed. Not to stop activities that were illegal under the CIA charter, but how to do them better and not get caught. Using cover firms was reemphasized and ex CIA personnel. Not only is it most likely ITT knew George Webster's background to use to their advantage, but it's a fair bet the CIA knew where former employees were as well. The public posture said one thing, but the truth of the CIA's continued conduct was something far different. These were men who justified anything as long as it helped them reach their desired goal. There were no boundaries, constraints, and no real accountability. Actions were motivated by men with their own agenda and labeled as National security.

A Sense of Deja Vue at CIA

I am very familiar with the behavior patterns expressed to deal with the problems when the CIA was caught doing things they shouldn't. First is the lie and deny, the time tested method of anyone guilty of conduct they want to keep hidden. But also the attitude to ride it out. Don't acknowledge anything, ignore, don't answer the phone, don't tell, discredit. These are all approaches until one hopes the whole thing will blow over.

Another interesting reference is to the "Safe House." In the Church Senate hearings the use of safe houses came up. They were little better than brothels where influential, politicians, or wealthy individuals might fall prey to their own vulnerabilities thus putting them in a position to be blackmailed, controlled. I am not sure if this term is being used in the same way here, but it is obvious there were plenty of people who did not want their activities known. Again, an age old practice of control to hold things over someone's head. They are then more likely to keep secrets for others not to be exposed themselves and/or be in a position to do things they might not otherwise do.

The CIA clearly shows the ability to plan, stratagize and realliy connive. Their actions were not spontaneous, but took care and sometimes cnsiderable time to execute a plan.

 

 

This is a beta version of NNDB

 

 

 

Search: for

 

 

 

 

Perjury

CRIME

Presence on this list implies merely that, to the best of our knowledge, charges were filed against the people in question, or in some cases, a civil suit. It is not meant to imply guilt, and in fact many of the individuals listed may have been found innocent of said charges or claims. Some details of the charge in question can often be found inside the specific profiles linked.

Name

Occupation

Birth

Death

Known for

Elliott Abrams

Government

24-Jan-1948

 

Asst. Secy. of State involved in Iran-Contra

Jeffrey Archer

Novelist

15-Apr-1940

 

First Among Equals

Silvio Berlusconi

Head of State

29-Sep-1936

 

Prime Minister of Italy

Joh Bjelke-Petersen

Politician

13-Jan-1911

23-Apr-2005

Former Premier of Queensland, Australia

Nellie Bly

Journalist

5-May-1864

27-Jan-1922

Ten Days in a Mad-House

Joe Bonanno

Criminal

18-Jan-1905

12-May-2002

Bonanno crime family

Barry Bonds

Baseball

24-Jul-1964

 

Holds all-time home run record

Henry Cisneros

Politician

11-Jun-1947

 

Secretary of HUD, 1993-97

Bill Clinton

Head of State

19-Aug-1946

 

42nd US President, 1993-2001

Bull Connor

Government

11-Jul-1897

10-Mar-1973

Birmingham Public Safety Commissioner

Michael Deaver

Government

11-Apr-1938

18-Aug-2007

Reagan Deputy Chief of Staff

Sheila Dixon

Politician

17-Dec-1953

 

Mayor of Baltimore

John Ehrlichman

Government

20-Mar-1925

14-Feb-1999

Watergate criminal, served time

Joseph Ejercito Estrada

Head of State

19-Apr-1937

 

Deposed president of the Philippines

Pope Formosus

Religion

c. 816 AD

4-Apr-896 AD

Roman Catholic Pope, 891-896

Mark Fuhrman

Government

5-Feb-1952

 

Former LAPD detective, O. J. Simpson case

Leopoldo Galtieri

Head of State

15-Jul-1926

12-Jan-2003

Invaded Falklands, ran death squads

David Greenglass

Spy

2-Mar-1922

 

Gave atomic secrets to Julius Rosenberg

H. R. Haldeman

Government

27-Oct-1926

12-Nov-1993

Nixon's Chief of Staff

Alcee Hastings

Politician

5-Sep-1936

 

Congressman, Florida 23rd

Roger Hedgecock

Politician

2-May-1946

 

Mayor of San Diego, 1983-85

Richard Helms

Government

30-Mar-1913

22-Oct-2002

CIA Director, 1966-73

Alger Hiss

Government

11-Nov-1904

15-Nov-1996

Accused spy for the Soviet Union

Christine Keeler

Model

2-Feb-1942

 

John Profumo's mistress

Otto Kerner

Politician

15-Aug-1908

9-May-1976

Governor of Illinois, 1961-68

Kwame Kilpatrick

Politician

8-Jun-1970

 

Mayor of Detroit, 2002-08

Lil' Kim

Rapper

11-Jul-1974

 

Wore a pastie to the 1999 MTV Video Awards

Richard G. Kleindienst

Government

5-Aug-1923

3-Feb-2000

US Attorney General, 1972-73

Bud Krogh

Government

3-Aug-1939

 

Nixon's plumbers

Owen Lattimore

Author

29-Jul-1900

31-May-1989

Scholar of Mongolia

Rita Lavelle

Government

8-Sep-1947

 

EPA official

Lewis Libby

Government

22-Aug-1950

 

Cheney's former Chief of Staff

Aimee Semple McPherson

Religion

9-Oct-1890

27-Sep-1944

Evangelist, faith healer

Evan Mecham

Politician

12-May-1924

22-Feb-2008

Governor of Arizona, 1987-88

John Mitchell

Government

15-Sep-1913

9-Nov-1988

Attorney General and Watergate figure

Titus Oates

Criminal

15-Sep-1649

12-Jul-1705

Popish Plot

John Poindexter

Military

12-Aug-1936

 

Iran-Contra criminal

Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh

Religion

11-Dec-1931

19-Jan-1990

Holy man, owned 93 Rolls-Royces

Mel Reynolds

Politician

8-Jan-1952

 

Congressman from Illinois, 1993-95

Ralph Sampson

Basketball

7-Jul-1960

 

Three-time Naismith Award winner

Carmine De Sapio

Government

10-Dec-1908

27-Jul-2004

The Last Boss of Tammany Hall

Richard Scrushy

Business

Aug-1952

 

Imprisoned CEO of HealthSouth

Maurice H. Stans

Government

22-Mar-1908

14-Apr-1998

US Commerce Secretary, 1969-72

John B. Swainson

Politician

31-Jul-1925

13-May-1994

Governor of Michigan, 1961-63

Pat Swindall

Politician

18-Oct-1950

 

Congressman from Georgia, 1985-89

Janet Ventura-Arvizo

Relative

16-Jul-1968

 

Gavin Arvizo's mother

Sam Waksal

Business

8-Sep-1947

 

CEO, ImClone

Daniel Walker

Politician

6-Aug-1922

 

Governor of Illinois, 1973-77

James Watt

Government

31-Jan-1938

 

Reagan's Secretary of the Interior

Chris Webber

Basketball

1-Mar-1973

 

2003 NBA All-star, Sacramento Kings

Louis Wolfson

Business

28-Jan-1912

30-Dec-2007

Business criminal, horse breeder

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Path: dukenews1.cox.net!duke.cox.net!filt01.west.cox.net!peer01.west.cox.net!cox.net!newshub.sdsu.edu!postnews.google.com!d34g2000cwd.googlegroups.com!not-for-mail From: garaguilar@gmail.com Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy.jfk Subject: Ed Dolan believes Richard Helms told the truth about the CIA's role in toppling Chile's democracy. Is he right? Date: 13 Sep 2006 21:40:25 -0700 Organization: http://groups.google.com Lines: 257 Message-ID: <1158208825.294717.33410@d34g2000cwd.googlegroups.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: 24.5.21.204 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-Trace: posting.google.com 1158208831 11244 127.0.0.1 (14 Sep 2006 04:40:31 GMT) X-Complaints-To: groups-abuse@google.com NNTP-Posting-Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2006 04:40:31 +0000 (UTC) User-Agent: G2/1.0 X-HTTP-UserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win 9x 4.90; en-US; rv:1.8.0.6) Gecko/20060728 Firefox/1.5.0.6,gzip(gfe),gzip(gfe) Complaints-To: groups-abuse@google.com Injection-Info: d34g2000cwd.googlegroups.com; posting-host=24.5.21.204; posting-account=81zsQQwAAAAGHA0g2G0A62P-8V9SJkLX Xref: cox.net alt.conspiracy.jfk:342042 X-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2006 00:40:31 EDT (dukenews1.cox.net) ishtar26o@netscape.net wrote: > > You forgot in discussing the establishment press how it, i.e. The New > York Times, lied when it wrote that Richard Helms was covicted od > perjury. > > Dolan > > > > Ned, The New York Times quoted the language of Helms' conviction: that he had failed to testify fully, ACCURATELY, and completely. And the NY Times described how the judge sternly rebuked him. It was CIA investigators who said Helms crime was "perjury." Don't you remember? We discussed this in detail years ago. Here it is again, just to help you out, pal, with all the references so you can check them yourself: 74030.3022@compuserve.com (Ed Dolan) wrote in message news:<2b29c281.0211181753.64a26aa0@posting.google.com>... I said:> > Just as Helms was opposed to demolishing Chile's democracy, and lying about > > it to the US Senate? > Dolan, hilariously, replied:> Another falsehood without evidence. > > You have nothing to contradict Helms except an overstimulated > imagination. > GA> > Just as you believed Helms when he told the U.S. Senate the CIA wasn't > > involved in toppling Chile? [He was convicted of "failure to testify fully, ACCURATELY, and completely" on that one, wasn't he, Ed?] > Ed Dolan:> What he told the Senate was true. You have no evidence otherwise. > I answered: Nothing at all, other than the fact it was widely reported that he was convicted for his Senate lie, that Time Magazine reported that Helms agreed he had misled the Senate, that the CIA's own inspectors said Helms' denials of the CIA's involvement in toppling Chile's Allende was "perjury," and that Jimmy Carter supported reports that Helms had lied. But that's nothing compared to your saying he didn't lie, is it? Helms' conviction made it the front page of The New York Times on its 5 November 1977 issue: "Helms Is Fined $2,000 and Given Two-Year Suspended Prison Term - U.S. Judge Rebukes Ex-C.I.A. Head for Misleading Panel." Time Magaziner said (on 11-14-77) that, "Asst. Attorney General, Ben Civiletti presented a 3-page, 'statement of facts' TO WHICH HELMS HAD AGREED...(which, among other things, said) that when Helms testified on 2/7/73 & 3/6/73 he was fully aware that the CIA in 1970 had secretly funded anti-Allende propaganda, financed groups opposed to Allende, applied economic pressure on Chilean military forces to thwart Allende's selection, and discussed with the ITT Corp. the support of candidates opposing Allende....But Helms had testified that the CIA had not tried to influence the election...." Thomas Powers, in "The Man Who Kept the Secrets--Richard Helms and the CIA", [New York, Alfred Knopf, 1979, p.299-] said, "With (CIA's) Colby's approval, (Inspector General William) Broe appointed a three-man team to examine Helms's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Church's subcommittee...The three men concluded that the CIA had certainly been heavily involved in Chile (which Helms had denied under oath before the Senate, and) thus establishing a discrepancy (between the truth and Helms's testimony). But when the team wrote its report it went a step further and flatly described Helms's testimony as PERJURY...". So you see, CIA investigators claimed that Helms' act was PERJURY. Imagine that! Are we to accept that The New York Times, Time Magazine and the CIA's investigators were all lying, Ed? But as expected, that "commie" rag, The Nation, fully elaborated on the fascinating affair. In the November 12, '77 'Nation' issue, it reported: "Helms was indeed in a difficult situation when he took the oath and testified to the Senate committee that the CIA he had headed had not acted to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President to which the people of Chile had elected him...if he (Helms) failed to tell the whole truth in that forum (The Senate), he would be liable under the "refusal of a witness to testify" section of the federal criminal code, EVEN IF HE ONLY MISLED THE SENATE OR EVADED THE QUESTIONS." "Helms on that day had an honorable way out of his dilemma (between violating his CIA secrecy oath and his duty to testify truthfully). He could have told the Senators that, in his view, his National Security Act oath had priority over the oath which he had just taken to tell the Senate the truth.... "That would have been an honest and forthright thing to do, but it would have spilled the beans. That action would have been taken as an admission that the CIA had in fact done the dark deeds with which it had been charged. One can only speculate about what the Senators would have done if confronted by Helms in such an upright posture...Given Congress's past record of obeisance to all the intelligence agencies whenever they breathe the term "national security," it is hard to imagine the Senators inflicting a hard rap on Helms's knuckles. "But the former CIA chief wanted it both ways. He wanted to SEEM TO TELL THE TRUTH WHILE NOT DOING SO, and of course HE WANTED TO GET AWAY WITH IT, BOTH PERSONALLY AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SYSTEM OF SECRECY WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY. He failed to get away with this straddle because too much was known about the Chile operation, and so he found himself in court on what might have been a criminal charge of PERJURY (Oh no! The "P"-word!!) BUT WAS REDUCED, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT, TO A MERE MISDEMEANOR. "Enter the question of BLACKMAIL. This in not to accuse Helms of employing that crude protective device, but it must be said that he was in a position to threaten his superious with some extremely embarrassing disclosures. For he did not act alone in the matter of Chile. It is clear from the record that Henry Kissinger and the Forty Committed of the National Security Council, which he headed, were in this up to their ears. What the CIA did in its ultimately successful effort to get rid of Allende, thus subverting representative government in Chile and making a military dictatorship inevitable, had the enthusiastic approval of the Nixon White House. Helms was just one of the agents in this operation. But if he chose to tell all he wound have pulled the temple of intelligence down around everyone's heads." "The point is that all this dirty work was done in the name of national security. The true national security, correctly defined, was never involved....Senator Frank Church who was the chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, commented on the decision to allow Helms to plead nolo on a misdemeanor that he had "thought there was to be an end to the double standard of justice for the big shots" but that "apparently Helms was too hot to handle." (The Nation, 11/12/77) And on 11/19/77, The Nation reported, "The Helms case has now been settled by a bargain that led to a no-contest plea to the reduced charge of a misdemeanor--as against the crime of Perjury before Congress (WHICH HE CERTAINLY COMMITTED-SIC)--followed by a $2000.00 fine, a 2 year jail sentence (suspended) and a year of probation..." There was, in the whole affair, a "startling contrast between the words uttered in the courtroom and the phrases that fell from the lips of Helms and his high-powered lawyer on the courthouse steps. Inside the halls of justice Edward Bennett Williams, the lawyer, had begged the court for leniency for his client on the ground that he would carry "the scar of a conviction for the rest of his days." Outside the court, a trice later, as Helms and Williams talked to reporters, that "scar" had been miraculously changed into "a badge of honor", even a "banner," as the wily attorney put it. "The decicatrization of Helms belongs in the book of miracles for its speed, if not in *The Guinness Book of World Records* for its cynicism. For the truth is that there was never any doubt--pace the vaunted independence of our judiciary and of the judge in this case, Barrington Parker--that Helms would walk out of that court with only the faintest tap on the wrist for his lies to the Senate about the CIA's sinister $8 million involvement in the corruption of Chile's politics.....The QUID the government got for the QUO of Helms's agreement to enter a nolo plea to a misdemeanor was the avoidance of a trial to which the former CIA chief could have brought a heavy load of dirty linen for judicial laundering. Among others, Henry Kissinger's splattered shirts would have been revealed for all to see. "In order t avoid such a spectacle, the government went to extraordinary lengths, EVEN MANUFACTURING A "'CRIME' FOR THE OCCASION" TO WHICH HELMS COULD PLEAD HIS NOLO as Joseph l. Rauh Jr. points out in a letter to The Washington Post (11/9/77). It was "plea-bargaining run riot," Rauh writes. To spare Helms from having to plead to the crime of perjury, which certainly exists, the Justice Department charged him with, he pleaded to, and Judge Parker sentenced him for "a crime that doesn't exist." There is no such misdemeanor as failing to testify "fully, completely and accurately" before Congress....Rauh concludes, "that the law is only peripherally for them. The true lesson of Watergate has even now not been learned." "..(Judge Parker) even found it within him to declare that "From this day forward, let there be no doubt that no one in government is above the law." That is a variation on the theme expressed by Carter at his 1976 Convention, when he said: "It is time for our government leaders to respect the law no less than the humblest citizen, so that we can end the double standard of justice in America. I see no reason why big-shot crooks should go free while the poor ones go to jail." (Do you regard this as a treasonous juxtaposition, Ed?) Astonishingly, President Carter failed to 'stand by his man', Helms. As reported in *The Nation* on 11/26/77, "Carter seems to have stripped Richard Helms of the "badge of honor" which he and his lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, had vaingloriously affixed to his breast outside the court that had just sentenced him (very lightly) for the "misdemeanor" of lying to the Senate about the dirty work in Chile. Carter put it plainly at his 11/10/77 press conference when he said, "No, it is not a badge of honor and a public official does not have a right to lie." Some, perhaps even Dolan, might take exception to my callling Helms act of perjury "Perjury." But that word, "perjury" came from the CIA itself, not me. Powers, incidentally, clarified the question of PERJURY rather neatly, and in a way that vindicated *THE NATION'S* representation: "Helms's part of the bargain was to plead nolo to two misdemeanor charges of violating a federal statute which made it an offense not to testify "fully and completely" before Congress. In addition, the Justice Dept. INSISTED THAT ITS STATEMENT WOULD CHARGE HELMS WITH HAVING "FAILED TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS (PUT TO HIM BY STUART SYMINGTON ON 2/7/73-sic) FULLY, COMPLETELY AND ACCURATELY AS REQUIRED BY LAW." THE WORD "ACCURATELY" WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATUTE GOVERNING HELMS'S PLEA. (Helms's attorney) Williams argued against its inclusion, but the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INSISTED, SINCE THE REAL CHARGE AGAINST HELMS WAS THAT HE HAD LIED. TO DESCRIBE HIS CRIME IN MILDER TERMS WOULD ONLY INVITE PUBLIC REACTION. (Powers, T. p.303-304) *The Nation* had argued that Helms's misdemeanor conviction was for a felonious crime. That is, "HAVING "FAILED TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS (PUT TO HIM BY STUART SYMINGTON BEFORE THE US SENATE ON 2//7/73) FULLY, COMPLETELY AND ACCURATELY AS REQUIRED BY LAW" is a felony charge, not a misdemeanor. (Failing to answer "fully and completely, period" CAN be charged as a misdemeanor. So when *The Nation* said that the US govt. went "to extraordinary lengths, even manufactruring a "'crime for the occasion" to which Helms could plead his nolo (plea)...It was 'plea bargaining run riot'...the Justice Department charged him with, he pleaded to, and Judge Parker sentenced him for 'a crime that doesn't exist. There is no such misdemeanor as failing to testify 'fully, completely and accurately' before Congress...Helms could have avoided all that 'anguish' by taking 'the honorable course' of refusing to discuss the CIA's role in Chile..." in his Senate testimony --but he apparently didn't do the "honorable thing", he tried to deceive Congress and, of course US citizens, on what he and the CIA had done in Chile, and he got caught. Thus it appears that Saint Richard Helms has been the innocent victim of the courts who held he had lied, of the press who held his actions decitful and plorable, of the writer Powers, and even of President Jimmy Carter. Imagine that, Ed! Do you see the makings of a real conspiracy here, Ed? Oh, but no, as you said, so it must therefore be true, that: "What he told the Senate was true. You have no evidence otherwise." Not a whit, as you said. You win, Ed. Gary

HELMS

UNCLASSIFIED

 

The Power of Disinformation

The Lie That Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination

Max Holland

 

On 2 June 1961, just weeks after the Bay of Pigs debacle, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee convened to take testimony from Richard M. Helms, then an assistant deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In those halcyon days of the Agency’s relationship with Congress, it was rare for a CIA official to give a presentation that senators had every intention of making public. The subcommittee, dominated by some of the fiercest anti-Communist members of the Senate, undoubtedly wanted to help repair the Agency’s tarnished image. The hearing, entitled "Communist For-
geries," would surely remind Americans of the threat that Communism posed to Western interests and the Agency’s frontline role in containing that threat.[1]

Helms began his testimony by describing an episode that had just faded from the headlines. It proved just how virulent and resilient a lie can be when everything around it seems to fall into place. Although Helms never used the precise term, the scheme he described would eventually become better known by its KGB appellation: dezinformatsiya or disinformation.

For years, Soviet propagandists had sought to impugn the United States by linking it to France’s brutal colonial war in Algeria. The effort was a mediocre success until 22 April 1961, when four Algerian-based generals organized a putsch against President Charles de Gaulle, who was trying to extract France from the seven-year conflict. Coincidentally, one of the plotters, Air Force Gen. Maurice Challe, had served in NATO headquarters and was unusually pro-American for a senior French officer. This fact provided the basis for a fabrication that the plotters enjoyed the CIA’s support.[2]

"This lie was first printed on the 23rd of April by a Rome daily," Helms testified. In English, the headline in Paese Sera read, "Was the Military Coup d’état in Algeria Prepared in Consultation with Washington?"[3] The very next day, Pravda, citing Paese Sera, ran a story alleging CIA support for the revolt, as did TASS and Radio Moscow. Other Soviet Bloc and then Western outlets picked up the story, which gathered credibility with every re-telling. Eventually Le Monde, the most respected and influential newspaper in France, ran a lead editorial that began, "It now seems established that some American agents more or less encouraged Challe." The vehemence of the US Embassy’s denial was primarily taken as an indication of the allegation’s truth.[4]

As the story spread to this side of the Atlantic, the controversy grew to such a pitch that it threatened to disrupt President Kennedy’s state visit to France, scheduled for May 1961. Relations remained testy until Maurice Couve de Murville, France’s foreign minister, went before the National Assembly and sought to quell the allegation.[5] Altogether, Helms observed, the episode was an "excellent example of how the Communists use the false news story" to stunning effect. And it had all started with an Italian paper that belonged "to a small group of journals published in the free world but used as outlets for disguised Soviet propaganda…instead of having this originate in Moscow, where everybody would pinpoint it, they planted the story first in Italy and picked it up from Italy…."[6]

Helms’s testimony reveals that the CIA’s Counterintelligence (CI) Staff had a sophisticated understanding of how dezinformatsiya worked by no later than 1961.[7] Yet six years later, a grander and more pernicious concoction originating in the same newspaper, Paese Sera, would go unexamined, unexposed, and unchallenged. This lapse, while understandable in context, proved a costly one for the Agency over the long run. Paese Sera’s successful deception turns out to be a major reason why many Americans believe, to this day, that the CIA was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.[8]

Garrison Opens His Investigation

The complex story begins in early February 1967, when the FBI and CIA learned about a striking development in New Orleans. Two years after the completion of the federal inquiry into President Kennedy’s death by the Warren Commission, the local district attorney, Jim Garrison, had opened his own investigation into the November 1963 assassination.[9] Whatever Garrison was up to, he did not seem intent on involving the federal government. So both the Bureau and the CIA simply awaited the next development, believing, like most Americans, that no responsible prosecutor would dare reopen the case unless he truly had something.

On 17 February, the New Orleans States-Item revealed Garrison’s reinvestigation to the world and ignited a media firestorm. The first legal action, however, did not occur until 1 March 1967, when Garrison ostentatiously arrested an urbane local businessman named Clay Shaw and charged him with masterminding a plot that culminated in President Kennedy’s death.[10] Both the Bureau and the CIA rushed to their respective files and ran name traces on Shaw, a man who had never been linked to the assassination despite Washington’s painstaking investigation. Insofar as the Agency was concerned, only one sliver of information was noteworthy. The businessman now charged with the crime of the century had once been a source for the CIA through its Domestic Contact Service (DCS).

The CIA’s concerted effort to gather foreign intelligence from domestic sources had its roots in World War II. After the conflict, careful analysis revealed that a coordinated effort to collect information known to American citizens might have averted some bitter failures. Thus, when the CIA was formed in 1947, it was handed responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence within the United States, and DCS offices were discreetly opened in several major cities. DCS officers sought contact with American citizens who traveled abroad and were in a position to acquire significant foreign intelligence as a routine matter. The highest priority, naturally, was attached to debriefing Americans who traveled behind the Iron Curtain or to international conferences where they met Soviet Bloc citizens. Although all DCS relationships with individual Americans were routinely classified "secret," the information gleaned was often no more confidential than what could be gained from a close reading of the Wall Street Journal. By the mid-1970s, DCS files contained the names of 150,000 Americans who had willingly provided information or were promising sources.[11]

Shaw had volunteered his first report to the DCS in 1948, the year that the division of Europe into antagonistic blocs hardened. His offering concerned Czechoslovakia, a country whose fate had gripped Americans’ imagination. Until February 1948, Czechoslovakia had been a pluralistic, democratic state, mindful of Soviet national security concerns but linked economically and intellectually to the West. Then, in the space of seven days, it was abruptly transformed into a Communist dictatorship, a shattering development because it suggested a replay of events that had led to the last world war. In December 1948, Shaw informed the CIA about the new regime’s effort to expand exports via the New Orleans Trade Mart. He shared details about a lease for exhibition space that had been negotiated with a Czech commercial attaché based in New York.[12]

That voluntary report led to an extended relationship on matters involving commercial and international trends. Shaw was an observant businessman who traveled widely. It was effortless for him to pick up the kind of information useful to analysts inside the US Government. Over the next eight years, Shaw relayed information on 33 separate occasions, his fluency in Spanish helping to make him a particularly astute observer of trends in Central and South America. His reports about devaluation in Peru, a proposed new highway in Nicaragua, and the desire of Western European countries to trade with the Soviet bloc—a subject of keen interest to Washington because of worries about technology transfers—were invariably graded "of value" and "reliable."[13]

Why the relationship ended after 1956 is not revealed in any of the recently declassified CIA files or Shaw’s own papers. Whatever the reason, the documentary record is clear: Shaw was not handed off by the DCS and developed as a covert operative by the CIA’s Plans (now Operations) Directorate. The relationship just lapsed. He had never received any remuneration and probably considered the reporting a civic duty that was no longer urgent once the hostility between the two superpowers became frozen in place and a new world war no longer appeared imminent.[14]

Upon reviewing Shaw’s file after the businessman’s arrest, Lloyd Ray, chief of the New Orleans DCS office, expressed some concern but saw no reason to be alarmed. "While I do not expect that this office will become involved in the matter," Ray wrote in a 3 March 1967 cable to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, "nevertheless there is always the possibility of this." Ray had joined the DCS in 1948 and knew Shaw personally. A lawyer by training, he suggested briefing Lawrence Houston, the CIA’s general counsel, on the facts of the relationship "to be on the safe side."[15]

European Leftists Fan the Flames

The day after Ray’s cable, on 4 March, the left-wing Roman newspaper Paese Sera published a "scoop" that would reverberate all the way to New Orleans and Langley. According to the afternoon daily, Clay Shaw was no mere international businessman. That profession was a facade for his involvement in "pseudo-commercial" activities via the Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC), a trade-promotion group headquartered in Rome from 1958 to 1962. The defunct CMC had been "a creature of the CIA," according to Paese Sera, "set up as a cover for the transfer to Italy of CIA-FBI [sic] funds for illegal political-espionage activities." Revealingly, one of the CMC’s most nefarious acts, according to Paese Sera, was support for the "philo-fascists" who had attempted to depose Charles de Gaulle in the early 1960s.[16]

The plausibility of the Paese Sera allegations was strengthened immeasurably by a contemporaneous media firestorm. On Valentine’s Day, Ramparts magazine had ignited a controversy over CIA subsidies.[17] As elite news outlets raced to outdo Ramparts by revealing the methodology and extent of covert CIA funding around the world, it became known that anti-communist elements in Italy had been among the beneficiaries of the CIA’s overseas largesse. Moreover, as was the case in 1961, Paese Sera’s 1967 scoop was built around certain undeniable facts: the CMC had existed in Rome; Shaw had been a board member; and now he was charged with having conspired to murder President Kennedy.

The Italian defense, interior, and foreign affairs ministries denied the allegation of a link between the CMC and the CIA, and mainstream Italian newspapers limited themselves to pointing out the Roman connection of the businessman arrested in New Orleans.[18] Other outlets, however, showed less restraint. On 5 March, the day after Paese Sera’s scoop, l’Unità, the newspaper of the Italian Communist Party, published a front page story headlined, "Shaw…was a Rome agent of the C.I.A." Moscow’s Pravda picked up the story on 7 March, publishing it under the simple headline, "Clay Shaw of the CIA." The same theme appeared in the 8 March edition of l’Humanité, the newspaper of the French Communist Party, which reported that the "CIA used [Clay Shaw] for its activities in Italy…where [he specialized] in the financing of political groups considered to be ‘intransigent anti-Communists’."[19] Similar stories then popped up in the leftwing Greek and Canadian press, all of which echoed Paese Sera’s
observation that "in this complex and still obscure matter the CIA certainly has a hand."[20]

Oddly, despite its vast intelligence-gathering apparatus, the Agency missed the seminal article, probably because Paese Sera was not a strict Communist party organ, and therefore not monitored daily.[21] Once the accusation began appearing in organs like Pravda, however, the story grabbed the attention of the CIA’s CI Staff, which ran file traces on CMC and PERMINDEX, its Swiss-based parent corporation. The results were uniformly negative. Neither company was a proprietary or front, nor had either been used to channel funds to anti-Communists as alleged. Agency files also proved that Shaw had never been asked, after 1958, to exploit his affiliation with the CMC for any clandestine purpose. "It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue," reads the Agency’s most detailed review of its links to Shaw, "except that there was a CIA-Shaw relationship."[22]

This emphasis—that there was a "relationship"—marked a conceptual turning point. By focusing on a tangential truth rather than the overwhelmingly falsity of the allegation, the Agency effectively donned a set of blinkers. With its attention fixated on the DCS link, it never dawned on the CIA that a disinformation scheme was at the root of its problem with Garrison—despite Paese Sera’s well-documented involvement in dezinformatsiya and the fact that efforts to link the CIA to the Kennedy assassination had been a staple of communist-oriented publications for three years.[23]

For the Agency, the eight weeks between 4 March and 25 April 1967 were the calm before the storm. During this period, Clay Shaw’s alleged connection to the CIA went unremarked in the United States, save for a brief reference in a leftwing New York newspaper, the National Guardian.[24] Still, the "gruesome proceedings" in New Orleans, as DCS Director James Murphy labeled them, were grounds for concern if not alarm. Garrison seemed intoxicated by the world’s attention and was acting like a carnival barker rather than a DA investigating a grave matter.

Helms, who had become Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1966, asked Ray Rocca, chief of Research & Analysis for the CI Staff, to stay abreast of the situation. During the lull, a lively debate took place between the CI Staff and the DCS over what to do. The latter argued against devoting more time and effort to what already seemed to be a "sensational hoax." Rocca, however, wanted to stay ahead of the disclosure curve, and ultimately his position prevailed. The CIA intensified its monitoring weeks before Garrison actually trained his sights on the Agency. "We regret to have to burden you with this sort of coverage," wrote DCS Chief Murphy in a 20 March letter to the New Orleans office, "but [it] could be damaging to the Agency if some link could be exploded by enterprising news hounds."[25]

Unbeknownst to the Agency, Garrison had been convinced by the Paese Sera article that Shaw was linked to the CIA; that association, in turn, implicated the CIA in a cover-up of the Kennedy assassination. A diary kept by Richard Billings, a LIFE editor who worked closely with the DA in the early stages of the investigation, corroborates the timing and impact of the foreign disinformation on Garrison. Billings’s entry for 16 March, less than two weeks after the publication of the first Paese Sera article, notes that, "Garrison now interested in possible connections between Shaw and the CIA…article in March issue Humanities [l’Humanité] supposedly mentions Shaw’s company [CIA] work in Italy."[26] Six days later, the DA had at least one of the articles in hand. Garrison "has copy [of story about Shaw] datelined Rome, March 7th, from la presse Italien [sic]," Billings records. "It explains Shaw working in Rome in ‘58 to ‘60 period."[27]

Dezinformatsiya thus exerted a profound influence on the prosecution of Clay Shaw. Overriding the opposition of his top aides, who had begged him to drop the case, Garrison now persisted because the DA believed he had nabbed an important "covert operative."[28] Under the duress and publicity of indictment, Shaw would surely fold. And the moment he cracked, Garrison imagined that it would be easy to unmask the sequence of events leading to the assassination in Dallas.

US Media Pick Up the Thread

Despite the flurry of articles in Europe’s pro-Communist press, the sensational revelation about Shaw was not playing well at home. This was a problem for a DA whose modus operandi required a steady drumbeat of positive publicity. Garrison dared not bring up the allegation openly, as he later explained in a letter to Lord Bertrand Russell, the famed British philosopher who was also an avid conspiracy buff. Doing so might hand skeptics in the media the ammunition to destroy his controversial probe.[29] Critical articles had begun to appear, including a devastating exposé of Garrison’s sources and methods that ran in the 23 April Saturday Evening Post.[30] Garrison wanted the Italian story in the news, but via a hidden hand.

On 25 April, the New Orleans States-Item published a front page, copyrighted story. The headline read, "Mounting Evidence Links CIA to ‘Plot’ Probe," and the primary source of the article was "Garrison or one of his people."[31] The story went on to report that Shaw, the pivotal figure in Garrison’s investigation, had been linked to the CIA "by an influential Italian newspaper." It took more than 20 column inches before the article notedthat Paese Sera was "leftist in its political leanings." (The US State Department routinely labeled the afternoon daily a "crypto-Communist" newspaper.) Inexorably, the Associated Press picked up the New Orleans States-Item scoop for distribution on its national wire. It was reprinted, in truncated form, in hundreds of newspapers nationwide on 26 April. Even the august New York Times ran a brief item from the wires about the "mounting evidence of CIA links" in District Attorney Jim Garrison’s probe of the assassination.[32] As Richard Billings noted in his diary, "Now Garrison is hard on the trail of the CIA."[33]

The New Orleans States-Item exclusive confirmed the Agency’s worst fears. Just as the media were beginning to catch on that Garrison’s case was flimsy, the DA was moving to draw the CIA into the maelstrom. In a long memo prepared on 26 April, Rocca concluded that it would be "unwise to dismiss as trivial any attempts by Garrison to link the Agency to his plot." Though it is impossible to discern what the New Orleans DA "knows or thinks he knows," wrote Rocca, the grim truth, given the Ramparts exposé, was that the "impact of such charges…will not depend principally upon their veracity or credibility but rather upon their timeliness and the extent of press coverage."[34] From this point on, Garrison would not utter a word without it being parsed inside Agency headquarters.

Having laid the groundwork with his calculated leak to the New Orleans States-Item, Garrison now unleashed a barrage of sensational accusations. In no particular order, Garrison alleged that Kennedy’s alleged assassin Lee Oswald had been under the control of the CIA; the CIA had whitewashed the real assassins; the CIA had lied to the Warren Commission and concealed evidence with the FBI’s connivance— no, the CIA had lied to the FBI too![35] As with Senator Joe McCarthy, the legitimacy conferred by public office gave Garrison a license for audacious mendacity, a privilege he exploited to the hilt. These charges made for new accusatory headlines in New Orleans and elsewhere throughout the month of May, but also served a second purpose. They had the simultaneous effect of blunting the increasing number of articles criticizing the DA’s probe. The impression left was that Garrison was being put under siege because he dared to tell the truth.

A Rock and a Hard Place

The CIA occasionally responded to a specific allegation from the barrage, but never issued a substantive, thorough rebuttal for fear that it would only create a larger problem for itself and for Shaw. Disclosing the Shaw-DCS connection was ruled out as too explosive, given the nature of Shaw’s indictment and the spotlight the Agency was already under because of the Ramparts exposé. At the very least, DCS sources and methods would be scrutinized, and virtually all Americans traveling abroad would fall under suspicion. Every businessman or scholar who had ever cooperated voluntarily would think twice before doing so again. The DCS as a whole would likely be damaged, perhaps irreparably. Then, too, the Agency had to contemplate the cost of disclosure to Clay Shaw. Garrison’s scapegoating of the CIA left officers more persuaded than ever that the DA knew about Shaw’s DCS contact, and that he probably intended to distort the connection during Shaw’s trial.[36]

Despite the surface placidity of the CIA’s "no comment" responses, internally the Agency was seething. The "Red Flash" and "Red Comet" editions of the New Orleans States-Item, in particular, were received with the kind of enthusiasm normally reserved for Pravda. The CIA had weathered public debacles like the Bay of Pigs and the Ramparts exposé; had deflected criticism in the press and from books; and had resisted attempts to broaden Congressional oversight. Never in its 20-year existence, however, had it confronted such a challenge from an elected public official with legal, albeit limited, authority. Garrison’s allegations— the "grossest we have seen from any responsible American official"—gave the Agency fits, just as they did Shaw and Shaw’s lawyers.[37] For months, the tactics of what Rocca called "that wild man down there" preoccupied senior CIA officers. When Shaw’s trial appeared imminent, DCI Helms ordered an ad hoc committee to formulate a strategy—six of CIA’s highest officials comprised this "Garrison Group."[38]

Ray, the New Orleans DCS chief, sent reports back to headquarters about efforts to goad the Agency into a reaction that would be good for a few more headlines. Ray also expressed concern over the possibility that Garrison might bug DCS offices or tap its telephones, so a secure communications link with CIA headquarters was established. As the "bizarre and unsubstantiated" campaign to implicate the CIA reached a fever pitch in the late spring, an Agency internal memo dated 6 June observed that Garrison had "attacked CIA more vehemently, viciously and mendaciously than has any other American official or private citizen whose comments have come to our attention. In fact, he [has] outstripped the foreign Communist press, which is now quoting him delightedly."[39] Left-leaning and Communist organs presented Garrison’s allegations as affirmation of America’s deeply confused and corrupt political system. The KGB delighted in such Garrison quotes as one saying that the CIA was "infinitely more powerful than the Gestapo [had been] in Nazi Germany."[40]

With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that the Agency never gained its footing amid Garrison’s blizzard of accusations, even though there were scattered clues as to what was going on behind the scenes.[41] On 1 May, for example, Jack Miller, a former assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, called the CIA’s general counsel to offer some intelligence that had come to Miller "from within Garrison’s office." Miller’s inside information was that a "left-wing newspaper published in Rome, the Paese Sera," was the source for the story that Shaw was a director of the CMC and that the CMC was a "CIA organization." Miller apparently did not know, or did not convey, how much importance Garrison attached to the ostensible revelation. There is no evidence that the CI Staff followed up on his inside information.[42]

The CIA Continues To Play It Low Key

Like the Agency, Shaw’s lawyers were groping their way through the fog of charges generated by Garrison via the media. Shaw’s lawyers were confident that their client was leveling with them and publicly denied that he was a clandestine CIA operative.[43] In September 1967, however, when a trial appeared imminent, there was a revealing contact between Shaw’s attorneys and the Justice Department. The defense team was "confused by the [CIA] smoke-screen Garrison was raising," and wanted to talk to someone in the federal government "who could steer them as to the true facts and circumstances," according to an 18 September CIA memo.[44]

Some sharing of information might have helped, but Agency officials found the request for cooperation too risky, newly available documents show. "New Orleans is such a seamy maze that the risk of under-the-table deals is always present," concluded a 25 September Agency memo. "Moreover, if Garrison learned of federal assistance to Shaw’s lawyers, he’d play it to the hilt."[45] Shaw’s defense team thus returned to New Orleans empty-handed and puzzled over the government’s apparent nonchalance, given that Washington was very much on trial, too.

Via this brief contact, the CIA learned that one of its assumptions was wholly incorrect. All along, Agency officials had presumed that Shaw told his lawyers about the DCS relationship once his alleged link to the CIA became an issue. But after meeting with Shaw’s defense team, Justice Department attorneys shared their "very clear impression" that Shaw had not confided in his own lawyers.[46]

Overhanging everything, insofar as the CIA was concerned, was the upcoming trial. The Agency had to proceed on the assumption that Garrison would play his trump card in the courtroom and flummox the jury. "The fact that Garrison’s charges against CIA are false," noted a 13 September memorandum, "does not mean that when he goes to court his case will collapse like a house of cards."[47] The decision on how to prepare for that dreaded day was outlined in a memo submitted by Houston to DCI Helms in October 1967. It is perhaps the most revealing CIA document generated during the entire affair, as it lays out all the sundry allegations of CIA involvement and the truth in each instance. The CIA general counsel’s recommendation, developed in consultation with other members of the Garrison Group, was stark: other than active resistance to any subpoenas from Garrison, the best course of action was to do nothing.[48]

The catch, Houston acknowledged, was that a tight lip threatened to leave Shaw at Garrison’s mercy. Shaw’s lawyers would have no way of refuting allegations without documents and testimony from the CIA. Yet a controlled disclosure of exculpatory information seemed unachievable. A local judge would be under intense pressure to rule that the federal government could not both submit material evidence and hide behind claims of national security or executive privilege. Under these circumstances, Houston reasoned, the best thing to do would be to take no action whatsoever, and hope that the defendant would win acquittal without CIA intervention. If Shaw were to "be convicted on information that could be refuted by CIA," concluded Houston, "we may be in for some difficult decisions."[49]

As it turned out, the dilemma Houston described did not materialize for more than a year. Shaw’s talented legal team, determined to win an acquittal, introduced several motions (including a request for a change of venue) that had the effect of postponing the trial repeatedly.

Meanwhile, Garrison kept fine-tuning his theory about the assassination. In February 1968, he unveiled what would be his final and enduring explanation during a Dutch television show hosted by a left-wing, anti-American journalist named Willem Oltmans.[50] According to Garrison, it was no longer the case that the CIA was an unwitting accomplice to the murder and then an accessory after the fact. No, the truth had turned out to be much worse. Garrison now averred that the Agency had consciously plotted the assassination, executing the plan in concert with the "military-industrial complex." Both had a vested interest in the continuation of the Cold War and the escalation of the hot war in Vietnam. President Kennedy wanted to end both conflicts; that was why he had to be assassinated.

The shift in Garrison’s line went largely unnoticed at first—except at the CIA, which was monitoring the DA’s every utterance. As Rocca observed in a March 1968 memo, "Garrison has now reached the ultimate point in the logic of his public statements…. This is by and large the Moscow line." For a fleeting moment, Rocca, one of the Agency’s most esteemed counterintelligence experts, seemed to be musing about the possibility of a Soviet hand in all that had happened, given that the statement fit so neatly with Moscow’s known goals. But Rocca’s insight never went further than this brief speculation.[51]

Around the same time in 1968, Garrison began to recognize that an adverse legal outcome would detract from what he had achieved in the public mind. Many of his key assistants didn’t believe the accusations about CIA involvement; moreover, none of them could be proved in court. While expressing confidence that the Shaw indictment would never actually be tested in a courtroom, Garrison remarked to Tom Bethell, one of his investigators, that we have "made our point."[52] On this one issue, the undesirability of a trial, the CIA was in complete agreement with its New Orleans nemesis. The Agency vastly preferred no trial, even if it meant Garrison prattling on forever about CIA involvement, uncontradicted by a decisive verdict. By the time Shaw finally achieved his day in court on 21 January 1969, he was probably the only party who wanted to be there.

The Trial

The trial lasted 35 days. Despite two years’ worth of allegations and a specific promise of testimony that would "rock the nation," Garrison’s case was remarkably unchanged from the loopy account presented at Shaw’s preliminary hearing in March 1967. As such, it was decidedly anticlimactic. Nonetheless, the Agency’s apprehension was palpable throughout the trial. It closely monitored news accounts and ran name-checks on the jurors and some witnesses. Officers were in attendance throughout.

The prosecution, to the Agency’s surprise, never mentioned the CIA in the courtroom. The stance of the lead prosecutor, James Alcock, was probably decisive in this regard. No one on Garrison’s staff had belittled the notion of CIA complicity more than Alcock.[53] The closest Garrison came to articulating his conspiracy theory about CIA involvement was during the summation, when he appealed to the jury to deliver a message to those who had plotted the coup d’état.[54] The jurors were not impressed, and rendered a unanimous verdict of "not guilty" after deliberating 54 minutes.

Ultimately, it had been left to Shaw’s attorneys to raise the issue that had caused such anxiety within CIA headquarters for two years. They did so with dispatch, in one question during direct examination of their client. "Have you ever worked for the Central Intelligence Agency?" asked lead defense attorney F. Irvin Dymond. "No, I have not," replied Clay Shaw, reserving for himself a small kernel of truth that no one else in the courtroom needed to know.[55]

Bittersweet Victory

A "glorious, a wonderful, a sweet, and a very grand victory," one of the defense lawyers called it. Yet for Shaw, relief was short-lived. Within 48 hours, Garrison rearrested Shaw on two counts of perjury, neither of which pertained to Dymond’s question. If convicted, he faced a 20-year prison sentence. Garrison’s private correspondence right after the verdict makes clear that he hadn’t wavered from the conviction that Shaw was an "important CIA operative," although he still never uttered those words in public.

With the media now firmly on Shaw’s side—even the New Orleans States-Item had done an about-face after the verdict—the defendant’s lawyers allowed their client to begin speaking publicly. That openness resulted in the most expansive answer Shaw would ever give on the subject of the Paese Sera allegation. Still, he chose to keep concealed his unpaid cooperation with the DCS.

The idea [behind the CMC] was to have one place where buyers coming into the Common Market area would find all the Common Market countries represented in one (trade) center…. It turned out to be either badly planned or badly organized and it closed very shortly, and that was the last I ever heard of it. I never heard that it was a CIA operation and I don’t know that it was…. Other than what I’ve told you, I know nothing more about the Centro Mondiale Commerciale. I have never had any connection with the CIA.[56]

In 1971, Shaw’s lawyers reached a court willing to put an end to Garrison’s abuse of prosecutorial authority. On 27 May, Federal Judge Herbert W. Christenberry enjoined Garrison from prosecuting the perjury charges and, for that matter, ever hauling Shaw into a courtroom again in connection with the Kennedy assassination.[57] The CIA let loose a sigh of relief along with the long-suffering defendant. The Agency had been cautiously following the case all the while, even though it no longer generated adverse headlines—in fact, it was getting almost no headlines at all. "Looks like Mr. Garrison is on the ropes and will have all he can do to keep the hornets away," noted DCS Director Murphy in October 1971, as he officially closed the file.[58] Garrison’s pursuit of Shaw was now widely regarded as a legal farce and a fraud. The episode had even precipitated a bitter split among the many critics of the Warren Commission report on the assassination, nearly all of whom had flocked to Garrison’s side in 1967. Now many of them considered the Orleans Parish DA to be the Joe McCarthy of their cause. Just as the Wisconsin senator disgraced anti-Communism by making reckless charges that ruined innocent peoples’ lives, they believed that Garrison had irrevocably set back the case against the Warren Report by persecuting an innocent man.

Battle Over Perceptions

Although 1971 marked the nadir of Garrison’s legal quest, the Agency was mistaken in assuming that the struggle over public perceptions had ended. An abject failure in courts of law, Garrison’s probe achieved a latent triumph in the court of public opinion. The DA’s message became part and parcel of what has been called "the enduring power of the 1960s in the national imagination."[59]

Garrison triumphed in this sphere partly because his thirst for vindication was unlimited. He sloughed off Christenberry’s decision and adopted the position that the validity of his investigation ought not to be judged on its legal results. To anyone who would listen, he claimed that the "company" (a.k.a. the CIA) was the all-powerful entity that had thwarted his investigation. The defiant mood in the DA’s camp was captured in a 10 July 1971 letter to Garrison from Ralph Schoenman, Bertrand Russell’s former personal secretary and a like-minded conspiracy theorist who remained staunchly supportive. Schoenman proposed the strategy that Garrison would eventually pursue.

I have thought about the situation with the company right now. One of their primary objectives is to keep you off balance, defensive, always on the run from them and never able to pause sufficiently to regain the offensive…. Paradoxically, by stopping you from using the courts against Shaw, they have FREED you to put the case into a book. Now it cannot be considered sub judice or prejudicial to a trial. So, I suggest urgently that we take the offensive. Let’s get out a book, hard and fast, which nails the case against Shaw that we couldn’t get into the courts…. let’s put THEM on the defensive by blowing the Shaw case sky high with a muck-raking book that closes in on the company even closer.[60]

Before Garrison could follow Schoenman’s advice, however, the DA had to contend with a $5 million dollar lawsuit lodged by Shaw, although his finances were so depleted that he could barely afford to file. The retired businessman had retained four lawyers and a small army of private investigators to keep pace with Garrison. Shortly after giving his first deposition, Shaw died in August 1974, his lifespan doubtlessly shortened by having his world shattered.

As the episode faded from view, the Paese Sera articles became akin to the Dead Sea scrolls of the investigation, an inner secret shared by Garrison’s shrinking band of die-hard believers. Shaw was a "high-ranking CIA operative in Italy" and the Paese Sera articles proved it. Within this small circle of pro-Garrison conspiracy buffs, the DA was the person who had been martyred, victimized by the vast but hidden power of "the company"andits "disinformation machinery." The alleged link between Shaw and the CIA became a staple of conspiracy books published in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era.[61]

In December 1973, former CIA officer Victor Marchetti went public with information that fanned the embers. Marchetti, executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA before his 1969 resignation, had been present at several high-level meetings in which DCI Helms expressed sympathy for Shaw’s predicament. Marchetti overheard Helms instructing General Counsel Houston to help Shaw, consistent with the Agency’s interests. Marchetti aired this information shortly before publishing his 1974 exposé, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. In keeping with his now-antagonistic relationship with the Agency, he couched the disclosure in such a way as to suggest that it was just as likely that the CIA had concealed a nefarious connection with Shaw as an innocuous one.[62]

Unfounded assertions of CIA complicity were bolstered inadvertently by a series of investigations of the Intelligence Community in the 1970s. The 1975 Rockefeller Commission report was followed by the 1976 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 1979 report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). All examined the CIA’s activities both before and after Kennedy’s assassination, and, in the case of HSCA, specifically looked into Shaw’s supposed role as a high-ranking operative. The bottom line in each instance gave no credence to any of Garrison’s allegations about Shaw and the CIA. Inexorably, however, the mere fact that such questions were asked helped fashion Garrison into something of a prophet in the public mind.[63]

In 1979, Shaw’s link to the CIA was dredged up again when former DCI Helms gave a deposition in a libel case. The lawsuit involved a 1975 book entitled Coup d’état in America: The CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, yet another book that had swallowed the Paese Sera deception.[64] Although not party to the suit, Helms was deposed by the defendants’ attorney. Under oath, he divulged the kernel of truth that the Agency and Shaw had struggled to keep secret when Garrison’s probe was at its height. Helms accurately described Shaw’s contact with the CIA from 1948 to 1956: at "one time, as a businessman, (Shaw) was one of the part-time contacts of the Domestic Contact Division."[65] Garrison, by then a Louisiana state judge, pounced on Helms’s disclosure and distorted it. Garrison wrote in his memoir that the disclosure represented "confirmation…that Clay Shaw had been an agent."[66]

Losing the Fight

Bolstered by these developments, Garrison tried to implement the advice rendered by Schoenman in 1971: write a "muckraking book" that would bring the Shaw-CIA connection front and center. It took Garrison more than four years to find a publisher for his memoir, although he hawked it with a promise to reveal, for the first time, the actual CIA hand in the assassination. Fifteen major publishers rejected the manuscript. Finally the memoir found a home at a small New York-based press, which printed On the Trail of the Assassins in 1988. For the first time, Garrison made explicit the connection between his grand conspiracy theory and Shaw’s link to the CIA (Paese Sera’s version). To explain why he had not made the affiliation known when it presumably might have counted—during the trial—Garrison claimed that he did not learn about Shaw’s CIA activities in Italy until after 1969.[67]

None of this seemed to matter, least of all to the CIA, until the publisher of Garrison’s memoir thrust a copy into the hands of filmmaker Oliver Stone during an international film festival in Cuba.[68] That chance encounter eventually led to the endorsement of Paese Sera’s disinformation by a major Hollywood film, JFK. In the movie, Garrison (portrayed by Kevin Costner) confronts Shaw (played by Tommy Lee Jones) with an Italian newspaper article exposing Shaw’s role as a CIA operative. The confrontation, of course, never occurred in real life; yet the scene captures a hidden historical truth. The epicenter of Garrison’s prosecution, and the wellspring for his ultimate theory of the assassination, was the DA’s belief in a fantasy published by a Communist-owned Italian newspaper.[69]

According to one historian who admires Stone, the movie JFK probably "had a greater impact on public opinion than any other work of art in American history" save Uncle Tom’s Cabin.[70] While that may be hyperbole, not many Hollywood films can claim to have generated new legislation. JFK ignited a public clamor for millions of pages of documents that had been "suppressed" as part of the government’s alleged massive cover-up.

In response, Congress passed a sweeping statute in 1992, the President John F. Kennedy Records Collection Act, which forced open all federal records relating to the assassination and an unexpected amount of state, local, and private records as well—including those of the former Orleans Parish district attorney. The law directed that these documents be catalogued and housed at the National Archives.

Oliver Stone likes to assign full credit for the legislation to his film, which is something of an exaggeration. The coincidental end of the Cold War also played a critical role in the enactment and implementation of the 1992 law. More disingenuously, Stone claims that while the records declassified by the statute have not produced a "smoking gun," they have opened "a clear historical record of a cover-up taking place."[71]

In truth, one legacy of Stone’s JFK is an altogether ironic one. Far from validating the film’s hero, the new documents have finally lifted the lid on the disinformation that was at the core of Jim Garrison’s unrelenting probe. The declassified CIA records document that everything in the Paese Sera story was a lie, and, simultaneously, reveal the genuine nature and duration of Clay Shaw’s innocuous link to the CIA. These same records explain why the CIA never responded appropriately to the disinformation, as it had in Helms’s 1961 Senate testimony and would later do in swift response to such schemes in the 1980s. Finally, the personal files turned over by Garrison’s family underline the profound impact that one newspaper clipping had on a mendacious district attorney adept at manipulating the Zeitgeist of the late 1960s.


 

[1] Senate Judiciary Committee, Communist Forgeries (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961). In September 1961, "Communist Forgeries" became the first Senate hearing ever translated into three foreign languages (Spanish, French, and Italian).

[2] Ibid., pp. 2-4.

[3] "Preparato in accordo con Washington il colpo di stato militare in Algeria?" Paese Sera, 22-23 April 1961.

[4] "Communist Forgeries," pp. 2-4.

[5] "Paris Rumors on C.I.A.," The New York Times, 2 May 1961, and "French Minister Tries to Halt Rumors of U. S. Role in Mutiny," The New York Times, 6 May 1961.

[6] "Communist Forgeries," pp. 2-3.

[7] The KGB’s emphasis on dezinformatsiya as a particularly useful "active measure" (the Soviet term for covert activities) is a staple in intelligence literature. Among the earliest reliable accounts is Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972). See also Vladislav M. Zubok, "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-1962," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, Issue 4, Fall 1994, pp. 22-33.

[8] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 219-220. On the 30th anniversary of the assassination, according to national polls cited by Moynihan, three-quarters of those surveyed believed the CIA had murdered the President.

[9] Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused assassin, had lived in New Orleans for five months prior to the murder, which provided the pretext for Garrison’s probe.

[10] For the circumstances of Shaw’s arrest, see Patricia Lambert, False Witness: The Real Story of Jim Garrison’s Investigation (New York: M. Evans, 1998). At the time of the arrest, Garrison had no knowledge of any actual or presumed link between Shaw and the CIA.

[11] Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report to the President (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1975), pp. 208-210.

[12] Subject: Clay L. Shaw, Enclosure 21, Microfilm, Box 23, HSCA Segregated CIA Collection (hereafter HSCA/CIA Collection), John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, National Archives (hereafter JFK NARA). See also Information Report No. 00-B-9381, Central Intelligence Agency, 27 December 1948, File JFK-M-04 (F2), Box 1, Miscellaneous CIA Series (hereafter CIA Series), JFK NARA. Seven of Shaw’s reports are contained in this file.

[13] Memo to Director, DCS, from Chief, New Orleans Office, re Clay Shaw, 3 March 1967, JFK-M-04 (F3), Box 1, CIA Series; Memorandum re Garrison Investigation: Queries from Justice Department, 28 September 1967, Box 6, Russell Holmes Papers; various Information Reports, JFK-M-04 (F2), Box 1, CIA Series—all JFK NARA.

[14] Memo to Chief, New Orleans Office, from Chief, Contact Division, re Case 20791, 4 June 1956, JFK-M-04 (F2), Box 1, CIA Series, JFK NARA.

[15] Memo, Director, DCS, from Chief, New Orleans Office, 3 March 1967, JFK-M-04 (F3), Box 1, CIA Series, JFK NARA.

[16] "Clay Shaw (arrestato per Kennedy) ha svolto un’oscura attività a Roma," ("Clay Shaw Carried Out Obscure Activity in Rome") Paese Sera, 4 March 1967. The "scoop" ran for three successive days in Paese Sera. An accurate description of the CMC’s purposes is found in "Rome’s Trade Center—How It Came To Be," Chicago Daily Tribune, 17 September 1960.

[17] On 14 February 1967, Ramparts and The New York Times simultaneously revealed that the National Students Association had knowingly accepted cash subsidies from the CIA. See Michael Warner, "Sophisticated Spies: CIA’s Links to Liberal Anti-Communists, 1949-1967," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1996/97, pp. 425-433; Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 121-124; and Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 85-94. In addition to lending the Paese Sera story credence, the Ramparts exposé may have helped precipitate the disinformation to begin with.

[18] Corriere della Sera, for example, ran a story on 5 March entitled "Shaw fu nel consiglio di un centro economico di Roma," ("Shaw Was on the Council of an Economic Center in Rome") that did not mention the CIA at all.

[19] "Clay Shaw a travaillé à Rome pour les services US d’espionnage," ("Clay Shaw Worked in Rome for US Intelligence"), l’Humanité, 8 March 1967.

[20] "Vasta eco alle rivelazioni di Paese Sera sull’attivita italiana di Clay Shaw," ("Vast Echos from Paese Sera’s Revelations on the Italian Activities of Clay Shaw"), Paese Sera, 6 March 1967. It is possible, of course, that the stories simply reflected sloppy and sensational journalism rather than intentional disinformation. Yet one of the entries pertaining to Italy from the so-called "Mitrokhin archive" suggests a KGB provenance. Vasili Mitrokhin, the former KGB archivist who defected to Britain in 1992, brought with him 25,000 pages of handwritten notes about highly sensitive documents. One brief note refers to a disinformation scheme in 1967 that involved Paese Sera and resulted in publication of a false story in New York. See Max Holland, "The Demon in Jim Garrison," Wilson Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Spring 2001.

[21] Though not the official organ, Paese Sera was a proprietary company of the Gruppo Editoriale PCI, and thus owned by the Italian Communist Party. Gaetano Fusaroli, Giornali in Italia (Parma, Italy: Guanda Editore, 1974), pp. 300-301.

[22] Memo for Chief, CI/R&A, "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale," 24 March 1967; and "Subject: Clay L. Shaw," Enclosure 21; both in Microfilm Box 23, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA. Counterintelligence officers retrieved Italian coverage of the story as it appeared in Corriere della Sera and Il Messaggero, but not the seminal Paese Sera article.

[23] Memo from Rocca to Houston, 1 March 1968, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA. Though outdated, the best work on Soviet exploitation of the assassination remains Armand Moss, Disinformation, Misinformation, and the ‘Conspiracy’ to Kill JFK Exposed (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1987). See also Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 225-230.

[24] "New questions raised on JFK killing," National Guardian, 18 March 1967. The New York-based Guardian may well have been the publication referenced in the note from the Mitrokhin archives.

[25] Memo to Chief, New Orleans, from Director, DCS, 20 March 1967, JFK-M-04 (F2), Box 1, CIA Series, JFK NARA.

[26] "Clay Shaw a travaillé à Rome pour les services U.S. d’espionnage," l’Humanité, 8 March 1967.

[27] "Dick Billings’s Personal Notes on Consultations and Interviews with Garrison," p. 25, Richard Billings File, Assassination Archives and Research Center, Washington, DC.

[28] "The Case That Never Was: Former Aides Attack Garrison’s Case Against Shaw," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 20 November 1983. When asked in this article why aides opposed Shaw’s prosecution, Garrison said that most of his assistants were not privy to the behind-the-scene workings of his inquiry.

[29] Letter, Garrison to Russell, 27 August 1967, New Orleans Public Library Microfilm #92-83, JFK NARA.

[30] James Phelan, "A Plot to Kill Kennedy? Rush to Judgment in New Orleans," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXL, 6 May 1967, pp. 21-25.

[31] Interview with Rosemary James, 24 February 2000, and interview with Ross Yockey, 1 March 2000. James and Yockey were two of the five reporters credited with writing the story.

[32] "A Newspaper Links ‘Plot’ Figure to C.I.A.," The New York Times, 26 April 1967.

[33] Billings’s Notes, p. 27, Assassination Archives and Research Center, Washington, DC.

[34] 4 Memo for Assistant Deputy Director for Plans from Rocca, 26 April 1967, Box 6, Russell Holmes Papers, JFK NARA.

[35] The Times-Picayune and States-Item published these allegations, and many others involving the CIA, during the months of May and June 1967.

[36] See, for example, Memorandum No. 7, Re Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination, 13 September 1967, Box 6, Russell Holmes Papers, JFK NARA. In point of fact, Garrison was ignorant of the Shaw-DCS relationship and would remain so for the duration.

[37] Memorandum, Garrison TV Interviews of 21 May 1967 and 28 May 1967, Box 84, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[38] Memorandum for the Record, Garrison Group Meeting No. 1, 20 September 1967, Box 46, Russell Holmes Papers, JFK NARA.

[39] Memorandum, Garrison TV Interviews of 21 May 1967 and 28 May 1967, Box 84, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[40] Memorandum No. 3, Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination, 1 June 1967, Box 84, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[41] A July 1968 letter to Senator Richard Russell from DCI Helms is an excellent summary of the CIA’s perception of the Garrison probe. Nowhere does Helms mention a disinformation scheme as the wellspring of Garrison’s accusations against the Agency. Letter, Helms to Russell with Attachment "Jim Garrison and the CIA," 24 July 1968, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[42] Memo for the Record, Report Concerning Garrison-Kennedy-CIA, 1 May 1967, Box 84, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA. Miller’s source was Walter Sheridan, then a reporter for NBC News and formerly a top aide to Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

[43] "Oswald Depicted as CIA Agent, Sources Here Say," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 6 May 1967.

[44] Memorandum for Executive Director-Comptroller, re Garrison Investigation, 18 September 1967, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[45] Draft Memorandum for the Record, 25 September 1967, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[46] Cable to New Orleans from Office of General Counsel, 29 September 1967, Box 86, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[47] Memorandum No. 7, Re Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination, 13 September 1967, Box 6, Russell Holmes Papers, JFK NARA.

[48] Memorandum for the Director from Lawrence Houston, 2 October 1967, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Memorandum for Director, FBI, 2 March 1968, re Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination: Interview of Garrison on Dutch TV, 1 March 1968, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[51] Memo from Rocca to Houston, 1 March 1968, Box 85, HSCA/CIA Collection, JFK NARA.

[52] "Tom Bethell Diary," 9 March 1968, Box 3, Edward Wegmann Papers, JFK NARA.

[53] Ibid., 22 February 1968.

[54] Jim Garrison’s Closing Argument, 28 February 1969, State of Louisiana vs. Clay L. Shaw, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 198-059, Box 5, Jim Garrison Papers, JFK NARA.

[55] Lambert, p. 153.

[56] Clay Shaw Interview, Penthouse, November 1969, pp. 34-35.

[57] Lambert, pp. 174-175.

[58] Memo to Chief, Dallas Field Office, from Director, DCS, 6 October 1971, File JFK-M-04(F3), Box 1, CIA Series, JFK NARA.

[59] "Steal This Myth: Why We Still Try to Re-Create the Rush of the 60s," The New York Times, 8 August 2000.

[60] Letter, Schoenman to Garrison, 10 July 1971, New Orleans Public Library Microfilm, #92-83, JFK NARA.

[61] See, for example, Robert Sam Anson, "They’ve Killed the President!" The Search for the Murderers of John F. Kennedy (New York: Bantam, 1975), p. 122; Robert D. Morrow, Betrayal(Chicago: Regnery, 1976), p. 92; and Bernard Fensterwald, Coincidence or Conspiracy? (New York: Zebra Books, 1977), pp. 452-453.

[62] Zodiac News Service Press Release, 21 December 1973, File G-1396, World Trade Center, Box 8, Jim Garrison Papers, JFK NARA.

[63] Joe Manguno, "Was Jim Garrison Right After All?" New Orleans, June 1976, and Richard Boyle, "The Strange Death of Clay Shaw," True, April 1975.

[64] Michael Canfield and Alan J. Weberman, Coup d’état in America: the CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (New York: Third Press, 1975), pp. 39-40.

[65] Deposition of Richard McGarrah Helms, 1 June 1984, E. Howard Hunt, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Defendant, No. 80-1121-Civ.-JWK, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Box 6, Jim Garrison Papers, JFK NARA.

[66] Jim Garrison, On the Trail of the Assassins: My Investigation and Prosecution of the Murder of President Kennedy (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1988), p. 276.

[67] Ibid., p. 87.

[68] Lambert, p. xiii.

[69] To drive home the point, just before the credits roll a reference is made to Helms’s 1979 deposition. Rather than quoting Helms, or accurately characterizing Shaw as an unpaid and sporadic contact, the following words appear against a black screen. "In 1979, Richard Helms, director of covert operations in 1963, admitted under oath that Clay Shaw had worked for the CIA."

[70] Robert Brent Toplin, editor, Oliver Stone’s USA: Film, History, and Controversy (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 174.

[71] Ibid., p. 260.

 

Max Holland is a Research Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. His current book project—A Need to Know: Inside the Warren Commission—won the J. Anthony Lukas Work-in-Progress Award for 2001.

Helms-HSCA

 

NOTE: The testimony of Richard Helms, before the HSCA, has been divided into four separate pages because of its size. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, AND PRESENTLY A BUSINESS CONSULTANT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND REPRESENTED BY GREGORY B. CRAIG, OF WILLIAMS & CONNELLY beginning at 4HSCA5...

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Helms. We appreciate your being here today, and the Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith to begin the questioning.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, as part of your association with the CIA were you

required to execute a secrecy oath?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I was.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall testifying before this committee in

executive session on August 9 of this year?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I do.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At that time, Mr. Helms, were you presented

with a series of letters which authorized you to testify fully and

truthfully about all information that you had available pertinent

to the committee's legislative mandate?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be

shown JFK exhibit F-536.

Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that JFK exhibit

F-536 consists of two exhibits, A and B. They are both letters dated

September 1, 1978, from the General Counsel's Office of the CIA.

They are directed to Mr. Helms. [Handed to witness.]

Mr. Chairman, may we have JFK exhibits F-536A and F-536B

admitted into the record?

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, so ordered.

 6

JFK EXHIBIT F-536A

 

OGC 78-6272

21 September 1978

The Honorable Richard Helms

Safeer Company

Suite 402

1627 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ambassador Helms:

The Agency has been notified that the House Select

Committee on Assassinations has invited you to testify in

open session on 22 September 1978.

Please be advised that the Agency agreement with the

Committee, a copy of which was attached to Mr. Carlucci's

letter to you dated 27 July 1978, deals only with the dis-

cussion of classified matters in executive session. It does

not constitute a grant of authority to discuss classified

matters in public circumstances, nor a waiver of any secrecy

oath or agreement that might otherwise be applicable in such

circumstances. Therefore, if you are asked any questions in

open session requiring the disclosure of classified informa-

tion, I suggest that you indicate to the Committee your

willingness to respond in executive session and that you ask

the Committee to convene such a session for that purpose-

Sincerely,

 

Anthony A. Lapham

General Counsel

JFK EXHIBIT F-536A

 7

JFK EXHIBIT F-536 B

21 September 1978

The Honorable Richard Helms

Safeer Company

Suite 402

1627 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ambassador Helms:

By way of elaboration upon Mr. Lapham's letter to you

of this date concerning your testimony in open session

before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on

22 September, Mr. Lapham has authorized me to relay the fol-

lowing to you. You are, of course, completely at liberty to

discuss unclassified materials, including the materials

which have been declassified and made available to your

counsel on 20 September 1978. However, in the event a

response would involve the disclosure of classified infor-

mation, whether based on these or other materials, it is the

Agency's position that you should so inform the Committee

and request that your response be heard in executive session.

Sincerey,

John D. Morrison Jr.

Deputy General Counsel

 8

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, have you received the originals of

these letters?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Have you had a chance to discuss these letters

with your attorney?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand these letters?

Mr. HELMS. I hope so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand that at today's hearing you

are still obliged to testify truthfully before this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I understand that.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand, Mr. Helms, that in the event

that your testimony touches upon classified information, the alter-

native would be to request that the committee go into executive

session?

Mr. HELMs. I understand that, sir.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that the letters

that Mr. Ambassador was shown at the August 9 hearing corre-

spond with JFK exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127.

Mr. Helms, what was the organizational function of the Deputy

Directorate for Plans in 1963?

Mr. HELMS. The Deputy Director for Plans or the Deputy Direc-

torate for Plans? I was the Deputy Director for Plans and head of

an organization which performed certain covert activities overseas.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Before you proceed I would like to show you JFK

exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127 from the hearing that we

had in August.

[Handed to witness.]

Mr. HELMS. Thank you. [Pause.] I have not read every word of

those memoranda, Mr. Goldsmith, but I recall having seen them on August 9.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At the time did you understand them?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I might ask, for the record, would Mr. Helms'

attorney identify himself.

Mr. CRAIG. My name is Gregory B. Craig, of Williams & Con-

nolly.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you. Returning to my previous question,

would you describe the organizational function or purpose of the

DDP in 1963 which I believe you headed.

Mr. HELMS. That is one of the most--it contained one of the most

highly classified documents in Washington, the description of what

the DDP does, and if you have received a specific authority from

the Director of Central Intelligence to disclose all these activities, I

would be glad to do so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be given a copy of

the declassified transcript from his executive session testimony.

Mr. Helms, I refer your attention to page 4 of that transcript,

specifically lines 111 through 118.

Mr. HELMS. All right, Mr. Goldsmith. Since this has been declas-

sified, I understand, then let me just read what it says:

 9

In 1963, the Deputy-Director for Plans was * * * the Deputy Director who was in charge of--I guess the simplest term is--overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received its mandate from NSC documents.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to conduct espionage and counterespionage and covert actions outside the continental limits of the United States.

Some of the lines you will note have been excised.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand.

Mr. HELMS. So if to the press it is not a coherent statement, it is

because it is not coherent.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I would ask to the extent you are

able to testify without touching upon classified information you

make an effort to do so. Have you had a chance to review the

declassified transcript that the committee made available to you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I have looked through it. I am not sure, though,

that I have become aware of all of the things that have been taken

out and all the things that have been left in. It is really difficult to

read something that has been chopped up the way this has. I have

looked through it but I would not say I have in my head what was

allowed in and what was taken out.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, did the committee make available to

you the testimony from your executive session transcript?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have in front of me these documents which

were made available to me by the committee I think 2 days ago. I

went through them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand that. My question now is, Has the

committee made available to you the full transcript from your

executive session testimony?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I believe I could have come and read it at any

time, at least I was so assured by the committee.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did you ever avail yourself of that opportunity?

Mr. HELMS. I did not.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, what role, if any, did the Agency

have in the investigation of the assassination of President

Kennedy?

Mr. HELMS. At the time that the Warren Commission was

formed, the Agency did everything in its power to cooperate with

the Warren Commission and with the FBI, the FBI having the lead

in the investigation. As best I can recollect, it was the Agency's

feeling that since this tragic event had taken place in the United

States, that the FBI and the Department of Justice would obviously

have the leading edge in conducting the investigation, and that the

Agency would cooperate with them in every way it was possible,

and the same applied to the Warren Commission.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. So I take it, then, that the Agency perceived its

role to be somewhat secondary to the role of the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. What were your specific responsibilities with

regard to the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. As the Deputy Director for Plans, I regarded my

responsibility as being one which saw to it that inquiries given to

the Agency by the FBI or originated with the Warren Commission,

were answered as well and as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Which staff or unit within the CIA was given

primary responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

 10

Mr. HELMS. After I believe maybe 2 or 3 weeks following the

assassination, the counterintelligence staff in the Deputy Director-

ate for Plans was given the job of coordinating and handling the

inquiries which came in and the replies which went back, both to

the FBI and to the Warren Commission, and as you are aware, the

so-called counterintelligence stall had the job in any event of carry-

ing on liaison on covert matters with the FBI for the CIA.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would you describe in general terms what the

organizational function of the counterintelligence staff was in

1963?

Mr. HELMS. In the organization of the Deputy Director for Plans

at that time we had a series of staffs. These staffs were assigned

functions in terms of the mission of the entire DDP. There was a

foreign intelligence staff which dealt with the acquisition of normal

intelligence. There was a counterintelligence staff which provided

staff guidance to the rest of the organization in counterintelligence

say that the counterintelligence staffs mandate was somewhat wider than the others because the CIA had the mandate within the intelligence community to maintain basic files on counterintelligence cases, counterespionage cases, originating overseas.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the investigation of the death of President

Kennedy perceived as a counterintelligence-type case?

Mr. HELMS. It was not perceived in any specific terms at all that

I recollect. It was perceived as a great national tragedy, and I

think the feeling in the Agency was that anything it or its person-

nel could do to help resolve the questions that prevailed at the

time, we would try to do, whether it was counterintelligence, posi-

tive intelligence, or what it was.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state why the CIA staff in particu-

lar was given this responsibility?

Mr. HELMS, Well I think one of the more compelling reasons was

that since it had had through the years the responsibility for

carrying on liaison with the FBI, that it was in a better position

and used to dealing with that Agency and therefore it was sensible

to have them continue to.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Now prior to giving the CI staff this responsibil-

ity was the chief of one of the Western Hemisphere desks desig-

nated to coordinate the flow of information at CIA headquarters?

Mr. HELMS. I believe in the early day after President Kennedy's

demise that there was a feeling that the principal point of interest

as far as the Agency was concerned was Mexico City, where infor-

mation, had been provided by the CIA to the rest of the Govern-

ment that someone called Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch

with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates there. Once it was estab-

lished that this investigation was going to be Far more wide rang-

ing than just Mexico City, the responsibility was transferred.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did this particular desk officer ever-complain to

you about interference with Mr. Angleton, who was then chief of

the CIA staff?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall any complaint, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall whether this desk officer had any

particular responsibilities with regard to the investigation after the

 11

responsibility for coordinating the investigation was transferred to

the CIA staff.

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any recollection of the details.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone, who was

then Director of Central Intelligence, have in the Agency's investi-

gation?

Mr. HELMS. I think that he had the role any Director would have

had that was to see to it that sufficient manpower and funds and

other resources of the Agency were put to work in support of the

Warren Commission and the FBI. And I recall certainly that he

maintained a continuing and abiding interest in these proceedings.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was he kept regularly apprised of the develop-

ments of the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought that he was. I can't tell you in

precise detail 15 years later, but he had every opportunity 5 days a

week at the agency staff meeting to ask any questions on his mind,

and we had every opportunity to pass on to him anything that had

come up we thought would be of interest.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Has Mr. McCone ever indicated to you that he

was not satisfied with the flow of information from below upstream

to him?

Mr. HELMS. In connection with this investigation?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Goldsmith. I think, if

knowing Mr. McCone, if he had been dissatisfied he would have

made his dissatisfaction clear and I wouldn't have forgotten it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You mentioned earlier that the responsibility for

investigating this case was primarily in the hands of the FBI and

the CIA saw itself serving as a support function. Do you think this

division of responsibility was adequate?

Mr. HELMS. But I think it is the only way the matter could have

been handled. I can't conceive of its being handled any differently.

There has to be one investigative organization in charge of an

investigation, and I can't see how this could have been otherwise.

Am I missing something here?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I am not suggesting that you are missing any-

thing, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms, were there any substantive or procedural problems

between the Bureau and the CIA in conducting the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any procedural problems. As for ques-

tions of substance, my memory is not all that clear. I don't know

whether there were some small disagreements about certain as-

pects of this case or not. Certainly investigators, no matter how

well motivated tend to have different emphases, and it may well

be that there were some, but nothing that looms large in my mind

today.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall specifically whether there was any

disagreement in the handling of the Nosenko case?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any disagreement about the so-called

handling of the Nosenko case. There was I believe a difference of

interpretation as to what Nosenko represented. It was my impres-

sion that the FBI had passed on what Nosenko had to say about

Lee Harvey Oswald to the Warren Commission exactly the way

Nosenko had given it to them and that at a later date it was

 12

necessary to point out to the Warren Commission that the bona

Mr Nosenko had not been established.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the agency's investigation reflect any work-

ing hypotheses? By that question I mean, Did any particular aspect

of the investigation receive emphasis?

Mr. HELMS. You mean inside the CIA?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Oh I think there was concern among many officers

working on these matters that the Soviets might have been in-

volved in this in some fashion and that the Cubans might have

been involved in some fashion, I imagine we shared the concerns of

the Warren Commission at the time. After all, there is a lot of give

and take and conversation and meetings back and forth and one

organization obviously influences the sensations of another

organization.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency pay particular attention to the

area of foreign conspiracy? You made reference to Soviet involve-

ment and Cuban involvement. Was that the primary focus?

Mr. HELMS. That was obviously a matter of prime concern and since Nosenko was in the Agency's hands this became one of the most difficult issues to face that the Agency had ever faced. Here a President of the United States had been murdered and a man had come from the Soviet Union, an acknowledged soviet intelligence officer, and said his intellignece service had never been in touch with this man and knew nothing about him. This strained credulity at the time. It strains it to this day.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was all information pertinent to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren Commission, M.r Helms?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know how to answer that question, Mr. Goldsmith. I thought we made a major effort to be as cooperative and prompt and helpful as possible. But in recent years I have been through enough to recognize that you can't make a flat statement about anything, so I don't know. Maybe there were some places where it wasn't as prompt as it should have been. But I am not in a position to identify them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state what factors generally governed

whether information was made available to the Warren Commission---

Mr. HELMS. I misunderstood the first part of your question.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state what factors governed whether information was made available to the Warren Commission---

Mr. HELMS. I don't think there were any governing factors except

the necessity for us to be careful about our sources and methods in

certain cases, and I believe that obstacle was gotten over by going

down and having conversations with the Warren Commission at

various times in order to make these points clear on what the

issues were, I don't believe we held anything back.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an

inquiry from the Commission prior to passing information on to

the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I believe so.

 13

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Turning to another area now, to what extent, if any, did Mr. Dulles, former Director of the CIA, play a special role on the Warren Commission insofar as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any sensation that he played any special role. He obviously was in tough with the Agency on two or three occasions, as was only natural under the circumstances. He had been director of it for a long time and he would obviously feel more comfortable dealing with people in the Agency than he might in other agencies of the Government. But I don't recall this had any particular force and effect as far as the conduct of the agency was concerned or the conduct of the Warren Commission investigation.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. To what extent did he attempt to represent the interests of the CIA while serving as a member of the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-529.

[Documents handed to witness.]

Mr. PREYER. If there is no objection, exhibit F-529 will be admitted into the record.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. That's F-529.

[Whereupon, exhibit F-529 was received.]

 

 

 

 

14

JFK EXHIBIT F-529

8 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Discussion with Mr. Dulles

Re the NOSENKO Information

on OSWALD

1. Mr. Dulles, With whom I spoke today, recalled

his earlier conversation with you on this subject and

said that there were still some members of the Commis-

sion who were concerned Rest they suppress the NOSENKO

information now only to have it surface at a future

date. They expressed concern that this could possibly

prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told

Mr. Dulles that this concern was understandable but

that we still felt the best course by far would be to

omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the

final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO

might someday be in a position to claim that he provided

information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that

the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of

other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less.

likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this

way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were in-

cluded as is in the final Commission report and then

later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public

knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater nega--

tive affect on the standing of the Commission's report.

The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still

use the information would be for them to indicate that

doubt existed regarding the source of the information.

We would be opposed to this because it would signal to

NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case

and could also bring about renewed press and public in-

terest in NOSENKO.

2. Mr. Dulles and I then exchanged views on the

possibility of finding language which would allude to

the existence of other, unverified information on the

OSWALD case. This language would permit the Commission

to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it

had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in

15

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

the final report but at the same time it would not be

presented in a manner which would be at variance with

the important operational considerations we have raised.

3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to

find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in

persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to

the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt

this, however, we would have to know precisely in what

context the Commission intended to make use of the

NOSENKO information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to

determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as

possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and

therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the infor-

mation he needs from Mr. Rankin.

4. I have briefed C/SR/CI on these latest

developments and since he and CIA Officer in my shop are

fully cognizant of all the problems involved, they can

work out language for your approval which hopefully will

be satisfactory. C/SR/CI knows Mr. Dulles and would

be the most suitable person to work with him directly if

this is indicated.

 

Chief, SR Division

 

16

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief SR

1. Nosenko's answers to our questions appear to be quite

complete. No really new information appears and they are consistent with his

previous statements. Their chief value lies in the fact that they elaborate

what he has said before concerning OSWALD in the USSR. The details he

provides concerning KGB involvement in the OSWALD case eliminate a number of

minor obscurities which were present in his earlier statements but they do

not change the overall picture of OSWALD's status and activities in t he

USSR.

2. There are, however, some rather surprising statements in Nosenko's

replies - and these statements may call into question all or part of his

story. For example:

a) he says (paragraph 5) that although the KGB recognised that OSWALD

might have been an American agent, no "unusual measures" were taken to check

on this possibility since it had already been decided not to let igim stay in

the USSR.

b) he says (paragraph 16) that the KGB did not consider recruiting

Marina to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered

 

dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband

 

17

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

c) he repeatedly refers to KGB recognition that OSWALD

"was not normal" as the reason for KGB failure to take various steps which it

could normally be expected to take vis-a-vis a foreigner like OSWALD. In

other words, a lack of normality and the KGB's recognition of it provide the

peg for the whole story of KGB hankling of the OSWALD matter.

3. Another sequence of events, as related by Nosenko is noteworthy. he

states that Marina had no trouble marrying OSWALD because he was a resident

of and working in the USSR, and that she had no difficulty leaving the country

because she was married to a foreigner. This reasoning seems to overlook the

fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention via mail to the US.

Embassy) to leave the USSR. If this fact were known to the KGB as we must

presume it was, we would expect Marina's marriage request to have given more

than routine consideration.

 

4. Although I believe that the Commission would be interested in the

entire set of questions and answers as a follow-up to the information it

received earlier from Nosenko via the FBI, perhaps you will think it not

advisable to send them on at this late date, especially in view of the

continuing doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides. There are no specific

points in

 

18

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

specific points in this latest information that change the Oswald story or add

significantly to it and would therefore warrant separate transmittal to the

Commission in my opinion. When the results of our further checks into

Oswald's arrival time in Helsinki are in, we might send along with them

Nosenko's statemetn that a 2-4 day delay in obtaining a Soviet tourist visa is

not uncommon.

C/SR/CI/ Research

 

 

 

 

19

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that you skim through exhibit

F-529, Mr. Helms, paying particular attention, however, to para-

graph No. 3.

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I have read paragraph 3.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does this exhibit, Mr Helms, refresh your

memory on the extent to which Mr. Dulles may have represented

CIA interests while serving "as a member of the Warren

Commission?

Mr. HELMS. I don't read that memorandum that way Mr. Gold-

smith. I read this memorandum to say that since the Agency was

not able to, what shall we say, vouch for the bona fides of Mr.

Nosenko, that this was going to have an effect on the Commission

report and what the Commission had to say and the point at issue

here, if I read this correctly, was how best to have the Commission

word its report, come to its conclusions without leaving itself hang-

ing on a limb on the basis of the fact that they thought that Mr.

Nosenko was bona fide when in fact this had not been demon-

strated. That is the way I read this memorandum.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I certainly understand what the central issue is.

My question is whether Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the

Agency views to the Warren Commission.

Mr. HELMS. I don't get that from reading this exhibit. I believe in

reading the material that you have made available to me that the

gentleman who signed this memorandum made that deposition

before you, and I assume that you asked him what he thought

about it. Did he give a different answer?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I am sorry but I am not in a position

today to answer your questions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my initial line of inquiry. I would

defer to you at this time, sir.

Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Congressman Stokes for such

time as he may consume for the questioning of the witness.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Ambassador Helms.

Mr. HELMs. Good morning, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Helms, I wonder if you would tell us what

role, if any, you played with regard to Mr. Nosenko.

Mr. HELMS. When Nosenko defected in Geneva and came to the

United States, or was brought to the United States, in my position

as Deputy Director for Plans, I obviously was involved in the basic

decisions that were going to have to be made or were made in now

and the past involving the interrogation of him, his handling, and

what we would do with respect to finding out what he represented

and what information he had to purvey.

Chairman STOKES. So would it be fair to say that right from the

very beginning of the initial contact with him, right on through his

custodial period here in the States, that you were constantly in

charge of that situation?

Mr. HELMS. No; I was not constantly in charge of it. In fact, I

was not in charge of it from the first day because I do not think

any Deputy Director regards himself as being in charge of any-

thing when he has a Director who is really in charge, plus the fact

there were other members of the Interagency Defector Committee

which is composed of other agencies of Government interested in

 

 

 

20

these matters. They also have a say in what happens with respect

to these things. So I certainly was involved with decisions on

Nosenko from beginning to end, but I was not the controlling

authority at all times.

Chairman STOKES. There were three major agency reports that

were written in regard to the Nosenko case; specifically there was

a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet Russia Division, another

report later in 1968 called the Office of Security report, and then a

third report in 1976, referred to as the Hart report.

Would you tell us whether you are familiar with all three of

these reports?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any longer whether I read the first two

or whether I was simply briefed on their contents. The Hart report

I have never seen. I left the agency in early February 1973 and I

have had no substantive connections with it since.

Chairman STOKES. During his defection in 1964 and upon his

arrival in the United States was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, I missed the question.

Chairman STOKES. I was asking precisely during his defection in

1964 and upon his arrival in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

in the custody of the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, he was. That was an accepted procedure under

the functioning of the Interagency Defector Committee that defec-

tors that came to this country were handled by the CIA, through

the interrogation period, resettling period, whatever had to be done

to them.

Chairman STOKES. Is that the legal authority under which he

was being detained?

Mr. HELMS. No. I think that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you

would not mind, I would like to answer that question a little bit

more fully. If you would indulge me.

Chairman STOKES. Certainly.

Mr. HELMS. Two days ago, on September 20, 1978, I received a

transcript of my testimony before this committee in executive ses-

sion on August 9. While reviewing that transcript I noted that,

although I am not a lawyer, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's

legal status with the CIA between 1964 and 1969 in a number of

different ways. Since this is an area of obvious interest to the

committee, I would like to take this opportunity to describe my

understanding in somewhat greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-

ko's legal status with the Central Intelligence Agency was.

As I say, I am neither a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not

reared to draw any legal conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure

with the Central Intelligence Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.

On January 23, 1964, in Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-

quested that he be permitted to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's

request I believe was accompanied by a claim that he could give a

comprehensive report on Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connection with the KGB during Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1962.

It is difficult to overstate the significance that Yuri Nosenko's defection assumed in the investigation of President Kennedy's as-

sassination. If Mr. Nosenko turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

 

 

 

21

his information were to be believed, then we could conclude that

the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey

Oswald in 1953 and therefore had nothing to do with President

Kennedy's murder.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in

advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if

Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's con-

tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise

that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November

1963 more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy.

If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United

States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been

staggering. Thus it became a matter of the utmost importance to

this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko.

Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end

us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosenko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicholas Katzenback, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley's first Asistant in the Internal Security Division; and Mr. Garold f. riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice

Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-

ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind

of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's

on going custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the

record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting

on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the

substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,

April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the

Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part

of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice

was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and

the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the

Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical

status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole,"

which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had

technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had

also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency.

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that

Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it

was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or

whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

 

22

If Mr. Nosenko violated the terms of the parole, he would be

deported. As these memorandums indicate, it was the opinion of

the Justice Department that the Agency was free "to take any

action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole." That opin-

ion was expressed to us in the meeting of April 2, 1964, and

repeated to us the following day by way of a telephone call from

Mr. Foley, who had been requested by Mr. Katzenbach to check

and to confirm the Department's legal opinion.

In addition to the Justice Department, the Interagency Commit-

tee on Defectors was also fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status.

The agency and that committee concurred, I believe, with the legal

position adopted by the Department of Justice. The Interagency

Committee on Defectors was the Government body which was

formed in order to preside over the care, feeding, and general

treatment of defectors.

That committee is composed of representatives from the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the De-

fense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the De-

partment of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization

Service' as the Rockefeller Commission report indicated, Mr. Nosenko's

confinement--and I quote from the report, "was approved by the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Attor-

ney General, and the U.S. Intelligence Board; selected Members of

the Congress were also aware to some extent of the confinement."

End of quotation and end of my statement.

Chairman STOKES. So then, do I understand that based upon that

meeting it was your opinion then that this man was being held

legally and not in violation of law?

Mr. HELMS. It was our opinion that--l don't know, I am not a

lawyer, I have to be careful of my words--hut let me just say it was

our impression we had the authority to hold him as we were

holding him.

Chairman STOKES. At the time you testified to our committee

here in executive session, is that what you said to us?

Mr. HELMS. No. I say, when I went through the transcript of' my

testimony that day on August 9, I found that I characterized his

confinement in various ways, so I composed this statement in order

to straighten the matter out as we understood it.

Chairman STOKES. Now, can you recall what Mr. Katzenbach

said in that meeting? You were present and Mr. Katzenbach was

present; right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell the committee what Mr. Katzen-

bach said on that occasion about the situation?

Mr. HELMS. What we remember about this, Mr. Stokes, is pretty

well encompassed in here, that we shared with him the problem we

had in connection with Mr. Nosenko. We identified to him why the

problem was very serious. We pointed out that there might be

difficulties in connection with holding him. Suppose that Mr. No-

got a lawyer; then what did we do about it? How did we ever

establish what his bona fides were?

In other words, we had a whole series of problems which we were

sharing with the Justice Department in an effort to get some help

 

 

 

23

or assistance, how we ought to go about this matter and ascertain

what our authorities to do it were. That was the purpose of the

meeting. But 15 years later I certainly do not remember direct

quotations, from either Mr. Katzenbach or myself.

Chairman STOKES. But it would be fair to characterize the situa-

tion as saying that he did make comment upon the situation and

give you advice?

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Chairman STOKES. Now, Mr. Helms, yesterday Mr. Katzenbach

appeared before this committee and testified in the same hearing

room. I want to read to you from the transcript of that testimony

and then ask for your comment:

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Katzenbach, Mr, Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms had a conversation with me or thinks he recalls he had a conversation with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation but perhaps his recollection is better than mine. I don't know. I don't recall any such conversation.

Chairman STOKES. Was this your testimony, that you don't recall anyone. talking to you about it?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony.

Chairman STOKES. At any time?

Mr. KATZENBACH. At any time.

Chairman STOKES. How did you learn of it?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and asked me about it. And I said, who is Nosenko?

Chairman STOKES. That would be Mr. Epstein?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was the first time that I heard of it, to my recollection.

Chairman STOKES. So, then, so that the record is patently c]ear on this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of' this situation?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time.

Chairman STOKES. While you held the office that you held, were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector in this manner?

Mr. KATZENBACH. No sir. The only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories One was when they wished to, wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they came to me, and the only other thing was whenever they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it?

Chairman STOKES Told them what?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Told them not to do it, that there was not any way you were going to do it. Those were the only ways, at least offhand, when I none that I recall as Deputy. A little bit l guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange, but I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don't recall except for those occasions their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever perhaps for good reason.

Chairman STOKES. Are you absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko?

Mr. KATZENBACK. I am certain that I don't recall it, yes, sir. I can't flatly deny such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection it. It is quite a while ago and I believe if it was as dramatic as put by Congressman sawyer, I would remember it. I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned. There was a potential defector, I might not recall that.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you.

Any other questions?

Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Yes.

Mr. Katzenbach, I don't know whether you were informed of the details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA so that it is not just a

 

 

24

statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.

He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go.

And then they gave as their--I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.

And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why--and I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.

Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.

Mr. SAYWER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you

reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just

read to this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to

reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the

meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the

meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am

aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.

Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April

3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for

the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole-or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone.

I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is

signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-

dum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was

the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence

Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS--

 

25

that is the Immigration and Naturalization Service, I interpret

here so there will not be a lack of clarity--

whose inspection by INS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

That, I believe, is paragraph 1 of this memorandum, Mr. Stokes.

The balance of the memorandum has been excised and therefore is

not on the sheet there.

Chairman STOKES. Then, in light of the document which you

have just read and along with your other testimony, then obviously

the statement of Mr. Katzenbach to this committee yesterday could

not be true, could it?

Mr. HELMS. No; I am afraid it is not.

Mr. PREYER. Chairman Stokes, may I interrupt?

Chairman STOKES. Certainly.

Mr. HELMS. I would like to say, because I would like to be clear

with this committee, that I asked my attorney to be in touch with

Mr. Katzenbach some weeks ago in connection with this matter. It

is reflected in his testimony that it was brought to his attention

that I had this meeting with him. I did not want to have this

committee think I pulled this as a surprise on Mr. Katzenbach and

he came down here innocently and had no opportunity to review

the facts if he cared to.

Chairman STOKES. Then he was appropriately advised prior to

his appearance here yesterday of the memorandums you just read?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that he was advised of the memoran-

dums, but he was advised certainly of our recollection of this

meeting.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Helms, I understand that you are requesting

that this document be made a part of the record. I would like to

ask the clerk if she will mark it as an exhibit so that we can enter

it into the record at this point.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as a point of clarity, is it just these memoranda

that you want to make a part of the record? My statement is in the

transcript so I don't think that is necessary. I think these are the

two documents.

Mr. PREYER. The document will be marked as exhibit F-4/3 and

made a part of the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

 

26

JFK EXHIBIT F-413

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Nosenko Case

1. Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy and I met with Mr. Nicholas

deB. Katzenbach, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Mr. William E. Foley,

and Mr. Harold F. Reis on the Nosenko case on 2 April 1964.

Mr. Helms outlined the problems forseeable in our future relations

with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives

on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his

technical status was one of exclusion and parole for more technically

deferment of inspection and parole).

2. After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion

that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry

out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to

check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position

by telephone. I, in turn, after the meeting reviewed the parole agree-

ment and provided an interpretation thereof for the Director of Security.

a copy of which is attached hereto. Also I informed Mr. Foley of this

interpretation.

 

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

General Counsel

Declassified 19 September 1978

by Anthony A. Lapham, General

Counsel

 

27

JFK EXHIBIT F-413 cont.

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department

of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred

upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency.

It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible

for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

 

Declassified (paragraph 1 only)

19 September 1978 by Anthony A.

Lapham, General Counsel.

/s/Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

General Counsel

 

 

 

 

 

28

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, Mr. Helms, I note that the memorandum does not give

indication from which Mr. Katzenbach would be able to draw the

conclusion with reference to the way that the CIA intended to treat

this man. That is not in that memorandum, is it?

Mr. HELMS. No, it is not in the memorandum as of the time that

the meeting with Mr. Katzenbach was held. Deliberations were

still going on inside the Agency as to what exactly to do about Mr.

Nosenko, and as things developed over the months, I don't think

that Mr. Katzenbach can be held responsible for that and I have no

reason to want to involve him in it.

Chairman STOKES. Is it fair also to say that in all probability he

was never informed of the way this man was treated?

Mr. HELMS. In all probability, that is correct.

Chairman STOKES. Now, how long did Mr. Nosenko remain in

CIA custody?

Mr. HELMS. I think all told, I think it was from 1964 when he

defected until he was resettled with the new identity which I

believe was in 1969 or 1970.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us what unit within the CIA had

the primary responsibility for handling Mr. Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection is that the office of security was

given the responsibility for his housekeeping, his care, his feeding,

his guarding, and that the Soviet bloc division had the responsibil-

ity for his interrogation.

Chairman STOKES. Did the Soviet Russia division continue to

have responsibility for questioning Nosenko until he was released

from CIA custody in 1969?

Mr. HELMS. No. I believe that it was in 1967 that the decision

was made or I made the decision if you would prefer that, that the

case simply could not go on in that fashion it had to be resolved.

Therefore, a change was made. Nosenko was turned over to an

officer in the office of security who had made an examination of

the case. He felt that he could get along well with Nosenko and

that possibly he could, if he couldn't solve the problem of his bona

fides, at least he might be able to solve the problem of how we

were going to resettle him on the American scene.

I was rather puzzled by some of Mr. Hart's testimony the other

day before this committee. He seemed to go into lurid detail about

Nosenko's treatment, but when it came time to make his contribu-

tion to the purposes of the committee hearing, in other words, what

Nosenko knew about Oswald, he had no clarification to make and

nothing to contribute.

Yet he was here as the official representative of the Director of

Central Intelligence, as I understand it. It was almost as though

his purpose was to use his testimony before this committee to

excoriate some of his former colleagues for the handling of the Nosenko case.

In any event, I never heard of the note alleged to have been

handwritten by the "Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division"

using such sensational terms as "liquidate the man, commit him to

a looney bin," et cetera. These options were never presented to me,

were never entertained by me, and were never considered.

 

29

The problem was to resettle Nosenko in American society and

this is what the Agency did. Any other assertions are false as far

as I personally am aware. I would not like to see perpetuated on

indefinitely into the history of this country that there was any

consideration given by senior officials of the Agency to those op-

tions that were identified in this lurid, handwritten memorandum.

I don't know how the thing happened to get written. I don't know

how it happened to be held in the files. I don't know how it

happened to be part of Mr. Hart's role to bring it down here, but in

any event, I want to put to rest once and for all that this was never

considered.

Chairman STOKES. Now you have mentioned a security officer.

When did the security officer assume the responsibility for han-

dling Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection Mr. Stokes, is that it was about 1967,

some time in 1967.

Chairman STOKES. So at that time would they have assumed

primary responsibility and taken it away then from the Soviet

bloc?

Mr. HELMS. Well, they assumed primary responsibility. I think

that is the fair thing. I had asked Adm. Rufus Taylor, who sadly

died the other day but who became Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence after I was made Director, to make it his personal

responsibility to look into all aspects of the Nosenko case in an

effort to get it resolved.

He had done a lot of work on this case and one of his recommen-

dations as I recall it was that this be turned over to the office of

security and that we try an entirely different approach.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us why the responsibility for

handling Nosenko in terms of questioning was transferred from the

SR people over to the security officer?

Mr. HELMS. It was just another approach we were attempting. In

other words, wee wanted to take him away from those people who

had been interrogating him and see if a quiet, solicitous and let's

say, favorable approach were used, that we might be able to solve

the problem of his bona fides but at least get him in the frame of

mind where we could resettle him.

Chairman STOKES. How long a period of time was Nosenko actu-

ally held in this status?

Mr. HELMS. Well, during the period of 1964 to 1967 he was held

under Spartan circumstances. In 1967 when he was turned over to

the office of security he was moved to a safe house where he

certainly was in confinement but lived under very comfortable

conditions, perhaps as well as anybody in this room.

Chairman STOKES. Now, during that 3-year period, and I suppose

you would say it is 3 years he was held in confinement, as a basis

of Mr. Hart's testimony a few days ago, I posed the question to him

that the man was actually being held in jail, wasn't he. His answer

was substantially yes.

How would you characterize the period?

Mr. HELMS. I find no fault with that characterization.

Chairman STOKES. Initially, can you tell us how the individuals

who handled Mr. Nosenko for the SR division had been selected?

 

30

Mr. HELMS. When the defection took place in Geneva, or at least before it took place, two officers were sent to Geneva to talk to Mr. Nosenko. One was a high officer in the SR division and the other was a case officer who not only spoke fluent Russian but had had a great deal of experience in handling Soviet agent cases and this seemed to be a good team as far as those in charge though at the time, and so did I.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us how knowledgeable or how expert they were in terms of the Oswald case?

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any recollection of that any more, Mr. Stokes. I don't think that we chose them because of their knowledge- ability in the Oswald case initially. This issue was to decide about the defection of this man in the first place.

The Oswald matter really hadn't gotten viable until it was indicated he knew something about it, and then when we got him to the United States, what he knew about it. Actually, I think that it may be of interest to the committee that in attempting to establish the bona fides of someone, it is necessary to have information in some depth of the facts about which they are talking.

With respect to Nosenko, we put people who were knowledgeable about the Soviet Union and Soviet mores, and so forth, on the case because we had more information about those things and could check his statements out much better than if we were using something about Lee Harvey Oswald. He had been in the Soviet Union and we knew very little about him, because I would like to remind you, Mr. Stokes, that what is known about Lee Harvey Oswald today was certainly not known in early 1964. This is all material that has been developed since.

I think one has to be fair with history that when we go back to February 1964, the knowledgeability of anybody in the Government on Lee Harvey Oswald was very limited, even more limited than it is now.

Chairman STOKES. Wouldn't I understand that first they did know he was a KGB officer at the time he came to you; correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is what he told us.

Chairman STOKES. You did know that Oswald been in Russia, did you not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, we knew that he had been in rUssia, certainly.

Chairman STOKES. And as a part of your responsibility to the Warren Commission was to give them such information as came to your knowledge regarding Oswald in Russia, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES- And in establishing this man's bona fides,

would it not be logical that you would want to know everything he

knew about Oswald as a part of the interrogation process so that

you might establish his bona fides through that?

Mr. HELMS. But I thought that he was asked about what he knew

about Oswald. I thought there were four or five interrogations, one

by the FBI and some by us during this period. Am I wrong?

Chairman STOKES. Well, he was under the custody of the CIA.

You have told us that.

Mr. HELMS. But other people had access to him. The FBI was

given access to them. We gave other people access to these people if

they requested it. It was the FBI's statement to the Warren Com-

 

31

mission quoting Nosenko based on their own interrogation that led

me weeks later to go down and talk with the Chief Justice of the

United States and point out with him that we could not go bail, we

could not vouch for the bona fides of this man, and therefore we

could not vouch for his statement.

Chairman STOKES. Yes, and this was the precise problem that

you were confronted with. You knew you had an important issue

on your hands, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly.

Chairman STOKES. And it was extremely important by virtue of

the high level conference which you had had, which you referred to

this morning, that you had been able to establish his bona fides;

isn't that correct?

Mr. HELMS. We were doing our best to do so.

Chairman STOKES. So it is in that area, then, I would think, that

you would want to see the top interrogators, not only those expert

in interrogating with reference to the Soviet Union, but also about

events in the Soviet Union such as Oswald would be important to

you to have him interrogated about?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, I was not present at these interrogations

and I don't know the exact questions. I assume there is a record

available someplace. But it seems to me that in posing this ques-

tion this way, to me it is damned if you do and damned if you

don't. You are damned if you hold a fellow too long and treat him

badly because you would like to find out what he does know about

Oswald, and you are damned the other way if you have not dug his

teeth out to find out what he knows about Oswald.

I don't know sir, the answer. If we had to do it over, I don't know

what we would do. We would probably do it differently, but I don't

know how we would have arrived at the truth in the space of time

we had available to us.

You may recall from the record that Mr. Nosenko, at the time he

defected and before, was a very heavy drinker. One of the problems

we had with him during his first period of time in the United

States was he didn't want to do anything except drink and carouse.

We had problems with him in an incident in Baltimore where he

started punching up a bar and so forth.

One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him

away from the booze and settle him down and see if we could make

some sense with him. The fact that he may have been held too long

was therefore deplorable, but nevertheless we were doing our best.

Chairman STOKES. Well, in light of what you are now saying to

us about the fact that you are damned if you do and damned if you

don't, was it important to you that you be kept informed regularly

of everything that he was saying and everything that he was doing

et cetera?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, I felt that certainly I should be kept

generally informed, but during the period of the Warren Commis-

sion, they are the ones who should be kept informed, the FBI

should be kept informed, and that after the Warren Commission

had made its report and things then were not guided by their

investigation, we still went on with the job of attempting to find

out what this man represented.

 

32

Chairman STOKES. But if, as you say, as you have just indicated,

the Warren Commission needed to be informed and so forth, and

wasn't it your direct responsibility to inform the commission?

Mr. HELMS. But I thought I did. I thought I told them that we

couldn't establish his bona fides.

Chairman STOKES. Well, in order for you to be able to communi-

cate with the Warren Commission, you had to get information from

some source, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Chairman STOKES. So my question to you is: What direction did

give those under you as to how often you were to be briefed,

how often you ought to be given the results of the interrogation or

whatever was occurring with this man?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly I stayed current to that extent. If there

bad been the slightest intimation that we were prepared to vouch

for his bona fides or that the interregation reached that point it

would have been brought to me immediately.

I think that if I don't any longer recall the exact date, but I

think it was in June or something of 1964, that after getting the

permission of the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, I

went to see the Chief Justice privately to point out to him what

our difficulties in this matter were. It seems to me I was as forth-

coming as a man could be, what else could I do? What else should I have done?

What did you tell him about your difficulties?

What were they?

Mr. HELMS. I told him we were not able to satisfy ourselves that

the man was what he was purported to be, that the jobs that he

had held were the ones that he really did hold, that there were

inconsistencies in his testimony, that what he had to say about the

Oswald case didn't make sense to us, and that, therefore, I simply

wanted to point out to the Chief Justice that I was sorry but

whatever the FBI had given him or given the Commission about

what Mr. Nosenko had said about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald, that I

felt he should take into consideration the fact that we could not

vouch for his bona fides and therefore they should not take at full

strength what he said. It was up to them to make their evaluation,

but I felt we owed this to him.

Chairman STOKES. In order for you to tell the Chief Justice that,

how often had you been briefed?

Mr. HELMS. I have no recollection any longer, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. In terms of the interrogation that took place

of Oswald, I'm sorry, Nosenko, were the interrogators instructed to

pose a large number of questions relative to Oswald to Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, there was no issue more central in those

days than an effort to straighten out this business about Oswald.

But I would submit in evidence, I don't know whether you have

been an interrogator, sir, but there are so many questions you can

ask about based on the information that was known about Oswald

at the time.

If my facts are straight, the information about Oswald that was

known was that he had gone to the Soviet Union, that he ex-

pressed a desire to give up his citizenship. That is what he told the

 

33

American Embassy. He had gone to Minsk, married a Russian girl,

which was suspicious in its own right.

He then decided to come back to the United States and virtually

disappeared, but it was not the CIA's jurisdiction to keep an eye on

him in the United States and the amount of information available

at that time based on which one could make an interrogation was

pretty thin for the simple reason that how were we going to find

out in the Soviet Union what Oswald had done there except from

his own statements?

We had no independent means of verification. We didn't have

that good an organization inside the Soviet Union. We had no

means of following up on these leads.

Chairman STOKES. In light of your statements in this context, let

me cite to you the testimony of Mr. Hart to this committee and get

your comment on that.

Mr. Hart, with reference to the matter of whether Nosenko was

being incarcerated or being questioned, said to this committee this:

Mr. HART. Insofar as I can tell, the assumption among the top leadership of the agency was that during this period of incarceration Mr. Nosenko was being questioned or interrogated.

That is flatly contrary to the facts because although he was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned. We do not, it is difficult to tell just how many hours of questioning there took place on those 292 days when he actually was questioned. The rest of the time, which is 77 percent of the total time of incarceration, he was left entirely unoccupied and was not being questioned. There was, in other words, no effort being made to get at more information which he might have.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. I have no comment to make on it. Mr. Hart, I gather,

was appointed by Director George Bush in 1976 to look into the

whole Nosenko case. I have been informed of that in recent times. I

assume he looked into it fairly and squarely. I would assume also

that this committee has talked thoroughly with all the interroga-

tors and has verified independently whether these facts are true or

not. I have no capacity for doing that.

Chairman STOKES. So you take no issue with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. None. I don't know its merits one way or the other.

Chairman STOKES. Then I take it from that you in no way contest

the statement of Mr. Hart?

Mr. HELMS. I have no basis for contesting it, Mr. Stokes. I mean,

he has a record there. I simply was saying that I have no independ-

ent verification of the number of days he was interrogated. I would

assume, though, that the committee does have an independent

verification because I believe that the interrogators are still alive

and I assume the committee has talked to them.

Is this correct?

Chairman STOKES. I think that is substantially correct, yes.

Mr. Helms, in January 1968 when the SR division report con-

cerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency's position re-

garding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. There were those in the agency who believed he was

bona fide and there were those in the agency who did not. I never

recall having resolved the case in my own mind one way Or the

other. My preoccupation at the time was to get Mr. Nosenko reset-

tled. If there were those who felt there was a reasonable chance he

 

34

was bona fide, that was all right with me, but as far as I am aware,

never signed off on any document or made any final decisions

about his bona fides.

If you have a document, I would appreciate seeing it because I

have not been shown one, and if my recollection is not accurate, I

don't want to mislead this committee. I want to be absolutely fair

and truthful and forthcoming.

Chairman STOKES. Perhaps it may help refresh your recollection

that at the time the committee took your testimony previously, Mr.

Goldsmith asked you the question: "Is it not a fact that the SR

report of 1968 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona

fide defector?" Your answer at that time was: "I don't remember

firsthand what the thrust of the report was."

So I take it, then, that your testimony today is that you still do

not recall?

Mr. HELMS. No. But I am sorry, 1 must have misunderstood your

earlier question. I am sorry. I thought that you were asking me

what my opinion was about that.

Chairman STOKES. No, no.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry.

Chairman STOKES. Basically, what we are asking you is this: In

January 1968, when this report came out of the SR division, what

was the Agency's position regarding Nosenko bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. Well, the Agency's position would not have been

reflected in the 1968 report, The Agency's position would have been

one that l would have signed off on and I don't recall ever having

made personally the decision based on recommendations and var-

ious other factors involved, whether he was bona fide or not. I

simply was trying to explain that m)' interest then was different.

Chairman STOKES. Well, then, can you tell us in January of 1968

the Agency's position with regard to the veracity of the informa-

tion Nosenko had provided concerning Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think any judgment has ever been made

about that. I thought I read in the newspapers--and I assume the

newspapers reported accurately--that Mr. Hart, after all his inves-

tigation, was not able to tell you that Nosenko was accurate about

Oswald or not accurate about Oswald, if he could not do it--

Chairman STOKES. To the contrary. He said to the committee,

based upon everything he knew about him, that the testimony he

had given this committee, he said I would not use it, so he did have

an opinion.

Mr. HELMS. He said he would not use it?

Chairman STOKES. That is what he said.

Mr. HELMS. That confuses me.

Chairman Stokes. Why?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it confuses me because isn't that a copout? If

you are not going to use it, then it is not true.

Chairman STOKES. That is substantially correct, that would be

my own interpretation.

Now let me ask you this: Wouldn't your analysis and the doubt

which you had of this man's overall bona fides also bear upon the

question of what he was saying to you and through you to the

Warren Commission about Oswald, that is, if you doubted his gen-

 

35

eral bona fides, wouldn't you have to doubt what he was saying to

you about Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, that is why I went to see the Chief Justice.

Chairman STOKES. Now let me ask you this: After the SR division

issued its report in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by

the security officer?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, I think the ground was gone over not only by

that security officer, but I think that through the weeks after that

a long interrogation, or if you don't want to call it an interroga-

tion, let's say an elicitation, was carried on with Nosenko to find

out what he knew about a whole host of things, including the

Oswald case.

I believe it was during that latter period that he had additional

contributions to make about the size of the files that the KGB held

on Oswald and matters of this kind.

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this: In light of what you said

to us this morning, would you agree that the consequences of the

Nosenko case for the American intelligence community were quite

great particularly if it turned out that he was not a bona fide

defector? I think you may have commented on some of that in your

first statement.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I did, Mr. Stokes, but I agree with what you

said.

Chairman STOKES. I would like to call your attention to page 137

of the declassified transcript which you have there at the witness

table with you. Lines 6 through 20. Do you have that?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. This, of course, is your testimony before this

subcommittee of this committe earlier.

Now, at that time did you testify that you had no recollection of

ever signing off on any piece of paper that made Nosenko a consul-

tant to the CIA and that you never agreed to any such thing?

Mr. HELMS. When I made that statement in executive session on

August 9, it was my distinct impression that we had made an

arrangement or signed a contract with Nosenko which made him

an independent contractor. In other words, it was a relationship

between him and the Agency whereby he would do research work

under controlled circumstances and we would control the environ-

ment, what documents he saw, what he did, and in this way we

would be justified in seeing if his expertise was of any help to us,

and, second, under this document we could pay him so that he

could live and eventually get to be resettled.

I was not aware at that time that the independent contractor

provision had along with it in the document the word "consultant."

If I was aware of it at the time, I never thought about it. I must

confess that my thought of what a consultant is has been changed

in present times, because I am a consultant to various American

businesses now and my relationship to them is not the relationship

I contracted for with Nosenko, so this is a semantic problem.

I can only say that I am sorry that I was maybe the slightest bit

misleading, but I have now explained it and I hope that satisfies

you.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that an exhibit in

the possession of the Clerk be marked as JFK F-531. I will ask that

 

36

a copy of it be delivered to the witness and that the exhibit be

made a part of the record at this time.

Mr. PREYER. If there is no objection, the exhibit, F-531, will be

entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

JFK EXHIBIT F-531

37

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

38

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

39

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

40

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

41

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

42

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

43

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

44

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

 

45

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

46

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

 

47

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

  

48

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

49

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

50

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

51

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

  

52

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

53

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

54

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

55

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

56

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

  

57

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

58

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

 

59

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

 

  60

Mr. HELMS. I have the document before me, Mr. Stokes, now. It

is a document dated October 5, 1972.

Chairman STOKES. That is the document. Can you tell us what

that document is?

Mr. HELMS. The subject of it is retroactive reimbursement of

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. It entails a description of his case, what

he was promised in the way of money, and gives at the end a

suggestion as to how the moneys might be handled. This in turn

was passed up the line in the Agency and was approved on October

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Helms, I would direct your attention to

page 4 of that document and ask you whether or not your signa-

ture appears on that document?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it does, beside the date October 18, 1972. That is

my signature.

Chairman STOKES. Now, I will ask you to read three of the

paragraphs from this document, paragraphs 6, 7 and 9. Would you

do that, please, read it out loud?

Mr. HELMS. Six, seven, and nine?

Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signed a 1-year contractual agreement for $16,500, including a clause giving assistance to him in resettlement expenses in the amount of $8,000. In March 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed a new contract for 2 years at $18,500 per annum. At about the same time he was provided with certain financial assistance, $20,000 being for the down payment on a new house and $5,000 for other related household expenses. Mr. Nosenko's contract was renewed at the new rate of $19,500 per annum on March 1, 1971 and the contract was again renewed in February 1972 at the salary of $21,000 per annum.

Paragraph 7:

An analysis of this case clearly indicates that Mr. Nosenko has been an extremely valuable source, one who has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, and he has otherwise provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and methods.

Then I find a blank and written in here in somebody's hand is

sensitive information. The remainder of the sentence reads:

Have been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on data from Mr. Nosenko. He has conducted numerous special security reviews on Soviet subjects of specific intelligence interest and he has proven himself to be invaluable in exploring counterintelligence leads. He recently authored a book which is of interest to the Agency. In effect, Mr. Nosenko has shown himself to be a productive and hard working defector, who is rehabilitated and favorably disposed to the Agency.

Paragraph 9:

In summary, the original oral agreement with Mr. Nosenko is fully documented and supports his claim; his resettlement since 1967 has been relatively smooth, with no significant security problems having developed; and he continues to function at the present time as a highly productive and useful source of information on the KGB. In view of these various considerations, it is requested that the payment of $125,000 to Mr. Nosenko be approved. These funds would be paid out of unliquidated obligations applicable to lapsed appropriations.

The sentence stops there and it is written in somebody's hand-

writing, "sensitive sources and methods information." And the

memorandum has the signature below.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you.

In paragraph 9 where it says: "and he continues to function at

the present time as a highly productive and useful source of infor-

 

61

mation on the KGB," that does not, to you, connote the activities of

a consultant?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Chairman STOKES. That's how you would interpret that?

Mr. HELMS. That is the kind of information we get from any

agency. I am sorry, but my impression today, and it may not have

been 5 years ago, I don't know, but today my impression of a

consultant is one that has a closer relationship with the organiza-

tion for which he is working than an agent does in an intelligence

relationship. They are insulated from certain kinds of information,

they are insulated from certain access, and insulated from a lot of

things.

Consultant is not necessarily so. Consultant is a very wide rang-

ing term which covers all kinds of things in our language. I would

just not like to see a reference at that time to his having been a

consultant. I have been told since, I don't know how accurately,

that Nosenko has been seen in the CIA headquarters building at

Langley. I guess if he has access to the building out there, maybe

he is a consultant now, but he was not considered one in my time.

Chairman STOKES. I see.

Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the clerk mark another exhibit in

her possession, JFK exhibit F-537 and that a copy of it be shown to

the witness.

Mr. HELMS. I have the document in my hands. It is JFK exhibit

F-537.

Chairman STOKES. Have you had a chance to read that docu-

ment?

Mr. HELMS. No.

Chairman STOKES. Could you take the time to familiarize your-

self with it?

Mr. HELMS. This is an interrogatory which this committee pre-

sented to the Agency; is that correct?

Chairman STOKES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HELMS. I have read the document now, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. All right.

Mr. Helms, prior to referring you to that particular document,

would you look at page 133 of the declassified transcript before

you, beginning at line 11 1/2. It looks like where Mr. Goldsmith

poses a question to you and your answer follows.

Mr. HELMS. Is this where Mr. Goldsmith says, "What about at

the conclusion of the [security officer's] work?"

Chairman STOKES. That is right.

Would you please read Mr. Goldsmith's question and your

answer?

Mr. HELMS [reading]:

 

MR. GOLDSMITH. What about at the conclusion of [the security officer's] work when he issued his report, at that time did the Agency have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. I do not believe so. At least during my time there I do not recall us ever taking a position as an agency.

 

Chairman STOKES. Now let me ask you, having read that ques-

tion and your answer to it, is that your best recollection?

Mr. HELMS. That is my best recollection, Mr. Stokes. I notice that

in this document which you tell me the Agency has provided, they

 

 

 

62

say that the final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector. I

simply do not recall participating in any meeting or signing any

document which made the final judgment that he was a bona fide

defector.

Chairman STOKES. Let me now refer you to the exhibit, F-537

and ask you, now that is a document from the Director of Central

Intelligence is it not?

Mr. HELMS. It is not signed by him, sir, so I don't know.

Chairman STOKES. Well, on the first page it does have a signa-

ture on there.

Mr. HELMS. On the first page it just has the signature of Mr.

Breckinridge, principal coordinator for the House Select Committee

on Assassinations.

Chairman STOKES. Is there a letterhead at the top of it?

Mr. HELMS. yes, it say, "Office of Legislative Counsel."

Chairman STOKES. And ahead of that?

Mr. HELMS. The Director of Central Intelligence.

Chairman STOKES. Washington, D.C.; right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, 20505.

Chairman STOKES. Does the first page read as follows:

1 September 1978, Mr, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington D.C.

DEAR MR. BLAKEY. Forwarded herewith are answers to the interrogatories received at the close of business on 28 August 1978.

Signed, S.D. Breckinridge, Principal for HSCA with attachment.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Chairman STOKES. Now, would you turn to the next page, com-

mencing where it says question 3, would you read everything from

that point forward?

Mr. HELMS [reading]:

Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency, include (a) the dates and nature of this employment; (b) the services rendered by Nosenko; (c) itemize the counting of all compensation received by Nosenko; (d) an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation arrangements for the CIA. Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised $50,000 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification in 1962 of a particular espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future services.

Mr. Richard Helms himself approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some 5 years after Nosenko's defection, the original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment and/or monetary remunerations. Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate of $16,500 a year. As of 1978 he is receiving $35,327 a year (see attached annual compensation table for years 1969 to 1978).

In addition to regular yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years 1964 to 1969; in November 1972 in the amount of $25,000 a year, less income tax. The total amount paid was $87,000--I beg your pardon--total amount paid was $87,052.

He also received in varying increments from March 1964 to July 1973 amounts totaling $50,000 to aid in his resettlement on the private economy (see attached table for the breakdown).

The total resettlement figure in effect satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko $50,000 for previous cooperation. In 1976, Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of $28,500, representing the difference between the $25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969 to 1 March 1975.

 

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Since 1969, the agency has contributed to Nosenko's hospitalization insurance premium. The agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses.

To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor with the compensation provision being periodically amended. His work for the agency includes consultation with both the agency and the FBI on certain matters of current interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he was also consulted by various elements of the agency on current Soviet developments and requirements. He has been, and continues to be, used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the agency, the FBI, Air Force, OSI, and others.

Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any role in authorizing Nosenko's employment compensation arrangements with the CIA.

Annual compensation table.

Do you want me to go through that?

Chairman STOKES. No.

Having read this answer to the interrogatories posed to the

agency, is there anything at all in this interrogatory that you

would say is untrue?

Mr. HELMS. The only two statements, Mr. Stokes, that I would

cavil with are the one that is "Following acceptance of Nosenko's

bona fides in 1968," and I guess it appears on the last page of the

document. That is the only point. If these bona fides were estab-

lished in late 1968, I have no recollection of this having happened,

that is all. I am sorry, I just--you want me to tell the truth here. I

am doing my best.

Chairman STOKES. So then, if I understand your answer, you are

not sticking with your previous testimony with reference to the

fact that the agency never arrived at a determination on his bona

fides?

Mr. HELMS. I didn't believe they ever did. I think my other

testimony is consistent with what I am saying now. If it is not

consistent, then you and I are misunderstanding each other, and

that I would like to get straightened out right away.

Chairman STOKES. I guess where I am having difficulty is my

understanding of how you enter into this financial arrangement.

Whether you call it consultant or independent contractor or give it

any other name, how you justify entering into a contract where

you give taxpayer funds to someone Who you say in your opinion is

not bona fide.

Mr. HELMS. I think, Mr. Stokes, that I can explain--I trust I can

explain this satisfactorily. It has been said, and I believe it is true,

that in the latter days of his interrogation Mr. Nosenko provided

the agency with useful information with respect to certain Soviet

activities. I do not recall that he gave them any additional informa-

tion that helped to resolve the Oswald case or Oswald status with

the KGB.

The reimbursement was for two purposes, one, to get him reset-

tled in the United States. May I say that this was the only viable

option left to us at that time. There was no way of deporting him

to the Soviet Union; he would have been shot and killed when he

got back. He would never have been able to explain to them what

he was doing during the period that he was away. So we had only

one option and that was to try to resettle him. That was what I

had in mind to do, and he needed money and he needed

employment.

 

 

 

64

If you will study the history of Soviet defectors in this country,

they have had an extraordinarily difficult time adjusting to our

society. They have a very difficult time making money and running

businesses and being gainfully employed. I think if you will put an

interrogatory to the agency to give you a history of the resettle-

ment of defectors since 1945, you will find what I am telling you is

true. Therefore, it was a complex of matters involved in his com-

pensation; part of it was the useful information, part of it was to

get him resettled, and part was because we had no choice except to

do these things. At least we had no choice in my opinion. Maybe

somebody else would have a different opinion, but at least in our

opinion we had no choice.

Chairman STOKES. That is your total answer as to why he was

being given this kind of compensation?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Chairman STOKES. Let me now ask you this---

Mr. PREYER. There is a vote on the floor at this time. The

committee will take a 10-minute recess. The committee stands in

recess for 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other

documents which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms'

testimony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time

to ask specific questions. May they be admitted into the record as

JFK exhibit F-532 at this time?

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, so ordered.

[The exhibit referred to follows:]

 

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JFK EXHIBIT F-532

 

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JFK EXHIBIT F-532 cont.

 

 

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JFK EXHIBIT F-532 cont.

 

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Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Stokes, would you indulge me

moment, please. I would like to straighten something out.

Mr. Craig tells me that he feels that I did Mr. Katzenbach an

injustice in something that I said, and I would not want to do that,

so let me just modify what I said this morning.

Mr. Stokes asked me whether I thought Mr. Katzenbach's state-

ment to this committee regarding our meeting was untrue. I be-

lieve I replied in the affirmative. All I meant to say was that

couldn't count on Mr. Katzenbach's memory. I wasn't questioning

either his judgment or his integrity. I just want to make this point.

The meeting did occur but I didn't mean to imply that he testified

untruthfully before this committee.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just

follow up at this point in an area that gives me some concern, that

is, if I understand you correctly, I believe you said you still even

today don't really know whether Nosenko is bona fide or not;

further, it is your recollection you don't believe the agency ever

arrived at that determination, particularly when you were there.

Let me ask you this: If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's

statements concerning Oswald were untrue, what significance

would you attach to such a finding insofar as the broader question

of his overall bona fides are concerned?

Mr. HELMS. I think, Mr. Stokes, that is just the point. This is the

issue which remains, as I understand it, to this very day, that no

person familiar with the facts, of whom I am aware, finds Mr.

Nosenko's comments about Lee Harvey Oswald and the KGB to be

credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus. I think, there-

fore, this tends to sour a great deal of one's opinion of all the other

things that he may have Contributed to the knowledge of the

intelligence community about Soviet affairs and Soviet agents and

so forth.

I do not know how one resolves this bone in the throat. And

therefore, if I sit here before you and say, Mr. Stokes, I believe that

Mr. Nosenko is a bona fide defector and you can rely on everything

he says, I am in effect saying now, Mr. Stokes, you can rely on

what he says about Lee Harvey Oswald. And I would not like to

make that recommendation to you. That is where this thing lies

and it is a most difficult question even at this late date.

Chairman STOKES. Then doesn't this raise a question, then, of a

further part of the dilemma, that if he was not, bona fide, the only

alternative, then, is what the CIA suspected, and that was that he

might have been a KGB plant sent here for the purpose of deceiv-

ing the United States?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Chairman STOKES. Doesn't that logically follow?

Mr. HELMS. That is certainly true, and that was foremost in our

minds.

Chairman STOKES. So it leaves you with the conclusion, then,

that if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, that Oswald would in fact

be left as being an agent of the KGB?

Mr. HELMS. By implication.

 

 

 

97

 Chairman STOKES. Right. If just the basic Nosenko story were

fundamentally disproved without our taking the next step and

saying Oswald is a KGB agent, what significance would that have

on the overall assessment of Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, I find this extraordinarily difficult to

say. As one works this backward and forward, as you have been

doing with great skill, it is, I find, rather dangerous for me to sort

of jump from one assumption to another assumption and then

extrapolate from these things to judgments which might be very

alarming and which could not be demonstrated. I am sorry, and I

recognize that it is absolutely central to the investigation of this

committee, which has worked very long and very hard on this

subject to try to resolve this issue. But I can give no more help

than I have already given.

Chairman STOKES. Then that leads to to my next question, which

is whether you can tell us to what extent, if any, Nosenko's story

concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the story he had been

telling earlier about Oswald.

Mr. HELMS. I didn't recall that there was all that much change

in his story by 1968. I may be wrong. I have not studied this matter

in the depth that would be required to answer that statement

accurately. Mr. Hart has been all through the records. He might

have found something which may be helpful on this. But I can't be

helpful on it. I don't know at what point any longer, at what date

Mr. Nosenko began telling us about the additional files which were

in the KGB. First he said there was only one file, then he said

there were seven or eight files on surveillance, and I believe there

were modifications of this story that came later. If that was in

1969, I accept that, I am not arguing about it, I just don't recall.

Chairman STOKES. Are you in a position to tell us today whether

any independent investigation ever confirmed Nosenko's story

about Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know of any, sir. There may have been, but I

am not familiar with it.

Chairman STOKES. Are you aware of the fact that Nosenko was

given three polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968? Are you aware

of that?

Mr. HELMS. I was aware of it and I read it recently in the

documentation which I have been shown.

Chairman STOKES. Can you give us some idea as to why he was

given a polygraph test on three separate occasions?

Mr. HELMS. I want to be clear, Mr. Stokes, that in testifying in

answer to this question that I am not depending on my recollection

from 15 years ago. I am depending on what I have read recently.

I believe one polygraph test was designed as a sort of psychologi-

cal trick on Nosenko to indicate that he wasn't telling the truth.

This was early on. I believe the latter two tests were an effort to

find out about his credibility, whether he was telling the truth, his

questionable behavior.

I must confess when I was reading the results of the second

polygraph; there is a statement from some polygraph expert in the

United States who was brought in independently, but I didn't

understand his quotations, I didn't understand to what they re-

lated. I couldn't figure out whether he was saying this was a good

 

 

 

 

98

polygraph test or it was a bad one or whether Mr. Nosenko was

lying or wasn't lying. I am sorry, but I just couldn't figure it out.

Chairman STOKES. Did you learn that he had failed his first two

polygraph tests and that he passed the third?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. This assertion I saw in the record.

Chairman STOKES. Did you learn further that with reference to

the test that he passed this test which was given to him approxi-

mately 1 month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report by a

security officer, and this was where the report concluded that he

was a bona fide defector?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I am aware that there was a relationship be-

tween that last polygraph test and the recommendation that we

resettle him in the normal way of handling defectors.

I would like to point out though, Mr. Stokes, that I don't believe

anyone contends that the polygraph or lie detector is anything

more than an aid to interrogation. I don't think when one says one

passes or fails a polygraph test this is an accurate description of

the phenomenon involved. When you take a polygraph test you are

asked various questions and the operator has to make a judgment

as to whether you are answering the questions accurately or

whether you are lying--I don't mean accurately; whether you are

answering the questions to the best of your knowledge and there-

fore honestly, or lying.

But I don't believe anyone including courts of law accept poly-

graph examinations as a final judge. They are simply aids in

attempting to establish whether a man is telling the truth or not.

Chairman STOKES. I would concur with you in terms of the law,

that the law accepts them as merely an investigative tool at best

and they have no real reliability in a courtroom. Yet we know that

it is an investigative tool that has fairly wide usage. So when we

see and our investigation reveals the fact that your agency con-

ducted three polygraph tests, obviously the question is raised by us

as to why they polygraphed him on three different occasions. Cer-

tainly not just for the fun of it.

Then when we look further we realize that with him having

failed two tests and we see that the third one is conducted in 1968

just prior to the issuance of the report which said he was bona fide,

obviously it raises the question in our mind someone said: Uh huh,

if we're going to come out and say he's bona fide, we better get a

test that supports that.

Is that a logical conclusion?

Mr. HELMS. I think the conclusion which is logical is that in

trying to wrap up the case and come forward with a recommenda-

tion that a polygraph test and all other kinds of investigative

techniques would have been brought to bear in an effort to make a

good tidy package. In other words, I don't think the officers wanted

to come forward with this proposal that he be resettled and then

have the question asked: How does he react on the polygraph these

days, and so forth. And they would have to say: Well, we never

tested him.

But you know, Mr. Stokes, and this is perhaps not relevant to

this inquiry, but I think in some respects it may be. I don't know

where the polygraph role stands in Mr. Nosenko's case. We discov-

ered there were some Eastern Europeans who could defeat the

 

 

 

99

polygraph at any time. Americans are not very good at it, because

we are raised to tell the truth and when we lie it is easy to tell

are lying. But we find a lot of Europeans and Asiatics can handle

that polygraph without a blip, and you know they are lying and

you have evidence that they are lying. I don't know in which

category----

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Nosenko falls in that category?

Mr. HELMS. In some category.

Chairman STOKES. I am advised that the CIA used polygraph

tests on all its employees.

Mr. HELMS. It works very well with Americans.

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this. We have learned further

through our investigation in the first two polygraph tests, that

Nosenko was asked numerous questions, numbering somewhere in

the neighborhood of 30 or 40 questions, relative to Oswald. We

have learned, further, that in the 1968 tests he was only asked two

questions about Oswald on that polygraph test. Can you tell us why

that occurred?

Mr. HELMS. I could not answer. I have no idea. In fact, I can't

even give you a rational explanation at this late date. I may have

been able to give one at the time. I may have known, but I am

sorry, my memory is blank.

Chairman STOKES. At any rate, the questions revolved around

Oswald wouldn't be any less important in 1968 than they were in

1964 or 1966.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, they wouldn't have been less important. But

by 1968, there was a clear objective in mind of trying to do some-

thing about the resettlement of this man, that this case simply had

to be resolved. That was determined, and therefore I was

to accept many obstructions or obstacles, and so forth, and still

probably would have said I think we better go ahead and resettle

that man. There is no other option, there is nothing else we Can do.

Chairman STOKES. I would like to get to a further Comment

this area. From what we have heard from you regarding the poly-

graph and from what we have heard from Mr. Hart, we have a

conflict here that the committee must in some way resolve. Mr.

Hart told us when he testified here, representing the head of the

CIA, that the polygraph was not utilized for the purpose of ascer-

taining the truth of this man's statements. It was used to intimi-

date him, it was a part of the whole process of breaking him. Let

me just quote some of the things he said to us, so we can then ask

you your opinion.

He said:

The agency's activity was devoted to breaking Nosenko, who was presumed, on the basis of the supposed evidence given by Mr. X that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent to mislead the United States.

It is with this in mind that we have to approach everything that happened from 1962, after the first contact with Nosenko terminated, and the time Nosenko was turned over to the CIA Office for Security Reinvestigation.

The polygraphs themselves must be evaluated in the light of their use, not to get at truth, because they were not used as an instrument of getting at truth. They were used as an instrument of intimidation of one sort or another, in one way or another.

Now, again on the handling of Mr. Nosenko, the belief among the small group of people running the Nosenko case, a very limited group of people, was that he was

 

 

 

100

part of a plot of the type outlined by Mr. X, which was so horrendous that therefore not many people could be made privy to this investigation.

Then at another part of his testimony--and I am skipping parts

to get at pertinent parts--he said:

In addition to that, the operator was guilty of some provocative remarks. He told, before the polygraph examination, one of the polygraph examinations began, he told Nosenko that he was a fanatic, that there was no evidence to support his legend, and "your future is now zero."

Then, if I recall his testimony correctly, he went on to explain that in a polygraph test obviously you do not make comments this sort to a man prior to him being given the test.

Then he says in further quotes:

* * * The chief of SB and the Deputy Chief of SB, the fact that the man was, except for extraordinary lengths of time strapped into the chair, all of these add up in the estimation of the CIA examiners who have gone over this series of tests, to an invalid polygraph.

Now in the handwriting of the Deputy Chief, SB, who is a day-to-day supervisor of the activity which I have been describing, it is--there is an admission which is implied fairly clearly that there was no intention that this 1966 series of polygraphs would be valid. I read here a direct quotation which exists in writing and most of it is in the handwriting of the Deputy Chief of SB Speaking of the aims to be achieved by the 1966 polygraph examinations, he writes, "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating and ostensibly confession insofar as we could make one consistent and believable event to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko."

Now, he does not clarify what he means in this document by disposal, but it is apparent that---

And then Mr. Sawyer interrupted and said,

Excuse me. Did you use the term eventual disposal of him?

Mr. Hart. I used the term eventual disposal, yes, sir.

Now, Mr. Helms, I think it would be important to this committee to have your comments on Mr. Hart's testimony with reference to why the polygraph was being utilized in light of your own.

My understanding is that the first polygraph examination that he was given was designed not to elicit the truth; it was designed to be used as a pressure tactic on him to see if he would confess.

Mr. HELMS. I thought the only polygraph or the only two polygraphs that were given in the normal polygraph way by examiners who had nothing to do with the interrogation were the last two. I think the first one, it has been admitted, was for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on him.

As to those lurid comments about the disposal, I have already addressed myself to those. I knew nothing about these comments; I knew nothing about a written confession; I knew nothing about anything of those things at the time. They may have been written down by Deputy Chief of Soviet Bloc Division, but I have not seen his notes. All I know is that I was never aware of this, and therefore there was never any indication on the part of anybody in a position of responsibility in the management of the Agency to do anything with Mr. Nosenko except to try to establish his bona fides somehow.

Chairman STOKES. So if these things were being done while you

were in the capacity which you have described here, it was never

brought to your attention?

Mr. HELMS. It was not.

Chairman STOKES. The responsibility for handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR branch or the SR division. Did the SR  

101

division enter into a situation as the neutral party, or did the SR

division think from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a

bona fide defector?

Mr. HELMS. I think early on their conviction was that he was not

a bona fide defector. That is my impression today.

Chairman STOKES. When the security officer began his investiga-

tion did he enter the situation in a sort of neutral capacity?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know whether he entered it, sir, in a neutral

capacity or whether he felt the SR division fellows had been wrong

and that a different treatment with Nosenko would elicit a differ-

ent result. I am inclined to think that was the status of the affair.

In any event, by that time it was clear that the hostile interroga-

tion was getting nowhere.

Chairman STOKES. At that point you were aware, of course, of

the hostile interrogation; is that it?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. Since I indicated a decision was made to try

that after his behavior--his thinking was such there was no way to

get him to talk at all except to confine him.

Chairman STOKES. How would you characterize, by the way, your

own reaction to this whole situation? Was this frustrating? Or were

you just content to go along with this in this whole period of time?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think there has ever been anything more

frustrating in my life. This would have been resolved very rapidly

if it involved anything except the assassination of President Ken-

nedy. I don't suppose I would be sitting here today if he hadn't

been assassinated either.

Chairman STOKES. I think you testified earlier today that you

told or communicated the fact to Chief Justice Warren that this

man's bona fides generally could not be established, that he was

not believable. When you met with Chief Justice Warren for the

purpose of clarification did you tell him specifically the agency had

been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides, or did you

tell him that the Agency did not think that Nosenko was bona

fide?

Mr. HELMS. I believe, and it is my recollection, that what I said

to the Chief Justice was that we don't know what this man repre-

sents but we cannot vouch for him. In other words, we cannot

vouch for him positively, and therefore I think the Warren Com-

mission should take into consideration the fact that we cannot

vouch for him and therefore we cannot sign off, if you like, on

what he has said as being true, and that in all fairness to the

Commission this obviously sets in question the statement which the

FBI passed to the Warren Commission about Nosenko's comments

right after his defection about Oswald, and that I took as close to a

middle position as I could.

In other words, I didn't use any excessive language, I didn't

attempt to dramatize this. I just said we can't establish his bona

fides. And that is our responsibility and I am sorry.

Chairman STOKES. Yesterday I put into the record an exhibit

which was a report to the Warren Commission that had been

compiled as a result of testimony taken from Nosenko by the FBI

a fairly extensive document which the Warren Commission had in

its files. I did not see Such a document with reference to the CIA.

Can you tell us what the substance was of what you told the

 

102

Warren Commission or Chief Justice Warren of Nosenko's story

about Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I am not sure I quite understand. Are you asking

me is there a document in existence of what I told Chief Justice

Warren?

Chairman STOKES. Yes. It can be answered twofold. No. 1, I am

asking you, is there such a document? No. 2, tell us what, if

anything, was said, whether there is or is not a document.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know; I don't think there is a document. I

don't recall ever having written a document about it. Whether

Chief Justice Warren himself wrote a document or whether it is

incorporated in the proceedings of the Warren Commission, that I

don't know either, sir.

Chairman STOKES. Can you give us the benefit of what you told

him about the substance of Nosenko's story?

Mr. HELMS. I don't believe that at this meeting, at least as I now

vaguely recall it, that I went into the substance. I simply stuck to

the fact that I couldn't vouch for the man and therefore whatever

he had said they would have to judge in that light.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us what Chief Justice Warren's

reaction was?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think he was pleased to hear this. He was

perfectly reasonable about it and said, thank you, and I will inform

my colleagues on the Commission about this; I appreciate your

having told us, and we will be guided accordingly.

Chairman STOKES. Did the Warren Commission themselves or

staff ever make a request to interview.

Mr. Helms. I am not aware of it, Mr. Stokes, if they did.

Chairman STOKES. Did you inform the Warren Commission in

April of 1964 that Nosenko was then being placed in solitary

confinement?

Mr. HELMS. I don't remember any more what the Warren Com-

mission was told about the circumstances of Mr. Nosenko's living

conditions or handling. I don't have any recollection of that at all.

Whether any of my colleagues sought, to provide it,

know. Fifteen years is a long time to remember.

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this. Is it something that you

think they should have been told about?

Mr. HELMS. I have a hard time answering. I think we were all

preoccupied with getting at what Mr. Nosenko knew about Oswald

and the details had been given them, and it would seem to me

those were the relevant things.

Chairman STOKES. Wouldn't it have been either a responsibility

of you or Mr. McCone to advise the Commission of the extraordi-

nary action being taken with reference to this affair?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think there is anything particularly extraor-

dinary about the manner in which the Warren Commission was

sitting.

Chairman STOKES. You misunderstood my use of the word "ex-

traordinary." It seemed to me at the point where you are getting

ready to put a man in solitary confinement--under conditions

under which he was confined is not a normal American situation.

Mr. HELMS. I understand that.

 

 

 

103

Chairman STOKES. So I put it in that sense. Don't you think they should have been advised of this extraordinary situation?

Mr. HELMS. Maybe my recollection is faulty, but during the time that we were attempting to resolve is bona fides in order to help the Warren Commission, the fact that he was being kept alone and isolated and so forth, I don't think that would have come as a surprise to anybody. This is the way we handled all defectors.

Chairman STOKES. That was standard operating procedure; is that it?

Mr. HELMS. Of course. What would you do with them, put them in the Hilton?

Chairman STOKES. Whose decision was it, Mr. Helms, to place him in solitary confinement?

Mr. HELMS. I think it was the decision arrived at by those involved in the case that this was--well, it was a kind of a decision jointly arrived at, I am sure, on the recommendation of the individuals who were going to do the interrogating, and at the original point of departure obviously he would have been kept alone and an effort would have been made to interrogate him on successive days. The fact he was held do long is something that came afterward. That didn't have much to do with the Warren Commission once their report had come out but we still were under this necessity to try to resolve the cse; but a lot of people were involved in this decision. This is probably not the kind of a decision an individual makes all by himself.

Chairman STOKES. What I am trying to do is have the record clear as to who made this decision as of April 4, 1964, to place him in solitary confinement.

Chairman STOKES. What I am trying to do is have the record clear as to who made this decision as of April 4, 1964, to place him in solitary confinement.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know who exactly made the final decision. I assume it went to the Director for his approval. I don't know this as a fact. I would assume that the agency records might show this. If they don't, my recollection is not that clear any more. I was a party to the decision, I am sure of that. I don't want to duck anything around here. I don't want any of you gentlemen to think that like so many witnesses which come before congressional committees nobody can be found who is prepared to stand up and say they were there; but I was there. It would not have been my final decision to make.

Chairman STOKES. So that the committee then, following up on your last words, so they an properly assess it, what specifically was your input?

Mr. HELMS. I assume my input would have been to agree this should be tried, the hostile interrogation should be tried. I obviously had no idea at that time that this was going to drag on so.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Helms, let me refer you once again to page 147 of the declassified transcript. The question posed to you on that pate.

Mr. HELMS. 147, Mr. Stokes?

Chairman STOKES. 147.

Mr. HELMS. Is this where I say, "I certainly agreed to the fact that this should be tried."?

Chairman STOKES. No. I would like you to refer to line 17 and then I want to ask you this question.

 

 

 

104

Mr. HELMS. I see line 17, It is where Mr. Goldsmith asked me a

question.

Chairman STOKES. The question asked of you by Mr. Goldsmith,

"Please describe to the best of your knowledge the conditions under

which Nosenko Was placed When he was put in solitary confine-

ment."

 

Answer: "He was put into a small house in the countryside

where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory living condition.

They were just not particularly spacious or padded, let us say. His

bed was perfectly adequate, his chair was perfectly adequate, the

lighting was pefectly adequate, but it was not particularly comfort-

able in the normal American sense of the terms."

Was that question asked of you and was that your answer?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. If that is not an accurate description of the first

place he was held after his defection, then I was misinformed. I

never went to visit the place myself. This is simply what I was told.

Chairman STOKES. So my understanding now is the testimony

here today would not be the same as it was on that day. Is that

what you are saying?

Mr. HELMS. No, I am not, sir. I am simply saying that I believe

he was held in different places in this period of time. As to the first

place he was held, it is my understanding this is an accurate

description of it. If it is incorrect, I am sorry. But I would just do

my best to describe what I understood. Is it not correct?

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this. What do you understand;

the conditions changed from what you have described?

Mr. HELMS. Some months later when another facility was cre-

ated specifically to hold Mr. Nosenko, I believe that was somewhat

later on--it must have been later on because it had to be arranged.

Chairman STOKES. I am having a little problem understanding.

On that occasion if you were under the impression Mr. Goldsmith

was asking you about one particular place and you had in mind

another place. Why didn't you indicate that at that time?

Mr. HELMS. That is quite conceivable, Mr. Stokes. I am sorry if

when he says the place he was in solitary confinement, if that

referred to the later installation, I didn't understand it that way.

He was in solitary confinement from the time he was brought over.

Chairman STOKES. At the point he was put into solitary confine-

ment, then, can you describe the conditions that existed then?

Mr. HELMS. Now in "solitary confinement," are you referring to

the installation in which he was later held, which was constructed

for this purpose? Is that the one you are talking about?

Chairman STOKES. Let me put it this way, so that there is no

mistake about it: He was put in solitary confinement April 4, 1964;

is that right?

Mr. HELMS. He was subjected to hostile interrogation. Is there a

magic to solitary Confinement, aside from the fact that is kind of

buzz word in the United States? I mean, he is living alone in a

house; is that solitary confinement, or do you have something else

in mind? That is all I am trying to get after.

Chairman STOKES. How many times was his position, where he

was headquartered at a house, changed?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I don't know where he was first put

when he arrived in Washington. I don't know if that is the same

 

 

 

105

place he was kept until he was moved to a later place. I am not

sure of these details anymore at all.

Chairman STOKES. Well, are you able to describe any of these

places where he was kept for us?

Mr. HELMS. The place, the installation, which he was later taken

to, I saw many years afterward. Have you seen it?

Chairman STOKES. No, I have not.

Mr. HELMS. I guess it still exists.

Chairman STOKES. Can you describe that place for us, the condi-

tions that he experienced there?

Mr. HELMS. I never visited the place when Mr. Nosenko was

there. It was quite some years after he had left there that I went to

see it at the time it was constructed, I believe I sent an officer or

a couple of officers in whom I had confidence to go down and

examine the place and see if it was too rigorous or whether it was

proper for the purposes and so forth; and I was assured that it was

all right.

Perhaps I should not have taken their word. Maybe I should

have gone down myself, but the fact remains that I have seen it

once; but I can't describe the conditions under which he was held

because I never visited him when he was there.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Helms, prior to April 4, 1964, when he

was put in solitary confinement, hadn't he been on vacation in

Hawaii with some of the CIA agents for over 2 weeks?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I knew he was drinking in Baltimore; he was

in Hawaii. There were various devices being used to try and take

care of him, and talk to him, and so forth; so it may be that it was

in April precisely that he was put in solitary confinement or that

he was confined. Let's put it that way.

Chairman STOKES. He was confined as of that date?

Mr. HELMS. After all, he was in the custody of these individuals,

as soon as he arrived in the United States. I am not sure when he

was confined, but if it was in the same house in which he was

living in Washington, or whether it was or not, I am sorry, I just

don't have these details, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. But even the place which you described in

your previous testimony--you don't know when that was, do you?

Mr. HELMS. I thought this was the first place he was put when

the serious interrogation began. When I was down here before--

and I guess it is in this book somewhere--Mr. Nosenko himself, l

believe, gave this committee an affidavit, describing the fact that

he was held in two different places. That was the basis on which I

assumed he was accurate about it; but if this is now coming down

to a question of my veracity about this testimony, then I must have

misunderstood the question. I would rather withdraw it and not

describe at all how Mr. Nosenko was held. I think that would be

better for the record.

Chairman STOKES. Is that your preference?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. Then there won't be any question about it.

Chairman STOKES. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the clerk mark

another exhibit in her possession as JFK F-446. I request that the

witness be provided a copy of it and that this exhibit be entered

into the record at this point.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit No. F-446 will be

admitted into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

 

 

 

106

JFK EXHIBIT F-446

In accordance with a request of the staff of the Committee

(House Select Committee on Assassination), I make the following

statement describing the conditions of my imprisonment from

April of 1964 till the end of 1967.

On April the 4th of 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up

and a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had

given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken in another

room for the test on a lie detector.

After finishing the test an officer of CIA has come in

the room and talked with a technician. started to shout that

was a phoney and immediately several guards entered in the room.

The guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and checked

me. After that I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room

had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room.

Nobody told me anything how long I would be there or what would

happen to me. After several days two officers of CIA

started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and even in

evening hours was writing for them whatever I could recollect about

the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two

months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped

to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room

till the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965.

The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a

shower once in a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not

 

 

 

 

107

JFK EXHIBIT F-446 cont.

given a tooth brush and a tooth paste and food given to me was

very poor (I did not have enough to eat and was hungry all the

time). I had no contact with anybody to talk, I could not read, I could not smoke, and I even could not have fresh air or to see

anything from this room (the only window was screened and boarded)

The only door of the room had a metal screen and outside in

a corridor two guards were watching me day and night. The only

furniture in the room was a single bed and a light bulb. The room

was very very hot in a summer time.

In the end of 1964 there were started again interrogations by

several different officers. The first day they kept me under 24

hours interrogation. All interrogations were done in a hostile

manner. At the end of all those interrogations when I was told

that it was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to

higher ups I said that I was a true defector and being under arrest

about 386 days I wanted to be put on trial if I was found guilty

or released. I also asked how long it would continue. I was told

that I would be there 3860 days and even more.

This evening I was taken by guards blindfolded and handcuffed

in a car and delivered to an airport and put in a plane. I was

taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room with

bars on a door. In the room was a single steel bed and a mattress

(no pillow, no sheet, and no blanket). During winter it was very

cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after some

time. Except one day of interrogation and one day of a test on a

lie detector I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor

(guards were not allowed to talk with me].

 

 

 

108

JFK EXHIBIT F-446 cont.

After my constant complaining that I needed fresh air - at

the end of 1966 I was taken almost every day for 50 minutes exercise.

to a small area attached to this cell. The area was surrounded by

a chain link fence and by a second fence that I could not see

through. The only thing I could see was the sky. Being in this

cell I was watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass

the time a couple of times I was making from threads chess set. And

every time when I finished those sets immediately guards were

entering in my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately

wanting to read and once when I was given a tooth paste I found in

a tooth paste box a piece of paper with description of components of

this tooth paste. I was trying to read it (under blanket) but guards

noticed it and again it was taken from me. Conditions in both (first

and second) locations were analogical.

I was there till November of 1967. Then I again was transferred

blindfolded and handcuffed to another location. In this new place

I had a room with muck better conditions. And * * * * * * * (CIA

officer) started questioning me every day (excluding Sundays)

touching all questions concerning my biography, carrier in the KGB

and all cases of the KGB known to me. I was imprisoned for the whole

5 years. And I started my life in the USA in April of 1969.

August 7, 1978

UNREADABLE SIGNATURE

 

 

 

 

 

109

Chairman STOKES. I request further, Mr. Chairman, that in the

event I did not request that JFK exhibit F-537 be made a part of

the record, that it be made a part of the record at this point.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-537 is entered into

the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-537

 

 

THE: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D.C.20505

Office of Legislative Counsel

1 September 1978

Mr. G Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel & Director

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Forwarded herewith are answers to the interroga-

tories received at close of business on 28 August 1978.

Sincerely,

S.D. Breckinridge
 
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Attachment

 

 

110

JFK EXHIBIT F-537 cont.

Question #3

Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements

with the Central intelligence Agency. Include:

a. the dates and nature of his employment

b. the services rendered by Nosenko

c. itemized accounting of all compensation

received by Nosenko

d. an account of the roles of Richard Helms

and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko's

employment and compensation arragements with

the CIA.

Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was

promised $5O,O00 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his

identification, in 1962, of a particular espionage agent, and

$25,000 a year compensation for future services. Mr. Richard

Helms approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although

no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some five years

after Nosenko's defection, the original promise formed the

basis for the eventual employment arrangement and other monetary

remunerations.

Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968,

Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's

employment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969.

This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate

of $16,500 a year. As of 1978, he is receiving $35,327 a year

(see attached annual compensation table for years 1969-1978).

 

 

 

111

JFK EXHIBIT 537 cont.

In addition to regular, yearly compensation, Nosenko was

paid for the years 1964-1969 in November 1972, in the amount

of $25,000 a year less income tax. The total amount paid was

$87,052. He also received, in varying increments from March

1964-July 1973, amounts totalling $50,000 to aid in his re-

settlement on the private economy (see attached table for

breakdown). The total resettlement figure, in effect, satisfied

that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko $50,000

for previous cooperation.

In 1976 Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of

the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage

agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of $28,500,

representing the difference between the $25,000 a year promised

and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969-

1 March 1975.

Since 1969, the Agency has contributed to Nosenko's

hospitalization insurance premiums. The Agency has also

compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses.

To date, NoSenko continues to work as an independent

contractor, with the compensation provision being periodically

amended. His work for the Agency includes consultation with

both the Agency and the FBI on certain matters of current

interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel

 

 

 

112

JFK EXHIBIT F-537 cont.

both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he is also

consulted by various elements of the Agency on current Soviet

developments and requirements. He has been and continues to

be used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses

of the Agency, the FBI, Air Force OSI, and others.

Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any

role in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation

arrangements with the CIA.

 

 7

113

JFK EXHIBIT F-537 cont.

ANNUAL COMPENSATION TABLE

Effective 1 March 1969 $16,500 a year

Effective 1 March 1970 $18,500 a year

Effective 1 March 1971 $19,500 a year

Effective 1 March 1972 $21,000 a year

Effective 1 March 1973 $22,250 a year

Effective 1 March 1974 $23,750 a year

Effective 1 March 1975 $25,250 a year

Effective 1 March 1976 $26,513 a year

Effective 1 October 1976 $28,103 a year

Effective 1 March 1977 $33,000 a year

Effective 9 October 1977 $35,327 a year

1978 $35,327 a year

 

 

 

 

114

JFK EXHIBIT F-537 cont.

RESETTLEMENT FEE TABLE

March 1964 $2,000

April-May 1969 $8,000 (furniture

and auto)

June 1970 $25,000 ($20,000 for down

payment on house; $5,000

for additional furniture,

moving expenses, and

other costs incidental

to the purchase of new

home)

July 1973 $15,000 (balance of

resettlement figure

promised)

 

 

 

 

 

 

115

JFK EXHIBIT F-537 cont.

 

12. What was the CIA's position from 1964 to 1968 on

the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide?

13. What is the CIA's position today on the question

of whether Nosenko is bonafide?

The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed

position on Mr. Nosenko until late 1968. Various persons

within CIA entertained serious doubts about his bona fides,

 

believing in fact that he was a dispatched agent. Had the

 

Agency, as distinguished from those employees, so concluded

he could simply have been turned back. The final conclusion

was that he is a bona fide defector, a judgment that has

been reinforced convincingly by 14 years accumulated

evidence.

 

Mr. HELMS. I have the document.

Chairman STOKES. Mr, Helms, when this committee interviewed

Nosenko, during the course of the testimony we took from him I

made a special request that he provide this committee with an

affidavit which set forth with preciseness exactly the way he was

treated while a member--while in custody by the CIA.

I want to read this exhibit at this time:

 

In accordance with the request of the staff of the committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make the following statement describing the conditions of my imprisonment from April 1964, to the end of 1967.

On April 4, 1964, 1 was taken for a physical checkup and a test on a lie-detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical checkup and after that I was taken in another room for the test on a lie-detector. After finishing the test, an officer of CIA has come in the room and talked with the technician, started to shout that I was a phoney, and immediately several guards entered in the room. Guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room. Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or what would happen to me.

After several days, two officers of CIA started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and even in evening hours was writing for them whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or 2 months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965. The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once in a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and a toothpaste, and food given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and was hungry all the time, I had no contact with anybody to talk to. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only window was screened and boarded. The only door to the room had a metal screen, and outside, in a corridor, two guards were watching me day and night

The only furniture in the room was a single bed and a lightbulb. The room was very hot in the summertime.

In the end of 1964, there was started again interrogations by several different officers. The first day they kept me under 24-hours interrogation. All interrogations were done in a hostile manner. At the end of all those interrogations, when I was

 

 

116

told that it was the last one and asked what I wanted to be related to higher-ups. I said that I was a true defector and being under arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was found guilty or released. 1 also asked how long it would continue.

I was told I would be there 3,860 days and even more. This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and handcuffed, in a car and delivered to an airport and put in a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room with bars on a door. In the room was a single steel bed and a mattress, no pillow, no sheet and no blanket. During winter it was very cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after some time.

Except 1 day of interrogation and 1 day of a test on a lie-detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor. The guards were not allowed to talk with me. After my constant complaining that I needed fresh air, at the end of 1966 I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes' exercise to a small area attached to this cell. The area was surrounded by chain-linked fence and by a second fence that I could not see through. The only thing I could see was the sky. Being in this ceil, I was watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass the time a couple of times, I was making from threads a chess set. Every time when I finished those sets, immediately guards were entering in my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to read. Once when I was given a toothpaste, I found in the toothpaste box a piece of paper with description of components of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under blanket, but guards noticed it and again was taken from me.

Conditions in both first and second location were analogical and illogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I again was transferred blindfolded and hand cuffed in this to another location.

In the new place I had a room with much better conditions, and CIA officers started questioning me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions concerning my biography, career in the KGB and all cases of the KGB known to me. I was in prison for the whole 5 years and I started my lile in the USA in April of 1969.

 

Dated August 7, 1978, signed by Nosenko, Y.I.

This affidavit was taken by counsel for this committee, Kenneth

Klein, as a result of my request.

Having heard this affidavit as I read it, can you tell me whether

or not that was a bona fide statement of Mr. Nosenko about the

way he was treated by the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, I have no means of agreeing or disagree-

ing. I have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing. I didn't visit him

during the time he was being held. After that affidavit was read to

me back in August, I inquired of one of my former associates who

had to do with the holding of Nosenko. He said that he was

certainly held under difficult conditions but I don't think that his

testimony about the food that Nosenko has--he made the point

that the doctor examined him once a week and that certain of

these statements would seem to be somewhat exaggerated. But I

have no independent basis for saying that.

You can bring this officer in here anytime you like and ask him.

I just don't know whether it is correct or not.

Chairman STOKES. Did anyone working under you ever request

permission to give him drugs?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection is that there was a request made to

use the kind of drugs that were considered to be aids in interroga-

tion, the truth drugs, such as, I believe, sodium pentathol, is one of

them.

I don't recall exactly what was proposed, but I made it clear on

that occasion that he was to be given drugs under no circum-

stances; and I also made it clear from the very outset that he was

not to be mistreated physically. To the best of my knowledge, he

was never given drugs and never mistreated physically and regu-

 

 

 

117

larly was checked by doctors to check his state of health. The

doctor who did the checking was a medical doctor as well as a

psychiatrist.

Chairman STOKES. When Mr. Hart testified here a few days ago,

in substantially every detail in Mr. Nosenko's affidavit, Mr. Hart

verities that this is the way this man was treated, and he verities

that from 6 months compilation of records of the CIA, compiled,

researched, and studied by him and four assistants, with that

knowledge.

Do you still say that your position being what it was with the

Agency that you knew nothing of these Spartan conditions?

Mr. HELMS. I knew that he was being held under Spartan condi-

tions. I am simply saying I am unable to attest to the details that

he has in here, because I never went to visit him during this time.

The reports were made to me that he was being held in Spartan

conditions; that is why we had the doctor go down to examine him.

Chairman STOKES. With reference to his diet there, is it your

statement that you said that statement was exaggerate?

Mr. HELMS. The gentleman with whom I spoke a few days ago

told me the one thing he insisted on was that Mr. Nosenko got

enough food. He told me this. I can only attest to what he told me,

but he is available if you want to talk to him.

Chairman STOKES. We have the statement of the CIA that peri-

odically during this time his diet was modified to the extent his

portions of food were modest and restricted. That is their state-

ment to us.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have maybe just one or two final

questions.

The conditions that we have just talked about obviously began

April 4, 1964; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. That is what you say, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. I am not the witness here.

Mr. HELMS. I am going with your time schedule from now on.

There is no sense in my getting all confused and delaying this

hearing. I will accept what you say, that it started in April 1964.

Chairman STOKES. You will accept it. The report of the Warren

Commission was not issued until-December-September of that

year.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, sir--did you say September or December?

Chairman STOKES. I originally said December, and I was wrong.

It was September.

Mr. HELMS. September?

Chairman STOKES. Right. It would seem to me that that would

have been ample time for the Warren Commission to have been

advised of the conditions under which a defector who professed to

have important information about Oswald was being kept

If I understand your testimony correctly, the Commission was

not told of these conditions under which this defector was being

kept?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall their having been told;. they certainly

knew that we had the defector in our custody, because that was the

burden of what I told the Chief Justice. The precise circumstances

under which he was being held, if they were identified to the

Warren Commission, I am not aware of it.

 

 

 

118

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. PREYER. This may be a good place for us to break, if you

have completed your questioning, Mr. Chairman.

Let me suggest that the committee recess until 1:30. Would that

be agreeable to you, Mr. Helms?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Is that agreeable with the committee?

The committee stands recessed until 1:30 today.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was recessed, the commit-

tee to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. of the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. PREYER. The committee will resume its session.

The Chair recognizes Congressman Dodd for such time as he may

consume to resume the questioning.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, before I begin my line of questioning, I would like to

ask you if you might not want to clarify one of your statements. I

received some calls over the lunch break from some constituents

from my home State of Connecticut who were listening to the

testimony this morning. They mentioned to me your response ear-

lier regarding Eastern Europeans and Asians with their propensity

to be able to pass polygraph tests, and it occurred to me that you

might want to rephrase your statement.

I understood you to mean trained agents from those parts of the

world rather than Asians and Eastern Europeans as ethnic groups.

I thought you might want to take a minute to clarify that.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS--(Resumed)

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Dodd, if my generalization caused offense, I had

no intention of doing this. What I, in effect, was trying to say was

that there is an occasional individual who lives in that part of the

world who has spent his life lying about one thing or another and

therefore becomes so good at it that he can pass the polygraph test.

But this would be 1 individual in maybe 1 million or a 100,000,

something of that kind.

I imagine Americans, if they set their minds to it, could do it as

well. I meant no offense to Eastern Europeans as a category or any

individual Eastern European.

Mr. DODD. I thought I would clear that up.

Mr. HELMS. I am glad you did. I am sorry if any of your constitu-

ents felt I was being disrespectful, but I had no intention of being

that way.

Mr. DODD. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask the clerk to show

to the witness JFK exhibit F-413A. This is a letter dated April 3,

1964, from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel, that Mr. Helms

brought with him this morning and had, I believe, inserted in the

record.

This is the only copy. Would you please show that to Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. I have it in front of me, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Helms, I noted in looking at the exhibit during

the lunch break that there was, no signature on that letter. There

 

 

 

119

is an initial. I am not sure it is even Mr. Houston's initial but it

was not signed by anyone. I would like to, if I could, address some

questions to you with regard to Mr. Houston and the credibility of

that statement.

This morning you supplied the committee with this memoran-

dum which was ostensibly written by Mr. Houston, the former CIA

General Counsel, regarding meetings with the Justice Department

officials about Nosenko. That was the substance anyway, as I un-

derstood it, of the memorandum. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DODD. Is this the same Lawrence Houston who on May 7,

1962, along with Sheffield Edwards, also of the CIA, briefed Attor-

ney General Robert Kennedy about the pre-Bay of Pigs CIA Mafia

plots?

Mr. HELMS. I believe it was the same Mr. Houston. He was

General Counsel of the Agency for many years.

Mr. DODD. I am looking here at the report from the Intelligence

Committee on page 131, the bottom paragraph: "Briefing of the

Attorney General on May 7, 1962."

An entry in Attorney General Kennedy's calendar for May 7,

1962, states, "1 o'clock Richard Helms. At 4 o'clock the Attorney

General met with Houston and Edwards to be briefed on the CIA

operation involving Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana."

Mr. HELMS. That would be the meeting.

Mr. DODD. That satisfies your recollection?

Mr. HELMS. That satisfies my recollection. I have been ques-

tioned about that calendar on many occasions. That appointment

that I had with the Attorney General that day at 1 o'clock appar-

ently was canceled, so I was never there. But I believe Edwards

and Houston did keep their appointment.

Mr. DODD. Isn't it true that at that meeting both Mr. Houston

and Mr. Edwards told the Attorney General--on May 17, 1962--

that the CIA-Mafia plots no longer were in any existence, were

terminated?

Mr. HELMS. That is my understanding of what they told him, Mr.

Dodd. I believe--wasn't that contained in a memorandum for the

record written after their meeting? Was it written by Colonel

Edwards? I don't recall; someone wrote it.

Mr. DODD. I will quote for you the bottom paragraph, bb, on page

132 of this report. It says, "And that Kennedy was told the activity

had been terminated as of that time."

Mr. HELMS. I assume that is what they told him.

Mr. DODD. In fact, I will read a direct quote here I have on page

133 of this same report, footnote 4 referring to the italicized para-

graph at the top of page 133:

The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had already been reactivated, nor as Jar as we know was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements.

That is from the Inspector General's report, page 65. That is

where the italicized words come from. And then the fourth footnote

referrring to this general line of questioning, it says, footnote 4:

Houston testified that Kennedy insisted "There was not to be any contact of the Mafia without prior consultation with him."

 

 

 

 

120

Isn't it also true to your knowledge that in 1967 the CIA Inspec-

tor General's report concluded that Sheffield Edwards had, in fact,

lied when they and Houston had told the Attorney General that

these plots no longer existed?

Mr. HELMS. Does it appear in the Inspector General's report that

Edwards lied?

Mr. DODD. Well, maybe semantically we could---

Mr. HELMS. I'm not caviling, I just don't recall any more.

Mr. DODD. On page 134 of this same report, I am reading from

the first full paragraph at the top of page 134, which reads as follows.

As concluded by the CIA itself and the Inspector General's report. Edwards' statement that he was not aware of these developments is implausible.

Do you have any disagreement with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know how to judge it one way or the other. I

did not recall the statement as I was sitting here, and I am just

unable to help with it. If the Inspector General thought it was

iraplausible, I guess he thought it was, but I don't think any final

judgment was made about it. It was part of a very long report

which was directed at some other things as well, and I don't recall

this ever became an issue that anybody had attempted to define, or

refine, let me put it that way.

Mr. DODD. The reason I raise it is the credibility of Mr. Houston

with regard to the memo, and I thought maybe you might be able

to shed some light on why that was not signed. Was that a normal

operating procedure not to sign something with your name type-

written underneath it?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. What we are dealing with is a Xerox,

or if it isn't a Xerox--maybe I shouldn't use a company name--

let's say a copy. I don't know whether it is a copy of the original

memorandum Mr. Houston wrote or a copy of a copy that was

made at the time that he wrote the memorandum. I don't know

who put the signed LRH down here. In other words, I think that

we need some help from the agency as to the exact circumstances,

but I can't conceive that Mr. Houston wouldn't be glad to speak for

himself. He is still alive and well and living here in Washington.

Mr. DODD. Thank you very much.

This morning I believe I heard you testify that you gave all of

the information you believed pertinent to the Warren Commis-

sion's investigation--to the commission promptly. Am 1 recalling

your statement correctly there?

Mr. HELMS. I said--I believe I testified, Mr. Dodd, that I believed

this to be the case although I had learned in recent years that one

must never make a flat statement about anything, so there may

have been certain cases in which they did not get information

promptly. But I believe our effort was to give it to them as

promptly as possible.

Mr. DODD. Alright, I would like to proceed, if I could, for the next

few minutes and ask you to respond to questions surrounding the

so-called assassination plots that were ongoing during the period

from 1961 on. And so I would like to have you focus your attention

on that particular aspect of your inquiry here today.

 

 

 

121

My first question is, to your knowledge, was any member of the

Warren Commission, or its staff, ever informed by the Central

Intelligence Agency of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. HELMS. I assume that you are referring to the one that is

most frequently characterized as an assassination plot Which in-

volved the Mafia? Because the other assassination plots I don't

accept as assassination plots. And so again We have a definitional

problem.

Mr. DODD. Let's start off and ask whether the Warren Commis-

sion was ever informed of any of these attempts on the Cuban

regime whether on the person of Fidel Castro or an effort to

overthrow his government, or an effort to knock him off personal-

ly-whatever they fall into. In any of those to areas your knowl-

edge was the Warren Commission, members or their staff, ever

informed of these efforts?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know what the Warren Commission knew

Mr. Dodd. I didn't inform them of these things, but they had

among them as members Mr. Allen Dulles, who was certainly

aware of what had been going on with respect to Cuba; Senator

Russell of Georgia, the chairman of the Oversight Committee, who

was also aware of what was going on with respect to Cuba; Mr.

McCone who was director at the time, also knew what was hap-

pening. What the Commission knew from those gentlemen I don't

know. I never spoke to them myself about it.

Mr. DODD. But you never did personally?

Mr. HELMS. I never did.

Mr. DODD. I would like to draw your attention if I could to page

22 of your now declassified August 9, 1978, testimony before this

committee written, you stated and I will quote--do you have a copy

of the report in front of you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I do. What page is this?

Mr. DODD. Page 22.

Mr. HELMS. I am on 22.

Mr. DODD. On line 9. Does your copy read, "The only assassina-

tion plot that had any semblance of substance to it"--I am quoting

your response now to Mr. Goldsmith's question--"was one involv-

ing a couple of Mafia chieftains and which were supposed to have

taken place before the Bay of Pigs."

Is that an accurate reflection of your views?

Mr. HELMS. As far as I know, it is an accurate statement. I would

make essentially the same statement today.

Mr. DODD. Before proceeding with the line of questioning on that,

may I ask who these Mafia organized crime chieftains were?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection--I would like to point out that there

were two times in which different people were in touch with the

Mafia. One happened before I was aware that this was going on

and which was the episode that was referred tO by Colonel Edwards

and Mr. Houston when they saw the Attorney General.

The second one, which I never characterized as an assassination

plot because as far as I knew it never went anywhere, was a second

one involving the the Mafia, the one which I have on public television

apologized for and said it was the greatest mistake of my life to

have had anything to do with it and I am sorry about it. But I have

 

 

 

122

never had any convincing evidence from any human being today

that this plot ever went anywhere.

I think just to make myself quite explicit here, I would want to

see the information that said that I had any indication from Wil-

liam Harvey that his operation with Rosselli ever produced any-

thing in Havana. I would like some evidence of this. I would like a

statement under oath from somebody other than a Mafia chieftain.

Mr. DODD. I will go back to my question again. The first relation-

ship existed prior to your direct involvement, is that right?

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Mr. DODD. This is prior to the May 7, 1962, meeting referred to

by Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston?

Mr. HELMS. That is right, and therefore I don't know the details

of it.

Mr. DODD. Am I correct in assuming that the names referred to

in the report Mr. Rosselli, Mr. Giancana, that those were the

principals involved. Were there others that you were aware

Mr. HELMS. I believe there were others. I thought there was a

fellow named Trafficante involved but I am not sure about that. He

maybe came into the picture later.

Mr. DODD. I do recognize that you have made a public apology

and I preface my questions to you with that in mind. But could you

tell this committee who the individuals were that you happened to

be involved with on the second set of circumstances involving

Mafia chieftains or organized crime figures?

Mr. HELMS. As far as I am aware in that particular situation it

was William K. Harvey who was in touch with John Rosselli, and

it was Harvey and Rosselli who were attempting to find, if I

understood it correctly, some channel from Florida into Havana.

I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which

were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was never any

evidence they were ever transported there or ever left the United

States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the

Florida mainland. If it was indeed an assassination plot, it was

misadvertised to me, because I had understood it was an effort to

see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and

the Mafia in Havana. To the best of my knowledge, the connection

never was made.

Mr. DODD. Other than Mr. Harvey and Mr. Rosselli, was there

anyone else that would fall into the character of being members of

organized crime that you had direct contact with?

Mr. HELMS. I had direct contact with none of--the only gentle-

man I had direct contact with myself was Harvey, who was a staff

officer. I never met Mr. Rosselli. I never met Mr. Giancana. If I

met a Mafia chieftain, I wasn't aware of it.

Mr. DODD. Am I to understand that Mr. Giancana was also

involved in this second.

Mr. HELMS. I don't think he was. It was not my understanding

that he was. But then I have no way of demonstrating that, Mr.

Dodd. The Mafia has its own internal organization, and who Ros-

selli talked to I don't know.

Mr. DODD. Going back again to the statement that I read from

page 22 of your declassified testimony before this committee, "The

only assassination plot that had any semblance or substance was

 

 

 

 

123

the one involving a couple of Mafia chieftains." I would like to,

refer to JFK exhibit F-527. I would ask the clerk to supply Mr.

Helms with a copy of that exhibit.

And I would ask you, Mr. Helms, if you would take a look over

this exhibit with particular emphasis on the last paragraph of

what is page 2 of the exhibit, page 3, to the top of page 4, ending

with the paragraph that ends at the top of page 4. Take a minute

to look at that.

I am not asking that you read it out loud but just that you

familiarize yourself with the contents of this exhibit.

Mr. HELMS. I have read that now.

Mr. DODD, Is it fair to assume you recognize this document? You

have seen it before?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have.

Mr. DODD. Am I correct in stating this is the CIA's Inspector

General's report done in 1967----

Mr. HELMS. The one that I asked to have done.

Mr. DODD. The one you asked to have done as DCI, Director of

the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Right.

Mr. DODD. I don't intend to read all of this but beginning at the last sentence on page 2 of the Inspector General's report it reads as

follows:

We can identify five separate phases in agency assassination planning although the transitions from one to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

Without reading each one of them, the inspector General's report

prepared at your request, then outlines in separate paragraphs,

from A to E, five separate phases, as they describe, and using their

language again in "agency assassination planning."

I would like to know, first of all, how you can explain that we

have in a report prepared for you in 1967 what appears to me to be

five separate areas of assassination planning and how that can be

distinguished from your statment to this committee in executive

session where you talk about basically one or tee semblance

assassination attempt involving organized crime figures. Can you

please enlighten the committee as to how you can reach two sepa-

rate---

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I can. I think this is rather lurid language that

has been used in this report. As I read through it, this looks like

the efforts that were made during this time to upset the Castro

regime. If one identifies that as assassination planning, I don't

think that is a proper description of it, and if somebody will come

forth with all the items that are supposed to have been in that

planning, I would be delighted to hear it.

Mr. DODD. They identify here one period beginning prior to

August 1960, That is the first one. The second one is August 1960

to April 1961. The third is April 1961 late 1961.

Mr. HELMS. Aren't those all the same one?

Mr. DODD. That is my question for you. The Inspector General

seemed to distinguish between the various phases here, and accord-

ing to your testimony before us, is this what you were referring to?

is this what you are calling one, what they call five?

 

 

 

124

Mr. HELMS. That is right. I became involved with this business

sometime in 1962 after I took over as DDP. I've forgotten what

month. Anything prior to that I didn't have anything to do with. I

would assume this was one plot but maybe there were others. But

if there are, in all the time I spent with the Church committee and

all the time I have spent endlessly for the last 3 or 4 years, it

seems to me, about these matters, I haven't had anything else

brought to my attention. And if you gentlemen have something, I

would like to know it. But I don't know what it is and I am sorry I

can't help.

Mr. DODD. Did you take issue with this report 11 years ago at the

time it was issued?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Dodd, when I got this report I had some prob-

lems with respect to reporting to President Johnson about certain

points that he was particularly interested in. I did not attempt to

parse it or analyze it or get it changed or do anything with it

except use it as a fact-finding document.

I want to say right now that I never expected to see the docu-

ment in the public domain declassified for the appetites of all those

who wanted to make the most of it, and therefore if I had known

this, I obviously would have edited the report and changed it

rather substantially, put it in the hands of lawyers and had it

entirely rearranged.

Mr. DODD. I say to you, Mr. Helms, with all due respect, it is not

being put into evidence to satisfy the voracious appetites of anyone

but merely to try to clear up a point we are trying to resolve here.

I hope you don't understand---

Mr. HELMS. What is the point you would like to resolve?

Mr. DODD. As someone who is just confronted, I am not an expert

in these matters but I read your transcript and you said, "The only

assassination plot that had any semblance of substance was the one

involving a couple of Mafia chieftains."

Mr. HELMS. And that is what I believe to this date.

Mr. DODD. I am confronted with an Inspector General's report

which was not written to satisfy the appetites of anyone I presume.

It is a declassified document which says, "We can identify five

separate phases." I am merely asking you to clarify that in light of

the earlier statement. That is the only purpose for this being

brought into testimony.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry. For example, it says here that particular

scheme--which scheme? Is this the Mafia thing that we are talking

about?

Mr. DODD. That is correct.

Mr. HELMS. And was again pushed vigorously in the area of

Mongoose and in the climate of intense administration pressure to

do something about Castro and Cuba. Are we talking about the

same. Mafia thing here as well? If that is a lot of plots, I regard it

as one and the same operation. And if I am misleading you in some

fashion--

Mr. DODD. Maybe I can help you. Is it one and the same in your

mind because it involved Cuba and Fidel Castro, and that was one

entity?

Mr. HELMS. The only one that I know about that was

that seemed to have been taken seriously was the one involving

 

 

 

125

Rosselli and Harvey. I believe the Church committee brought out--

found a wetsuit, a clam shell, various things that were on the shelf

in the agency that were regarded as things that might be used in

possibly killing Castro, or being used against him, which never

came off the shelf, were never used. If that is a plot to have created

this, then I will back up and say we ought to enumerate every

single item that conceivably had to do with the invasions of Cuba

which we were constantly running under government aegis. We

had task forces that were striking at Cuba constantly. We were

attempting to blow up powerplants, we were attempting to ruin

sugar mills, we were attempting to do all kinds of things during

this period. This was a matter of American Government policy.

This wasn't the CIA alone.

Now, if those things taper over into assassination plots, maybe

so. I find the semantics the English incendiary but not very clear

and not very clarifying, and not very specific.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that

exhibit JFK F-527 be entered into the record at this time.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK F-527 is entered into the

record at this point.

[Whereupon exhibit JFK F-527 was received in evidence.]

 

 

 

 

126

 JFK EXHIBIT F-527

 

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D.C. 20505

Office of Legislative Counsel

20 September 1978

G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Washington, D.C. 20515

 

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Attached you will find pages 1-8, 14, 17-18, 24-25,

57-59, 62a-63, 94, 118, 130-133 from the report by the

Inspector General on plotting against Castro. These

pages have been sanitized and declassified in compliance

with a request by Mr. Goldsmith, and may be used by you

in your hearings.

 

It should be noted that it is Agency policy to not

release reports of the Inspector General outside the

Agency, in order to protect the unique fact-finding

advisory function that they fulfill within the Agency.

Were the internal confidentiality of the reports to be

compromised the effectiveness of the function could be

impaired. Because so much of the information from the 1967

report was placed officially in the public domain by the

interim report of the Church Committee, Alleged Assassi-

nation Plots Involving-Foreign Leaders, it can be released

in this form on this special occasion.

 

Sincerely yours,

S.D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

encl.

 

 

 

 

 

127

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

 

25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM

This reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to

assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or

attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept

of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written

records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main

events or were lout on paper from memory years afterward. William Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the

years in question, and they ere our best source of dates.

of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of

whom he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed,

of TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are

pertinent. and were involved in only the technical

aspects of operational planning, and their participations were short-

lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing

critical time frames. Operational files are useful in some instances,

because they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be

inferred from collateral information.

For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information

to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time.

Their recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and some of them

 

-1-

 

 

 

128

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

are no longer able to keep the details of one plan seprate from those

of another. We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely

to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles and General

Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go on

fishing expeditions among the mere possibles. To have done so

have risked making witting a number of employees who were previously

unwitting and; .in our estimate; would have added little to the details

available from those directly involved. There are inconsistencies

among the various accounts, but most of them can be resolved by

collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable

participants in a particular plan and by then checking it against

specific dates that can be fixed with fair certainty. We believe

that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking

associated with it is reasonably sound. If there are significant

inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty

ordering of the sequence of events. People still remember much of

what happened; but they can no longer recall precisely when.

It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor

with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro

personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts

to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases

in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one

 

 

 

129

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

to another are not allways sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection

of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes

prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were

aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing

his behavior or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched

in late 1960 and early 1961 were aggressively pursued, and were

viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one

aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime

that culminated in the Bay of Pigs.

 

c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major scheme that was

begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and

remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency

operational activity related to Cuba.

 

d. Late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was

reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the

era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense admini-

stration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and

Cuba.

 

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile

crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the

-3-

 

 

 

130

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in

April 1962 was finally terminated in early 1963. Two other

plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable

and nothing ever came of them.

We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible agency

Kennedy

officers felt themselves subject to the ^ administration's severe

pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless

and, in retrospect; often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in

that light.

Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so

obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe,

though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the

dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him

personally rather than to the government as a body, will not

necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was

stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft

paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General

Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the

position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would

offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist

and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically

relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the downfall of

a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from

 

 

 

 

131

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

positions of power, and there is always the risk that the partici-

pants will resort to assassination. Such removals from power as the

house arrest of a--Mossadeq or the flight of a Batita should not

cause one to overlook the killings of a Diem or of a Trujillo

forces encouraged but not controlled by the U.S. Government.

There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of

those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews

and from review of files. The point is that of frequent resort to

synecdoche--the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood,

or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such

as "disposing of Castro", which may be read in the narrow literal

sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in

the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime.

Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing some-

thing about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically

in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may

not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said

what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral

than was intended.

The suggestion was made to us that operations aimed at the

assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere

stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's

 

 

 

 

132

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would

follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1900 through

1966.

The NIE's on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"

* * * * * * * * have brief paragraphs on likely successor

Castro were to depart the scene.

In each case the treatment is no more nor

less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such

as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the

Operators were unduly influenced by the content of Intelligence

publications.

Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA

plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has

information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a

meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro

was discussed and that a team actually landed in Cuba with pills to

used in an assassination attempt. There is basis in fact for each

of those three reports.

a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an

Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963.

The weapon was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe.

133

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

The CIA officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe

with Black Leaf 40. The evidence indicates that the meeting

was under way at the very moment President Kennedy was shot.

b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

in Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August 1902 at which

Secretary McNamara broached the subject of liquidation of

Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project MONGOOSE

action memorandum prepared by Edward Lansdale. At another

Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of

a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services information

on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused

the exile's request for funds and had no involvement in the plot.

c. CIA twice (first in early 1962 and again in early 1932)

supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working

in behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961

plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in

April 1962 were passed hy the gambling syndicate representetive

to a Cuban exile header in Florida, who in turn had them sent

Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that

a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the

operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would

make an attempt on Castro's life--perhaps using the pills.

 

 

 

134

JFK EXHIBIT 527 cont.

This report describes these and other episodes in detail; puts them

into perspective; and reveals, that while the events described by

Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched together

as though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative

relationship among them is unfounded.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

135

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

Gambling Syndicate

The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had

its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of members of

the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation

had two phases: the first ran from August 1960 until late April

or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigs;

the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely

a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about

May 1961.

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1

August 1960

 

Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield

Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact

with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The

objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although

claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term

conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated

with J.C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now

recalls having had only limited Knowledge of such a plan and at a

much later date--about mid-1962.

 

 

 

 

136

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by Sheffield

on 14 May 1962 states: "No monies were ever paid to Roselli and

Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods

that he was in Miami. (Giancana is "Gold.")

* * * * * * * was introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee

of Maheu, the explanation being that * * * * * * would handle the

case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full time

himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of

the operation at this time. Edwards himself did not meet Roselli

until the summer of 1962.

At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards

told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had

a contact who in turn had other con%acts through whom syndicate

elements in Cuba could be reached. These syndicate elements in

Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter

part of September 1960, Edwards, * * * * * * *, and Bissell were the

ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S.

gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed

of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time.

With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles)

and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving

members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards

 

 

 

137

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words." The descriptive term

used was "an intelligence operation." Edwards is quite sure that the

DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he

was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being from A to

B to C." As he then envisioned it, "A"'was Maheu, "B" was Roselli,

and "C" was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles

merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly,

there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no

formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval

to use his own judgment. Bissell committed $150,000 for the support

of the operation.

(Comment: In the light of this description of the

it is appropriate to conjecture as to dust what the Director did

approve. It is safe to conclude, given the men participating

and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little

likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were

deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never

stated in unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to

conclude that the pointed avoidance of "bad words" emphasized

to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.)

During the week of 25 September 1960, * * * * * * and Maheu went to

Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting

 

 

 

 

 

 

138

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee,

or bouillon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well

suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid fore would be most

desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in

the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets * * * *

remembers meeting with Edwards and * * * * * in Edwards' office to

discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison be

stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting,

and with a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to

meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either

liquid or solid form. * * * * * * * * states that the pill form

chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment: The gangsters may have had some influence on the

choice of a means Of assassination. * * * * * says that in his

very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely,

Maheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the

 

 

 

 

139

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do

the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be

negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill

that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante

the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official

with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable

him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters

named their man inside as * * * * * * * who was then * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The gangsters said that * * * * * * had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost

that source of income; and needed the money.)

 

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of

water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even

disintegrate, let alone dissolve. * * * * * * took them hack and made

up a new hatch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards

at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He

called on * * * * * to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave

* * * * money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. * * * * * * has a record of a conversation with * * * * * * * on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that * * * * * tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.

 

 

 

140

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2

William Harvey, Chief of * * * * * was briefed In February 1961

(by authority of Richard Bissell) on phase one of the gambling

syndicate operation. That briefing was in connection with a sensitive

operation that Bissell had assigned to Harvey. Harvey describes it

thus: Early in the Kennedy administration, Bissell called him in to

discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; i.e.,

a general stand-by capability to easy out assassinations when required.

Harvey's notes quote Bissell as saying, "The White House has twice

urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalls discussing

the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He

mentioned the Edwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro

in that context; but he now thinks that the operation was over by

then and that reference to it was in terms of a past operation as a

case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be

briefed by Edwards. Harvey's fixing of the date as February was only

after review of events both preceding the briefing and following it.

He says now that it might have been as early as late January or as late

as March 1961.

After some discussion of the problems involved in developing an

Executive Action Capability, Bissell palced Harvey in charge of the

effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects

 

 

 

141

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

of the problem with * * * * * * * * and with * * * * * *. Since

* * * * * * was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the

Executive Action Capability, although never with respect to Castro.

We did not question * * * * * * * * on his knowledge of the program for

creating an Executive Action Capability, but Harvey's mention of him

in this connection may explain a notation by * * * * * * that Harvey

instructed * * * * * * * to discuss techniques with * * * * * without associating the discussion with the Castro operation.

Harvey states that after the decision was made to go ahead with

the creating of an Executive Action Capability, and while he

still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms

fully on the general concept but without mention of the then ongoing

plan to assassinate Castro.

The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRRIFLE.. Its

principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier

by * * * * * * * * * for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of Patrice Lumumba) to be run by * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which Bissell

granted.) The project name, ZRRIFLE,. first appears in the files

May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February

1962. The new DD/P (Helms) on that date authorized Harvey, by

- 38 -

 

 

142

JFK EXHIBIT 527 cont.

memorandum, to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for

expenditures was to be by general category and on Harvey's certification.

The initial approval was for $14,700, consisting of $7,200 for QJIN's annual salary and $7,500 for operational expenses.

Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers). It continued on a course separate from the Edwards/gambling syndicate operating against Castro until 15 November 1961. Harvey has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. Harvey says that Bissell instructed him to take over Edwards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter to run the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that as a completely unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he was told by Helms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba task force.

 

Late 1961 - Early 1962

 

Harvey recalls that he was very busy with a number of things in the period that followed the discussion with bissell that led to his taking over Edwards' Castro operation. He was turning over his responsibilities in. He was working with NSA on the Martin/Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and

 

 

 

143

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said he understood the situation

and in due time might brief the Director, Mr. McCone. It is not known

whether General Carter did or did not brief Mr. McCone. There is no

indication that General Carter was further briefed on the full details

of the assassination plot against Castro.

 

May 1962

 

The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational

involvement with gangster elements, because he requested a briefing

on the details. On May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston

met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and, as Edwards puts

"briefed him all the say. " Houston says that after the briefing

Kennedy "thought about the problem quite seriously." The Attorney

General said that he could see the problem and that he could not proceed

against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite

firmly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business

with organized crime again--with gangsters--you will let the Attorney

General know before you do it." Houston quotes Edwards as replying that

this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that among the points

covered was that of Roselli's motivation. The Attorney General had

thought that Roselli was doing the job (the attempt at assassination

of Castro) for money. Edwards corrected that impression; he was not.

 

 

 

 

144

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney

General the latter asked for a memorandum record of the meeting.

Edwards believes that the request was made later and by telephone.

A memorandum was prepared and was signed by Edwards. Both Edwards and

Houston recall having had a hand in writing it. A transmittal buck-

ship from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was made on

11 May, which suggests that Edwards is correct in his belief that the

request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney

General. The memorandum is dated 14 May 1962- It was typed in two

copies only with the original being sent to Attorney General Kennedy

and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It

typed by Edwards' secretary, * * * * * * * * * *. It does not state the

purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was briefed, but it does

make it clear that the operation was against Castro and its true

purpose may be inferred from the memorandum.

Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and

the forwarding of a memorandum of record was canned out without

briefing the Director (John McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the

DD/P (Richard Helms). He felt that, since they had not been privy to

the operation when it was under way, they should be ]protected from

involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had

briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the

 

 

 

145

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

out of the meeting * * * * and AMLASH were informed that President

Kennedy had been assassinated. * * * * * was visibly moved over the news. He asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?" The

contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the

AMLASH meeting, but it is likely that at the very moment

President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban

agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against

Castro. * * * * * * * states that he received an OPIM cable from FitzGerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything off. We do not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. There is a record in the file that * * * * * * * was due to arrive back in

Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November.

The AMLASH project was probably about as widely known within

the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature.

However, we can identify only four people who how of the just-

described episode involving a hypodermic syringe and Black Leaf 40.

* * * * * * * knew all of the story, * * * * * * * knew most of it,

* * * * * * * * * much of it. Fitzgerald did not mention this aspect of the AMLASH operation when he first briefed us on it. When we went back

him later with specific questions, he said he remembered something

about Black Leaf 40, but nothing ,whatever about a device for

administering it. * * * * * * said he had the impression that FitzGerald

 

 

 

146

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

(Text in book turn sideways)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

147

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

him on the Pearson story.

d. Pearson, Anderson, and Greenspun (in Los Vegas) are

newspapermen with a newsworthy story. Pearson has already

published much of it.

e. Maheu does have good reason for not wanting

aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose

his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be some value

to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach

* * * * * * * and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion.

 

What do other components of Government know about this operation?

Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy vas fully briefed by

Houston and Edwards on 7 May 1962. A memorandum confirming the

oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962. The memorandum

does not use the Word "assassinate," but there is little room for

misinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original of that

memorandum is still in the files of the Justice Department. It should

be noted that the briefing Of Kennedy was restricted to Phase One

of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier. Phase Two

was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was

not told of it.

As far as we know, the FBI has not been told the sensitive

 

- 130 -

 

 

 

 

 

148

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

operational details, but it would be naive to assume that they have

not by now put two and two together and come out with the right

answer. They know of CIA's involvement with Roselli and Giancana

as a result of the Lag Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago

newspaper stories of August 1963, and from Giancana's own statement;

it appears that they know this related to Cuba. When Roselli's

story reached them (Roselli to * * * * * * * to pearson to Warren

to the FBI), all of the pieces should have fallen into place. They

should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of

Castro and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation.

There is some support for this thesis in The conversation I had

with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting.

between Roselli and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Giancana

have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation" He said that

he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either

Roselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your

people."

Can we plausibly deny that-we plotted with gangster elements to

assassinate Castro?

No, we cannot. We are reasonably confident that there is nothing

in writing outside of the Government that would confirm Pearson's

 

 

 

 

149

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

story of the gambling syndicate operation; but there are plenty of

non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation.

a. Maheu can confirm that Shef Edwards told Roselli

that Edwards had told the Attorney General of Roselli's

activities on behalf of the Government.

b. * * * * * * * * * * * * can confirm the pill and

three-man team elements of the story.

c. * * * * * * can confirm the pill element of Phase One.

d. If an independent investigation were to be ordered,

the investigators could learn everything that we have learned[.

Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to

us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants.

 

Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?

Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two was carried

out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to

do something about Castro such is not true of the earlier phase.

Phase One was initiated in August 1960 under the Eisenhower

administration. Phase two is associated in Harvey's mind with the

Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in

response to White House urgings. Again; Phase One had been started

and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared

 

 

 

 

150

JFK EXHIBIT F-527 cont.

on the scene.

When Robert Kennedy was briefed on phase One in May 1962; he

strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check with the Attorney

General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal

elements. This was not done with respect to Phase Two, which was

already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed. The

Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes

one detail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team.

 

What measures might be taken to lessen the damage?

We see little to be gained from personal approaches now to

Maheu, * * * * * *, or Roselli. Maheu has much to lose and might be able

to prevail upon * * * * * * and Roselli not to spread the story further.

It is questionable whether any such urging would be effective with

Roselli, because Roselli stands only to gain from having the story

of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress

the story, because it is already out and may boil up afresh from the

Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and

urge discretion upon him, and if this became known, it would merely

lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat improbable.

 

 

 

 

151

Mr. DODD. Mr. Helms, did John McCone, former Director of

Central Intelligence Agency and your immediate supervisor, know

about--I gather you don't care for the word assassination plots and

I am trying to find some words you and I can agree on. Let's call

them efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro. Does that satisfy you?

Mr. HELMS. Fine.

Mr. DODD. Did John McCone know about the agency's efforts to

get rid of Fidel Castro?

Mr. HELMS. He certainly was on top of all the operations that we

mounted against Cuba. He was in the vanguard of this. He attend-

ed most of the committee meetings, he pushed certainly as hard as

anyone in the administration to see if we couldn't topple the Castro

regime. I believe he has testified to the effect that he did not know

of what he called specific efforts to kill Castro. I don't know wheth-

er he knew about it or not. I will accept his word. I have no reason

to argue with him about it. There was a big flareup at the time of

the Church committee hearings over whether I had told McCone

about this or whether I had told Harvey not to say anything about

it. I don't have any clear recollection any more of the events

surrounding that particular detail, so I cannot help you on it. I

would be glad to if I could.

Mr. DODD. So you don't know when he would have been in-

formed, if he had been?

Mr. HELMS. Then I believe he had Mr. Elder, who was his execu-

tive assistant his--

Mr. DODD. I am having a hard time hearing.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry. During the Church committee hearings

Mr. EIder, who had been his executive assistant, swore out an

affidavit that he had been instructed by McCone to tell me that

anything smacking of assassination was not permissible to Mr.

McCone. Mr. Elder gave his testimony under oath. I never had any

conversation with Mr. Elder like that, that I ever recall. As I have

said on previous occasions and on the record, I have great regard

for Mr. McCone. He was my boss. I would have no doubt whatso-

ever, if he had expressed himself in this fashion through one of his

subordinates to me, that I would have remembered it. I think I

would have remembered it. So the issue is unresolved.

Mr. DODD. For the purposes of clarity can we talk about these

efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro in terms of pre-Bay of Pigs and

post-Bay of Pigs? I think for our purposes that might be of some

help.

Mr. HELMS. Certainly.

Mr. DODD. Did I understand you to say that you are not sure he

knew about either the pre-Bay of Pigs or the post-Bay of Pigs

efforts or that he knew about the pre-Bay of Pigs and didn't know

about the post-Bay of Pigs or knew about both?

Mr. HELMS. I thought on one occasion I told him about the pre-

Bay of Pigs episode because my recollection is that something

appeared in a newspaper--I think in the Chicago Sun Times--

about it, and I went and spoke to him about it and told him what

was involved.

As to the post-Bay of Pigs, I don't know what he knew. You

know, Mr. Dodd, I am not looking for refuge in these matters. I am

 

 

 

152

prepared to stand here and take my beating in any form that you

gentlemen want to administer it.

Mr. DODD. We are not out to beat anyone. We are just trying to get at the facts.

Mr. HELMS. I am delighted to hear you say that. But let me just

explain as Director of the agency Mr. McCone had every opportuni-

ty to find out anything in the agency that he wanted to find out.

He had an inspection staff, he had executive assistants, he had all

kinds of people around him. So what he knew and what he didn't

know on a given date I can't possibly attest to, but I do want to

make the point that nobody was stopping him from finding out

anything he wanted to find out.

Mr. DODD. In the Church committee report which 1 have marked

here as JFK exhibit F-539, reading at the bottom:

 

Mr. McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during"the years in which he

was DCI, Director of Central Intelligence and that he did not

authorize those plots. He testified that he was not briefed

about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissel, Helms, or anyone

else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961.

Do you take issue with that?

Mr. HELMS. No, I am not going to take issue with it. I would

simply end up in a lengthy hassle between me and Mr. McCone. I

I have better ways to spend my time.

Mr. DODD. So you would agree with Mr. McCone's testimony that

he was not briefed?

Mr. HELMS. I have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Can you think of any reason why you might not have briefed him.

Mr. HELMS. When he came aboard as Director I was not the

Deputy Director of Plans. It was Mr. Bissell who was the Deputy

Director of Plans, and Allen Dulles was the Director. Dulles left,

McCone took his place, and Bissell continued on as Deputy Director

of Plans for a time.

Mr. DODD. When you became Deputy Director of Planning in

1962, can you think of any reason why you would not have told Mr.

McCone?

Mr. HELMS. The episode, the pre-Bay of Pigs episode, I did talk to

him about one day, I know.

Mr. DODD. So you did inform him of the pre-Bay of Pigs effort?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. That was not when he came in 1961; it was

after that, so I guess if you parse the statement, the statement is

accurate.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK exhibit F-539 be

entered into the record at this time.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-539 is entered in

the record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-539 was received in evidence.]

[The information follows:]

 

 

 

153

JFK EXHIBIT F-539

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

154

JFK EXHIBIT F-539 cont.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

155

Mr. DODD. If I told you August 3 or August 1963 is when Mr.

McCone believes that he was informed by you of the pre-Bay of

Pigs efforts, would you argue with that date?

Mr. HELMS. Is that when that story came out in the Sun Times?

Because that is the only thing I can key it to.

Mr. DODD. That is what he states, and I just wondered if you

would argue with that.

Mr. HELMS. No, certainly not.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that JFK F-538 be entered

in the record at this time as well.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-538 is admitted

into evidence at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit No. F-538 was received in evidence.]

[The information follows:]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

156

JFK EXHIBIT F-538

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

157

Mr. DODD. Mr. McCone testified he did not know about author-

ized plots. Helms, Bissell, and Harvey all testified that they did not

know whether McCone knew of the assassination plots. Each said,

however, he did not tell McCone of the assassination efforts either

when McCone assumed the position of DCI in December 1961 or at

any time thereafter until August 1963. So that would have been

the first time Mr. McCone was aware of any of these efforts?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is plausible. I can accept that.

Mr. DODD. These would have been the efforts that were pre-Bay

of Pigs?

Mr. HELMS. That is my recollection of that particular episode,

yes.

Mr. DODD. Did you ever talk with the Warren Commission or

anyone on the Warren Commission staff about these efforts to get

rid of Castro?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I might point out in fairness to all concerned

that that was not my function in those days. If anybody was going

to be briefing the Warren Commission about ongoing operations of

any kind in the CIA, it would have been the Director or with the

Director's authority.

Mr. DODD. In other words, you talked about these plots to no one

who had any connection whatsoever with the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I know of; no.

Mr. DODD. I would like to, if I could, refer to page 17--I hope we

have the same copies--of the now declassified August 9 executive

session testimony that you gave before this committee.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have page 17.

Mr. DODD. You can read along with me. Mr. Helms is responding

to a question by Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. HELMS. Excuse me, did you say you wanted me to read it?

Mr. DODD. No. I will read it and you may read along with me.

On the bottom of page 16:

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the agency's investigation reflect any working hypotheses?

By that, did the agency give any particular emphasis to the particular areas, geographic areas?

Mr. HELMS. I think that the entire U.S. Government, not only the CIA was very concerned as to whether there would be evidence of' some foreign conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubaus were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may have been involved in it.

 

Then dropping to the next paragraph, second sentence:

 

There is hardly any question there was more discussed during those days as to who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done the things he had done, and so forth.

 

Then dropping down to the last paragraph here on this page

beginning with the sentence:

 

I think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, 1 would like to make a comment about the various investigations into the assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the day that the KGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence m Havana is prepared to turn over their files to the United States as to what their relationships to these various people were, it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally and conclusively.

 

It seems to me that the question of possible Cuban complicity

was, according to your testimony, on the minds of a lot of people.

 

158

This was not something that came up later, but right at the very

time. Isn't that correct? In fact, this morning you said in response

to a question from Chairman Stokes that you certainly were aware

that the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald had sought a visa at

the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. And you were aware that the alleged assassin Lee

Harvey Oswald had lived for more than 2 years in the Soviet

Union; is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Right.

Mr. DODD. And you were aware that Lee Harvey Oswald had

passed out Fair Play for Cuba materials in New Orleans; is that

correct?

Mr. HELMS. I believe it is.

Mr. DODD. In light of all-of that knowledge, in light of the

obvious interest and emphasis that the entire U.S. Government

had on the possible activities of the Cuban Government, and in

light of the fact that you knew that Lee Harvey Oswald had

engaged in these activities, why didn't you tell the Warren Com-

mission about the efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro or to overthrow

the Cuban Government?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Dodd, you are singling me out as to why I didn't

march up and tell the Warren Commission when these operations

against Cuba were known to the Attorney General of the United

States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Assist-

ant to the President for National Security Affairs, the President of

the United States himself although he at that point was dead. All

kinds of people knew about these operations high up in the Govern-

ment. Why am I singled out as the fellow who should have gone up

and identified a Government operation to get rid of Castro? It was

a Government wide operation, supported by the Defense Depart-

ment, supported by the National Security Council, supported by

almost everybody in a high position in the Government.

Mr. DODD. According to your earlier testimony you have made

note of the fact and I think the record indicates that the Attorney

General had asked that be stopped. I presume he was told

that they would be. So far as he was concerned, they had ended.

Mr. HELMS. What about some connection with the Mafia? But

the efforts to unseat Castro under Operation Mongoose had gone

on full blast under the Attorney General's direction and we had

the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962. If the Cuban missile

crisis with the connivance of Fidel Castro and the Soviet leaders

had been a success, those missiles would have been introduced to

Cuba and the United States would have been hostage to those

missiles of the Soviets. It would have been the coup of the century.

In December of 1962 the brigade comes back to the United States

having been bought off with drug supplies by the Attorney Gen-

eral, et cetera. President Kennedy went to the Orange Bowl in

Miami and greeted them in December 1962 and assured them, and

this may not be an exact quote, as follows: "I will return this

banner to this brigade in a free Havana"

Those operations went on nonstop during 1963. If that doesn't

indicate there was bad blood between President Kennedy and Fidel

Castro, I don't know what does.

 

 

159

Mr. DODD. But my point is this, according to your testimony, Mr.

McCone was not aware of the post-Bay of Pigs efforts and attempts.

Robert Kennedy, the then Attorney General, asked that all activi-

ties such as that be stopped. Mr. McCone is not aware. I can't ask

you why others who had knowledge of this, did not communicate it

to the Warren Commission.

But as I read your executive committee testimony, you felt you

had, not the link with the Warren Commission but had a very

active role in communicating with the Warren Commission. That

doesn't help me in trying to understand why you would not have

made that information available and known to the Warren Com-

mission.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I am sorry, I didn't.

Mr. DODD. In retrospect, do you think it was relevant?

Mr. HELMS. In retrospect, Mr. Dodd, I would have done a lot of

things very differently. I would like to point out something since

we are so deeply into this. When one government is trying to upset

another government and the operation is successful, people get

killed. I don't know whether they are assassinated or whether they

are killed in a coup. We had one recently in Afghanistan. The head

of the Afghanistan Government was killed. Was he assassinated or

killed in a coup? I don't know.

These semantics are all great. I want to say there is not a chief

of state or chief of government in the world today who is not aware

of the fact that his life is in jeopardy. He takes every possible

protection to guard himself. The relevance of one plot or another

plot and its effect on the course of events I would have a very hard

time assessing and I think you would, too.

Suppose I had gone down and told them and said, yes, you know

we tried to do this. How would it have altered the outcome of the

Warren Commission proceeding?

Mr. DODD. Wasn't that really for the Warren Commission to

determine?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is absolutely correct, but they did not

have that chance apparently.

Mr. DODD. That is right.

Mr. HELMS. I don't want to take the sole blame for the fact that

they didn't have that chance.

Mr. DODD. I am not asking you to.

Mr. HELMS. Well, the implication of the hearing is to that effect.

Mr. DODD. You have to take these things in the entire context.

This is not the only hearing we are having. Prior to the issuance of

the Warren Commission's report, did the Agency at any time have

 

 

any documents or other information which might have indicated

that Mr. Castro may have known about some of these efforts to get

rid of him?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that. I have heard these allegations

flying around. I don't know whether they are accurate or not. I

have heard allegations of newspaper stories that Mr. Castro knew

or didn't know. Eminent Senators of the United States have taxed

me with the fact they knew that Castro knew Mr. Cubela was a

double agent. Mr. Cubela gets up in Havana not long ago and says

Mr. Castro did not know he was a double agent; and

 

160

testified to this committee that he didn't know he had any connec-

tions with the CIA.

Who is right in all of this?

Mr. DODD. That is what we are trying to find out.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I can't contribute anything.

Mr. DODD. Was there any effort to investigate whether or not

Castro or the Cuban Government was aware of these efforts?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think that we used what few resources we

had in Cuba. But after all, you must remember that the whole

object of this exercise at the time was to get intelligence on Cuba of

any kind and it was turning out to be extraordinarily difficult and

the U.S. Government made a major effort to get intelligence on

Cuba during this period of months.

Mr. DODD. I am not in any way trying to be harassing, Mr.

Helms, when I ask these questions. But you stated earlier that

there were other people that were aware of these efforts to get rid

of Castro and that they might have had a responsibility as well to

communicate that to the Warren Commission.

Mr. HELMS. Well, they might have communicated to the Warren

Commission the operations that were being run against Cuba

which were certainly advertised to the Cubans because people

began getting arrested. I mean, task forces would land. The people

would be arrested. I have no doubt they were interrogated. There-

fore, Castro knew these efforts were being made against him.

Now, if you want to single out the assassination plot involving

the Mafia as one thing and you want to circumscribe it and sepa-

rate it from all these other things, exactly who knew about it and

who might have told the Warren Commission, I am not dead cer-

tain.

Mr. DODD. I want to try to determine, if I could, whether or not

it was a conscious decision on your part not to inform the Warren

Commission, or was it just something that you didn't think should

be done at the time?

Mr. HELMS. It never occurred to me. We never talked to anybody

outside the Agency about covert operations of any kind--that per-

haps was a mistake--except to the Senate and House Committees

to whom we reported.

Mr. DODD. But as I understand your statement, you believe today

that that was a mistake?

Mr. HELMS. I think it was a mistake, no doubt about it. I think

we should have shoved the whole thing over. I would have backed

up a truck and taken all the documents down and put them on the

Warren Commission's desk.

Mr. DODD. I notice in your executive testimony and earlier today

in previous testimony it was your position that the

the Warren Commission information only in reponse to the Com-

mission's requests.

Mr. HELMS. Basically that was the case. I imagine that if any-

thing came into the Agency which seemed to be of fundamental

interest to them, we would have volunteered it, but basically we

felt our role was to respond to Warren Commission requests and

not to try and get out in front of them or to try and second-guess

them or anything else. I mean the Commission.

 

 

161

Mr. DODD. But fundamentally it was on a request basis. You

were not necessarily volunteering information?

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Mr. DODD. I would like to refer you to JFK exhibit F-520. I

would ask the clerk to give Mr. Helms a copy of that exhibit, so

that he has it in front of him.

[The information follows:]

 

162

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-520

 

  

163

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

 

164

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

 

165

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

166

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

167

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

168

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

 

169

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

 

170

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-520 cont.

 

 

171

Mr. DODD. This exhibit, Mr. Helms, is dated May 11, 1964. It is a

memorandum that was prepared for your review. The subject of

the memorandum is information regarding Lee Harvey Oswald

provided to the CIA by a Cuban defector.

Mr. HELMS. Which part of it, Mr. Dodd, would you like me to

look at?

Mr. DODD. Do you recall the document? Just looking at it, does it

refresh your memory?

Mr. HELMS. I had better look at it a little more carefully. I have

no doubt it is in my packet of papers. Yes, sir, I have been through

it now.

Mr. DODD. And you recognize this as a memorandum that was

prepared for your review and it does involve information regarding

Lee Harvey Oswald provided to the CIA by a Cuban defector?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. All right. I will read paragraphs 3 and 4 here if you

want to follow along with me, beginning on paragraph 3:

 

We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of blank--

 

The name having been sanitized here--

 

and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin, blank is such an operational gold mine that Mr. Blank wants at a maximum 2 months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of blank.

 

It looks like.

Then paragraph 4:

 

It is recommended that the DDP in turn or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the blank situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience, either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.

Doesn't this language here indicate that in this particular in-

stance anyway, the Agency was contemplating volunteering this

defector's information to the Warren Commission Without a specific

request from the Commission itself?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I think that is right sir. That is what it looks

like to me.

Mr. DODD. Let me ask you this: Why did you fee] in this case

that the Commission should be privy to this information? Why did

you volunteer this information?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I can only assume from reading this, since I

don't have any independent recollection of exactly what this defec-

tor was saying, that it was so obvious to all of us that it would be

of interest to the work of the Commission that we wanted to get it

in their hands.

In saying earlier today that we reacted both to the time and in

response to questions, I didn't mean to imply that we never volun-

teered anything, particularly if it seemed that the Commission

ought to have it, at least in our judgment it seemed that the

Commission ought to have it.

Mr. DODD. I noticed earlier today in response to Mr. Stokes'

question you voluntarily went, I presume, to the Chief Justice at

the time and communicated to him about the reliability of Nosen-

ko's testimony with regard to Oswald?

 

 

172

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, it was certainly voluntary because we were

very concerned at the time.

Mr. DODD. These were pieces of information that the Warren

Commission would not on its own have had access to as a result of

their own work?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is correct.

Mr. DODD. And certainly it was as well, a conscious decision on

the part of the Agency and yourself that both of these pieces of

information were relevant to the investigation by the Commission?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Now I come back again, Mr. Helms---I suppose it is a

constant difficulty I have. I can see and appreciate why you would

feel that the defector's information was relevant. I can certainly

see why the question of the reliability of Mr. Nosenko with regard

to his information with regard to Oswald was relevant.

I have this terrible problem of trying to understand why, albeit

today you recognize it was a mistake, but why--when you back in

1964 recognize the relevancy of those two pieces of information--

there was a lack of understanding as to the relevancy of attempts

on our part to destabilize or get rid of Fidel Castro. That is the

difficulty I have.

Mr. HELMS. I can understand your difficulty Mr. Dodd. I am just

sorry. It is an untidy world.

Mr. DODD. Other than the anti-Castro assassination plots, was

there any other information pertaining to a possible mode or

means or opportunity to kill the President that you are aware of

and that Warren Commission was not told about?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, I don't get the---

Mr. DODD. Other than the assassination plots. We know about

the defector, you volunteered that. We had the voluntary turning

over of the opinion with regard to Nosenko. We know today we

didn't turn over relevant information with regard to these efforts

to get rid of Castro.

Are there other things that you can recall that might have had

relevancy--things of importance, to the Warren Commission's in-

vestigation of the assassination of an American President.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I don't know of any others. I can't think of what they might have been, but then we might have been guilty of

some other errors of omission, I don't know. None come readily to

mind. This didn't come readily to mind at the time.

Mr. DODD. You said earlier that you informed President Johnson

of the anti-Castro plots or the efforts to get rid of Castro.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I did.

Mr. DODD. Do you recall when he would have become aware of

that?

Mr. HELMS. I guess he became aware of it when I told him,

although I believe there were some allegations in a column by

Drew Pearson. Yes, I think that is correct, that there was a column

by Drew Pearson and then maybe some lawyer in town, 3 friend of

his, made some mention of this to President Johnson. It was re-

sponsive to this inquiry from him that I gave him the information.

Mr. DODD. And he was told specifically about the CIA's efforts to

get rid of Castro?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, he was.

 

 

173

Mr. DODD. Was he told specifically about the CIA--organized

crime connection?

Mr. HELMS. That is the thing we were talking about. It was

about the operations to get rid of Castro. They were ongoing even

in his administration.

Mr. DODD. Let me ask you when that would have been? I think

in your executive testimony you said May 10, 1967.

Mr. HELMS. If that is what I said in the executive testimony, I

believe that to be the correct date on which I did this. That is my

belief. I did my best to reconstruct when it was, in recent times. If

it is a mistake, it is a mistake, but it is an honest one. It is my

recollection of when I did this.

Mr. DODD. Is it further your testimony that President Johnson

so-called AMLASH.

Mr. HELMS. I gave him what I recollect is a good fill-in on what

we were trying to do. The AMLASH. operation was a political

action operation to get a political grouping together to unseat

Castro. I recognized it in one of the documents, because

the other day in this group of documents, some officer in the

Cuban operations testified to the fact that that was referred to

consistently in the group as an assassination operation. That is not

my recollection of the case. It was not an assassination operation

or designed for that purpose.

I think that I do know what I am talking about here, but there

are other witnesses to that. Mr. FitzGerald is dead, but there are

other gentlemen who worked with him at the time.

Mr. DODD. As you said in your earlier testimony, it is semantics

that we are having trouble with.

Mr. HELMS. If you are the target there is a great deal of differ-

ence whether somebody is thinking of doing something to you 10

miles from here and actually doing something. I don't mean to

indulge too much in seroantics, but it is a question of whether

anything happened or not.

Mr. DODD. That is not the question. We are talking about what

was planned to happen.

Mr. HELMS. The AMLASH operation was designed to try and get

a political action operation and a military operation to get fid of Castro.It was he who kept saying that the fastest way to do this is to kill the man. But this didn't mean that the Agency was interested in that aspect of the thing and the primary reason for being in touch with him was quite the opposite. We were trying to do various things to rein him in.

Mr. DODD. It was not suggested that there be a democratic elec-

tion to unseat Castro?

Mr. HELMS. I should say not. But if you go through the records of

those years, you will find it was the whole U.S. Government was

behind this one.

Mr. DODD. Well, could you distinguish this one, then, from the

other ones? You didn't want to characterize the other efforts as

assassination plots or efforts to single out and get rid of Castro?

This one you describe as more of a political operation. I am having

a difficult time distinguishing the earlier ones if they are to be

distinguished.

 

 

174

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think it goes back, Mr. Dodd, to what I was

saying a few minutes ago where one government mounts oper-

ations to unseat another government, at what point does what

word become what word. You are trying to unseat them and you

are trying to unseat them by the means at your disposal. Some

may be shooting with guns. Others will take off and go to the hills.

Others might be that you could arrest them and put them in jail.

You know this as well as I do. It is the history of the world. There

are coups constantly going on.

All I am trying to say is the U.S. Government had a policy for

many months of trying to mount a coup against Fidel Castro.

Mr. DODD. I would like to draw your attention to JFK-527.

would ask the clerk to show the witness, Mr. Helms, a copy of this

exhibit.

Mr. Helms, as they bring it over to you, this is page 94 of the

CIA's 1967 Inspector General's report. Do you have a copy of it

there?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I do. I think this is correct. Is this about the

AMLASH meeting?

Mr. DODD. There you go; that is the proper one. Again, just to

make sure I understood you, your testimony was that you didn't

consider AMLASH to be an assassination plot? It was more of a

political operation?

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Mr. DODD. OK. Now let me read the section where you identified

the document. I am reading what is underlined here, and I think

for the purpose of the record it is important to note that the

underlining was done by the InspectorGeneral It was not done by

the committee.

It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro.

 

Now, again, I am reading from the same report that we read

from earlier. They are calling it an assassination device. Are we

getting semantical here again?

Mr. HELMS. No. I think the device, that was a hypodermic with

some kind of poison in it---

Mr. DODD. I am having a hard time hearing you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. I believe it was a hypodermic Syringe they had given

him with something called Black Leaf-40 in it. This was in re-

sponse to AMLASH request that he be provided with some sort of a

device whereby he could kill Castro. He returned this device on the

spot to the case officer. The case officer brought it back to Wash-

ington and that was the end of the plot.

Mr. DODD. OK, but for purposes of discussion, the officer gave

this Cuban, this agent in Paris, a device with that material you

described in it. 1 presume the material, if injected into a human

being, would kill him; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. I would think so, yes.

Mr. DODD. So the officer gives the Cuban agent the device to kill

somebody.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry he didn't give him a pistol, because it

would have made the whole thing a lot simpler and less exotic.

 

 

175

Mr. DODD. Well, whether it is a pistol or a needle, if AMLASH is

a political plot to destabilize the governement, what in the blazes

are we giving an agent a device to kill Castro for if it is not an

assassination plot?

Mr. HELMS. Well, if you want to have it that way, why don't you

just have it that way.

Mr. DODD. It is not what I want.

Mr. HELMS. I think it is what you want.

Mr. DODD. I am reading to you from reports prepared at your

request by the Inspector General. I'm not fabricating, I am quoting.

Mr. HELMS. I understand that.

Mr. DODD. Well, it is not a question of what I want. It is a

question of what this committee would like to know. and the com-

mittee is not satisfied, I don't believe, at this point as to exactly

what the characterization of AMLASH was.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I have told you what I believe the characteriza-

tion of AMLASH to be.

Mr. DODD. What does that have to do with this?

Mr. HELMS. Because we gave him a gun or hypodermic syringe or

whatever the case may be at his request because he had aims on

Castro. If that is your definition of an assassination plot, then have

it that way. It is quite satisfactory with me.

Mr. DODD. But it is your characterization that it would not be---

Mr. HELMS. No; it is not. He didn't accept the weapon. If we gave

him a gun and he gave it back there is no way he was going to

make an assassination or murder with that particular device, was

there?

Mr. DODD. It is not a question of what he wanted to do. It is what

we were trying to do by giving him this device. That is what I am driving at.

Mr. HELMS. Is it important? I thought you had Mr. Cubela testi-

fying that they never even knew he was in touch with the CIA. So

how is it relevant to the hearings of this committee let alone the

Warren Commission?

Mr. DODD. I would suggest to you that it might be relevant, if, in

fact, Mr. Castro was aware of the fact that we were engaging in an

activity designed to cause his early demise.

Mr. HELMS. Well, if he didn't know it, he could have guessed it.

Mr. DODD. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Helms, was the

AMLASH operation well, I guess called in in-house jargon a secure

operation an operation where to your knowledge there were not

any leaks.

Mr. HELMS. The allegations I believe have been made by some

officer connected with it that he felt there had been leaks.

Mr. DODD. I am sorry. I didn't hear you.

Mr. HELMS. The allegation I believe has been made by some

officer connected with the operation that there were leaks, that it

was not a secure operation. The merits of that allegation I do not

know. I know that the Senate committee seemed to feel that this

was the case and I believe they came to the conclusion that it was

a double agent operation.

 

176

I never believed that it was a double agent operation. I am now

supported by Mr. Castro and Mr. Cubela I don't know whether

that support gives me any solace or not.

Mr. DODD. Just a second ago you said even if he didn't know, he

could have guessed anyway.

Mr. HELMS. Sure.

Mr. DODD. I will ask that JFK exhibit F-527 be entered into the

record at this point.

Mr. FITHIAN [presiding]. Without objection it is admitted.

[JFK exhibit F-527 was entered previously.]

Mr. DODD. Mr. Helms, I would like to show you JFK exhibit

F-512. This is an affidavit that was prepared by an individual who

no longer works with the Agency. The name at the top is a ficti-

tious name, not his real name.

Mr. HELMS. That is known in the jargon as a cryptonym.

Mr. DODD. Then, Joseph H. Langosch is a cryptonym. This indi-

vidual is a person who has extensive experience in counterintelli-

gence matters related to CIA operations against Cuba.

In fact, quoting from his background here, he worked for the

Agency from 1955 to 1968. During 1963, he functioned in two

capacities as a CIA officer, the first capacity being as Special

Assistant to the Chief of the Special Affairs staff, and the second

capacity being as the Chief of Counterintellgience for the Special

Affairs staff.

During 1963, the Special Affairs staff was the CIA staff responsi-

ble for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba

and the Cuban intelligence services and that as Chief of Counterin-

telligence for the Special Affairs staff he was responsible for safe-

guarding the Special Affairs staff against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Service.

So he was directly involved here on page 4.

Mr. HELMS. He is the man I was talking about a few moments

ago when I said somebody identified with the operation made the

allegation that this was an assassination plot. The gentleman may

have heard somebody say this, but I had not heard anybody say it.

I had occasion to ask if this was the common talk in the SAS staff

from someone else who was there in a high position and I am told

it was not.

So, I don't know the merits of the case. I have no reason to put

the man down on his affidavit, but on the other hand this was not

my understanding of it.

Mr. DODD. Well, for the purpose of the record, for the other

committee members who may not be aware of his statement in the

affidavit, he says that the AMLASH operation might have been an

insecure operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy

because it was highly possible that as of 1962 the Cuban Intelli-

gence Services had knowledge of the CIA's association with persons

involved in the AMLASH operation, including AMLASH 1, also

known as blank, and that the information which led him to doubt

the security of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of

President Kennedy was available to senior level CIA officials, in-

cluding Desmond FitzGerald. And the last paragraph states that

the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President

Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond

 

177

FitzGerald, and other very senior CIA officials, as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by the Central Intelligence

Agency.

Mr. HELMS. It is interesting to me that a man who is so close to

Mr. FitzGerald spells his name wrong.

Mr. DODD. How do you spell the name?

Mr. HELMS. It has a capital G.

Mr. DODD. That may not be his fault. That may be the stenogra-

pher's fault.

Mr. HELMS. But he has all kinds of initials in the margin here in

which he made certain corrections. He would have had the oppor-

tunity to take note of that, too, I would think.

Mr. DODD. We will take note of that. Obviously, you have had

some experience..in intelligence Work. Would you like to comment

on this aside from that?

Mr. HELMS. You know, it is an interesting fact that this commit-

tee knows more about the truth of the assertions than I do because

you have talked to Cuban officials. The meeting in Cuba at which

Cubela testified has occurred within the last 2 or 3 months, and I

imagine in the two trips that this committee has made to

Havana--at least the newspapers tell me it has been two trips--

you have had a chance to satisfy yourself perhaps as to whether

the operation was insecure or not.

The Cuban position seems to indicate that it was secure that

they did not know about it That is why I say it is interesting. I

have nothing to contribute myself. I don't know whether it was

insecure or not. I can only tell you, though, that intelligence offi-

cers are just as human as most people and the fellow who doesn't

feel that maybe he was properly appreciated at one time in his

career is always glad to get back at his superiors by saying he was

the one who was right and they were the ones who were wrong.

Mr. DODD. Fine. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would terminate

my line of questioning and turn back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much.

Mr. FITHIAN. We were not sure, Mr."Dodd, that you had a bal-

ance of time, but we do want to thank you for your exhaustive

questioning.

I think the plan here, Mr. Helms, is very soon to go back to the

counsel, but I am going to exercise the prerogative of the Chair

because I have a plane to catch and I want to ask a couple of

questions before I leave.

Mr. Helms, the fact that Oswald was in possession of information

of some sort on U.S. radar equipment and radar operating proce-

dures at the time he defected or attempted to defect to Russia in

1959 is of some interest to us. Some people claim that he might

have had knowledge of the U-2 spy plane performance characteris-

tics as well, although that is less certain.

But we are certain at least about the radar information. He told

a State Department official, as you testified this morning I believe,

in Moscow in 1959 that he intended to give this information to the

Soviets.

My question is: Was the CIA aware of Oswald's defection and the

extent of his radar training in 1959?

 

 

178

Mr. HELMS. I don't know, Mr. Fithian. My impression was that

we first heard of his defection to the Soviet Union through State

Department channels. Having been a marine and therefore a re-

sponsibility of the Navy Department, I think the Agency would not

have gotten very close to Mr. Oswald-They would not have regard-

ed him as part of our responsibility.

Mr. FITHIAN. So then the Agency, though aware, I would pre-

sume there is some procedure for Americans, for your handling or

someone handling American attempts to defect?

Mr. HELMs. Yes, sir. He went to the Embassy in Moscow, and the

ordinary Consuls would have handled this affair.

Mr. FITHIAN. And you or the Agency would not have been, under

a routine arrangement, have been alerted by the State Depart-

ment?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think we would have heard from the State

Department and I believe that we did hear from the State Depart-

ment. We would have had no jurisdiction in the case.

Mr. FITHIAN. Would you, would the Agency then not have--as a

matter of practice--not have inquired of DOD or someone as to

how much damage to our U-2 operation, let's say, theorized, that

Oswald might be able to do by the defecting.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. We might have, but I would have

thought that the feeling would be that that was the Navy Depart-

ment's responsibility.

Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your best assessment that in all probability the

Agency did not make any effort to assess the potential damage of

Oswald's----

Mr. HELMS. I think that is right. In other words, he was another

Marine, but what specialty he had or what he had been involved

with, I don't think we would have gone into that unless it were

volunteered to us in some form.

Mr. FITHIAN. Then the return of a defector to the United States,

as Oswald did in 1962, is that--would that trigger an action by the

Agency to interview him?

Mr. HELMS. Normally it would have, except that he would have

been regarded by the Agency as a member or a Reserve member

from the Defense Department, and therefore it would have been up

to the Navy to take him over and talk to him.

Mr. FITHIAN. Now, I thank you for your assessment. I would like

your best guess on this. I doubt that you have any specific informa-

tion, though you may.

Given our work in the whole field of intelligence, is it reason-

able for this committee to assume that with Oswald's background

and his attempt to defect, that he would be "an uninteresting

target" to the KGB?

Mr. HELMS. I simply do not understand that assertion. I would

have thought, to begin with, that any American who went to the

Russian Government and said, "I want to defect to the Soviet

Union" would have immediately been taken over by the KGB to

find out what his game was because, after all, the KGB's charter is

to protect the Soviet state against infiltration.

How would they know that he was serious about this? How

would they know that the CIA had not sent him to make a fake

defection and to try to get into Soviet society through this device?

 

 

179

So for that reason, if not for many others, I find it quite incredi-

ble, the assertion by Nosenko that Oswald was never interrogated

or was never in touch with the KGB While he was in the Soviet

Union. This really stretches one's credulity. It goes back to the

testimony this morning that this is the hardest thing about the

whole. Nosenko case to swallow, and I have not been able to swal-

low it in all these years.

Mr. FITHIAN. Then my own belief that it is highly improbable

that the KGB would have so acted, you would not find that too far

off base?

Mr. HELMS. No. In other words, I would have thought they would

have grabbed him immediately.

Mr. FITHIAN. With all of that, and that is where I sort of come

down to, this did not rule out him becoming a bona fide agent as

far as the Agency was concerned? That is, it did not rule out

coming down favorably on his own as far as the Agency was

concerned?

Mr. HELMS. You see, I don't know whether you were here this

morning when we were talking about this.

Mr. FITHIAN. Yes, I was.

Mr. HELMS. I realize that the publications are full of sentences

saying that the Agency considered or made the judgment that

Nosenko was bona fide. When we speak about the Agency, we are

speaking about an organization, and normally when an organiza-

tion is going to take a position, the various people in it decide that

this is the position that ought to be taken and there is some record

made of this.

I don't ever recall having taken a position in writing or a firm,

final position about Nosenko's bona fides. I did make a decision

that he was to be resettled. I feel that there is no basis for me to

waver in my feelings here.

When I was talking this morning, I omitted to make a point in

connection with that memorandum which I signed off on and

which is a matter of your record here now in the committee hear-

ings so there is no need to get the document.

But in that April 2 memorandum of 1963, which I signed off on,

there were various steps outlined in the attachment to the memo-

randum about the resettling of Nosenko and I would like to read

step 5 for the benefit of the committee because I think it is rele-

vant here.

I said:

 

When we have favorably resolved this agreement within the Agency as to his bona fides, we will allow him his ultimate freedom, including assistance in finding suitable employment. If disagreement persists, however, as to his bona fides beyond the end of this calendar year, we will consult with other appropriate Government agencies as to whether he may be allowed full freedom as a nonresident alien or whether the security of the United States require his deportation.

 

I have a note here that I misread the date on the copy I have of

the memorandum. Maybe my eyesight is not very good here; 1969

was the date of the memorandum. I am sorry. It is such a bad copy.

It is April 2, 1969.

In any event, if the Agency records do not have in them a

memorandum which bears my signature which says that this Agen-.

cy's position is that Nosenko is bona fide, I think that would bear

 

 

180

out my recollection that I never made a final decision on the

subject.

Mr. FITHIAN. My problem--and this is an opinion rather than a

question, Mr. Ambassador--my problem is that as I look over this,

I find it extremely difficult, as I have indicated, to accept that they

would have--to accept Nosenko's story with regard to the KGB

activity or nonactivity.

I find it almost equally impossible to understand why, in the face

of this, which was considered by many the crucial question about

Nosenko, why we as a Government continued to pay him the kind

of money that we went over this morning in testimony.

I find, as a matter of fact, I find both of these about equally

implausible, if I can come back to this.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think, sir, that you must realize, Mr. Fithian,

that one has difficulty handling these defectors. What do you do

with them? I mean, do you put them on welfare? This is really one

of the problems. Defectors are encouraged to come to this country

because they do have information that is denied to the United

States in these closed societies and otherwise. They have been very

useful in the information they have turned over.

I am told that Mr. Nosenko, in certain categories, has made a

very useful contribution to American intelligence. But if you have

the man on your hands, and even if he is not turning out to be

particularly useful, do you want him wandering around as a public

charge? I don't think we do.

Now you can get down to the details of whether he is being paid

the correct amount or not. I think that is Admiral Turner's respon-

sibility now. I have not had to deal with this matter for 5 years. I

prefer that you ask him if he thinks he is worth it now.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Goldsmith is recognized for a few additional

questions on direct.

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question?

The Chair recognizes Mr. Blakey.

Mr. BLAKEY. Ambassador Helms, I have not, up until this point,

asked questions in our hearing before. I had an occasion several

years ago in a public forum to ask a question of Mr. Colby along

the lines of what I would like to ask you now. I wonder if you

would respond to it.

You had a conversation with Congressman Dodd in which you

discussed the pre-Bay of Pigs plots involving the Mafia and the

post-Bay of Pigs involving the Mafia. You raised some question in

your mind as to which of the plots were serious in the sense that

they contemplated more than the overthrow of Castro, but more

particularly his personal assassination. I found the factual discus-

sion extremely interesting.

Let me change the focus and direction, if l might. Let me ask you

a moral question, not a legal question, not a practical question, but

a moral question: Would you tell me and the members of this

committee and maybe the American people what possibly could

have been the moral justification for the CIA entering into an

alliance with tile Mafia to execute the President of a foreign coun-

try?

 

181

Mr. HELMS. There was none. I have apologized for this. I can't do

any more than apologize on public television that it was an error

in judgment on my part. There was great pressure on us at that

time to try to find connections in Cuba. For my part in this and to

the extent I had anything to do with it, I am heart sorry. I cannot

do any more than apologize.

Mr. BLAKEY. I understand you say there was no moral justifica-

tion for it.

Mr. HELMS. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Goldsmith?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-518. I might state

for the record that JFK F--518 is a summary, a partial summary, of

a conversation involving a woman named Luisa Calderon who was

identified as having possible connections with DGI, Cuban Intelli-

gence.

Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission into the record of this

exhibit.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibit is ordered admitted

into the record at this time.

[The information follows:]

 

SUBJECT: Comments of Luisa CALDERON Carralero

 

1. A reliable source reported that on 22 November

1965, several hours after the assassination of President.

John F. Kennedy, Luisa CALDERON Carralero, a Cuban employee

of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be

a member of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence

(DGI) discussed news of the assassination with an acquain-

tance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest

news, CALDERON replied, in what appeared to be a joking

manner, "Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

 

2. After further discussion of the news accounts

about the assassination, the acquaintance asked CALDERON

what else she had learned. CALDERON replied that they

(assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy)

learned about it a little while ago.

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-518

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, this document was provided to the

committee from the CIA and it describes a conversation which

raises the possibility that a woman affiliated with DGI, Cuban

Intelligence, knew about the assassination before it occurred. In

other words, it suggests the possibility of foreknowledge.

I want to be very clear that the committee is not indicating that

this definitely does indicate foreknowledge. It simply raises the

possibilities of foreknowledge.

Do you recall ever having this conversation brought to your

attention?

Mr. HELMS. I really can't remember. I just don't have any idea. I

imagine it would have been brought to my attention and I imagine

 

 

182

we would have tried to follow up to find out what it meant, but I

don't have a personal recollection of it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you know whether this particular informa-

tion was ever communicated to the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think that it should have been?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought that it would have been one of

the things that would have been reported to them, but I don't have

any specific knowledge that it was. This did not show up in the

Warren Commission report?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Again, Mr. Helms, I am not in a position to

answer questions.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry. I won't ask you any more question, Mr.

Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I appreciate that.

Did the Agency ever conduct an investigation to determine

whether Lee Harvey Oswald been connected with the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I believe that Mr. McCone presented to the

Warren Commission a sworn affidavit saying that he had no

formal connection with the CIA of any kind. I gather that through

the years a couple of people have been identified who had once

thought that maybe the Agency should have some kind of a contact

with Lee Harvey Oswald, but to the best of my knowledge no

contact was ever made.

In any event, he was not an agent of the CIA and I was horrified

this morning to have. Mr. Blakey, as a part of this committee's

work coming out with the allegation at legation at this late date that he had

some indentification with the Agency. Can't this ever be put to rest?

What does it take to put it to rest?

Excuse me, I am asking you a question. I will rephrase it. I

would hope that at some juncture someone would find some means

of putting this allegation to rest.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, what did the Agency's investigation

involve when it was looking into this matter?

Mr. HELMS. We have records for one thing in the Agency, and

then on top of that, I have the recollection that various people

were asked whether they knew anything about Oswald or had any

connection with him, people like the officers in the contact divi-

sion, did you ever interview Lee Harvey Oswald; people in the CE

staff, et cetera.

I don't remember the exact details. Fifteen years later it would

be implausible for me to remember exactly what, but I can assure

you that we would not have asked or suggested or allowed Mr.

McCone to swear out an affidavit, present it to the Warren Com-

mission unless we believed the affidavit to be truthful.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was there a written report summarizing the

Agency's investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think one should have been filed?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Why not?

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any idea why it should have. If it

manifested itself in the affidavit sworn by Mr. McCone, isn't that

evidence enough?

 

 

183

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are the Agency's files sufficiently accurate to

resolve that issue?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. You know, after this inquiry today, I

am reminded of the fact that back in the days of the Continental

Congress that intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage were

conducted by committees of the Continental Congress. I think

maybe the best thing to do would be to return secret intelligence to

the aegis of the U.S. Congress and let you fellows run it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, did the Agency ever have an oper-

ational interest in Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that the witness be shown JFK

F-526. I would ask that you read that.

For the record, this is a memorandum dated November 25, 1963.

Mr. HELMS. I have glanced at this memorandum. I have not read

it in great detail. Who wrote it?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You are asking me who wrote it?

Mr. HELMs. Oh, I am sorry. I am supposed to take an anonymous

memorandum and make judgments on it. I'll do the best I can.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I might add that this is a sanitized document

and I would hope you would not want me to indicate who wrote it.

Referring you to the first paragraph that makes reference to the

laying on of interviews.

Mr. HELMS. The first paragraph makes reference to the laying on

of interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does the language of this memorandum suggest

that the possibility of a contact with Oswald was contemplated?

Mr. HELMS. The memorandum does not say anything about a

contact.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does the memorandum make reference to the

laying on of interviews?

Mr. HELMS. It says I had discussed--some time in summer 1960--

with almost a whole line blank the laying on of interviews through

blank or other suitable channels. At the moment, I don t recall if

this was discussed while Oswald and his family were on route to

this country or was after his arrival.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I am sorry. I didn't ask you to read the docu-

ment. I simply asked you to---

Mr. HELMs. I am sorry. I didn't know I was disobeying.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I simply asked you whether the document makes

reference to the laying on of interviews?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, if says someone thought about laying on an

interview.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In light of that, does it suggest that at the very

least a contact with Oswald was contemplated bythe Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Not by the Agency, by some individual in the

Agency. For a lawyer, I think you ought to be more precise.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I am not in a position here today to

respond to your criticism.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry. That was not criticism.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, have you testified before at a con-

gressional hearing?

Mr. HELMS. At any time?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes.

 

 

184

Mr. HELMS. Do you mean in my life?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. On more than one occasion, yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. And during those occasions, sir, was the stand-

ard operating procedure for the attorney to ask the questions and

for the witness to answer them?

Mr. HELMS. I must confess during my life, Mr. Goldsmith, that I

was usually asked questions by the Senators or the Congressmen

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Very well, Mr. Helms. Under those circum-

stances again, was the procedure for the member of the committee

or its staff to ask the questions and to have the witness answer the

questions?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did anyone tell you before you came to testify

here today that standard operating procedure would not be followed?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall discussing it with anyone.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Fine. Let's follow the standard operating proce-

dure, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. Certainly, Mr Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you know what followup there was to this

memorandum dated November 25, 1963?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would like to draw your attention to the last

line on this memorandum. It makes reference to the Harvey story.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you know what Harvey story that is refer-

ring to?

Mr. HELMS. No, I do not.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency debrief Lee Harvey Oswald upon

his return from the Soviet Union?

Mr. HELMS. I was not aware that it did. I don't believe it would.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would standard operating procedure have called

Oswald to have been debriefed?

Mr. HELMS. I would not have thought so, Mr. Goldsmith. I think

that the standard operating procedure after he returned to the

United States would have been for the Navy to debrief him.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Why is that, sir?

Mr. HELMS. Because he had been a member of the Marine Corps,

and I believe he stayed in the Marine Reserve, if I am not mistak-

en. But in any event, the understandings were that military offi-

cers were handled by the intelligence organs of the Defense Estab-

Mr. GOLDSMITH. So I take it, then, that the Agency had no

interest in finding out whatever information Oswald may have

picked up during his work at a radio factory in Minsk?

Mr. HELMS. I think they would have hoped--they would have got

that information from the Navy.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency ever obtain that information

from the Navy?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Again, Mr. Helms, would you agree that a

memorandum that makes reference to the possibility of the laying

on of interviews on Oswald is contemplating a contact with

 

 

185

Oswald? I am not suggesting a contact necessarily occurred, sir, but

that it is contemplating a contact.

Mr. HELMS. Apparently someone, and 1 am sorry but the memo-

randum is so sanitized that I don't know who it was nor do I know

in what part of the Agency he was, apparently had an idea at some

point it might be a good idea to interview Oswald. To the best of

my knowledge, his thought never came to anything.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency ever interview the author of this

memorandum to determine whether there was any followup?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I don't know who wrote the memoran-

dum.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think if there were a written report

summarizing what the Agency had done in its investigation of the

Oswald allegation, perhaps issues like this might more readily be

resolved?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I think these issues are very difficult to

resolve, particularly 15 years later when I don't even know what I

am dealing with.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think the availability of a written report

summarizing the steps that the Agency went through would facili-

tate resolving this issue today?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I think probably it would have been, in light of

hindsight, might have been very useful if we had had a memoran-

dum for the record of everybody in the Agency who was talked to

about Oswald. We should have kept that going for several years.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. If I may have a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, what is a 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. I believe the 201 file, if memory serves, is simply the

number given to a type of file at the Agency in which personality

information is placed. In other words, if you open a 201 file on the

chairman of this committee, for example, it would simply be infor-

mation that had come into the Agency which involved that gentle-

man.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Why would the Agency have opened a 201 file on

Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Why would it have?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. I believe at some point a decision must have been

made that Oswald was perhaps a matter of continuing interest and

therefore the information which we held on him should be put in

the file.

I would like to suggest to the committee that when a Govern-

ment agency receives mail it has to do something with it, and one

of the things that you do with it is to try to categorize the type of

information it is and where it would best be filed so that if you

need it at some future date you can get it back.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK

exhibit F-534. For the record, that is a Department of State tele-

gram dated October 31, 1959.

Would you please read to yourself that telegram.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, Mr. Goldsmith, I have read it now.

MR. GOLDSMITH. This telegram makes reference to Oswald indi-

cating his intention or desire to defect, and it says that Oswald has

offered the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted

 

186

radar operator. My question to you is whether information con-

tained in this particular telegram would normally lead to the

opening of a 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. I just don't know how to answer the question. I would

have thought so but, on the other hand, maybe a decision would be

made that this was something that involved the Marine Corps and

that this was their concern. After all, the Department of Defense

has a very large Defense Intelligence Agency and then it has

intelligence units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and they do

have jurisdiction over their people and their security.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to your

previous testimony to this committee on page 75, specifically to line

15 response to the question posed by me:

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would the information contained in this telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

We are referring to the same telegram. Would you please read

the response that you gave that day?

Mr. HELMS.

 

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought so, an American who was defecting to the Soviet Union would have been of counterintelligence interest and that would have been quite sufficient to have caused the Agency to open a file.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission of this

exhibit.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibit is ordered into the

record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-534 was received in evidence:]

 

 

187

JFK EXHIBIT F-534

 

 

188

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, when if ever is it permissible to

remove a document from a 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. I don't really know what the regulation of the

Agency is any more about the removal of documents. I would have

thought it was not a common practice to remove documents from a

201 file, but whether there were specific cases under which this

might have been done for some particular reason, I suppose there

were.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. When a document is removed from a 201 file is

any record of this event required to be kept?

Mr. HELMs. Normally I would think that an entry would be

made that such-and-such a document had left the files, so anybody

who was reviewing that file would then realize it was not complete.

But I am so far away from these matters anymore, Mr. Goldsmith,

that I am really not a good witness on these technicalities, and I

am sorry about that. But I am not and I would not like the

vagueness of my memory to mislead anybody.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-523.

I might indicate this is a form that is used to initiate the opening

of a 201 file.

Mr. Helms, in whose name was this 201 file opened?

Mr. HELMS. The name is Oswald, Lee, and the middle name

Henry. Excuse me, I stated December 9, 1960. Is that correct?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. I just wanted to be sure I can read it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency ever initiate inquiry as to_why

the file on Oswald was opened Under the middle name of Henry

instead of Harvey?

Mr. HELMs. I don't know-the answer to that, Mr. Goldsmith. I

believe that it caused a great deal of controversy at the time it was

discovered after President Kennedy's death. But what the resolu-

tion of the matter was and whether any logical explanation was

found, I do not know.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did you ever see a written report dealing with

this issue?

Mr. HELMS. If there was one I don't recall seeing it, but I have no

doubt that somebody must have made an effort to explain it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You made reference earlier to the date of this

particular document. It is December 9, 1960. The State Department

telegram which we showed you earlier was dated October 31, 1959.

That is the document that made reference to Oswald intending to

defect and to give military information to the Soviets.

Why after the receipt of this State Department telegram in

October of 1959 would it have taken more than a year to open a

201 file on Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I have no explanation for that, Mr. Goldsmith, I am

sorry, I just don't know.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would a routine name trace for Lee Harvey

Oswald have resulted in a reference to the file opened under the

name Lee Henry Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I believe that the procedure in the Agency was when

traces were being run of this kind that all the Oswalds would have

been run and certainly all the Leo Oswalds would have been run.

 

 

189

It was probably at that time it was discovered there was a mistake

here.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I take it, your answer then, is yes?

Mr. HELMs. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I notice under the section in the middle of the

page where it says other identification, the initials AG are insert-

ed. Do you know What the initials AG stand for?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, I am not with you.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Please look down the right-hand side of the page.

There is a column marked other identification and within that the

initials AG appear. Do you know what that term stands for?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know what that is. I am not familiar with it. I

am sorry, I just don't know?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand. I note by looking at the bottom of

the page that Oswald's file was restricted. Do you know why Os-

wald's file would have been restricted?

Mr. HELMS. No, I don't.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is that unusual in any way?

Mr. HELMS. Maybe because he was an American, but I don't

literally know the reason.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is it unusual to restrict such files?

Mr. HELMS. I wouldn't have thought so. But the Agency was

loaded with different kinds of classifications and classification pro-

cedures and special arrangements, and so forth, to take care of

unusual circumstances, so I don't think that was unusual.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are 201 files ever maintained on a covert basis

or is there ever such a thing as a fake 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. You brought to my attention the fact

that you had discovered one in the Agency. I was not aware of the

phenomenon myself prior to your having brought it to my atten-

tion. Since you did find one, then I concede that I guess there was

such a thing, but I was not aware of the one that you brought to

my attention and I am not aware of any others.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Let's examine that particular one at this point. I

would ask that Mr. Helms be given JFK F-522.

What was the ZR rifle project?

Mr. HELMS. My understanding from the hearings of the Church

committee, I believe the ZR rifle originally started out as an indica-

tor for a project which was supposed to cover a man who in turn

had been taken on to have available an operational capability to

kill people. This man was hired before I was aware of these things.

I have this in hindsight but I believe that is what the ZR rifle was

supposed to be and then I believe later it metamorphosed into

something else. But anyway, after I became Deputy Director for

Plans, I put on the shelf for good any and all use of his capacity for

killing people. We didn't need that, so that was the end of that.

If the ZR rifle continued after that, it was in another context and

I don't remember precisely what the context was. I can read what

you have given me here, that it was to spot, develop, and use agent

assets for Division D operations. My recollection of Division D was

that it was the operational staff in the Agency which attempted to

procure code and cipher materials overseas for use by the National

Security Agency.

 

 

190

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In fact, that form which you were just reading,

the reference to Division D, has no bearing at all upon any execu-

tive action-type problem, any type of assassination program?

Mr. HELMS. I would not have thought so. If that was in Division

D, maybe it was there for convenience. Maybe they didn't know

where else to put it, and 1 can t blame them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is it also possible the person writing these notes

was writing that aspect of--it to mislead people to cover the fact

that this was assassination activity? '

Mr. HELMS. I don't know whether that was the idea or not, Mr.

Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Let's take a closer look at this particular docu-

ment. This document consists of handwritten notes. The notes are

in the handwriting of two different individuals.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I notice here on one of the pages, "It should

have a phony 201 to backstop this."

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You are reading from which page, sir?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, they are not numbered, Mr. Goldsmith. I

am not trying to be difficult. It is 1, 2, 3--this is page 4.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You are referring to the bottom of the page

where it says, "should have phony 201 in RI"?

Mr. HELMS. That is it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. The document indicates, "should have phony 201

in R1 to backstop this. All documents therein forged and backdated.

Should look like"--I believe that says a "CE file."

Mr. HELMS. I think that must be what it means.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Let's refer your attention now to page 6, two

pages further.

Mr. HELMS. Right.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At the bottom right-hand portion of the page

approximately five or six lines up, the person wrote in, "Never

mention the word assassination." Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, that is what it says.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would you turn to the next page. Does that page

say "No projects or papers except for cover"? Does it also say

"cover file create from RIS"--the rest of it not really legible? Does

it contain that language?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I don't know, I can't read it either. It is so cut

up and excised, and so forth, it really doesn't make much sense.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In any event, Mr. Helms, do these handwritten

notes contain any indication that this particular project contem-

plated the use of fake files?

Mr. HELMS. That is what it says here. I don't know any more

about it than that, if this is the item I mentioned a moment ago

that you had brought to my attention and I concede that is what

this says. But I find it awfully difficult to deal with these matters

so totally out of context and excised and sanitized, and so forth. My

recollection is as I have told you, that the ZR rifle project was an

individual who was supposed to kill people. He never killed any-

body and he was never used for that purpose after I had anything

to do with it, and any further business the ZR rifle was involved in

was something else's entirely.

 

 

191

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to page 86

of your prior testimony which is given at a time when you had

access to the complete document.

Mr. HELMS. Is the top of that page supposed to have been cen-

sored by the Agency or is that somebody else's lining.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. No, sir, that was not intended to be sanitized by

the Agency. I believe your lawyer will confirm that.

[Witness conferring with counsel.]

Mr. HELMS. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith, I was confused by what I

was looking at here.

[Witness reading from prior testimony.]

Mr. GOLDSMITH. The question to you:

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In any event, would you agree that here is a case where at the very least agency personnel were contemplating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake operational file?

Will you please read your answer?

Mr. HELMS [reading]:

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it looks like that. But then his boss would have known about this. He would have had to get permission to do that. Somebody would have known about it.

 

Is that as far as you want me to read?

Mr. GOLDSMIH. Yes. I have one more exhibit to show you, Mr.

Helms. I would ask Mr. Helms be given JFK F-524.

While that is being done, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK

F-522, F-524, and F-526 be entered into the record.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the

record at this time.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In addition, I would ask that JFK F-525, F-512,

and F-523 also be entered into the record.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the

record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibits F-512, F-522, F-523, F-524, and F-526

were received in evidence:]

 

192

JFK EXHIBIT F-512

AFFIDAVIT

JOSEPH H. LANGOSCH, a former employee of the Central

intelligence Agency, being duly sworn, makes oath as follows:

 

That this statement is made freely, voluntarily, and

without threats, promises, assurances, or remuneration from

any source.

 

That from January 5, 1955 until approximately August

1968 I was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

 

That during 1963 I functioned in two capacities as a

CIA officer, the first capacity being as Special Assistant to

the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff and the second capacity

being as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special

Affairs Staff.

 

That during 1963 the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA

staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the

Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services.

 

That as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special

Affairs Staff, I was responsible for safeguarding the Special

Affairs Staff against penetration by foreign intelligence

services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services.

 

That I was further responsible as the Chief of Counter-

intelligence for the Special Affairs Staff for initiating and

supervising counterintelligence operations designed to penetrate

the Cuban intelligence Services.

 

193

JFK EXHIBIT F-512 cont.

That during the latter half of April 1964, in my

capacity as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special

Affairs Staff, I became acquainted with an intelligence

officer of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia(DGI).

 

That the Cuban intelligence officer with whom I

became acquainted had defected from the DGI while in Canada

and subsequently entered the United States and maintained an"

operational relationship with the CIA under the cryptonym

 

That cryptonym after his defection, provided the CIA

with certain DGI documents and that none of these documents

concerned or referred to either the assassination of

President Kennedy or Lee Harvey Oswald.

 

That during May 1964 cryptonym reported information to

me concerning the reaction of the DGI in Havana, Cuba to the

assassination of President Kennedy and that this information

is recorded in a memorandum dated May 8, 1964 which I

prepared for the Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff

and that this memorandum accurately reflects the information

reported to me by cryptonym.

 

That the above-referenced memorandum of May 8, 1964

recording cryptonym's information states that Luisa Calderon

Carralero, also known as Luisa Rodriguez Calderon, was being

paid a salary by the DGI., that she might have had contact

with Lee Harvey Oswald, that during the time she was in Mexico

the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar, that

 

 

194

JFK EXHIBIT F-512 cont.

after the DGI's interception of the letter she had been followed

by the DGI and seen in the company of an American and that

DGI officer in Havana, Cuba named Roberto Hernandez de Curbelo

believed that Luisa Calderon--Carralero had been recruited

by the Central Intelligence Agency.

 

That I do not recall ever reviewing a CIA report of

or being informed about a conversation which transpired on

November 22, 1963, approximately three hours after the

assassination of President Kennedy, in which Luisa Calderon

Carralero may have expressed foreknowledge of the assassination

of President Kennedy.

 

That during 1965 I prepared a memorandum for the Chief

of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division for Cuba, entitled

Allegations," which concerned security problems with

the AMLASH operation.

 

That I prepared the following statement at page 3,

paragraph 3A(3) of the memorandum entitled

Allegations": "Assassination, obviously, is a dangerous game,

not merely to the plotters in a physical sense, but to a

sponsoring government which may suffer severe political

repercussions at home and abroad if its involvement is made

known." That the government referred to herein is the Govern-

ment of the United States and that the plotters referred to

herein were persons connected with the AM_LASH operation.

That the AMLASH operation was initiated and supported

by the CIA.

 

 

195

JFK EXHIBIT F-512 cont.

--4--

That when I prepared the memorandum entitled

Allegations, considered that "the AMLASH operation been an insecure

operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy

November 22, 1963.

 

That the AMLASH Operation had been an insecure operation

prior to the assassination of President Kennedy because it was

highly that as of 1962 the Cuban Intelligence Services

had knowledge of the CIA's association with persons involved

in the AMLASH Operation, including AMLASH-1, also known as

 

That the information which led me to doubt the security of the AMLASH Operation prior to the assass[nation of President Kennedy was available to

level CIA officials, including Desmond Fitzgerald.

 

That the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination

of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs

Staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officials as

an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

 

I understand that this affidavit may be introduced and

received into evidence by the Select Committee on Assassinations

of the United States House of Representatives, and may lead

them to make various findings of fact, and the statutes

applicable to Congressional investigations, including but not

limited to those concerning false statements, obstruction, or

misleading, would subject me to criminal penalties for not

telling the whole and complete truth in this affidavit.

 

 

196

JFK EXHIBIT F-512 cont.

-5-

 

Further affiant saith not.

 

-------------------------

JOSEPH H. LANGOSCH

 

Sworn and subscribed to before me

on this 14th day of September, 1978.

 

ROBERT F. MITCHELL,

----------------------------

Notary Public

Robert F. Mitchell, Jr.

Notary public

My Commission expires March 31, 1982

My Commission Expires:

--------------------------------

 

 

198

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

199

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

200

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

201

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

202

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

 

203

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

 

204

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

205

 

JFK EXHIBIT F-522 cont.

 

206

JFK EXHIBIT F-523

 

 

207

JFK EXHIBIT F-524

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of Legislative Counsel

19 September 1978

Mr. G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel & Director

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Washington, D.C. 20515

 

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Forwarded herewith is an unsigned memorandum

dated 20 February 3964 concerning a machine listing

of documents for the Oswald 201 file. This document

was not released earlier under FOIA, but has been

declassified in the light of new considerations. It

formerly bore the classification of Secret and the

handling restriction of Eyes Only.

 

Mr. Goldsmith requested this statement for use of

the document in the public hearings, as the classifica-

tion and handling restriction had been removed when

the document Was approved for release under FOIA.

 

Very truly yours,

S.D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

encl.

 

 

208

JFK EXHIBIT F-524 cont.

 

209

JFK EXHIBIT F-526

 

 

210

JFK EXHIBIT F-526 cont.

 

211

Mr. GOLDSMITH. The first page of JFK exhibit F-524 is a letter

from Mr. Breckinridge to Professor Blakey of this committee. I

would refer your attention--why don't you read both pages.

Mr. HELMS. I have had a chance to read not only Mr. Brecken-

ridge's covering memorandum to Mr. Blakey but also the attached

memorandum which is unsigned and just says "To Chief," I don't

know what.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does this memorandum make reference to 37

documents being missing from Oswald's 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it does. It says that:

 

[In 1964, February 20, a comparison of the documents available in 201 file and those recorded as being those in the 201 file has shown 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it.

 

And there is a breakdown of what seems to be missing.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was this document ever brought to your atten-

tion?

Mr. HELMS. I can never remember it having been brought to my

attention.

Mr. GOLDSMITH, Were you ever informed that at some time there

were at least 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. No I doubt that would have been brought to my

attention. I would assurne somebody in charge of the registry would

have gone looking for the documents.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is the information contained in this document

particularly sensitive?

Mr. HELMS. You mean sensitive operationally or in a security

sense?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Sensitive in the sense that the Agency normally

attributes to that term.

Mr. HELMS. I wouldn't have thought so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In light of that, why would this document have

carried the classification of "secret" and the restriction for eyes

only" prior to its declassification?

Mr. HELMS. Sir; I am sorry but I don't see "eyes only" on it nor

do I see "secret" on it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand that. I said prior to its declassifica-

tion.

Please reread the letter to Professor Blakey from Mr. Brecken-

ridge.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. Maybe it was overclassified. A lot of

documents in the agency were.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Helms. I have no further

questions.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other

exhibits which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms' testi-

mony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time to

ask specific questions. They have been marked for identification as

JFK F-513 through F-517, F-519, F-521, F-525, F-528, F-530, and

F-533. May they be admitted into evidence at this time?

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, they may be admitted into evi-

dence.

[The exhibits referred to above follow.]

 

 

212

JFK EXHIBIT F-513

 

213

JFK EXHIBIT F-514

March 26, 1964

 

SUBJECT:

 

Mexico - CIA Dissemination of Information on

Lee Harvey Oswald on March 24, 1964

 

The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

(Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the

disseminatiorI of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to

our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that

the complete answers will give us the additional information we

requested.

 

We would like to know Just when

got the information with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald

and what was the information and how was it obtained. How

did the information Set from Mexico to the CIA in Washington,

and in what form did it come?

 

At what the information that the Lee

Harvey Oswald was probably the Lee Harvey Oswald who had

defected and was married to a Russian developed so that when

the telegram went from the CIA in Washington to the various

agencies it contained such information. In other words, I

would like to know whether this was information available in

 

214

JFK EXHIBIT F-514 cont.

Mexico or did. this additional information get in the message

only after it reached Washington and the information was

being disseminated to the various agencies.

As you know, we are still trying to get an explana-

tion of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite

Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4

of the memorandum of March 4, 1964 sent Mr. Rankin by the

CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to

this inquiry.

 

We should also determine why the Navy never furnished

the CIA with copies of the most recent photographs of Oswald.

 

215

JFK EXHIBIT F-515

 

216

JFK EXHIBIT F-516

217

JFK EXHIBIT F-516 cont.

 

 

218

JFK EXHIBIT F-516 cont.

 

 

219

JFK EXHIBIT F-517

 

 

220

JFK EXHIBIT F-517 cont.

 

 

 

221

JFK EXHIBlT F-519

 

  

 

222

JFK EXHIBIT F-519 cont.

 

 

223

JFK EXHIBIT F-519 cont.

 

 

224

JFK EXHIBIT F-521

 

225

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

226

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

227

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

228

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

229

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

230

JFK EXHIBIT F-521 cont.

 

231

JFK EXHIBIT F 525

232

JFK EXHIBIT F-528

 

233

JFK EXHIBIT F-528 cont.

 

 

234

JFK EXHIBIT F-528 cont.

 

 

235

JFK EXHIBIT F-528 cont.

 

 

236

JFK EXHIBIT F-530

 

237

JFK EXHIBIT F-530 cont.

 

 

238

JFK EXHIBIT F-530 cont.

 

 

239

JFK EXHIBIT F-530 cont.

 

 

240

JFK EXHIBIT F-533

 

 

241

JFK EXHIBIT F-533 cont.

 

  

242

JFK EXHIBIT F-533 cont.

 

  

243

Mr. PREYER. It has been a long afternoon and I imagine Mr.

Helms would be ready for a recess period. I think we are very close

to finishing. We have one other member who wishes to ask ques-

tions. I know you are anxious to finish. Would you prefer to take a

10-minute recess at this time or would you like to attempt to finish

up?

Mr. HELMS. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go

right along. I would like to finish if we possibly can as soon as we

can.

Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Mr Sawyer.

Mr. HELMS. Good afternoon, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Good afternoon, Ambassador.

First I would like to clear up what I think was a combination of

misstatements about what Mr. Hart testified to via-a-via Nosenko.

He did not say that we should not believe the veracity of what

Nosenko said. He said he believed that but that he felt, because of

the size and compartmentalization of the KGB, he would not at all

necessarily know whether they had contact with him or not, and

for that reason I am quite puzzled with this combination of not

having accepted the bona fides of Nosenko and yet putting him on

the payroll as a consultant.

How can you possibly get any value out of information supplied

with someone when there is a belief or at least a strong possibility

that he is a double agent, there for the specific purpose of deceiv-

ing?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, this is the constant and continuing hazard

in all intelligence work of this kind. There isn't a statement that is

made by any defector that comes to the United States that goes

unchecked. We take all the statements and then they are checked

out and there is an effort made to find out if they are true and

they are examined and research work is done on them, and so

forth, because this is a very difficult and untidy problem, I am sad

to say. And it is particularly untidy given the importance of the

Nosenko case.

I have been told he gave useful information to an agency of the

U.S. Government about certain Soviet operations overseas and cer-

tain information about the KGB. I can't personally attest to this,

and I am sorry; but I believe that certain of high information was

believed to be of value.

Mr. SAWYER. It seems to me, looking at the facts of this thing

here he was incarcerated under horrible conditions for a period of

some 5 years or approximating 5 years, and then apparently the

project was given up as not being able to resolve the question, at

least to everyone's satisfaction. There are memorandums indicating

it would be now a great catastrophe to release this man presum-

ably after what had been done to him here in the country; it would

be devastating if he talked much about it. There was even a memo-

randum of the director of the Soviet bloc group or division, discuss-

ing the possibilities of disposing of him and elaborating on that to

mean either liquidation or drugging him to a point where he

became incomprehensible so he couldn't tell anybody anything, or

just putting him in an insane asylum and just throwing away the

key apparently.

 

 

244

It would just seem to me after what you people did to Nosenko

here in this country, without any color of law at all, that you really

only had two choices: One was dispose of him as suggested---

Mr. HELMS. That was never considered, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I am talking about what your division chief of

the Soviet bloc wrote down that was being considered at least by

him.

Mr. HELMS. He was the Deputy Division Chief and maybe he did

write these things down, but I say these things were never brought

to my attention, the suggestion was never made to me, this was

never an option that was considered.

Mr. SAWYER. You have testified about your considering assassi-

nating people along with the Mafia. It is nothing new to you people

apparently to assassinate somebody?

Mr. HELMS. That is your statement, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I thought that was what you have been

testifying to here about willingly becoming a party to an assassina-

tion either by syringe, by gun, or by poison pills of Castro. So once

we get in the acceptance of that line, it doesn't seem to me so out

of line that would be one of the things you would consider, and

apparently your deputy division chief did consider it.

It seems to me the only other option would be to pay him off and

handsomely enough so he would keep quiet about this when you let

him go. You obviously couldn't deport him very well at this point

in time, and it just appears to me as I look at that it is perfectly

plain that you exercised the option of paying him off.

Do you dispute that?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I dispute it.

Mr. SAWYER. You said you paid over a_period of time some half a

million dollars, is about what it amounts to as I

both in lump-sum payments and in monthly stipends to a guy that

the Agency never decided wasn't, in fact, there to mislead it and

give it false information YoU paid that as a consultant and you say

the motivation was not at all to pay him off. Is that your position?

Mr. HELMS. No sir. I am-counting 10. That is what my mother

taught me to do under these circumstances.

Mr. SAWYER. You are doing what?

Mr. HELMS. I am counting to 10.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I will be patient if it takes that long.

Mr. HELMS. The effort in Mr. Nosenko's case and the only option

that we had available to us my opinion was to resettle him and

give him a new identity and handle him in such a way he would

have a chance to make a life for himself on the American scene.

It has been 5 years since I had anything to do with his case. I

don't know what has been done to him since.

Mr. SAWYER. You said you could not just put him out on welfare.

What do we do with most immigrants that come in either from

Indochina that are refugees or regularly admitted immigrants? We

may provide them some educational help in the language, and that

sort of thing, but we don't pay them off. Here you are talking

about sums of money that wouldn't be mentionable in the same

breath as welfare, and I just say as 1 look at this thing, taking all

these facts you have testified to into account, it would just seem to

 

 

245

me on the face of it that it was a payoff. I am surprised to hear you

deny it.

Mr. HELMS. I believe that under the Constitution you are entitled

to your viewpoint and I am entitled to mine.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, you did in fact, plead guilty to having with-

held information from the Senate committee, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. SAWYER. I thought you had.

Mr. HELMS. I did not. I pleaded nolo contendere.

Mr. SAWYER. So that you just don't contest it, then, which is the

legal equivalent of a plea of guilty, is that correct; except that it

can't be used as an admission against you in a civil case; right?

Mr. HELMS. I am not a lawyer, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. But i am sure you were advised by a lawyer before

you entered a nolo contendere; were you not?

Mr. HELMS. I was advised by lawyers.

Mr. SAWYER. Something else bothers me. When you put Nosenko

into solitary you obviously intended to hold him a very long time;

did you not?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think that was the intention at the time. The

intention was to hold him no longer than it took to find out

whether he was bona fide or not or to satisfy ourselves on this.

Mr. SAWYER. But you invested in building a whole separate vault

and building around it, and so forth, for the purpose of accommo-

dating Nosenko; did you not?

Mr. HELMS. I asked this morning if anybody from the committee

had looked at the building. It was no vault, as I recollect it. I don't

think it was a very expensive building at all.

Mr. SAWYER. Where was it located?

Mr. HELMS. It was located in Virginia.

Mr. SAWYER. Was it on a military base?

Mr. HELMS. I believe those items are classified, and I was told by

the agency to go into executive session if you wanted to discuss

this.

Mr. SAWYER. Do they still use this?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

Mr. SAWYER. Was it ever used for anyone else other than

Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I don't think so.

Mr. SAWYER. Apparently it was a reinforced steel box that was

described by Mr. Hart as being like a bank vault, and he then

described that a house had been built around it to accommodate

the interrogating staff and guards, and what not, and then sur-

rounded by a linked barbed-wire fence.

You wouldn't do that just to put somebody in it for a couple of

months, would you?

Mr. HELMS. It would have depended on the circumstances. And

after all, this was a very important case to us, so I would think the

question of the amount of money that the installation cost really

rarely came up.

Mr. SAWYER. What was the purpose of moving him from what

was apparently a secure place of confinement into this so-called

safe house? What was the purpose of building another facility and

moving him out of there into that?

 

 

246

Mr. HELMS. I assume because those safe houses are much more

complicated to administer, it take more guards, and things of that

kind I think there were practical considerations involved.

Mr. SAWYER. Wouldn't it be a fair deduction if you went to the

trouble of building a separate facility of this type that it obviously

was going to be quite a long-term incarceration if that is specifical-

ly for what it was built?

Mr. HELMS. Well, 1 just said, sir, this was not the intention. The

intention was to try to find out whether this man was bona fide

and that was the objective, and when we had done that we would

have let him loose and if this was a mistake in building this house,

then I guess it was a mistake.

Mr. SAWYER. You said, too, that you didn't subject Nosenko to

physical abuse. As I have both talked to Nosenko and listened to

the CIA official spokeSmen define it, it was a partial starvation,

being subjected to cold weather without being provided a blanket,

not being allowed fresh air during the heat of the summer for over

a year. Don't you consider that, just those items alone, as being

physical torture actually? i those items 1 don't know whether

Mr. HELMS. I cannot verify those items. I don't know whether

they are true or not. You have told me today they are true.

Mr. SAWYER. You were the man in charge when he had been

without any legal process or trial, just incarcerated in solitary

confinement. You were in charge of the Agency that was doing

that, weren't you?

Mr. HELMS. I wasn't in charge at that time.

Mr. SAWYER. During part of that time you were.

Mr. HELMS. I became in charge later. Is there any evidence when

I was Director these things happened to him? I didn't know any-

thing about it at the time. I hear conflicting stories about how he

was greated. You'll have to use your stories, I'll use mine.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. McCone could have found out anything in the

Agency that he wanted to find out. You said that right here, you

remember?

Mr. HELMS. I said that.

Mr. SAWYER. So I presume as one of the people in charge of this

having occurred to the man ou could have found out anything

about what was happening to him that you wanted to, couldn't

you?

Mr. HELMS. I never was told any tales.----

Mr. SAWYER. Well, you knew he was in your custody?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Mr. SAWYER. And you never made any inquiry about what was

happening to him over this 4- or 5-year period?

Mr. HELMS. Of course I did.

Mr. SAWYER. Did you find out then what they were doing to him,

what you were doing to him?

Mr. HELMS. I was never told of these details of his being kept in

a room so hot he couldn't stand it, or any of those things. Those

were never brought to my attention and I never got those in

answer to any inquiry. If this is the truth I am genuinely sorry

about it, but I was not aware of it at the time.

Mr. SAWYER. You said about Oswald when he came back from

Russia that you wouldn't have had really any particular jurisdic-

 

 

247

tion or interest because he was a marine. As I understand it, he

had been discharged from the Marine Corps, and for how long a

period of time does military service retain intelligence jurisdiction

over a person?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I really don't.

Mr. SAWYER. When you were interviewed apparently by a Mr.

Lardner, George Lardner of the Washington Post after your excu-

tive testimony here, you said in effect to him--the article is in the

Washington Post of Thursday, August 10, referring to your appear-

ance here on August 9: "Your questions are almost as dumb as the

committee's."

Does that fairly reflect your personal opinion and attitude?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall talking to Mr. Lardner after the hear-

ing the other time. I was chatting in the hall with a newspaperman

around lunchtime. I don't recall such an acerbic remark as that,

and of course I withdraw it if I did make it. I never even saw the

article, so it must have been the first edition of the Washington

Post. The article I saw the next day didn't have anything like that

in it. It teaches you never to talk to the press. I mean that's the

only lesson, if they quoted me accurately. If they didn't quote me

accurately, then I shouldn't have made off-the-cuff remarks.

But I don't feel that way. I think this inquisition has been

admirably handled.

Mr. SAWYER. If you didn't read the article, let me give you the

benefit of the applicable part of it. It says:

 

Helms told reporters during a break that no one would ever know who or what Lee Harvey Oswald, named by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's assassin,

represented. Asked whether the CIA knew of any ties Oswald had with either the KGB or the CIA, Helms paused and with a laugh said, 'I don't remember.' Pressed on the point, he told a reporter, 'Your questions are almost as dumb as the committee's.

 

You don't recall any such statement?

Mr. HELMS. I recall an exchange about Oswald because I don't

think we are ever going to find out what Lee Harvey' Oswald's role

was until we get the Russians KGB files, That is what I was

referring to.

Mr. SAWYER. You did allude to the representation in Mr.

McCone's letter or affidavit that there was no formal connection

between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA. Did the use of the word

formal intend to exclude any other type of relationship or contact?

Mr. HELMS. No, Mr. Sawyer. I am sorry. I was trying to use a

short cut, I think. But in the documents I was given in preparation

before this hearing the actual affidavit of Mr. McCone is there

present and I think should be permitted to stand on its own feet. In

other words, I would not want to say I was attempting to add or

subtract from it.

Mr. SAWYER. But there was no specific connotation?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I am sorry if in my effort to make a short

sentence I didn't go all through the various points that were made

in there, because as I said earlier this afternoon, I never found the

slightest evidence that the Agency had anything to do with Lee

Harvey Oswald, and I was just hoping that maybe this hearing

would put that rumor to rest.

 

 

248

Mr. SAWYER. In your long time with the Agency, have you ever

known of any example where anything remotely similar to what

was done to Nosenko was done to someone else here in this

country?

Mr. HELMS. No; I know of no other case comparable, nor do I

know of any case that confronted us where a man might have

information having to do with the assassination of the President of

the United States.

The answer to your questions specifically is I know of no compa-

rable case and I believe there never was one.

Mr. SAWYER. Whereas I recognize your disclaimer of being a

lawyer, you certainly know that the police, even with the assassin

himself, could never have done anything like this, would never

have been permitted to do anything like this. You understand

people's rights enough for that, don't you?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, yes, I understand people's rights.

Mr. SAWYER. Holding a man in solitary confinement under these

kinds of conditions without a trial and subjecting him to both

physical and mental torture--even with an assassin himself.

There is no way the laws of our country permit that kind of

thing. You knew that, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I rather thought that the legal status of Mr.

Nosenko in those days was in a very gray area and if I am wrong

about it I wish you would correct me now, Mr. Sawyer, because I

am prepared to be corrected.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, he was a human being, wasn't he?

Mr. HELMS. I believe so.

Mr. SAWYER. You know in most States even treating an animal

like this will land you in jail.

I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, you made a point earlier in your testimony today

with regard to the testimony of Mr. Hart before this committee.

You commented on the fact that he didn't really share with us any

specific knowledge about the substance of our inquiry; that is, in

connection with whatever connection there may have been between

the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald, and to that extent what informa-

tion the Agency had with regard to that specific information.

I have to agree. In fact, Mr. Hart mentioned here that he had

stated specifically to the Agency that if he were to be expected to

talk about Lee Harvey Oswald, then it was pointless of the Agency

to send him up here because he had no intention of talking about

Lee Harvey Oswald.

If this committee were to ask you who would be a good witness

or several good witnesses that we could talk to either presently

employed at the Agency or former employees of the Agency who

could shed additional light on that particular aspect of our investi-

gation, who would you suggest?

Mr. HELMS. I would suggest the Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division

and the Deputy Chief who have been maligned here. I think they

might come before this committee and answer for themselves as to

 

 

249

the reasons behind the way the interrogation was conducted. I

think that would be good for openers.

Mr. DODD. Who are these people again? I am sorry.

Mr. HELMS. The gentlemen who were Chief and Deputy Chief of

the Soviet Bloc Division at the time of the Nosenko interrogation.

Mr. DODD. Could I go back a minute. Counsel asked you some

questions about this 201 file that existed on Lee Henry Oswald,

believe.

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Mr. DODD. There is some confusion I think in the committee's

mind as to how that file was opened. What kind of file is it? What

is a 201 file.

Mr. HELMS. It is nothing but a personality file. We might open a

file--we get pieces of paper like this and if they refer to Christo-

pher Dodd, we would open a file on Christopher Dodd. They just

happen to be called a 201 file because we had a numbering cate-

gory files of different kinds used in different parts of the Agency.

There is no arcane significance at all; it is just a number. It might

have been called 5-type files or X-type files.

Mr. DODD. You said it takes something to trigger it?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it takes a form like this to be filled out.

Mr. DODD. I wanted to get clear in my own mind. Can you tell

the committee what it was specifically that triggered the opening

of the 201 file on Lee Henry Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know what happened, sir, I don't know how

they got the name wrong. I have no idea any more, if I ever knew.

I don't know whether it was a clerical error, a mistake, or just

what. I recognize in 1978 when you look back 15 years, Lee Harvey

Oswald was not a household name. It may have been somebody

thought it was Henry and read it wrong and it was Harvey. But I

think it got straightened out very quickly, at the time of the

dissemination of reports to the Government when he visited the

Soviet and Cuban consulates in Mexico City.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, may I request that we suspend for a

couple of minutes.

I think I can get down to the bottom line very quickly. The mere

existence of a 201 file does not suggest in any way, does it, that the

person who is the subject of a 201 file is in any manner, shape or

form an employee, agent, operative of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; it does not. It simply is a device for holding

information. When an individual gets into special categories of

relationships with the Agency, then the whole file business is

changed.

Mr. DODD. So the existence of a 201 file on Lee Henry--or Lee

Harvey Oswald in the Agency would in no way indicate that he is

in fact a paid employee of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. It means absolutely nothing. As a matter of fact,

there were files in the Agency on Congressmen and Senators, but

they had newspaper clippings. If you are going to file a newspaper

clipping, you have to put it someplace.

Mr. DODD. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you for making that point of clarification, Mr.

Dodd.

 

 

250

Mr. PREYER. Thank you. I have no questions.

I think the ground has been very thoroughly covered.

I do just want to take my few minutes to make a brief statement

about the hearings that we have had today and yesterday. I think

the past 2 days of testimony have shown the CIA did things 15

years ago or so which shock us, sometimes shock us profoundly

today.

I had someone at the luncheon recess conclude from this testi-

mony that America is a lawless society because one of' our institu-

tions broke the law some years ago. Well, this is certainly not a

lawless society. Russia is a lawless society, where a handfull of

people control things and where you cannot change it unless a

revolution or a war comes along.

I think the past few days' hearings here have indicated that we

can change things. The kind of testimony Mr. Hart of the C/A

gave, criticizing his own institution, your testimony today, it is

impossible to conceive of a KGB agent, for example, ever admitting

that an thing they did 15 years ago was wrong.

I don't think it was wrong to bring out these horrors of the past.

I think the old adage that "the truth can make you free" is true

here. The truth about these things, I think, will free up the CIA

from past mistakes and it will free up all of us. And that is the

second point I want to make.

I think when we view these actions of some time ago today, we

have to realize that at that time when these acts were committed

there was a national consensus that this Nation's security was in

peril. So I think we would want to be very careful how we make

retroactive scapegoats.

There are those who betrayed one trust, their trust of office, the

trust of power; but they did so to preserve another trust, the trust

of national security.

In all of these hearings, Mr. Helms, in all of the inquiry situa-

tions that you have been subjected to lately, I don't think anyone

has ever suggested that you ever betrayed that other trust, of the

national security. I think in judging the actions of individuals in

the past, we want to consider who it was who called up those

actions. In large measures, the American people at that time were

calling up these measures out of fear that our national security

was in peril.

Mr. Helms, we appreciate your being here with us today and

answering all of these questions.

At the conclusion of the testimony of our witnesses, we allow

each witness 5 minutes to make any statements that he may

choose to make. You have testified at some length today, but if

there is any matter you wish to clear up, any statement you wish

to make, we will be glad to hear from you at this time.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I would like to say I deeply appreciate the remarks you

have just made at the conclusion of this hearing. I thank you for

them. 1 thank you for your courtesy as chairman. I have no other

comments.

Mr. PREYER. If there is no further business today, the committee

stands recessed until 9 o'clock Monday morning.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com-

mittee to reconvene on Monday, September 25, 1978, at 9 a.m.]