PROFESSIONAL KILLERS

CIA ASSASSINATION MANUAL

THE COVER OF THE ORIGINAL CIA FILE

A Study of Assassination

TRANSCRIPTION

EBOOKED AND REVISED EDITION BY SOKOL 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... 3

PREFACE ..... 5

A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION:

DEFINITION. EMPLOYMENT. JUSTIFICATION ..... 6

CLASSIFICATIONS. THE ASSASSIN ..... 7

PLANNING. TECHNIQUES ..... 8

EXAMPLES ... 16

ANNEX 1: CONFERENCE ROOM TECHNIQUE ... 17

ANNEX 2: ORIGINAL 'A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION' DOCUMENT PAGES ... 19

ANNEX 3: ORIGINAL GUATEMALA '54 COUP ASSASSINATION LISTS ... 23

PREFACE

Here you find a transcript of the CIA file titled 'A Study of Assassination'. This

unsigned and undated (estimated publication date: Dec 31st, 1953) 19-page

typewritten file was part of a collection of CIA documents pertaining to

Operations PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS and was declassified under the

Freedom of Information Act on May 15, 1997.

After years of answering Freedom of Information Act requests with its

standard "we can neither confirm nor deny that such records exist," the CIA

has finally declassified some 1400 pages of over 100,000 estimated to be in

its secret archives on the Guatemalan destabilization program. An excerpt

from this assassination manual appears on the Op-Ed page of The New York

Times on Saturday, May 31, 1997.

Operations PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS were the CIA code-names of the

1952-54 attempts to topple the Guatemalan government under the

democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.

Arbenz Guzman was elected President of Guatemala in 1950 to continue a

process of socio-economic reforms that the CIA disdainfully refers to in its

memoranda as "an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the

touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the 'Banana Republic.'"* The first

CIA effort to overthrow the Guatemalan president - a CIA collaboration with

Nicaraguan dictator Anastacio Somoza to support a disgruntled general

named Carlos Castillo Armas and codenamed Operation PBFORTUNE - was

authorized by President Truman in 1952.

As early as February of that year, CIA Headquarters began generating

memos with subject titles such as "Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be

disposed of during Military Operations," outlining categories of persons to be

neutralized through "Executive Action" (= murder) or through imprisonment

and exile. The "A" list of those to be assassinated contained 58 names, all of

which the CIA has excised from the declassified documents.

PBSUCCESS, authorized by President Eisenhower in August 1953, carried a

US$2.7 million budget for "psychological warfare and political action" and

"subversion," among the other components of a small paramilitary war. But,

according to the CIA's own internal study of the agency's so-called "K

* That Arbenz Guzman confiscated two-thirds of United Fruit Co.'s land did not endear him to the

USA. In these days, anti-communist paranoia was at its highest, and a politician who took away

United Fruit's land (even if to improve the lives of the plantation workers, who were living in

slavery but by name) had to be a closet Ruskie.

program," up until the day Arbenz Guzman resigned on June 27, 1954, "the

option of assassination was still being considered."

While the power of the CIA's psychological war, codenamed "Operation

SHERWOOD," against Arbenz Guzman rendered that option unnecessary,

the last stage of PBSUCCESS called for "roll-up of Communists and

collaborators."

Although Arbenz Guzman and his top aides were able to flee the country,

after the CIA installed Castillo Armas in power, hundreds of Guatemalans

were rounded up and killed.

Between 1954 and 1990, human rights groups estimate that the repressive

operatives of sucessive military regimes killed more than 180,000 individuals.

Among them are the Mayans massacred in 626 documented governmentsponsored

or government-committed attacks on native villages, today only

rebembered by a rather small number of people abroads as the cause for

1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu, an ethnic Mayan, to start

her struggle for civil rights and peace in the region.

This document has been carefully reformatted (and in instances where the

HTML transcript had obvious errors not related to the original document,

corrected*) and put into e-book format to be read onscreen or printed out and

read at leisure by sokol. This introductory text has been in most parts adapted

from George Washington University's National Security Archive website at

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

sokol, June 2002

* like the doubled lines in the 'Explosives' section.

A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION

DEFINITION

Assassination is a term thought to be derived from "Hashish", a drug similar to

marijuana, said to have been used by Hasan-ibn-Sabah to induce motivation

in his followers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders,

usually at the cost of their lives.

It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the

legal jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer,

who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and whose

death provides positive advantages to that organization.

EMPLOYMENT

Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine

operations. It should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by

any U.S. Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its

execution by members of an associated foreign service. This reticence is

partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper. No

assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded. Consequently,

the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be reached in the

field, at the area where the act will take place. Decision and instructions

should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one

person will be involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be

properly covered by normal news services, whose output is available to all

concerned.

JUSTIFICATION

Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has

knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization if divulged.

Assassination of persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be

regarded as just punishment. Killing a political leader whose burgeoning

career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held

necessary.

But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons

who are morally squeamish should not attempt it.

CLASSIFICATIONS

The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is

unaware of his danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be

affected by whether or not the assassin is to be killed with the subject.

Hereafter, assassinations in which the subject is unaware will be termed

"simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will be termed

"chase"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."

If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "lost." If the

assassin is to escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no

compromises should exist here. The assassin must not fall alive into enemy

hands.

A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the

subject was actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or

natural causes. If such concealment is desirable the operation will be called

"secret"; if concealment is immaterial, the act will be called "open"; while if the

assassination requires publicity to be effective it will be termed "terroristic."

Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe,

simple, and terroristic, while that of Huey Long was lost, guarded and open.

Obviously, successful secret assassinations are not recorded as

assassination at all. [Illeg] of Thailand and Augustus Caesar may have been

the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination. Chase assassinations

usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal organizations.

THE ASSASSIN

In safe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine

agent. He should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and

physically active. If special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or

drugs, it is clear that he must have outstanding skill with such equipment.

Except in terroristic assassinations, it is desirable that the assassin be

transient in the area. He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the

rest of the organization and his instructions should be given orally by one

person only. His safe evacuation after the act is absolutely essential, but here

again contact should be as limited as possible. It is preferable that the person

issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering action which may

be necessary.

In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics,

religion, and revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is

unstable psychologically, he must be handled with extreme care. He must not

know the identities of the other members of the organization, for although it is

intended that he die in the act, something may go wrong. While the assassin

of Trotsky has never revealed any significant information, it was unsound to

depend on this when the act was planned.

PLANNING

When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the

operation must be planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to

that used in military operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in

information and possibly indicate a need for special equipment which must be

procured or constructed. When all necessary data has been collected, an

effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be mental; no

papers should ever contain evidence of the operation.

In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal.

Since this requires advertising to be effective, the resistance organization

must be in a position to warn high officials publicly that their lives will be the

price of reprisal action against innocent people. Such a threat is of no value

unless it can be carried out, so it may be necessary to plan the assassination

of various responsible officers of the oppressive regime and hold such plans

in readiness to be used only if provoked by excessive brutality. Such plans

must be modified frequently to meet changes in the tactical situation.

TECHNIQUES

The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human

being may be killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those

who may be emotionally unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to

commit. The specific technique employed will depend upon a large number of

variables, but should be constant in one point: Death must be absolutely

certain. The attempt on Hitler's life failed because the conspiracy did not give

this matter proper attention.

Techniques may be considered as follows:

1. Manual.

It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough

to do it well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by

hand unless he has absolutely no alternative.

However, the simplest local tools are often much the most efficient means of

assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, fire poker, kitchen knife,

lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. A length of rope or

wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised

weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent

innocence. The obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an

item of sporting goods succeeded.

In all safe cases where the assassin may be subject to search, either before

or after the act, specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the lost

case, the assassin may accidentally be searched before the act and should

not carry an incriminating device if any sort of lethal weapon can be

improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally carries weapons

because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and

implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his identity.

2. Accidents.

For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the

most effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little

excitement and is only casually investigated.

The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or

more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair wells, unscreened windows

and bridges will serve. Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases

a private meeting with the subject may be arranged at a properly-cased

location. The act may be executed by sudden, vigorous [excised] of the

ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin immediately sets up

an outcry, playing the "horrified witness", no alibi or surreptitious withdrawal is

necessary. In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the

subject before dropping him. Care is required to ensure that no wound or

condition not attributable to the fall is discernible after death.

Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot

swim. It will be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as

he can thus be sure of the subject's death and at the same time establish a

workable alibi.

If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used [2 words

excised] to prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind.

Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact

timing and can seldom be free from unexpected observation.

Automobile accidents are a less satisfactory means of assassination. If the

subject is deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and

investigation is likely to be thorough. If the subject's car is tampered with,

reliability is very low. The subject may be stunned or drugged and then placed

in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can be run off a high cliff or

into deep water without observation.

Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a

burning building. Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated

and highly combustible.

3. Drugs.

In all types of assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very effective. If

the assassin is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical

care, this is an easy and rare method. An overdose of morphine administered

as a sedative will cause death without disturbance and is difficult to detect.

The size of the dose will depend upon whether the subject has been using

narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice.

If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at

the passing out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute

alcoholism.

Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strychine, are effective but their

possession or procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is

problematical. Poison was used unsuccessfully in the assassination of

Rasputin and Kolohan, though the latter case is more accurately described as

a murder.

4. Edge Weapons.

Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain

minimum of anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability.

Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is

reached. The heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to

locate.

Abdominal wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical

treatment has made this no longer true.

Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical

region. This can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or

hatchet.

Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood

vessels on both sides of the windpipe.

If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs,

either of the above methods can be used to ensure death.

5. Blunt Weapons.

As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge

for effective use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A

hammer may be picked up almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and [illeg]

bats are very widely distributed. Even a rock or a heavy stick will do, and

nothing resembling a weapon need be procured, carried or subsequently

disposed of.

Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the

ear, and the lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very

heavy, any portion of the upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the

head, from the eyes to the throat, can withstand enormous blows without fatal

consequences.

6. Firearms.

Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The

assassin usually has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of

weapons, and expects more range, accuracy and killing power than can be

provided with reliability. Since certainty of death is the major requirement,

firearms should be used which can provide destructive power at least 100% in

excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half that

considered practical for the weapon.

Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They

may be difficult to obtain. They require a degree of experience from the user.

They are [illeg]. Their [illeg] is consistently over-rated.

However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient

than any other means. These cases usually involve distance between the

assassin and the subject, or comparative physical weakness of the assassin,

as with a woman.

(a) The precision rifle.

In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target rifle should always be

considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can nearly always be achieved

at a distance of one hundred yards. In ideal circumstances, the range may be

extended to 250 yards.

The rifle should be a well made bolt or falling block action type, handling a

powerful long-range cartridge. The .300 F.A.B. Magnum is probably the best

cartridge readily available. Other excellent calibers are . 375 M.[illeg].

Magnum, .270 Winchester, .30 - 106 p.s., 8 x 60 MM Magnum, 9.3 x 62 kk

and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers,

since ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type,

whereas most ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not

sufficiently lethal. Military ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling

bullets, as this will adversely affect accuracy.

The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set

triggers, but in any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the

weapon should be able to group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 2 1/2"

groups are adequate. The sight should be telescopic, not only for accuracy,

but because such a sight is much better in dim light or near darkness. As long

as the bare outline of the target is discernable, a telescope sight will work,

even if the rifle and shooter are in total darkness.

An expanding, hunting bullet of such calibers as described above will produce

extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. If a man is struck just

once in the body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain.

Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some

safety if a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The

propaganda value of this system may be very high.

(b) The machine gun.

Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is

applicable. Usually, this will require the subversion of a unit of an official

guard at a ceremony, though a skillful and determined team might

conceivably dispose of a loyal gun crew without commotion and take over the

gun at the critical time.

The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a

concealed subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky.

The automatic feature of the machine gun should rather be used to increase

reliability by placing a 5 second burst on the subject. Even with full jacket

ammunition, this will be absolute lethal is the burst pattern is no larger than a

man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In ideal circumstances, a

properly padded and targeted machine gun can do it at 850 yards. The major

difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine

gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This

will not do in assassination as the subject will not wait.

This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans

and "machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination.

Unlike the rifle and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it

fires pistol ammunition, much less powerful.

To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest,

though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing

efficiency than the 9 mm European arms.

The assassination range of the sub-machine gun is point blank. While

accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards

or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary

circumstances, the SMG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the

hands of a capable gunner, a high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as

speed of execution is most desirable, particularly in the case of multiple

subjects.

The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than

one subject is to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised

for the use of a pair of sub-machine gunners, by which a room containing as

many as a dozen subjects can be "purified" in about twenty seconds with little

or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated below.

While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridges, the higher

cyclic rate of some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target

quicker with acceptable pattern density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is

particularly good in this way. The Danish Madsen SMG has a moderately

good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and concealable. The Russian

SHGs have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small, light projectile

which requires more hits for equivalent killing effect.

(d) The Shotgun.

A large bore shotgun is a most effective killing instrument as long as the

range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used only on single

targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully.The barrel may be "sawed" off for

convenience, but this is not a significant factor in its killing performance.

Its optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is

considered the best shot size for a twelve gauge gun, but anything from single

balls to bird shot will do if the range is right. The assassin should aim for the

solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close range and can easily [illeg]

the head.

(e) The Pistol.

While the handgun is quite inefficient as a weapon of assassination, it is often

used, partly because it is readily available and can be concealed on the

person, and partly because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While

many well known assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln,

Harding, Ghandi), such attempts fail as often as they succeed, (Truman,

Roosevelt, Churchill).

If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just

beyond reach. The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical

situations, except that the shotgun is much more lethal and the pistol is much

more easily concealed. In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite

deadly, but such experts are rare and not usually available for assassination

missions.

.45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Kly, .45 A.S.[illeg] (U.S. Service) and .357 Magnum

are all efficient calibers.

Less powerful rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges

such as the .32s and .25s should be avoided.

In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete

reliability.

(f) Silent Firearms.

The sound of the explosion of the propellant in a firearm can be effectively

silenced by appropriate attachments. However, the sound of the projectile

passing through the air cannot, since this sound is generated outside the

weapon. In cases where the velocity of the bullet greatly exceeds that of

sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that of the explosion.

Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per second,

they cannot be silenced.

Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the

sound of their flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any

sort of improvised carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can

be silenced. The user should not forget that the sound of the operation of a

repeating action is considerable, and that the sound of bullet strike,

particularly in bone, is quite loud.

Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have

been widely publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low,

effective precision range is held to about 100 yards with rifle or carbine type

weapons, while with pistols, silent or otherwise, are most efficient just beyond

arms length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree of safety to the

assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough

hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pistol combines the

disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine

purpose.

A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet of

great weight, and built for accuracy, could be very useful to an assassin in

certain situations. At the time of writing, no such weapon is known to exist.

7. Explosives.

Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in

assassination. Such devices, in terroristic and open assassination, can

provide safety and overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have

often been the implement of lost assassinations.

The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for

assassination. The charge must be very large and the detonation must be

controlled exactly as to time by the assassin who can observe the subject. A

small or moderate explosive charge is highly unreliable as a cause of death,

and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone to kill the wrong

man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death of

casual bystanders can often produce public reactions unfavorable to the

cause for which the assassination is carried out.

Bombs or grenades should never be thrown at a subject. While this will

always cause a commotion and may even result in the subject's death, it is

sloppy, unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and

the assassin is never sure of: (1) reaching his attack position, (2) placing the

charge close enough to the target and (3) firing the charge at the right time.

Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge of proper size

to be employed, but requires accurate prediction of the subject's movements.

Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum,

and this is explosive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any

hard, [illeg] material as long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock

fragments should be walnut-size rather than pen-size. If solid plates are used,

to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1" thick, gives excellent

fragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical for use in

assassination. Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While

possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Antipersonnel

explosive missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical

knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm

mortar shell, are particularly good. Antipersonnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100

and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be completely

reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.

The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at

the moment of detonation.

A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1"

nuts and bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type [illeg] to 50 yards. This

reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact replica of the

proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range,

pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at

least 1" of seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability.

Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin.

An ordinary commercial or military exploder is efficient, as long as it is rigged

for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the system.

The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide

exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This

will avoid the disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed positions

of the assassin and the subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the

charge from a variety of possible positions.

The radio switch can be [illeg] to fire [illeg], though its reliability is somewhat

lower and its procurement may not be easy.

EXAMPLES

[Illeg] may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following

assassinations and attempts:

Marat Heydrich

Lincoln Hitler

Harding Roosevelt

Grand Duke Sergei Truman

Pirhivie Mussolini

Archduke Francis Ferdinand Benes

Rasputin Aung Sang

Madero [illeg]

Kirov Abdullah

Huey Long Ghandi [sic]

Alexander of Yugoslavia

Trotsky

CONFERENCE ROOM TECHNIQUE

1. 2.

(1) Enters room quickly but quietly (2) Opens fire on first subject to

react. Swings across group

(2) Stands in doorway toward center of mass. Times

burst to empty magazine at end

of swing.

(1) Covers group to prevent

individual dangerous reactions;

if necessary, fires individual

bursts of 3 rounds.

3. 4.

(2) Finishes burst. Commands "shift." (1) Finishes burst. Commands

Drops back thru [sic] door. Replaces "shift". Drops back thru [sic]

empty magazine. Covers corridor. door. Replaces magazine.

Covers corridor.

(1) On command "shift", opens fire on

opposite side of target, swings one burst (2) On command "shift", reacross

group. enters room. Covers group: kills

survivors with two-round bursts.

Leaves propaganda.

5. 6.

(2) Leaves room. Commands "GO".

Covers rear with nearly full magazine.

(1) On command "GO", leads withdrawal,

covering front with full magazine.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT – PAGE 1

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT – PAGE 4

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT – PAGE 5

FIRST PAGE OF ONE OF THE MANY ASSASSINATION LISTS COMPILED BY THE CIA DURING PLANNING FOR

OPERATION PBSUCCESS. AS THE MEMORANDUM INDICATES, THE CHIEF OF ONE OF THE CIA'S

DIVISIONS INVOLVED IN THE COUP (THE DIVISION TITLE HAS BEEN DELETED) REQUESTED A LIST OF NAMES

OF ARBENZ GUZMAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS, MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND INDIVIDUALS

"OF TACTICAL IMPORTANCE WHOSE REMOVAL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL OR OTHERS

REASONS IS MANDATORY FOR THE SUCCESS OF MILITARY ACTION."

THE MEMO ASKS THAT CIA PERSONNEL READ THROUGH THE LIST AND INITIAL THE NAMES OF THOSE

WHO SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON A "FINAL LIST OF DISPOSEES." THE LIST (AND THE INITIALS OR NAMES OF

ALL CIA OFFICERS APPEARING IN THE DOCUMENT) HAS BEEN WITHHELD. A HANDWRITTEN NOTE

ATTACHED ON THE BOTTOM OF THE MEMO READS:

Elimination List

April [illeg] - [Illeg] is taking a copy of list of

names for checking with the [illeg]

April 7 - Original Memo

with attached Biographic data

has been passed to [deleted]

Returned by [deleted] on 1 June 1954

FIRST PAGE OF ANOTHER VERSION OF THE ASSASSINATION LISTS COMPILED BY THE CIA AND CARLOS

CASTILLO ARMAS (CODE-NAMED CALLIGERIS) IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING FOR THE 1954 COUP.

THE NAMES OF THE AGENCY'S INTENDED VICTIMS WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES: PERSONS TO BE

DISPOSED OF THROUGH "EXECUTIVE ACTION" (I.E. KILLED) AND THOSE TO BE IMPRISONED OR EXILED

DURING THE OPERATION. BEFORE RELEASING THIS DOCUMENT TO THE PUBLIC, THE CIA DELETED EVERY

NAME, LEAVING ONLY THE ROWS OF NUMBERS TO INDICATE HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE TARGETED.

'ATTACHMENT # 1' OF THE ABOVE. THE LIST OF INDIVIDUALS TO BE MURDERED CONTAINED 58 NAMES.

'ATTACHMENT # 2' OF THE ABOVE. 74 INDIVIDUALS WERE SINGLED OUT FOR IMPRISONMENT OR EXILE.

AS NAMES HAVE BEEN DELETED IN BOTH LISTS, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY THE CIA'S CLAIM

THAT IN SPITE OF THE NUMBER OF ASSASSINATION PROPOSALS, NO SUCH KILLINGS WERE ACTUALLY

CONDUCTED DURING THE COUP.

OPERATION PHOENIX

CIA and Operation Phoenix in Vietnam

by Ralph McGehee, 1996-02-19

Until outlawed in mid 70s CIA directly involved in assassination attempts against Castro of Cuba, and Congolese leader Lumumba. CIA also encouraged plots that resulted in assassination of Dominican Republic President Trujillo, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in 63 and Chilean Rene Schneider in 73. Most extensive assassination op was Operation Phoenix conducted during latter part of VN war. Twentieth Century Fund. (1992). The Need to Know: Covert Action and American Democracy, 83.

Vietnam, 65-70 details re Vietnam. From 65-68 U.S. and Saigon intel services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix Program for 69 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of VC targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of VC suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and navy SEALs most common recruits for Phoenix Program. Green Beret detachment B-57 provided admin cover for other intel units. One was project cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with NVNese, and kgb. Another was project oak targeted against svnese suspected collaborators. They controlled by special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, which worked with CIA outside of general abrams control. Stein. J. (1992), A Murder in Wartime, 360-1.

Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, CORDS reported 20,857 VCI killed. Gvt of VN reported 40,994 from 8/68 thru mid 71. Per cord statistics 12.4% Deaths could be attributed to Phoenix ops. Kenneth osborn of program said Phoenix became a depersonalized murder program. A dept of defense analyst thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war NVNese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000 officially listed by the U.S. In some parts of south 95% of communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 72.

Vietnam, 68-72 Under Phoenix "security committees" in provincial "interrogation centers" would determine fate suspected NLF. Counterspy spring/summer 78, 8.

Vietnam, 69 Under Phoenix in July 69 "Vietnam information notes," a state dept publication said target for 69 elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 97.

Vietnam, 73 According to Defense Dept official 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians killed under Phoenix while op under direct U.S. control (Jan 68 thru Aug 72 ). By same source, another 33,358 detained without trial. Colby in 73 admitted 20,587 deaths thru end 71 , 28,978 captured, and 17,717 "rallied" to Saigon gvt. Thus approx 30% targeted individuals killed. All Phoenix stats fail to reflect U.S. Activity after "official" U.S. Control of op abandoned. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8.

Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy spring/summer 75 6.

Vietnam, in 82 Ex-Phoenix operative reveals that sometimes orders were given to kill U.S. military personnel who were considered security risks. He suspects the orders came not from "division", but from a higher authority such as the CIA or the ONI. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) summer 82 52.

Vietnam. Phoenix Program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc). Plan to send pru or police teams to get in practice, death the frequent result of such ops, some times through assassinations pure and simple. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secret, 181.

Vietnam. Phoenix Program took over 20,000 lives, 65-72 U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27.

Vietnam, July 71 Colby inserted chart to Representative Reid showing that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops against VC between 68-71 Of these 31 percent had been killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CI, 18.

Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the pru's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program, late 60 early 70 took over 20,000 lives in Vietnam. U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27.

Vietnam. Phung Hoang aka Phoenix Program quotas for units set by komer for all 242 districts. One result indiscriminate killing with every body labeled VCI. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2.

Conflict, li.

Law professor at University of Washington, Seattle, Roy L. Prosterman, designed the land reform program the U.S. Government promoted in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In each place the program was accompanied by a rural terror. In Vietnam the Phoenix Program killed 40,000 civilian between August 68 and mid-71; in Philippines, martial law; in El Salvador, a state of siege. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Winter 90 69

Consequences.

Vietnam, 67-70 Phoenix a fiasco, it unmanageable and encouraged outrageous abuses. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 323.

Vietnam, 75 according to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval up to thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix related Vietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the agency over the years. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) 6-7/79 4.

Vietnam, 68-72 CI Phoenix project run jointly CIA and U.S. Army military intel. Counterspy 5/73 21.

Vietnam, 75 U.S. military provided approx 600 case officers to supplement 40-50 CIA case officers for Phoenix ops. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8.

Vietnam. The Phoenix and the identity card programs. Volkman, E., & Baggett, B. (1989), Secret Intelligence, 150.

Vietnam, 65-69 CI/pacification efforts initiated by French culminate in Phoenix Program designed to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure. Made official June 68, Phoenix was intensification of ci ops and involved "mass imprisonment, torture and assassination." For thorough Phoenix description seeCountersp 5/73 20.

Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, ARVN intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 99.

Vietnam, 66 beginning of Phoenix Program. Lv 218. Phoenix to increase identification VC infrastructure and passing info to military, police, and other elements who were to induce defections, capture them, or attack them in their strongholds. Colby, W. (1989). Lost Victory, 266.

Vietnam, 67-73 In 67 CIA proposed all U.S. Intel agencies pool info on VC at district, province and Saigon levels for exploitation. Program first called intel coor and exploitation program (icex). Phoenix the name of program. Assigned quotas for VC to be neutralized. To focus police and intel orgs. Against communist apparatus. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, 243-8.

Vietnam, 67-73 District intel ops coor center (diooc). Dien ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by two U.S. soldiers, 2 census grievance, one rd cadre, and one special branch. Diooc intel clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate info. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, VCI and order battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and diooc's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 126.

Vietnam, 67 12/20/67 Prime Minister signed directive 89-th. T/vp/m legalizing Phung Hoang, VN clone of Phoenix. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 148.

Vietnam, 67 Phoenix Program in fledgling stage conceived and implemented by CIA. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 147.

Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program statistics were phony a bust and a fake. DeForest, O., & Chanoff, D. (1990), Slow Burn, 54-55.

Vietnam, 69 Program of 69 campaign called for elimination of VCI. Program became known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. In each province the chief established a province security committee (PSC). PSC controlled the npff and sp who maintained province interrogation centers (pics). Counterspy 5/73 20.

Vietnam, 71 CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to national police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to begin forming special intel force units (sifu). 8-Man teams composed of 4 volunteers each from special police and field police. Sifu targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for pru. They sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb, while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting attention. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 391.

Vietnam, 71 In revising Phoenix Program (because of all communist penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire southeast asia computer associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise 200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers. VNese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management info system (phmis). Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 363.

Vietnam, 72 In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. The end of Phoenix? Some Phoenix ops in 73. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program 403, 406.

Vietnam, 75 U.S. Still involved in Phoenix in 75. Program renamed special police investigative service (spis). U.S. provides data processing facilities for spis thru, Computer Science Services, inc. Which runs intel thru machines to classify and collate them and then turns info over to spis. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 415.

Vietnam. Phoenix Program, resources control program, checkpoints, identification card program, paramilitary police called the police field force a 100 man mobile company at least one assigned to each province. Aid helped upgrade police and developed national police academy, improved communications and files, established one two-way radio in every village. Chieu hoi program. Refugee generation programs. Province coordinating committees supervised civic action on bridges, roads, public buildings, agricultural extension work, medical technicians and more. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, 217-8.

Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the PRU's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732.

Vietnam, Phoenix. Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 437-441.

Vietnam, police. Public safety included Michigan State University program. Resources control, effort to regulate movement resources both human and material. Includes set up checkpoints roads and waterways, mobile checkpoints. Resulted in 560,000 arrests by 1969. National identity registration program. Every VNese 15 or older must register and carry identification card. Fingerprints obtained. Once completed program to include fingerprints, photos and bio data. Surveillance of suspects role of special police branch. Sp agents penetrate subversive organizations and use intel collection, political data and files from census data to separate good from bad. Pacification or Phoenix Program. Systematic effort at intel collection and exploitation. All intel services and America's CIA and military intel orgs. Pool data from informers and prisoners. With this info police and provincial reconnaissance units make raids in contested areas to seize or eliminate VCI agents. See Klare, M.T. (1972), War Without End, 265 for more death squads.

Vietnam, 66-71 Phoenix op designed to help U.S. Military reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded VC's ability to field replacements. In 4/67 Pres Johnson announced formation of civil ops and revolutionary development support (CORDS) for pacification. R. Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 68-71. CORDS the management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 71, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 Civilians by 71. Usaid responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name revolutionary development cadre. Rd program formed teams of 59 SVNese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "eleven criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...Cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create regional and popular forces (rf/pfs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of SVN gvt forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of communist casualties. Underground pm effort called Phoenix which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All info fed into intel coordination and exploitation program. VNese at Komer's request set up staff that with CIA was responsible for coordinating intel reports on VC infrastructure. Info from census grievance, military, police reports. PM units - including CIA's provincial reconnaissance units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not killed when captured - taken to provincial interrogation centers (pic). Also regional prisons and a national center all financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 55-65.

Vietnam, 71 William E. Colby on july 19, 1971, before Senate subcommittee testified CIA op Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between 1/68 and 5/71. In response to a question from mr. Reid "do you state categorically that Phoenix has never perpetrated the premeditated killing of a civilian in a non-combat situation?" Colby replied: "No, I could not say that...I certainly would not say never." Counterspy 12/78 6.

Vietnam, 67 First MACV alloted Phoenix 126 officers and ncos. By end 67 one nco assigned to each of 103 dioccs then in existence. All military officers and enlisted men assigned to Phoenix Program took orders from CIA. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 145.

Vietnam, 68-73 Phoenix ci/terror op funded and covered by U.S. Aid, CORDS pacification survey, public employment projects, and other benign agencies. Counterspy may 73 22.

Vietnam, 71 1.7 Billion dollars go to CORDS in Phoenix Project. Colby refuses congressional audit Phoenix funds before committee. Counterspy 5/73 24.

Vietnam, 71 When questioned concerning unaccounted-for 1.7 Billion dollars which had financed much of covert aspect of Phoenix Program, Ambassador Colby assured house subcommittee on foreign ops and govt info, all main problems has been resolved and Congress could rest assured aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. He did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. He did not have authority to discuss reasons why Congress could not audit 1.7 billions worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. Counterspy 5/73 24.

Vietnam, 69 Colby rendered due process obsolete. VCI target broken into three classes a, for leaders and party members; b, for holders of responsible jobs; c, for rank-and file. Decision c category to be ignored since Phoenix directed at VCI command and control structure. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) explained. Hes guesstimate of VCI in 1/69 was 75,000. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 260.

Vietnam, 71 House subcommittee on foreign operations and gvt. Info. investigates Phoenix. Colby insists project "respectable", brutality minimized. Estimates 5000 killed. Congress denied audit of Phoenix funds. Counterspy may 73 24.

Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.

Vietnam, 68 Phoenix ci/terror program established by Thieu's presidential decree, literally written by CIA man William Colby. Decree and future authorizations indicated that suspects could be arrested without a warrant or copy of charges and detained on basis of police dossier heresay evidence. Once arrested, suspect could not confront accusers or see dossier, was denied bail legal counsel, and was denied a trial or even a hearing. At best one's case was reviewed by province security committee composed of milt and intel officers. Under Phoenix all rights of due process stripped. Counterspy Winter 78 28.

Covert Action Information Bulletin 13:3, 16-17:6-10; 17:48-49; 22:2,4,6,10-24; "from Phoenix associates to civilian-military assistance," 22:18-19; "from the hessians to the contras: mercenaries in the service of imperialism," 22:10-11.

89 An article by Rob Rosenbaum from interviews with General Secord and Ted "Blond Ghost" Shackley. They give their answers to questions about Iran-Contra, secret war in Laos, Phoenix Program in Vietnam, CIA-Mafia plots of the sixties. Shackley discusses charges of opium smuggling in Laos by elements supported by CIA. Photos of Secord and Shackley. Shackley interview in his risk-assessment consulting firm, Rosslyn-based Research Associates International. Vanity fair, 1/90 72-77, 126-8,130-1 Vietnam 68-73 Evan Parker, Jr., John Mason, and John Tilton all from CIA were men who headed Phoenix Program when it supposedly transferred to military and CORDS. Roger McCarthy said CIA very much involved with Phoenix. Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 193.

Vietnam. John Murray, of WHD, and his wife Delores, former CIA ops officer, sending letters of disclosures re Shackley. He covertly contacted William Miller, staff director of Church Committee, and told how Shackley and Helms in 70 arranged to keep CIA from being implicated in My Lai massacres. (Some evidence suggested massacre related to CIA's Phoenix Program.) Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 302.

Vietnam, 67 50 officers and enlisted men invited to join counter insurgency program. Those who accepted by CIA joined as junior officer trainees. Most assigned to provinces as rdc/p or rdc/o advisers and many as Phoenix coordinators. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 198.

Vietnam, 68-69 Robert K. Brown (later editor of Soldier of Fortune magazine) worked with James K. Damron, CIA's project coordinator for the Phoenix Program in Gia Dinh province. Pigeon, R. (1986). The Soldier of Fortune, 44.

Vietnam, Orrin DeForest, with U.S. Air Force special investigations early on. Joined CIA in 68 as chief interrogator Hau Nghia province in bien hoa under cover of Office of Special Assistance (OSA). Duties included inspection of pics, training VNese in interrogation. Monitoring intel production. He discovered pics poorly run, Phoenix Program slipshod, and CIA had been unable generate single agent. Using methods learned while working with Japanese national police in identifying, communist agents, disregarding CIA methods, DeForest's efforts produced 80% hard intel in VN. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provacateurs, 50-1.

training, 55 Eisenhower establishes public safety program whose goal is to train foreign police units in, among other things, counterinsurgency. 62 Program becomes Office of Public Safety which eventually procures 400 officers in 45 countries and yearly budget 50 million. Much of Phoenix funding and training was thru Office of Public Safety. By 75 ops had distributed 200 million in equipment foreign police, trained 7000+ senior police officials, and trained over 1 million rank and file police officers worldwide. Counterspy Winter 78 29-30.

Vietnam. Former Phoenix advisor Wayne Cooper said "Operation Phoenix was a unilateral American program", and Klare confirmed by saying "although most of the dirty work was performed by indigenous operatives, Phoenix was designed, organized, financed, and administered by U.S. authorities." Counterspy Winter 78 27.

Vietnam. "Phoenix demonstrated that the U.S. Government through the CIA will create, impose, and conduct an operation in another country without a semblance of a mandate from a given people or their representatives as long as the operation is considered in interest of U.S. governmental objectives." Counterspy Winter 78 27-8.

Vietnam, 59-69 the SEALs and the Phoenix Program. The Intel Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was a joint MACV/CIA op - forerunner of Phoenix. SEALs helped train VNese personnel. SEALs assigned ops detachments. SEALs worked with PRUs. By 68, with prisoner snatches, ambushes, and increasing VC defections, ICEX program neutralizing 800 VCI every month. Phoenix began 7/1/68. Description of the province intel ops coordinating center (piocc) and the district (diocc). Combatting VCI in urban areas responsibility of national police force and police field force. SEALs taught PRUsin mekong delta. Description of prus. They the most effective native troops. By end of 68, the iv corps PRUswere almost entirely advised by seal personnel. Seal advisors accompanied PRUson average of 15 missions a month. Description of ops. Dockery, K. (1991). SEALs in Action, 167-176.

Vietnam, 68-73 ttwo small groups wreaked havoc on the VCI. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and the Navy's SEALs. PRUs and SEALs often worked together and both killed many VCI and guerrillas -- the enemy had wrapped itself in the population. Together they were fewer than 6000 men. They had access to the best intel often coming directly from CIA. Pru had roots in the counterterror teams of the early 60s. In 66 the ct became prus. Details of the makeup and recruiting source of the prus. PRUsoften killed targets. Military participation in the pru program was to end in 10/70. Pru was the most effective action arm of the Phoenix Program. Details of the SEALs larger-than-life reputation earned in VN. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 171-199.

Vietnam, 65-72 During Nixon's first 2 1/2 years, state department officially admits that the CIA-run Phoenix Program murdered or abducted 35,708 VNese civilians, 4,836 more than the pentagon claimed the NLF had assassinated or kidnapped during the same period, and a monthly increase over the 200 killed by the CIA every month under johnson. Senator Gravel edition, (1971), Pentagon Papers v 300.

Vietnam, 65-73 Phoenix Program torture tactics include rape, electric shock, water torture, hanging from ceiling, beatings, incarceration and execution. Counterspy 5/73 16. Vietnam, 69-71 K. Barton Osborn, Phoenix agent, testified to Congress "I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half. Uc 114. Note says this testimony given before U.S. Congress,Heari. 315-321.

Vietnam, 73 "The prime difference between the types of intelligence provided to the military units and the Phoenix coordinator was that all information going to Phoenix was of a political nature ... I was following through on a reported (VC) suspect that one of my agents had identified. The man was interrogated at the marine counter-intelligence complex and I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hooch the man was being taken out, dead. He died from a six inch dowel pushed through his ear and into his brain." Barton Osborn, former Phoenix case officer before Armed Services Committee, 1973. Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 7.

Vietnam. Colby supervised est of pics in each of SVN's 44 provinces. Each center constructed with CIA funds. Agency personnel directed each centers op much of which consisted of torture carried out by VN nationals. Coi 207. Colby admitted serious abuses committed under Phoenix. Former intel officers came before Congressional cmttees to describe repeated examples torture. Marchetti, V., & Marks, J.D. (1974), The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 207 see fn.

Vietnam, 66-74 CIA analyst, Nelson H. Brickman, on 11/66 produced basic guidelines for [the Phoenix Program] in a memorandum that described the VCI and suggested which parts of it should be targeted. His memo said rank-and-file members were not legitimate targets "because they were most often unwilling participants in the revolution." Brickman called for using all available intelligence services to neutralize the VCI. Robert Komer was so impressed he assigned Brickman to the revolutionary development office. He adopted brickman's suggestion that there was no need to begin a new anti-vci program, only that the existing programs be brought together and managed by a single bureau. He recommended the U.S. Agencies get their houses in order before bringing in the gvn. Brickman "deserved the credit" for the Phoenix Program. A program called intel coordination and exploitation (icex) was the first structure. Evan parker named director of icex but komer had full control. U.S. Military reluctantly participated initially. Icex officially created on 7/9/67, although basic structure had been in place a year. Building of district ops and coordinating centers (doicc) which by late 67 were called district intel and ops coordinating centers (dioccs). MACV directive 381-41 stated: "to coordinate and give impetus to U.S. and gvn operations...Directed toward elimination of the VC infrastructure." Icex placed under cords. South Vietnamese were unwilling to take program seriously. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 58-70.

Vietnam, 67-72 K. Barton Osborn's testimony re the Phoenix Program before the house committee on government ops, 8/71. Osborn characterized program as a "sterile, depersonalized murder program." Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, xv-xvi.

Vietnam, 67 The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) program was officially born on 12/20/67 when the SVNese premier issued a decree. This differed from ICEX only in official SVNese support for the program. Seal-and-search op in Bui Cui village. LRRP ambush parties. People's self-defense forces (psdf) started after Tet, it was a nationwide system of local militias. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 72-81.

Vietnam, 68-70 PIOCCC had extensive dossiers on VCI and the chieu hoi program was the largest producer of Phoenix intel. 132. A criticism of Phoenix was the covert control by CIA. Despite influx of military advisers, CIA controlled chain of command and purse strings. Colby, top man of CORDS in 69 had been with CIA. American directors of Phoenix at national level were all CIA. In 7/69 the system changed. "Management and support facilities for Phoenix were officially transferred from the office of the special assistant to the ambassador (osa) (cia) to MACV, who assumed full responsibility for providing for or arranging monetary and logistical support through American channels." From July 69 on, CIA made up only a small part of the program. Details of numbers neutralized and differences between CIA and military estimates. The use of diocc VCI target folders, a simple prepared set of biographical, operational, and administrative questions. By the end of 1970 one hundred thousand copies had been distributed. A sophisticated computerized collation program called the Phung Hoang Management Info System (PHMIS) was implemented. The program combined the national police tracking system with VCI info to gear up police for handling both. PHMIS was manned by Vietnamese, using American advisers as trainers. 135-6. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 134.

Vietnam, 68 President Thieu with the help of William Colby, Komer's deputy for CORDS, drafted a decree that officially sanctioned Phoenix/Phung Hoang on 7/1/68. Article 3 was of paramount importance -- it defined who was or was not a member of the VCI. Article 3 -- definitions: the Viet Cong infrastructure is all Viet cong, political and administrative organizations established by the communist party which goes under the name people's revolutionary party, from the cities to the countryside. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the highest level steering organization...And the front for the liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN)....Viet Cong military units, members of mass organizations established by the Viet Cong, citizens forced to perform as laborers, or civilians in areas temporarily controlled by the Viet cong, are not classified as belonging to the Viet Cong infrastructure. Definition adjusted over time. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 84.

Vietnam, 94 VN rejects visit of ex-CIA chief Colby, now a Washington lawyer, who had planned to visit as a director of a U.S.-based investment fund. Fund directors had planned to hold a reception Monday. Event canceled, and directors will meet in Bangkok. Colby was CIA's chief in Saigon during war and was associated with Phoenix, an op to root out rural support for communist guerrillas via sweeping arrests, torture and execution of suspects. Critics said most of those killed were innocent peasants. Chicago Tribune 12/3/94 21.

Vietnam, accelerated pacification campaign, July 68 Thieu with Colby's help issued decree est Phoenix committees at national, regional and provincial and even district level, "to which all the agencies involved had to furnish representation." Colby, W. (1978). Honorable Men, 267.

Vietnam, Australia, Vietnam, 62-73 Australian AATTV teams operated in VN often in CIA Phoenix op. `Black team' commanded by American of australian usually given target figure. He pinpointed and black team would go out, usually dressed in enemy's gear and the assassination then blamed on VC. Toohey, B., & Pinwill, W. (1990), Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 87-88.

Vietnam, icex intel coor and exploitation MACV/cia program to work on VCI with Vietnamese cooperation. Colby helped devise program which became Phoenix. Colby, W. (1978), Honorable Men 267.

Vietnam, National Security study memo, 67-69 said although Phoenix launched in Dec 67, Vietnamese cooperation minimal and only after American prodding, Thieu issued a decree in July 68 directing network to be set up. Program forced on VNese. Pru supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 111-125.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program most notorious of counterinsurgency programs. Originated by robert w. Komer, who now headed Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS), Phoenix designed to root out secret Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam. Miller, N. (1989). Spying for America379.

Vietnam, Phoenix, 68-70 In 69 CIA apparently had attack squeamishness and pulled out of CORDS. Concluded Phoenix inappropriate. It believed North had moved away from military engagement to lacing entire gvt with spies -- possibly as many as 30,000 so Thieu's gvt could be easily overthrown. Baritz, L. (1985). Backfire, 269.

Vietnam, Phoenix op. Every person who ran program from Saigon assigned to program from CIA. Colby and 20,000 + figure of persons killed under Phoenix, see fn ag 440. Phoenix General Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 436-441.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program, beginning circa 66-67 CORDS pacification program. Komer settled on massive intel program on VC who could be neutralized by SVN forces. First called ICEX. Name changed to Phoenix in 69 with SVN version phung hoang. Had interrogation centers in each of SVNs 235 districts and 44 provinces, card files and computerized indexes. Pru's of 50 to 100 men. In Phoenix CIA provided weapons, paid for Saigon computer files, funded and trained PRU's and passed intel to Phoenix. Colby told senate Phoenix killed 20,587 VCI. When questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 87% killed in regular military actions. Two army lts. Told federal judge they order to maintain kill quota 50 VCI a month. Prados, J. (1986), Presidents' Secret Wars, 307-310.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program evaluation. Robert Komer wrote Phung Hoang has been a small, poorly managed, and largely ineffective effort. Clearly Phoenix failed to eliminate the infrastructure that remained after heavy losses of tet. Ce 274-8. Colby continued to see Phoenix as contributing usefully to attack on VC. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, notes 328.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program, july 69 "Vietnam information notes" a State Dept publication says: target for 1969 calls for elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CIA, 97.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Part of total pacification program of gvt VN. Colby testified that in over two and a half years there were 29,000 captured, 17,000 defected and 20,500 killed, of which 87% were killed by regular and paramilitary forces and 12% by police and similar elements. Vast majority killed in military combat, fire fights, or ambushes, and most of remainder were killed in police actions attempting to capture them. Major stress to encourage capture. Borosage, R.L., & Marks, J. (eds.). (1976), The CIA File, 190.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Quotas and indiscriminate killing of people. CIA conceived and organized program and regional and provincial officers in charge were all CIA. Colby actually wrote Phoenix directive which Thieu was finally pressured into adopting july 68 Colby conceded Phoenix recorded deaths of 20,587. Powers, T. (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2.

Vietnam, Phoenix Program, 67-75 Targets members VCI. 637 Military intel advisers assigned to Phoenix. Much money given to VNese police to expand detention facilities. Phoenix org: first the district co - ordination center, diocc, that maintained dossiers on suspected VC. Once enough evidence person placed on police green list. Suspect then jailed without right to civilian trail. In cordon and search ops all villagers lined up and walk past police checkpoint. Next level province interrogation center, pic, staffed by SVNese, Americans and CIA. After interrogation, suspect passed on to province security committee, comprised of police chiefs, military and police intel and advisors. Finally suspects could be imprisoned under law for 2 years. This one way to neutralize. Other way via Provincial Reconnaissance Units, PRUs, who would kidnap or assassinate agents targeted by diocc. Had American advisors from SEALs, Green Berets. Official amnesty program called chieu hoi used to convince VC to surrender. VC categorized as a,b, or c. A were key members, c least impt. National police detention center processed 180,000 a year. American money and effort went into national identification card, id, project. All Vietnamese over age 15 jailed if did not carry a card a RAND computer tracked the 15 million suspects also cross-linked to 10 million dossiers and fingerprints. The Dossier issue 6, 11/83 14-5.

Vietnam, Phoenix, 72-73 The F-6 program was a defensive measure to bolster Phung Hoang after the Easter Offensive. F-6 sought to increase pressure on the VCI by allowing province chiefs to move against suspected cadre on the strength of a single report rather then the usual three. With the culmination of the F-6 program in early 73, the Phoenix Program came to an end. In the spring of 72 phung hoang was absorbed into the national police. The last American advisers left VN in december 72. Various tables, command structure charts in appendix. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 231-251.

Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA man managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, arvn intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 99.

Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called phung hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.

Vietnam, 68-72 NLF according to Nixon adm decimated during Tet Offensive, remainder by Phoenix Program. Nvese officer reported Phoenix resulted in loss of thousands of our cadres. Proof in 2 remaining offensives. In 72 and in 75 they did not rely on guerrillas. Baritz, L. (1985), Backfire, 273.

Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet Cong Infrastructure system (vciis) fed 3000 names VCI into computer at combined intel center political order battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 70 computerized blacklist a unilateral American op. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259.