VII. THE RESIDUAL ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE
IN MOTORCADE PLANNING
(A) THE MAIN STREET-HOUSTON-ELM TURN
(60) As the Dallas SAIC, Forrest Sorrels told the Warren Commission, he selected
the Main-Houston-Elm turn through Dealey Plaza because it was the "most direct"
route to the Trade Mart. (189)
==================================================================================================
BULLHIT ! !
straight down main
street leads to industrial boulevard industrial and stemmons freeway both
intersect at the very corner where the trade mart is located
==================================================
HERE'S A PHOTO OF JFK IN 1960 GOING WEST TO EAST THROUGH DEALYPLAZA
===================================================================================================
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Sorrels' questioning by Warren Commission staff counsel Samuel M. Stern,
however, prevented a total picture of motorcade route logistics from emerging.
Stern asked Sorrels why the expressway was proached from the Elm Street ramp
instead of from Main Street just beyond the triple overpass at the westen
boundary of Dealey Plaza. Sorrels explained that the size and cumbersomeness of
the motorcade, along with the presence of a raised divider separating the Elm
Street lane from the Elm Street lane at the foot of the ramp up to the
expressway, deterred him from trying to route the motorcade under and through
the overpass on Main Street. Such a route would have assigned the drivers in the
motorcade the almost impossible task of making a reverse S-turn in order to
cross over the raised divider to get from the Main Street lane into the Elm
Street lane. (190) However, this question-and-answer process failed to make
clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such
a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway.
The motorcade could have progressed westward through
Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceeded on
Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (191)
(61) George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963, was consulted
by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security planning. (192)
Lumpkin explained that the alternate route, continuing straight on Main through
and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching the Trade Mart on Industrial
Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding Industrial
Boulevard was "filled with winos and broken pavement." (193) Additionally,
Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there would have been no
crowds cn Industrial Boulevard. (194)
(62) Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that he had nothing
to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before November 14, since
only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected for the motorcade at that
time. He did not specify the exact date on which the turn was selected nor did
he identify the person selecting the turn.(195) Sorrels stated that he and
Lawson did drive the entire route together, but did not specify when this
occurred. (196)
(63) Sorrels' Warren Commission exhibit No. 4 suggested that both men drove the
entire route on November 18. (197) It is not certain that both men knew about
the turn earlier than this date.
(B) THE PROTECTIVE RESEARCH SECTION
(64) In making a determination as to whether the advance agents for the Texas
trip, as well as local field agents, were duly informed of any potential
problems that might occur, a thorough review of the function of the Secret
Service Protective Research Section was conducted. The Protective Research
Service (PRS) was meant to function both as repository of information about
threats to the security of Secret Service protectees and as a provider of such
information to agents in all types of assignments. It acquired and made
available information received from its own agents and from other sources. (198)
(65) In 1963, information acquired from any source external to the
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Secret Service, when presented informally to a local Secret Service office, was
relayed by the local office of PRS headquarters in Washington. (199) What was
not set forth in the Warren Commission report was a description of how threat
information was processed and analyzed by PRS and of how the results of its
analysis were communicated to local field offices. Lawson's Warren Commission
testimony suggested that the Washington, D.C. office would ordinarily provide
agents with information about Presidential trips within that city, and that PRS
seldom provided advance agents with threat information before their departure.
But nothing more specific was given.
(66) Roy Kellerman was the special agent in charge of the Texas trip. Since that
assignment required him to travel with Kennedy, (201) he was removed from active
investigation in Dallas concerning evidence that suggested danger to the
President. Nevertheless, his testimony is important due to his account of
breakdowns in Presidential security during the Texas visit.
(67) Secret Service procedure required an inquiry to be made of the PRS about
one week before a trip was assigned. Kellerman testified that he received the
assignment to coordinate the Texas trip on November 17, 1963, and that by custom
the check with PRS was made a week ahead of that date (on or about November 10).
(202) Kellerman was not sure who made the check but believed it was either
Gerald Behn, Chief of the Secret Service White House Detail, Floyd Boring,
Assistant Chief, or one other agent whose name he could not recall. (203) He
further stated that he received no information, and that he considered this
"unusual." (204) By comparison, Winston Lawson, advance agent for Dallas, knew
of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, (205) 9 days before
Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the overall responsibility, (206)
began to undertake basic trip planning.
(68) On November 8, Lawson checked with PRS at the Executive Office Building,
learning that there were no active subjects in the Dallas area and that no JFK
file existed. (207) Further comparison discloses that by November 13, Lawson was
in Dallas and in contact with local Secret Service Agents' Sorrels and John Joe
How]ett, with whom he met concerning protective investigations of local anti-JFK
suspects. (208)
(69) Kellerman also testified about an inquiry in Dallas which was conducted
prior to November 22, in order to locate anti-JFK subjects. When asked
specifically about right-wing individuals, scurrilous literature, and extremist
groups known to be in Dallas, he claimed virtually total ignorance. (209) He
insisted that no one told him anything about an investigation of threat
information submitted to the Secret Service in Dallas on November 21 and 22 by
the FBI. (210) Additionally, Kellerman observed that it was strange that among
five cities in one State and despite the anti-Adlai Stevenson demonstration in
Dallas on October 1963, no information about suspects was forthcoming and
nothing had been given him. (211)
(70) The Secret Service final report for the November 21 trip to Houston
mentioned two active subjects. (212) Both individuals had made specific threats
in Houston. (213) Nevertheless, Kellerman was not questioned about Houston.
(214)
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(71) However, without being questioned about the San Antonio leg of the Texas
strip, Kellerman did recall the receipt of PRS information prior to November 21
regarding anti-Presidential picketing that did in fact occur in San Antonio on
that date. (215)
(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was
in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was
therefore ideally placed to relay information: that provided cause for alarm, he
was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with
maximum protective effort.
(73) As regards SAIC Sorrels' role, both Sorrels and Howlett cooperated with the
special services bureau of the Dallas Police Department, the police in Denton,
Tex., Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald, and the FBI.(216) The FBI was
interested in a Ku Klux Klan suspect from a neighboring area. (217) Additionally
on November 21, Dallas field office FBI agent James Hosty informed the local
Secret Service office of a handbill accusing Kennedy of being a traitor. (218)
(74) The results of these investigations indicated that there were no. known,
periodically checked PRS subjects; that no formerly institutionalized persons
were out on release; and that neither the-DPD nor the Secret Service could link
anyone with the "traitor" handbill. (219)
(75) White House Detail agent Lawson's position was that, the responsibility for
any investigation was that of the PRS or Sorrels, and was not his.(220) Although
Secret Service procedure allowed him to investigate or not, on the basis of
discretion, he did not because he knew that the Service preferred to have the
local agents, who have to work with the police on a daily basis, maintain
liaison and conduct investigations.(221) Secret Service procedure would not,
necessarily require him to receive information solely from the local office. It
could come from Washington PRS as well. In his opinion, the handbill presented
no "direct threat" to John Kennedy. (222)
(76) When interviewed by the committee, Sorrels stated that in November 1963 all
known PRS subjects within the jurisdiction of the Dallas field office were in
mental hospitals. Hence, he was surprised when he heard about the circulation of
the "JFK--Wanted for Treason" handbills. His reaction was to determine who the
printer was, bring him in and interview him. (223) Sorrels stated that the
standard procedure for the White House Detail advance agents and the field
office SAIC was to become familiar with the entire threat profile before
endeavoring to contact the local police department. (224)
(77) When interviewed by the committee, Lawson said that as White House Detail
agent, his duties were limited to shift work and advances, and that in effect,
he was not encouraged to participate in the process of investigating threats at
the local level and referring them back to PRS. (225) Lawson's only recollection
concerning PRS procedures was that when PRS received information about a threat
subject from a local agent or a White House detail agent making an advance. the
subject was given a file number. "In the old days." files consisted of a folder
containing 3 by 5 cards and PRS had the job of coordinating a what were called
"collateral" investigations in the same or an adjacent district. (226) At no
time while he was in Dallas did
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Lawson receive information about threats to the President made in other regions.
(227)
(78) White House Detail SAIC Gerald Behn described to the committee the
procedures in use in PRS at tiffs time. He disclosed the great extent to which
the PRS was the central focus of protective operations. Information from the
field about, active or potential threats to the President were referred to PRS
directly from the local office before they were referred to the Chief of the,
White House Detail. The SAIC of the White House Detail (Behn) would receive
reports from the field only from White House Detail advance agents. He and the
SAIC of the PRS (Robert I. Bouck) would then discuss the matter with the overall
Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James Rowley. (228)
(79) Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson
the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor
could he recall whether any information was distributed prior to the, November
21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker. Behn
specifically stated, as to the availibility to him of information about both
Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." (229) When asked if he
himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he
did "not remember any discussion with any agent? (230)
(C) PHYSICAL PROTECTION ALONG THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(80) In reviewing the performance of the Secret Service, consideration must be
given io the Dallas Police Department also, since the agency defined and
supervised the functions of the police during Kennedy's visit. The activities of
the Secret Service, in collaboration with the DPD, covered many areas of
security apart from PRS activities.
(81) Arrangements made by the Dallas police included provisions for traffic
control to contain the crowd; followup assignments for each officer directing
him, to subsequent stations after the motorcede has passed his post; assigning
at least two officers to each intersection, one to cover traffic primarily the
other to control the crowd: and the stationing of officers at all over- and
underpasses. (231) The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their
joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no followup
instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson as the Dallas advance agent,
make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was
not normal for there to be such written directions. (232)
(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the
landing area. Detectives mingled with the crowd, while officers patrolled both
sides of a chain-link barricade fence. One of the two service roads linking two
general public areas were closed off for motorcade use. The danger from rooftops
was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President
disembarked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was
blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building
as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices
providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would
land.
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(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not
check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances:
Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign
country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years. (234)
(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and Lawson as to
possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings when a
motorcade route has been standard for years. (235) Sorrels stated categorically
to the Warren Commission that Main Street was the best choice for parades in
that it went through the heart of the city, flanked on either side by tall
buildings which maximized the opportunity for large numbers of people to see the
parade. He added that this route was used for a Presidential motorcade in 1936,
when President Roosevelt traversed Main Street from east to west, just as
Kennedy's motorcade would have done had the Women's Building been selected.
(236)
see connally's hsca testimony>>> http://www.whokilledjfk.net/REASON%20FOR%20TEXAS%20TRIP.htm
(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating procedure required
agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the instructions to
watch them.(237) He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch windows was greater
than his own. His duties, while stationed in the lead car immeditely in front of
the Presidential limousine, included looking directly to the rear at the
President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and maintain radio
contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about adherence to schedule.
(238) Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository Building, he was doing
too many things at once to notice it.(239)
(86) Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did not have the same supervisory duties
as Lawson end was in fact freer to observe windows. He recalled observing the
facade of the Depository, but recalled nothing unusual; hence, he did not study
it intently. (240)
(87) Lawson readily admitted that windows posed an added danger in a narrowing
area that required the motorcade to slow down, especially given the President's
"usual" action of standing up to wave.(241)
(88) Lawson further testified that on the morning of November 22, he received a
call from Kellerman in Fort Worth asking about weather conditions in Dallas and
whether the bubble-top on the President's car would be used or not. During that
call, Dawson was told the bubble-top was to be on if it was raining, and off if
it was not.
(89) The final decision in this matter was made by Bill Moyers. Moyers had been
on the phone to Ms. Harris, informing her that the President did not want the
bubble. He told Harris to "get that Goddamned bubble off unless it's pouring
rain."(243) Shortly thereafter the weather began to clear. Ms. Harris approached
Sorrels about the bubble-top and together they had the special agents remove the
glass top.(244)
(90) Dallas Police Department Capt. Perdue W. Lawrence was assigned, on the
basis of his familiarity with escort security, to be in charge of traffic
control for the motorcade. (245) He recalled that he received this assignment on
November 19. (246) His immediate superior was Deputy Chief Lunday, head of the
traffic division, who was in turn commanded by Assistant Chief Char]es Batchelor.(247)
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Lawrence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he
discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At
this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18
motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the Presidential
limousine. (248)
(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting between Chief
Curry, Deputy Chief R.H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on November 19, it was
agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used, "with men on either side of the
motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and
three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks."
(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating meeting held on
November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting. (250) It was here
that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination meeting,
according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs
Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter, Lawrence, and King,
Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David Grant.
The meeting touched on various topics, however, particular emphasis was given to
the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts. (251)
(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the Secret Service
is as follows:
. . . I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not
desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the
crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear. (252)
. . . when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers alongside the
President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers should be back
and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there was any movement at
all where the President was endangered in any way, these officers would be in a
position to gun their motors and get between them and the Presidential car . . .
(253)
(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the November 21
meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit assertion that the Secret
Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a rearward
distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:
Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on either side of the
motorcede immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated
that this was too many. that he thought two motorcycles on either side would be
sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was
instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the
rear. (254)
(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated that the
alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution concerned the number
of motorcycles, not their physical locations in relation to the Presidential
limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence
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versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of
security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.
(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding that the
President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles
surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with conversations
taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were
positioned "just back" of the limousine. (255) Lawson stated to the committee
that he had "no recall of, changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the Dallas
Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21. (256)
(97) There are several instances of failure by the motorcycle officers to adhere
to Lawson's final plan involving two cycles on each side and to the rear of the
Presidential limousine. (257)
(98) Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence testimony as to the
alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had originally been
instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later informed by his sergeant
that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the officers were to fall in
beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10 minutes before the
motorcade left Love Field.(258)
(99) As to actual deployment of the cycles, DPD officers Billy Joe Martin and
Bobby W. Harris were assigned to ride immediately to the left and rear of
Kennedy's limousine.* (259) Martin stated that he rode 5 feet to the left and 6
to 8 feet to the rear of the back bumper. (260) He indicated that he saw Hargis
to his right as he left Houston for Elm.(261)
(100) Hargis, too, rode to the rear left side of the limousine and remained even
with its bumper rather than move "past" the President's car. He testified that
as he turned left onto Elm Street, he was staying right up with Kennedy's car
though crowd density prevented him from staying right up next to it.
Nevertheless, because of the thinning out of the crowd by the triple overpass.
Hargis stated that he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy when he heard the first
shot. (262)
(101) Officers M.L. Baker and Clyde A. Haygood were assigned to the right rear
of the Presidential limousine. (263) The activity of both indicated again a
departure from standard maximum security protection. Haygood, for example,
admitted that although he was stationed to the right rear of Kennedy's car, he
was generally riding several cars back(264) and offered no explanation for this.
Haygood testified before the Warren Commission that he was on Main Street at the
time of the shooting. (265)
(102) Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his sergeant not to
ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to fall in beyond
the press car. (266) Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to place
himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy.(267) Baker was on Houston Street
at the time of the first shot.(268) Haygood and Baker were too far from the
presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no
position
--------------------------------
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to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level incident, yet
the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale
for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (269)
(103) Kellerman who rode in the right front seat of the Presidential limousine
testified before the Warren Commission that there were two motorcycles on each
side of the rear wheel of the President's car. (270)
Nevertheless, he was not asked either about the reason for that positioning or
whether the two motorcycles on the right side were there at the time of the
shooting.
(104) The Secret Service`s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department
motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security
precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the
limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward
deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles
originally intended for use.
(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motor cades during
the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the
Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey
Report for the November 21 visit to Houston stated that in all motorcade
movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional
33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcede and cover the
intersections."(271) There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final
Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential
limousine. (272)
(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November that the President
did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the Presidential
vehicle. (273) If the word "flank"' denotes parallel deployment, and if in fact
such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering
Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan the Secret
Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day
before in Houston. (274)
(107) Besides limiting motorcycle protection, Lawson prevented the Dallas Police
Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the Vice-Presidential car,
a Dallas Police Department squad car containing homicide detectives. For the
Secret Service, the rejection of this Dallas Police Department suggestion was
not unusual in itself. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that-with
the exception of New York City motorcades, it was not the Secret Service's
standard practice to insert a police homicide car into a motorcade. (275) He did
not remember who recommended either its insertion, its proposed placement, or
its cancellation. (276)
(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels and Dallas
Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of
vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be."(277)
Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he "thought we
had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade
behind the Vice President's car."(278) Sorrels spoke up at that point
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and stated that "nothing was discussed on that."(279) Lawson explained that a
car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added
that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of
the motorcade. (280) Curry then structed Deputy Chief Lunday to take care of the
matter. (281)
(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary survey report of
November 19,(282) he made no mention in the sequenced list of motorcade vehicles
of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on November 14 to have been included
and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of November 21. He answered
that "the DPD could have put it [a DPD car] in on their own"; that "he could not
recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was scheduled to be there";
and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car because he didn't know who
decided to include it."(283)
Submitted by:
G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief counsel and Staff Director.
GARY T. CORNWELL,
Deputy Chief Counsel.
BELFORD V. LAWSON III,
Staff Counsel.