Malley was sent to Dallas to stop the DPD from talking to the press. But, Nobody tried to stop the FBI from talking to he press.
FBI
JAMES MALLEY HSCA
Volume III
TESTIMONY
OF JAMES R. MALLEY
Chairman STOKES.
Please stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give
before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. MALLEY. I
do.
Chairman STOKES.
Thank you. You may be seated.
The Chair
recognizes counsel for the Committee, Mr. James McDonald.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Would
you please state your full name for the record?
Mr. MALLEY. My
full name is James R. Malley.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And were you employed by the FBI, Mr. Malley?
Mr. MALLEY. From
1937 until 1971.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And in what capacity did you begin your service with
the FBI?
Mr. MALLEY. As a
special agent.
Mr. McDONALD.
What was your position in November 1963?
Mr. MALLEY. I
had been designated as inspector at the time and was working as an assistant or
No. 1 man, you might say, to Assistant Director Alex Rosen, in charge of the
General Investigative Division.
Mr. McDONALD.
What did your duties entail?
Mr. MALLEY. My
actual duties were very broad. I was supposed to try to keep track of everything
going on in the General Investigative Division, handle routine matters I did not
feel was necessary to send into the Assistant Director, also see all mail that
was going to him and, in general, to double check on things that were going on
in four different sections in the Bureau's General Investigative Division.
Page
463
463
Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, let me direct your attention to November 22, 1963. You were employed
then as the inspector for Mr. Rosen?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is right.
Mr. McDONALD.
That was a Friday. Were you working that day?
Mr. MALLEY. I
was working that day.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And when did you learn of the assassination of President Kennedy?
Mr. MALLEY. Returning from lunch I turned on a radio that was available
while I was sitting in Mr. Rosen's office in his absence. I turned on the radio
to catch, I believe it was the 12:30 news. That was the first time I learned
anything about it.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And what did you do in an official capacity?
Mr. MALLEY.
Before I had any opportunities to do anything, and I can't recall the exact
time, I was contacted by Associate Director Al
Chairman STOKES.
Excuse me just a moment. We are having a little difficulty hearing you. Mr.
Malley, if you can put that mike a little closer.
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think you want me to talk louder; you merely want it a little closer?
Chairman STOKES.
Right. Thank you very much.
Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Belmont was in the same position that everyone else was in. He knew, I knew,
that we had no actual jurisdiction. He did indicate to me that he had been in
touch with Mr. Shanklin, who was the Special Agent in charge of Dallas, and that
he would be back in touch with me as soon as there was more definite information
available. That was about it for the time being.
Later in the
day, and I presume it must have been close to 3 o'clock, I was either told be
telephone or asked to come down to Belmont's office, I cannot recall which, at
which time he informed me that the General Investigative Division would be
handling the assassination case of President Kennedy.
Following that,
and still not having many details to go on, I started lining up personnel that
would be available on a round-the clock basis to handle whatever might develop.
Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any specific instructions as to what your role would be?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
at that time.
Mr. McDONALD.
And your immediate supervisor was Mr. Rosen?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. McDONALD.
Was he present that day?
Mr. MALLEY. He
was not. He was scheduled to go on annual leave that morning and instead of
taking off as he had planned to leave the city, he was ill and did not leave the
city at all. He eventually came back to the office sometime the following week.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you have any meetings with Mr. Hoover on that day?
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not.
Mr. McDONALD.
What were the next set of instructions you received on Friday afternoon?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I received any instructions on that particular afternoon. In
reading this statement, Mr. Blakey
Page
464
464
has
mentioned that there was a lot of confusion. There was. Because up until around
7 o'clock, if my memory is correct, there was a definite uncertainty as to what
jurisdiction the Bureau had.
As I understand
it, Belmont had instructed the Dallas office to be certain that they stayed in a
position where they would know exactly what was going on and what the Dallas
police were doing so that possibly nothing would be interfered with in the way
of evidence and nothing lost.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Did there come a time when you proceeded to go to
Mr. MALLEY.
There was. On Sunday, after the shooting of Ruby, I am sorry, of Oswald by Ruby,
I heard it on television. I had been at the office all morning and had just gone
home around 12 o'clock. My wife heard it on television while I was changing
clothes, mentioned there was going to be a rerun. I listened to that and
immediately dressed and started back to the office and arrived around 2 o'clock.
When I arrived
there, Courtney Evans was sitting in Mr. Belmont's office, who had not had time
to get to the office yet. He was talking to Mr. Hoover. Following that call I
was told that I was on my way to
Mr. McDONALD.
And who is Courtney Evans?
Mr. MALLEY. Mr.
Evans at that time was an Assistant Director in charge of the Special
Investigative Division.
Mr. McDONALD.
Were you given any instructions on going to
Mr. MALLEY.
There was no time for instructions. I was told to get the first plane that I
could and Evans commented that undoubtedly by the time you arrive in
Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you receive any instructions when you got to
Mr. MALLEY. I did. As I recall, I arrived in the
Mr. MCDONALD.
Did Mr. Belmont relate to you anything specific as far as what President Johnson
wished to have told to these individuals?
Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my recollection, it was simply a statement
that the President was extremely unhappy and desired that the individuals be
requested to stop talking about the assassination.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And did you in fact relay those instructions?
Mr. MALLEY. As
soon as I was able to contact each one of them by telephone I did so. I was
unable to reach the District Attorney for some time because about 2 minutes
before an agent tried to
Page
465
465
reach
him in his office, he had left to appear on television, and again for some time
related different things that he felt were important to the assassination.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, tell us what happened upon your arrival in
Mr. MALLEY. In
answering you truthfully I couldn't tell you what the status was. I had so many
telephone calls when I arrived there that I had to take care of that it was some
time before I had a chance to even ask questions.
Shortly after
contacting the three individuals that I have mentioned to you, I had a telephone
call from Mr. Belmont telling me that a detailed memorandum setting forth all
information that was known concerning the assassination was to be prepared and
be back in
It was mentioned
that two men from
Mr. McDONALD.
Who was directing the investigation in
Mr. MALLEY. It
was under the overall direction of the SAC, Gordon Shanklin.
Mr. McDONALD.
What role did you play?
Mr. MALLEY. I
was supposed to oversee the entire thing, to make sure that the Bureau's
interests were properly looked after, to make sure that there were no
unnecessary delays on anything, and that everything possible was done to find
out exactly what the correct facts were.
Mr. MCDONALD.
You had been working on the case over the weekend prior to going to
Mr. MALLEY. I
had been in the office a great deal. When you say working on it, I saw a great
many teletypes, a lot of other information, files were being checked in
Washington for any possible helpful information there, and I couldn't tell you
right now exactly what I did over that weekend before I left for Dallas.
Mr. MCDONALD. Did you in fact convey President Johnson's instructions to
each of the three men you mentioned?
Mr. MALLEY. I
did.
Mr. McDONALD.
What was their reaction?
Mr. MALLEY. The
Chief of Police was very cordial, said he would be glad to do it but he didn't
know how to go about it, and if my memory serves me correctly, I suggested that
he had no problem, all he had to do was either say he had no comment to make or
the matter is under investigation and I do not care to discuss it.
The Sheriff was
extremely cordial and said he didn't recall that he had been making many
comments but we would see that he didn't if he had.
Page
466
466
In speaking with
Henry Wade it was a little bit different story. He informed me that he had been
a former FBI agent, which I was well aware of, that he had been district
attorney for a number of years, that he felt that he was qualified to decide
what statements he could make and what ones he should not make.
If I remember
correctly, I said, you are certainly entitled to your opinion but in this
instance the President of the
Mr. McDONALD.
Now, you have testified you arrived in
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. MCDONALD.
When you arrived at the
Mr. MALLEY. I
just answered you, Mr. McDonald; from the time I got there I had so many things
to do I would have no idea. It was a number of hours after I was there that I
was even able to start asking questions.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to your going to
Mr. MALLEY. I
hadn't formed any ideas of any kind. The President had been shot on Friday;
Oswald was shot on Sunday; it was much too early to form any ideas.
Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to read to you from a memorandum
that was prepared by Walter Jenkins to President Johnson--Mr. Blakey also
referred to it in his narration--the memorandum reflecting a phone call with J.
Edgar Hoover, and the memorandum is dated November 24, 1963, two days after the
assassination. The pertinent paragraph quoting Mr. Hoover states: "The
thing that I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something
issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."
What would your
comments be on that? We are talking about two days after the assassination. This
is probably being written contemporaneously with your arriving in
Mr. MALLEY. Not
having talked to Mr. Hoover, I certainly am not in a position to say what was
going on in his mind. I can give you my interpretation of what he would have
meant by it. That would simply mean that because of such a crime of that
magnitude, he was talking to either the President or Jenkins, whichever it was,
saying that the public needs to be settled down.
As far as saying that Oswald
is the man and nobody else, I don't think you can take that interpretation from
such a one sentence remark such as that.
Mr. MCDONALD. I
am looking at a memo dated November 26, 1963, from Mr. Evans to Mr. Belmont and
it is titled "The Assassination of President Kennedy," and it
says--this is dated 4 days later, "From the facts disclosed in our
investigation, there is no question that we can submit in our report convincing
evidence, beyond any doubt, showing Oswald was the man who killed President
Kennedy."
Then at the
bottom of this page there is handwriting, which has been identified as Mr.
Hoover's. And in the last line Mr. Evans is
Page
467
467
making
reference that a case of this magnitude cannot be fully investigated in a week's
time. And Mr. Hoover has written underneath, "just how long do you estimate
it will take."
Then under that
he went on to write, "it seems to me we have the basic facts now."
Again, we are 4
days after the assassination. You were in
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I was asked by anyone how long it was going to take. If I had
been I would have told them I had no idea because of the magnitude of what
needed to be done in
If I recall
correctly, it was either Tuesday or Wednesday following the assassination that I
was asked if we had sufficient personnel, and I requested that 40 more agents
along with clerical help, stenographic help, be sent into Dallas to assist those
who were already there. So certainly I did not feel it was going to be completed
within any week.
Mr. McDONALD.
You were asking for additional agent personnel, and as reflected in these memos,
at the top level, at least there was an opinion being formed that the case
essentially was wrapped up.
Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with you because I don't know what they were doing in
Mr. McDONALD. I will quote one more memorandum to you, and that is dated
29 November 1963, which is found in the Senate Intelligence Committee's, the
Church Committee's, Book 5 Report on page 34. In it, the memorandum is by Mr.
Hoover, recounting a telephone conversation he had that day with President
Johnson. And he says, "I advised the President that we hoped to have the
investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of
the week, as another angle had developed. Again we are getting an example of at
the top level the case being in a sense completed.
Now, again, from
your
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, again, I say that when people say that they hoped to have it completed and
so on, I don't think for a minute they were talking about having every facet
fully and exhaustively investigated. I think what they are saying is that, based
on the information that was available at that time, the essential facts of the
investigation had been developed. It doesn't mean it was over by any means.
Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Chairman, the memorandums that I have just quoted from have been marked JFK
exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459. I move that they be received into the record
at this time.
Chairman STOKES.
Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The above
marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459 follow:]
Page
468
468
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457
Page
469
469
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457 cont.
Page
470
470
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457 cont.
Page
471
471
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457 cont.
Page
472
472
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457 cont.
Page
473
473
JFK
EXHIBIT F-457 cont.
Page
474
474
JFK
EXHIBIT F-458
Page
475
475
JFK
EXHIBIT F-458 cont.
Page
476
476
JFK
EXHIBIT F-459
Page
477
477
Mr. MCDONALD. When you were in
Mr. MALLEY. That
existed from the minute it happened. I can't say that I saw a memorandum to this
effect or a memorandum to that effect or a telephone call, but I do know that it
was on everybody's mind, was there somebody else involved. It was an essential
part of the investigation to find out.
Mr. MCDONALD.
These discussions of conspiracy, were they active in the
Mr. MALLEY. You
are asking me a question that dates back 15 years ago and I am not in a position
to truthfully answer you and say this happened or that happened in the way of
some conversation I had.
Mr. McDONALD. In
light of Evans memo to Belmont with Mr. Hoover's writing, his handwriting,
saying essentially we have got it all wrapped up, in your opinion, would that
affect the investigation ongoing in the field, if Mr. Hoover was saying that he
felt the investigation was essentially closed? Would that have an effect, in
your opinion, on the way the Bureau handled the conspiracy aspects to the case?
Mr. MALLEY. To
start off, I was handling 90 percent of the telephone calls between Washington
and Dallas after I arrived, there may be a higher percentage. I know that I
never received any comments from Belmont, the Director, or anyone else in
Mr. McDONALD.
You stated that you arrived in
Mr. MALLEY.
Around 7:30 to 8 o'clock on Sunday night.
Mr. MCDONALD. Did this event have any effect on the Bureau's relationship
with the Dallas Police Department?
Mr. MALLEY. I do
not recall hearing of any friction that developed while I was in
Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall after the shooting of Oswald, did you yourself participate in any
discussions as to the possibility of whether it was a related event, directly
related to the murder of the President. In other words, if it involved a larger
conspiracy, the possibility of a larger conspiracy?
Mr. MALLEY. Are
you refering to other personnel in the
Mr. MCDONALD.
Either in the
Mr. MALLEY. You
gentlemen have had access to the file. I think you will find that teletype, if
my memory is accurate, sent by the people at the seat of Government telling the
Dallas office to not overlook the possibility and check thoroughly to see
whether it could have been any police involvement in the shooting of Oswald by
Ruby.
Page
478
478
Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, I am going to direct your attention to an organizational chart that
we have prepared that I showed you before the hearing. If the clerk could
display the organizational chart for us. It has been designated JFK exhibit
F-456. If you would walk over to the easel we have a clip-on microphone. If you
would give us a rundown of the organizational structure in the Bureau at the
time of the assassination.
[JFK exhibit
F-456 was received into the record.]
JFK
EXHIBIT F-456
Page
479
479
Mr. MALLEY. In
1963, at the time of the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover, as you heard
previously, was the Director. The Associate Director was
Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes. If you would stand on the other side of the easel.
Mr.
MALLEY. Be glad to either way.
Mr. McDONALD.
Thank you.
Mr. MALLEY.
Under Mr. Belmont was the Domestic Intelligence Division, whose Director was
William C. Sullivan; the General Investigative Division, whose Assistant
Director was Al Rosen, and a Laboratory and Special Investigative Division, and
I am not going to identify those people unless you want me to.
Mr. McDONALD.
No, that is fine.
Mr. MALLEY. I
failed to mention that under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover was an Inspection
Division whose Director at that time was Mr. James Gale. Under the Domestic
Intelligence you had an inspector, No. 1 man in charge, Joseph A. Sizoo, another
inspector, No. 2 man, Donald E. Moore, the Espionage Section under a section
chief by the name of William A. Branigan, and there were a number of individual
agent-supervisors who were assigned to this case. Do you want their names
mentioned?
Mr.
McDONALD. Not at this time, thank you.
Mr. MALLEY. In
the General Investigative Division, I happened to be the No. 1 man, and as you
heard, I was assigned to handle liaison with the, oh, you haven't heard yet, I
was assigned to handle liaison with the Warren Commission.
There was also a
criminal section, whose section chief was James Hanley. An individual by the
name of Henry Schutz was a unit chief, under which was bank robberies and a
number of other rather important criminal investigations, and there were two
individuals that did work quite a bit on this particular case, by the name of
Richard Rogge and Fletcher Thompson.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, regarding Rogge and Thompson, you just said that they worked closely
with you on the case.
Mr. MALLEY. They
did in the early stages. They were the two individuals who were sent to Dallas
to write the first two memorandums that I told you about, and we also had a
civil rights section, which was under a section chief by the name of Clement
McGowan. Does that cover what you have?
Mr. MCDONALD.
That is fine, thank you.
Mr. Malley, in
the investigation of the assassination how did the various divisions participate
in the case?
First of all,
which was the primary division to run the case, the assassination case, and who
was in charge of that investigation?
Mr. MALLEY. As
far as the actual assassination is concerned, it was definitely in the General
Investigative Division. When you say who is responsible, are you referring to
what section it was being handled and what supervisor was primarily responsible?
Mr. MCDONALD.
Which person was primarily responsible at the top to begin with?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, because of what happened when I got back from
Page
480
480
Mr. MCDONALD.
What happened when you got back from
Mr.
MALLEY. Well, I had been told before I left Dallas, sometime in the afternoon,
that the Warren Commission had been established, they would be functioning
almost immediately, and that I was to return to Washington on the first plane
that I could get out of Dallas. I came back that night, and the next morning I
had a little note from the Director that I was to get in touch with Mr. J. Lee
Rankin as soon as possible, with the telephone number on it. I didn't succeed
for a day or two but I did make an effort continuously for the next days until I
got it.
I then
went up to see him and introduced myself. We had a rather long chat about things
in general but nothing concerning any real developments because neither one of
us were in a position to talk about it.
Mr. MCDONALD. On
what date was this again?
Mr. MALLEY.
Strictly from memory, I think I returned from
Mr. EDGAR. Would
the counsel yield?
Mr. McDONALD.
Yes.
Mr. EDGAR. Would
the witness talk into the microphone?
Mr. MALLEY. I am
sorry, beg your pardon.
Mr. MCDONALD. So
you stated that you returned from
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. MCDONALD.
What duties were you to do? What were your duties going to be?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, very generally, I was to handle all contacts by telephone or in person
with the
Mr. MCDONALD.
Now, prior to December 12, the Bureau released its report on the assassination?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes,
sir.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Did you play a role in the preparation of that report?
Mr. MALLEY. In
that report I have to say no. I told you that two memorandums were prepared in
Mr. McDONALD.
When you refer to memorandum you are referring to the report?
Mr. MALLEY. I am
not. I am referring to a piece of paper similar to this, consisting of around 15
pages, I believe, on Mr. Ruby, I mean on the assassination of President Kennedy
and around 8 or 9 on the shooting of Oswald by Ruby.
Page
481
481
Mr. McDONALD.
Well, the report came out in early 1963, prior to the 12th, and the report said
in essence that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President alone.
Do you know why
this report was put out so rapidly?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can only tell you that based on what I was told in
Mr.
MCDONALD. They wanted to.
Mr. MALLEY. It
was strictly on the basis of letting the President, the Attorney General and a
few others that they felt needed to know immediately what the facts were as of
that time.
It was my
understanding that information was going to be disseminated long before it was.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Were you aware--
Mr. MALLEY. I do not know what occurred in
Mr. McDONALD.
Prior to your return to
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't remember whether 1 ever heard that there was a possibility of the
I have no way of
thinking back and recalling whether I did or didn't.
Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, as you knew, what the Bureau's reaction to the formation of such
a commission was?
Mr. MALLEY. I
never heard of anything one way or the other until you showed me a memorandum on
it. The last time I talked to you I might have indicated to you the Director was
unhappy. I don't interpret that memo that way.
Mr. McDONALD.
So, it is your testimony you have no personal knowledge of what the Bureau's
reaction, specifically Mr. Hoover s, was to the creation of the
Mr.
MALLEY. I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his office
after I returned from
Mr. McDONALD.
Mr. Malley, in the overall investigation of the assassination, what was the
interaction between the various divisions in the Bureau, specifically general
investigative and domestic intelligence?
Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my knowledge, there was complete cooperation between all the various
people working on the assassination or the domestic intelligence aspect, and in
the civil rights angle.
Mr.
McDONALD. What was your relationship with William Sullivan, the Director of
Domestic Intelligence?
Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to this individual case?
Page
482
482
Mr. MCDONALD.
Yes.
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think I had very many conversations with Sullivan on this particular case.
I usually dealt with the section chief, Mr. Brannigan, or the individual
supervisor.
Mr. MCDONALD.
What was the domestic intelligence section, what were they doing regarding the
assassination case?
Mr. MALLEY. As
you Saw, they had five or six supervisors. To go back and tell you exactly what
they were doing at this time, I cannot. I do know that they all had specific
assignments in it and one of the fundamentals, again, was to prove or disprove
whether there was any possibility that they could come up with of a conspiracy.
It was also to develop all aspects of Oswald's personal life, where he had been
from the time he returned from
Mr. MCDONALD.
And this division handled the conspiracy aspect within that division?
Mr. MALLEY.
There, again, it is difficult to say that they were the only ones doing it. They
were primarily, because of their knowledge with various nationality groups, et
cetera, and the fact they were looking into his entire personal life, they would
have been in a better position to come across something than somebody handling
criminal aspects.
Mr. MCDONALD.
You were in the General Investigative Division?
Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Would you have any direct knowledge or supervision over what was being done in
the Domestic Intelligence Division as far as the assassination was concerned,
considering your role as liaison with the Warren Commission?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes,
I would, in that every report that was sent to the
Mr. MCDONALD.
When you say Division 5, what are you referring to?
Mr. MALLEY.
That's the Domestic Intelligence Division, I beg your pardon. Likewise, any
teletypes that came to them, whether it seemed to refer to our work or not,
teletypes were sent to the General Investigative Division for information so if
there was anything that could be tied in, they could do it.
Mr. MCDONALD. Well, I am going to refer to the book 5 of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, the Church committee report, where they are speaking of
a supervisor in Domestic Intelligence Division who was reported to be the
leading Cuban expert within the Bureau at that time, and he testified before the
Church committee that he was never informed--first of all, he never even knew of
any CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro. And this supervisor
testified before that committee that he had no recollection of any Bureau
investigation of Cuban involvement in
Page
483
483
the
Kennedy assassination. He was asked a question: "Were there ever any
meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or not the
Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?"
And he answered,
"No; I don't recall. I would say no."
And they
questioned, "Do you know if that possibility was investigated?"
Answer:
"Well I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't.
Question:
"Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda or instructions that
Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any
Cuban involvement in
the assassination
of President Kennedy?"
And he answered,
"There were no such communications, to my knowledge, ever sent out from
headquarters."
And they asked
him: "If they were sent out, in all likelihood, would you have known about
it?" And he said, "Yes."
Now, this was
the investigations being conducted, as you say, in Division 5, the Domestic
Intelligence, and this is the leading Cuban expert in the Bureau at the time
saying that during the assassination investigation, he wasn't even contacted to
consider this aspect.
As liaison to
the
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't know how good his memory was. I do know that their division had the
responsibility for keeping their own people aware of what was going on and if he
didn't know what was going on in that section, I would say somebody was remiss.
Mr. MCDONALD. I
am sorry.
Mr. MALLEY.
Somebody was remiss in not keeping him aware. I can't possibly answer what went
on over in their division on a day-to-day basis. You know, and I know that there
was an investigation concerning the possibility of Cuban involvement, if you
reviewed the material. It would be impossible for me to think that he wasn't
aware of it.
Mr. MCDONALD. Is
it your testimony the investigation would have been conducted by Division 5,
Mr. MALLEY. That
part of it.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And we have this statement given in 1976 that the leading Cuban specialist
wasn't involved.
Mr. MALLEY.
That's his statement. I can't answer for him.
Mr. MCDONALD.
OK.
Turning now to
the Special Investigative Division that you referred to on the chart, what was
that division's responsibility?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think they had any specific assignment. Courtney Evans, at that time, as I
mentioned, was an Assistant Director and he was handling liaison with the
Department, primarily with Robert Kennedy and other top officials of the
Department.
Mr. McDONALD.
Was part of their jurisdiction organized crime?
Mr. MALLEY. To
the best of my memory, yes.
Mr. McDONALD.
Can you recall, after the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, what consideration was
given at that point to the possibility of organized crime involvement, either in
the Ruby shooting of Oswald or the overall assassination of the President?
Page
484
484
Let me ask one
question further before you answer that. After Ruby shot Oswald, how long did it
take the Bureau to learn about Jack Ruby himself, his background, his
associates, the kind of person he was?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, from the standpoint of the type of person he was, I am sure that within an
hour or so before we ever got near the investigation, the Bureau was probably
well aware of the fact that he was running a night club which amounted to sort
of a striptease place. And beyond that, I am not able to tell you when we really
developed his full background data except that we did start so-called civil
rights investigation on the basis that he had been shot while in custody of the
police department, and that did give us the basis for jurisdiction.
Mr. MCDONALD.
So, this investigation was handled by the General Investigative Civil Rights
Division?
Mr. MALLEY.
General Investigative Division in the Civil Rights Section.
Mr. McDONALD.
What consideration was being given at the time to the possibility of Jack Ruby
being involved with organized crime in the commission of either of the
shootings?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't tell you what they were doing back in
Mr. MCDONALD. As
you pointed out, Courtney Evans was the Assistant Director of that division and
he has appeared before this committee in deposition and interview. When he was
asked whether his division had ever been asked to render assistance in the
investigation of Jack Ruby or any organized crime aspects of the case, he said
to us, I am quoting from an interview, "They sure didn't come to me. I know
they sure didn't come to me. We had no part in that that I can recall."
This committee,
in our look at this case, spoke to Mr. Charles Stanley. Do you know who he is?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes;
I do.
Mr. MCDONALD. He
was Evans' principal assistant in 1963. And he was asked whether that division
was ever asked to participate in the investigation of the assassination. And he
told us:
I don't think we
had one thing to do with it. To my knowledge, we were never brought in on that.
I don't recall a thing coming through our division on Ruby or Oswald.
And then we
spoke to Jack Danahey; do you know who he is?
Mr.
MALLEY. I believe he was working in
Mr. MCDONALD. In
1963, he was the assistant special agent in charge in your
Page
485
485
And lastly, we
spoke to Mr. Al Staffeld, who is another official in the organized crime section
and he was asked essentially the same question and he gave essentially the same
answer, that he had no recollection of any involvement or any information or
request for assistance coming to that division by those handling the
assassination case.
With that in
mind, could you explain to us how the General Investigative Division would have
been handling any organized crime aspects, the possibilities, if there were
some, to the assassination?
Mr. MALLEY. As
briefly as I can, if any name showed up either in the investigation of the
assassination of President Kennedy or in the investigation being conducted by
the civil rights section of the shooting of Oswald, there is no question in my
mind, and you would have to doublecheck with the supervisors, but if a criminal
figure of any known standing had been mentioned or any criminal figure that had
a lot of information in the files on him, I don't have any doubt they would have
discussed it with the individual supervisors down in the organized crime unit.
That would not
necessarily have been called to the attention of either Mr. Stanley or Mr.
Evans, and it might not even have been called to the attention of Staffeld. If
there was any reason to send any memorandum or letters or anything else through
them to be initialed by that division, it certainly would have been done.
I do know that
in the civil section--civil rights section--I was told they were in touch with
him many times on individual names that came up in connection with possible
criminal figures.
Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, after the creation of the Warren Commission,
first of all, what was the Bureau's relationship to the Commission, and you
being the one essentially in the middle, how would you categorize the
relationship?
Mr. MALLEY.
Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just
strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you,
we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get
them from you.
There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. At least, it
didn't rub off on me if there was.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Prior to the creation of the Commission, the Bureau was handling the case on its
own. The directives were coming out from Washington or Dallas, or wherever, to
cover leads. Did this change after the
Mr. MALLEY. Not
for quite a long, long time. After the Warren Commission had had an opportunity
to review the large number of reports that had been sent to them, they
eventually started asking a few questions and in many instances, their questions
were answered by saying, if you will look at the report of so and so on a
certain page, the information is there and you haven't located it yet. In a few
instances, they sent us letters or made telephone calls and said we have checked
into this aspect; we feel that maybe it would be well to conduct a little
further investigation and they would outline what they wanted.
As far as
directing the investigation, they did not attempt to take over what we were
doing. We continued to do our own investigation
Page
486
486
on
everything we thought was necessary the entire time that they were in existence
and up until the time I retired in 1971.
Mr. MCDONALD.
And you are saying that the Bureau continued its own investigation, you did not
respond only to leads from the
Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I'm saying. We did our own work. Whenever they had any questions, we
tried to answer them for them. They did not give us directives, you do this, you
do that, you do this. When they had specific items they wanted to check on, they
did tell us.
Mr. MCDONALD.
You stated you were in
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say I was told before I got back from
Mr. MCDONALD. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover was involved in
the, I guess we could say, the blocking of the first choice for the Warren
Commission general counsel, a man by the name of Warren Olney. Were you aware of
that situation?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I was ever told that.
Mr. McDONALD.
Did you learn of it subsequently?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't remember it. If I did know it, I don't remember it now.
Mr. McDONALD.
One of the other items that has come up over the years regarding the
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I was ever told. It seems to me it would be a normal procedure
if you were dealing with a large number of staff members and committee members,
that it would be well to know exactly what was transpiring on each one, from
your standpoint of your dealings with him.
If one of them
said this on a certain date, contradicted himself on another date, certainly, it
would be well to have had a record of what was going on. So, when you refer to a
file, a dossier on each one, I can well understand why they might have had such
a thing.
Mr. MCDONALD.
Mr. Malley, I just have one further question. And that is with the benefit of
hindsight of 15 years and looking back on what went on, in your opinion, was the
overall investigation of both the assassination of the President and the murder
of Lee Harvey Oswald handled properly?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I might turn that around just a little bit and say you have had the
benefit of the Church Committee investigations, you have had the benefit of the
Page
487
487
Mr. MCDONALD.
Well, we appreciate you trying to turn the table on us--but, we are here to ask
you questions.
Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not trying to turn the tables. I am just asking you what you feel we did
wrong and if I am not entitled to that, well, that's that.
Mr. MCDONALD. I
am not here to answer questions. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I have no further
questions.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Counsel. The procedure at this point will be
that the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after which we
will then operate under the 5-minute rule.
Mr. Malley, one
thing I would appreciate you clearing up for me that you just stated to Counsel
for the committee, do I understand you to say that the Commission did their work
and we did ours; is that your statement?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Chairman STOKES.
And by that, what do you mean?
Mr. MALLEY. I
meant, Mr. Stokes, exactly what I said, in that we were not asked to be
leg-runners or do every little thing that they might think of. If they did have
something to come up, we did it. We were operating independently on our own
investigation, but definitely under instructions from Mr. Hoover that if they
needed any clarification or had any requests to make of us, that we carry them
out fully.
Chairman STOKES.
Then, for further clarification, anyone having the understanding that in terms
of the Commission's investigation that was being directed by them and the FBI
was pursuing leads under their direction, that would not be true; is that right?
Mr. MALLEY. It
would be true if they asked us. But the numbers of requests they made was
minimum. They were reviewing reports, anything else that we sent to them and
proceeding on their own to evaluate it and whenever they made a request, we did
do it. You can say that we are an investigative arm when they needed us. But
beyond that, we were not under their direction.
Chairman STOKES. So, the basic investigation was being completed under
the total direction, then, of the FBI itself?.
Mr. MALLEY.
That's right.
Chairman STOKES.
In terms of your responsibilities, what was your relationship with Assistant
Director William Sullivan?
Mr. MALLEY. As I
mentioned awhile ago, and I don't know whether you understood me, I said I do
not recall very many conversations that I had with Sullivan in connection with
the assassination and the Oswald case. I did have direct communication with
other people in his division.
Chairman STOKES.
You know, of course, that Assistant Director Sullivan is now deceased?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes.
Chairman STOKES.
Let me read to you some excerpts from an interview with former Assistant
Director Sullivan that was conducted by another House committee in 1975 after
which I will ask for your comment.
In the
interview, Mr. Sullivan was asked to recall Director Hoover's relationship to
the
Page
488
488
"did
not like to see the
In this same
interview, Mr. Sullivan went on further and said this, and I again quote
"From what I saw and what I heard, what I understood, he, Mr. Hoover, was
not pleased about the creation of the
Having heard
this statement by Mr. Sullivan, would you concur in his observations on this
point?
Mr. MALLEY. I
would not, because I have no knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about
when he says the Director was opposed to the creation and so on. The only
comment I have heard along that line is the one that Mr. McDonald read awhile
ago based on the telephone conversation with the White House. And I never
personally heard him object to the
Chairman STOKES.
In this same interview, Mr. Malley, Mr. Sullivan was asked whether he had seen
anything in the files to indicate that Oswald had any relationship to the CIA.
In response to this question, Mr. Sullivan answered in a rather ambiguous
manner, and I quote his testimony at that point:
"No
I think that has been discussed. I think there may be something on that,
but you asked me if I had seen anything. I don't recall having seen anything
like that, but I think there is some thing on that point. Whether it is valid or
not I don't know It rings a bell in my mind."
Now, it would
seem that Director Sullivan was not giving a clearly negative response to that
type of a question. And I wonder, from your investigation of this matter,
whether you would make some comment with reference to that point.
Mr. MALLEY. I am
not trying to avoid your question. I have difficulty answering it because when I
was before the Church Committee, I was asked about some CIA material that had
allegedly been delivered to the Bureau and that it had not been furnished by the
Bureau to the Warren Commission.
The material
they referred to me, I had no recollection of it at the time. Subsequently, I
was shown a letter which was sent on November 23d to the President--it may have
gone to the Attorney General--where it referred to a source in Mexico giving
some information which related to the fact that Oswald had been in Mexico and
had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy.
I do not know
for sure. I can only assume where it came from. But I had no knowledge of it at
the time I was before the Church Committee, that I can recall. Whether Mr.
Sullivan had knowledge, he is the only one who could answer the question, or
maybe somebody in his division who worked with him. I don't know what Mr.
Sullivan did as far as any materials such as this.
Chairman STOKES.
On that specific point, that is as much light you can shed on that point?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is all I know about it.
Page
489
489
Chairman STOKES.
Let me now make reference to another segment of the same interview with
Assistant Director Sullivan in 1975. This segment relates to what Mr. Sullivan
perceived as gaps in the Bureau's investigation into the possibility of whether
Lee Oswald was involved with others in the assassination.
Keeping in mind
that Mr. Sullivan was the man in charge of directing the Bureau's investigation
of any conspiracy aspects of the case, let me refer to these further comments by
him.
"To my
recollection, we never developed any conclusive evidence that would tie or bind
Mr. Oswald to any foreign nation or to the instructions of any foreign nation
directly or indirectly in connection with the assassination of President
Kennedy. Now, there are gaps here that I would like to make very clear. These
gaps certainly bothered the men in my division and they bothered me. And I am
sure they bothered some of the men in the
"For
example, there is a gap as to what transpired when Mr. Oswald was in
From your own
investigation, did you find the same or similar gaps?
Mr. MALLEY. If
my memory is correct, another Government agency, who had access to information
about Oswald's activities in Russia, furnished to the Warren Commission--my
memory is not good enough to tell you that I had access to every word of it--but
I would presume if they furnished it to the Warren Commission, it was given to
us. That would have been given to the Domestic Intelligence Division inasmuch as
it related to their activities, rather than the actual assassination.
Chairman STOKES.
What about Mr. Sullivan's comment that there were other men in the division who
found such gaps disturbing.
Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing I can tell you, and I repeat what I have said before, there was very,
very close coordination between the men, and I say that regardless of what Mr.
Sullivan may have said because I know it of my knowledge.
And if there
were any such gaps in anyone's mind, they certainly had an obligation to discuss
it with the men in both divisions to see to it that they were cleared up, if
possible.
Chairman STOKES.
You are saying, then that no one discussed those gaps with you?
Mr. MALLEY. No.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, let me again quote Mr. Sullivan during the
course of interview. He says, "It is my understanding from conversations on
this subject, that he,
And then when
asked if he believed that the Dallas FBI's secret destruction of a letter from
Lee Harvey Oswald could have been one of the things that Mr. Hoover was afraid
the Warren Commission might uncover, Mr. Sullivan further stated as follows, and
I quote him again: "Well, that could be, but it didn't happen to come
Page
490
490
to
my mind when you raised the question. I do think, though, and this is only an
opinion, I do think that what he had in mind went beyond that. If he did have
that in mind, it went to something more basic, that we might have failed to
discover a relationship between Oswald and the Cubans, and if we had failed to
discover a relationship between the two and the Warren Commission did, then we
would, indeed, as a Bureau be in serious trouble."
Can we ask for
your reaction to this point brought up by Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. MALLEY. With
regard to the first part, where he is saying the Director was opposed to this,
that and the other thing, I don't know if it was the first day I was back in
Washington or the second, Mr. Hoover called for Belmont, his associate director,
and myself, to come to his office. We were told in very firm conversation by the
Director that we were to exhaustively pursue every aspect of any lead that
developed, no matter how small it appeared to be, and to leave nothing to doubt.
If that sounds
like the Director, who was trying to short-circuit the investigation, I can't
understand plain English. I think that is a very, very important thing for you
gentlemen to understand, that where I was concerned, Mr. Hoover never said
anything except go forward to the nth degree on anything that comes to your
attention.
Where Mr.
Sullivan gets his information, I cannot tell you. He is dead and I am not going
to make any statements that I can't back up personally.
Chairman
STOKES. Mr. Malley, we have learned in the years since the assassination that
Director Hoover secretly disciplined 17 Bureau officials for what he regarded as
mistakes and deficiencies in their pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey
Oswald.
The fact that
these Bureau officials were punished for these deficiencies in the Oswald
investigation was never revealed to the
And I quote him:
"I suggested that the disciplinary action was arbitrary but calculated
rather than capricious. It was calculated, it was thought out as a means of Mr.
Hoover protecting himself against any indictment that he was at fault in the
assassination of President Kennedy. That the FBI, under his direction, had made
mistakes and, therefore, he was culpable and apparently his reasoning, as we
interpreted it at the time, was that if he ordered disciplinary transfers and
letters of censure to a large number of men and then if he was charged with
culpability in the assassination of President Kennedy, he could say these men
are the ones responsible, and I have already taken disciplinary action against
them."
Do you believe
that this was true?
Mr. MALLEY.
Again, I don't know where Mr. Sullivan got his information. I know that I was
not made aware nor did I ever see the memorandum which you are referring to
concerning the disciplinary action. I did hear that some had been recommended,
but I
Page
491
491
was
never made aware of what went on. I think you would have to talk to somebody
else who had more knowledge about it that I do.
Chairman STOKES.
Were you personally familiar with any disciplinary action relative to Mr. Hosty,
James Hosty?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes,
in that there were certain things that occurred in
One other thing.
You mentioned this note. The first time I ever heard about the note was after it
appeared in the newspapers. I believe it was a year ago this summer. I was
questioned at that time by the Bureau when they were conducting their own
investigation to find out who might have known about it at the time, and didn't
reveal it.
Chairman STOKES.
The first time you heard about the note was a year ago?
Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct, when it came out in the newspapers.
Chairman STOKES.
Thank you. I have no further questions. The gentleman from
Mr. DODD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley, for being here this morning.
I would like to
go back to the very first question that Chairman Stokes raised to you. I didn't
write down your exact quote when you responded, but it struck me. You talked
about the relationship between the Bureau and the
It occurred to
me that we had a commission that was set up by the President of the
I sensed, in
your response, and this is my opinion, but I sensed in your response that the
creation of the Warren Commission was a source of embarrassment to the Bureau
because it, in effect, was saying that we can't rely on the Bureau to do a
thorough and complete investigation of this matter, and we have to set up a
separate commission.
Would I be
incorrect in assuming that that was not an uncommon feeling among upper echelon
people within the Bureau that, in fact, the creation of the Warren Commission
was, in effect; a black eye; that the very fact it was created was a black eye
for the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY. The
only answer I can give you on that is no official---
Mr. DODD. Is no
what?
Mr. MALLEY. No
official higher than I has discussed their feelings with me about the creation
of the
Page
492
492
Director's
feeling that we should cooperate fully and do anything we could to help, which
we did.
Mr. DODD. Your
answer now has a bit of a different twist to it than it did when you originally
answered it.
Mr. MALLEY. No,
you are indicating that I felt there was something wrong, that I was not in
agreement that the Commission should be created. If I gave that impression, I am
sorry because it was none of my business whether they did or did not have a
commission.
Mr. DODD. Let me
ask you this: You talked about it as a business relationship, and I presume by
that you mean that since you, the agency, the Bureau, was the body responsible
for the collection of data, evidence and so forth, in effect, the Bureau was the
investigating arm of the Commission. The Commission did not have a separate
group of investigators. It relied upon the Bureau for the collection of
information; isn't that correct?
Mr. MALLEY.
That's correct.
Mr. DODD. Am I
to assume further from your response to Mr. Stokes' question that unless the
Commission asked for something specifically, unless they asked for certain data
and evidence, that the Bureau was not forthcoming on its own with information---
Mr. MALLEY. No,
that's a completely erroneous impression. We were constantly turning over
reports, every time that one was received from the field, to the
So, when you say
that we were not doing anything unless they asked us, that is completely wrong.
Mr. DODD. The
Bureau volunteered information?
Mr. MALLEY. We
kept doing it up until the day they disbanded the Commission.
Mr. DODD. Why didn't you give them the Hosty letter?
Mr. MALLEY.
Because I didn't know about it. If I had I certainly would have.
Mr. DODD. I am
not suggesting you yourself, I am talking about the Bureau. If the Bureau was
cooperating in giving information to the Warren Commission, you were aware of
the Hosty letter, that is the Bureau was, why didn't the Bureau in the sense of
cooperation you are describing, turn over the Hosty letter to the Warren
Commission?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer the question because not knowing about it, I don't know what the
thinking was of the people who had it or knew about it.
Mr. DODD. So,
using that example, there was not a full sense of cooperation in terms of making
the information available?
Mr. MALLEY. Well
I would have to say, is there a man in this room who never made a mistake in
judgment?
Mr. DODD. I am
not suggesting that there is a mistake in judgment. You are talking about a
letter written in the hand of the man who has been accused of assassinating the
President to an FBI agent in
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer your question any more than saying what I have already.
Page
493
493
Mr. DODD. Did
you have any, or to your knowledge, did anyone in the Bureau have any kind of a
special relationship with anyone who was a member of the
Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I am aware of. There is a possibility that somebody may have been very
friendly and talked to them, but I don't know of any special request that was
ever made to anyone to keep them advised.
Mr. DODD. You
never made any requests?
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not.
Mr. DODD. To
your knowledge, no one else made any requests of any member of that Commission
to report on what the activities of
the
executive sessions of that Commission were?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
that I can recall.
Mr. DODD. Mr.
Chairman, I think my 5 minutes may be up. I will come back.
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from
Mr. McKINNEY.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malley,
during the original investigation in Dallas, and when you were first brought in,
was there a tremendous amount of pressure from the Bureau to get it done?
Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on how you interpret the comment that you have just made. There was
all kinds of pressure to get everything under control as fast as you could.
Everybody was reading things from the news media, radio, television and so one,
questions were being asked, what about this, what about that, and no matter how
much pressure you were getting, a group of men can only do so much in a given
time in handling investigative work; whereas as far as I am concerned, I repeat
again, I was never given any time limit that we had to have anything finished.
Mr. McKINNEY. In
other words, at that stage in your investigation you did not feel that there was
pressure being brought to bear that resulted in the investigation being anything
but complete?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
where I am concerned.
Mr. MCKINNEY.
Did you hear through general gossip columns of the FBI or your fellow
colleagues, of any inordinate pressure being brought upon the FBI by the
Attorney General or by anyone else in the administration, including the
Director, to speed it up at any cost?
Mr. MALLEY. No.
Mr. McKINNEY.
After the
Mr. MALLEY.
Truthfully, I cannot remember that such comments were made. It wouldn't have had
any effect whatsoever on what
Page
494
494
the
Bureau did at that time regardless of whether they wanted to wind it up or
whether they didn't. We were working on something and we would have continued it
until we thought we had fully exhausted it.
Mr. McKINNEY.
You made a statement earlier that you were sending reports to the
Did you feel, as
an individual and as a long-term agent, and I gather a specialist in your field
which was Communism in the United States, that the Warren Commission was brought
to a close too soon, before it had all of the information the FBI had? Or, did
you feel that it should have been continued longer?
Mr. MALLEY. The
best answer I can give you on that is that the majority of reports that were
being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of the summer,
1964, were rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous allegations and so on that
were continuing to come in. I am not in a position to give you examples, but
just things that would have to be checked out to see if there was anything to
them.
I do think that
the
Mr. McKINNEY.
The
Mr. MALLEY. Well, when you say his ties with organized crime, the only
comment I could make is from what I remember reading in reports. I do remember
reading that there were several individuals, possibly high school associates of
Ruby, that did eventually become pretty well known in organized crime. To the
best of my---
Mr. McKINNEY.
Wasn't it pretty well known to the FBI that Jack Ruby, No. 1, was a member of
organized crime, No. 2, he ran a strip joint and has been somewhat commonly
referred to as a supplier of both women and booze to political and police
figures in the city of Dallas.
Didn't you find
it a little difficult to accept the
Mr. MALLEY. You
are saying the final findings. All I know is that every effort was made to check
out his activities completely and anything that we checked was given to them.
Now, I am not in
a position to criticize what the Warren Commission findings were and I can't say
that I agree or disagree with what they found, it is too many years ago.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think that the push for speed and a resolution to
the
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, based on my conversations with Mr. Rankin I think if he felt we were
shortchanging him on time that he would have made a statement for the record at
that time to say so.
Page
495
495
Mr. MCKINNEY. I
have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from
Mr. FORD. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malley,
yesterday, Mr. Kelly, with the Secret Service, testified that on December 9,
1963, they were instructed to turn over the assassination to the FBI. To what
extent was this investigation continued by the FBI?
Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to what Secret Service was doing or what?
Mr. FORD. No;
when they turned the investigation over to the FBI on December 9, after
receiving orders from the White House, to what extent was this investigation
continued from that point on?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I don't know whether I interpret your question correctly because we were
already doing everything we possibly could. We continued to do so.
Mr. FORD. Mr.
Kelly said yesterday that the Secret Service considered the case practically
closed when Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested. I think you said earlier that the
FBI did not feel that way, and so I am asking at this point what steps or how
did you continue the investigation?
Mr. MALLEY. We
never changed our position one way or the other. Just because Secret Service was
dropping out of it we went right ahead with everything that we could possibly do
to definitely establish not only the information we thought was correct, namely,
Oswald was probably involved, but to firmly show it and see if there was anyone
else involved, which we had in mind constantly.
Mr. FORD. Memos
were coming from Director Hoover instructing that the case be wrapped up as soon
as possible, is that correct,
Mr. MALLEY. That
is what you are telling me. I wasn't in
Mr. FORD. One
final question.
Could Director
Hoover's attitude toward the Kennedys have had any effect or influence on the
investigation of the assassination?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think I am going to say this for about the third or fourth time. He told
me not to stop at anything, to go all out and do everything to thoroughly
exhaust every possibility. That certainly wouldn't indicate that any
relationship he had would have had any effect on our investigation.
Mr. FORD. Thank
you.
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to
review again exactly the structure of authority in
Is it your
testimony that you were put in charge and that Shanklin and Hosty reported to
you during their days out there?
Mr. MALLEY.
Hosty did not report to me directly at any time. As far as Mr. Shanklin's
position, he was the agent in charge of the office, I was sent down there to
help coordinate the activities, to help him out in any way I could.
There were a
number of days where I think that both of us were on the phone close to 16 to 18
hours a day, and beyond that, I don't know whether I know exactly what your
question is.
Page
497
496
Mr. FITHIAN.
Well, who made decisions?
Mr. MALLEY. If
there were any decisions to be made, if Shanklin was the one who received the
information, he discussed it with me. If we agreed, fine. If we didn't agree, it
was up to me to say yes or no.
Mr. FITHIAN. So,
in other words, you were the authority in
Mr. MALLEY. As
far as from the sLandpoint of making any decisions on that level.
Mr. FITHIAN. OK.
At the time you were conducting your investigation, did you know, were you aware
that when Oswald killed Officer Tippit, presumably, that he was in about the
most direct walking route that one could lay out between his apartment and Jack
Ruby's
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I knew it immediately. It did come out because of checks that
were made to try and tie in whether or not Ruby and Oswald had ever had any
relationship of any kind, friendship, working relationship, or anything else,
the Bureau's investigation did not ever reveal the slightest indication of a
tieup between Ruby or they were ever---
Mr. FITHIAN. I
understand that. I am just asking whether or not you were aware at the time the
investigation was-----
Mr. MALLEY.
Sometime during the investigation I definitely was.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
were you aware of a memorandum from Evans to Belmont, or the substance of that
memorandum, dated November 26, 1963, which I believe is JFK F-457, in which it
is clearly acknowledged, that at least there are rumors, this is not evidence,
there are rumors, people
want to know and it says "There have also been allegations that
Oswald and Ruby were known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been
further alleged Oswald was killed to silence him."
Just to clarify
for you in the record, I am not now espousing the theory that necessarily Ruby
killed Oswald to silence him. What I am doing is this. This data was in the
possession of the Bureau, that is, it was no news to you or anybody else that
there were rumors that these two men were associated and, therefore, it seems to
me rather pertinent that the chief investigative officer there on behalf of the
Bureau would have known that, to the layman at least, it appears that Oswald
might be walking from his apartment to Jack Ruby's at the time that he
inadvertently came upon police officer Tippit.
My question is
whether or not you at the time you were conducting the investigation were aware
of that?
Mr. MALLEY.
There is no way that I can go back 15 years and tell you when I became aware of
it. While I was in Dallas I certainly went out and retraced the steps from here
to here to here, to the rooming house he stayed in, and so on and so forth.
Mr. FITHIAN. So
you were aware of it sometime before December 10th?
Mr. MALLEY. I
think I left on the 12th.
Mr. FITHIAN. On
the 12th, when you returned, you were aware of it some time?
Mr. MALLEY. I am
reasonably sure I would have had to be.
Mr. FITHIAN. Let
me move to another question.
Page
497
497
I think you
testified that you were not aware of a threatening note from Oswald to the
Bureau in
Mr. MALLEY. Had
I known about it I would certainly have done something about it. I am sorry, he
didn't tell me.
Mr. FITHIAN. Did
you recommend to the Bureau any kind of censure or punishment or reprimand for
either Hosty or Shanklin as a result of subsequently finding out that this had
been destroyed and that, you while in charge, were not informed?
Mr. MALLEY.
First of all, I didn't find out about it until a year ago, when I had been out
of the Bureau for some 6 years. So I would not be making any recommendations as
to what should be done about it.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FORD [now
presiding]. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Were you made aware at any time during your stay in
Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that on Friday, November 22. I had not had a chance to see the file before
I left to go to
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you.
I would like now
to ask a question of a much more general nature and perhaps would call upon sort
of your general philosophy and review of your thoughts while you were in the
Bureau.
Yesterday we had
some interesting testimony here from the Secret Service. One of the important
aspects of that testimony was a rather clear indication on the part of the
witness that he believed Oswald to be some kind of a nut, and it seemed to have
emanated from this witness' view that anybody who attempted the assassination of
the President of the United States would have to be psychopathic or he would
have to be mentally out of order.
Would you concur
with that general line of interpretation?
Mr. MALLEY. I am
not in a position to give you a very direct answer. All I can tell you is that
there are many people around the country that you would never know what their
thoughts were or what they were capable of doing, and that because one does
something on a spur of a moment or with a few days of deliberation, I don't know
how you can describe the individual.
We do know that
Oswald, 6 months before he killed Kennedy, took a shot at Oswald, I mean at
General Walker. So the man's mentality must have been one of wanting to either
do something where he would feel proud of himself, or something of that nature,
Page
498
498
but
that is not a very direct answer to what you have asked me. I just don't know
how to answer you.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
was just wondering if ever in any of the times when you were talking over coffee
and----
Mr. MALLEY. The
only thought that I have ever had on the matter is that from the very early
stages of Oswald's life he seemed to be a complete loner, completely
independent, and resented taking instructions from anyone.
Mr. FITHIAN.
What I was trying to get at is whether or not you and the other high officials
in the Bureau, when discussing this, either after the Kennedy case, after the
Kennedy assassination, or before, generally tend to believe that the only person
capable of actually trying to undertake the assassination of a President or a
high official in the United States would have to be mentally unbalanced or off
or different?
Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say that that is a complete necessarily correct situation.
You do know that
where Oswald is concerned he did some planning on his own. You can say that he
was mentally unbalanced. He was certainly smart enough to do a little figuring
on that particular situation. He did manage to get away from the building, not
for long, but he did manage to get away. Who is to say whether the man is
unbalanced or whether he has just got a temporary point that he wants to make
for himself and make some history, whether he is going to be prosecuted, killed
or what himself, I don't know.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr.
Chairman, the reason I raise this question, is that I guess that I was
increasingly disturbed by yesterday's testimony and I really kind of wanted to
go back to that witness or to those witnesses, both of these agencies, and ask
whether or not either agency would in retrospect have been able to detect or
identify a politically motivated, apart from a pathologically motivated,
psychopathically motivated, type of an assassination.
I guess I am not
sure that we are fully aware that there are terrorists who for political reasons
these days do things which cannot be normally attributed to somebody who is just
mentally off. Maybe we would have thought that 15 years ago, that anybody who
hijacked a French airliner or who did many of the kinds of sensational terrorist
things that have happened in the last 5 years, or so, maybe we would have
thought that only someone who was mentally warped could have done that, but my
question, which is very ill phrased, and ineptly phrased, is whether or not,
either then or now, the Bureau and the Secret Service and other agencies are
really thinking in the dimension of today's world in terms of real terrorists,
who act for political, not personally unbalanced reasons, and it disturbs me
that that kind of thinking might have prevailed then and therefore, the whole
investigation by the FBI was put in that direction rather than to immediately
question and thoroughly investigate the potential of either a politically
inspired collaborative thing or one in which organized crime was involved?
There are two or
three other kinds of lines of investigation that seem to me to be rather
inadequate by the Bureau and the Secret Service and the Warren Commission, as
for as that is concerned, and that is why I was wondering what your philosophy
was, where you were coming from?
Page
499
499
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, the only thing that I can say to you is that at that time and today you
have literally hundreds of people walking around the streets that may be capable
of violence or terrorist activities at any time. I don't know how the Government
could afford to spend the money that would be necessary to keep a surveillance
on everyone that they thought had the potential to do something out of the
question.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr.
Chairman, I would like to return to this question but I am going to have to run
and vote or miss that vote. Thank you very much.
Mr. EDGAR [now
presiding]. I yield back to the Chairman and then I will ask some questions.
Chairman STOKES.
The gentleman from
Mr. EDGAR. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malley, who
is in charge of the Monday after Oswald's assassination by Jack Ruby, of the
FBI's investigation into the death of President Kennedy?
Mr. MALLEY. Who
was actually in charge of it? In
Mr. EDGAR. OK,
let's start with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, I think you would say Mr. Alan Belmont, Associate Director under Mr.
Hoover, was actually overseeing the entire investigation.
Mr. EDGAR.
Again, would you sit closer to the mike? Mr. Alan Belmont?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. EDGAR. In
your opinion, Mr. Alan Belmont was in charge of the investigation?
Mr. MALLEY.
Overall.
Mr. EDGAR. For
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. What was your relationship with him?
Mr. MALLEY. I
described my prior position. I was, therefore, working under
Mr. EDGAR. At
any time in the days following the assassination of President Kennedy, did you
suggest or did you participate in a meeting to develop an investigative plan of
where the Federal Bureau of Investigation was going to go in analyzing this
particular case?
Mr. MALLEY. To
say that that particular question, the purpose of a meeting, I cannot do it. I
do know that I had many, many conferences with Mr. Belmont by myself, many with
the supervisory staff that was working in the Division that I was from, as well
as supervisors from the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Mr. EDGAR. Did
the FBI have a plan?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, there was a definite plan, namely, the purpose of the investigation, as we
have said five times already, was to find out whether there was any conspiracy
involved and to make sure whether or not Oswald did actually kill the President.
Mr. EDGAR. Was
that plan written down anywhere?
Mr. MALLEY. If
it was, I am not aware of it.
Mr. EDGAR. Now,
you have just indicated that the FBI had a plan and that that plan was not
written down anywhere but----
Page
500
500
Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say it wasn't. I said I am not aware of it.
Mr. EDGAR. You
did suggest, though, that the verbal plan was to check out conspiracy?
Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly.
Mr. EDGAR. What
part did the FBI play in trying to coordinate the information of the CIA and
Secret Service?
Mr. MALLEY. If
we received any information from the Secret Service or the CIA we would have
taken it into consideration in our own investigation.
Following the
creation of the
Mr. EDGAR. Why
wouldn't you have suggested that the FBI sit down with the CIA and the Secret
Service to find out what information they had and to share with them what
information you had about Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, or anything relating to
the assassination?
Mr. MALLEY. With
respect to the Secret Service, while I was in
As to CIA
relationships, that would have been handled by Mr. Sullivan's division and I
can't offhand say what they did with CIA.
Mr. EDGAR. Did
you talk to Mr. Kelly about the scope of the FBI's investigative plan?
Mr. MALLEY. I do
not remember that I did.
Chairman STOKES.
The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
chairman, I ask unanimous consent to continue for 3 additional minutes.
Chairman STOKES.
Without objection, the gentleman is recognized.
Mr. EDGAR. Mr.
Kelly testified yesterday that his agency checked out Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle
in Chicago, and the purchase of that rifle, and discovered that the FBI had
already been there and that some information was shared with the proprietor of
the shop indicating that the FBI had said don't talk to anyone else about this.
Do you know if that is accurate?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have the slightest idea. I am not ignoring your question, I just don't
know.
Mr. EDGAR. Just
a few moments ago you said that the purpose of the
Was that your
testimony?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall that I said the purpose. I may have been asked a question where I
said I would presume that they were asked to make certain what the FBI did and
whether it was complete and thorough and so on.
Page
501
501
Mr. EDGAR. Was
that the attitude of the FBI at the time of the
Mr. MALLEY. We
just went through this a little while ago, and I can't tell you of anybody that
had any attitudes as such. They may have talked among themselves, I don't know
what they did. All I know is that nobody tried to convince me that we were to do
anything other than a very thorough job and cooperate fully with the
Mr. EDGAR. But
if the prevailing attitude were that of the same phraseology that you have just
shared, it would indicate to me that the FBI was a bit paranoid about the Warren
Commission in that it was in a sense looking over its shoulder and
doublechecking it and looking at its investigation, and that is backed up by
some comments that I just read in a report that we have in our folder here, the
final report, book V of the investigation of the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy reference of the intelligence agencies. It goes through a whole
litany of concerns that the FBI had about the overseeing of its investigation
and the things that the
Did it ever
occur to you that the Warren Commission may have been formed to provide a
coordinated function of putting together a puzzle and that rather than being a
doublecheck of the FBI it was m essence using the FBI as its investigative arm,
and it was looking at the Secret Service and the CIA and Oswald and Ruby and
just trying to figure out what in fact took place in Dallas, and what it could
tell the American people about that particular event,
with no malice or intention of doing anything to the FBI. Is that a
possibility?
Mr. MALLEY.
Well, unless I saw the instructions that were given to Mr. Rankin and the entire
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from
Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, in
order that the record may be complete--and I welcome Mr. Malley here today--Mr.
Malley, you and I have been acquainted for something in excess of 35 years,
isn't that right?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. DEVINE. And
you and I were both assigned to the
Mr. MALLEY. That
is right.
Mr. DEVINE. I
believe you were in a supervisory capacity and I was just an ordinary special
agent; is that right?
Mr. MALLEY. I
wouldn't say an ordinary, Mr. Devine, I would say you were assigned there and
were doing your job.
Mr. DEVINE. I
believe that Assistant Director Belmont was also assigned to the
Page
502
502
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. DEVINE. And
he has since deceased?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. DEVINE. How
long ago did he pass away?
Mr. MALLEY. I
believe it was a year ago this spring, but I may be wrong. Time goes by fast.
Mr. DEVINE. Yes.
Mr. Malley, I am
sorry that these rollcalls require us to be absent from time to time, and I
understand that our chairman and perhaps our counsel questioned you about the
statements attributed to Mr. Sullivan.
Are you in a
position--you may have answered this--are you in a position to state whether or
not Mr. Sullivan was looked upon with disfavor by the majority of your
personnel? I don't mean to put you on the spot.
Mr. MALLEY. I
said before--Mr. Sullivan is dead, he can't speak for himself--I will repeat
what I have told the two men from your committee, that I said to them, Mr.
Sullivan was not an easy man to get along with and on a personal situation. I
think I am correct in saying that three out of five telephone calls I ever had
with him I ended up hanging up after a discussion where there was no possibility
of discussing anything sensibly.
It all comes
down to the fact that Mr. Sullivan had a very strong attitude, that if I say
something, I am correct, and if you don't agree with me, you are wrong.
Mr. DEVINE. Are
you in a position to say the circumstances under which he left the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY. I
had left the Bureau prior to that time so I am really not capable of saying. It
would be strictly hearsay on my part. I do know from rumors that there were some
difficulties encountered.
Mr. DEVINE. Mr.
Malley, I think I know what your answer will be to this but I think it should be
made clear for the record.
Did the Bureau
have any preconceived notion on who was responsible for the Kennedy
assassination and then conducted an investigation to confirm that preconceived
idea?
Mr. MALLEY.
Other members of your committee have indicated they might feel that we did that.
That is not correct. As far as people who were working on the assassination,
they had an open mind and still had an open mind up to the time that I left the
Bureau in 1971 that there could be somebody else involved.
Mr. DEVINE. So
that in this investigation the Bureau followed its time-tested policy of being
purely a factfinding organization, seeking facts and not making recommendations,
letting the chips fall where they may; is that correct?
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. DEVINE.
Finally, Mr. Malley, I would like to refer to the narration our chief counsel,
Mr. Blakey, when he was giving pretty much the history of the Bureau. In one
place he indicated that J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct priorities were the
fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress, and the
positive image of the Bureau.
Page
503
503
He also had,
according to some, two glaring blindspots in the areas of civil rights and
organized crimes, which put him at odds with the Kennedy administration.
Are you in a
position to make any comment upon the activities of the Bureau in the area of
civil rights up to and including this time?
Mr.
MALLEY. Yes, I think I am.
Mr. DEVINE.
Would you state that, please?
Mr. MALLEY.
Personally, while I was in the field, before I was called into the seat of
government, I had several occasions where I was asked, not asked, told, to
conduct civil rights investigations, which I did.
Back in the late
middle-forties, while I was assigned as an assistant agent in charge in Houston,
Tex., I attended a number of schools for police and sheriffs, where one of the
topics to be discussed was the civil rights statutes, and explained to the
police officers who were present the full details of why the investigations were
being made on civil rights matters and the necessity of changing their ways, if
they were engaging in any activities whereby they would be in violation of the
civil rights statutes.
On returning to
or coming back to
I also know that
some claims were made concerning our attitude and when you say that we didn't
take over and do things until the Kennedys came in, I remember one instance,
which I would like for your record to show, namely, that certain people in the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice felt that they had a perfect
right to have agents assigned to them to go out in the field and they would
direct all of the agent's activities and not be in a position to do what they
felt needed to be done except on the departmental attorney's instructions.
The Director
flatly refused to assign personnel under those circumstances but did say,
"you tell us the cases you want investigated, we will do them, turn the
results over to you, and if your have any problems with our investigation we
will do as much more or anything else that you want to ask us to do, but we will
conduct our original investigation." Beyond that, I think I have covered
it.
Mr. DEVINE. The
second part of the question, Mr. Malley, had to do with organized crime and some
conflict with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position to comment on
that? I know you were not assigned to the criminal division at that time.
Mr. MALLEY. I am
not really in a position to comment about any conflict. I do know that following
the Kennedy assassination, I am sorry, the Kennedy administration taking power,
more emphasis was placed on organized crime. Beyond that I am not in a position
to comment.
Mr. DEVINE.
Thank you.
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has expired.
Page
504
504
Mr. Malley, with
reference to some of the answer's you have just given Mr. Devine with reference
to the attitude of the department with reference to civil rights, were you still
with the department when the COINTEL program was initiated?
Mr. MALLEY. That
was in another division. I did hear references to it. I was not thoroughly
familiar with it.
Chairman STOKES.
Well, since you have left the department are you now familiar with the COINTEL
program?
Mr. MALLEY. Only
what I have read in the newspapers. No other way could I be familiar with it
since I left the Bureau.
Chairman STOKES.
Are you aware of the fact that as a result of a Senate committee uncovering the
COINTEL program, it has been described as being one of the most disgraceful
activities to ever be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against
people like Dr. Martin Luther King, and other civil rights persons?
Mr. MALLEY. I
saw it in the paper that there was a lot of criticism.
Chairman STOKES.
And having seen that in the paper, does that in any way impact upon your
statements here this morning with reference to the great civil rights attitude
of the department?
Mr.
MALLEY I didn't hear your last part
Chairman STOKES.
From what you have read, then, about the impact upon the statements that
you have made here about the fine attitude of the department toward civil
rights?
Mr. MALLEY. When
you say department, are you referring to the
Justice
Department or do you mean a department in the FBI?
Chairman STOKES.
I am talking about the FBI.
Mr. MALLEY. The
only thing that I can tell you is what I did say, that we were interested in
conducting civil rights investigations.
What was handled
under the COINTEL program I cannot comment on because I don't know exactly what
was going on.
Chairman STOKES.
Another point with reference to Mr. Sullivan.
It seems to me
that the underlying question here is not whether he was a difficult man to get
along with. The question, it seems to me, is as you knew him, was he a truthful
man?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't cite instances. I would say there are a number of recollections where I
felt to myself that that is not the way I understood the situation to be when I
read certain things that he had prepared.
Chairman STOKES.
That is not my question, sir. My question is, as you knew him, was he a truthful
man?
Mr. MALLEY. I
wasn't acquainted with him on a social basis. As far as official dealings with
him, I did not always believe everything that he tried to convince me of. That
still is not a direct answer. That is the only way I can answer it.
Chairman STOKES.
Well, let's put it another way. From all that you knew about him, would you
disbelieve him under oath?
Mr. MALLEY. I
think that if it looked to Mr. Sullivan like it was to his advantage to say what
he was thinking he might say it and I don't know whether he would even be aware
whether he' was fabricating or not.
Page
505
505
Chairman STOKES.
Mr. Malley, I think the question I am putting to you is a fairly simple question
and really requires a fairly simple answer.
From all you know about him.
Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him.
Chairman STOKES.
Beg pardon?
Mr. MALLEY. I
would not trust him, if that is a better answer for you.
Chairman STOKES.
There is a difference between trust and credibility.
Mr. MALLEY. Let
me say then that I don't think his credibility was as high as most people that I
was acquainted with in the Bureau.
Chairman STOKES.
You don't care to answer my question, is that correct?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't say that he lied deliberately at any time. All I know is that I had many
dealings---
Chairman STOKES.
I just asked you sir, from all you knew about him, would you believe him under
oath?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
necessarily.
Chairman STOKES.
Now, Mr. Hoover was a powerful man, wasn't he. Isn't that a fair statement?
Mr. MALLEY. I
would regard it as true.
Chairman STOKES.
And throughout the Bureau, by the men in the Bureau, he was regarded as being a
powerful man, was he not?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes.
Chairman STOKES.
And it will be a fair statement to say that in his imposing position he
intimidated men who worked in that Bureau, isn't that true?
Mr. MALLEY. I
won't agree with that statement. Some fellows may have felt that way. I felt
that if I didn't like what Mr. Hoover was doing I had a right to walk out any
time I wanted to. He didn't ask me to come to work, I asked him to work there.
Chairman STOKES.
Well, with reference to other men in the Bureau, wasn't it commonly known that
he intimidated men?
Mr. MALLEY. All
I can answer there is to say that if something went wrong your agents knew they
would probably be receiving disciplinary action. If you call that intimidation,
maybe it is.
Chairman STOKES.
And with reference to that disciplinary action, because of the fear of incurring
his wrath, wasn't it commonly known in the Bureau that field supervisors would
often cover up the mistakes of their men so as not to incur his wrath?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't have knowledge of that. I was a field supervisor for 4 1/2 years and I
don't remember that I ever covered up for anybody.
Chairman STOKES.
Well, I am not asking you what you did, I am asking, wasn't it common knowledge?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what other people did. When you say common knowledge, I don't know
that to be common knowledge.
Chairman STOKES.
I have no further questions. The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
yield to Mr. Sawyer.
Chairman STOKES.
I am sorry. I didn't realize the gentleman had gotten back. The gentleman from
Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page
506
506
As I understand
your job of liaison entailed reading carefully anything that went from the
Bureau to the
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. SAWYER. At
least that was part of the job?
Mr. MALLEY. Yes.
Mr. SAWYER. What
was the purpose of your reading carefully everything that went to the
Mr. MALLEY. To
make certain that everything was properly, thoroughly, and exhaustively run out.
Mr. Belmont and I had the same assignment, and in reading reports, et cetera, I
know that I did it, and I am sure that Belmont made notes reading reports to
double check back and see what the preliminary investigation was on certain
matters, whether it had been completely followed through.
If there wasn't
a definite answer, to see to it that further investigation was made, check with
the supervisors to find out whether more investigation was being conducted.
Mr. SAWYER. Did
you have authority to decide, after reading something, that it wasn't going to
go to the
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not. There was nothing that came through, as far as the Bureau was
concerned, that did not eventually go to the
Mr. SAWYER. When
you say eventually, what do you mean eventually?
Mr. MALLEY. What
I am saying is that if a report came through and it was obviously incomplete and
had not been thoroughly looked into, we sent it back to the field to get a more
complete investigation and then sent over a completed product.
Mr. SAWYER. Did
you do that, did you exercise any discretion with respect to things that, in
your judgment, might be embarrassing to the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY. I
did not.
Mr. SAWYER. Was
that part of your job?
Mr. MALLEY. As I
said before, we were told to hold nothing back from the
Mr. SAWYER. But
you were told to read carefully anything before it went?
Mr. MALLEY. And
to make sure it was accurate and fully investigated.
Mr. SAWYER. You
operated somewhat as a censor, then, between the Bureau and the
Mr. MALLEY. No,
sir. When you say a censor, you are inferring I would have the right to take
this out and take that out, and I am saying that my only purpose in reading
material was to make certain that the investigation was complete.
Mr. SAWYER. So
you only had authority to add in and not take out, is that correct?
Mr. MALLEY. And
the additions would only be to get further data to explain what the thing was
all about.
Mr. SAWYER. And
you never in the course of this saw this Hosty letter either?
Mr. MALLEY. I
have said four times I never saw the letter until-am sorry, you were out, maybe
you didn't hear me--I never knew
Page
507
507
anything
about the Hosty letter until 1 year ago when it came out in the newspapers.
Mr. SAWYER.
Thank you.
I have nothing
further, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.
Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me just
make sure I am correct. You were the first person assigned, you were initially
assigned as the liaison to the
Mr. MALLEY. That
is correct.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
did anyone else serve as the liaison throughout its existence?
Mr. MALLEY. Not
to my knowledge, unless there was some situation where I was ill or might have
taken a day off, and I don't recall that occurring.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
you told us that you reviewed documents and all matters that went to the
Mr. MALLEY. That
is right.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
would now like to direct your attention to the Oswald address book and ask you
whether or not you saw that document prior to its going to the
Mr. MALLEY. To
be specific, I can't recall that I saw the address book as such. I saw the
results of everything that was in his address book in a report form and I
believe that I was shown the actual address book.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
did you satisfy yourself that it was authentic and complete; that is, did you
look at the report that was going from the Bureau to the Warren Commission,
compare that with the address book itself?.
Mr. MALLEY. I
had to use a little reliance on people who were working with me. To take the
time to go through everything that was in Oswald's notebook and compare item by
item, I could not take the time to do it.
Mr. FITHIAN. So
that we can be completely accurate, then, it would be inaccurate to say that you
read everything that was forwarded from the Bureau to the
Mr. MALLEY. I
did make the comment that I read any letters and all reports that went from the
Bureau.
Mr. FITHIAN. Are
you aware that a particular page from the Oswald notebook was not forwarded and
that that page included agent Hosty's name and address and license number?
Mr. MALLEY. I
had no recollection of it. I was told by one of your staff members that that
occurred.
Mr. FITHIAN. Do
you have any comment for the committee as to how that could have occurred?
Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not in a position to answer you because I knew nothing about it.
Mr. FITHIAN. Is
it your professional judgment that the book once acquired by the FBI always
remained in the possession of the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY. It
would be most unusual if it did not.
Page
508
508
Mr. FITHIAN.
And, therefore, would it be fair for the committee to conclude---
Mr. MALLEY. May
I interrupt you there?
Mr. FITHIAN.
Yes.
Mr. MALLEY. I do
not know if this is one of the items of evidence that was picked up by the
Dallas Police Department prior to the time that
it was turned over to the FBI.
Mr. FITHIAN. Who
would have given you the book?
Mr. MALLEY. One
of the supervisors in
Mr. FITHIAN.
Does the Bureau retain some kind of chain of custody within the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY.
Generally speaking, when a piece of evidence is picked up in the field, it is
handled by the agent who picked it up until he dictates his material. It is then
put in an evidence envelope. If it is coming to
Mr. FITHIAN. So
it would be reasonable, would it not, to believe that the only possible
alteration of the contents of the book would have to have been done by somebody
in the Bureau?
Mr. MALLEY. All
I can tell you is that we did receive a lot of material from the Dallas Police
Department. When that book may have been turned over, if it was turned over by
them, I don't know.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
should correct this by saying it is the transcription that has the page removed.
Mr. MALLEY. Not
from the actual report, and not from the actual notebook.
Mr. FITHIAN. No,
I believe it is; I have to check with counsel on this, but I believe it is the
transcription of the address book, that which was prepared by the Bureau, the
transcription prepared to go through you to the Warren Commission, is that not
correct, and so it would be a page of that transcription that is missing.
Mr. MALLEY. I
would have no way of knowing.
Mr. FITHIAN. Who
would have prepared the transcription and signed off on it?
Mr. MALLEY. It
would depend on the agent's name that was on the report or whether it was an
insert prepared by an agent.
Mr. FITHIAN. But
when it got to you, you would verify that someone had, even if you didn't check
it yourself, line by line, you would verify that somebody, some responsible
authority in the Bureau, had signed off on the document, wouldn't you, isn't
that the way you keep your custody straight?
Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring now to keeping the evidence straight or are you referring to this
transcription?
Mr. FITHIAN. You
see, I am not a lawyer, but it just seems to me that when the President of the
United States is killed and documents are transmitted from one person to another
or one agency to another, certainly documents as important as those belonging to
the alleged assassin---
Mr. MALLEY.
Certainly.
Mr. FITHIAN
[continuing]. That there would have to be some kind of clear chain of travel for
the document. I don't think it just appears in your hand, and so my question is:
Was there not some
Page
509
509
system
in the Bureau whereby each person who had that and prepared the transcript and
brought it to you as the supervisor, as the liaison to the Warren Commission,
would have signed off on it? And your responsibility to the supervisor would
have been to ascertain that, in fact, someone had attested to you in one form or
another that that was a bona fide document, a complete document before it went
to the
Mr. MALLEY. You
are dealing with an entirely different situation in this instance. It was
usually handled in the field; namely, most pieces of evidence went direct from a
field office to the
As far as
signing a document of some kind, to say this one handled it or that one handled
it, I don't know of any time the Bureau followed that much of a clerical
procedure.
Mr. FITHIAN. I
ask for unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.
Without objection, the gentleman is recog* nized.
Mr. FITHIAN. Let
me review this, then. Since it has now been demonstrated that a page, in fact,
of the transcription was missing and since reasonable evidence is that it came
to the Bureau complete, the alteration, the omission would have to come either
at the Dallas office level, at the Washington supervisor level, or by you or by
the Warren Commission prior to publication. That's the only four stops that it
made; isn't that correct?
Mr. MALLEY.
Correct.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
your testimony is that you did not know of the omission. Is that correct?
Mr. MALLEY.
That's what I said.
Mr. FITHIAN.
Now, there is additional evidence that the page, in fact, was not only missing,
but that it was retyped so as to appear to be a complete record. What kind of
penalty, what kind of reprimand might be reasonably expected to come down from
the top, from you or someone, for the person who had made such an alteration?
Wouldn't there be some kind of discipline?
Mr. MALLEY. If
it had been known, there would have been a thorough check made and
recommendations made.
Mr. FITHIAN. The
way it appears to the casual and perhaps to even the careful observer is that
the Hosty note was destroyed because it reflected badly on the Bureau, that the
Oswald transcription was altered because it reflected badly on the Bureau and a
number of other things were done so as to put the Bureau in the best possible
light.
Can you give us
any hard evidence as to why we should not believe that that is the case; that
is, that various things were altered, omitted, or drafted in such a way as to
put the Bureau in the very best possible light rather than to give the complete
information to the Warren Commission?
Page
510
510
Mr. MALLEY.
Concerning your second comment, that Hosty's name was left out of this
transcription, I know of no good reason that it would have been left out. Hosty,
at one time, was handling the investigation of Oswald. The fact he had gone out
and talked to his wife would be no reason to try to eliminate Hosty's name that
I know of.
So, I am not in
a position to say why anyone would eliminate it. I have to let you draw any
conclusions you want to as to why these things were done because I do not know
about them.
Mr. FITHIAN. And
you are not prepared to offer any hard information as to why that kind of
conclusion might be drawn by someone reviewing the documents?
Mr. MALLEY. No,
I am not; I am not.
Chairman STOKES.
The time of the gentleman has again expired.
The gentleman
from
Mr. EDGAR. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Going back to
the questioning of our chairman, Mr. Stokes, and the questioning of Mr. Devine
about both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover, could you describe Mr. Hoover's
personality to the committee as you understood it?
Mr. MALLEY. With
regard to what?
Mr. EDGAR. What
was he like to work for as an individual?
Mr. MALLEY. He
was a very domineering individual who wanted the job done by everybody that was
involved. As far as I am concerned, demanded as much excellence that was
possible to obtain.
Mr. EDGAR. In
the course of your many years in the FBI, did you see any changes in Mr.
Hoover's personality?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't think so.
Mr. EDGAR. So,
he was the same in 1955 as he was in 1963 and the same as he was in 1968?
Mr. MALLEY. As
far as I am concerned.
Mr. EDGAR. It
has been pointed out through a number of documents that we have had access to
that Mr. Hoover became concerned at some point that the FBI would not be looked
upon favorably by the Warren Commission. Is that your impression of Mr. Hoover's
concern during the end of 1963 and early 1964?
Mr. MALLEY. I
have previously stated that I saw nothing to indicate that Mr. Hoover was
worried about what the
You say you have
these indications; I know nothing about them.
Mr. EDGAR. Well,
on an April 3, 1964, memorandum to William Sullivan, he handwrote the note,
"Their so-called compliments of the Bureau's work are empty and have no
sincerity." It goes on to point out several other memorandums and notes
where Mr. Hoover was concerned about how the Bureau would be seen. I do note
that there was by one agent--well, here's another quote of Mr. Hoover, "In
any event, such gross incompetency cannot be overlooked for administrative
action postponed,' and this was a handwritten note on the 17 agents that were
going to be disciplined secretly. Did you know of that disciplinary action?
Mr. MALLEY. I
knew that Mr. Gale had been requested to conduct an investigation. I didn't know
when he completed it, nor did I
Page
511
511
know
all details about it. I don't recall that I ever saw the memorandum that
recommended it.
Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever bring to the attention of the
Mr. MALLEY. I
just got through telling you that I never saw the note, memorandum. I wasn't
aware of all the details and I, therefore, would not have had anything to do
with bringing it to their attention.
Mr. EDGAR. It
seems to me that what you are saying by that answer is, even though you were the
liaison person for the FBI, there was information available to the FBI not
available to you that was not transmitted to the
Mr. MALLEY. As I
said, I was not shown the memorandum. I couldn't have made any recommendations
about it going any place, not knowing whether it had ever been completed.
Mr. EDGAR. I can
respect that. From the indications that 1 am receiving from reading these
documents, Mr. Hoover was angry that those agents did not put Mr. Oswald on the
security index and yet Mr. Hoover, at least, did not direct you to transmit that
information, and the reasons for that feeling on his part to the Warren
Commission; is that correct?
Mr. MALLEY. I
can't answer what Mr. Hoover thought.
Mr. EDGAR. Did
you ever transmit to the
Mr. MALLEY. No;
not to my recollection.
Chairman STOKES.
The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from
Mr. SAWYER. You
knew Agent Hosty was suspended or otherwise disciplined for his conduct in
connection with the Oswald affair; did you not?
Mr. MALLEY. I
don't recall the exact date. I do know that eventually for some time he was
suspended, but I don't remember when it was.
Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why?
Mr. MALLEY. Are
you referring to the original investigation? Are you referring to the Hosty note
or what are you referring to?
Mr. SAWYER. Do
you know why he was suspended--Agent Hosty?
Mr. MALLEY. If I
knew, I would be glad to tell you. I do not know.
Mr. SAWYER. And
it was then, in your view, just happenstance that Hosty was eliminated from this
transcription of the notebook?
Mr. MALLEY. I
didn't say that. I said I do not know why it would have been because I see no
reason for it to have been.
Mr. SAWYER. You
don't think that reason could have been connected with the same reason that
Hosty was suspended for his activities?
Mr. MALLEY. I
really can't say that I would take that attitude because it was very obvious
from the reports that were available that Mr. Hosty had been involved in the
investigation of Oswald. I don't know why they would want to try to eliminate
his name just from a notebook.
Mr. SAWYER. I
have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.
The time of the gentleman has expired.
Page
512
512
Mr. Malley, as a
witness before our committee, at the conclusion of your testimony, you are
entitled to 5 minutes at which time you may, in any way, explain any portion of
your testimony, you may comment upon it, you may expand upon it in any way.
On behalf of the
committee, I, at this time, extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose.
Mr. MALLEY. I
have no further comments I desire to make.
Chairman
STOKES. There being nothing further, on behalf of the committee, we thank you
for having appeared here and giving us your testimony today.
Thank you very
much. You are excused.
[Witness
excused.]
Chairman STOKES.
The Chair now recognizes Professor Blakey.
Contact Information tomnln@cox.net
Page Visited
Times