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PLANNING THE TEXAS TRIP

            President Kennedy's visit to Texas in November 1963 had been under consideration for almost a year before it occurred.  He had made only a few brief visits to the State since the 1960 Presidential campaign and in 1962 he began to consider a formal visit.1  During 1963, the reasons for making the trip became more persuasive.  As a political leader, the President wished to resolve the factional controversy within the Democratic Party in Texas before the election of 1964. 2 The party itself saw an opportunity to raise funds by having the President speak at a political dinner eventually planned for Austin. 3 As Chief of State, the President always welcomed the opportunity to learn, firsthand, about the problems which concerned the American people.4  Moreover, he looked forward to the public appearances which he personally enjoyed.

            The basic decision on the November trip to Texas was made at a meeting of President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, and Governor Connally on June 5, 1963, at the Cortez Hotel in El Paso, Tex.6 The President had spoken earlier that day at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo., and had stopped in El Paso to discuss the proposed visit and other matters with the Vice President and the Governor.7 The three agreed that the President would come to Texas

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in late November 1963.8 The original plan called for the President to spend only 1 day in the State, making whirlwind visits to Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Houston.9  In September, the White House decided to permit further visits by the President and extended the trip to run from the afternoon of November 21 through the evening of Friday, November 22.  When Governor  Connally called at the White House on October 4 to discuss the details of the visit, it was agreed that the planning of events in Texas would be left largely to the Governor. At the White House, Kenneth O'Donnell, special assistant to the President, acted as coordinator for the trip.12

Everyone agreed that, if there was sufficient time, a motorcade through downtown Dallas would be the best way for the people to see their President.  When the trip was planned for only 1 day, Governor Connally had opposed the motorcade because there was not enough time.  The Governor stated, however, that "once we got San Antonio moved from Friday to Thursday afternoon, where that was his initial stop in Texas, then we had the time, and I withdrew my objections to a motorcade."  According to O'Donnell, had a motorcade wherever we went," particularly in large cities where the purpose was to let the President be seen by as many people as possible.16 In his experience, "it would be automatic" for the Secret Service to arrange a route which would, within the time allotted, bring the President "through an area which exposes him to the greatest number of people."

Advance Preparations for the Dallas Trip

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DALLAS TRIP

Advance preparations for President Kennedy's visit to Dallas were primarily the responsibility of two Secret Service agents: Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, a member of the White House detail who acted as the advance agent, and Forrest V. Sorrels, special agent in charge of the Dallas office.  Both agents were advised of the trip on November 4.18  Lawson received a tentative schedule of the Texas trip on November 8 from Roy H. Kellerman, assistant special agent in charge of the White House detail, who was the Secret. Service official responsible for the entire Texas journey.19  As advance agent working closely with Sorrels, Lawson had responsibility for arranging the timetable for the President's visit to Dallas and coordinating local activities with the White House staff, the organizations directly concerned with the visit, and local law enforcement officials.20  Lawson's most important responsibilities were to take preventive action against anyone in Dallas considered a threat to the President, to select the luncheon site and motorcade route, and to plan security measures for the luncheon and the motorcade.

Preventive Intelligence Activities

The Protective Research Section (PRS) of the Secret Service maintains records of people who have threatened the President or so conducted

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themselves as to be deemed a potential danger to him.  On November 8, 1963, after undertaking the responsibility for advance preparations for the visit to Dallas, Agent Lawson went to the PRS offices in Washington.  A check of the geographic indexes there revealed no listing for any individual deemed to be a potential danger to the President in the territory of the Secret Service regional office which includes Dallas and Fort Worth.21

            To supplement the PRS files, the Secret Service depends largely on local police departments and local offices of other Federal agencies which advise it of potential threats immediately before the visit of the President to their community.  Upon his arrival in Dallas on November 12 Lawson conferred with the local police and the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation about potential dangers to the President.  Although there was no mention in PRS files of the demonstration in Dallas against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson on October 24, 1963, Lawson inquired about the incident and obtained through the local police photographs of some of the persons involved.22 On November 22 a Secret Service agent stood at the entrance to the Trade Mart, where the President was scheduled to speak, with copies of these photographs.  Dallas detectives in the lobby of the Trade Mart and in the luncheon area also had copies of these photographs. A number of people who resembled some of those in the photographs were placed under surveillance at the Trade Mart.25

            The FBI office in Dallas gave the local Secret Service representatives the name of a possibly dangerous individual in the Dallas area who was investigated.  It also advised the Secret Service of the circulation on November 21 of a handbill sharply critical of President Kennedy,24 discussed in chapter VI of this report.  Shortly before, the Dallas police had reported to the Secret Service that the handbill had appeared on the streets of Dallas.  Neither the Dallas police nor the FBI had yet learned the source of the handbill.25  No one else was identified to the Secret Service through local inquiry as potentially dangerous, nor did PRS develop any additional information between November 12, when Lawson left Washington, and November 22.  The adequacy of the intelligence system maintained by the Secret Service at the time of the assassination, including a detailed description of the available data on Lee Harvey Oswald and the reasons why his name had not been furnished to the Secret Service, is discussed in chapter VIII.