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President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed the President’s Commission on the

Assassination of President Kennedy, commonly called the Warren Commission,

by Executive Order (E.O. 11130) on November 29, 1963. Its purpose was to

investigate the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22,

1963, at Dallas, Texas. President Johnson directed the Commission to evaluate matters

relating to the assassination and the subsequent killing of the alleged assassin, and to

report its findings and conclusions to him.

Proceedings and Minutes of

Executive Sessions 1963-1964

Arranged chronologically by date of session. The proceedings and minutes relate to

the organization and administration of the Commission and the conduct of its

investigation.

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1

THE WARREN COMMISSION

THE 26 VOLUMES

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Contents

Introduction to the Proceedings and Minutes of Executive Sessions of the Commission....................3

Expanded Biographies of Commission Members and Staff.............................................................5

Testimony of SteveTilly.....................................................................................................................12

1968 Introduction to Warren Commission Ex. Sessions by David Lifton....................................15

Proceedings and Minutes of Exective Sessions as Released by the ARRB

Minutes taken of June 29, 1964, Exective Session, by Mark Sobel

Note: Harold Weisberg, in Whitewash IV, made the 1/27/64 transcript publicly available for the first time.

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3

Proceedings and Minutes of Executive Sessions of the

Commission

1963-1964

Arranged chronologically by date of session.

Transcripts of proceedings of the Commission for executive sessions of

December 5, 6, and 16, 1963

January 21, January 27, February 24, March 16, April 30, May 19

June 4, June 23, September 18, 1964.

The proceedings and minutes relate to the organization and administration of the Commission and the

conduct of its investigation.

President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed the President's Commission on the Assassination of President

Kennedy, commonly called the Warren Commission, by Executive Order (E.O. 11130) on November

29, 1963. Its purpose was to investigate the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy on

November 22, 1963, at Dallas, Texas. President Johnson directed the Commission to evaluate matters

relating to the assassination and the subsequent killing of the alleged assassin, and to report its findings

and conclusions to him.

On December 13, 1963, Congress passed Senate Joint Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) authorizing

the Commission to subpoena witnesses and obtain evidence concerning any matter relating to the

investigation. The resolution also gave the Commission the power to compel the testimony of witnesses

by granting immunity from prosecution to witnesses testifying under compulsion. The Commission,

however, did not grant immunity to any witness during the investigation.

The Commission acted promptly to obtain a staff to meet its needs. J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor

General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel for the Commission on December 16,

1963. He was aided in his work by 14 assistant counsel who were divided into teams to deal with the

various subject areas of the investigation. The Commission was also assisted by lawyers, Internal

Revenue Service agents, a senior historian, an editor, and secretarial and administrative personnel who

were assigned to the Commission by Federal agencies at its request. Officials and agencies of the state

of Texas, as well as of the Federal Government, fully cooperated with the Commission on its work.

From the first, the Commission considered its mandate to conduct a thorough and independent investigation.

The Commission reviewed reports by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, Department

of State, and the Attorney General of Texas, and then requested additional information from

federal agencies, Congressional committees, and state and local experts. The Commission held hearings

and took the testimony of 552 witnesses. On several occasions, the Commission went to Dallas to

visit the scene of the assassination and other places.

The Commission presented its Report, in which each member concurred, to the President on September

24, 1964. The publication of the Report was soon followed by the publication of the 26 volumes of

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the Commission's Hearings. The Commission then transferred its records to the National Archives to

be permanently preserved under the rules and regulations of the National Archives and applicable

federal law.

In the National Archives, the records of the Warren Commission comprise Record Group 272: Records

of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. The record group contains

about 363 cubic feet of records and related material. Approximately 99 percent of these records are

currently open and available for research. The records consist of investigative reports submitted by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency; various kinds

of documents such as income tax returns, passport files, military and selective service records, and

school records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby; transcripts of testimony, depositions,

and affidavits of witnesses, correspondence; manuals of procedures of federal agencies; administrative

memorandums; records relating to personnel; fiscal records; agenda, proceedings, and minutes of Commission

meetings and minutes of staff meetings; exhibits; tape records, newspaper and press clippings,

and films; indexes; drafts and printer's proofs of the Report and Hearings of the Commission; a chronology

of events in the lives of Oswald, Ruby, and others, 1959-1963; records relating to the interrogation

and trial of Jack Ruby; and other records. Most of these records relate to the period of the investigation

of President Kennedy's assassination, November 1963 to September 1964, but some records of

earlier and a few later dates are included.

The Kennedy family donated the autopsy X-rays and photographs to the National Archives under an

agreement dated October 29, 1966. The agreement limits access to these materials to

* persons authorized to act for a Committee of Congress, a Presidential

commission, or any other official agency of the federal government having authority

to investigate matters relating to the assassination of President Kennedy or

* recognized experts in the field of pathology or related areas of science

and technology whose applications are approved by the designated Kennedy family

representative.

This record group is administered as part of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection, a research collection established by the National Archives in accordance with the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. The collection also includes pertinent

records of Congressional committees and commissions, Executive branch agencies, and U.S. district

courts. An electronic database maintained by the collection staff contains document-level data on records

that were not available for research at the National Archives at the time that the law establishing the

collection was enacted, including records in agency custody destined for eventual transfer to the National

Archives. For additional information on the collection's holdings and access procedures, consult

the JFK Access Staff of the National Archives.

5

Expanded Biographies of Commission Members and Staff

COMMISSIONERS

The Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on

March 19, 1891. He graduated from the University of California with B.L. and J.D. degrees, and was

admitted to the California bar in 1914. Chief Justice Warren was attorney general of California from

1939 to 1943. From 1943 to 1953 he was Governor of California and in September 1953 was appointed

by President Eisenhower to be the Chief Justice of the United States.

The Honorable Richard B. Russell was born in Winder, Ga., on November 2, 1897. He received his

B.L. degree from the University of Georgia in 1918 and his LL.B. from Mercer University in 1957.

Senator Russell commenced the practice of law in Winder, Ga., in 1918, became county attorney for

Barrow County, Ga., and was a member of the Georgia House of Representatives from 1921 to 1931.

He was Governor of Georgia from 1931 to 1933, was elected to the U.S. Senate in January 1933 to fill

a vacancy, and has been Senator from Georgia continuously since that date.

The Honorable John Sherman Cooper was born in Somerset, Ky., on August 23, 1901. He attended

Centre College, Kentucky, received his A.B. degree from Yale College in 1923, and attended Harvard

Law School from 1923 to 1925. Senator Cooper has been a member of the House of Representatives of

the Kentucky General Assembly, a county judge and circuit judge in Kentucky, and is now a member of

the U.S. Senate, where he has served, though not continuously, for 12 years. He was a delegate to the

Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an advisor to the

Secretary of State in 1950 at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Ambassador to

India and Nepal in 1955-56. He served in the 3d U.S. Army in World War II in Europe, and after the war

headed the reorganization of the German judicial system in Bavaria.

The Honorable Hale Boggs was born in Long Beach, Miss., on February 15, 1914. He graduated from

Tulane University with a B.A. degree in 1935 and received his LL.B. in 1937. He was admitted to the

Louisiana bar in 1937 and practiced law in New Orleans. Representative Boggs was elected to the 77th

Congress of the United States and in World War II was an officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve and of the

Maritime Service. He has been a Member of Congress since 1946 when he was elected to represent the

Second District, State of Louisiana, in the 80th Congress, and he is currently the majority whip for the

Democratic Party in the House of Representatives.

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford was born in Omaha, Nebr., on July 14, 1913. He graduated from the

University of Michigan with a B.A. degree in 1935 and from Yale University Law School with an

LL.B. degree in 1941. Representative Ford was admitted to the Michigan bar in 1941. He was first

elected to Congress in 1948 and has been reelected to each succeeding Congress. He served 47 months

in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Representative Ford was elected in January 1963 the chairman

of the House Republican Conference.

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles was born in Watertown, N.Y., on April 7, 1893. He received his B.A.

degree from Princeton in 1914, his M.A. in 1916, his LL.B. from George Washington University in

1926, and LL.D. degrees. Mr. Dulles entered the diplomatic service of the United States in 1916 and

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resigned in 1926 to take up law practice in New York City. In 1953 Mr. Dulles was appointed Director

of Central Intelligence and served in that capacity until 1961.

The Honorable John J. McCloy was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on March 31, 1895. He received an

A.B. degree, cum laude, from Amherst College in 1916; LL.B. from Harvard, and LL.D. from Amherst

College. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1921 and is now a member of the firm of Milbank,

Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He was Assistant Secretary of War from April 1941 to November 1945. Mr.

McCloy was President of the World Bank from 1947 to 1949 and U.S. Military Governor and High

Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. He has been coordinator of U.S. disarmament activities

since 1961.

GENERAL COUNSEL

J. Lee Rankin was born in Hartington, Nebr., on July 8, 1907. He received his A.B. degree from the

University of Nebraska in 1928 and his LL.B. in 1930 from the University of Nebraska Law School.

He was admitted to the Nebraska bar in 1930 and practiced law in Lincoln, Nebr., until January 1953

when he was appointed by President Eisenhower to be the assistant attorney general in charge of the

Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. In August 1956 President Eisenhower appointed

Mr. Rankin to be the Solicitor General of the United States. Since January 1961 Mr. Rankin has been in

private practice in New York City. He accepted the appointment as General Counsel for the President's

Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy on December 8, 1963.

ASSISTANT COUNSEL

Francis W. H. Adams was born in Mount Vernon, N.Y., on June 26, 1904. He graduated from Williams

College with an A.B. degree, and received his LL.B. degree from Fordham Law School in 1928.

Mr. Adams has acted as chief assistant U.S. attorney in New York, special assistant to the U.S. Attorney

General, and as an arbitrator for the War Labor Board. In 1954 and 1955 he served as police commissioner

of New York City. Mr. Adams is a member of the New York and Washington law firm of Satterlee,

Warfield & Stephens.

Joseph A. Ball was born in Stuart, Iowa, on December 16, 1902. He received his B.A. degree from

Creighton University in Omaha, Nebr., and his LL.B. degree from the University of Southern California

in 1927. Mr. Ball teaches criminal law and procedure at the University of Southern California. He

is a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Mr. Ball is a member of the firm of Ball, Hunt & Hart, Long Beach and Santa Ana, Calif.

David W. Belin was born in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1928. He is a graduate of the University of

Michigan, where he earned three degrees with high distinction: A.B. (1951), M. Bus. Adm. (1953), and

J.D. (1954). At the University of Michigan he was associate editor of the Michigan Law Review. He is

a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. He is a member of the law firm of Herrick,

Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, Iowa.

William T. Coleman, Jr., was born in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 7, 1920. He graduated

from the University of Pennsylvania in 1941 with an A.B. degree, summa cum laude, received his

LL.B. in 1946, magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School and served as an editor of the Harvard

Law Review. From 1947 to 1948 he served as law clerk to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, U.S. Court of

7

Appeals for the Third Circuit, and during the 1948-49 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, as law clerk to

Justice Felix Frankfurter. Mr. Coleman has served as a special counsel for the city of Philadelphia and

has been a consultant with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since January 1963. He is

a member of the law firm of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Kohn & Dilks, Philadelphia, Pa.

Melvin A. Eisenberg was born in New York City on December 3, 1934. He was graduated from

Columbia College, A.B., summa cum laude, in 1956, and from Harvard Law School, LL.B., summa

cum laude, in 1959. Mr. Eisenberg is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and served as an editor of the

Harvard Law Review. He is associated with the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in

New York City.

Burt W. Griffin was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on August 19, 1932. He received his B.A. degree, cure

laude, from Amherst College in 1954, and LL.B. from Yale University Law School in 1959. He was

note and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. During 1959-60 Mr. Griffin served as law clerk to

Judge George T. Washington of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From

1960 to 1962 Mr. Griffin was an assistant U.S. attorney for the northern district of Ohio, and since 1962

he has been associated with the firm of MacDonald, Hopkins & Hardy, Cleveland, Ohio.

Leon D. Hubert, Jr., was born in New Orleans, La., July 1, 1911. He received his A.B. degree from

Tulane University in 1932, and LL.B. from Tulane in 1934. He was associate editor of the Tulane Law

Review, and a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. Mr. Hubert was assistant U.S.

attorney for the eastern district of Louisiana, 1934-46, and a professor of law at Tulane University,

1942-60. He has worked with the Louisiana State Law Institute on the revision of statutes and on the

codes of civil and criminal procedure. Mr. Hubert is a member of the law firm of Hubert, Baldwin &

Zibilich, New Orleans, La.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr., was born in Chicago, Ill., on, June 20, 1907. He received his law degree from the

University of Illinois in 1930. He is a member of the Order of the Coif. In 1956 and 1957 Mr. Jenner

served as a special assistant attorney general of Illinois in the investigation of fraud in the office of the

auditor of public accounts of the State of Illinois. Mr. Jenner is a Commissioner on Uniform State

Laws, a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and vice chairman of the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice. He is a

former professor of law at the Northwestern University School of Law. Mr. Jenner is a member of the

law firm of Raymond, Mayer, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill.

Wesley J. Liebeler was born in Langdon, N. Dak., on May 9, 1931. He received his B.A. degree from

Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., in 1953 and graduated, cum laude, from the University of Chicago

Law School in 1957. He was a managing editor of the University of Chicago Law Review and is a

member of the Order of the Coif. Mr. Liebeler is associated with the law firm of Carter, Ledyard &

Milburn, New York City.

Norman Redlich was born in New York City on November 12, 1925. He received his B.A. degree,

magna cum laude, from Williams College in 1947, his LL.B., cure laude, from Yale Law School in

1950, and LL.M. (Taxation) in 1955 from the New York University School of Law. He is a member of

Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif, and was executive editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr.

Redlich is Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, and is editor in chief of the Tax

Law Review, New York University.

8

W. David Slawson was born in. Grand Rapids, Mich., on June 2, 1931. He received his A.B. degree,

summa cure laude, from Amherst College in 1953, and M.A. from Princeton University in 1954. Mr.

Slawson received his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard University in 1959. He is a member of

Phi Beta Kappa and was a note editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Slawson is a member of the law

firm of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colo.

Arlen Specter was born in Wichita, Kans., on February 12, 1930. He received his B.A. degree from the

University of Pennsylvania in 1951, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and received his

LL.B.. from Yale Law School in 1956. He was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Specter was an

associate of the law firm of Dechert, Price & Rhoads in Philadelphia from 1956 to 1959, and from 1959

to 1964 he was an assistant in the Philadelphia district attorney's office. Mr. Specter is a member of the

firm of Specter & Katz, Philadelphia, Pa.

Samuel A. Stern was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on January 21, 1929. He graduated with honors from

the University of Pennsylvania with an A.B. in 1949. In 1952 he received his LL.B., magna cum laude,

from Harvard Law School, and was developments editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Stern served

as law clerk to Chief Judge Calvert Magruder, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, during 1954-

55 and was law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren during 1955-56. He is a member of the law firm of

Wilmer, Cutler & Picketing, Washington, D.C.

Howard P. Willens was born in Oak Park, Ill., on May 27, 1931. He received his B.A. degree, with

high distinction, from the University of Michigan in 1953 and his LL.B. from Yale Law School in

1956. Mr. Willens is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. He was

associated with the law firm of Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Washington, D.C., until

1961, when he was appointed Second Assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of

Justice.

STAFF MEMBERS

Philip Barson was born in Philadelphia, Pa, on May 2, 1912. He received his Bachelor of Science of

Commerce, from Temple University, Philadelphia, in 1934. Mr. Barson has been employed by the

Internal Revenue Service, Intelligence Division, Philadelphia, since September 1948, first as a special

agent and since 1961 has been group supervisor. Mr. Barson is a certified public accountant from the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Edward A. Conroy was born in Albany, N.Y., on March 20, 1920. He attended Brooklyn Polytechnical

Institute and Benjamin Franklin University, Washington, D.C. Mr. Conroy joined the Internal Revenue

Service as a revenue officer in 1946. After acting as executive assistant to the assistant regional inspector,

Boston, Mass., Mr. Conroy became senior inspector in the Planning and Programing Branch of the

Internal Security Division, Inspection, of the Internal Revenue Service. He currently occupies that

position.

John Hart Ely was born in New York City on December 3, 1938. He graduated, summa cum laude,

from Princeton University in 1960, and from Yale Law School, magna cum laude, in 1963. He was note

and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. He is a member of the Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of

the Coif. During the 1964-65 term Mr. Ely will serve as law clerk to Chief Justice Warren.

9

Alfred Goldberg was born in Baltimore, Md., on December 23, 1918. He received his A.B. degree from

Western Maryland College in 1938, and his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University in 1950. After 4

years' service with the U.S. Army, Dr. Goldberg became historian with the U.S. Air Force Historical

Division and later Chief of the Current History Branch. In 1962-63 he was a visiting American fellow,

King's College, University of London, and since his return has been senior historian, U.S. Air Force

Historical Division. Dr. Goldberg is the author or editor of several publications on historical subjects

and is a contributor to Encyclopedia Britannica and the World Book.

Murray J. Laulicht was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 12, 1940. He received his B.A. in 1961 from

Yeshiva College, and received his LL.B. degree, summa cum laude, from Columbia University School

of Law in 1964. He was notes and comments editor of the Columbia Law Review. During 1964-65 Mr.

Laulicht will clerk for Senior Judge Harold R. Medina of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit.

Arthur K. Marmor was born in New York City on December 5, 1915. He received a B.S.S. degree from

the College of the City of New York in 1937 and an A.M. degree from Columbia University in 1940. He

served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Mr. Marmor has been historian for the Departments of

Interior, Army, and Air Force, and Chief, Editorial Services Branch, Department of State. He has also

taught for the American University and the University of Maryland. Mr. Marmor has contributed to

numerous Government publications and has been in charge of the editing of historical and legal volumes.

At present he is a historian for the Department of the Air Force.

Richard M. Mosk was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on May 18, 1939. He graduated from Stanford

University, with great distinction, in 1960 and from Harvard Law School, cum laude, in 1963. Mr.

Mosk is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. During the 1964-65 term of the California Supreme Court Mr.

Mosk will clerk for Justice Mathew Tobriner.

John J. O'Brien was born in Somerville, Mass., on September 11, 1919. Mr. O'Brien received his

B.B.A. degree in law and business, cum laude, from Northeastern University, Boston, Mass. He rereceived

his M.A. degree in the field of governmental administration from George Washington University,

Washington, D.C., and in 1941 joined the Bureau of Internal Revenue. After service in the U.S.

Coast Guard, Mr. O'Brien resumed his work as an Internal Revenue Service investigator, and is currently

the Assistant Chief of the Inspection Services Investigations Branch, in the National Office of

Internal Revenue.

Stuart R. Pollak was born in San Pedro, Calif., on August 24, 1937. He received his B.A. degree from

Stanford University, with great distinction, in 1959, and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Mr. Pollak

obtained his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962, where he was book review

and legislation editor of the Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term Mr. Pollak was law clerk to

Justices Stanley Reed and Harold Burton. Mr. Pollak is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the

U.S. Department of Justice.

Alfredda Scobey was born in Kankakee, III. She received her A.B. degree from American University,

Washington, D.C., in 1933, studied law at John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Ga., and was admitted

to the Georgia bar in 1945. Miss Scobey did graduate study at the National University of Mexico, at

Duke University, and at Emory University, Atlanta. She practiced law from 1945 to 1949 in Atlanta and

since 1949 has been a law assistant in the Court of Appeals, Georgia.

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Charles N. Shaffer, Jr., was born in New York City on June 8, 1932. He attended Fordham College in

1951 and received his LL.B. from the Fordham University School of Law in 1957. From 1958 to 1959

Mr. Shaffer was associated with the law firm of Chadburn, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, New York City.

He was assistant U.S. attorney in the southern district of New York from 1959 to 1961 when he was

appointed Special Trial Attorney in the Criminal and Tax Divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.

Lloyd L. Weinreb was born in New York City on October 9, 1936. He received B.A. degrees from

Dartmouth College, summa cum laude, in 1957, and from the University of Oxford in 1959. He received

his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962. He was case editor of the

Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term Mr. Weinreb was law clerk to Justice John M. Harlan.

Mr. Weinreb is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Testimony of SteveTilly to the ARRB

Los Angeles, California -- September 17, 1996

Mr. Steve Tilley. Mr. Tilley has been from the beginning the Review Board's liaison at the National

Archives. He is the caretaker of the JFK Collection and he is going to provide for the Review

Board an update on the contents of the Collection. And in the past has provided very helpful information

for the Board. Welcome Steve and thank you.

STEVE TILLEY

National Archives, Caretaker of the JFK Collection.

MR. TILLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's always a pleasure to appear before the Board.

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 gave seven specific

responsibilities to the National Archives, but for the purposes of today's discussion I will touch on the

three that are the most important for the research public.

First, within 45 days of the statute being signed, the Archives was required to prepare and make

available standard identification forms used by all government offices in describing assassination records.

Furthermore, the Archives was required to insure the creation of a database for identification forms to

serve as an electronic finding aid to the Collection. This database has been available since the Collection

opened for research in August of 1993. It currently contains over 175,000 identification forms, and

as of last February is available for research via the internet. I have with me some blue book marks

which we have had published at the Archives and we've had them available out on the table and this

gives the internet address for the Collection for those who want to research it via the internet.

I want to emphasize that the database does not contain the actual text of documents. The database

consists of the record identification forms created by each agency as the documents were reviewed.

Secondly, the database has not been updated to reflect decisions made by the Review Board and other

changes in the status of some documents. The National Archives is currently working on that issue and

we hope to be able to start updating the database within a few months.

My second responsibility was to establish the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection. On December the 28th, 1992, the National Archives established the Collection by an announcement

published in the Federal Register on December the 21st of that year. This announcement

also solicited open assassination records from all federal offices for inclusion in the collection. As

established on that date the Collection consisted of open records already in the custody of the National

Archives including the Warren Commission, the Secret Service, the criminal division of the Department

of Justice, a portion of the CIA's 201 personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald and donated records

from several presidential libraries.

A third responsibility, which we shared with other government offices, was to identify, review and

make available to the public all assassination records that could be disclosed under the provisions of

12

the law within a 300 day review period. All records reviewed during this period were required to be

entered into the database and have a record identification form attached. At the end of the review period

the newly released records were made available, including the remainder of Oswald's 201 file, the first

portions of the CIA segregated collection of related assassination records, the records of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations and records of several DOJ components, although none from the

FBI.

The first records of the FBI were transferred in December of 1993 beginning with the headquarter

and field office files on Jack Ruby. Since then the FBI has transferred records relating to Lee Harvey

Oswald, Marina Oswald, David Ferrie, Clay Shaw, Sam Giancana, Marie DeLorenz, Carlos Marcellos,

Santos Trafficante, and many other individuals and subjects. We are scheduled to receive approximately

40 additional boxes of FBI records on Friday of this week. My understanding is that those

records particularly apply to Johnny Rosselli and additional files at the FBI are also under review.

The CIA made additional transfers of records in September and December of 1994 providing the

remaining portions of the segregated collection. The records transferred in September related primarily

to the CIA's work with the Cuban exile groups in the early 1960s, while the latter transfer of consisted

of the notes taken by HSCA staff members during its review of CIA documents. I must point out,

however, that only a portion of the Oswald 201 file and the notes of the HSCA staff members can be

searched in the database. The CIA has run into difficulty with their program for creating data disks and

we are waiting for the transfer of the remainder of these data disks for their records.

The Collection includes the assassination related records of the Church and Pike Committees.

While we have 41 boxes of Church Committee records, a review of the Committee's published report

and certain Committee documents indicates that there are additional assassination related records still

in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There have been contacts with the staff

of the Committee to pursue this issue. The data disks of the records are still in our custody having been

recently transferred and we plan to add them to the database shortly. We have recently identified assassination

records among the records of several Congressional Committees already in our custody. The

records of the Senate Internal Securities Sub-Committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee contain

transcripts of executive session testimony and other documents relating to Ruth Paine, General Edwin

Walker and the Fair Play For Cuba Committee. The records of the House Unamerican Activities Committee

contain a variety of files on several individuals along with files on the Fair Play For Cuba

Committee.

The records of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management

Field, known as the McClelland Committee, may contain assassination records. The index of these

records remains in the custody of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. But a sampling of

entries under Carlos Marcello and Santos Traficante produced references that indicate the probability

of assassination relation documents among the records of the Committee.

Finally the records of the Sub-Committee on Government Information of Individual Rights of the

House Committee on Government Operations, known as the ASZUG Committee, contain documentation

concerning access of records to the Warren Commission and the Kennedy autopsy materials. We

are working with the staffs of the various committees to add these relevant records to the Collection. In

the last year there have been some significant additions to the Collection. In 1995, the Secret Service

turned over the shift reports of the agents protecting the President for November, 1963. Earlier this year

13

the Service released records from the files of Chief James Reilly plus documents relating to the organization

of the Service for the years 1961 and '62.

In October '95 the State Department released additional documents from the passport office. In

April of this year NARA received one cubic foot, approximately 2,500 pages, of the Rockefeller Commission

and the staff of the Ford White House from the Ford Library. These documents were released

as a result of a review of the records of the Rockefeller Commission and the Ford White House staff by

a CIA team which spent a week at the library. The remaining records of the Commission are still under

review by the CIA and other agencies.

There are also acquired records donated by individuals under deeds of gift. The papers of Jim

Garrison and Edward Wegmann were donated to the Collection after the public hearing in New Orleans.

In July of this year motion picture film taken in Dallas on the November the 22nd, 1963, was

donated by Janet Veazey and Helen Sturgess Anderson.

A great deal of material remains under review by various agencies. The FBI continues to review

related documents and the criminal division of the Department of Justice is currently reviewing the

previously withheld portions of that office file on the assassination. We have yet to receive any records

from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The Postal Service indicated last year they were almost ready to transfer a file on the investigation

of the sale of Oswald's rifle through the mail, but we have not received that file at this time.

Various components of the Department of Defense continue to locate and review documents related

to the assassination. For example, we recently located at NARA the files of the Secretary of the

Army related to Operation Mongoose. While these records were legally transferred to NARA in 1995,

when the Kennedy Act was signed into law in 1992, these records were in the custody of the Department

of the Army were not located.

A team of CIA and other reviewers recently visited the Kennedy Library in Boston to review the

National Security files related to Cuba and other related topics. We hope to receive the results of this

review in the near future.

And if I may answer a couple of questions that were raised previously in the hearing, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, all executive sessions transcripts of the Warren Commission are now released and

available. And also at this time all documents created by the staff of the Warren Commission are

available for research with no redactions. The remaining records of the Warren Commission that are

closed, are all created by other agencies and some of them are still going through that 30-day review

process. And I'm willing to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you, Mr. Tilley. Are there any questions for Mr. Tilley?

DR. NELSON: How many documents would you say are now there to be plowed through?

MR. TILLEY: It's hard to say.

DR. NELSON: A couple of million?

14

MR. TILLEY: A couple of million. A couple of million, yeah. We probably have more than 175,000

records in the database as we continue to add things. But of course the database only reflects the

documents that were reviewed since the passing of the statute. It doesn't reflect those documents which

were open which was a considerable amount of material. So we have a great number of documents

available.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you very much, Steve. Thank you for your continued help.

MR. TILLEY: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: It's been a very interesting and provocative hearing this morning with testimony.

I think the Review Board has certainly heard very good advice from quite a number of people. I

do want to particularly thank James Rankin, Wesley Liebeler and David Lifton for their donations of

records and physical material. That information will be very helpful to the American public.

We are going to hold the record open from this hearing for a period of time in case there's additional

testimony that anyone wishes to submit. What day will it be open --

MR. MARWELL: October 11th.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: It will be open until October 11th. So, any additional testimony the Board

would be very pleased to accept.

There being no further business to come before the Assassination Records Review Board today, is there

a motion to adjourn?

DR. HALL: So moved.

DR. JOYCE: Second.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: All of those in favor of adjourning say aye.

(Aye)

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Opposed?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: It's carried. This meeting of the public hearing of the Assassination Records

Review Board is adjourned.

(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter concluded at 1:05 p.m.)

15

Editor’s Note: David Lifton first published this material on July 1968, in a book that also included

Commission Document 344: The transcript of a tape recording of the first interrogation of Marina

Oswald by the United States Secret Service, on November 24, 1963, with a covering memorandum from

Inspector Kelly and the Liebeler Memorandum of September 6, 1964 regarding “Galley Proofs of

Chapter IV of the Report.”

We’ve reproduced his introduction to allow the reader to experience the early researcher’s limited

access to documentary evidence and the status of the case regarding the Warren Commission’s performance

compared to today.

In his book Lifton noted that of the Warren Commission Executive transcripts, four entire meetings

are at present being withheld. The transcripts of December 6, 1963, January 27, 1964, May 19,

1964, and June 23, 1964, remained classified, as well as portions of three others. These sessions and

certain redacted pages have now been declassified and are included on this CD-Rom.

Debra Conway

JFK Lancer

July 2001

THE WARREN

COMMISSION’S

EXECUTIVE

SESSION

TRANSCRIPTS

Introduction by David Lifton

The three documents published in this book will be of great

interest to students of the assassination of President Kennedy, particularly those who have followed the

evolution of the controversy over the conclusions of the Warren Report. When the Report was released

in September, 1964, it was generally conceded that the findings of such a prestigious investigative

body would bear a stamp of authority that would insure their immediate, widespread, and lasting acceptance.

Undoubtedly authoritative, the Warren Report has been less than successful when judged by

the standard of credibility, rather than the credentials of its authors. In view of the controversy, rather

than the surrounding the conclusions of the Commission, it is a matter of considerable interest as to

exactly how the seven members of the Commission approached the task of investigating the murder of

former President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.

Shortly after the creation of the Commission by President Lyndon Johnson, the seven members

met in private executive session to discuss the problem of internal organization, and a large number of

details of the investigation. These details ranged from important policy questions such as how to deal

16

with the autopsy x-rays and photos of President

Kennedy to more lighthearted matters such

as who might be responsible for various news

leaks about their work which appeared from

time to time. Subsequent executive sessions

were held throughout the tenure of the Commission,

and a transcript was kept of these proceedings

and deposited with the U.S. National

Archives after the Commission disbanded. The

transcripts of the sessions in which the Commission heard the testimony of witnesses was published in

the 26 Volumes of Hearings and Exhibits in November, 1964, about two months after the publication of

the Warren Report. In contrast, the executive session transcript was only recently declassified from

“Top Secret” in February, 1968. It is published here for the first time.

The executive session transcript is a most unique historical document. here we have recorded the

conversations, frequently on a first name basis, between Chief Justice Earl Warren; Allen Dulles, former

head of the CIA; Senator Cooper, Senator Russell, Representative Boggs, Representative Ford and

John McCloy. The close perspective of the Commission at work that is afforded by this transcript is

revealing. For example, members of the Commission later denied the charge, leveled by its critics, that

the attitude with which the Commissioners approached their work mitigated against their finding evidence

of conspiracy. Specifically, it has been charged that the Commission’s primary purpose was to

reassure the nation and to prove that the assassination of President Kennedy was the non-political and

nonconspiratorial act of one lone deranged man. The transcript reveals numerous conversations which

can be cited to support this charge.

At the very first meeting of the Commission on December 5, 1963, John McCloy, truncating a

commonly used expression, said: “This Commission is set up to lay the dust, dust not only in the

United States but all over the world...everybody is looking for it to come forward promptly, unfortunately,

with an objective, comprehensive report which will lay all the dust...”

As soon as the Commission members took their oath of office during their meeting of Dec 16, 63,

Allen Dulles handed out paperback copies of a book about previous assassinations. Said Dulles: “It’s a

book written about ten years ago giving the background of seven attempts on the lives of the

President...It’s a fascinating book, but you’ll find a pattern running through here that I think we’ll find

in the present case. I hate to give you a paperback, but that’s all there is.” Said Chairman Warren:

“Paperback is good enough. Thank you very much.”

When Dulles again brought up the subject, stating that except for the Truman assassination attempt,

“...these other cases are all habitual, going back to the attack on Jackson in 1835.” McCloy cited

the Lincoln assassination and retorted: “THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION WAS A PLOT.” Replied

Dulles: “Yes, but one man was so dominant that it almost wasn’t a plot.”

During the meeting of January 21, 1964, Dulles suggested that a member of the Commission’s

staff be assigned “the question of studying previous cases of assassination attempts against the head of

state particularly in the United States...There is a pattern that runs through that, you know. It is rather

interesting, I have been studying that a good bit myself...”

Dulles was not alone in looking to the past for precedent. at the December 16 meeting, Chairman

Warren made these remarks: “Gentleman, this came to mind a day or so ago, and that is this, in England

whenever they have a crisis they have a Royal Commission appointed, and they have had some great

reports made up. I thought it might be wise for us to ask the Library of Congress to get us a set of all

these Royal Commissions reports, back a good many years, including the most recent one, the Lord

“THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION

WAS A PLOT.”

Replied Dulles: “Yes, but one man

was so dominant that it almost

wasn’t a plot.”

17

Denning report.” McCloy then said: “It’s very

interesting the way he handled that.” And Warren

continued: “They have served a great purpose

in satisfying the public and I thought we

might learn something by getting them.”

The anecdotes just cited partially indicate

the extent of the Commission’s initial predisposition.

It is impossible in this brief introduction

to do justice to the entire transcript and the attitudes

that it reveals which guided the investigation.

It is perfectly clear that a conspiracy might

have been responsible for the death of President

Kennedy, and never even considered the possibility of a conspiracy to deceive and mislead the Commission

itself. it did not design its investigation so as to discover the former, if it existed, or to avoid the

pitfalls of the latter, if it existed.

Consider the fact that in the very first meeting, on December 5, 1963, the Chairmnof the President’s

Commission, Chief Justice Earl Warren, made the following statements and suggestions in his opening

remarks:

1) “...I am sure that there is not one of us but would rather be doing almost anything

else tha he can think of than to be on a commission of this kind...the very thought

of reviewing these details day by day is really sickening to me.”

2) “Now I think our job here is essentially one of gathering evidence, and I believe

that at the outset at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the

reports of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigating the matter,

the F.B.I., the Secret Service, and others...If we can’t rely on them I couldn’t think

of any investigators we can get to do it anyway.”

3) “...at the present time I do not feel that it would be necessary for us to have any

staff of investigators.”

4) “I am of the opinion also that it is not necessary for us to bring witnesse before us.”

5) “Having that view, I do not believe that it is necessary for us to have the power of

subpoena...”

6) “So I would hope we could hold our meetings and take any evidence or any statements

that we want in camera, and eventually make our report without any great

fanfare throughout the country.”

It is true that the Commission eventually called witnesses and did arm itself with the power of

subpoena. But the point is a that from the very beginning the man who headed this investigation viewed

these forensic tools as superfluous to the purpose of the Commission and the scope of its investigation.

Each of the documents published in this book is important in making a more informed judgement

of the work of the Warren Commission. Until now, they have been unavailable unless one made the

“...we can start with the premise that

we can rely upon the reports of the

various agencies that have been

engaged in investigating the matter,

the F.B.I., the Secret Service, and

others...If we can’t rely on them I

couldn’t think of any investigators

we can get to do it anyway.”

18

effort to order them from the U.S. National Archives. That process takes several months and, due to the

combined length of the documents, costs almost as much for a xerox copy as the entire 26 volumes of

the Warren Commission. It is hoped that the publication of these documents in this format will be a

small but useful addition to the growing library of critical materials about the Warren Report.

David Lifton

Los Angeles, California

July 31, 1968

Printed with permission.

Copyright © 1968 by David Lifton. All rights reserved.

First Sightext Publications Edition, 1968

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

24 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001

Behind Closed Doors

Minutes of Unrecorded Warren Commission

Executive Session Found in National Archives

by Mark Sobel

cussed at a meeting scheduled for July 2, 1964 — of

which there seems to be no record.

Among the Comments made by the Commission:

i) The answer to the question “Did Oswald kill Officer

Tippit” would be an unqualified “yes”.

ii) Regarding Marina Oswald’s allegation that Oswald

threatened to kill Richard Nixon, “the Commission

questions whether the incident did, in fact, occur.”

iii) Dancing around what has since come to be known

as the “Second Oswald Theory”, the Commission

wished to state that “there is some evidence by reputable

people that Oswald practiced with his rifle during

October and November 1963, ... (but) ... other

circumstances tend to negate any such conclusion.”

The notion of an Oswald look-alike is not raised.

iv) To the question “Did Oswald have any accomplices

at the scene of the assassination?” the Commission

responded that “all of the evidence the Commission

has indicates that Oswald was alone at the scene of

the assassination.”

v) The Commissioners deal with the statement by

Deputy Sherrif Roger Craig that Craig saw a man

resembling Oswald run down the knoll beside the

Depository and get into a station wagon by concluding

that Craig was “mistaken” since Oswald was on

a bus at the time.

vi) In answering “What do the investigative agencies

conclude on the subject (of Oswald being a Foreign

Agent)?” the Commissioners responded that “the

agencies uniformly said that Oswald was a “loner.”

vii) The Commissioners “were unwilling to assign any

particular motive” to their conclusions regarding the

actions of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby.

A 9-page document found in the National Archives

[among the 40,000 private papers of Commission

General Council J. Lee Rankin donated by his family

in 1997 ???] details a meeting of the Warren Commissioners

on June 29, 1964 that is not listed by the

Archives as ever having taken place, (presumably because

there is no official transcript of this meeting). All

previously known meetings of the Commission Executives

were transcribed by a court reporter, which was

the standard procedure.

The minutes begin with a discussion of the unauthorized

publication of the diary of Lee Harvey Oswald

in the Dallas Morning News, and with the Commissioners

unanimously adopting a request for the FBI

to investigate the source of the leak.

It was agreed that the tentative date for delivering

the report to President Johnson be set to early August,

(the final report was ultimately delivered in late

September). The Commission also heard a report from

members Earl Warren and Gerald Ford of their interview

with Jack Ruby in the Dallas jail. Mention is made

of Ruby’s request for a polygraph exam; interestingly

no mention is made of his repeated requests to be taken

to Washington to testify, citing that his life was in danger,

as the Ruby transcripts demonstrate. (New York

Columnist Dorothy Killgallan later obtained an unauthorized

copy of the Ruby transcript, which was subsequently

published before the Warren Report was issued).

The Commissioners discussed the existence of

conspiracy-oriented writings that were being widely

circulated in Europe, especially a book by Thomas

Buchanan, and decided that the best way “to handle

these matters” was to evaluate them in an appendix to

the report entitled “Refutation of Rumors and Theories.”

The Commissioners then turned to a list of 72 conclusions

that the staff had reached in the writing the

draft of the Warren report for the Commissioners to

approve, disapprove or comment on. The first 65 were

dealt with at this meeting, with the remainder to be disKennedy

Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001 25

viii) Regarding the draft chapter on Oswald himself,

“the Commissioners commented that they thought

the Liebler draft was too soft and sympathetic about

Oswald and did not adequately present the strength

of his character which they considered to be “steely”

as evidenced by a number of Oswald’s acts.” (Author

Edward J. Epstein makes mention of a rewrite

of this chapter in his 1966 book Inquest.)

There is no indication in the minutes of whether

or not a court reporter was present at the meeting. It is

known that at a previous Commission Executive session

of January 22, 1964, the Commissioners had requested

that the transcript of the meeting be destroyed.

The National Archives listed this meeting as having

occurred, but the record destroyed at the request of the

Commission. The existence of a transcript became

known, however, when Gerald Ford published excerpts

of the “destroyed” (and then still Classified) transcript

in his 1965 book Portrait of the Assassin. Later it was

discovered that the original court reporter’s tape of this

meeting still existed in the National Archives, and after

a Freedom of Information lawsuit lasting almost 10

years, the transcript was released in the mid-1970s. It

was first published by Harold Weisberg in his Whitewash

series of books.

Although the official records indicate that the final

meeting of the Warren Commissioners in September

1964 consisted of minutes only, (no transcript just

as the June 29 meeting), the first page of the minutes of

that September meeting is, itself, a transcript — starting

with Earl Warren’s opening statement. Only at the

top of page 2 does the document turn into several pages

of minutes written by Commission Council J. Lee

Rankin. It was later confirmed in the Johnson Tapes

that at this September meeting Senator Richard Russell

initially wished to dissent from signing the Warren

Report (due to his disbelief of the Single Bullet Theory)

and yet Rankin’s minutes do not make reference to this

significant event.

In light of these Minutes of the final session starting

as a transcript, and not containing reference to

Russell’s dissent, it is not unreasonable to suggest that

there had indeed been a transcript made which was secretly

destroyed so that the lack of unanimity among

the Commissioners would not be on the record. One

then asks the question of why Rankin allowed the first

“transcript” page to remain intact, an obvious contradiction

of the “official” position that only minutes were

made. Rankin was certainly not a stupid man, and the

record indicates that he began his work for the Com-

LBJ amd Russell September 9,1964:

RUSSELL: No, no. They're trying to prove that the same

bullet that hit Kennedy first was the one that hit

Connally, went through him and through his hand, his

bone, and into his leg.... I couldn't hear all the evidence

and cross-examine all of 'em. But I did read the

record...I was the only fellow there that ... suggested

any change whatever in what the staff got up. This

staff business always scares me. I like to put my own

views down. But we got you a pretty good report.

LBJ: Well, what difference does it make which bullet

got Connally?

RUSSELL: Well, it don't make much difference. But

they said that ... the commission believes that the same

bullet that hit Kennedy hit Connally. Well, I don't

believe it.

LBJ: I don't either.

RUSSELL: And so I couldn't sign it. And I said that

Governor Connally testified directly to the contrary

and I'm not gonna approve of that. So I finally made

'em say there was a difference in the commission, in

that part of 'em believed that that wasn't so. And ‘course

if a fellow was accurate enough to hit Kennedy right

in the neck on one shot and knock his head off in the

next one - and he's leaning up against his wife's head

- and not even wound her - why, he didn't miss

completely with that third shot. But according to their

theory, he not only missed the whole automobile, but

he missed the street! Well, a man that's a good enough

shot to put two bullets right into Kennedy, he didn't

miss that whole automobile.

mission with great idealism, wishing to bring in investigators

outside of the FBI, and to investigate possible

conspiratorial meetings in Mexico.

Rankin also expressed concern that the alignment

of wounds in the President’s back and throat would have

required a single bullet to turn upwards. Over a period

of time he become less vocal, as the Commission’s

agenda solidified. Perhaps, objecting to the revisionist

history taking place in the record of the final meeting

in September 1964, Rankin deliberately left a small

breadcrumb for future historians to find — a

breadcrumb almost certainly confirmed by the contents

of the 1993 released telephone recording between President

Johnson and Senator Richard Russell in which

Russell details the controversial events of that final

meeting.

26 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001 27

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

28 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001 29

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

30 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001 31

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

32 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2001

Minutes of the June 29, 1964 Executive Session Meeting

JFK Lancer 1

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JFK Lancer 4

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SPRING 2001

JFK Lancer 5

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, published four times each year, is devoted to providing

information on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and related events.

This newsmagazine is typically 40 pages and contains exciting articles and photos from some

of the foremost researchers in the world and promises to keep even the casual reader informed

on recent events and research.

We encourage you to give a gift subscription to your local school

and county library.

See the Library Patrons page for a listing of our Patrons.

JFK Lancer’s Kennedy Assassination Chronicles

Submission Guidelines

One of our goals at JFK Lancer is to provide a forum for researchers’ work while at the same time

providing our readers with the most valid information on the case as possible. Without the efforts of each

of you, we cannot succeed. To reach this goal, let us encourage one another to make our research and

analysis part of the written record on the JFK assassination case. To begin a near year of publication,

KAC quarterly magazine is pleased to list the following publication submission guidelines:

Submitting Feature Articles: Printed out, double-spaced pages (3,000 words maximum) with all text

formatting, illustration or photo placement noted, accompanied by a copy on disk in ASCII format, or Emailed

in ASCII format. A copy of documents sited should accompany article and references to the Zapruder

film should state which version referenced.

Submitting Reviews: Approximately 500–1000 words with all text formatting, illustration or photo placement

noted. Photograph(s) should accompany article (can obtain from Lancer, manufacturer or book publisher)

and a copy on disk in ASCII format, or E-mailed in ASCII format.

Submitting Photography: We prefer color and black/white photography as prints (no negatives please).

(JPEG or GIFs may be emailed.) All photos should bear the photographer’s name and be numbered for

placement. (Please send with a self-addressed stamped envelope for return.) Copyrighted photos may be

used under “Fair Use Compliance” only with the proper owner sited.

Internet Articles: May be sent in html code or text format. Graphics should be in GIF or JPEG. Articles

submitted for the KAC may be also featured on our web site.

TOPICS: We encourage writers to first propose a story in a letter. If we deem the subject is

appropriate for our publication, we will then respond with suggestions. We discourage telephone

inquiries.

The best method for determining topics that would be of interest to KAC readers is to be one

yourself. Being familiar with the publication and its format is your best assurance for composing

an acceptable story. All manuscripts should include a final paragraph (50 to 75 words) giving

the author’s credentials. First-time writers are always welcome, but should not send their

queries via e-mail; please use traditional postal delivery with a self-addressed stamped envelope.

Typically, you will be notified of our intentions within three weeks.

We accept articles which summarize events of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

and implications related to evidence.

PUBLICATION RIGHTS: We ask to be notified immediately if articles are to be, or have been

previously, printed in other publications or on the internet. We may ask that you withhold publication

on the internet until after publication in KAC.You must request all permissions for

reprinting before submitting to KAC.

JFK Lancer 6

STYLE: We prefer manuscripts written in the active voice, and they should be double-spaced

(and not in all caps). Also, the inclusion of subheads and sidebars add to an article’s readability

and are requested.

EDITING: Robert Chapman is our senior editor. We also utilize several volunteer editors for

content, language usage, continuity, and references. Articles will be returned to you for changes

requested. Articles not spell-checked before submission to us will not be corrected but will be

put in our circular file. (we have enough problems!)

SUBMIT ARTICLES FOR PUBLICATION TO:

Robert Chapman, Senior Editor

6797 Satinwood Cove

Memphis, TX 38119

901-682-9670 tel.

editor@jfklancer.com

The editor’s primary responsibility is the supervision of the printed material produced by the institution.

The editor reads and, if necessary, corrects, rewrites or revises such material to insure that it is presented

in clear terminology, precise language and proper grammatical and stylistic form. The editor works with

the graphic designer to project the museum’s desired image, and will supervise all the mechanical processes

of production, from submission of manuscript to the printer to binding of the final product.

JFK Lancer does not pay for articles published in the Kennedy Assassination Chronicles.

We hope you will join us in our efforts to make your research more widely available.

JFK Lancer 1

SPRING 2001 Volume 7 Issue 1

This issue contains the following articles along with our

usual features, In The News, Passages, Voices, and JFK

Lancer Resource Mail Order specials.

• Vince Salandria's “Tale of Two Tapes”

The second of a series of essays by Vince Salandria and

E. Martin Shotz featured on the JFK Lancer website

“Upfront.” Salandria's article is a compelling personal

journey regarding JFK assassination evidence and on

the recent article by George Lardner detailing the

revelations of the new study concerning evidence of a

shot from the grassy knoll.

• W. Tracy Parnell's “Handwriting is on the Wall”

This article is based on Part Three of a series of critical analysis of the research of John

Armstrong that first appeared on the internet at “The Lee Harvey Oswald Research

Page.” (http://www.madbbs.com/~tracy/lho/index.htm). Parnell's article is an fascinating

analysis of selected examples of Oswald's known handwriting.

• John D. William and Debra Conway's “The Don Reynold's

Testimony and LBJ: November 22, 1963 and the Senate Rules

Committee Hearing.”

A very important, long withheld document is included with this comprehensive article:

The explosive “Halfen List” of 40 names given by Mafia payoff man, Jack Halfen. It is

published in this issue for the first time anywhere.

Order your copy or subscribe online at:

http://jfklancer.com/Chronicles.html

Call/Fax Tom Jones 972-264-2007

Email tom@jfklancer.com

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles

Back Issues

On the next few pages is a listing of our back issues with the table of

contents. Many articles are on our web site and others are highlighted here

in Adobe PDF format so you can read a sampling of articles we’ve published

throughout the years.

Please continue to support JFK assassination research by subscribing to

KAC and purchasing our back issues. You’ll find they are an important addition

to your reference library.

JFK Lancer 2

WINTER 2000 Volume 6 Issue 3

• NID 2000 Conference Review, Jim Fetzer

• NID 2000 Speakers and Awards

• Oswald and the Helsinki Hotel, Ian Griggs

• JFK Opposed Globalist, Jim Marrs

• The Spirit of the New Frontier, Kerry McCarthy

The Secret Service Agent on the Knoll, Debra Conway

SUMMER 2000 Volume 6 Issue 2

• Being There, Almost:A first person account of the filming of the movie JFK in Dealey

Plaza,Michael West.

• Harvey and Lee: In North Dakota: Correcting the record on the Aline Mosby Interview, W.

Tracy Parnell.

• Gov. Connally's Wrist Wound and CE-399: A complete account of the bullet fragments,

Clint Bradford.

• The Running Woman: Toni Foster. An exclusive interview with the Dealey Plaza witness

seen in the Zapruder film, Debra Conway.

SPRING 2000 Volume 6, Issue 1

• Was "Hidell" A Bartender? Wallace Milam

• The Failures of the ARRB, Doug Horne

• The Fourteen-Minute Gap, Rex Bradford

The 1999 JFK Lancer Bus Tour ( Ken Holmes, Jr..

• When a Mysterious Death is No Longer Mysterious Mark K. Colgan

FALL 2000 Volume 6 Issue 3

• Vince Salandria's False Mystery and the Transparent Conspiracy, a Review by William

E. Kelly, Jr.

• If At First You Don't Succeed: Robert Blakey, the HSCA and the Return of the Single

Bullet Theory, Joe Biles

• The Harper Fragment (Excerpt from the new book, Murder in Dealey Plaza) David W.

Mantik, M.D., Ph.D.

• Herbert Helps Out -- A Brief Rebuttal to the Christenberry Dicision, by Joe Biles

JFK Lancer 3

SPRING 1999 Volume 5, Issue 1

• A Fragment of Truth?, Joe Backes

• The Culture of the ARRB, Doug Horne

• In Politics and Policies of JFK and RFK: The McClellan Committee Investigation of

Organized Labor, Dr. Anthony Baltakis

A Profile of Political Assassins: The Common Denominators' Exclusion of Lee

Harvey Oswald, Angus Crane.

• With A Study of the Presidential Limousine, Doug Weldon

• Stewart Galanor, A History of the Medical Evidence, and The Grassy Knoll

These articles are excerpted from his book, Cover-Up.

Ian Griggs' The Railroading of Lee Harvey Oswald

SUMMER 1999 Vol. 5, Issue 2

• A Tribute To John F. Kennedy, Jr.

• William Harvey in Florida, 1963, Noel Twyman

• William Gaudet: Make Room for the Man at the Front of the Line, Nancy Wertz

• First Shot/First Hit Circa Z-190, Barb Junkkarinen

• Two Presidential Limousines: Did They Play A Role in the Assassination?, Mike Johnson,

with comments from Pamela McElwain-Brown

• First-Day Evidence and Dealey Plaza, Michael Parks

FALL 1999 Volume 5, Issue 3

• Warren Commission Report Turns 35 Years Old, Martin Shackelford

• K.G.B. Told Tall Tales About Dallas, Book Review by Martin Shackelford

• Phone Transcript Between Acting AG Ramsey Clark and LBJ,

Transcribed by Debra Conway

• SWAT Snipers vs. Lee Harvey Oswald, Mark Anning and Eric Nelson Mark

• Continuation to First Shot/First Hit Circa Z-190, Douglas DeSalles, M.D.

• I Led One Life, Hal Verb

• A Visit to SAM 26000, James Sawa

WINTER 1999 Volume 5, Issue 4

• Conference Awards

• The Man in the Middle:Richard Case Nagell's View of an Evolving Conspiracy, Larry

Hancock

• An Examination of the Presidential Limousine in the White House Garage, Pamela

McElwain-Brown

• We Remember President Kennedy, Kerry McCarthy

• An Interview with Kerry McCarthy, John Kelin, from Fair Play Magazine

• Three Phases of Assassination-Excerpt: Robert Kennedy and Phase I, Debra Conway

• Doug Horne-Specifics in the Files, Comments by John Kelin

• Why the JFK Assassination Still Matters, Bill Holiday

What's Wrong With These Pictures?, Barb Junkkarinen

JFK Lancer 4

Summer 1998 Volume 3 Issue 2

• The Unified Solution of the Shots Fired in Dealey Plaza: A breakdown of the sequence of

shots and their sources, Bill Truels

New Witness Speaks on Medical Evidence, JFK Lancer Oral History Project interviews

Saundra Spencer, former Navy Lab tech. William Law

http://www.jfklancer.com/LNE/MedDepo.html#New

The Zapruder Film: Version or Virgin? Anna Marie Kuhns-Walko

Robert Kennedy 30 Years Later: A Case Update, Lawrence Teeter, Sirhan Attorney

Lee Bowers' View, A Photo Essay by Greg Jaynes

Frank Sinatra, Sam Giancana and the 1960 West Virginia Primary, Chris W. Courtwright

Did Oswald Talk? An analysis of LHO's whereabouts while in the DPD jail, Russ Burr

SPRING 1998 Volume 4 Issue 1

Amnesty: The Initiative's Origins, George Michael Evica

Seek and Ye Shall Find: Making Sense of the New Document Releases, Anna Marie Kuhns-

Walko

The Unidentified Finger Prints, KAC Interview: Glen Sample and Mark Collum

The Secret Service: In Their Own Words, Vince Palamara

Three Shots in Three Seconds, Audio tapes tell the tale:, Jim Fetzer

Eugene B. Dinkin: Foreknowledge? excerpt from the book Bloody Treason by Noel Twyman

Fall 1998 Volume 4, Issue 3

Brilab's Calling: Released transcripts from the FBI's wiretaps of Carlos Marcello during

the HSCA investigation.

THE ARRB Departs: Selections from the ARRB Final Report

ARRB Open Meeting Question and Answer Session, Sept. 9, 1998, Transcript by Joe

Backes

Once Again Into the Breach: Book Review of Stewart Galanor's COVER-UP, Charles

Drago

Whiplash Greer: A study of frame extraction within the Zapruder film, Michael Parks

James Jenkins on JFK'S Autopsy,Charles Drago. L.I.N.E. News Release

The Big Easy: Background on the James Jenkins Oral History Interview, William Matson

Law

The Third Wound: A New Look at the President's Wounds, Milicent Cranor

Evidence: A Photo Essay: JFK's backbelt, shirt, and coat-front

US -VS- Cuba: Documents on US Military Planning, 1962 -

Winter 1998 Vol. 4, Issue 4

JFK Lancer Announces a New Editor for KAC: Robert Chapman

November In Dallas 1998 Conference

Student's Symposium Recap, James Sawa and Glenn Vasbinder

Examination of Two Different Brain Specimans Following President Kennedy's Autopsy,

Doug Horne

NEW Evidence Regarding Ruth & Michael Paine, Steve Jones

Michael Paine- A Life of Unanswered Paradoxes, Nancy Wertz

JFK Lancer - Mary Ferrell Pioneer Awards:David Lifton and Gaeton Fonzi, transcript of

Keynote Speech

JFK JFK Lancer - Mary Ferrell Scholarships: Marco Panella and Mark Taylor

Bus Tour Recap and Photos,, Russ Shearer

Don’t Forget Dallas, Connie Kritzberg

JFK Lancer 5

SPRING 1997 Volume 3 Issue 2

Dr. Robert McClelland in Trauma Room One, Brad Parker

Oswald In Aliceland , Chris W. Courtwright

The Gun That Didn't Smoke, Walter F. Graf and Richard R. Bartholomew

A Clue Of Singularity: Lee Harvey Oswald and the History of Presidential Assailants,

Angus E. Crane

Prelude: The "Taking" of the Zapruder Film, Jeremy Gunn, ARRB General Counsel

The Unseen Hand: A Book Review, Craig Roberts

Letters To The Chronicles, featuring Martin Shackelford on the Z film alteration

SUMMER 1997 Volume 3 Issue 2

• JFK Information on the Internet, A close look at disinformation on McAdams' web page.

David Lifton

• What Have You Got There, Jack? A brief examination of Ruby's possessions at the time of

his arrest. Ian Griggs

• Jolly Green Giant, A personal look back at D.A. Jim Garrison's case against Clay Shaw,Art

Keven

• The Magic Fragment and Other Stories, Milicent Cranor

Gerald Ford's Terrible Fiction: The Ford-Rankin Document, George Michael Evica

• Reasonable Doubts: The McCloy-Rankin Document

• Book review and interview with author of Working Press, Andrew McCarthy

Former UPI reporter writes his memoirs and admits he knewof Casto plot to kill JFK, Debra

Conway

FALL 1997 Volume 3 Issue 3

• The Plot's Vertical Convergence with U.S. Policy Divisions: The Fourth Decade Conference

Keynote Speech, Peter Dale Scott

• Tippit After the Murder, Bill Drenas

• The Secret Service Interviews,Vincent Michael Palamara

• Hope and Despair:Visiting the Dark Side Of Camelot, Debra Conway

• Cuban Missile Crisis 35 Years Ago

WINTER 1997 Volume 4 Issue 3

Selections from Conference Presentations:

The 81 Promises: The Context of the Crime George Michael Evica

Review of John Armstrong's "Harvey and Lee, Tom DeVries

Acoustic Evidence Revisited, Greg Jaynes

Call To Action and Justice For JFK:

Roger S. Peterson

William Xanttopolis

Notes and Quotes

The Researcher's Workshop, Debra Conway and John Kelin

Dallas and the JFK Lancer Conference: A Personal Memory, William Law

The ARRB Represented at the Lancer Conference, John Kelin

Mary Ferrell, Keynote Address

Remembrance Ceremony

Scholarship Awards

Mary Ferrell-JFK Lancer Awards

Awards Dinner Special Guest Speaker: Kerry McCarthy

JFK Lancer 6

SPRING 1996 Volume 2 Issue 1

No Mentesana Rifle, What Weapon Does The Film Show? by Anthony Marsh

And We Are All Still Mortal, Thomas Dodd and Lee Harvey Oswald by George Michael

Evica

Ordering the Rifle, A Search For Truth, Martha Moyer

An Open Letter, A Hero For Our Time: Gary Raymond

Behind the Lines, Writing and Research Requirements, An Educational Outreach by

George Michael Evica

The Man Who Wasn’t There, Was There, Research Notes and Review by Michael Griffith

ARRB Document Releasing History, Batch 3 by Joe Backes

Oswald Smiling, The Tale of the Tooth, by Richard Bartholomew

The Earliest Evidence, What Did The Parkland Doctors Really Say? by Russell Kent

SUMMER 1996 Vol. 2 Issue 2

• Jim Garrison:In History and Film, George Michael Evica

• Trapped by Their Own Words: The Dallas Police, Jack White

• Stranger in a Strange Land: Kennedy in the Maelstrom, Jim Hargrove

• Richard Bissell: The Man Who Couldn't Kill Castro, Jane Sitko

• Understanding Silvia Odio: What the LaFontaines Don't Tell You, Steve N. Bochan

• The Chronicles Interview: Gaeton Fonzi, Part 1, Steve Bochan with Gordon Winslow

• Internet Resources: Searching R.I.F.'s on the Internet, Chris Courtwright

• Federal Register Updates:and Batch 4, Joe Backes

• James Files' Confession: A Letter from Files to Tom M. Hudson

• Student Contributor:"Eyewitness Account", Carrie Gallagher

FALL 1996 Volume 2 Issue 3

• Pieces of the Jigsaw: Glimpses of the Real Lee Harvey Oswald, Martin Shackelford

• Speaking Out: Odio, LaFontaines, and Oswald

A Conversation With Gaeton Fonzi, Part Two: Steve Bochan, with Gordon Winslow

Elrod Talked And It's About Time: Raymond Carroll

• The Strange Allegations of Raymond Carnay, Chris Courtwright

A Photo Essay: The Board In Los Angeles by Clint Bradford

Statements from:

Marina Oswald Porter

David Lifton

Robert Tannenbaum

The New Improved Limousine Ride: Pro and Con, John Balantyne and John Kelin

Our Guest Speaker: Charles Drago, Santayana Gets The Last Laugh -- Again

WINTER 1996 Volume 2 Issue 4

• The JFK Case: What Does the Blood Tell Us? Sherry Gutierrez

• An ARRB Update, Joe Backes

• 20 Questions: Loose Ends in the JFK Assassination, Jerry Rose

• The Zapruder Film and the Language of Proof, James Fetzer

• The Zapruder Film and the President's Wounds, David Lifton

• Hemming Does Dallas, Charles Drago

• Student's Symposium, James Sawa and Glen Vasbinder

• Witnesses To History, Mark Oakes-Witnesses Panel

• The Paschall Film: Movement Behind the Fence, Greg Jaynes-Witnesses Panel

JFK Lancer 7

SPRING 1995 Volume 1 Issue 1

Basic Training: The Manlicher Carcano, Craig Roberts

Interview With “Mr. X” Fletcher Prouty, Part Two, Gary James

Firearms, Photographs, Lee Harvey Oswald, Ian Griggs

A Conversation With Ronald C. Jones, M.D., Brad Parker

A Book Review Reviewed: KILL ZONE, Craig Roberts

Project JFK: Kansas Students Comment On Trip To Dallas

SUMMER 1995 Volume 1 Issue 2

Letters From A Dallas Jail: Jack Ruby's letter about his role

Now Appearing At the Carousel, Ian Griggs

Conspiracy of Silence Broken, Charles Crenshaw, M.D.

This Dirty Rumor, George Michael Evica

An Open Letter by Marina Oswald Porter

Harold Weisberg The Chronicles Interview, Debra Crouch-Conway

Video Reviews by Tom Hudson

Paul Peters, M.D. Thirty Years After Warren, Brad J. Parker

Ed Hoffman's Changing Story Never Changed,Ron Friedrich

Fletcher Prouty In New Zealand, David Perry

Roger and Me, Richard Barthlowmew

FALL 1995 Volume 1, Issue 3

Camelot, The Theodore H. White Interview With Jackie Kennedy

Missing Parkland Witnesses, Brad Parker

Ed Hoffman vs Badgeman, Ron Friedrich

Roger and Me, Part II, Richard Bartholomew

The President, The Patsy, and The Press, Ian Griggs

What's In A Name? Warren Caster's Story, Rick Caster

The Chronicles Interview: Tom Samoluk of the ARRB, Debra Conway

Solved!, Hal Verb

Parallels, Oswald and McVeigh, Craig Roberts

On The Psychiatric Evidence For The Lone Nut Theory, Dr. Samuel F. Kritzberg

Emmett Hudson and Jack Lawrence, Some Unanswered Questions, Mark Bridger

WINTER 1995 Volume 1 Issue 4

What Happened on November 22, 1963? George Michael Evica

The Bolton Ford Dealership Story: Gerard F. Tujaque, Steve N. Bochan

JFK Blood Evidence: What does the blood tell us?, Sherry Gutierrez, Crime Scene Expert

Trauma Room One: A Resourse: 17 Physicians Placed, Russell Kent

Known Personnel in and out of Trauma Room One: Parkland Memorial Hospital 12:38pm-

2:08pm 11/22/63, Brad J. Parker and Charles Crenshaw, M.D.

Unlikely Witnessess: Which side would have called Ronald Fischer and Ronald E.

Edwards? Ian Griggs

Best Witness: JFK's Limousine, by Anthony Marsh

ARRB Documents History, Joe Backes

C.O.P.A. National Conference 1995, John Kelin, reprinted from Fair Play magazine

From Rio to Nassau, Information exchange with Cuban Officals, Gordon Winslow

Reviews: Oswald and The CIA, by Frank DeBenedectis

“The Truth Shall Set You Free”:The Men Who Killed Kennedy, Part 6, Tom Hudson

The Man Who Wasn't There: The Secret Serviceman behind the picket fence? Chris Mills

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

CHRONICLES

A sampling of articles

throughout the years.

Featured:

Russ Burr

Angus Crane

Mark K. Colgan

George Michael Evica

Ian Griggs

Ken Holmes, Jr.

Dug Horne

Barb Junkkarinen

34 Vol. 6, Issue 1 Spring 2000

1999 JFK LANCER BUS TOUR

Ken M. Holmes, Jr.

This year’s JFK Lancer Bus Tour was hosted by Bill Drenas.

Bill has written several very well researched articles on J. D. Tippit

including “Car #10 Where Are You” and has a background of

interviewing many witnesses. He is careful to question and record

the answers with the most accuracy. He has taken great pride in

the Tour for the past two years and goes into great detail to help

the researchers on the Tour to understand exactly where and what

happened.

The researchers boarded the 45-seat bus in Dealey Plaza near

the corner of Houston and Main streets. When all had boarded the

bus, Bill went to each person to introduce himself and shake hands

and help them to feel comfortable and welcome on the tour. Bill

told everybody that if they had

questions not to hesitate to ask.

While waiting for the bus to

depart, Bill pointed out the various

buildings in Dealey Plaza,

such as the Texas School Book

Depository, The Dal Tex Building,

The Dallas County Records

Building, The Criminal Courts

Building, The Old Red Courthouse,

The Terminal Annex

Building, and The Dallas Morning

News Building.

Because of a mix up at the

Bus Company, the bus had to

make a stop at the Dallas Grand

Hotel before the tour began so

that Tom Jones, who supervised

this year’s Bus Tour, could correct

a problem. Bill took this

opportunity to show points of interest

as we traveled east on

Commerce Street towards the

Hotel. First was the Greyhound

Bus Depot at Commerce and

Lamar Streets, where Oswald

boarded William Whaley’s cab after the assassination and rode to

Oak Cliff. Next was the Santa Fe Building, which housed the FBI

offices in 1963 and where Oswald delivered his note to agent James

Hosty shortly before the assassination. A short distance up Commerce

Street, Bill pointed out the former locations of Jack Ruby’s

Carousel Club, Enquire Shine and Press Shop, Nichols Brothers

Parking Garage, and Abe’s Colony Club all of which were important

in Jack Ruby’s life. Across the street from

these former locations is the Adolphus Hotel and a few blocks east

is the former location of Sol’s Turf Bar, a Ruby hangout.

While we waited outside the Dallas Grand Hotel, Bill informed

us that at the time of the assassination it was known as the Statler

Hilton Hotel and that Jack Ruby was often seen there trying to

promote his business. Bill also pointed out that diagonally across

Commerce Street at the corner of Harwood Street is the location

of Dallas Police Headquarters where Lee Harvey Oswald was interrogated,

detained and murdered. After the difficulty with the

Bus Company was corrected, we were able to depart on the Tour.

As we headed west on Main Street towards Dealey Plaza, Bill

pointed out that this was the exact route that President Kennedy’s

Limousine took down Main Street on 11/22/63. As the bus waited

for a traffic light on Main Street, Bill was able to show where on

Elm Street Oswald boarded Cecil McWatter’s bus on 11/22/63.

Because many of the buildings have been demolished, Bill was

able to point out most of the route that Oswald walked when he

got off the bus on Elm Street and walked down Lamar Street to the

Greyhound Bus Depot. As the tour bus crossed the Houston Street

Viaduct heading towards Oak Cliff, Bill explained that William

Whaley’s cab carrying Oswald on 11/22/63 took this same route.

Bill explained where the Gloco gas station was located at the south

end of this Viaduct, and told how officer J. D. Tippit was seen here

by five witnesses sitting in his squad car shortly before he was

murdered. The bus then passed Methodist Hospital where J. D.

Tippit was taken by ambulance and pronounced dead. Also near

Methodist Hospital was the location of the Dobb’s House Snack

Bar. Employees of the Dobb’s House stated that Oswald, Jack

Ruby and J. D. Tippit had all been customers there at different

times. Bill also showed us that Oswald’s rooming house is only a

little more than a block away from the snack bar.

The tour bus then stopped across the street from Oswald’s

rooming house at 1026 North Beckley Ave. and everyone got off

the bus to get a closer look and some took photographs. Bill explained

such details as when Oswald moved in, what room he lived

Dobb’s House Snack Bar

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 35

in and his activities when he returned here after the assassination.

Of special interest was the bus stop where the rooming house manager

Earlene Roberts last saw Oswald standing after he left the

house at about 1:00 P.M. on 11/22/63. As the bus traveled south

on North Beckley, Bill pointed out that this is a possible route that

Oswald could have taken after he left his rooming house. Bill also

showed us the corner of North Beckley and West Neeley Street

and mentioned the controversy as to where Oswald actually left

Whaley’s cab.

The next stop was the former Mack Pate Garage where an

employee of the garage saw a red Ford Falcon and later identified

the driver as Lee Harvey Oswald. Bill explained the details of this

event, and told us that he has developed some new information

about this from a very reliable source and mentioned that some of

the documents regarding this incident might not be accurate.

The bus then stopped at East Tenth Street and North Patton

Ave. and everybody got off the bus. Bill then asked for volunteers

to help him. He then gave out brightly colored pieces of paper

with the names of the witnesses of the Tippit murder written on

them. Bill then instructed these volunteers exactly where to stand

to recreate the witness locations of the Tippit murder. I noticed

the crowd was amazed by this demonstration of the actual distances

that these witnesses were from the murder. I heard some

say that they now had a better perspective of an event that they had

only read about. Bill did a good job at explaining a very complicated

historical event, basically telling what each witness had seen.

He explained some of the discrepancies in the direction that the

Tippit assailant was reported to have been walking before the

murder. Bill explained the escape route of the assailant as we

walked the same route south on North Patton Ave. and also showed

the locations of Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard and Warren Reynolds

as they observed the escape of the assailant. We then proceeded

west on East Jefferson Blvd.

Bill showed us the service station that the assailant ran behind,

and gave a description of the parking lot that was formerly at

the rear of this station.

Of special interest was the alleyway at the rear of this former

parking lot and the former Abundant Life Temple building. Bill

explained to us about early reports on the police radio after Tippit

was shot that had the assailant running down this alley and also

the police had searched the Temple. From this location we walked

east down the alley back to the bus. After we boarded the bus, Bill

showed us something very interesting. Many researchers have

questioned why the ambulance got to the Tippit murder scene so

quickly. Bill had the bus driver pull up to a point on North Patton

Street where you can see how close the distance from the Dudley

M. Hughes Funeral Home to where the ambulance was dispatched

from, to the Tippit murder scene was a distance of about two and a

half blocks.

The bus then passed by the library on East Jefferson where

the Tippit assailant was thought to have been hiding and then passed

through the intersection on Lancaster and Eighth, where Tippit

reported his position at 12:54 P.M. We also drove by the apartment

building where Kathy Kay, one of Jack Ruby’s dancers lived

and then proceeded to the apartment building that Jack Ruby lived

in at the time he murdered Oswald. This building had recently had

a severe fire and was heavily damaged.

As we headed west on West Jefferson Blvd. we passed by the

Texas Theater, the location of Oswald’s arrest. It is now closed.

Our next stop was the Top Ten Record Shop. Everybody got off

the bus and went in to see a unique piece of history. This shop is

basically the same as it was on 11/22/63. The shop’s owner, Mike

Polk, is a very friendly and warm man and allowed us complete

run of the store while Bill explained how J. D. Tippit ran in here

shortly before he was murdered and made a hurried phone call.

The same telephone that Tippit used is still mounted on the side of

the counter exactly where it was in 1963. We then visited two

former residences of Lee Harvey Oswald. First we stopped at 214

West Neeley Street, where the famous “backyard photos” were

taken. As we left the bus for a closer look a woman that is a current

resident of this house informed us that if anybody wanted to

go into the back yard and take photographs that there would be a

five-dollar admission charge. We then went around the corner to

the apartment at 604 Elsbeth Street where the Oswald’s lived before

they moved to West Neeley Street.

Bill told us an interesting story about the Oswald’s. When the

Oswald’s moved from Fort Worth to Dallas their friend Gary Taylor

had to rent a U Haul to move their belongings to

Elsbeth Street.

When they moved from Elsbeth Street to Neeley

Street the Oswald’s used a baby carriage to move their

belongings to the new apartment. It was now time to

return to the Dallas Grand Hotel. As Bill was concluding

his remarks several researchers had questions

to ask. Some gathered in the Hotel lobby to visit and

talk about the tour. Bill provided an excellent tour and

one that I highly recommend for next year.

Editor’s Note: Ken Holmes, Jr. is a Dallas Historian,

raised in Oak Cliff, and he has researched the assassination

for many years. His research favorites are J.

D. Tippit, Bonnie and Clyde, and Dallas in the 30’s.

He has worked on several documentaries over the past

few years: “Gangster Guns, Tales of the Gun on the

History Channel, Texas Rangers CBS, Bonnie & Clyde

German T.V., PBS, and has provided research and pho-

The Top Ten Record Shop tos for three books.

36 Vol. 6, Issue 1 Spring 2000

When A Mysterious Death Is No Longer

Mysterious

by Mark K. Colgan

In Lake Lawn Park Cemetery, in Metairie, Louisiana a suburb of New Orleans, in a section called “The Patio,” find a mausoleum

labeled “South Corridor F.” Enter this mausoleum and turn so that you can view the inscriptions found on the right hand side.

Gaze at all of the names on tier “B.” This is the second row from the bottom. Find the crypt in the back corner, which has no

inscription. You are now looking at crypt 12. You are now standing in front of the final resting-place of one of the many mysterious

people to emerge in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy’s assassination. And yet in death, a final mystery was left to us to solve. “Who

is in Crypt 12,” you ask? None other than a star plucked from the sky some might answer. Others would, I think, answer differently,

because in this unmarked crypt is a person whom many questions were asked about during the Warren Commission’s hearings in

1964. It is here that the mortal remains of Janet Adams Conforto lies, though many of us know her better as “Jada.”

Over the last thirty-seven years since JFK’s assassination many people have wondered what happened to Janet. I too

wondered if she was alive or dead. I had read that she died mysteriously, yet no one offered any clues. I checked the

internet forums and no one really knew any facts, except that she reportedly died in 1979 or 1980. This information was

developed when her son was

contacted during the filming of the

program The Men Who Killed

Kennedy 1. So I set out to track down

Jada, a renowned stripper, and star of

a 1960’s burlesque motion picture,

Naughty Dallas2.

I started with the Warren Commission

Exhibits. Several days of heavy

research followed by many days of

waiting explains most of the rest. The

clues that I gathered led me to the

following information that everyone can

now read.

Newspaper clipping from the Albuquerque Journal, New Mexico, May 10, 1980.

Sources:

All this information has been

compiled from 3-9-2000 to 5-23-

2000.

1. The Men Who Killed Kennedy,

1992, A&E Network Video.

2. Naughty Dallas, 1992 S.W.V."

(SOMETHING WIERD Video)

3. I began by calling the Social Security

800 number as I understood it would lead

me to what is called the “Master Death

File.” I will tell you that a I contacted a

very helpful lady, who turned out to be

the exception within our government,

who checked every combination of name

listed in the Warren Commission exhibits

for Jada. With this lady helping I found

nothing that told me Jada was dead. I

next called every state, county, or city

mentioned in the Warren Commission

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 37

The arrow

below points

to Jada’s

unmarked

cryp at Lake

Lswn Park

Cemetery.

Photos by

Mark Colgan

JADA

I first met Jada about a month

before the assassination. Bud

Shrake and I shared an apartment

on Cole Avenue that autumn, and

since we were both sportswriters,

Ruby considered us favored

customers. He invited us to the

Carousel one night, and Shake

came home with Jada.

We all became good friends,

and when Jo and I got married a

few weeks later, Jada gave us our

first wedding gift -- a two-pound

Girl Scout cookie tin full of illegal

weed she had smuggled across the

border in her gold Cadillac with the

letters JADA embossed on the

door.

Jada cleared customs with

100 of the two-pound tins in the

trunk of her car. She was accompanied

by a state politician (who knew

nothing about the load) and wore a

mink coat, high-heel shoes, and

nothing else. The first thing she did

at customs was open the door and

fall out, revealing more than the

customs official expected.

That was one of Jada's great

pleasures, driving around Dallas in

her mink coat and high heels, her

orange hair piled high and the coat

flaring open. It was a better act

than the one Ruby paid for.

from “Who was Jack Ruby?” by

Gary Cartwright, Texas Monthly,

November 1975

Mug shot from New Orleans,

LA, April 16, 1963.

exhibits with regards any of Jada’s marriages. With the exception of Georgia, nothing

was available over the phone. (If I had not mentioned that I was in charge of building

one of the Big Twelve school’s football stadiums I am not sure the guy who helped me

over the phone would have. So for his sake “Go Dogs.”) This happened on a Friday

leaving me with nothing more than the thought that I might learn Jada’s maiden name

when her third marriage license showed up in the mail.

I spent all day Saturday trying to find death records online over the Internet. I

was able to access the Death Master File through two online web pages. I then spent

countless hours trying every combination of name I could to track down Jada. I awoke

Sunday morning, (about 3:00am) with a new idea, I placed Jada’s birthdate in the

screen with no name as all I wanted was the people who were dead that were born on

that day. I then searched through 884 names. About half way through I found Janet

Mole, I knew this was her, even though I forced my way through the rest of the names.

Now, I do have to explain: In the Warren Commission Exhibits Janet Conforto nee

Mole is listed, I did not find out until much later that this is a French format meaning

Birth name.

The next day in the mail I found her wedding license with the name Mole listed.

This gave me a place of birth not only for her, but also for her parents and Mr.

Smallwood. This left only one last major hurdle. Where did she die? The Master Death

File lists everybody’s place of last residence if available. But that does NOT mean you

died there. The Master Death File did list a death payment being made, this read as

70179, which I took as a date, and that her death of 5-00-80 was when it was reported.

I was wrong. Because of this one item I searched through two years of the San Francisco

Examiner before giving up and looking for other options. 70179, I figured out

after several days, was a zip code . I then requested through Inter-library loan the New

Orleans Times Piscayane Newspaper, I requested three months of papers, and found

her obit within 30 minutes of looking. That information lead me to New Mexico where

you now have the rest of the story.

38 Vol. 6, Issue 1 Spring 2000

Statistical Information on Janet Conforto “Jada”

Maiden Name: Janet Mole

Born: February 12, 1936

Died: May 9, 1980 Albuquerque, New Mexico

Found in New Orleans Times Piscayne, May 16, 1980.

Listed as Jada in Obituaries.

Buried : Buried under the name “JADA”

Lakelawn Park Metarie Cemetery, New Orleans, LA

Patio section, South Corridor “F”, Tier “B”, Crypt 12

(crypt owned By Joseph Conforto)

Cause of Death: Injuries sustained in a motorcycle and school bus collision

Last Known Address: J. Mole (1980-1981 Phone Book, Only J. Mole listed)

1169 Market Street, San Francisco, CA (000) 626-3085

Trinity Plaza Apartments (415) 861-3333

Death Payment: 70179 (a New Orleans Zip Code,

Child, Edward M. Washington living at home)

Mother’ Name: Elsa T. Mole

Mother’ Maiden Name: Elsa T. Clark

Born: January 25, 1905

Where: Trinidad, West Indies

Died January 20, 2000

Where: Livingston, New York

Last Known Address: Adventist Nursing Home

Prior Residence: New York City, New York

Additional Information: Became U.S. Citizen November 6, 1958

Married John Ives Mole June 12, 1933.

Fathers Name: John Ives Mole

Born: New York, New York

Died: unknown

Married: Elsa T. Clark June 12, 1933

Where: unknown

Brother’s Name: Adam Mole

Born: unknown

Died: unknown but reported to be dead.

Possible/ or Known Spouses:

1. Nick Bonney Married in California 1954 unconfirmed

2 Joseph Cuffari Married in Baltimore, Md. unconfirmed

3 Ralph C. Smallwood Married in Bainbridge, Ga. March 24, 1959 confirmed

4 Joseph Conforto Married in New Orleans, La. Approx. 1961 unconfirmed

5. ? Washington Unknown (name on obituary )

Children: Joseph Jerome Adam Peter Conforto DOB 5-14-59

Edward M. Washington DOB ?

Step Children : Angelo J. Conforto DOD 5-29-95

Additional information on Ralph C. Smallwood:

Born February 26, 1934

Died unknown

Occupation Jockey

Address 1041 Washington Street, Atlanta, Ga.

Mother’s Maiden Name Nora M. Baker

Mother place of birth Marrietta, Ga

Father’s name John S. Smallwood

Father place of birth Jefferson, Ga.

Janet’s residence at time of marriage

202 Georgia Ave. New Orleans La. No Occupation listed on application

New at JFK Lancer Online:

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JFK Lancer is announcing the JFK

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organization for JFK assassination

researchers. JFK-AOA is having a

Special Membership Preview ongoing

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Mexico City:A New Analysis

John Newman at the "November in

Dallas" JFK Lancer Conference

Friday, November 19, 1999. Transcript

and hundreds of documents! Congratulations

to Joe Backes and Debra Conway

for putting this valuable resource online.

http://jfklancer.com/backes/newman/

newman_1.html

JFK Lancer adds a new feature! Planet

JFK. Add your JFK related web site

link to Planet JFK with our self-service

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links/links.html

Kennedy assassination article added

“Firearms, Photographs, & Lee

Harvey Oswald” by British researcher

Ian Griggs from from Vol. 1, Issue 1,

1995 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles.

A comprehensive study of photographs

showing Oswald with various firearms.

Source notes and photographs.

http://www.jfklancer.com/bymain.html

The report on laboratory analyses of

evidence from the assassination of

former President John F. Kennedy was

released today by the National Archives

and Records Administration. JFK Lancer

has scanned and placed this report at

http://jfklancer.com/fragreport.html.

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

The Mysterious Deletions of the Warren Commission’s

“TOP SECRET” Transcript of January 22, 1964

by Hal Verb

Warren Commission member, Senator Richard Russell

Warren Commission member & former head of the CIA, Allen Dulles

Author’s Note: The reader should be aware that when there is a deleted word, or words, there

is a space before the first letter of the word, a space between words, and a space after the last

letter of the last word. Thus, the total number of spaces deleted will be more than the actual

letters in the “found” word(s).

Thanks to the brilliant, patient, audacious and exhaustive efforts of assassination researcher and

writer Harold Weisberg, the once “top secret” transcripts of variously held Warren Commission meetings

shortly after the Warren Commission was formed are in the public domain and can be examined

more closely.

For over thirty years a transcript of one of those “top secret” executive session meetings (January

22, 1964) has been in existence. This particular transcript dealt principally with an alleged “dirty rumor”

that Oswald had been an agent of some federal agency, notably the FBI. It was at the January

22nd executive meeting that Allen Dulles opined: “I think this record ought to be destroyed.” Another

Commission member, Hale Boggs, nervously restated the case when he said plaintively, “I don’t even

like to see this taken down.”

Five days after these jarring sentiments were expressed another meeting was held (Jan. 27, 1964)

expanding on the earlier meeting. This article, however, deals solely with the Jan. 22nd meeting. Those

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

interested in reading the contents of both the Jan.

22nd and the Jan. 27th meetings can refer to

Weisberg’s Whitewash IV and Post Mortem.

Weisberg reprints the text of the Jan. 27th

meeting and the text is complete, but the earlier

meeting on Jan. 22nd is complete except for a total

of six redactions (deletions) in the text. The

obvious intention by the censors was to see to it

that these deleted words or group of words not be

revealed. As will be seen from this article, both

the deletions and the intentions of the censors can

now be revealed and understood once the deletions

are known. I believe I have “solved” these deletions

and the “mystery” of that January 22nd document

can be better understood. As I see it, the significance

of this revelation is that it moves the entire

JFK case a great step forward in demonstrating

that Oswald, indeed, was an agent of the U.S.

government.

It should be pointed out here that, as Weisberg

notes, the thirteen-page January 22 transcript was

not prepared until 1975 when the National Archives

located the reporter’s notes and sent these to the

Pentagon for transcribing. Weisberg, in fact, discovered

that all the records of the Jan. 22nd session

were ordered destroyed at the Warren

Commission’s behest. Fortunately for all of us,

Weisberg obtained a copy.

For those following the Post Mortem text of

the Jan. 22nd meeting, refer to the following pages

for the redactions: two on page 478; one on page

482; one on page 483, and finally, two on page

485. We will take each of these in order so that

they can be readily followed.

The first of these is at the top of page 478

which contains the following:

A. (J. Lee Rankin, Warren Commission

General Counsel): “And Mr. Carr said

that they had used this saying before the

Court that they knew why the FBI was 8

SPACES DELETED ing to give some

of these records to the Defense Counsel

being able to get the records and asking

the Court to rule that they couldn’t get

them.”

The deleted word or group of words are:

so will (=so willing) comprising a total

of 8 spaces.

“The matter” is a reference to the

alleged Oswald association

with some federal agency.”

Carr is Waggoner Carr, the Attorney General

of Texas. What is being discussed here is the “willingness”

of the FBI to release its files to the Ruby

defense. Those files would or would not contain

information as to Oswald’s alleged government

connections. It appears that a kind of political

gamesmanship is being played out here by the FBI,

suggested by Rankin in the above statement. One

might put it as: “Now you see it — now, you don’t!”

The second redaction on the same page (478)

occurs near the bottom and is more intriguing if

not totally revealing:

A. (J. Lee Rankin): “...Now Mr.

Jaworski, who is associated with the Attorney

General working on this matter

was reported to you before, and 12

SPACESDELETED, story, I don’t talk

to Story about it but I did talk to Jaworski

and he said he didn’t think Wade would

say anything like this unless he had some

substantial information back of it, and

thought he could prove it, because he

thought it would ruin many in politics,

in Texas, to be making such a claim, and

then have it shown them that there was

nothing to it.”

Jaworski was the special counsel to Carr and

“Story” (immediately after the deleted word)

should be Storey (misspelled twice in this statement.)

Storey is Robert G. Storey, dean emeritus

of SMU Law School, assigned to Carr’s staff as

part of Carr’s Texas Court of Inquiry studying the

assassination. “The matter” is a reference to the

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

alleged Oswald association with some federal

agency.

The deleted word here is most probably:

Shanklin.

Shanklin occupies ten spaces and is the best

candidate for this redaction for at least four possible

reasons. (Shanklin’s full name is J. Gordon

Shanklin and he was Special Agent-in-Charge of

the Dallas FBI office.)

The four principal reasons are:

1. Early on the afternoon of the assassination

Shanklin received a call in his Dallas office

from a Lt. Col. Robert Jones of the 112th

Military Intelligence Group which assisted the

Secret Service in security operations for the

JFK visit. Jones offered information linking

the name of the fictitious “A. J. Hidell” to Lee

Harvey Oswald. The information included

items on Oswald’s “defection” to Russia and

his Fair Play for Cuba activities in New

Orleans. Note here that none of this is referred

to by Rankin in the above statement.

2. As Weisberg also notes, Earl Warren, who

headed the Warren Commission, said (see

Whitewash IV, page 37): “ We talked to the

Texas people.” Thus, if Storey, Carr and

Jaworski make up some of these “Texas

people” it would make Shanklin an obvious

candidate for one of those “Texas people.”

As to the significance of why Shanklin’s

name being deleted, consider this: the Jan. 22nd

meeting was well before any testimony was taken

of witnesses, but the Warren Commission was trying

to maintain its posture as being free of any taint

of dependency for its facts. True enough, the services

of the FBI were called upon to help “investigate”

the murder. But the “solution” of the crime

had already been reached on the very day of the

assassination by Hoover and the U.S. government

through Katzenback, who agreed to this complicity.

It there were any doubts that the Warren Commission

members realized that their “independence”

had been dealt a death blow, read the transcript

of the once “top secret” Jan. 27th meeting.

That sorry record proves once and for all that the

jittery, nervous and frightened Commission members

were there to “rubber stamp” a solution which

even the more conscience-bound members did not

agree with but were forced to accept.

“...why...did the FBI and Katzenback

go along with this

...?”

We now come to the third deletion which begins

on page 481 and continues on page 482 of

Post Mortem. While very simple to deduce, it does,

however, offer its own puzzling aspects:

A . Rankin: “One of the strange things

that happened and it may have no bearing

on this at all, is the fact that this man

who is a defector, and who was under

observation at least by the FBI, they say

they saw him frequently, could walk out

of the Immigration Office in 5 SPACES

DELETED Orleans one day and come

out the next day with a passport that permitted

him to go to Russia. From my

observations of the cases that have come

to us, such passports are not passed out

with that ease.”

The deleted word here occupies five

spaces and it is quite obviously: New.

Now why this one word was deleted could

perhaps best be explained by human error in that

the words “New Orleans” most likely should have

been redacted entirely. The “strange” phenomenon

alluded to by Rankin apparently refers to the ease

and alacrity with which Oswald obtained his passport.

In a footnote reference to this “strangeness”

Weisberg comments: “The unmistakable implication

is that Oswald’s relationship with the government

was such that his passport applications would

receive special treatment.”

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

The fourth redaction occurs on page 483 near

the top:

Dulles: “But it don’t get 10 SPACES

DELETED passport files or the passport

records. They are issuing hundreds

and thousands of passports. They have

their own particular system.” (author’s

emphasis.)

The best candidate for this deleted word

occupying ten spaces is: assigned.

The “it” in Dulles’ statement refers to the U.S.

State Department, and Dulles virtually gives the

game away on the matter of passport files when he

remarks that “They have their own particular system.”

It was not too difficult to figure out what this

deleted word (assigned) could be, because a little

later on Dulles refers to the fact that the Passport

Office will “wait until it is assigned there.”

One must be cautious and always weigh what

Dulles says about anything in this entire case. One

recalls, for instance, that in the January 27th meeting

Dulles uttered this real whopper: “We [CIA]

couldn’t investigate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee

in the United States.” (What about the CIA

list I have in my hands giving all the members of

the FPCC in 1962, Mr. Dulles?)

But there is an element of truth in Dulles’

statement. When Frances G. Knight, Director of

the Passport Office in the Department of State, testified

before the Warren Commission (WE5, 386)

she stated when asked by Commission member

Senator Cooper about what “division” in the Passport

Office “cleared” Oswald for his return to the

U.S. that she personally didn’t make that decision.

Yet she was its director!

Knight said that a group made up of “experienced

citizenship lawyers” reached that decision.

Under further prodding from Senator Cooper, she

revealed that these “citizenship lawyers” were “in

the Foreign Operations Division of the Passport

Office” (author’s emphasis). They approved it, she

said, and she emphasized that “both the Consul

(Richard Snyder)...and the citizenship

lawyers...were in agreement.”

Who were these “citizenship lawyers?” If my

reading of all the books and articles on the assassination

is any guide, these have never been identified!

The fifth deletion in the transcript appears on

page 485 of Post Mortem and is at the top of that

page:

A. (Rankin): “Secondly, there is this factor

too that a 10 SPACES DELETED

consideration, that is somewhat an issue

in this case, and I supposed you are all

aware of it.”

Here the most appropriate word that

would fit the ten spaces would be: security.

“Security” as a “factor” covers a wide range

of “consideration,” of course, but one such concern

could be Oswald’s ties to the U.S. government

as a agent. To reveal this would obviously be

a strict question of security and this would have to

be avoided at all costs. The Warren Commission

members were “well aware” of this political fact

Senator Richard Russell

“We haven’t been told the truth

about Oswald.”

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

— all you have to do is look at the political and

career backgrounds of some of the ones appointed

by President Johnson to serve on the Commission.

As to the sixth (and final) redaction in the transcript

there is this on page 485, about two-thirds

of the way down:

“What “pattern” for the future was being set by

the example of the Warren Commission in conducting

its sorry spectacle?”

A. (Rankin): “But they are concluding

that there can’t be a conspiracy without

those being run out. Now that is not 13

SPACES DELETED from my experience

with the FBI.”

Here, Rankin’s reference to “they” is the FBI

and his mention of “those being run out” is to the

“leads” they (the FBI) had that weren’t being followed

through on as the skeptical Rankin notes.

My choice of words for this deletion for

the thirteen spaces is: the pattern.

One can easily figure this out by noting that

on the very same page Rankin comments about

his experience with the FBI that “they don’t do

that.” As he points out, the FBI doesn’t “evaluate

and this is “uniform prior experience” (author’s

emphasis). Indeed, “pattern” is virtually a synonym

for “uniform prior experience.”

Why, then, did the FBI (with Hoover as its’

head) and Katzenback (representing the U.S. government

as its’ backup man) go along with this from

the very first day? Why did they “buy” this “no

conspiracy” story and, thus, break the FBI’s longstanding

“pattern” of behavior?

Why indeed? Could it be because we really

never found out, as Senator Russell noted to

Weisberg, who Oswald really represented or that

the assassination event itself never happened the

way the Warren Commission (and other investigations)

determined? What “pattern” for the future

was being set by the example of the Warren Commission

in conducting its sorry spectacle? And is

that “pattern” continuing in other areas of political

life, even today?

Just before Senator Russell died (he had come

to the conclusion, as Weisberg proved for him, that

his own role on the Warren Commission had been

lied about) he made some revealing statements to

Weisberg. As Weisberg notes (see Whitewash IV,

page 209), “Privately Senator Russell told me that

he was convinced that there were two areas in

which Warren Commission members had been

deceived by the Federal agencies responsible for

investigating the assassination of President

Kennedy. These two areas were: (1) Oswald’s background;

and (2) the ballistics evidence. The first

of these two areas was the principal subject discussed

at the January 27, 1964 Executive Session.”

On the second point raised by Russell, we now

have confirmation of Russell’s suspicions: the

record now shows that both LBJ and Russell did

not believe the single bullet theory. A copy of the

transcript of their discussion is available. There can

be no doubt that demolishing the single bullet

theory destroys the Warren Commission’s case of

no conspiracy and a single assassin. Thus, both

Weisberg and Russell have been confirmed and

vindicated in their evidence certainly with respect

to the ballistics evidence.

That Russell’s expression of his views on the

ballistics evidence would come before Weisberg

had access to the documented record should make

it clear that when it comes to Russell’s first point:

Oswald’s intelligence connections, we now have

a powerful argument that we never did find out

“the truth about Oswald.”

HAROLDWEISBERG RESPONDS:

By way of comment, perhaps the most interesting

one would be to quote from Senator Russell’s

assistant’s letter to him of June 14, 1968, after reading

the first of the Whitewash series and skimming

the next two of that series and then Oswald in New

Orleans. His assistant, C. E. Campbell, said, that

we agree with him [Russell], (not that he agrees

with me and others), that the single bullet theory

is impossible:

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1 Issue 3, Fall 1995

“He [Weisberg] completely agrees with your thesis, that no one shot hit both the President

and the Governor.”

Campbell said of my books and work,

“His work is scholarly and evidences a tremendous amount of research. His basic approach

is not to try to prove that Oswald was innocent, although acceptance of his inferences, etc.,

lead to that conclusion.”

Campbell noted what must have been a sore point for Russell in saying that I was critical of the

Commission members because, “it delegated too heavily to the staff.”

I think it is obvious that not a single one of these redactions was justified and, with both releases

to me under FOIA, those redactions are outside the exemptions of that Act. Glad to see that Hal has

raised these questions and that you are calling them to public attention.

Harold Weisberg

26 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

Angus E. Crane

INTRODUCTION

A pioneer of American literature, Washington Irving, noted that

“there rise authors now and then, who seem proof against the mutability

of language, because they have rooted themselves in the unchanging principles

of human nature.” Irving’s attestation of a poet’s grasp on the

universality of humanity perhaps inspires my confidence in the following

observation by the acclaimed novelist Henry James: “What is character

but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration

of character?” James, a literary artist who imbued his gallery of

fictional characters with the flesh and bone of living creatures, posed

these rhetorical questions to demonstrate the predictable nature and disposition

of the human personality. Certainly the authenticity of Henry

James’ art confirms his perspicacious understanding of the human soul.

Thus, his conclusion that character and incident are irrevocably intertwined

warrants serious consideration.

The Henry James concept that a personality’s conduct may be accurately

anticipated by established behavior patterns also forms the basis

for a ground-breaking and highly proficient crime-fighting tool known

as profiling. Even the words used by John Douglas, the father and architect

of modern behavioral profiling, to describe profiling seem strikingly

similar to those of Mr. James: Profiling operates “on the principle that

behavior reflects personality.” The criminal personality program Douglas

conceived and originated has spawned an internationally recognized

crime detection system that tracks recurring

links between behavioral traits

and personality types. Douglas has orchestrated

the evolution of a widely acclaimed

investigative tool employed by

such preeminent law enforcement agencies

as the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) and Scotland Yard.

Criminal personality programs

have earned their esteem with an unbroken

chain of successful results. Now

that the practical application of profiling has dispelled the reservations

of many skeptics, both state and federal courts are beginning to recognize

profilers as bona fide experts in criminal proceedings. Indeed, momentum

seems to be pushing the US legal system towards an expanded

use of profile evidence.

Given the sweeping possibilities of profiling, one finds it tempting

to ask whether adept profilers could settle the question of Lee Harvey

Oswald’s involvement in the execution of President John F. Kennedy.

Does Oswald’s demeanor and actions on November 22, 1963 match the

profile of a political assassin? The key to finding an answer rests upon

a personality profile of that rare oddball known as a political assassin.

As part of this theoretical inquiry, Oswald will be compared to the idiosyncratic

markings of an assassin. This experiment will help to dispel

the accusations that have besmirched his name for the past thirty-five

years.

A Profile of Political Assassins:

The Common Denominators’

Exclusion of Lee Harvey Oswald

JOHN DOUGLAS: PROFILING TRAILBLAZER

Some of the most notorious and vicious criminals have been arrested,

tried, and convicted through the innovations of behavioral profiling and

criminal investigative analysis. Yet this proven crime fighter was not

even considered legitimate until the death of long-time FBI director,

J. Edgar Hoover. The Bureau likened the profile approach to black magic

or witchcraft. With Hoover’s demise, John Douglas began perfecting a

new and sometimes controversial technique called investigative profiling.

During his productive years with the FBI’s National Center for the

Analysis of Violent Crime, Douglas achieved sufficient success to win

his investigative profiling system the endorsement of top criminologists

everywhere. The respect and regard afforded John Douglas manifests

itself in legendary proportions. For instance, numerous novelists have

modeled their detectives and investigators upon the Douglas mystique.

Most notable among such tributes is the amazing likeness of Douglas to

Thomas Harris’s Jack Crawford, the

brilliant FBI agent in The Silence of

the Lambs.

A. The Evolution of Behavioral

Science into Criminal

Personality Profiling

As an innovator in behavioral

science, Douglas has watched the

gradual silencing of his critics. He

reflects on when profiling was in its burgeoning stage: “What had been an

informal service without official sanction was developing into a small

institution. I took on the newly created title of “criminal-personality profiling

program manager” and started working with the field offices to

coordinate the submission of cases by local police departments.”

The Douglas profiling philosophy is comparable to a doctor’s diagnosis.

He states that by

“studying as many crimes as we could, and through talking to the

experts - the perpetrators themselves - we have learned to

interpret those clues in much the same way a doctor evaluates

various symptoms to diagnose a particular disease or condition.

And just as a doctor can begin forming a diagnosis after

recognizing several aspects of a disease presentation he or she has

seen before, we can make various conclusions when we see

patterns start to emerge.”

“To define is to

exclude and negate.”

Jose Ortega Y Gasset

Oswald under arrest

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 27

Douglas has devised a scheme for interpreting the clues of the criminal

mind. The implementation of this scheme has produced profiles for

serial killers, rapists, spouse beaters, sexual murderers, assassins,

sadomasochists, pedophiles, and other deviants. Douglas firmly believes

that “the more behavior we have, the more complete the profile and analysis

we can give to the local police. The better the profile the local police have

to work with, the more they can slice down the potential suspect populations

and concentrate on finding the real guy.”

With tremendous success in the investigative arena, many local law

enforcers wanted to transfer their field success to the court room. State

and federal courts, however, barred admission of profile testimony based

on legal restraints set forth in federal and state rules of evidence. Some

prosecutors attempted to clear these legal hurdles in a rather unorthodox

manner to accommodate the complexities of a lust murderer case in Tennessee.

B. A Circuitous Route to Legal Acceptance of Profiling

Evidence

Before profile evidence was admitted by any court, resourceful prosecutors

indirectly took advantage of the emerging science. In prosecuting

a highly publicized murder case in Memphis, Tennessee, the District Attorney

sought the advice of John Douglas. Although Douglas would be

prohibited from presenting profile testimony, he was invited to observe

the proceedings for two purposes. First, if the defendant got into the

witness box, he would ingratiate himself with the jury through a deceptive

display of a meek and mild demeanor. In that event, Douglas could

coach the District Attorney on probing

beneath the defendant’s facade

with a prod guaranteed to provoke a

self-betraying outburst. The Douglas

technique worked liked clockwork.

The defendant lashed out with a fury

so vicious that his carefully crafted

persona of a gentle soul lost all credibility,

and his loss of composure

proved to be a turning point in the

trial that ended with his conviction.

Douglas served another role, too. The District Attorney feared that

the jury might acquit the accused murderer simply because a reasonable

or logical motive had not been proffered. Finding a motive acceptable to

the jury would be impossible unless the jurors could comprehend an almost

unfathomable moral degeneration that had obliterated all sense of

decency. Douglas educated the prosecution on the behavioral characteristics

of a “lust murderer.” Once the abnormalities manifested by a lust

murderer were divulged to the jury, many elements of the crime that confused

the panel emerged from the dark and slid neatly into place. While

the criminal profile was not officially admitted into evidence, the reliability

of the profile enabled the prosecution to convince the jury that in light

of personality types a motive behind such a heinous crime could be explained.

This indirect use of profile evidence signaled the inevitable toppling

of legal resistance to behavioral science in the courtroom. As illustrated

in the discussion below, the legal barriers no longer prohibit the introduction

of profile evidence. As these once formidable barricades crumbled,

John Douglas found himself seated on the stand as an expert.

CRIMINAL PERSONALITY PROFILES IN THE

US COURTS

The acceptance by US courts of profile evidence is continuing to

evolve and “whether such evidence will be admitted depends upon the

particular facts and issues of the case.” Unfortunately, the likelihood that

federal and state courts will reach a unified consensus on criminal profiles

appears remote. Of course, the US Supreme Court could resolve the

conflict by ruling on the issue. Even amid sharp divisions between federal

circuit courts, the Supreme Court has declined to settle the matter

with a definitive opinion. In fact, the Supreme Court has denied every

Petition for Certiorari presenting this controversy.

While the Supreme Court remains silent, federal circuit and district

courts, along with state courts, admit specific types of profile evidence on

substantive questions of fact. The majority of courts have also recognized

exceptions to the prohibition against profiling testimony, and the trend

among federal and state jurisdictions is to expand the use of exceptions.

In the legal decisions surveyed below, profiling proves to possess

ample persuasive powers to sway the ultimate outcome of a jury’s deliberations.

A. US Law Accepts Criminal Profiles as Valid Evidence

Before the convincing powers of profiling are permitted in front of a

jury, the court must determine whether profile testimony may be admitted

into evidence. Featured below is a brief examination of laws relevant to

deciding the admissibility of profile evidence.

1. Common Law

The mere mention of common law spark some law professors

into a fiery and impassioned dissertation on the origin and meaning

of this ancient legal precedent. A simple definition will suffice here.

The common law is a collection of rules recognized since time immemorial

as the dictate of wisdom and experience. In the absence

of written law that is applicable to a singular situation, courts, even

today, may turn to the common law for guidance and direction in

reaching a decision.

The sanctity of common law

has been desecrated by America’s

seditious preference for legislation.

Early American jurists gave birth to

a new legal philosophy more attuned

to employing the court’s authority to

advance societal interests rather than

paying homage to ancient rules.

As part of the revolt against

traditional common law, American

courts dramatically reformed the legal

process for criminal suits. This system commanded the judiciary

to dispassionately adhere to procedures prescribed by statute

for conducting a trial and sentencing a convicted defendant. Inevitably,

the rules controlling the admissibility of evidence at trial were

formalized through codification. If the codified rules of evidence

failed to address the proffered evidence, a judge could resort to the

common law to support a ruling on admissibility. Recourse to the

common law during an Oswald trial seems highly improbable.

2. Rules, Codes, and Statutes

Previously the rules of evidence strictly limited admission of

character evidence. These limitations appeared to be carved in stone,

but the incorporation of Rule 413 and 414 into the Federal Rules of

Evidence grant courts greater flexibility in entertaining the merits

of character testimony. The rules also mark a departure from the

preclusion against propensity or profile type evidence. For instance,

the rules now allow a federal prosecutor to rely upon propensity

evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt of sex crimes. While the

rules do not entirely obliterate previous restrictions on propensity

type or character evidence, the break with tradition signals a growing

acceptance of profile evidence in criminal prosecutions.

To combat the legal community’s reluctance to lift the bar against

admission of certain types of psychological evidence, some state

legislatures have enacted into law specific code provisions that require

the judiciary to admit expert testimony based on social behavior

science. For example, the State of Illinois has revised its

evidentiary rule to expressly allow evidence of post-traumatic stress

syndrome in criminal sex cases. The State of Missouri’s legislature

passed legislation mandating that state courts admit testimony on

the battered woman syndrome when self-defense is an issue. Ohio

lawmakers have adopted similar language to its state code to permit

“This indirect use of profile evidence

signaled the inevitable toppling of legal

resistance to behavioral science in the

courtroom.”

28 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

testimony on battered woman syndrome.

The fact that states are boldly engaged in the enactment of formal

rules of evidence demonstrates the confidence vested in profiling.

The assertive invasion of judicial territory also symbolizes a

drive to liberate evidentiary rules from legal technicalities that preclude

behavioral sketches as evidence.

3. Case Law

When an opinion from the field of psychology might determine

a defendant’s fate, the courts try to substantiate the reliability of the

scientific evidence proffered. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1993

decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, federal and

state courts applied the Frye test to decide if the scientific formula

espoused found general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.

The Frye test did not measure the soundness of a formula,

but certified that the formula in question commanded the respect of

the expert’s colleagues. Courts’ application of the Frye test to different

factual scenarios resulted in the admission of evidence on 1)

rape trauma syndrome; 2) rapist profile; 3) child abuse accommodation

syndrome; 4) battered woman syndrome; and 5) and other

types of “soft sciences.”

The Daubert decision rejected the “general acceptance” test of

Frye in favor of a scientific validity standard. In others words, the

judge must ascertain whether the reasoning and methodology underlying

an expert’s proposed testimony is scientifically valid. Undoubtedly,

this more rigorous standard imposes a troublesome burden

upon courts. Despite Daubert’s mandate that courts flex their

scientific muscle, profile evidence continues to gain admission in

criminal proceedings.

B. Conformance to a Criminal Profile has Resulted in

Convictions

1. Drug courier profiles -

Convictions Obtained

To assist the surveillance of drug

couriers, a nationally recognized profile

has been created to reasonably narrow

the field of suspects. This profile consists

of characteristics and behaviors ordinarily

exhibited by drug couriers. Federal

and state courts acknowledge the

practicality of using profiles to fight the nation’s drug epidemic,

and, where allowed as evidence, conformity to a drug courier profile

significantly amplifies the potential for a conviction.

For example, in an Eleventh Circuit case, two customs agents

explained to the jury that the defendant’s packages were examined

when his actions mirrored the classic signs of a narcotics dealer.

The defense objected to the profile evidence. The court stipulated

that the profile evidence could not be used as substantive proof of

guilt, but was admissible to clarify the performance of the customs

officers. In this case, the defendant’s similarity to a typical drug

courier induced a verdict for possession with intent to distribute.

Consider the Seventh Circuit case where the government’s proof

of intent to distribute was supported solely by circumstantial evidence.

The prosecution established that the defendant possessed a

large assortment of telephone beeper numbers. This fact was augmented

by experts who stated that drug couriers routinely retain

numerous beeper numbers. The court held expert profile testimony

could be weighed by the jury as an indicator of guilt. Again, a

resemblance to a stereotypical drug courier resulted in conviction

for possession with the intent to distribute.

2. Abusive profile - convictions

Both the defense and prosecution find profile evidence helpful

in cases surrounding abuse, battery, rape, or other crimes of violence.

The prosecution may find expert testimony on a victim’s

reaction pattern to be instructive. From the prosecution’s perspective,

such testimony helps remove doubt from the jury’s mind that

the victim fabricated her story. The defense may also utilize profiling

to demonstrate that defendant’s behavior stands diametrically

opposed to the accepted demeanor of a violent criminal.

A specific instance of a court embracing an abusive profile is

found in a Delaware Supreme Court case in which it held that evidence

of child rape patterns could be admitted. The defendant argued

that the alleged behavioral model of child molestation victims

lacked broad support among the professional community. The court

rejected the argument and concluded that the doctor’s specialized

knowledge helped the jury to understand some of the victim’s actions

that initially appear inconsistent with the object of sexual

molestation.

The Delaware decision finds support among jurisdictions

throughout the nation. One court effectively articulated the basis

for admitting victim profiles:

“[T]he purported common knowledge of the jury may be very

much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic, drawn from their own

experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where

expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior

conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.”

Rape trauma syndrome may also be admitted into evidence to

establish lack of consent or refute consenusal intercourse. Courts

allow battered child syndrome to validate that certain types of bruises

and lacerations found on the victim emanate from beatings. The

courts also consent to admitting a batterer’s profile when the accused

introduces character witnesses on his behalf.

3. Murder - convictions

The discovery of a murdered prostitute’s body in 1987 prompted

police in Delaware to undertake their typical homicide investigation.

The inquiry became more complicated when a year later an

arrest for the 1987 murder still had not been made, and another

prostitute was slain in a similar fashion. Several months later, yet

another prostitute was added to the list of murder victims.

In the course of the investigation, police arrested Steve Pennell

who had displayed an unusual

interest in a female police

decoy parked along the

roadside. The officers

searched his vehicle and

found a blood stain along

with other clues that suggested

the motorist had been

engaged in foul play. The

available evidence plainly

implicated Pennell in the murder of one prostitute, but the prosecution

charged him with the murders of all three women.

At Pennell’s trial, the prosecution characterized the murders as

serial killings. In order to convincingly connect Pennell with all

three murders, John Douglas, Director of the FBI’s Behavioral Sciences

Unit, was introduced as an expert on serial killers. The trial

court accepted Douglas as an expert. Douglas imparted to the jury

his understanding and knowledge of serial killers. Specifically, he

testified that all three murder victims were slain by the same person.

Douglas’ opinion was extremely detrimental to Pennell as confirmed

by his conviction on all three counts.

On Appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, Pennell argued

that serial killing is not a proper topic for an expert. The Delaware

court justified the admission of Douglas’ opinion because any “specialized

knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue” may be admitted as evidence.

The court further explained that Douglas’ extensive experience

with signature crimes and crime analysis was indeed specialized,

as mandated by Rule 702, and, if accepted by the jury, could

be helpful in determining whether all three murders had been committed

by the same person.

The Pennell decision effectively demonstrates the persuasive

impact profile evidence may have on a jury. Arguably, Douglas

alone convinced the jury that Pennell was guilty of the other two

murders. In support of this supposition, consider that Pennell also

argued before the court that the prosecution lacked sufficient evidence

on the two other murders. In refuting that argument, the court

itself relied upon profile testimony to justify the ultimate verdict:

“[T]he injuries sustained by DiMauro and Ellis were so strikingly

“Why does an individual want to kill

the nation’s leader?”

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 29

similar that there was expert testimony to the effect that they were

inflicted by the same person.” .

In an Ohio rape case, profiling yet again proves the deciding

factor in the jury’s final judgment. The State of Ohio had been

terrorized during the 1980’s by a lunatic whom the press dubbed

the West Side Rapist. When Ronny Shelton was identified and arrested

on a charge of rape, the police suspected that he might be a

perpetrator of numerous sexual assaults. Not a shred of evidence

could be uncovered to link Shelton with the other crimes. John

Douglas compensated for the scarcity of evidence by presenting a

rapist profile.

Douglas traced the various crimes to one another and helped the

jury perceive Shelton’s modus operandi. By the time Douglas completed

his testimony, little doubt remained in the jury’s mind that an

unbroken trail leading from one

crime to another ended at Shelton’s

door. The jury returned a guilty

verdict on 49 counts of rape. Douglas

not only convinced the jury, but

the judge was swayed, too, as demonstrated

by his imposition of the

maximum sentence for each crime

committed. When the judge finished,

Shelton had been given the

longest sentence in the history of

Ohio - 3,198 years.

C. Exoneration of the Accused Based Upon Profile Evidence

In a story that is becoming far too familiar, Mrs. Koss returned home

late one night and was physically struck by her husband upon entering

their shared bedroom. The next thing Mrs. Koss remembered was a noise.

What Mrs. Koss had forgotten was that she had shot her husband through

the head and killed him. The police arrested Mrs. Koss for homicide.

As part of her defense, Mrs. Koss sought to introduce expert testimony

on battered woman syndrome. The court permitted expert testimony

in support of the affirmative defense of self-defense. Based on the

profile evidence depicting the emotions and reactions of a battered woman,

the jury acquitted Mrs. Koss of murder and found her guilty of manslaughter.

Reliance upon profile evidence in this case saved Mrs. Koss from

prison time that she otherwise would have served under a murder charge.

The battered woman syndrome has been accepted as evidence in a

variety of other courts and has been the key to successfully protecting the

defendant from a murder conviction.

SELECTED PROFILES OF A POLITICAL

ASSASSIN

The Bible promises that in the mouth of two or three witnesses shall

all things be established. In keeping with that tradition of validation,

three profiles prepared by three different experts have been joined together

to attain a composite of traits irrevocably affiliated with a political

assassin. These three profiles arise from essentially three areas of expertise:

1) historical precedent and examples; 2) professional profiling techniques

employed by the FBI and other law enforcement organizations;

and 3) psychological analysis of an assassin’s social distortions in the

context of his crime. In addition, a summary of historical attacks upon

US Presidents enhance the credibility of the three profile composite by

revealing assassin characteristics that correspond with the composite.

A. The Historical Archetype

Assassination researcher Lee Davis has explored and analyzed a

diverse spectrum of political assassinations that range from the 1793 stabbing

of Jean-Paul Marata, despised member of the French National Convention,

to the 1991 slayings of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Ministers

of India. Based upon an exacting examination of the perpetrators themselves,

Davis has designated the key attributes of a political assassin.

Supporting his conclusions with a plethora of historical evidence, Davis

paints a composite portrait that captures a persistent and repetitive figuration

that merges together to create the profile of a political assassin.

Whether labeled by royalty as regicide or legally defined as homicide,

the aberrations that distinguish an assassin from a garden variety

murderer start with the selection of the crime scene. Because most killers

prefer absolute anonymity, they secretly skulk about in dark alleys. Not

the assassin. As the Davis research documents, an assassin demands an

open and public arena. A spectacle before millions is preferred, but a

generous gathering of one hundred plus people will suffice.

In a community-like forum, the

political assassin’s next step is killing

a person of prominence. The target

may be a celebrity or a political leader,

but fame and renown are indispensable

ingredients for the victim. When

unreserved pandemonium arrests the

crowd’s attention, that previously elusive

elixir known as recognition

emboldens the assassin to step forward

and proclaim his message. This

declaration of belief or purpose contributes another feature to the assassin’s

make-up. The validity of the assassin’s message is irrelevant. Because

the end-goal of a political assassination is capturing an audience, the assassin

willingly assumes the role of martyr. Hence, the killer shows more

interest in reading his manifesto than escaping the scene of the crime.

This brand of murderer insists upon taking credit for his action.

Indeed, assassins are known throughout history for brazenly seizing center

stage and assuming blame for the horrendous execution of a world

leader. Interestingly, Davis concludes that the absence of these defiant

pronouncements of guilt signals a conspiracy. Specifically referring to

Lee Harvey Oswald, Davis asserts that Oswald’s denial of guilt, in contrast

to history’s catalog of other assailants, exhibit “classic patsy behavior”

that “give credence to the theories that the supposedly one-man-onegun”

assassination of John F. Kennedy was really a conspiracy.

The following behavioral patterns synthesize the essential elements

of Davis’ assassin profile: 1) a public 2) act of violence designed to kill 3)

a noted personality 4) in order to advance the personal, political, religious

cause 5) of an individual who seeks recognition for his crime and voluntarily

confesses guilt 6) and neglects an escape plan or alibi because the

assailant is 7) resigned to his ultimate destiny of incarceration or death.

B. The Professional Profiler

The consummate authority on profiling, John Douglas, accumulated

extensive information from interviewing celebrity stalkers and political

assassins. Based upon his highly acclaimed expertise and unparalleled

experience, Douglas has sketched a political assassin profile. The

Douglas profile proved instrumental in locating and capturing a young

man threatening Ronald Reagan after John Hinckley’s failed assassination

attempt. Thus, the Douglas profile boasts a unique distinction of

independent collaboration through its application to a real-world situation.

Douglas finds similarities between political assassins and celebrity

stalkers. He noted that both the celebrity stalker and political assassin

target a person that assumes larger-than-life proportions. He also confirms

the assassin’s need for recognition. Douglas, however, believes

that the quest for attention stems from emotional deficiencies rather than

promotion of a sacred mission, and he even suggests that the deep rooted

sense of insignificance encourages a futile effort to transfer some of his

victim’s importance to himself. “The construct of a ‘cause’ for the killing”

and a declaration of that cause are crucial features to include in an

assassin’s portrait.

“In a community-like forum, the

political assassin’s next step is

killing a person of prominence.”

30 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

his breast. This assaulter has simply lost his grasp on reality, and his

comprehension of execution’s consequences is so tenuous that he unwittingly

greets death without complaint.

Clarke imparts his professional judgment on voluntary confessions

by asserting that “in every instance, the exercise of power in a public

manner generates the attention that had been denied in the past.” The

public setting opens the curtains to the stage upon which a statement of

purpose or motive will manifest itself.

Interestingly, Clarke concludes that Oswald fits the description of

his second category. In order to reach this conclusion, however, Clarke

ascribed motives to Oswald that do not exist in Oswald’s personal history.

Specifically, Clarke contends that Oswald killed Kennedy “in an attempt

to establish himself as a sympathetic figure to the only significant entities,

beyond his children, in his embittered life - his wife and his revolutionary

hero, Fidel Castro.”

Clarke’s premise is fallacious because it originates from pure speculation.

Clarke does not nor can he connect such emotional needs as the

propelling force behind Oswald’s supposed assassination of Kennedy. If,

like all other political assailants, Oswald sought to awaken Marina to a

greater awareness of his worth, why did Lee Harvey Oswald keep Marina

in the dark about his aim in executing a President? He apparently declined

to express his sentiments with the written word. Otherwise Marina,

Dr. Clarke, and the people would have knowledge of such a letter.

When Marina came to visit her husband in jail, why did not Lee take her

in his arms and dedicate his daring deed to the acquisition of Marina’s

sympathy and regard. Instead, Oswald assured Marina that he had not

shot Kennedy. Neither did Oswald avail himself of the opportunities to

speak to Fidel Castro or the world in general when live television cameras

were shoved in his face.

If Clarke is correct, Oswald purposely sabotaged his plans for glory.

Aborting his original objective and abstaining from the spoils of notoriety,

Oswald inverts the core behavioral patterns ascribed to an assassin.

Clarke offers no explanation for Oswald’s non-action.

D. A Brief History of Presidential Assailants in the United States

Why does an individual want to kill the nation’s leader? Thus far,

attacks upon a President have not been personalis actio - an act against the

person. Rather, the assaults have been perpetrated because of the

President’s position or to retaliate for action he undertook in his official

capacity. Assassinations in the United States have consistently been triggered

by the assassin’s belief - personal, social, religious or political.

Certainly the following synopsis of American history confirms that political

murders follow a readily identifiable pattern.

1. Abraham Lincoln

In a single leap from Abraham Lincoln’s private box, John Wilkes

Booth, brandishing a dagger, landed on the stage of Ford’s Theater

and declared to the audience assembled to see An American Cousin,

“Sic semper tyrannis! [thus ever to tyrants]. The South is avenged.”

Booth, a familiar face to theater crowds, now stood upon the

stage fearless that his famed visage would be associated with the

The Douglas profile offers a glimpse into an interior life haunted

by overwhelming inadequacy. These socially retarded beings fear communication

with other people, so to compensate for a dearth of human

discourse, they engage themselves in vivacious dialogue and spirited debate.

This internal conversation may evolve into written harangues in

journals, diaries, manifestos, or letters. The importance of such compositions

should not be overlooked for they usually reveal the rudimentary

antecedents propelling the writer towards an act of savagery.

Sometimes through the senseless and incoherent scribbling, the

narrative will reveal a hunger for public recognition so intense it expels

an energy force that propels and hurls the future assassin towards a boundless

abyss. In the midst of these rumblings, Douglas discerns the instigation

of plans leading up to an assassination. As the assassination project

evolves, the assailant gradually prepares for that day by abdicating his

freedom and resigning any hope of escape at the murder scene. The densely

scripted pages also fantasize over the accolades from an admiring crowd

with such vividness that the assassin becomes numb to the harsh realities

of captivity and prison. In the acquiescence to incarceration or death, the

assassin embraces the inevitable need to confess and assume responsibility

before the world.

Granted this type of thinking seems incongruous for a criminal.

Undoubtedly, the assassin is a rare breed of criminal. To illustrate an

assassin’s distinct and separate class among criminals, contrast the Tylenol

poisoner who, like most outlaws, committed his crime clandestinely with

a political assassin who, unlike any other lawbreaker, committed his crime

openly to satiate his craving for publicity. Every step taken seems predestined

to deliver the aggressor under the spotlight on center stage with a

supporting cast played by an inquisitive news crew and the perennially

curious multitude.

C. Psychiatric Diagnoses

Psychiatrists raise suspicions with the average citizen simply because

an opposing psychiatrist always seems more than happy to dispute the

professional findings of another doctor. Despite a mistrust that dates back

to Freud, the assassin profile created from field of psychology by Dr.

James W. Clarke should be given full consideration.

Consulting numerous professional sources and reconstructing the

lives of various American assassins, Dr. Clarke discerned certain patterns

among political assassins. Clarke further segregates assassins into categories.

This compartmentalization is rather misleading because, in the

final analysis, all of the assassins have fixed features in common.

Clarke distinguishes the categories by analyzing subtle differences

in motivation. For example, Clarke concludes that all assassins suffer

from frustration that evolves into violence, but the source of that frustration

may stem from personal or political antecedents. If, for instance, an

assailant’s aggravation stems from an oppressive political situation -

Collazo and Torresola (Truman’s attackers) illustrate this scenario - that

individual would be distinguished from someone whose discontent emanates

from personal problems. John Hinckley may be an appropriate example

of the personal problem category.

In the midst of a meticulous dissection of the intricacies of emotional

motivations, Clarke gleans a number of solid and reliable characteristics

common to all assassins. For example, Clarke recognizes that all

assassins claim a motive for acting out their aggression. Clarke’s research

also validates that the assassin’s target must be a figure of notoriety. Clarke

found that another shared characteristic emerges from an assassin’s surrender

to a fate of inevitable capture and likely death. All assassins in

Clarke’s categories seek acknowledgment for their actions.

While Clarke believes that the mental condition of an assassin may

alter the underlying impetus for relinquishing their freedom to law enforcement

officials, the element of capitulation and confession remain a

constant behavioral pattern. For example, one assassin may submit to

electrocution as attestation of political convictions. Another assassin may

be just as willing to sacrifice his life, but no glorious belief beats within

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 31

act of violence that had just occurred. Booth displayed no inclination

to disguise himself. As an ardent Southern sympathizer, he

was in his moment of glory.

To guarantee that full credit was afforded him Booth took no

chances that fame would rob him of his due. He recorded in his

memorandum book that “our country owed all our troubles to him

[Lincoln], and God made me the instrument of his punishment.”

Still not completely confident that he would receive proper notices

for his act of courage, Booth penned a letter to the editor of the

Washington National Intelligencer. Unfortunately that epistle no

longer exists, for Booth asked an actor friend, John Matthews, to

deliver the sealed envelope to the newspaper. Once Matthews heard

that Booth had been implicated in Lincoln’s death, he opened the

envelope. After reading Booth’s confession, Matthews feared his

possession of such a document would incriminate him, so he burned

it. Although the contents of the letter were destroyed, Matthews

conveyed the substance of Booth’s admission to the public.

2. James A. Garfield

Charles J. Guiteau, an itinerant preacher with

political aspirations, began appealing to President

James A. Garfield for a political appointment as

Counsul to Paris. When his importunate petitions

did not cease, the White House had him banned

from the premises. Incensed by this political bluntness,

Guiteau sought solace through prayer. While

enraptured in devotional supplication, Guiteau, according

to his later trial testimony, was visited by

God, who instructed him to save the republic and

publicize The Truth - Guiteau’s autobiography -

by executing Garfield.

Guiteau fired several shots into Garfield on Saturday, July 2,

1881 at the Baltimore and Potomac Depot. A Washington, DC policeman

wrestled the assailant to the ground. To assure the officer

of his willingness to cooperate, Guiteau said: “It’s all right. Keep

quiet, my friend. I wish to go to jail. Now Arthur is President of the

United States. I am a Stalwart of Stalwarts.”

Among Guiteau’s possessions was a copy of his autobiography,

and a speech to the American citizens in which he bequeathed his

gun to the State Department Library and granted the New York

Herald publication and serialization rights for The Truth. Attached

to these items was a note from Guiteau explaining God’s hand in

Garfield’s assassination and disclaiming monetary greed as a motive

for his actions: “I am clear in my purpose to remove the President.

Two points will be accomplished. It will save the Republic,

and it will create a demand for my book, The Truth. . . . This book

was not written for money. It was written to save souls. In order to

attract public attention the book needs the notice the President’s

removal will give it.”

When the President died, Guiteau wrote to Garfield’s successor,

Chester A. Arthur: “My inspiration is a God send to you & I

presume you appreciate it. . . . It raises you from a political cipher to

President of the United States . . .” Moments before the hangman

slipped a noose around his neck, Guiteau harangued the crowd with

one last dissertation on his divine calling to slay Garfield.

3. William McKinley

In the late 1890’s and early 1900’s, Emma Goldman, an effective

agitator for American anarchy, stirred enough ferment within

an anonymous disciple, Leon Czolgosz (pronounced

“Colgosh”), to prompt the assassination

of the twenty-fifth President of the United States,

William McKinley. After his

arrest, Czolgosz told police: “I killed President

McKinley because I done my duty. I don’t believe

one man should have so much service and

another man should have none.” Czolgosz was

found guilty and sentenced to the electric chair.

Before he faced death by electrocution, Czolgosz

affirmed his manifesto for the gathered spectators:

“I killed the president because he was the

enemy of the people - the good working people.

I am not sorry for my crime.”

4. Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt ascended to the Presidency

upon the death of William McKinley. Ironically,

Roosevelt’s means of ascension would serve as the

catalyst for a later attempt on his own life. During

the 1912 Presidential campaign, Roosevelt was in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin to deliver a speech before

a rally. Roosevelt stood up in his open automobile

to acknowledge the well-wishers when a man

stepped forward and shot him with a .38 Colt revolver.

The bullet penetrated Roosevelt’s overcoat,

a steel spectacles case, the fifty page manuscript of his speech, and

eventually lodged beneath his ribs. Dazed, but not critically

wounded, Roosevelt demanded that his assailant be brought before

him. After a penetrating examination by Roosevelt, John F. Schrank

was taken into custody.

Schrank, like Guiteau before him, had a visitation from beyond

the veil. The ghost of William McKinley appeared to Schrank and

denounced Roosevelt for complicity in his shooting. McKinley,

according to Schrank, demanded revenge and appointed Schrank as

his avenging angel.

5. Franklin D. Roosevelt

Shortly before Franklin Roosevelt’s 1932 inauguration, Giuseppe

Zangara fired five shots at the president-elect’s open motorcade in

Miami, Florida. Quickly arrested, Zangara assured

the police that he did not hate Roosevelt

personally, but explained that “I hate all Presidents,

no matter from what country they come,

and I hate all officials and everybody who is

rich.” While Zangara failed to even wound the

President-elect, he did hit Chicago Mayor Anton

Cermak and other bystanders. While Cermak

was on the operating table, Roosevelt visited the

other gunshot victims. Cermak died on March

6, 1933. Zangara was charged with murder and

was eventually electrocuted.

6. Harry S. Truman

White House renovations forced the Trumans to take up residence

a short distance from the Executive Mansion at Blair House.

On November 1, 1950, Harry Truman, after a particularly contentious

meeting with the CIA, needed a rest. He retired to his private

quarters at Blair House.

Outside Blair House, Puerto Rican patriots Oscar Collazo and

Griselio Torresola rushed towards a secret service

agent, positioned beneath the front entrance

canopy, from opposite directions. What could

have been a bloody assault was foiled because

Collazo had forgotten to release his weapon’s

safety trigger. An incongruously silent pistol eked

out a tiny click against the hammer. That almost

inaudible small noise sent Collazo into a panic. A

frenzied Collazo fumbled with his revolver, but

his attempts to correct his mistake triggered a comedy

of errors that featured misfired gun that hit a

guard in the leg.

The discharge of a bullet alerted the guards

stationed within Blair House, who charged out of their assigned

posts with guns blasting. Torresola and Collazo returned fire and

wounded several secret service agents and killed Leslie Coffelt, one

of Truman’s favorite officers. In the ensuing gun battle, Torresola

was killed. Collazo wounded himself at the outset.

With his compatriot slain, Collazo bravely declared the articles of

faith upon which the Puerto Rican Nationalist movement was instituted.

Ironically, Truman, a strong supporter of Puerto Rico’s autonomy,

appointed the first native Puerto Rican as governor of the

island. When confronted with these facts, Collazo defiantly asserted

that Truman was a symbol of the system and he was attacking the

system, not the man.

32 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

7. Gerald Ford

Twice within one month, Gerald Ford was the target of failed

assassination attempts. The first occurred on September 5, 1975 in

Sacramento, California. President Ford was walking between the

Senator Hotel and the state capitol where he was scheduled to deliver

a speech against crime. Across his path stepped Lynette

“Squeaky” Fromme, who pointed a colt .45 at his stomach. “The

country is in a mess. This man is not your president,” she proclaimed

as she pulled the trigger.

“Squeaky” was flustered that her effort had been foiled and explained

that she had simply “wanted to get some attention for Charlie

and the girls.” Fromme was a follower of cult leader Charles

Manson, who was imprisoned for the grisly murder of actress Sharon

Tate and others.

The Second attempt on Ford’s life

occurred on September 22, 1975, as

he emerged from the St. Francis Hotel

in San Francisco, California. Sara

Jane Moore was situated approximately

forty feet from President Ford.

She aimed her .38-caliber Smith &

Wesson at the President and fired.

“There comes a point when the

only way you can make a statement

is to pick up a gun,” she confided to

reporters. Precisely what statement her conduct was suppose to

declare is not certain, but at no time did Moore disclaim her action.

She pleaded guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to life in

prison.

8. Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan had been in office less than three months when

John Hinckley attempted to assassinate him. Hinckley’s motivation

for attacking the President is no more bizarre than the ghost of

a martyred president demanding vengeance, but Hinckley’s obsessive

attraction for a Hollywood movie star - Jodie

Foster - was rich in irony due to Reagan’s career

in Hollywood as a professional actor.

Hinckley had fallen in love with the child actress

Jodie Foster when she portrayed a 12-yearold

prostitute in Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver.

Foster ignored Hinckley’s overtures of love and

admiration. Enormously distressed by Foster’s

rejection, Hinckley was determined to gain the

attention and adoration of Jodie Foster by firing

six shots at President Reagan. Hinckley was immediately

apprehended. Prior to the shooting,

Hinckley wrote one last love letter to Jodie Foster

in which he swore his allegiance to her and as proof of his devotion

he would kill the President. After being sentenced to a mental

institution, Hinckley again iterated his motivation by describing his

action as the greatest love offering in history.

PROFILE EVIDENCE AND THE CASE OF LEE

HARVEY OSWALD

Creating a hypothetical trial for Lee Harvey Oswald is partially

justified by John Douglas, who engaged in an exhaustive study that employed

his profiling techniques to discover the true identity of Jack the

Ripper. Douglas applied the “same rules and strictures as a current investigation

. . .” Based on his immense skill and vast experience, Douglas

surmised that Jack the Ripper was in reality Aaron Kosminski, a Polish

immigrant and frequent resident of mental asylums. Douglas acceded

that he “can’t be sure that Aaron Kosminski was the Ripper. . . But

what I can state with a high degree of confidence is that Jack the Ripper

was someone like Kosminski.”

In similar fashion, the application of profile evidence to Lee Harvey

Oswald will authenticate his assertion of innocence and condemn the

Warren Commission’s conviction without due process.

A. Elements of a Political Assassin Profile

Profiling can be compromised by subjectivity,

but cautious documentation from authoritative

sources limit the likelihood of bias slanting

the outcome. To amplify the impartiality and fairness

of this analysis, a composite of four profiles

has been consulted.

A comparison between these four profiles

demonstrate a consistent repetition in an assassin’s

conduct. By assembling the assassin criteria common

to all four profiles, a reliable composite

emerges to forge an investigative tool possessed

of unparalleled probity. The combined attributes show an assassin 1) violently

attacking a 2) famous or noted person 3) in order to attract notice

and attain a national platform to 4) announce the purpose behind the violent

assault (which necessitates the assailer being apprehended and acknowledging

responsibility). Lastly, the 5) assassin anticipates capture

or death and is resigned to it.

B. Admissibility of Political Assassin Profile in Court

The admissibility of profile evidence actually depends upon the

intrinsic facts and issues of each case. Thus, legal precedents and trends

in case law only permit a reasoned forecast on the probable admission.

The non-existence of a bright line rule on profile evidence precludes reliability

in predicting court rulings.

The admission of personality sketches increases in likelihood when

the defense utilizes the special evidentiary exceptions provided by the

Federal Rules of Evidence. To strengthen the odds on admission of profile

evidence in the Oswald case, the following tactics should be employed:

Federal and state rules of evidence allow admission of scientific

evidence where such will assist the jury in determining a fact in

issue. The defendant should espouse, as a defense, the existence of

a conspiracy to kill John F. Kennedy. By creating conspiracy as a

factual issue, profile evidence outlining the signature aspects of a

political assassination becomes admissible on a substantive issue.

Another factual issue centers around motive. Maintaining throughout

the trial the viability of factual issues to which profile evidence

might be relevant preserves the avenue through which profile evidence

can find admission.

The expert presenting the profile evidence must qualify by knowledge,

skill, experience, or training. Psychological profiles of political

assassins must be offered by a bona fide psychiatrist, criminologist or

someone with similar professional distinction in the field of behavioral

science.

Careful attention should be afforded the selection of venue.

C. The Impact of Profile Evidence on Oswald’s Verdict

Some critics discard tentative conclusions or calculated guesses as

unreliable and the product of a lazy mind. Some proponents of the fertile

hypothesis assert that such theoretical thinking accounts for the very knowledge

that has stimulated progress. Regardless of which school the reader

belongs, speculation on the capacity of profiling to manipulate an Oswald

verdict is simply that - speculation. A definitive answer remains elusive.

Nevertheless, certain incontrovertible facts establish a compelling

case for profiling obstructing any jury from rendering a guilty verdict.

Consider that juries today are obviously influenced by profile testimony.

Defendants have been exonerated and convicted by profile testimony.

Numerous legal precedents support introduction of profile testimony. A

competent presentation of the core components constituting an assassin’s

personality sketch effectively exculpates Oswald because his conduct following

his arrest on November 22nd fails to match a single trait identified

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 33

by the four profile composite. Non-conformity to the assassin profile

also betrays the prosecution’s greatest weakness - absence of motive.

The most important element in any criminal proceeding and a feature

identified as an undeviating attribute of a political assassin is the

identification of the criminal’s purpose in violating the law. Motive, an

integral, indeed critical, factor for the prosecutor’s case, contributes to

courts and juries that piece of the puzzle that unfolds the rationalization

adopted by the criminal for committing an offense. John Douglas assures

his reader that “all crimes have a motive, all crimes make sense according

to some logic, though that logic may be a strictly internal one with no

relationship to any “objective” logic.” The prosecutor’s key to a conviction

remains inextricably entangled with selling the alleged motive to a

jury. Without that logical link with a crime, the case is fatally flawed, and

the jury remains shrouded in mystery.

The great Irish poet William Butler Yeats, in his poem The Countess

Cathleen, spoke of the blurred resolution of mysteries when motive remains

hidden: “Look always on the motive, not the deed, The Shadow of

Shadows on the deed alone.” Certainly a variety of incentives propelled

assailants to attack American presidents,

yet the diversity in motive does not alleviate

the common denominator that

binds them all together - a bold statement

of purpose. Regardless of whether

the design behind their rash and violent

act is imperceptible, unreasonable, obscure,

or insensible, political assassins

articulate their intentions. They could

never be fulfilled by secretly disclosing

their diabolical deed to an intimate associate.

Political assassins yearn for a prominent platform, megaphones

if accessible, to present their explanation for altering history.

Many motives have been assigned to Oswald, but assignment, particularly

by conjecture, of a plausible motive cannot withstand scrutiny.

The motive must come from the assailant himself either verbally or in

writing. Oswald was subjected to hours of police grilling, yet at no time

during that interrogation did Oswald volunteer information even remotely

resembling a confession. Nor were those with Oswald able to coerce a

profession of guilt out of him. He was paraded in front of live television

cameras. International news coverage is the most high-profile forum ever

offered to a presidential assailant. Yet no proclamations were barked into

the staring lens of countless cameras. Instead, Oswald insisted upon his

innocence. “I emphatically deny these charges,” he shouted to reporters.

The unavoidable truth is that Oswald’s behavior does not fit the profile

of a political assassin. By failing to conform to the modus operandi of

past presidential assailants and international assassins, he defies the standard

classification of a political assassin. Oswald cannot legitimately be

classified as a political assassin. Carefully apply the profile features to

Oswald. First, Oswald did not openly shoot Kennedy. The gunman were

obscured.

Second, Oswald never at any time or place articulated a rationale for

killing the President of the United States. One of the essential elements in

establishing a prima facie case for political murder is a public declaration

of the perpetrator’s motive and purpose. Without a proclamation of

purpose or advancement of a cause, Kennedy’s murder lacks another quintessential

element of a political assassination. The death of a leader cannot

be labeled a political murder when an annunciation of purpose is absent.

The omission of a declared purpose also invalidates Oswald as a

candidate for political assassin.

Third, Oswald’s refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing is far too

significant to be ignored. The lack of any confession is not merely a

distinction from all other Presidential assassination cases, before or since

Kennedy, it is an unprecedented break in the pattern of history. The poet

T.S. Eliot wrote that “history is a pattern.” History most definitely has a

pattern. Assuredly the role assigned to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Warren

Commission was meant to fit the pattern of other crazed American political

assassins. Oswald’s verbal refutation of allegations that he killed

Kennedy, however, clashes with the rhythm and flow of that pattern. When

the pattern of history is disrupted, a reevaluation is merited in order to

learn whether some unique variable modifies or explains the interruption

in consistency. Arnold Toynbee’s conviction that “there must be some

common element of regularity in human nature” further supports suspicion

when the pattern of predictable behavior is broken. As emphasized

again and again, not only did Oswald not confess, he insisted on his innocence.

Fifth, Oswald does not appear to be a person who graciously embraced

his fate and resigned himself to the death chair or life imprisonment.

Oswald showed definite signs of interest in the outcome of his

case. He plead before television cameras for legal counsel to come forward

to assist him. Oswald’s request for an attorney displays his fighting

spirit, not a quiet submission to fate as exhibited by other political assassins.

In reality, the only operable explanation tendered thus far is the

one Oswald himself provided: “I’m just a patsy.” Many resist such an

epilogue because its spells conspiracy.

CONCLUSION

Lee Harvey Oswald was denied

a trial in 1963. Had Oswald

survived Jack Ruby’s attack to face

charges of homicide, profiling evidence

would not have been available

in 1963 and 1964. Today, however,

the judiciary in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States has

resorted to the use of profile evidence in one form or another. Thus, in a

hypothetical trail of Lee Harvey Oswald today, profiling could join his

defense arsenal. Some may sneer at the mention of a theoretical day of

judgment and ask, “What difference does it make? He’s dead!” John

Douglas challenges these cynics. Perhaps as a rationale for devoting his

time and aptitude to solving the mystery of Jack the Ripper, Douglas reminds

his reader that “sometimes the Dragon wins.” In other words, sometimes

people get away with murder. By using the advantages of his profiling

expertise, Douglas reached back in time and identified with reasonable

certainty the real Jack the Ripper. By snatching away the Ripper’s

cloak of secrecy and exposing him as a brutal murderer, Jack the Ripper

did not, after all , get away with murder. From history’s seemingly eternal

vantage point, a promise looms on future’s horizon that the mysteries

that perplex us today may eventually be resolved.

As the debate rages on about Oswald’s guilt or innocence, profile

evidence can absolve him of Kennedy’s slaying. And by proving that

Oswald was not a lone gunman, the Dragon has been denied his scapegoat.

Without Oswald as a shield, an increased probability of detection

heightens the Dragon’s vulnerability and endangers the security of his

seclusion.

Sources:

1 Tony Augarde, The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1991), p. 112.

2 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A Lisa

Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 26.

3 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Obsession (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/

Scribner, 1998), p. 252.

4 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A Lisa

Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 26.

5 Id.

6 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Mind Hunter ((New York: A Lisa Drew

Book/Scribner, 1995), p. 173.

7 Id. at p. 123.

8 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A Lisa

Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 26.

“Oswald’s refusal to acknowledge

any wrongdoing is far too

significant to be ignored.”

34 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

9 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Mind Hunter (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/

Scribner, 1995), p. 26.

10 Douglas works on the principle that behavior reflects personality and divides

the profiling process into seven steps: 1) evaluation of the criminal act; 2) evaluation

of the specifics at the crime scene or scenes; 3) analysis of the victim or victims;

4) evaluation of preliminary police reports; 5) evaluation of the medical

examiner’s autopsy protocol; 6) development of a profile with critical offender

characteristics; and 7) investigative suggestions predicated on construction of the

profile. John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A

Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 26.

11 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Mind Hunter ((New York: A Lisa Drew

Book/Scribner, 1995), p. 31.

12 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A Lisa

Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 251.

13 Id. at 246-255.

14 Id.

15 Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence (Jospeh

M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed., 1977), 401.08[10].

16 Mark J. Kadish, “The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles;

and Now in the Jury Box,” 46 The American University Law Review 747,

760 (Feb. 1997).

17 Id. at fn. 66.

18 For example, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a drug courier

profile was relevant at trial. The court concluded that “the drug courier profile

testimony was relevant to the issue of proving the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”

United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 324 (7th Cir. 1989).

19 Kadish, at 762-63.

20 Id. at 763-779.

21 Morton J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 7-8.

22 Id. at 9.

23 Id. at 9-10.

24 Id. at 9.

25 Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414.

26 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, para. 115-7.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).

27 Mo. Ann. Stat. 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1994).

28 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2901.06 (Baldwin 1993).

29 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

30 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

31 State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d

131, 134 (N.Y. 1990).

32 State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (N.J. 1982).

33 State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396-402 (Utah 1989).

34 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).

35 Mark J. Kadish, “The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles;

and Now in the Jury Box,” 46 American University Law Review 747, 748

(1997).

36 Id. at 765- 779.

37 United States v. Hernandez-Curatas, 717 F.2d 552, 553-54 (11th Cir. 1983).

38 Id. at 553, 556.

39 United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991).

40 State v. Rammasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396-402 (Utah 1989).

41 Ibn-Thomas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).

42 State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (N.J. 1982).

43 United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619-620 (8th Cir. 1983).

44 People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. Supr. 1989).

45 Wheat v. Delaware, 527 A.2d 269, 272-73 (Del. Supr. 1987).

46 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984).

47 People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 298 (Cal. 1984).

48 People v. Chavis, 603 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (App. Div. 1993).

49 Fed. Rule of Evidence 404(a).

50 Pennell v. Delaware, 602 A.2d 48, 49-51 (Del. Supr. 1991).

51 Delaware Rule of Evidence 702.

52 Id. at 55.

53 Id. at 56.

54 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Obsession (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/

Scribner, 1998), pp. 75-87.

55 Ohio v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Oh. Sup. 1990).

56 State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981)(expert testimony admitted to explain

to jury why defendant believed killing was necessary as self-defense); State v.

Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984)(expert testimony admitted to validate reasonableness

of defendant’s belief that deadly force was necessary); and State v. Allery, 682

P.2d 312 (Wa. 1984)(expert testimony permittted to explain why defendant believed

she was in imminent danger at the time of the shooting.)

57 Lee Davis, Assassination (London: Tiger Books International, 1993), pp. 6-7.

58 Id.

59 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Obssession (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/

Scribner, 1998), p. 222.

60 Id. at 223.

61 Id. at 223.

62 James W. Clarke, American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics (Princeton,

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 13-16.

63 Id.

64 Id. at 14.

65 Id. at 15.

66 Id.

67 Id. at 127.

68 Jim Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p.

209.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 228-229.

71 Lee Davis, Assassination (London: Transedition Books, 1993), p. 23.

72 Id. at 24.

73 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Trial of the Assassin Guiteau (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 49.

74 A. Wesley Johns, The Man Who Shot McKinley (New York: A.S. Barnes &

Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 33-36.

75 John Mason Potter, Plots Against the Presidents (New York: Astor-Honor,

1968), p. 172.

76 Id. at 184.

77 Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: William Morrow and Company,

Inc., 1992), p. 530.

78 Nathan Miller, FDR (New York: New American Library, 1983), p. 299.

79 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 809-

812.

80 The Editors of Time Life Books, True Crime: Assassination (Alexandria, Virginia:

Time Life Books, 1994), p. 55.

81 Id.

82 Id.

83 William A. Degregorio, The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents (New York:

Wing Books, 1993), pp. 651-52.

84 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Mind Hunter (New York: A Lisa Drew

Book/Scribner, 1995), p. 366.

85 Id. at 367.

86 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Journey Into Darkness (New York: A Lisa

Drew Book/Scribner, 1997), p. 47.

87 Tony Augarde, ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 234.

88 The 1997 release of Agent Hosty’s handwritten notes of the Oswald interrogation

provide further substantiation of Oswald silence regarding a motive.

89 T.S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays, “Little Gidding” (New York:

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1971), p. 144.

90 Arnold J. Toynbee and G.R. Urban, Toynbee on Toynbee (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1974), p. 5.

91 Walt Brown, The People v. Lee Harvey Oswald (New York: Carroll & Graf

Publishers, 1992), p. 60.

92 John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Mind Hunter (New York: A Lisa Drew

Book/Scribner, 1995), p. 364 - 67.

is General Counsel to the North American

Insulation Manufacturers Association in

Virginia. Prior to joining the NAIMA, Crane

was an environmental lawyer in Washington,

D.C. and was also appointed to an attorney

position for the Appellate Section of the United

States Department of Justice's Environment and

Natural Resources Division through the Attorney

General's Honor Law Graduate Program.

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 17

I expressed interest in a staff position with the fledgling Assassination

Records Review Board (ARRB) in October of 1995, and followed by

submitting two formal resumes (one in private sector format, and a second,

as requested, in the approved government format) in November. After

many delays, and 5 telephone interviews between individual members of

the Review Board staff in Washington, D.C. and me in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,

where I was working at the time, I was finally offered a position as

a Senior Analyst on March 17, 1995—St. Patrick’s Day, appropriately

enough. When I reported for work on August 7, 1995, I was placed on the

Military Records Team. I was fortunate enough during my three-yearsplus

at the ARRB to participate in many medical interviews and depositions

as well as successful efforts to digitally preserve and enhance the

autopsy photographs of President Kennedy. I was also involved in modest

and inconclusive efforts to study the authenticity of the autopsy x-rays

and photographs, and in sponsorship of a major effort by a consultant

(Kodak) to examine issues surrounding the authenticity of the Zapruder

film. Due to attrition within the mid-level management structure, I was

asked to serve as the Chief Analyst for Military Records for the last year

and a half I was at the ARRB. As a result I was privileged to be at the

center of efforts to declassify crucial and fascinating Cold War records on

U.S. Vietnam and Cuba policy during the Kennedy administration.

Working on the staff of the Assassination Records Review Board

was not anything like I had imagined it would be before I went to work

there. I had been cautioned repeatedly during the extensive job interview

process that the ARRB was not chartered to “solve” or “reinvestigate” the

assassination. I was further admonished

that the mandate of the JFK Act

was simply to identify, locate, and open

assassination records (to the maximum

extent allowable within the terms and

conditions of the JFK Act), and to then

transfer them to a new permanent archival

collection (The JFK Records

Collection) at the National Archives.1

As I began my work at the ARRB I was

reasonably well read in the perplexing

and conflicting evidence in the case, and I strongly believed that the evidence

demonstrated the two official versions of what had happened could

not be true, and that therefore some kind of domestic conspiracy was responsible

for the death of President Kennedy. For someone approaching

the Kennedy Assassination from my perspective, working at the ARRB

proved to be a bizarre experience.

Why ‘bizarre?’ First, because while I had assumed that even though

some, or perhaps even a majority, of staff members would not agree with

me that there had been a conspiracy, they would at least have been hired

on the basis of having some fair amount of knowledge of the case, and

would also have an interest in it. I found out I was wrong. Many staff

members didn’t give much of a damn about the case one way or another,

and were apparently hired because they had little knowledge of the case,

and it was therefore assumed they would not bring a strong ‘bias’ with

them. Others were apparently hired because they were unemployed—

just out of graduate school or law school, or in-between jobs—and could

be “low-balled” from the standpoint of salary. To be sure, they all met the

required educational requirements for the staff positions for which they

were hired, but many were not well versed in the assassination, nor did

many of my colleagues initially have much of an interest in the subject

matter. Some, to their credit, subsequently developed an interest and became

self-educated ‘experts’ within their areas of responsibility, but they

were in a minority.

Second, I found it a bizarre experience because the 5 Board Members,

with one probable exception, were unfamiliar with the multiple and

serious conflicts in the evidence in the Kennedy assassination. They demonstrated

collectively by their lack of reading and lack of study over the 4

years of the ARRB’s existence that they were not interested in ‘catching

up,’ or learning anything substantive about the case.2 Of the maximum of

25 to 28 staff members employed at any one time, generally between onethird

to one-half of the staff population

believed the Warren Commission

had come up with the right conclusions.

At any given time, between

one-half to two-thirds of the staff

daily demonstrated not only a profound

overall ignorance of the

Kennedy assassination, but a strong

prejudice against any colleagues or

independent researchers who questioned

the Warren Commission’s conclusions.

Furthermore, they embodied through their behavior an appalling

lack of curiosity, and minds closed to new ideas.

Of course, there were curious people on the staff, and there were

staff members who felt as I did. Namely, there were some staff members

who felt that there were so many conflicts in the evidence in the Kennedy

murder that there was something terribly wrong with the conclusions of

both the Warren Commission, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

3 But this group was in a distinct minority.

The point here is not whether Board Members and staff members

were ‘biased’ one way or the other, for surely all of us were.4 Rather, the

point is that whereas a range of approximately 75-90 per cent of the American

people polled for the past couple of decades have believed there was

a conspiracy of some kind behind the assassination of President Kennedy,

this proportionality of belief systems was not represented by the makeup

of either the staff of the ARRB, or by the composition of the Board itself.

The belief systems represented by the staff and Board Members of the

ARRB were decidedly skewed, compared to those of the general public.

Jeremy Gunn, Head of Research and Analysis on the Staff, and General

Counsel for the bulk of the ARRB’s life-span, told me many times that

none of the Board Members believed there was a conspiracy to kill President

Kennedy. Gunn repeatedly cautioned me not to discuss any con-

The Culture of the ARRB

A Behind the Scenes Look by a Former Senior Staff Member

President Clinton meets with members of the

Review Board as they present their Final Report.

“Many staff members didn’t give much of

a damn about the case one way or

another, and were apparently hired

because they had little knowledge of the

case. . .”

Doug Horne

18 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

spiracy theories with the Board Members, no matter how well I thought

such a hypothesis was supported by evidence. It was directly implied that

this would not only have been politically incorrect, but dangerous, as

well—and by this I mean injurious to my professional standing on the

staff.

This strong bias by the core of the ARRB structure against the likelihood

of a conspiracy, or even against consideration of the possibility of a

conspiracy, sprang from two sources, in my opinion. First, the Board

Members themselves were nominated by professional societies5—the

conservative elites of academia that by their very nature always tend to

support the status quo, stability, and are part of the ‘establishment.’ [Any

study of the history of science, for example, readily reveals that the established

leaders of any given generation of the scientific ‘establishment’

rarely entertain radically new ideas with grace, and are extremely resistant

to new concepts that challenge the current orthodoxy established as

the ‘mainstream’ school of thought. More on this later.]

Second, the person chosen to serve as the founding Executive Director

of the staff, who had total control over staff hiring, was surely chosen

not only because of his worthy experience

as an archivist, administrator, and

historian, but also because his belief systems

were compatible with those of the

Board Members whom he would be

serving. For example, whereas I admittedly

came to the Kennedy assassination

through Rush to Judgment, Six Seconds

in Dallas, and Best Evidence, David

Marwell, the founding Executive Director,

was not bashful about openly stating

that he came to the case from Gerald Posner’s Case Closed. I view

this work as a simplistically written, sometimes inaccurately researched

apologia for the Warren Commission’s basic findings (‘old wine’ in a ‘new

bottle’). However, to David Marwell’s credit, he ultimately decided to

hire me to work on the staff, even though he knew that, contrary to his

own beliefs, I was persuaded that a domestic conspiracy was responsible

for the assassination of President Kennedy. (David Marwell and Jeremy

Gunn both stated on a number of occasions that they felt a wide divergence

of views on the staff was healthy.) I was in a distinct minority,

however.

At the time I joined the staff in August of 1995, I estimate that there

were only three other staff members, out of approximately 28, who were

widely read in the evidence of the case. Therefore, only about four people

out of twenty-eight on the staff had an open mind to the possibility of

conspiracy at the time they began employment. A handful of others—a

minority—became widely read in their areas of expertise over time. I

came to notice that the more widely read one became in the details of the

evidence, the more awareness one developed in how complex the Kennedy

assassination truly was, and about how few certainties there truly were in

this murder.

None of this means that there was any conspiracy at the ARRB to

hide the truth or suppress evidence in the Kennedy assassination. I never

saw any evidence that there was. Nor do I believe there was any such

conspiracy or cover-up at the ARRB. What it does mean is that anyone on

the staff who wanted to pursue any ‘quasi-investigative’ leads, or pursue

anything that smacked of ‘reinvestigation,’ was bucking against the current.

To continue the analogy discussed above, major paradigm shifts in

belief systems within mainstream elites generally are not originated by

the leadership of those elites. Rather, major paradigm shifts are almost

always proposed by ‘loners’ viewed as ‘mavericks’ within their own communities,

and are initially viewed as ‘heresy’ by the establishment before

being accepted by subsequent, new generations as the ‘new orthodoxy.’

The ‘old orthodoxy’ still defended by most of the mainstream historical

and establishment media elites in the United States are the Warren

Commission’s findings, and its bastard offspring, the HSCA report.6

Not only did the JFK Records Act timidly not empower the Review

Board to reinvestigate the assassination or reach conclusions, but the consensus

among both the Board Members and the majority of the staff was

that there was nothing out there to compel a reinvestigation anyway.

Anytime a staff member (such as myself) would propose that some investigative,

or re-investigative lead be followed-up on, it was an uphill fight

from the get-go. Such efforts had to be carefully couched with justifications

such as, “we are only trying to clarify the record”. (This was often

true, by the way.) These ‘clarification’ efforts had to be pursued incrementally,

in a piecemeal fashion, without expending too much at any one

time in the way of limited staff resources—resources that were officially

to be used only to identify, locate, review, open, and transfer assassination

records to the National Archives.

A good example of ‘limited reinvestigation’ at the ARRB was what I

came to call our efforts to ‘expand and clarify’ the medical record of President

Kennedy’s assassination. Jeremy Gunn and I had to obtain incremental

approval for each step that involved obtaining testimony under

oath—the 5 Board Members had to formally approve all depositions by a

majority vote. (Unsworn staff interviews

of witnesses, thankfully,

did not have to be approved by the

Board Members.) In the culture in

which we were working, presentation

to the Board of any kind of a

‘master plan’ for what looked like a

reinvestigation of the medical evidence

would not have been acceptable

in an environment where the

emphasis was on the search for existing

records.

So, for example, the first step taken by the staff with the Board in the

medical evidence area was a modest one—getting permission to depose

JFK autopsy pathologists James J. Humes and “J” Thornton Boswell, two

of the three pathologists at President Kennedy’s autopsy. Jeremy Gunn

approached David Marwell with the proposal and the rationale supporting

it.

Once David Marwell was persuaded the project was worthwhile and

could be supported within the structure of the Board’s mandate, it was up

to him to propose it to the Board Members and solicit a formal vote on

whether or not to depose the two former Navy pathologists.

I vividly remember the day of a Board meeting in the autumn of

1995 when Jeremy Gunn came to me, with his eyes lit up with excitement,

to tell me that the Board Members had just voted to allow the staff

to depose Drs. Humes and Boswell. It really was great news. I remember,

however, saying to Jeremy on that day, “That’s great, but I think we

should do the Dallas treating physicians first, don’t you, and then the

autopsy pathologists?” As a harbinger of weaknesses in our process and

methodology, Jeremy gave me what became his stock answer on this question

for the next two-and-one-half years: “Let’s wait until later. Maybe

we’ll have an opportunity to depose the Dallas doctors after we finish

with the autopsy pathologists. We can easily justify deposing the autopsy

pathologists now because they created so many official records central to

the case that require clarification. I would love to do the Dallas doctors

too, but let’s just wait until the appropriate time,” or words very similar to

these.

In this case, though, as in later efforts to “expand and clarify” the

medical record, the debate wasn’t always “over” just because the Board

Members had voted to conduct a deposition. In this instance, as in others

in the future involving medical issues, the decision by the Board to take

action only stimulated debate and dissension within the staff. On this

occasion, the staff member directly responsible to Jeremy Gunn for conducting

pre-deposition research, and assembling exhibits, attempted to

halt the depositions through personal lobbying of David Marwell. He

also dragged his feet on preparations, and exhibited little enthusiasm for

the project. Rather than halting the depositions agreed to by the Board,

“The belief systems represented by the

staff and Board Members of the ARRB

were decidedly skewed, compared to

those of the general public.”

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 19

this activity merely earned the staff member his removal from the project,

and resulted in my promotion from “number two” to “number one”

research assistant to Jeremy Gunn in the medical evidence area.

This staff member said he opposed the deposition of Humes and

Boswell primarily on “constructionist” or “legal” grounds. He said that

this activity constituted reinvestigation of the Kennedy assassination, and

he opposed it because: (1) reinvestigation of President Kennedy’s murder,

he reminded us, was not a mission empowered to the ARRB in the

JFK Act; and (2) memories were so unreliable after 34 years, that all we

would do, he feared, was unnecessarily “muddy the existing record.” But

this same staff member also thought the Warren Commission “got it right,”

and was quite vocal about visciously attacking anyone on the staff who

disagreed with this belief of his. He was a master at the use of invective

and sarcasm, and would often use the nasty rhetorical question that was

“unanswerable” to terminate a conversation, rather than debate one point

of evidence with another. As it turned out, this split between staff members

who opposed “clarification” efforts on “constructionist” or “legal”

grounds, and those who were not satisfied with the messy state of the

evidence in the case and wanted to “clarify the record” whenever possible

by asking witnesses questions under oath, continued throughout the

lifespan of the ARRB. And I cannot recall one staff member who opposed

‘clarification of the record’—i.e., admittedly creating a new assassination

record by pursuing evidentiary leads and asking a broad range of

questions, often under oath—who was not either a Warren Commission

supporter, or just plain completely bored by, and disinterested in, the whole

subject of the Kennedy assassination.

Just so that the reader understands, I was the strongest advocate on

the staff in favor of using our powers

to depose witnesses (and subpoena

them if necessary) in an attempt to

“clarify the record.” I reasoned as follows:

what harm was there in this, since

the deposition transcripts and interview

reports would simply be deposited

(without comment) in the JFK Collection

before the ARRB shut down, for

the American people to review on their

own? I knew that the medical witnesses

to the treatment of President Kennedy and Governor Connally, and President

Kennedy’s autopsy, were getting up in years, and that two of the

Dallas physicians, Drs. Shaw and Jenkins, were already deceased. Why

not question all of the surviving medical witnesses, I often asked my colleagues,

before it was impossible for anyone to do so? Each American

would be free later, on his or her own, I reasoned, to decide which testimony

was credible or incredible, accurate or inaccurate, worthy of belief

or not worthy of belief. This strategy was consistent with the whole spirit

of the JFK Act, which was to place records in the National Archives and

to make them available for review by ordinary citizens, and scholars of all

stripes, so that each person could determine individually what the evidence

meant.

Although many of these medical witnesses had indeed been interviewed

or deposed in the past, a case could be made that they were often

not asked the appropriate questions, the appropriate follow-up questions,

or enough questions. This alone, I felt, justified conducting several depositions

from among both the Dallas treating physicians, and the Bethesda

autopsy participants. Besides, the ARRB, because of its studiously neutral

role in the whole process, was the perfect candidate to conduct the

most useful depositions of assassination witnesses. Not only would many

witnesses be more likely to agree to be questioned by a neutral government

body than by a private researcher, but with all of its legal talent, the

ARRB was much more likely to conduct impartial interviews and depositions.

A private researcher with a pet theory might either consciously, or

inadvertently, ask leading questions and forget (or avoid) asking others.

To me, deciding to maximize, rather than minimize, the number of

depositions taken by the ARRB, particularly in the area of the medical

evidence, which was so replete with contradictions and inconsistencies,

was therefore a “no-brainer.” In my view, it could do no harm, and would

only leave a valuable legacy behind as the ARRB shut down its operations.

There was no guarantee that such activity would satisfy “doubting

Thomases” like me by allowing us to “solve” the assassination, but that

was not the criterion by which the success of such an effort should be

judged, I reasoned. The real reason to conduct as many depositions as

possible of important witnesses was to get their best recollections, while

under oath, on record, before they passed away. It was that simple. Figuring

out what it all meant could (and would) come later.

Fortunately, the Board Members sided with my philosophy more often

than they did with that of the nay-saying, strict “constructionists” on the

staff who didn’t want us to do anything but locate and release pre-existing

records. There was great irony in this. The same Review Board that

didn’t know the details of the evidence in the assassination very well at

all, and that (according to Jeremy Gunn) didn’t believe there was a conspiracy

to kill President Kennedy, ended up approving ten individual depositions

of personnel who participated in (or simply witnessed) the Bethesda

autopsy, and one joint deposition of some of the Dallas treating physicians.

I believe there were flaws in how some of these depositions were

conducted by General Counsel Jeremy Gunn—some quite serious—but

the point here is that over time, Executive Director David Marwell proposed

to the Review Board that the depositions of ten Bethesda autopsy

participants be taken, and that each time such a proposal was made, it was

approved by the Board Members. The result was that the Board Members

approved all 10 proposals put to them to depose Bethesda autopsy witnesses,

and thus left a priceless gift

to history. (The Board Members also

approved depositions of some of the

Dallas treating physicians, but only

in response to an intense public lobbying

campaign by a frustrated JFK

research community. This episode

will the subject of a future article.)

On the other hand, not one Board

Member attended one medical witness

deposition, and to my knowledge

not one Board Member read the transcript of any medical deposition

during the lifespan of the ARRB. (No, I’m not kidding.) I was told by an

administrative staff member that about one month prior to the ARRB’s

sunset in September 1998, 3 of the 5 Board Members, however, did suddenly

ask for photocopies of all of the medical witness deposition transcripts.

So, is the ARRB glass half-full, or half-empty, in regard to the medical

evidence? It certainly depends upon one’s perspective. In the case of

the autopsy evidence, I would submit that the glass is two-thirds full, and

only one-third empty. In the case of the Parkland Hospital treating physicians,

I believe the Board Members (although very reluctantly, and for the

wrong reasons) made the correct decision to depose some Dallas treating

physicians. However, the task was so badly bungled in execution by so

many people, that the glass in that case is almost completely empty...but

more on that later. (I will dedicate a future article solely to the subject of

the Dallas doctors joint deposition conducted by the ARRB.)

Based upon what I saw as the Military Records Team Leader for a

year-and-a-half, and based upon what I heard about the CIA, FBI and

Secret Service records reviewed by the ARRB from my staff colleagues

for three years, the Board Members’ attitude and performance in regard to

their primary task of reviewing and releasing pre-existing assassination

records that the originating agencies (or other agencies) wanted to withhold

in whole, or in part, was simply outstanding. The Board Members

aggressively pursued the opening of all records to the maximum extent

allowable under the provisions of the JFK Act, consistently upholding the

JFK Act’s “presumption of immediate disclosure” by demanding that agencies

wanting to redact (or withhold) text provide ‘clear and convincing

“. . . not one Board Member attended

one medical deposition, and. . . not one

Board Member read the transcript of any

medical deposition during the lifespan of

the ARRB.”

20 Vol. 5, Issue 1 Spring 1999

evidence that the nation would be harmed’ before agreeing to any such

redactions.7 And the Board Members were not an easy sell, either. Their

standards of proof were quite stringent, and consistently so. There were

some staff members who felt the Board was occasionally overzealous in

favor of release of what had formerly been national secrets, but they were

in a minority.

It would be the ultimate irony if some of the work of the Review

Board or its staff ended up being the catalyst that “busted” the old paradigm

of the Warren Commission’s orthodoxy in the minds of our country’s

power elites. The bipartisan consensus in Congress that led to passage of

the JFK Act in 1992 was without a doubt driven by a certainty within the

House and Senate that “the government had nothing to hide,” and that

“opening up the files” would quash unmerited speculation and paranoia

that was having a corrosive effect on faith in our government’s institutions.

One primary reason the Board Members were so aggressive in opening

records is because they felt the concept of a conspiracy in the death of

JFK was nonsense. This idea—that a body of Honorable Men such as the

Warren Commission was either dishonest, or simply “got it wrong”—was

in fact offensive to them, and they all wanted to help restore faith in American

institutions of government by releasing as many records as possible.

They felt with great certainty these releases would support the Warren

Commission’s findings, and reveal many public suspicions about the assassination

to be without foundation. Put a bit more kindly, the Board

Members understood the corrosive effect of unwarranted Cold War secrecy

on public confidence in government, and wanted to do as much as

they could to restore some faith in American institutions. They felt they

might do this by proving that a government body (such as the ARRB) was

willing and able, if properly empowered, to release former secrets to the

light of day, and public scrutiny, regardless of what those records revealed

about the subject matter at hand.

Whether what Board Member Henry Graff called “the law of

unintended consequences” will apply to the legacy of the Review Board

remains to be seen. Board Member Kermit Hall opined in September

1998, at the Review Board’s “sunset” press conference at the National

Archives, that it will be at least 10 years before the legacy of the Review

Board can begin to be properly assessed. I agree. It will take some time

to reverse the mantra of officialdom, particularly when government

officials, mainstream historians, and news organizations who missed the

“story of the century” in the first place (due to gullibility and laziness)

now have 35 years’ worth of bureaucratic and editorial turf to protect.

Perhaps, in one of the great ironies of history, the work done by the

conservative-minded, “non-investigative” Assassination Records Review

Board has begun to help shift the rudder on the ship of history that interprets

and delivers the Kennedy assassination to the American people. In

my view, that ship is already “coming about” and slowly beginning to

reverse course, but mainstream historians and the ‘respectable’ media organs

still refuse to acknowledge what the public has known for years: the

simplistic conclusions presented by the Warren Commission in 1964, and

repackaged by the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1979,

are not supported by the total body of evidence in the case—and no matter

how unsatisfying it may be to say so, the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy remains an unsolved murder.

ENDNOTES

1 See ARRB Final Report, Chapter 1F, pages 7-10, for a succinct summation of

the key provisions of the JFK Act.

2 The Board Members did receive numerous staff briefings that provided

‘context’ for key documents that were being examined; but these briefings were

always quite short, and narrow in scope. I was never aware of any proposal or

program to have the staff brief the Board Members on the essential evidence in

the Kennedy assassination. I think this was a great opportunity lost. The staff

could have prepared ‘prosecutorial’ and ‘defense’ briefs on ballistics evidence,

medical evidence, acoustics evidence, and neutron activation analysis, for

example...and the Board Members could have been educated, reasonably quickly

(i.e., during the first six months), in the basic evidence of the case. Since 4 of

the 5 Board Members had full-time jobs in the outside world, and the Board

Members only met an average of 2 or 3 days per month in Washington on Review

Board business, this approach may, in retrospect, have been the only way to ‘get

the Board up to speed.’ Hindsight is always ‘20-20.’ Perhaps the biggest

impediment to this concept was that it is never safe, or politically correct, to tell

the emperor he is not wearing any clothes. I specifically proposed to Jeremy

Gunn, on more than one occasion, that the Board Members receive a ‘big medical

briefing’ to acquaint them with the conflicts in the evidence in this area, but the

idea was abhorrent to Jeremy. He said they had little patience with the conflicts

in the evidence in the JFK murder, and had demonstrated great impatience with

him on more than one occasion when he had tried to discuss ambiguity or

incongruities in the medical evidence.

3 The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone,

killed President Kennedy. The House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded

that while Lee Harvey Oswald had indeed killed President Kennedy and

had been the sole individual to wound both the President and Governor Connally,

that an additional shot (i.e., a fourth shot) had been fired from the ‘grassy knoll’

in Dealey Plaza, and had missed the occupants of the limousine, and that therefore,

there had ‘probably’ been a conspiracy.

4 I never felt that ‘biased’ was the dirty word Jeremy Gunn seemed to think it

was. He often used to state, in the way of admonishment, that certain staff

members, or researchers, were biased, and used the term with such opprobrium

that being tagged by Jeremy Gunn as ‘biased’ was tantamount to having a social

disease. [Whenever he would use this label, the clear implication seemed to be

that the lowly mortals being criticized were biased, but that Jeremy Gunn, of

course, was not.] In my view, everyone is biased, but it is not a dirty word...it

simply means they have an opinion. If an opinion is based upon the relative

weight one gives to different evidence, and a person can suspend his opinion (or

bias) when engaged in professional activity, then there is nothing wrong with

this. In fact, this kind of self-awareness is healthy. What I believe is dangerous

is the person who thinks he is above bias, but nevertheless demonstrates that he

is biased, on a regular basis, through his statements and behaviors.

5 President Clinton nominated, for the advice and consent of the Senate, the

choices of the American Bar Association (John R. Tunheim), the American Historical

Association (Anna Kasten Nelson), the Organization of American Historians

(Kermit L. Hall), the Society of American Archivists (William L. Joyce),

and a fifth nominee recommended by the White House staff, Henry F. Graff.

The process whereby four of the above nominees were recommended by their

respective professional associations was mandated by Section 7a(4)(A) of the

JFK Act; see Appendix C of the ARRB Final Report. The JFK Act required that

the Review Board be composed of 5 Board Members, but only named four

nominating bodies, so having the White House staff nominate the fifth member

seems to have been an equitable and non-preferential way of having achieved

balance, and avoiding undue influence, or the perception of undue influence, of

any particular group on the Review Board’s activities.

6 Notable exceptions have been ABC’s 1992 “20/20” television interview of

Dr. Charles Crenshaw, and the position on the assassination taken by presidential

historian Michael Beschloss in The Crisis Years. [There are some chinks in the

armor of the establishment.]

7 The only allowable reasons for the withholding of information in assassination

records were enumerated by the Congress in Section 6 of the JFK Records

Collection Act of 1992, entitled “Grounds for Postponement of Public Disclosure

of Records.” [See Appendix C of the ARRB’s Final Report.] In brief, these

reasons were (and remain): (1) threats to the defense, military operations, or

foreign relations of the U.S., (2) the release of the name of a living person who

had provided confidential information to the government in cases where the

release today of that identity would cause a substantial risk of harm to that person,

(3) the release of information that would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy

to an individual, where that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs

the public interest in its release, (4) the public disclosure of the assassination

record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality

currently requiring protection between a government agent and a cooperating

individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful

that it outweighs the public interest, or (5) the public disclosure of the

assassination record would compromise protective procedures currently utilized,

and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 35

Barb Junkkarinen

It has been said that a picture is worth a thousand words. Tens

of thousands of words have been written about the JFK autopsy

photographs, and they have been the subjects of intense study by

government panels and researchers for years. Much has been

written about alleged touch up or outright fakery of the photos

and/or the wounds they are said to depict. I have seen discussion

claiming proof that the photos were taken in separate locations

because the stripe on the towel showing in other autopsy photos

does not show in this back of the head photo, below.

The “Back of the Head” Photo

Photo 1 (above) is the most familiar version of the autopsy

photo purported to show an entry wound in the cowlick of President

Kennedy’s head. Despite the autopsy report, and the autopsists

themselves who spent hours working with the body, noting an entry

wound 1” to the right and slightly above the EOP, latter day panels

decreed that this photo shows that entry wound to be in the cowlick.

Is that bloody splotch in the photo at the cowlick…and furthermore,

is it the entry wound seen by the autopsists at all?

Anyone familiar with the various on-line discussion groups

knows that I have argued against that photo depicting an entry

wound in the cowlick for years. JFK did, indeed, have a prominent

cowlick. As can be seen in any number of photos taken of him in

life, his cowlick was located on his left side. If his head were a

box, his cowlick would essentially be at the left rear corner of the

box where top and back of box meet. Apologists will argue that

“the cowlick” means the typical cowlick area in general, not JFK’s

cowlick location specifically. Okay, I am open to that, the general

cowlick area would be anywhere along that line on a box where

top and back meet. But that isn’t what the photo shows either.

We can see gloved fingers under the scalp tissue at the top of

the photo, lifting and holding it in place. Humes and Boswell have

said that the scalp was completely loose and being held up over

the bone defect that lurked beneath. Dr. McClelland, of Parkland,

made that same observation after looking at the photos for the

NOVA television show in 1988. He noted that, “of course,” the

large hole in the rear of the head did not show in the photo because

the scalp was being held up over it. Okay, that’s reasonable. And

because they say the scalp was loose and being held up over the

back of the head, perhaps we can be somewhat forgiving in noticing

that “the wound” in the photo is obviously not right of the midline

(as reported in the autopsy protocol). And given this orientation of

the photo, we can take that and some backward flex of the neck

into account for a not quite accurate depiction of the wound on a

high/low perspective on the back of the head. But is there enough

latitude there to account for a full four-inch difference between

EOP and cowlick?

While great care must be taken in evaluating 3D objects in a

2D medium (See sidebar on page 38), I believe some valuable

information can be gleaned by orienting this photo correctly and

making some basic observations. First, the photo must be turned

90 degrees to the left…JFK is on his side in this photo. There is no

stripe on “the towel” because the towel is not in the picture … that

is the autopsist’s shirt as can clearly be discerned in a less cropped

version of the photo. (See Photo 2)

Note the nearly straight on perspective; look at his ear. Also

note that there is actually little backward flex in his neck. Pay

particular attention to the location of “the wound” in relation to

the top of JFK’s ear.

Where is your EOP?

Over the last year, I have done what I refer to as the “string

test” on dozens of people and have challenged “cowlick supporters”

on the newsgroups to do the same. Simply take a piece of string

and run it around the back of your head from the top of one ear to

the top of the other. Make sure it is level on a horizontal plane.

Where does that string cross the back of your head in relation to

your EOP? Try it on several people. I have found that on most

people, the string crosses the back of the head just at the top of the

EOP or within 1/4 - 1/2” above it; on one person, it crossed 3/4”

WHATÕS WRONG WITH THESE PICTURES?

Photo 1

Photo 2

36 Vol. 5, Issue 4 Winter 1999

above the EOP. (See Photo 3) Also note the location of the tops of

the ears and EOP relative to the cowlick in these photos.

Now, again, look at Photo 2

and see where “the wound” falls in

relation to the top of JFK’s ear. And,

remember, loose tissue is being held

up over a void underneath. Between

that void and the loose relaxed tissue,

it is likely that that it could be pulled

up to an artificially high level, unlikely

that it would lay too low, and we can

also see in the photo that there is no

apparent slack in the scalp tissue low

down.

I contend that this autopsy

photo shows, without a doubt, that

what is purported to be “the wound”

is nowhere near what anyone would

consider to be the “cowlick area” …

on anyone.

Is that bloody splotch really “the

wound”?

Humes’ supposed recantation

of the location of the entry wound in the back of the head being

near the EOP has been much ballyhooed by apologists. Actually,

Humes never did that in the first place and was clearly confused

by what he was seeing in the photo. The splotch that was purported

to be an entry wound in the cowlick appeared too high to him. He

picked the white bleb at the hairline as what then must have been

the entry. He did later agree that the low white spot was no wound

and that the upper splotch must be the entry … but he never

conceded it was anywhere near the cowlick, in fact, he grumbled a

comment saying it wasn’t. The fact is that the only documentation

we have as regards statements from the autopsists on the location

of the entry in the back of the head are those in which they reaffirm

their original findings ….. 1” to the right and slightly above the

EOP.

In the same session with the HSCA Forensic Pathology Panel

as Humes’ experience above, Boswell made a direct statement that

seems to have been largely overlooked. When Petty, commenting

about the splotch just off to the right of the ruler, commented, “What

is this opposite – oh, it must be, I can’t read it – but up close to the

tip of the ruler, there you are, two centimeters down –,” Boswell

replied, “That’s the posterior-inferior margin of the lacerated scalp.”

He was saying that the splotch they were calling the entry wound

wasn’t the entry at all, but was the rearmost point of a particular

tear in the scalp.

When asked by the ARRB to point out the entry wound on the

back of the head photo, Boswell was asked to measure, on the

photo, to the area he was pointing at. As denoted by the question

asked of him in response to his pointing out where the entry was,

what he pointed out, “….wound be approximately 3.5 cm at

approximately a 45-degree angle from that white spot…….And

that it’s in the direction towards the right ear.” was clearly not the

bloody splotch generally identified as the entry, nor was it a spot

visible in the photo at all. Boswell agrees with the statement just

made by the questioner, and the questioner then asks, “And the

point you are estimating that the entrance wound was located, is

that the location that was previously recorded as approximately

2.5 centimeters to the right and slightly above the external occipital

-–.“ Boswell replies, “Right.”

Boswell was noting that the entry wound was not visible in

the back of the head photo, well in keeping with that overlooked

statement he had made to the HSCA so many years before.

In Dallas last November, Doug Horne, who served on the

ARRB, shared with me that after hearing Boswell’s comments

while being deposed, they did some further computer study of

photo #42 (the “back of the head” photo, Photo 1). I later wrote

and asked Doug to reiterate what he told me in Dallas, and he has

given me permission to use his reply in its entirety. Doug’s letter

to me:

Barb,

During his ARRB deposition on Feb 13, 1996 Humes was asked

by us whether the red spot (in the “cowlick area”) or the “white spot”

(down low near the hairline) on photo # 42 [“back of the head” photo]

was the entry wound–the same choices the HSCA gave him. He

exhibited confusion when answering this question for the ARRB.

Initially he told us “the red spot”–the answer he gave the HSCA the

second time around (in 1978) during his public testimony; then, when

Jeremy probed a little bit to test the strength of his answer, Humes

changed his answer and said “the white spot” down near the hairline—

the original answer he gave the HSCA Forensic Pathology Panel in

1977. His final conclusion for the ARRB, after he changed his mind,

was that the “white spot had to be it because the red spot was too

high,” or words to that effect. (I defer to the transcript, of course, for

completely accurate portrayals of what Humes said to us during his

deposition; I am going from memory here.)

[By the way, I do not consider the so-called “cowlick area” to

really be the cowlick, just because Andy Purdy characterized it as

the “cowlick” when he was working for the HSCA. I think JFK’s

cowlick was up really high, much higher than the “combed-back area”

in the autopsy photo of the back of the head. To me, it appears as if

someone has literally combed back, or parted, the hair to show the

red “lesion” for the photographer. That photograph was clearly taken

after the removal of the brain, because in the uncropped version of #

38 [“back wound photo” which includes a somewhat oblique view

of the back of the head], i.e., the transparency, the hands of two

different physicians are pulling or holding scalp in place from INSIDE

the cranium, which could only be done if the brain had been removed.

Whether it was taken during the middle of the autopsy, or after the

autopsy was completed and immediately before restorative

procedures, I do not know.]

When the ARRB deposed Boswell on Feb 26, 1996 we took a

different (i.e., better) approach with him when trying to make sense

out of the back wound photo that includes the back of the head (#

38). We asked Boswell if he saw the entry wound described in the

autopsy report ANYWHERE in that photograph. After careful

consideration, he calmly said, “no.” He identified the “red spot” as

the end of a long laceration, the white spot as some type of debris,

and said that the actual physical location of the entry wound that he

remembered would be located on transparency # 38 approximately

halfway between the “white spot” in the hairline, and the top of the

right ear! In the prints made from the transparencies you cannot see

anything in this area. However, in Rochester at Kodak’s research

lab, after transparency # 42 [the straight on photo of the back of the

head] was digitized on the world’s best scanner, the Kodak techs and

I (and later, Jeremy) looked at extreme blow-ups and enhancements

of extreme blow-ups of this area (between the white spot and the top

of the right ear) and lo and behold, there is a suggestion of a possible

puncture in this area (unclear because the hair is thick and there is

some shadow), clearly surrounded by a circular pattern of blood-

Photo 3

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles 37

spatter. This appeared to Jeremy and I to be a possible entry wound

surrounded by bloody back-spatter from the entry.

To summarize, we found photographic evidence of a possible entry

wound in photo # 42 (we used the Nov 10, 1966 Inventory List for

numbering) EXACTLY WHERE BOSWELL SAID IT REALLY

WAS ON THE BODY. You will recall that in front of the HSCA

Forensic Pathology Panel in 1977, both Humes and Boswell both

said “that’s no wound” in regard to the red spot, and somewhat

tentatively (by process of elimination, apparently) identified the white

spot as the entrance wound. After being pressured, Humes changed

his mind about what the red spot depicted in his public testimony in

1978, but clarified to the ARRB after his deposition (in writing—see

last page of transcript) that he always insisted, and still did in 1996,

that the entrance wound was low on the head, slightly to the right of

the EOP.

Later, the ARRB had Dr. Lee and Dr. DeMaio look at the enhanced

images of the possible “Boswell entrance wound” in photo # 42. Dr.

DeMaio, who was a vociferous Warren Commission supporter,

refused to consider that anything other than what the Warren

Commission concluded could have been true. He was a pretty closeminded

fellow. Dr. Lee, however, said that the enhanced area of

photo # 42 could indeed depict an entrance wound (or puncture), but

that the photo alone (without the body and better x-rays) was not

definitive.

We did not view the enlarged and enhanced images at Rochester

stereoscopically–only on a very high-quality computer monitor.

By the way, as enhanced from the transparency and magnified,

the “white spot” does NOT repeat NOT appear to be debris (fat or

brain tissue on the hair), as the HSCA said. It appears quite pink and

even red, with the substance of jellified brain tissue, and appears to

be oozing out of a puncture in the scalp near the hairline. The puncture

in the scalp even appears to be at the end of a “tunnel.” This seems to

be what is described as the entry wound in the Military Review of

January 1967!!!

Two punctures in the rear of the head???? I don’t know. That is

what it looks like to me, under enhanced and magnified viewing

conditions.

All such images are preserved in the Archives on JAZZ drives,

but are available for viewing only with the permission of the Kennedy

family.

_________________

Please feel free to use the above, but only if you quote it all 100%

without modification. No excerpts or paraphrasing, please!

Hope this helps,

Doug

The Back Wound Photo

Like the back of the head photo, one must first orient it

properly. JFK is on his side in this photo as well. From the creases

in his neck, we can tell that his head/neck is flexed back further in

this photo and that his shoulder is scrunched up a bit by the autopsist

who is holding him up. (See Photo 4)

Regardless of whether or not Gerald Ford relocated the wound

by changing the terminology, we can see that the wound in this

photo falls below what most would call the top of the

shoulder….where one would lay their hand to pat or tap someone

on the top of their shoulder, where one in that sort of uniform

would wear an epaulet. That in itself tells us something

anatomically. (See Chart 1) Note where the vertebrae fall in relation

to the top of the shoulder where one would pat, tap or wear an

epaulet. Also note that all of T1 and a good portion of T2 are

suprascapular, that is, above the shoulder blade.

According to the autopsists, the entry wound in JFK’s back

was measured to be 14 cm below the mastoid process and 14 cm

from the tip of the acromion

process. Neither of these are

fixed, unmovable points on the

body. As can be seen in Photo 5,

flexing the neck backwards has

a profound effect on where 14

cm from the mastoid process will

fall. In this photo, without having

taken the ruler away from the

mastoid process between

measurements, it made over a 2”

difference. Likewise, 14 cm from

the tip of the acromion process

would vary with shoulder

position, but that particular

measurement has an additional

problem.

Researcher Bill Hamley

expressed puzzlement about that

measurement to me a couple of

years ago. He noted that 14 cm from the tip of the acromion process,

no matter which way one measured from that point, would not

seem to be

s u f f i c i e n t

distance on an

adult male to

reach a wound

1-1/2” from the

spine as the

H S C A

determined this

wound did. So,

Bill wrote to Dr.

Humes and

asked him if the

distance from

the acromion

process to the

wound was,

“ m e a s u r e d

Photo 4

Photo 5

Chart 1

38 Vol. 5, Issue 4 Winter 1999

Dangers Inherent in 2D/3D Evaluations

In response to a newsgroup post asking me what I thought

about an evaluation done by Dr. Robert Artwohl some time

ago on the angles involved between JFK’s back and throat

wounds, I responded with the following. While the specific

situation is not applicable to the subject of this article, it does

point out the pitfalls in analyzing 3D objects in a 2D image.

I replied:

We cannot calculate what the angle was from any one

picture as Artwohl has apparently proffered.

Artwohl’s plane reference appears to be a line parallel to

the bottom of the picture. What relevance is that supposed to

have as regards the wounds on the body? His 21 degree angle

relates to the edge of the photo, not to the body in the photo. It

could only be relevant the way he has it set up, if the body and

camera were known to be perfectly aligned with one another.

That’s obviously not the case given the position of the body in

the picture.

When measuring angles from photographs, you are measuring

the projection of a 3D object on a 2D medium. Move

the medium and the angle relationship to the shadow changes.

You can demonstrate this by holding your index finger out as

the “line” between point A and point B. Take an index card

and place it behind your finger. Have a light source behind

you so that your finger casts a shadow onto the index card.

Hold your finger still as you move the index card (tip forward,

back, waggle one side edge closer, then the other, etc.)

behind your stationary finger. You will see the angle change.

The angle of your finger has not changed...because you are

holding it still. But the angle of the shadow of your finger

changes relative to the edge of the card.

Without knowing the relationship between the plane of

the film and the object to be measured, the angle is meaningless.

Such an angle can be calculated from photographs, but it

requires photos of the same scale taken from different angles

with a fixed reference point common to all. A vertical scale

would need to be determined on a frontal photo and also on a

photo taken from the rear. A lateral photo is needed to determine

the thickness from front to back. Then, by using the vertical

difference between entry and exit and the thickness, one

can calculate the actual angle relative to the standard anatomical

planes.

Any angle not referenced to a standard such as the anatomical

reference planes is worthless.

Likewise, in the case presented in this article, we do not

know the angles, focal length, etc involved in taking this photo

of the back of JFK’s head. We can see that it appears to be

pretty straight on; we can see that his outer ear is not being

viewed from either above or below but appears flat. But the

pitfalls as described in my response to the Artwohl evaluation

above remain a factor that has to be taken into consideration.

Photo 6

directly from the acromion process to the wound, at an angle, or

was the measurement taken in a straight line perpendicular to the

spine?” Dr. Humes actually replied! Dr. Humes highlighted, in

yellow, the words “or was the measurement taken in a straight line

perpendicular to the spine?” and initialed it. Now for the math.

Since 14 cm = 5.5”, and since we can see in the photo that the

wound is somewhat away from the spine (the HSCA determined

1-1/2”), that gives us 5.5” + 1.5” from the tip of JFK’s acromion

process to his spine. Double that for a width measurement (tip of

acromion process to tip of acromion process) and we have a 6 ft

tall, 170 pound president with a shoulder span of 14”. Doesn’t

sound likely, does it? My 5’2”, 120 pound son measures 14” from

tip of acromion to tip of acromion. Measurements on the average

sized adult males I have attacked with tape measure in hand yield

an average of about 17-1/2”. As can be seen in Photo 6, 14 cm

falls quite short of 1-1/2 inches from the spine on an adult male …

the gap in this photo is 2.7”. I encourage readers to try these

measurements themselves, but be very careful to measure from

the tip of the acromion … not the outside edge of the arm. Refer to

the “bones” chart to see how to locate the tip … and it can easily

be felt on the top of a person’s shoulder. If you have your finger on

the tip of their acromion process and have them gently swing their

arm, you should not feel the bone under your finger move. Kudos

to Bill Hamley for noting this problem with the measurement from

the tip of the acromion process!

In Summation

Considered at face value, both the back of the head and back

wound photos yield valuable information when observed in their

proper orientation. In my opinion, there is no doubt that the splotch

proffered as the entry wound in the back of the head is a far cry

from the cowlick area. In addition, Boswell’s comments and

measurements in front of the ARRB, and the further study of the

transparency done by the ARRB, casts doubt on that splotch actually

being the entry wound at all. The back wound photo does not

anatomically show a wound at or above T1, and the 14 cm

measurement from the tip of the acromion process appears to make

no sense at all. In addition, in his comments on the back wound

photo to the ARRB, Boswell seems to identify the second spot

down in the photo as the back wound entry … not the top spot!

Now there is fodder for another article!

All HSCA/ Forensic Pathology Panel references can be found

in HSCA Volume 7. In meeting with the panel, comments by both

Humes and Boswell that pertain to the issues raised appear in more

than one location. I encourage readers to read it all. ARRB

references can be found in the transcript of Boswell’s deposition

to the ARRB.

Barb Junkkarinen

has been studying the assassination since 1980. She became

active in the research community and online in 1994. Her clinical

laboratory background makes the medical evidence a natural as

her main interest and focus.

The Assassination Chronicles Summer 1997 33

JFK assassination eye-witnesses, including the observations of at least one

Secret Service man in Dealey Plaza and several FBI agents present at the Bethesda

autopsy, placed the president's back wound exactly where the mute testimony of the

president's jacket and shirt indicated the wound was: six inches below the collar line.

The signed Naval autopsy sheet, including the placement and description of the back

wound, was verified by Admiral George Gregory Burkley, personal physician to the

president who directed the autopsy at Bathesda. Burkley filled out and signed John

F. Kennedy's official death certificate on November 23rd, 1963. He verified the

location of the back wound and signed the Kennedy autopsy sheet at Bethesda on

November 24th. That death certificate revealed the back wound to be, in the

Admiral's own words, at the president's "third thoracic vertebra."

The neck has seven CERVICAL vertebrae, and this observed and verified

wound was described as three THORACIC vertebrae lower than the neck itself

(photo 1). A wound in the back, exactly where the official autopsy sheet and the coat

4. Kennedy's shirt

3. Kennedy's suit coat

1. Position of back

wound

2. Kennedy's back wound

erald Ford's Terrible Fiction

by George Michael Evica

See the actual

draft of the Warren

Report with Gerald

Ford's support of the

single bullet theory

in his own handwriting

(on page 34)

See the

Washington Post

article on Ford

promoting a change

in the Warren

Commission's

findings "...of the

bullet wound in

Kennedy's back to

place it higher up in

his body." (on page

35)

See Michael

Dorman of Newsday

on Warren

Commissioner

McCloy's doubt

about the singlebullet

theory. (on

page 36)

See the acutal

McCloy document,

newly released. (on

page 37)

34 JFK Lancer Productions & Publications

The Assassination Chronicles Summer 1997 35

Gerald Ford Changes Wound Description

WASHINGTON POST 7/3/97

As a member of the Warren Commission that investigated the 1963 assassination of President John F.

Kennedy, Gerald R. Ford suggested that the panel change its initial description of the bullet wound in Kennedy‘s

back to place it higher up in his body.

This change may have been intended to support the controversial theory that a single bullet struck Kennedy

from behind, exited his neck and then wounded Texas Gov. John Connally. The Warren Commission relied on it

heavily in concluding that Lee Harvey Oswald was Kennedy’s lone assassin, firing from the Texas School Book

Depository, above and behind the president

Ford’s handwritten editing, revealed in newly disclosed papers kept by the commission’s general counsel,

was accepted with a slight change.

The initial draft of the report stated: “A bullet had entered his (Kennedy’s) back at a point slightly below the

shoulder to the right of the spine.” Ford wanted it to read: “A bullet had entered the back of his neck slightly to

the right of the spine.”

The final report said: "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of his spine."

"A small change", said Ford on Wednesday, one intended to clarify meaning, not alter history. "My changes

had nothing to do with a conspiracy theory," he said. "My changes were only an attempt to be more precise."

Harold Weisberg, a longtime critic of the Warren Commission's work, said: “What Ford is doing is trying to

make the single bullet theory more tenable. The official story is that the bullet hit no bone, but it did. They are

trying to make it seem that the bullet traveled downward, but it didn't." Weisberg and others have long held that

the wound in the front of Kennedy’s neck was an entry wound, not an exit wound.

A forensic pathology panel assembled by the House Assassinations Committee In the late 1970s concluded

otherwise, holding by an 8 to 1 vote that Kennedy was struck by only two bullets, each of which entered from the

rear. The panel found that one bullet "entered in the upper right of the back and exited from the front of the

throat” and the second, fatal shot “entered in the right rear of the head."

The papers showing Ford’s editing were made public by the Assassinations Records Review Board.

The document, a memorandum from McCloy to the Commission's chief counsel, J. Lee Rankin, contained a

critique of a draft of the Commission's final report. "I think too much effort is expended on attempting to prove

that the first bullet, which hit the president, was also responsible for all of Connally's wounds," McCloy wrote.

"The evidence against this is not fully stated." He added that a section of the report dealing with the possibility of

shots being fired at Kennedy's motorcade from an overpass was "not well done."

McCloy also questioned the Commission's account of a bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital,

where Kennedy and Connally were taken after being shot. "The statement concerning the bullet which was found

on the stretcher is not particularly persuasive because there is no indication that the 'stretcher bullet' was in fact

the bullet which caused the [Connally] wrist wound," he wrote.

This is the second time in as many months that revelations about the inner workings of the Warren Commission

have worked against its official conclusions. The Dallas Morning News reported in July former President and

last surviving Commission member Gerald Ford edited a key sentence about a bullet that entered JFK's body. That

McCloy questioned Single Bullet Theory

in newly released documents,

Comments by John Kelin from Fair Play issue #18, 1997

(photo 3) and shirt photo 4) placed it. Warren Commissioner Gerald Ford was one of the key people responsible

for misleading the U.S. public about the facts of the JFK assassination. The single bullet theory and the lone

assassin fantasy are only possible if we believe Gerald Ford's terrible fiction.

36 JFK Lancer Productions & Publications

"I think too much effort is expended on attempting to prove that the first bullet which hit

the president was also responsible for all of Connally's wounds." McCloy wrote.

August 12, 1997

Excerpted from an article in Newsday written by Michael Dorman

A Warren Commission member expressed serious reservations about one of the panel's more

controversial conclusions, the theory that a single shot hit President Kennedy and Texas Gov. John

Connally, a long-secret document was revealed. The "magic bullet" theory was essential to the

commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone assassin.

Marked "confidential," the released document was a memorandum sent by commission member

John J. McCloy to the commission's chief counsel, J. Lee Rakin.It was dated June 24, 1964,

seven months after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, and conveyed McCloy's critique of a draft of

the final Warren Commission Report.

Elsewhere, McCloy questions the commission's account that a bullet found on a stretcher at

Dallas' Parkland Hospital where Kennedy and Collaly were treated after being shot -- was the

"magic bullet."

The document recently released by the U.S. Assassination Records Review Board -- which

screens Kennedy assassination documents and releases those that will not endanger national security

-- also contains many other suggestions by McCloy on revising the draft report. Some of those

suggestions were adopted by the commission. But the commission did not revise the sections dealing

with the "magic bullet" theory. Nor did it revise other sections criticized by McCloy, dealing

with the Kennedy and Connally wounds. He asked at one point, for example: "Why is there no

citation of authority with regard to the wound in the president's back and its path through his

body?"

The document recently released by the U.S. Assassination Records Review Board also contains

many other suggestions by McCloy on revising the draft report.

edit to the Warren Report, critics said, resulted in wording suggesting a bullet hit Kennedy

higher than it really did.

The SBT is central to the Commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald alone fired

the shots that killed Kennedy and wounded Connally. The Commission declared there was

time for Oswald to fire no more than three shots and that he did, in fact, fire three times. One

shot was said to have missed the presidential limousine entirely. A second -- the fatal bullet --

was said to have struck Kennedy in the back of the head. That left just one more bullet, which

spawned the hotly-disputed SBT. The Commission said this bullet hit Kennedy in the lower

part of the back of his neck and went on to cause wounds to Connally's back, right wrist, and left thigh.

If the Commission had concluded separate bullets had struck Kennedy and Connally, it would have been

forced to conclude there was a fourth bullet. And since there had not been time for more than three shots, it would

have meant there was a second gunman.

The document was released recently by the Assassination Records Review Board and contains many other

suggestions by McCloy on revising the draft report. Some of those suggestions were adopted by the Commission.

But the Commission did not revise the sections dealing with the single, or "magic," bullet theory. According to

one tally, McCloy attended just 16 of 51 Warren Commission sessions and heard only 35 of 94 witnesses. He died

in 1989.

Fair Play:

http://shell.rmi.net/~jkelin

McCloy

The Assassination Chronicles Summer 1997 37

1 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. I, Issue 2 Summer 1995

Volume 1 Issue 2 Summer 1995

“This Dirty Rumor”

Earl Warren's Refusal to Examine the So-Called Oswald FBI

File from Agent LHO, a chapter in The Iron Sights,

a work in progress.

©1995 by George Michael Evica

All rights reserved.

The first executive session of the Warren Commis

sion was quickly followed by (at least)

two later sessions concerned with a threatening

“dirty rumor”: that Lee Harvey Oswald

had been a paid asset, an “informer,” for the FBI.

Afterward, having been once-burned dealing with this topic,

the Commission (or at least its chair Chief Justice Earl Warren)

apparently intended to avoid any future backdraft as the Commission

faced four months of testimony often touching on that

same “dirty rumor.”

The fifth volume (5 H) of the Warren Commission’s 26

volumes of material is central to the topic of Oswald's possible

participation in U.S. intelligence activities. In Washington, Dallas,

and elsewhere, from May 6th, 1964, through September

6th, 1964, the Commission listened to representatives of the

FBI, including J. Edgar Hoover; the U.S. Army (on wound ballistics);

the CIA, including its Director and its Deputy Director

for Plans; Texas law enforcement officers on the state, county,

and city levels; the U.S. State Department, including the Secretary

of State; the Secret Service, including its Chief, James J. Rowley; and the Treasury Department, including

Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. The Commission also took testimony from Mark Lane, asked by Oswald’s

mother to represent the accused assassin; from the President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson and

his wife; and from several prominent residents of Dallas, including Marina Oswald and Jack Ruby.

First on this distinguished list of witnesses was Alan Belmont, Assistant Director of the FBI, who testified

in Washington on May 6th, 1964. (5H 1-32)

After some preliminary questions and comments, Commission member Allan Dulles began the more serious

inquiry, asking Belmont about teletype operations connecting FBI offices; Dulles’ specific example was,

appropriately for an Oswald focus, the link between the New Orleans and Dallas FBI offices. (5 H 3)

Commission member John J. McCloy, also adopting an Oswald focus, asked about U.S. “defections: to the

Soviet Union. (5 H 4) Both McCloy and Dulles questioned whether the so-called Oswald FBI file had been

“closed” or “open.” (5 H-6) Within a half-hour of Alan Belmont being sworn in, two Commission members (for

whatever their reasons) had begun to explore important issues in the Oswald “dirty rumor” story.

Samuel A. Stern, Warren Commission staff assistant counsel, referred to an April 6th, 1964, FBI letter

prepared and reviewed by Belmont (signed by FBI Director Hoover) and sent to J. Lee Rankin, Chief Counsel of

the Warren Commission. (5H 6) Though its contents were not given at that moment in Belmont's testimony, the

letter did indeed summarize (according to the Bureau) the FBI's relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald. (5H 11)

lee Oswald in New Orleans

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1, Issue 2 Summer 1995 2

The letter, dated May 4th, 1964, reportedly answered

“...a number of questions which the Commission posed

to the FBI." (5H 6). The letter, a response to a meeting

on May 4th, 1964, between Warren Commission staff

members and Belmont, briefly described 69 items contained

in the FBI's Oswald file. (17 H [CE 834] 804-

813). Earlier, the Warren Commission had written a

letter to the FBI

(dated March 26th,

1964) inquiring about

the FBI's knowledge

of Lee Harvey Oswald

before November

22nd, 1963; the

Bureau’s replies to the

Commission's thirty

questions posed by its

staff were delivered in

an FBI letter (dated

April 6th, 1964) with

a separate cover letter

signed by Director

Hoover; many of the

W a r r e n

Commission’s questions

asked for information

bearing directly

on the Oswald-as-agent question. (17H [CE 833]

787-803)

Earlier in the session, Commission Staff Assistant

Counsel Stern had established the Commission’s

primary focus: Lee Harvey Oswald. Belmont had commented:

“As the individual in charge of all investigative

operations, [I am responsible for] the Lee Harvey

Oswald investigation..., the same as any other investigative

case in the Bureau.” (5H 4)

Stern soon arrived at the hearing's crucial point:

Belmont’s “...examination of the investigation...of the

nature of the FBI interest in Oswald.” (5 H 6) Clearly,

Stern wished to examine through Belmont the key issue

of Oswald's rumored intelligence links. But Warren

interrupted Stern twice (5H 6, 7), attempting to shut

off Stern early in the session. (5H 7) In this exchange

(and later exchanges involving Rankin), apparently the

Warren Commission counsel (Rankin and Stern) and

Earl Warren demonstrated

quite different

agendas relative

to Lee Harvey Oswald

and U.S. intelligence.

But despite

Warren's objections,

Stern persisted in

exploring the Osw

a l d - a s - a g e n t

theme, querying

Belmont about both

the FBI's domestic

intelligence and

identification divisions

(on defection,

on Oswald's Marine

fingerprints, on

Oswald's correspondence,

and on the Albert Schweitzer College puzzle:

(5H 7). Though neither Stern nor any Commission

member (nor later, any Commission counsel) reportedly

pursued the topic, Stern elicited from Belmont that

the FBI had "set up" certain "connections with the State

Department passport file" on Oswald's (undefined) "activities"

and on Oswald's “...dealing with the [U.S.]

Embassy in Moscow.” (5H 7)

Belmont further asserted that the FBI had no interest

in Oswald when he returned from the Soviet

Union (5 H 8) and that Oswald was “not known” to be

connected to FBI “sources” in New Orleans (5 H 9)

Despite Warren’s interruptions and objections,

Stern (on behalf of Rankin and his Commission counsel

and staff) had been able to begin exploring hints of

Oswald’s possible intelligence connections.

Stern now introduced the Belmont summary of

the “HQ” FBI file on Oswald, its cover letter to Rankin

dated May 4th, 1964, and entered into the Commission’s

evidence as CE 834 (17 H 804-813). Stern established

that Belmont at that moment was in possession of the

actual FBI file. (5 H 11)

Stern asked Belmont about “...materials in that

[Oswald] file...for security reasons you would prefer

Commissioners ... must have understood

that the FBI’s “informants in subversive

movements” in the so-called Oswald file

had to include New Orleans and possibly

Dallas informants who had operated in

side pro-Castro organizations and whose

identities might have led directly to

evidence establishing Oswald as a U.S.

intelligence asset.

Lee Oswald in New Orleans

3 Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. I, Issue 2 Summer 1995

not to disclose....” (5 H 11) Belmont responded by defining

the file’s “security” materials: “The file contains

the identity of some of our informants in subversive

movements.” (5 H 11) Commissioners Warren, McCloy,

and Dulles and Commission Counsels Stern and Rankin

(at least) must have understood that the FBI’s “informants

in subversive movements” in the so-called Oswald

file had to include New Orleans and possibly

Dallas informants who had operated in side pro-Castro

organizations and whose identities might have led directly

to evidence establishing Oswald as a U.S. intelligence

asset. Stern cautioned Belmont: “I think that is

enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.” (5 H 11)

But is was not “enough” for Commissioner

McCloy (5 H 11), whose query of Belmont elicited a

response from Warren attempting to cut off any further

questioning of Belmont on security “matters” in the

FBI's Oswald file. (5 H 11) Though he complimented

Warren on his security-conscious behavior, Belmont

indicated that his chief J. Edgar Hoover had insisted

that Belmont be of “utmost help” to the Commission.

(5 H 11)

Belmont’s testimony strongly suggested that

1. The FBI (through Belmont) and Chief Justice Earl

Warren had earlier scripted the FBI’s offer of the

so-called Oswald file to the Warren Commission

so that Warren could reject it on ”security”

grounds but that

2. Commission counsel Stern and Rankin (unaware

of this probable FBI-Warren accommodation)

were working against Warren in order to accept the

FBI's seeming offer of the file.

After Stern elicited from Belmont that the FBI

file was “...available to the Commission...” (5 H 11),

Warren countered by establishing the “...security matter”

involving identified FBI informers was contained

in that allegedly complete file. (5 H 11) Belmont verified

that fact: “This file is as it is maintained at the

Bureau with all information in it.” (5 H 11) Justice

Warren responded: “With all information in it?” (5 H

11: italics added) Belmont answered: “Yes sir; this [the

file apparently in Belmont's hands or on the table in

front of him] is the actual file.” (5 H 11: italics added)

Warren commented: “I see.” (5 H 11)

Now Chief Counsel Rankin intervened, asking

Belmont if he would indeed leave that actual file in the

Commission's possession so that “...any of the Commissioners

[could]...examine it personally...” (5 H 11)

Obviously, Rankin intended to secure the purported

entire FBI Oswald file for his Commission staff.

Belmont agreed to leave the file. (5 H 11)

But Warren immediately interrupted with a confused

statement about nonexistent “conditions” and not

wanting “...information that involves our security...” (5

H 11) How the identity of FBI informers in New Orleans

or Dallas might compromise the security of the

United States (“our security”) was never made clear.

Warren then pushed his argument further, rejecting

the possession (and therefore the assumed use) of

any sensitive intelligence documents (5 H 11), opting

for only Belmont’s testimony. This rejecting of a reportedly

full intelligence file (on the accused assassin)

and relying solely on the sworn statements of an intelligence

officer helped to establish the Warren

Commission's antipathy toward any documentation of

Oswald's suspected intelligence links.

Warren concluded his argument with a muddled

statement in favor of “open” discussion as opposed to

reading and talking about sensitive documents “in privacy.”

(5 H 12)

Rankin was now apparently willing to give up almost

all of his ground if only to be allowed to examine

the FBI file; he promised that “...the [Commission] staff

will not examine it...” (5 H 12), a statement obviously

directed at Warren rather than Belmont. But Warren

countered that reading the FBI file was “one thing”

(whatever that meant), but for him, asking Belmont

questions about his summary of the Oswald FBI was

enough. (5 H 12) Finally, Warren defined his bottomline

position: “...I really would prefer not to have a secret

file...a file that contains [security] matters of that

kind in our possession.” (5 H 12)

Rankin now had little leverage except to air the

vexing “dirty rumor,” which he strongly hinted at in

his final major argument for accepting FBI's offer of

the “HQ” Oswald file. Though his impromptu statement

was garbled, Rankin obviously wanted the FBI

Oswald file available so that the Warren Commission

could, as he said, “...be satisfied that nothing was with-

Rankin obviously wanted the FBI

Oswald file ... Rankin’s two

phrases, “this particular question”

and “the purpose of the inquiry,”

clearly pointed to the

Commission’s continuing

problem: the “dirty rumor” of

Oswald’s FBI link.

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Vol. 1, Issue 2 Summer 1995 4

held from it [the Commission] in regard to this particular

question. That was the purpose of the inquiry.” (5 H

12) Rankin’s two phrases, “this particular question" and

"the purpose of the inquiry,” clearly pointed to the

Commission’s continuing problem: the “dirty rumor”

of Oswald’s FBI link.

Allan Dulles accepted Warren’s lead, but McCloy,

apparently now looking at a copy of the actual FBI file,

interfered, indicating Belmont's “summary” was disturbingly

not “a complete description” of the file's contents

as McCloy examined it. (5 H 12)

Warren again tried to head off objections (5 H

12), but Rankin counterattacked, articulating the Warren

Commission’s strongest argument for independent

analysis of intelligence files, concluding: “...we did

want the [Warren Commission] record in such condition

that the Commission could say in its report, ‘We

have seen everything that they have.’ I think [this file]...

is important to the case.” (5 H 13)

Further, Commissioner McCloy remained dubious,

suggesting that the Commission might miss “...the

full impact of all the narrative...” in the file's FBI reports

on Oswald. (5 H 13) Both Belmont and Warren

then argued with McCloy, telling him that the Commission

already had possession of the particular FBI

records to which he referred. (5 H 13)

Clearly, Warren was blocking any curious Commissioner

from reading through actual files and actual

documents, whether those materials were in the possession

of the staff or not. For Warren, the question

seemed to be: Where would it all end?

Rankin persisted, trying to emphasize his (and

Stern’s) argument: the Warren Commission would be

in possession of “...everything...the FBI had [on Oswald]...[;]

this is their total file...so that...nothing [is]

withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. That

is...what we [the staff counsel] are trying to develop

this morning...” (5 H 13: italics added)

Dulles again supported Warren, speaking to a

separate issue involving the staff, allowing Warren to

close with his argument against sharing files with nongovernment

investigators: “...the same people who

would demand that we see everything of this kind would

also demand that they be entitled to see it, and if it is

security matters[,] we can't let them see it. It has to go

back to the FBI without their scrutiny.” (5 H 13: italics

added)

But Commissioner McCloy persisted in opposing

Warren, apparently looking at Belmont’s file summary

on telegrams from “the Embassy” and “Mexico,”

key issues that later would be relevant to both the socalled

Second Oswald story and CIA manipulation of

the “Oswald” in Mexico story. (t H 14) Warren, however,

triumphed, and Stern and Warren moved to admit

only the Belmont file “summary” (CE 834) into

the record. (5 H 14) One last time, Warren emphasized

his point: “There are no security matter [detailed]

in this [summary]?” (5 H 14)

Belmont then continued his testimony, asserting

that Oswald was neither an agent nor an informant for

the FBI (5 H 14-16 and 29), speaking at length but to

no productive purpose about the FBI, the Secret Service,

cooperation, and presidential security; about

Ruby and Communism; and, at least for the FBI, about

some minor matters (5 H 16-32).

On behalf of the Warren Commission, its chairperson

Chief Justice Earl Warren had successfully refused

to accept the FBI HQ file on Lee Harvey Oswald,

ultimately relying on the unsupported statements

of U. S. intelligence officers that Lee Harvey Oswald

was not an agent (or asset) of the U.S. intelligence community.

Later, circumstantial evidence and some of the

CIA's Oswald files would be made available to the

House Select Committee on Assassinations, strongly

supporting the argument that Oswald may either have

thought he was a U.S. intelligence agent or was, indeed,

an agent or asset of--and provocateur for--any of

several U.S. intelligence services, including the FBI,

CIA, NO, ATF, and at least one Senate subcommittee

investigating weapons traffic in the United States.

Clearly, Warren was blocking any

curious Commissioner from

reading through actual files and

actual documents, whether those

materials were in the possession of

the staff or not.

JFK Lancer Productions & Publications

A week after cradling her slain

husband in her lap in Dallas,

Jacqueline Kennedy summoned a

trusted journalist friend to her

home in Hyannisport, Mass.,

"obsessed," to use her word, with

the notion that her husband be

remembered as a hero.

Preface

With clarity and political savvy of a master spin artist, the

34-year-old widow spoke to the writer, Theodore H. White, for

four hours, urging him to tell the world -- through LIFE magazine

-- that Kennedy was truly "a man of magic," that his

presidency was truly special, that the era was, to use the words

she borrowed from a Broadway musical, "one brief shining

moment that was known as Camelot."

A year after Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis' death of cancer

at 64, the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston made public Mr.

White's notes [see next article] from that Nov. 29, 1963, interview

in which the romantic Camelot myth--one that would

remain fixed in the public's mind despite ensuing revelations of

chinks in the Kennedy armor -- was born.

The newly released papers include Mr. White's handwritten

notes from the interview and the typed manuscript of the

essay -- with editing marks by Mrs. Kennedy -- that appeared in

the Dec. 6, 1963, issue of LIFE. The writer donated the papers to

the Kennedy Library in 1969, stipulating that they remain sealed

until one year after her death. Called the "Camelot documents,"

they offer another small piece of the puzzle -- another glimpse

into the mind and soul of a private woman who, even in death,

has remained a source of endless fascination and mystery to so

many.

Perhaps most important, the papers reveal the extent to

which the sad, wan, yet tearless widow had a hand in shaping

the extraordinary Kennedy legacy. "She certainly wanted to take

control of history," said presidential historian Stephen E.

Ambrose, a critic of the rose-colored portrayals of the Kennedy

years, " and in so many ways she managed to do so."

Much of the substance of the Camelot interview appeared

in the LIFE essay, "For President Kennedy: An Epilogue." The

magazine held the presses that November night, at a cost of

$30,000 an hour for overtime, while Mr. White talked with Mrs.

Kennedy. He finally dictated his story to editors form the

telephone in the Kennedy kitchen at 2 a.m., with his interview

subject hovering nearby.

Mr. White, who died in 1986, revealed many more details

and impressions from the interview in his 1978 memoir, "In

Search of History," in which he admits: "Quite inadvertently, I

was her instrument in labeling the myth." The young widow

chose Mr. White because, as he would later write, he had been

"friendly," a journalist who wrote sympathetically and

admiringly of Kennedy, especially in his Pulitzer Prize-winning

book documenting his presidential campaign, The Making of the

President, 1960.

She insisted he write the essay of LIFE, one of several

magazines Mr. White wrote for, because it had chronicled the

Kennedy magic before with layouts of the couple's 1953

wedding, the inauguration, the Kennedy children and even pets.

Reaching more than 7 million readers at the time, the magazine

played a key role in creating the images of public figures.

In the interview, the first of only a handful Jacqueline

Kennedy gave soon after her husband's death, she jumps back

and forth between graphic, poignant descriptions of the assassination

day and Camelot, her theme for the Kennedy legacy -- all

of her remarks were laced with what seems like extraordinary

devotion, admiration and love for her slain husband. On the

typed manuscript for the essay, which Mr. White composed in 45

minutes in a servant's room after the lengthy interview, Mrs.

Kennedy scribbled in an additional line after the Camelot quote:

"and it will never be that way again!" At the end of the essay,

she penciled in the sentiment again: "And all she could think of

was tell people there will never be that Camelot again."

Most of her discussion of Camelot appeared in the LIFE

article with the famous line from the song quoted more accurately

and her point that "it will never be that way again"

repeated twice.

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Fall 1995

Remarkable today, but perhaps not so 32 years ago, is the

extent to which Mr. White allowed himself to be used as a

vehicle for historical interpretation. Mrs. Kennedy not only read

over the manuscript and penciled in changes, but when editors

suggested to White that he had over-played the Camelot theme,

his "collaborator," overhearing the phone conversation, shook

her head. And she prevailed. White wrote in his memoir that

Mrs. Kennedy wanted him to "rescue Jack from all these `bitter

people' who were going to write about him in history. She did

not want Jack left to the historians."

"The Last side

of Camelot"

A week after the assassination of John F. Kennedy on

Nov. 22, 1963, Jacqueline Kennedy spoke with

journalist Theodore H. White in Hyannis Port, Mass.

The resulting article, which ran in Life magazine,

became known as the "Camelot interview," as it

contained the first reference to the Kennedy

administration as Camelot. Mr. White donated his

papers pertaining to the interview to the Kennedy

Library in 1969, stipulating that they remain sealed

until a year after Jacqueline Kennedy's death. She died on May

19, 1994. The library released Mr. White's notes on the interview

May 26. All ellipses and parentheses are Mr. White's. Bracketed

words have been inserted for clarity.

December 19th [1963]

No quiet moment until now to write up the Jacqueline

Kennedy notes. Of conversation on Friday, 29, November. She

was absolutely composed when I arrived (at about 8:30 in the

driving rain; and stayed and worked until 2 a.m.; and then drove

back in a Carey limousine).

There present were: Chuck Spaulding; Franklin D.

[Roosevelt] Jr.; and Dave Powers; and Pat Lawford; and perhaps

one or two others, plus service personnel. But left it that way.

The chief memory I have is of her composure; of her

beauty (dressed in black trim slacks, beige pullover sweater, her

eyes wider than pools): and of her calm voice and total recall.

We began by sitting down on the sofa and she leaned

forward and asked (I paraphrase because it is too long ago to

recall quotes) "What shall I say? What can I do for you?" It was

more as if she were asking me for help than anything else. I

listened and offered the thought that she continue from the

fragment of conversation we had had on the telephone in which

she'd said that now journalists Arthur Krock and Merriman

Smith and all those people were going to write about him as

history; and that was not the way she wanted him remembered.

How did she want him remembered--I suggested. But she

had a series of thoughts of her own and whether she took off

from the springboard I offered I don't know. This, however, is

what my notes recall:

"I'm not going to be the `Widder Kennedy' (and make

speeches like some people who talk about their family). When

this is over I'm going to crawl into the deepest retirement there

is. I'm going to live in the place I lived with Jack; I'm going to

live in Georgetown, I'm going to live on the Cape, I'm going to

be with the Kennedys; Bobby is going to teach Johnny. He's a

little boy without a father, he's a boyish little boy, he'll need a

man. That first night Bob McNamara he said he'd buy back our

old house in Georgetown. That was the first thing I thought that

night--where will I go? I wanted my old house back. Actually

Jack had said (when he was elected) why sell it? Maybe one day

we'll go back there. But then (she's referring to the night at

Bethesda) "I thought how can I go back there to that bedroom. I

said to myself--you must never forget Jack, but you mustn't be

morbid.

"There'd been the biggest motorcade from the airport; hot;

wild--like Mexico and Vienna; the sun was so strong in our face;

I couldn't put on sunglasses and then we saw this tunnel; and I

thought if you were on the left the sun wouldn't get into your

eyes.

"...the seat was full of blood and

red roses..."

They were gunning the motorcycles; there were these little

backfires; there was one noise like that; I thought it was a

backfire. Then next I saw Connelly grabbing his arms and

saying `no no no nonono,' with his fist beating--then Jack turned

and I turned--all I remember was a blue gray building up ahead;

then Jack turned back, so neatly; his last expression was so neat;

he had his hand out, I could see a piece of his skull coming off;

it was flesh colored not white--he was holding out his hand--and

I can see this perfectly clean piece detaching itself from his

head; then he slumped in my lap...Then Clint Hill, he loved us,

he was the first man in the car...we all lay down in the car and I

kept saying `Jack, Jack, Jack' and someone was yelling `he's

dead he's dead.' All the ride to the hospital I kept bending over

him saying `Jack, Jack can you hear me, I love you Jack.' I kept

holding the top of his head down trying to keep the...that long

ride to the hospital...these big Texan interns kept saying `Mrs.

Kennedy you come with us,' they wanted to take me away from

him. Dave Powers came running to me, my legs my hands were

JFK Lancer Productions & Publications

covered with his brains...when Dave Powers saw this he burst

out weeping. From here down"(here Mrs. Kennedy made a

gesture about the level of the forehead above the eyes) "his head

was so beautiful. I'd tried to hold the top of his head down,

maybe I could keep it in...I knew he was dead...

"They came trying to get me; they tried to grab me; but I

said I'm not leaving. When they carried Jack in, Hill threw his

coat over Jack's head, and I held his head to throw the coat over

it. It wasn't repulsive to me for one moment--nothing was

repulsive to me--and I was running behind this big intern, I was

running behind with the coat covering it.

"I remember this narrow corridor. I said, "I'm not going to

leave him, I'm not going to leave him, I'm not going to leave

him'...was standing outside in the corridor...in ten minutes later,

this big policeman brought me a chair...and I watched them

going in, with saline solutions, with other things...I thought

maybe he isn't dead maybe he's going to live. I always remember

when Ambassador Kennedy had his stroke Jack said, don't let

that happen to me when I go...I saw them going in and maybe he

would live...and I said to myself, `I thought: I'll take care of him

every day of his life. I'll make him happy, but I knew he was

dead'...I just wanted to be with him when he died. Doctors are so

bossy, they boss you around. I remember his operation at

Columbia when I was supposed to be with him, we promised

each other, and they took him away and I didn't see him again

for hours and hours...and I said: They're never going to keep me

away from him again.

So I saw them going in and so I thought he's still

alive...then Doc Burkeley came towards me just shaking (with

sobs)...he said, `Mrs Kennedy you need a sedative'...I said, I

want to be in there when he dies...so Burkeley forced his way

into the operating room and said, `It's her prerogative, it's her

prerogative...' and I got in, there were about forty people there.

Dr. Perry wanted to get me out. But I said `It's my husband, his

blood, his brains are all over me.' Perry is a very tall, bald man.

But some of the doctors were gentle. The priest. This priest.

They kept trying to get a priest...there was a sheet over Jack, his

foot was sticking out of the sheet, whiter than the sheet...I took

his foot and kissed it. Then I pulled back the sheet. His mouth

was so beautiful, his eyes were open. They found his hand under

the sheet, and I held his hand all the time the priest was saying

extreme unction.

"You know when he was shot. He had such a wonderful

expression on his face. You know that wonderful expression he

had when they'd ask him a question about one of the ten million

gadgets they have in a rocket; just before he's answer; he looked

puzzled; and then he slumped forward.

I saw them put him in a coffin...he was naked...I guess

they just put his little body in...Burkeley was clutching me,

shaking me. I called Kenny O'Donnell...I said, you just go to get

me in there alone before they close that coffin. When we were

married I gave him a St. Christopher's medal, like a coin clip.

But Jack loses everything. When Patrick died last summer, when

the time came that we had to put him in the coffin we had to put

something that belonged to both of us...Jack said put in the Saint

Christopher's medal...but I couldn't put this medal in because it

hadn't been with us long enough, I'd just got it for the tenth

anniversary of our marriage to replace the other one, I couldn't

put anything in. So I said to Kenny O'Donnell you've got to get

me in. By this time my gloves had stiffened with his blood. I

gave one hand to this policeman and he pulled the gloves off.

And then I went in to say goodbye: there was no one there but

Kenny O'Donnell and I and a couple of white-coated men and

females in white...but I'd pulled off my gloves...and the ring was

all blood stained...So I

put the ring on" (Jack's

finger) "and it just

went down to here"

(she points to her

finger joint)..." and

then I kissed his

hand...then I went

outside into the hall

and I said to Kenny do

you think I did the

right thing...and

Kenny said you leave

it right where it is and

Kenny said yes. He

brought me the ring

back later from the

Bethesda Hospital.

This is the closet thing I have to a memory of him--it's a

man's wedding ring" (a plain gold band that she was twisting I

think?). " He bought it in a hurry in Newport just before we were

married. It wasn't even engraved to me when he gave it to me, I

had to put the date in later.

"That baby" (Patrick) "was so beautiful. You know Jack's

Irish mystique. When we buried him" (the baby) "I asked Jack,

`Just give me something for Patrick, to remember him; so he

found this one." She held out her hand (there was a ring with

emerald chips on it);"and so I have one for Jack and one for

Patrick.

"Everytime we got off the plane that day, three times they

gave me the yellow roses of Texas. But in Dallas they gave me

red roses. I thought how funny, red roses--so all the seat was full

of blood and red roses. Dr. Burkeley brought out the two roses

and said `I want you to have one.' At Bethesda I gave him back

one-- and Dr. Burkeley said -- this is the great treasure of my

life.

"...don't let it be forgot that for

one brief shining moment there

was Camelot."

But there's this one thing I wanted to say. I'm so ashamed

of myself. Jack...everything he ever quoted was Greek or

Roman...no, don't protect me now...one thing kept going through

my mind the line from a musical comedy. I kept saying to

Bobby, I've got to talk to somebody, I've got to see somebody. I

want to say this one thing. It's been almost an obsession with

me. This line from the musical comedy's been almost an

obsession with me. At night before going to bed...we had an old

Victrola. He'd play a couple of records. I'd get out of bed at night

and play it for him when it was so cold getting out of bed. It was

a song he loved, he loved `Camelot.' It was the song he loved

Kennedy Assassination Chronicles Fall 1995

most at the end...on a Victrola ten years old...it's the last record,

the last side of' Camelot,' sad `Camelot.'...'don't let it be forgot

that for one brief shining moment there was Camelot.'

"When I came home I looked for it again. I wanted to say,

`There'll be other great presidents; and the Johnsons have been

simply

wonderful to

me. Do you

know what I

think of

history. The

more I used

to read of

history, the

more I

thought -- when something is written down,

does that make it history? -- the things they

say? But Jack loved history so. But history to

me was about Jack. But history made him

what he was...this lonely sick boy.

History made him what he was...he sat

and read history...scarlet fever...this little boy

in bed so much of the time...all the time he

was in bed this little boy was reading history,

was reading Marlborough, he devours the

Knights of the Round Table and he just liked

that last song...and then I thought I mustn't

think that bad way...if history made Jack that

way, made him see heroes then other little

boys will see...men are such a combination of

bad and good...and what is history going to see in this except

what Merriman Smith wrote, that bitter man...then I thought

history is what made Jack; he was such a simple man; he was so

complex too. He had that hero idealistic side but then he had that

other side, the pragmatic side; his friends were all his old

friends; he loved his Irish Mafia.

"...History..., everybody kept saying to me to put a cold

towel around my head" (and wipe the blood off: she is referring

to the swearing-in scene at the plane, when Johnson is sworn in

at the plant at Love Field and she was beside him)..."later, I saw

myself in the mirror; my whole face spattered with blood and

hair...I wiped it off with Kleenex. History. I thought no one

really wants me there" (HERE MY NOTES ARE UNREADABLE).

" Then one second later I thought, why did I wash the

blood off? I should have left it there, let them see what they've

done...If I'd just had blood and caked hair when" (they took

pictures of swearing in). "Then later I said to Bobby what's the

line between histrionics and drama. I should have kept the blood

on.

"McNamara changed the name at the Cape [Canaveral].

Jack was so interested in the Saturn booster. All I wanted was

Jack's name signed on the side of the nose of the booster

somehow no one would even notice. McNamara said that wasn't

dignified. But then he changed the name of the Cape itself so

that everything that goes to the sky goes from there.

"But I can't see changing the name of something like Sixth

Avenue [in New York City]. I don't want to go out on a Kennedy

driveway to a Kennedy airport to visit a Kennedy School -- that's

what Ethel said. And besides: I've got everything I want, I have

that flame [in Arlington National Cemetery] and I have the

Cape. Those were the only two things I cared about. I care about

the flame. Sometimes you drive across that bridge and see that

Lee mansion all lit up, that's one of the first things Caroline

learned to recognize. I wanted that flame and I wanted Cape

Kennedy. I don't care what people say. I want that flame, and I

wanted his name on just that one booster, the one that would put

us ahead of the Russians...that's all I wanted.

I'm never going to live in Europe. I'm not going to `travel

extensively.' Why that's a desecration. I'm going to bring up my

son. I want him to grow up to be a good boy. I

have no better dream for him. I want John-John

to be a fine young man. He's so interested in

planes; maybe he'll be an astronaut or just plain

John Kennedy fixing planes on the ground.

"I'm not going around accepting plaques. I

don't want medals for Jack. I don't want to be

seen by crowds. The first time I minded the

crowd was when I went out with the Irish Mafia

to the grave. The new president is interesting.

The new 1st lady is interesting -- that's who they

should be paying attention to her now.

"Caroline -- she held my hand like a

soldier, she's my helper; she's mine now. But he

(John-John) is going to belong to the men now.

Caroline asked me what kind of prayer should I

say? And I told her to say either 'Please God take

care of Daddy' or 'Please God be nice to Daddy.'"

"Let the skeptics snort about Camelot, but there was

something during the Kennedy years that was magic. Jackie was

more of that than anyone admitted for a long while. She

smoothed the rough Kennedy edges. As much as anyone in those

heady days, she grasped the epic dimensions of the adventure.

No small portion of the glamour of the Kennedy stewardship

that lives on today came from her standards of public propriety

and majesty."

Hugh Sidney, 1994

JFK Lancer 7

NOVEMBER IN DALLAS 2000

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Friday, Nov. 17, 2000

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• Otis (Karl) King: Dallas Events

• Anna Marie Kuhns Walko: ZR/Rifle Program and the 112th Intelligence

• Ian Griggs, Oswald and the Helinski Hotel

NID20-2 THE ASSASSINATION OVERVIEW-PANEL 2 hrs. $30.00

• David Mantik, Jim Marrs, Mark Taylor, Charles Drago

NID20-3 INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS 2 hrs. $30.00

• Gregory Burnham, Larry Hancock, Craig Roberts

NID20-4 THE PAINES 1 hr. $20.00

• Carol Hewett

NID20-5 THE KENNEDY LEGACY 1 hr. $20.00

• Michael Bell, JFK In The Balance

• Kerry McCarthy, The Spirit of the New Frontier

NID20-6 SPECIAL PRESENTATION 1 hr. 40 mins. $25.00

• George Michael Evica

Saturday, Nov.18, 2000

NID20-7a & b OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS PANEL 2 hr. 20 mins. $30.00

• Stephen Tyler: What Do We Know

• Stephen Roy: David Ferrie, the Man and the Myth

• Carol Hewett: A Legal Review of the Clay Shaw Trial

NID20-8 CHAUNCEY HOLT PANEL 1 hr. 46 mins. $25.00

• Karyn Harcourt, David Mollering, Gregory Burnham

NID20-9a & b NEW RESEARCH AND UPDATES 2 hrs 40 mins. $35.00

• Debra Conway: Too Many Agents on the Knoll

• Michael Parks: Altgens, Zapruder and Dealey Plaza Plats

ILLUSION and DENIAL PANEL

• Noel Twyman, David Mantik, Peter Dale Scott

NID20-10 SPECIAL PRESENTATION 1 hr. 37 mins. $25.00

• Dr. Ronald C. Jones

NID20-11 EXCERPTS FROM AUDIO FILES 1 hr. 34 mins. $25.00

• Rex Bradford: In Their Own Words

EXHIBITS

• Ian Griggs: Kathy Kay,

• Michael Parks: Gems from the Dallas Archives,

• Jamie Sawa: Air Force One, Then and Now

NID20-12 BANQUET AND AWARDS CEREMONY 1 hr. 46 mins. $25.00

• Debra Conway and Mary Ferrell: Awards Presentation

• Debra Conway: Year in Review

• Peter Dale Scott: Banquet Address

• Jerry Rose: Banquet Closing

Sunday, Nov. 19, 2000

JFK MEMORIAL AND DEALEY PLAZA CEREMONY

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JFK Lancer 9

ON SPECIAL!!

Mary Ferrell’s Database and

Chronologies

Database --

• detailed entries

• multiple cross-references

• searchable

Chronologies --

• detailed time-line of data beginning with

LHO pre-Russia, Aug. 1957, and continuing

for 20 more files, at times month by month,

through the assassination.

CD140

On Special $40.00

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Legacy Project

JFK Assassination

Database and

Chronology

Support JFK Research

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JFK Lancer 10

Warren Commission

Documents (CD’s) 1 – 1553

This set of 5 CD-ROM’s reproduces a

series of approx. 1,553 numbered documents

(approx. 50,500 pages) of the

President’s Commission on the Assassination

of President Kennedy that the Commission

regarded as “basic source materials”

for its investigation.

CDROM #150 *WINDOWS

Approx. 50,500 pages

$400.00

I was impressed not only with the speed with

which they arrived, but also with the ease of use of

both. The printed index of the Warren

Commission documents is an added bonus (also on

the CDs), but it is very easy to go from the index on

the CDs themselves to the documents using two

screens.

Martin Shackelford

Warren Commission members and staff gave a title to the 1553 Documents their

investigators amassed and worked with. They called these documents "Basic Source

Material." After more than 37 years, these 1553 Commission Document continue to be

the basic source researchers consult when attempting to find answers to questions of what

happened and why it happened on November 22, 1963. The documents have been

difficult to obtain and, once obtained, they are hard to handle and manipulate --

primarily because they contain more than 50,000 pages.

Your extraordinary accomplishment in putting these 1553 documents on CD-ROM in a

searchable form is one of the greatest aides the researchers have received in the past 37

years.

Tom, you have made so many valuable documents, manuscripts and photographs

available to us through the years; but I want to thank you for this valuable contribution.

To borrow a phrase from TV advertising, “It's priceless.”

Mary Ferrell

Comments from

Researchers Using this

Resource:

JFK Lancer 11

Files of Evidence

In the Investigation of the Assassination of

President John F. Kennedy - Volumes 1 - 21

CDRom

Files connected with the investigation of the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy from the Dallas Police Archives.

CD ROM #154 Approx. 2500 pages. $50.00

Vol. 1. Investigation of the assassination of the President JFK 456 pages

Vol. 2. Investigation by J.E. Bill Decker, Sheriff, Dallas County, TX. 90 pages

Vol. 3. Texas supplemental report: correspondence file. 245 pages

Vol. 4. Transcript of Dallas Police radio transmissions. 233 pages

Vol. 5. Dallas Police. 445 pages

Vol. 6. Dallas Police reports. 215 pages

Vol. 7. Investigation transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald, November 24, 1963. 312 pages

Vol. 8. Lee Harvey Oswald. 143 pages

Vol. 9. Officer J.D. Tippitt. 138 pages

Vol. 10. & Vol. 11. Marguerite C. Oswald vs. King Candy Co.,

and Liberty Insurance Co. of Texas; Final Judgment. 60 pages

Vol. 12. Edwin A. Walker file (Dallas PD Dept.) 33 pages

Vol. 13. to Vol. 21, Photographs (poor quality) 131 pages

Vol. 13. Evidence: photographs pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald.

Vol. 14. Photographs: Oswald shooting in basement.

Vol. 15. Photographs: Police “Line-Up”

Vol. 16. Photographs: Oswald’s property

Vol. 17. Photographs: Exterior and interior of Texas Depository Building; reconstruction

Vol. 18. Photographs: Aerial view of downtown and Oak Cliff sections of Dallas showing

Oswald's known and probable routes.

Vol. 19. Photographs: Trademarked aerial view and floor plans.

Vol. 20. Photographs: City Hall basement (Lee Harvey Oswald).

Vol. 21. Photographs: J.D. Tippitt: area of shooting and location Oswald arrested.

Ê

*WINDOWS 98 and higher Only

All Rights Reserved Copyright Digital-Doc-Imaging 2001

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

PRESUMED GUILTY

How and why the Warren Commission framed Lee Harvey Oswald.

A factual account based on the Commission’s public and private documents.

by Howard Roffman

(c)1976 by A.S. Barnes and Co., Inc.

(c)1975 by Associated University Presses, Inc.

ISBN 0-498-01933-0

- 2 -

From the jacket of the 1976 issue of the book:

If Howard Roffman is right, and his careful documentation argues that he is, Lee Harvey Oswald

could not have been the assassin of John F. Kennedy. He could not have been the gunman in the

sixth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository building, as is shown by his close analysis

of both the circumstantial evidence and the ballistics of the case.

The implications are serious indeed, and the Introduction deals with them extensively, besides

assessing the contributions of other critics. The documentation here presented, extracted from the

once-secret working papers of the Warren Commission, demonstrates conclusively that the

Commission prejudged Oswald guilty and made use of only circumstantial evidence to bolster its

assumption, while suppressing information that tended to undermine it.

Roffman in this book states the charge explicitly: "When the Commissioners decided in advance

that the wrong man was the lone assassin, whatever their intentions, they protected the real assassins.

Through their staff, they misinformed the American public and falsified history."

About the Author

Howard Roffman, now 23, was born and raised in Philadelphia, Pa., where he attended public

school. His interest in the assassination of President Kennedy began when he was fourteen, and he

read everything he could lay his hands on on the subject. By the 11th grade he had bought all 26

volumes of the Warren Report ($76), and, convinced of the inadequacy of the conclusions, he went to

the National Archives and studied the files—the youngest researcher ever to see them. Alarmed at

what he discovered, he writes, "I can’t think of anything more threatening than when the government

lies about the murder of its leader."

Mr. Roffman completed his undergraduate studies as a History major at the University of

Pennsylvania, and graduated with honors in 1974. At present studying law at the Holland Law

Center, Gainesville, Fla., he is the author of a second book, "Understanding the Cold War."

- 3 -

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the following publishers for having given me permission to quote from published

works:

The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., for permission to quote from Accessories After the Fact,

copyright (c) 1967 by Sylvia Meagher, reprinted by permission of the publisher, The Bobbs-

Merrill Company, Inc.

CBS News, for permission to quote from CBS News Extra: "November 22 and the Warren Report,"

1964, and CBS News Inquiry: "The Warren Report," 1967.

Harold Weisberg, for permission to quote from his books Whitewash, 1965, Whitewash II, 1966,

Photographic Whitewash, 1967, and Oswald in New Orleans, 1967.

I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Dick Bernabei and Harold Weisberg, who

gave so unselfishly of themselves to help further my research and my personal development. Special

thanks go to Sylvia Meagher for her encouragement and assistance with my manuscript, and to

Halpert Fillinger for his time and invaluable advice concerning the medical/ballistics aspects of this

study. To those too numerous to name who helped in so many ways, I offer my thanks and

appreciation.

- 4 -

Contents

Acknowledgments 3

Preface 5

Introduction 8

Note on Citations 23

PART I: THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

1 Assassination: The Official Case 24

2 Presumed Guilty: The Official Disposition 37

PART II: THE MEDICAL/BALLISTICS EVIDENCE

3 Suppressed Spectrography 48

4 The President’s Wounds 55

5 The Governor’s wounds and the Validity of the Essential Conclusions 68

PART III: THE ACCUSED

6 The Rifle in the Building 81

7 Oswald at Window? 93

8 The Alibi: Oswald’s Actions after the Shots 106

9 Oswald’s Rifle Capability 115

Conclusion 127

Appendix A: Tentative Outline of the Work of the President’s Commission 131

Appendix B: Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from David W. Belin 136

Appendix C: Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Norman Redlich 138

Appendix D: A Later Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Norman Redlich 142

Appendix E: Report of the FBI’s First Interview with Charles Givens 144

Appendix F: FBI Report on Mrs. R. E. Arnold 146

Bibliography 147

Index 150

- 5 -

Preface

A Decade of Deceit: From the Warren Commission to Watergate

Whoever killed President John F. Kennedy got away with it because the Warren Commission, the

executive commission responsible for investigating the murder, engaged in a cover-up of the truth

and issued a report that misrepresented or distorted almost every relevant fact about the crime. The

Warren Commission, in turn, got away with disseminating falsehood and covering up because

virtually every institution in our society that is supposed to make sure that the government works

properly and honestly failed to function in the face of a profound challenge; the Congress, the law,

and the press all failed to do a single meaningful thing to correct the massive abuse committed by the

Warren Commission. To anyone who understood these basic facts, and there were few who did, the

frightening abuses of the Nixon Administration that have come to be known as "Watergate" were not

unexpected and were surprising only in their nature and degree.

This is not a presumptuous statement. I do not mean to imply that anyone who knew what the

Warren Commission did could predict the events that have taken place in the last few years. My

point is that the reaction to the Warren Report, if properly understood, demonstrated that our society

had nothing that could be depended upon to protect it from the abuses of power that have long been

inherent in the Presidency. The dynamics of our system of government are such that every check on

the abuse of power is vital; if the executive branch were to be trusted as the sole guardian of the best

interests of the people, we would not have a constitution that divides power among three branches of

government to act as checks on each other, and we would need no Bill of Rights. Power invites

abuses and excesses, and at least since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, an enormous amount of

power has been assumed and acquired by the president.

Political deception is an abuse that democracy invites; in a system where the leaders are

ultimately accountable to the people, where their political future is decided by the people, there is

inevitably the temptation to deceive, to speak with the primary interest of pleasing the people and

preserving political power. There probably has not been a president who has not lied for political

reasons. I need only cite some more recent examples:

Franklin Roosevelt assured the parents of America in October 1940 that "your boys are not going

to be sent into foreign wars"; at the time he knew that American involvement in World War II was

inevitable, even imminent, but he chose not to be frank with the people for fear of losing the 1940

election.

Dwight Eisenhower in 1960 denied that the American aircraft shot down by the Russians over

their territory was a spy-plane, when he and the Russians knew very well that the plane, a U-2, had

- 6 -

been on a CIA reconnaissance flight;

John F. Kennedy had the American ambassador at the United Nations deny that the unsuccessful

invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was an American responsibility when exactly the opposite was

true.

So, deception and cover-up per se did not originate with the Warren Commission in 1964 or the

Nixon administration in 1972. They had always been an unfortunate part of our political system.

With the Warren Commission they entered a new and more dangerous phase. Never before, to my

knowledge, had there been such a systematic plan for a cover-up, or had such an extensive and

pervasive amount of deception been attempted. And certainly never before had our government

collaborated to deny the public the true story of how its leader was assassinated.

In the face of this new and monumental abuse of authority by the executive, all the institutions

that are supposed to protect society from such abuses failed and, in effect, helped perpetrate the

abuse itself. As with Watergate, numerous lawyers were involved with the Warren Commission; in

neither case did these lawyers act as lawyers. Rather, they participated in a cover-up and acted as

accessories in serious crimes. The Congress accepted the Warren Report as the final solution to the

assassination and thus acquiesced in the cover-up of a President’s murder. And, perhaps most

fundamentally, the press failed in its responsibility to the people and became, in effect, an unofficial

mouthpiece of the government. For a short time the press publicized some of the inconsistencies

between the Warren Report’s conclusions and the evidence; yet never did the press seriously

question the legitimacy of the official findings on the assassination or attempt to ascertain why the

Johnson administration lied about the murder that brought it into power and what was hidden by

those lies.

It was only a small body of powerless and unheralded citizens who undertook to critically

examine the official investigation of President Kennedy’s murder, and among them it was still fewer

who clearly understood the ominous meaning of a whitewashed inquiry that was accepted virtually

without question. It was only these few who asked what would happen to our country if an executive

disposed to abuse its authority could do so with impunity.

It was in 1966, long before the press and the public saw through the thicket of deception with

which we had been led into a war in Vietnam, long before this country was to suffer the horrors of

Watergate, that a leading assassination researcher, Harold Weisberg, wrote and published the

following words:

If the government can manufacture, suppress and lie when a President is cut down—and get away with it—

what cannot follow? Of what is it not capable, regardless of motive . . .?

This government did manufacture, suppress and lie when it pretended to investigate the assassination of John

F. Kennedy.

If it can do that, it can do anything.

And will, if we let it.

Weisberg, in effect, warned that the executive would inevitably commit wrongdoing beyond

imagination so long as there was no institution of government or society that was willing to stop it.

That one man of modest means could make this simple deduction in 1966 is less a credit to him than

it is an indictment of a whole system of institutions that failed in their fundamental responsibility to

society.

My political maturity began to develop only in the past few years; all of my research on the

assassination was conducted while I was a teenager. Yet the basic knowledge that my government

could get away with what it did at the murder of a president made me fearful of the future. On

October 10, 1971, when I was eighteen years old, I wrote what I hoped would be the last letter in a

- 7 -

long and fruitless correspondence with a lawyer who had participated in the official cover-up as an

investigator for the Warren Commission. I concluded that letter with these words:

I ask myself if this country can survive when men like you, who are supposed to represent law and justice, are

the foremost merchants of official falsification, deceit, and criminality.

It was to take three years and the worst political crisis in our history for the press and the public to

even begin to awaken to the great dangers a democracy faces when lawyers are criminals.

It is with pain and not pride that I look back and see that so few were able to understand what the

Warren Commission and the acceptance of its fraudulent Report meant for this country. This was

not omniscience, but simple deduction from basic facts. I cannot escape the conviction that had the

Congress, or the lawyers, or especially the press seriously endeavored to establish the basic facts and

then considered the implications of these facts, we all might have been spared the frightening and

threatening abuses of Watergate. If the institutions designed to protect society from such excesses of

power had functioned in 1964, it is possible that they would not have had to mobilize so

incompletely and almost ineffectively in 1972 and 1973.

Watergate has brought us into a new era, hopefully one in which all institutions will work

diligently to see that our government functions properly and honestly. As of now, the reasons for

optimism are still limited. It was not the press as an institution that probed beneath the official lies

about Watergate and demanded answers; essentially, it was one newspaper, the Washington Post,

that, true to its obligations, bulldogged the story that most of the nation’s press buried until it became

a national scandal. It was not the law as an institution that insisted on the truth; it was one judge,

John Sirica, who best served the law by settling for no less than the whole truth, and he was and

continues to be deceived and lied to by those whose responsibility it is to uphold and defend the law.

Whether Congress will adequately respond to the crimes and abuses of the Nixon administration

remains to be seen.

Our very system of government and law faces its most profound challenge today. A nation that

did not learn from the Warren Commission has survived to relive a far worse version of that past in

Watergate. It would do well to live by the wisdom of Santayana, for it is doubtful that American

democracy could survive another Watergate.

Howard Roffman

January, 1974

- 8 -

Introduction

On January 22, 1964, the members of the then two-month old Warren Commission were hastily

assembled for a top-secret meeting. Half-way into their executive session, the Commissioners

decided their words were so sensitive that they should not be recorded. Commission member Allen

Dulles, the former CIA director, even suggested "this record ought to be destroyed." The incomplete

stenographer’s tape remained locked in government vaults for eleven years until, under pressure from

a persistent researcher named Harold Weisberg, the National Archives retrieved it and forwarded it

to the Pentagon for transcription. The result was a blow to anyone who ever entertained the belief

that the Warren Commission set out in good faith to investigate the murder of President Kennedy and

discover the full truth.

It was never a secret that the Commission relied almost entirely on the FBI to conduct the bulk of

its investigation. In its own Report, the Commission boasted of this relationship: "Because of the

diligence, cooperation, and facilities of the Federal investigative agencies, it was unnecessary for the

Commission to employ investigators other than the members of the Commission’s legal staff"

(Rxiii). It was also no secret that this relationship was inherently compromising because the

investigative agencies, particularly the FBI, had a vested interest in the conclusion that the

President’s murder was the unforeseeable act of a lone madman. In the aftermath of the

assassination, the FBI was left holding the bag. Rumors immediately spread that Oswald had been

an FBI informant and that the FBI knew of Oswald’s potential for violence but failed to report his

identity to the Secret Service. As Harold Weisberg succinctly put it as early as 1965, after President

Kennedy was killed, all the federal agencies "had one objective, to take the heat off themselves."1

By any reasonable standard, the last investigator to have been entrusted with the task of

developing the facts surrounding the assassination was the FBI.

The Warren Commission realized this, but decided to rely on the FBI nonetheless. Its public

position would be one of praise for the FBI’s diligent cooperation. But the secret executive sessions

and confidential memoranda tell another story: The Commission knew what J. Edgar Hoover was up

to and played along.

The Commission convened in secret that January 22 to discuss the rumor that Oswald had been a

paid informant for the FBI. As chapter 2 of this book documents, the FBI had already preempted the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. Harold Weisberg, Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report (Hyattstown, Md.: Harold Weisberg, 1965), p. 189.

- 9 -

Commission by publicly claiming to have solved the assassination within three weeks of the event.

At the January 22 session, an unidentified speaker, probably General Counsel J. Lee Rankin,

explained the basic problem to the Commission: "That is that the FBI is very explicit that Oswald is

the assassin . . . and they are very explicit that there was no conspiracy." However, the speaker

noted, "they have not run out all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia. . . . But they are concluding

that there can’t be a conspiracy without those being run out." The inevitable question was raised:

"Why are they so eager to make both of those conclusions . . . ?" Mr. Dulles claimed to be confused

as to why the FBI would want to dispose of the case by finding Oswald guilty if, at the same time,

Oswald was rumored to have been in the FBI’s employ. Dulles’s question was quickly answered by

Rankin:

A: They would like to have us fold up and quit.

Boggs: This closes the case, you see. Don’t you see?

Dulles: Yes, I see that.

Rawkin [sic]: They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The Commission supports their conclusions,

and we can go on home and that is the end of it.2

The Commission engaged in a more explicit discussion of the problem at its secret session five days

later, on January 27. John J. McCloy noted "we are so dependent upon them [the FBI] for our facts

that it might be a useful thing to have him [Hoover] before us" for the purpose of requesting further

investigation "of the things that are still troubling us." The following discussion ensued:

Mr. Rankin: Part of our difficulty in regard to it is that they have no problems. They have decided that it is

Oswald who committed the assassination, they have decided that no one else was involved, they have decided—

Sen. Russell: They have tried the case and reached a verdict on every aspect.

Rep. Boggs: You have put your finger on it. . . .

Mr. Rankin: . . . They have decided the case, and we are going to have maybe a thousand further inquiries

that we say the Commission has to know all these things before it can pass on this.

And I think their reaction probably would be, "Why do you want all that. It is clear."

Sen. Russell: "You have our statement, what else do you need?"

Mr. McCloy: Yes, "We know who killed cock robin."3

Thus, the Commission recognized the untenable position it faced being put in if it relied on the

FBI for additional investigation when the FBI was claiming that the crime had been solved and no

more investigation was necessary. Hoover had already staked the very reputation of his agency on a

solution that demanded Oswald as the lone assassin. It would have been a naive Commission indeed

that would have expected the FBI to destroy its own "solution" of the crime with further

investigation. In light of these secret discussions, the Commission’s heavy dependence on the FBI is

nothing less than culpable.

The central FBI conclusion, which the Commission adopted as its own, was that Lee Harvey

Oswald shot and killed President Kennedy. This conclusion was sustained solely on the finding that

bullets from Oswald’s rifle had caused the wounds to President Kennedy and Governor Connally. If

this one finding crumbles, the case for Oswald’s guilt must crumble with it. It was thus of paramount

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. Transcript of Warren Commission executive session of January 22, 1964, pp. 11-13. The transcript is reproduced in Harold Weisberg’s Post Mortem

(Frederick, Md.: Harold Weisberg, 1975), pp. 475ff.

3. Transcript of Warren Commission executive session of January 27, 1964, pp. 170-71. The full transcript is reproduced in Harold Weisberg’s

Whitewash IV: JFK Assassination Transcript (Frederick, Md.: Harold Weisberg, 1974).

- 10 -

importance that the Commission independently verify this FBI finding.

The Commission was certainly aware of its responsibility. In secret, the members admitted to

each other the inadequacy of the Bureau’s ballistics findings as set forth in the FBI Report. At the

executive session held December 16, 1963, Mr. McCloy complained, "This bullet business leaves me

totally confused." Chairman Warren concurred: "It’s totally inconclusive."4 Members of the

Commission’s staff, noting the FBI’s sloppy work, recognized a need "to facilitate independent

analysis of the Bureau’s ballistic conclusions"5 and to "secure from the FBI and consider the

underlying documents and reports related to the rifle and shells."6

As I explain in chapter 3, the only way the Commission could possibly have established a firm

link between bullets fired from Oswald’s rifle and the wounds inflicted during the assassination was

to compare the metallic composition of all the ballistic specimens through a meticulous scientific

process called spectrographic analysis. The FBI claimed to have run such tests and arrived at

inconclusive results. The Commission took the FBI at its word, based on nonexpert testimony,

without ever having looked at the spectrographer’s report or having put the relevant documents into

its record. Evidence has since been developed by Harold Weisberg that a far more detailed

comparative process, neutron activation analysis (NAA), was utilized by the Commission through the

Atomic Energy Commission.7 Proper NAA testing could at once have settled the doubts that

plagued the Commission.

The Commission knew the value of NAA and recognized the need to apply the technology to the

evidence in the assassination. Indeed, the AEC had immediately offered its services to the FBI, only

to be snubbed by Hoover. Then, on December 11, 1963, Paul C. Aebersold of the AEC wrote a letter

to Herbert J. Miller at the Department of Justice explaining how the NAA process might be of vital

importance in the investigation of the President’s murder.8 Aebersold noted that "it may be possible

to determine by trace-element measurements whether the fatal bullets were of composition identical

to that of the purportedly unfired shell" found in the chamber of Oswald’s rifle. Likewise, "Other

pieces of physical evidence in the case, such as clothing . . . might lend themselves to

characterization by means of their trace-element levels." The Justice Department forwarded

Aebersold’s letter to the Commission, which immediately took the matter up with Hoover. The

Commission sought "your advice regarding the feasibility and desirability of taking advantage of [the

AEC’s] offer."9 When the Commission assembled on January 27, 1964, Mr. Rankin advised as

follows:

Now, the bullet fragments are now, part of them are now, with the Atomic Energy Commission, who are

trying to determine by a new method, a process that they have, of whether they can relate them to various guns

and the different parts, the fragments, whether they are part of one of the bullets that was broken and came out in

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

4. Transcript of Warren Commission executive session of December 16, 1963, p. 11.

5. Memorandum dated February 10, 1964, from Charles Shaffer to Howard Willens, available from the National Archives. This document is

reproduced in Weisberg’s Post Mortem at p. 488.

6. Memorandum dated January 23, 1964, from Francis Adams and Arlen Specter to J. Lee Rankin, attachment II, item (c), available from the National

Archives. This document is reproduced in Weisberg’s Post Mortem at p. 490.

7. See Post Mortem, chap. 29 and pp. 407ff.

8. Aebersold’s letter is available from the National Archives. The letter notes: "Our work leads one to expect that the tremendous sensitivity of the

activation analysis method is capable of providing useful information that may not be otherwise attainable."

9. Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated January 7, 1964.

- 11 -

part through the neck, and just what particular assembly of bullet they were part of.

They have had it for the better part of two and a-half weeks, and we ought to get an answer.10

Indeed, an investigative Commission aware of its obligation to verify ballistic findings on which

the case against an alleged presidential assassin depended "ought" to have insisted upon and received

an immediate "answer" from an independent agency employing a sensitive new technology. But this

Commission never got an answer.

And that was exactly how J. Edgar Hoover wanted things.

Still awaiting the AEC’s test results, the Commission on March 16, 1964, had staff lawyer Melvin

Eisenberg discuss the NAA process with FBI Special Agent John F. Gallagher, the man who had run

the Bureau’s earlier spectrographic analysis. Among the questions raised by Eisenberg was the

application of NAA to President Kennedy’s clothing, particularly to the overlapping holes in the shirt

near the collar button, which the FBI had been unable to relate spectrographically to the passage of a

bullet. Hoover disapproved the idea, writing the Commission on March 18 that "It is not felt that the

increased sensitivity of neutron activation analysis would contribute substantially to the

understanding of the origin of this hole and frayed area" (20H2). The Commission bowed to

Hoover’s wish and never subjected the alleged bullet damage in President Kennedy’s and Governor

Connally’s clothing to NAA. The secrets that might be held by the minuscule traces of metal left on

the clothing would not be unlocked by this Commission charged with evaluating "all the facts" of the

assassination (R471).

For what its own record discloses, the Commission merely forgot about the scientific tests it knew

were crucial and proceeded without them to assemble a case against Oswald (see chapter 2). The

Commission took not a word of testimony about NAA’s of the ballistic specimens, and allowed into

the published evidence references only to NAA’s of the paraffin casts of Oswald’s hands and cheek

made by the Dallas Police (R562). Even at that, as late as September 5, 1964, a week before the

Warren Report was set in type, the staff was still trying to obtain from the FBI a description of the

NAA process.11

The only word the Commission ever officially received relating to these vital tests was

communicated not through the AEC but through Hoover, whose brief letter remained buried in the

Commission’s unpublished files until Harold Weisberg dug it out.12 Hoover did not write the

Commission until July 8, 1964, after sections of the Report naming Oswald as the assassin had been

preliminarily drafted. Although he then attempted to play down the value of the NAA’s, his letter

stands as a monument to the deliberate inadequacy of the Commission’s investigation.

To begin, Hoover’s July 8 letter informed the Commission that the NAA’s conducted were

incomplete:

Because of the higher sensitivity of the neutron activation analysis, certain of the small lead fragments were

then subjected to neutron activation analysis and comparisons with larger bullet fragments.

Thus, according to Hoover, there were no NAA comparisons of any of the copper components of the

recovered bullets and fragments. Hoover’s listing also excluded several items of ballistics evidence

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

10. Transcript of Warren Commission executive session of January 27, 1964, p. 194.

11. Memorandum from Melvin Eisenberg to Norman Redlich dated September 5, 1964. This document is reproduced in Weisberg’s Post Mortem at p.

477.

12. See Post Mortem, chap. 29 and p. 607.

- 12 -

possessed by the Commission, among them the unfired cartridge and the metallic traces on the

clothing. What were the results of this examination of fatally limited scope? Hoover reported the

following only:

While minor variations in composition were found by this method, these were not considered sufficient to

permit positively differentiating among the larger bullet fragments and thus positively determining from which of

the larger bullet fragments any given small lead fragment may have come.

I invite the reader to unscramble these semantics. It is indeed impossible to know what Hoover

considered a "larger bullet fragment," especially because a whole bullet, Commission Exhibit 399,

was alleged to have been tested but seems not to have been included within the above description of

the test results. In short, Hoover told the Commission very little, if anything, about the NAA results,

and provided no documentation to support or clarify his incomprehensible summary.

The Commission, having already decided that Oswald was the assassin, was content to leave the

record in this hopeless state. One researcher, Harold Weisberg, was not, and tried to force the

government to release the entire record concerning the spectrographic analysis by filing a suit under

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), as described in chapter 3. After I completed the text of this

book, a federal court of appeals decided against Weisberg and allowed the Department of Justice to

continue suppression of the spectrographer’s report.13 The decision was so contrary to the FOIA that

Congress almost immediately moved to overrule it legislatively. A 1974 amendment to the FOIA

cited the Weisberg case as a frightening precedent and expressed Congress’s intent that the

government not be permitted to suppress reports involving well-known scientific procedures such as

spectrography.14 By February 1975, when the new law took effect, Weisberg was back in court,

demanding not only the spectrographer’s report but also the full report on the NAA’s performed by

the AEC for the Warren Commission. The government produced a batch of almost

incomprehensible working papers, most of them incomplete, some containing tables of elements with

statistical data missing. These, it claimed, represented the full extent of the relevant documents

within its files. The government’s claims defied belief: the spectrographer’s report that FBI Agent

Robert Frazier swore had been made "a part of the permanent records of the FBI" (5H69) did not

exist; the NAA’s that Rankin described to the Commission on January 27 had not been conducted

until May 15; and the experts of the FBI and AEC are equipped with such computerlike memories

that they could understand and evaluate the results of the spectrographic and NAA testing without

tabulating or recording literally thousands of multi-digit figures. Bald as the government’s

representations were, they satisfied a federal district judge.15 Once again, release of meaningful,

possibly determinative scientific data on the assassination awaits the appellate process.

One need not await the release of the full documentation, if it exists, to ask why it was not

published by the Warren Commission and made part of a complete historical record. Nor can one

avoid the observation that the Commission’s investigation cannot have been complete or legitimate

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

13. Weisberg v. U.S. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Dir. 1973).

14. During the Senate debate on the 1974 FOIA amendments, Senator Edward Kennedy expressed his understanding that one of the proposed

amendments would "in effect override the court decisions in the court of appeals on the Weisberg against United States." Senator Philip Hart, who

had written the amendment, responded: "That is its purpose." Congressional Record of May 30, 1974, S9329-30. The official legislative history is

contained in the Conference Report, H. Rep. 93-1380, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 1974.

15. Weisberg’s second FOIA suit for the spectrographic and NAA results is described in detail with much of the accompanying documentation

reproduced in Post Mortem, pp. 407ff. See also the affidavit of FBI Agent John W. Kilty filed by the government in the suit, at pp. 623-24.

- 13 -

absent this most fundamental scientific evidence, the value of which was only too well known to the

Commission.

One conclusion is both basic and irrefutable: the people have been lied to about the murder of

their president and how that murder was investigated by the government. Without a doubt, the

falsehoods and misrepresentations disseminated by the government and the media concerning the

assassination of President Kennedy are as odious in our society as the assassination itself. The

freedoms guaranteed under the law are without meaning unless the people are honestly and

competently informed. Indeed, when a government can get away with whitewashing the truth about

a president’s murder, the suggestion of authoritarianism is more than apparent.

The reader should understand that I regard the significance of the Warren Commission’s failure

not as part of an intriguing "whodunnit" but rather as a frightening breakdown of the principle of

governmental accountability. Surely the question of who killed the President must concern us all,

but over twelve years after the murder, speculation about who was responsible becomes a futile

exercise of questionable value. I have yet to see a shred of credible evidence linking any known

group or individual with the President’s murder. Yet speculation on that score is as rife today as it is

profitable. Those who engage in it have been dubbed "conspiracy theorists."

In this book I do not deal with theory; I deal with fact. The facts are that we do not know who

killed President Kennedy, that the Warren Commission named the wrong man as the assassin and

never searched for the truth of the crime. Although I do not allege that the Commission or its staff

knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, the documents presented here reveal that no

possibility other than Oswald as the assassin was ever considered in the investigation. What this

means, regardless of motives (about which I am not competent to speculate), is that the Commission

left President Kennedy’s murder unsolved, tacitly allowing the real assassin or assassins to go free.

A reader approaching the field of critical works on the assassination faces a thicket of conflicting

theories, doctrines, and allegations. I think it only fair to let the reader know in advance where I

believe my book stands within the maze. First, however, it would be helpful to review briefly the

events of the assassination and its subsequent history.

President Kennedy was shot to death at 12:30 P.M., c.s.t., on November 22, 1963, as he rode

through the streets of Dallas, Texas, in a motorcade. Texas Governor John Connally, seated in the

President’s open limousine, received serious bullet wounds in the shooting. Immediately, the

motorcade sped to nearby Parkland Hospital, where a team of doctors tried in vain to save the

President’s life. The President’s death was announced, and, over the objections of the local

authorities, who then had exclusive jurisdiction in the crime, the body was forcefully removed from

the hospital and flown back to Washington. Before the plane bearing the President’s body took off,

Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, who had ridden in the motorcade, took the oath of office and

assumed the duties of President.

Within forty-five minutes of the assassination, a Dallas Police Officer, J. D. Tippit, was shot to

death in a Dallas suburb. A half-hour later, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested in a movie theater a

half mile from the site of the Tippit murder. He was first accused of killing only Tippit, but by that

evening he became the prime suspect in the murder of the President as well. Throughout that hectic

weekend, the Dallas Police made repeated public accusations of Oswald’s guilt. Oswald steadfastly

maintained that he was innocent and said he would prove it when he was brought to trial.

The trial never came, however. On November 24, Oswald, still in police custody, was shot to

death by Jack Ruby.

Elimination of the only suspect in the assassination precluded a trial that might have turned up the

facts about the President’s murder through the adversary system of justice. In its stead, President

Johnson on November 29 appointed a commission to "evaluate and report upon the facts relating to

- 14 -

the assassination . . . and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the

assassination"(R471). Earl Warren, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, presided over this

commission, whose members included Senators Richard Russell and John Sherman Cooper,

Representatives Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford, Allen Dulles, and John J. McCloy. This panel, which

became known as the Warren Commission, appointed a General Counsel, J. Lee Rankin, who headed

a group of fourteen Assistant Counsel and twelve staff members. Throughout the Warren

Commission’s ten-month investigation, it was this staff of lawyers under Rankin who took virtually

all the testimony and composed the final report.

The Commission itself conceded that its task was not executed by its prestigious but preoccupied

members. In the words of the Warren Report, it was the staff that "undertook the work of the

Commission with a wealth of legal and investigative experience." "Highly qualified personnel from

several Federal agencies, assigned to the Commission at its request" also assisted in the

investigation(Rxi). Members of the legal staff, divided by subject into teams, were responsible for

analyzing and summarizing much of the information originally received from the various agencies,

and for "determin[ing] the issues, sort[ing] out the unresolved problems, and recommend[ing]

additional investigation to the Commission"(Rxii).

On September 24, 1964, the Warren Commission submitted an 888-page report to the President.

(This report was later to become known as the Warren Report.) The Commission concluded that Lee

Harvey Oswald alone had assassinated President Kennedy, and maintained that it had seen no

evidence indicating that Oswald and Ruby, together or alone, had been part of a conspiracy to murder

the President. Two months after the issuance of its Report, the Commission published as a massive

appendix the evidence upon which the Report was allegedly based, including transcripts of witness

testimony, evidential exhibits, and thousands of documents. This evidence is contained in twenty-six

volumes.

Immediately upon its release, the Warren Report was met by an overwhelmingly favorable

response from the nation’s "establishment" press.16 This response, analyzed objectively, was in fact

a blatant instance of irresponsible journalism, for newsmen lavished praise on the Report before they

could have read and analyzed it—two months before the evidence upon which it rested was released

to the public.

Nevertheless, the Warren Report, which was introduced to the public as the definitive and final

word on the assassination, was soon to be seriously questioned; a national controversy would erupt

in which the Warren Commission, its Report, its evidence, and its workings would be challenged by

a broad range of critics.

Criticism of the Commission and doubts about the assassination were brewing prior to the

issuance of the Report, although they did not command broad public attention and were regarded

more as suspicious rumblings of foreign origin. By the end of 1965 things were beginning to change.

Vincent Salandria published a well-documented critique of the medical/ballistics conclusions of the

Commission in a small left-of-center magazine. The Oswald Affair, by respected correspondent Leo

Sauvage, was published in France, challenging the conclusion that Oswald was guilty. In late 1965,

The Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy’s Assassination, a hasty critical analysis by

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

16. E.g., see Anthony Lewis’s coverage of the Warren Report and editorial comment by James Reston, New York Times, September 28, 1964;

Washington Post coverage of the same date, including praise by Robert Donovan, p. A14, Roscoe Drummond, p. A13, Marquis Childs, and an

editorial saying the Report "deserves acceptance as the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," a favorable editorial in the Washington Evening Star,

September 28, 1964, p. A-8; Time (October 2, 1964) and Newsweek (October 5, 1964) carried lengthy "news" features praising the Report.

- 15 -

reporter Sylvan Fox, was published. Whitewash, written in 1965 by Harold Weisberg, was the first

full-length book to examine in detail the Commission’s investigation, and bore the unenviable burden

of "breaking" the subject of Warren Report criticism in the United States. After Weisberg published

his book in a private printing at his own expense, several other works critical of the official version of

the assassination appeared on the market, including, in chronological order of publication: Inquest,

by Edward Jay Epstein; Rush to Judgment, by Mark Lane (Lane had been among the first to defend

the dead Oswald, and, at his own urging, gave testimony before the Warren Commission); The

Second Oswald, by Richard Popkin; Whitewash II and Photographic Whitewash, by Harold

Weisberg; Accessories After the Fact, by Sylvia Meagher; and Six Seconds in Dallas, by Josiah

Thompson.

These books were widely reviewed and often appeared on best-seller lists. They were responsible

for generating a considerable national controversy over the findings of the Warren Commission, in

which several responsible periodicals called for a new investigation17 and about two-thirds of the

public rejected the allegation of Oswald’s lone guilt.18

Early in 1967, New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison made the dubitable announcement that

his office, after conducting an extensive investigation, had "solved" the assassination.19 One figure in

the plot alleged by Garrison died immediately before he was to be arrested.20 Soon after, a New

Orleans businessman, Clay Shaw, was arrested and charged with conspiring to murder President

Kennedy.21 Finally the assassination was to get its day in court. But Shaw did not come to trial until

January 1969, and he was easily acquitted after a two-month proceeding in which all the shocking

evidence against him promised by Garrison failed to materialize.22 Garrison was in consequence

widely condemned by the media, and the New Orleans fiasco caused the virtual destruction of

whatever foundation for credibility had previously been established by critics of the Warren Report.

Garrison did not refute or in any tangible way diminish the legitimacy of several responsible and

documented criticisms of the official version of the assassination. But his unethical behavior and the

mockery of justice (involving only Shaw) perpetrated under him were "bad press"; it left the public

and the media highly suspicious of Warren Report criticism.

Then, in June 1972, there was the break-in at the Watergate and the beginning of a new national

consciousness, a skepticism toward government and an unwillingness to believe the official word.

By the time President Nixon resigned in August 1974, deception, dishonesty, and malfeasance in

government were accepted as the reality, even expected as the norm. Suddenly, the notion that the

government had not told the truth about John Kennedy’s murder did not seem so outrageous.

It was not long before there formed a new wave of doubt about the Warren Commission’s

findings. Revelations about the illegal domestic activities of the CIA led President Ford to appoint a

presidential commission in February 1975. This commission’s scope was quickly expanded to

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

17. E.g., see Life, November 25, 1966, pp. 38-48; Ramparts, October 1966, p. 3; Saturday Evening Post, January 14, 1967, and December 2, 1967, p.

88.

18. In May 1967 a Harris Survey revealed that 66 percent of the American public believed that the assassination was not the work of one man but was

part of a broader plot.

19. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 25, 1967.

20. Washington Post, February 23, 1967.

21. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1967.

22. Ibid., March 2, 1969.

- 16 -

include allegations that the CIA had been involved in the Kennedy assassination as well as numerous

plots against foreign leaders, notably Fidel Castro of Cuba.23 However, the commission, whose

investigation was headed by an ex-staff lawyer for the Warren Commission, David Belin, chose to

"investigate" only the most unfounded of the charges against the CIA relating to the assassination.

The outlandish allegations of Dick Gregory and A. J. Weberman that E. Howard Hunt and Frank

Sturgis were arrested in Dealey Plaza on November 22 provided easy targets for Mr. Belin’s

selectively aimed investigative cannons.24 It soon became public knowledge that the United States

had indeed been involved in the assassination business, having used the CIA and the Mafia to make

attempts on the lives of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba, among others. Doubts grew. In the fall of

1975 it was revealed that the Dallas office of the FBI, on orders from J. Edgar Hoover, had destroyed

a threatening note left there by Oswald.25 After the FBI confirmed this deliberate destruction of

evidence,26 no one could deny that there had been some sort of conspiracy to conceal by the

government. Representative Don Edwards announced that his subcommittee would hold hearings

into the FBI’s withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission, and two Senators on a select

committee investigating the CIA formed a special subcommittee to study the need for a

congressional investigation of the assassination. Clearly the tide was turning. Even the

Commission’s staunchest defenders were forced to call for a new investigation, including David

Belin27 and President Ford,28 both Warren Commission alumni.

I support the movement toward a new investigation, but the vital question now concerns what

should be investigated. A congressional reopening of the case should focus on those areas which will

yield meaningful findings and serve a constructive national purpose. Such an investigation would

inevitably have to deal with the question of "Who killed Kennedy?" However, my own familiarity

with the evidence leads me to believe that an inquiry limited only to that question would be doomed

to achieving very little. The major question at this point is "Who covered up the truth about the

murder, how, and why?" A congressional investigation could establish with little effort that the

Warren Report’s "solution" of the crime is erroneous; the Commission’s files, as well as the files of

other federal agencies, would provide a fertile starting point for the determination of responsibility in

the cover-up. The participants in all stages of the official investigation of the assassination are either

known or identifiable, and those individuals still living can be subjected to cross-examination. I do

not personally believe that the federal investigators knew who killed President Kennedy. But the

evidence is certain that decisions were made, at times and levels now unknown, that the truth about

the assassination should not be discovered, that falsehood should be disseminated to the people.

When such decisions are made by the government, the Congress has a reason, indeed an obligation,

to investigate and to assure that the executive is made to account.

Thus, it is my conviction that the only responsible approach to be taken toward the assassination

at this point is to focus upon the question of the Warren Commission’s failure, rather than to

speculate about conspiracies and solutions for which there is no evidence. My own review of the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

23. New York Times, March 8, 1975.

24. New York Times, May 12, 1975. See Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (June 1975), Chap. 19.

25. Dallas Times Herald, August 31, 1975.

26. New York Times, September 1, 1975, p. 7.

27. New York Times, November 23, 1975.

28. New York Times, November 27, 1975.

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critical literature and the varied positions of those opposing the Warren Report persuades me that this

approach is in fact the only viable one. I hope that a brief elaboration will help the reader to

understand my position.

The early writings on the assassination by Weisberg, Meagher, Lane, and Epstein focused on the

inadequacy of the official solution to the crime. Each author approached the subject in his or her

own manner, although, in my estimate, the books by Lane and Epstein were seriously flawed.

Harold Weisberg was the first and the strongest advocate of the doctrine that the assassination

should be studied from the perspective of the official noninvestigation. Weisberg has continually

stressed the great implications of the fraudulent investigation for our government and our society.

His own words on the subject forcefully convey his approach:

In its approach, operations and Report, the Commission considered one possibility alone—that Lee Harvey

Oswald, without assistance, assassinated the President and killed Officer Tippit. Never has such a tremendous

array of power been turned against a single man, and he was dead. Yet even without opposition the Commission

failed. . . .

A crime such as the assassination of the President of the United States cannot be left as the Report . . . has left

it, without even the probability of a solution, with assassins and murderers free, and free to repeat their crimes

and enjoy what benefits they may have expected to enjoy therefrom. No President is ever safe if Presidential

assassins are exculpated. Yet that is what the Commission has done. In finding Oswald "guilty," it has found

those who assassinated him "innocent." If the President is not safe, then neither is the country.29

Much more does it relate to each individual American, to the integrity of the institutions of our society, when

anything happens to any president—especially when he is assassinated.

The consignment of President John F. Kennedy to history with the dubious epitaph of the whitewashed

investigation is a grievous event.30

Above all, the Report leaves in jeopardy the rights of all Americans and the honor of the nation. When what

happened to Oswald once he was in the hands of the public authority can occur in this country with neither

reprimand nor question, no one is safe. When the Federal government puts its stamp of approval on such

unabashed and open denial of the most basic legal rights of any American, no matter how insignificant he may

be, then no American can depend on having those rights, no matter what his power or connections. The rights of

all Americans, as the Commission’s chairman said when wearing his Chief Justice’s hat, depend upon each

American’s enjoyment of these same rights.31

Perhaps the simplest statement of the context enunciated by Weisberg is contained in the quotation

that I included in the Preface of this book: "If the government can manufacture, suppress and lie

when a President is cut down—and get away with it—what cannot follow?"32

The basic focus of Mrs. Meagher’s book is set forth in its very appropriate title, Accessories After

the Fact: The Warren Commission, The Authorities and The Report. Mrs. Meagher scrupulously

contrasts the statements contained in the Warren Report with the Commission’s published hearings

and exhibits. She finds that:

The first pronounces Oswald guilty; the second, instead of corroborating the verdict reached by the Warren

Commission, creates a reasonable doubt of Oswald’s guilt and even a powerful presumption of his complete

innocence of all the crimes of which he was accused.33

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

29. Weisberg, Whitewash, p. 188.

30. Weisberg, Whitewash II, p. 7.

31. Weisberg, Whitewash, p. 189.

32. Weisberg, Photographic Whitewash, p. 137.

33. Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967), p. xxiii.

- 18 -

As stated by Mrs. Meagher, the corollary to this finding is as follows:

Because of the nature of the investigation, it is probable that the assassins who shot down President John F.

Kennedy have gone free, undetected. The Warren Report has served merely to delay their identification and the

process of justice.34

This is to say that the Warren Commission and the federal authorities, regardless of their motives or

conscious intent, made themselves accessories after the fact in the President’s murder by constructing

a false solution that allowed the real criminals to go free.

Mark Lane’s best-selling Rush to Judgment was presented as a critique of the Commission’s

investigation. One may question Lane’s selection and presentation of evidence; certain basic flaws

in the book raise more serious questions about its value as a "critique" of the official inquiry. The

Warren Commission’s investigation cannot be understood without reference to the relationship

between the Commission and its staff, for it was the staff that handled virtually all of the work and

digested the information that filtered up to the Commission members. Yet in Rush to Judgment the

staff is never identified. Where questioning of a particular witness is quoted, names of individual

staff members have been replaced by an anonymous "Q." An introduction by Professor Hugh

Trevor-Roper states: "It is clear that the bulk of the work fell upon the Chairman and upon the

assistant counsel and staff [who for Lane’s readers are nameless]."35 This assertion unjustly singles

out Earl Warren for blame, although he never came close to doing "the bulk of the work." Trevor-

Roper seems immediately to thwart the supposed purpose of the book by offering the assurance that

"moderate, rational men will naturally and . . . rightly" reject the idea that the Commission and the

"existing agencies" "sought to reach a certain conclusion at the expense of the facts . . . that they . . .

were dishonest . . . [that the] Commission . . . engaged in a conspiracy to cover up a crime. . . ."36

Lane surely no longer accepts this kind but false view of the Commission’s work, and has omitted

the introduction by the prestigious Trevor-Roper from the 1975 paperback reissue of his book. In the

intervening years, however, Lane has taken public stances that have seriously compromised his

credibility. In the midst of his close association with Jim Garrison prior to the acquittal of Clay

Shaw, Lane told the press that he knew the identities of the real murderers of President Kennedy.37

During the 1968 presidential campaign, in which he ran for Vice-President on a ticket with Dick

Gregory, Lane held a press conference in Philadelphia to announce that Garrison "has substantially

solved the assassination conspiracy. He knows who was involved and has strong evidence. I’ve seen

the evidence; I’ve talked to the witnesses."38 Lane also claimed to have two copies of this evidence,

which he promised to release if the government kept Shaw from going to trial. The evidence

presented at Shaw’s trial, needless to say, did not solve the assassination; neither Garrison nor Lane

ever possessed the dispositive evidence each claimed to have.

Doubters who sought a rational and scholarly treatment of the Commission’s failure flocked to

Edward Jay Epstein when his critique of the inner workings of the Commission, Inquest, was

published in 1966; they were soon to be disappointed. Many of Epstein’s most telling points were

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

34. Ibid., p. 456.

35. Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), p. 8.

36. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

37. "Lane: I Know the Assassin," New York Post, March 21, 1967, p. 14.

38. Philadelphia Distant Drummer for bi-weekly period beginning November 1, 1968, p. 9.

- 19 -

based on unrecorded interviews with Commission members and staff lawyers and thus could not be

verified when the inevitable denials came. Yet, for all his pretenses, Epstein actually defended the

official investigation. According to Epstein, the Warren Commission was involved in a situation that

might have excused lying in the "national interest." He rightly asserted that the "nation’s faith in its

own institutions was held to be at stake."39 But, in concluding his book, he found that "in

establishing its version of the truth, the Warren Commission acted to reassure the nation and protect

the national interest."40 This, he implied, justified the failure to make "it clear that very substantial

evidence indicated the presence of a second assassin."41 Three years after writing his book, Epstein

totally reversed his position in a New York Times Magazine article.42 "Nor is there any substantial

evidence that I know of," he wrote in 1969, "that indicates there was more than one rifleman firing."

Suddenly, to Epstein, it was incidental that the Commission "had conducted a less than exhaustive

investigation." Of the "great number of inconsistencies" between the official evidence and the

official conclusions, he could say only that "there is no formula for adding up inconsistencies and

arriving at the truth," as if this platitude would rescue the Commission’s findings. Those who

suggest that these massive "inconsistencies" prove the invalidity of the Warren Report, Epstein

opined, merely engage in "obfuscatory rhetoric."

Perhaps the two best-known books departing from the perspective of the inadequacies of the

official investigation and entering into the realm of alternative theories are Richard Popkin’s The

Second Oswald and Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds in Dallas. Both books cite a wealth of evidence

but are thoroughly inadequate in themselves, and thus, to my thinking, are counterproductive. The

Second Oswald was introduced as "the third stage of a great case" and promoted as "the startling new

theory of the assassination."43 The theory—that someone, resembling and posing as Oswald, planted

incriminating circumstantial evidence during the two months before the assassination—was hardly

new. Harold Weisberg had devoted a chapter of his Whitewash to it, although not in the context of

suggesting a solution to the crime. Weisberg’s copyrighted work was never acknowledged by

Popkin, who falsely claimed singular and original credit. Popkin’s preoccupation with the

importance of solving the crime has led him into strange pursuits, the latest of which was to inform

President Ford that John Kennedy was killed by "zombie assassins," programmed like robots by the

CIA.44 Professor Thompson’s book, a slick presentation utilizing numerous photographs, refuses to

name any assassins but offers a scenerio [sic] in which three assassins fired four shots in Dealey

Plaza. The theory is hopelessly flawed. It is based on a first shot fired later than the evidence

indicates;45 it relies heavily on interpretations of the Zapruder film that are tenuous at best;46 it fails

to account for at least one shot that missed the car;47 and it is riddled with basic inaccuracies such as

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

39. Edward J. Epstein, Inquest (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 2.

40. Ibid., p. 125.

41. Ibid.

42. Edward J. Epstein, "The Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy?," New York Times Magazine, April 20, 1969.

43. Richard Popkin, The Second Oswald (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p. 9 and jacket blurb, back cover.

44. Dick Russell, "Dear President Ford: I Know Who Killed JFK . . . ," Village Voice, September 1, 1975.

45. Compare Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1967), pp. 34- 35, with Olson and Turner, "Photographic

Evidence and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Journal of Forensic Sciences, October 1971.

46. For example, Thompson claims that the precise moment of impact on Governor Connally is ascertainable because the Governor’s right shoulder

slumps, his cheeks puff, and a lock of hair flies up. Six Seconds, pp. 71-75. The shoulder slump would occur coincidentally with the impact of the

bullet; the other signs necessarily would appear an instant after. Yet, the film reveals the shoulder slump at frame 238, with the secondary signs of

impact first appearing in frame 237, before the supposed momentum transfer occurs.

47. Thompson suggests that a fragment from the head shot might have retained enough energy to travel 270 feet, strike a curbstone, and ricochet to

wound a bystander, but adds that "270 feet is a long way for a fragment to fly." Ibid., pp. 230-33.

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the misidentification of a cartridge case first forwarded to the FBI by the Dallas Police (an integral

part of the "theory").48

Of all those critics who began with a desire to help but who wound up damaging their credibility

through irresponsible action, no one has been more of a disappointment than Dr. Cyril Wecht. For

years Dr. Wecht was an outspoken and highly qualified critic of President Kennedy’s autopsy. His

exceptional credentials in forensic pathology were of great value to many critics researching the case.

Then, in 1972, Dr. Wecht applied for and was granted access to the photographs and X rays of

President Kennedy’s body taken during the autopsy. Most critics rejoiced that finally an expert from

"our side" would be allowed to study this long-suppressed evidence.

I had great reservations as to the advisability of Dr. Wecht’s viewing this material. Affirmatively,

there was little that the pictures and X rays could tell because the autopsy itself had been hopelessly

botched. The report of an earlier examination by an expert panel convened at the government’s

behest in 1968 had already revealed enough information to destroy the official reconstruction of the

crime and suggest perjury in the testimony of the autopsy pathologists before the Warren

Commission.49 Thus, I felt that an examination by Dr. Wecht in 1972 could accomplish little and

actually be disserving, because Dr. Wecht, for all his expertise in forensic pathology, was never an

expert on the assassination. I knew that Dr. Wecht was closely advised by critics whom I considered

irresponsible, and I feared the sort of public posture he would assume as a result of their counsels.

When Dr. Wecht solicited my help prior to viewing the pictures and X rays,50 I advised him of my

position51 and received no response. Years later I learned that he was so enraged at my suggestions

of caution that he forbade his panel of "advisers" from ever communicating his findings to me.52

Dr. Wecht’s behavior subsequent to viewing the suppressed photographic material has exceeded

my worst expectations. His early statements and writings sensationalized the fact that President

Kennedy’s brain was missing,53 seriously overrating the evidential value of the brain.54 He initially

chose to temper his remarks about the pictures and X rays themselves by claiming that the

incomplete state of the evidence made a conclusive determination of the source of the shots

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

48. The three cartridge cases found in the Book Depository were given FBI identification numbers C6, C7, and C38. Only two cases were forwarded to

the FBI on the night of the assassination. Thompson, attempting to "excite . . . suspicion" about C6, alleges that C6 was the case initially withheld

from the FBI by the Dallas Police. Ibid., p. 143. However, the evidence establishes beyond question that C38 was the withheld case and that C6 and

C7 were immediately forwarded to the FBI. See CE 717, and 24H262. In support of his assertion that C6 had been withheld, Thompson cites

testimony by Dallas Police Lt. J. C. Day (4H254-55), which was erroneous and was later retracted by Day in a sworn affidavit (7H402). Thompson

does not mention the retraction.

49. See Weisberg, Post Mortem, Part II.

50. Letter from Dr. Cyril H. Wecht to the author, dated July 20, 1972.

51. Letter from author to Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, dated July 26, 1972.

52. Tape of a conference between Dr. Wecht and several Warren Report critics, recorded August 23, 1972. The tape was made available to me by a

participant in the conference. Of my letter, Dr. Wecht stated: "I’m a little too big of a boy to receive a letter from a punk kid like that, you know, 18

year old snotty nose kid." Dr. Wecht also expressed anger that Harold Weisberg disapproved of his examination.

53. "Mystery Cloaks Fate of Brain of Kennedy," New York Times, August 27, 1972, p. 1.

54. Philip Nobile questioned Dr. Wecht about the brain in a nationally syndicated column:

WECHT: The brain has disappeared because it would give us hard physical evidence that the Warren Commission is inaccurate regarding (1) the

number of bullets that struck the president’s head and (2) the direction the bullets came from.

NOBILE: In other words, you think the brain is the key to solving the assassination?

WECHT: Yes, it is.

Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, November 19, 1972, p. 4E.

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impossible.55 However, Dr. Wecht did not hesitate to offer unfounded speculation about the

assassination or the murder of Officer Tippit.56 On one occasion he stated: "I believe the evidence

shows conclusively . . . that the assassination was the work of a conspiracy, and that the Central

Intelligence Agency—the CIA—was definitely involved."57 When Dr. Wecht ultimately reduced his

findings to an article for a medical journal, his position changed, although hardly for the better. He

toned down his earlier caveats about the limits of the medical evidence and concluded that the

available evidence led him to believe that President Kennedy was struck by two bullets from the

rear.58 In my opinion, it was highly irresponsible for Dr. Wecht to announce such a tenuous

conclusion while ignoring the irrefutable evidence that the pictures and X rays destroy the integrity

of all the medical evidence upon which the Warren Report was based—as he himself had testified in

open court years before. In some cases it is difficult to believe that errors in Dr. Wecht’s article

could have been inadvertent. The article casually notes that an X ray of the President’s head

revealed at least three fragments of metal in the left hemisphere of the brain;59 the article also claims

to vouch for the accuracy of the description of the same X ray contained in the report of the 1968

panel review.60 What Dr. Wecht failed to tell his readers is that the 1968 panel stated that there were

no metallic fragments depicted on the X ray to the left of the midline of the head, a finding which,

according to that panel, renders the theory of a frontal shot "not reasonable to postulate."61 If Dr.

Wecht’s observation is correct, he deceived his readers in claiming to verify the earlier panel report

and in failing to note the glaring discrepancy.

Dr. Wecht’s apparent desire to solve a crime that cannot be solved has earned him the dubious

honor of being quoted extensively by defenders of the Warren Report.62 Even the 1975 presidential

commission investigating the CIA cited Dr. Wecht’s testimony and writings to support the notion

that President Kennedy was shot only from behind.63 Dr. Wecht, ostensibly still a "critic," protested

that he had been misrepresented and promised to eat the transcript of his testimony—on the steps of

the White House—if he really said what had been attributed to him.64 Soon Wecht admitted that his

words had merely been used out of context.65 But there would be no eating on the White House

steps; the testimony had already consumed Dr. Wecht.

Facts, not theories, documentation, not speculation, are the only responsible approach to the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

55. See Dr. Wecht’s article in Modern Medicine, November 27, 1972.

56. E.g., see source cited in note 54.

57. National Enquirer, October 15, 1972.

58. In 1972 Dr. Wecht wrote, "So far as the available materials show, there might even have been shots fired from the front and right. . . ." Modern

Medicine, November 27, 1972, p. 31. In 1974 Dr. Wecht wrote: "So far as the available medical evidence shows, all shots were fired from the rear.

No support can be found for theories which postulate gunmen to the front or right-front of the Presidential car." Wecht and Smith, "The Medical

Evidence in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Forensic Science Gazette, April 1974, p. 128.

59. Wecht and Smith, Forensic Science Gazette, April 1974, p. 118.

60. Ibid., p. 114.

61. Report of the Ramsey Clark panel, 1968, p. 12.

62. E.g., see Jacob Cohen, "Conspiracy Fever," Commentary, October 1975. My citation of Cohen’s article should not in any way be construed as an

endorsement of it, for it is a gross and deliberate misstatement of fact, as I documented in collaboration with Jerry Policoff in the Washington Star,

October 26, 1975, Section H.

63. Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975, p. 264.

64. New York Times, June 12, 1975.

65. Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 1975, p. 3-A.

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sordid history of President Kennedy’s murder. The evidence is simply insufficient to allow any

determination of what really happened on November 22, 1963, and a critic attempting to fashion a

solution without respecting the limits of the evidence is doomed to sacrifice his credibility.

The crime remains unsolved, and, as I document here, the federal government played a direct and

deliberate role in assuring that it would remain unsolved. This is a fact far more frightening than

even the most outrageous theory about who committed the crime. It is also intolerable. One of the

few remedies available to the average citizen is to set the record straight, however and wherever it

can be done, in order to lay the foundation for responsible congressional action.

To set the record straight is the purpose of this book. Here I present documented proof of two

points essential to any understanding of the assassination and its official "investigation":

1. Lee Harvey Oswald did not fire any shots in the assassination;

2. The Warren Commission considered no possibility other than that Oswald was the lone

assassin, and consciously endeavored to fabricate a case against Oswald.

It is not the critic’s responsibility to explain the motives of the Commission members or their

staff, or to name assassins and conspirators. The only responsibility of the critic is to deal with the

facts and never to avoid or attempt to modify, without factual basis, the implications of the evidence.

So, when the Commissioners decided in advance that the wrong man was the lone assassin, whatever

their intentions, they protected the real assassins. Through their staff they misinformed the American

people and falsified history. Regardless of whether their false solution to the crime was a "politically

acceptable explanation," they did nothing to rectify the politically "unacceptable" fact. When a

government can get away with what ours did at the death of its president, the presidency and the

people are betrayed.

The assassination of a president is a total negation of the electoral process, which is the very

foundation of democratic institutions. With the Warren Report, the government sacrificed its

credibility, and undermined any legitimate basis the people might have had for confidence in it.

Very simply, a government that disseminates blatant falsehoods about the murder of its chief

executive and frames an innocent man is not accountable to and does not deserve the confidence of

the people.

This is a disquieting reality, but one that must be faced if integrity is to be restored to our

government and its institutions. The government must function properly, with decency, honesty, and

respect for the law. In framing Oswald and exculpating presidential assassins, the Commission

mocked the law and every principle of justice. In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Louis

Brandeis, "In a government of laws, the very existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails

to observe the law scrupulously."66

This book is not a call to the people to lose faith in their government. It is a call to reason, so that

no one will unquestioningly accept governmental assurances without first checking the facts. In the

end we must face reality; we must reckon with truth no matter where it is found.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

66. Dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

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PART I:

THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

A Note on Citations

References to the 26-volume Hearings Before the President’s Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy follow this form: volume number, H, page number; thus, for example, 4H165

refers to volume 4, page 165. Exhibits introduced in evidence before the Commission are designated

CE and a number; CE399, for example, refers to the Commission’s 399th exhibit. References to the

Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1964) follow this form: R, page number; R150, for example indicates

page 150 of the Report. Most references to the Commission’s unpublished files deposited in the

National Archives follow this form: CD, number: page number; CD5:260, for example, indicates

page 260 of Commission Document 5.

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1

Assassination: The Official Case

As stated in its Report, one of the Warren Commission’s main objectives was "to identify the

person or persons responsible for both the assassination of President Kennedy and the killing of

Oswald through an examination of the evidence" (Rxiv). Accordingly, the Commission produced

one person whom it claimed to be solely responsible for the assassination: Lee Harvey Oswald

(R18-23). Because the scope of the present study is limited to Oswald’s role in the shooting, it is

vital that we first understand the foundations for the Commission’s conclusion that Oswald was

guilty.

In this chapter I will deal solely with the evidence that is alleged to prove Oswald’s guilt, as

presented in the Report. I will make no attempt to criticize the selection of evidence, but rather will

take the final report at face value, probing its logic and structure so that it can be judged whether the

determination of Oswald’s guilt is warranted by the "facts" set forth.

The first and most vital step in determining who shot at the President involved ascertaining the

location(s) and weapon(s) from which the shots came. In a chapter entitled "The Shots From the

Texas School Book Depository," the Commission "analyzes the evidence and sets forth its

conclusions concerning the source, effect, number and timing of the shots that killed President

Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally" (R61).

The Scene

The scene of the assassination was Dealey Plaza, the so-called heart of Dallas, made up of three

streets that converge at a railroad overpass. At the opposite side of the plaza are several buildings,

many city owned. Along each side leading to the underpass are grassy banks adorned with shrubbery

and masonry structures. Two grassy plots separate the three streets—Elm, Main, and Commerce—

all of which intersect with Houston at the head of the plaza. The shooting occurred as the

Presidential limousine cruised down Elm Street toward the underpass.

One of the major conclusions of the Commission is that the shots "were fired from the sixth floor

window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository" (R18), a book warehouse

located on the northwest corner of Elm and Houston. (Oswald was employed in this building.)

Several factors influenced this conclusion.

- 25 -

The Report first calls upon the witnesses who indicated in some way that the shots originated from

this source. It refers to two spectators who claimed to see "a rifle being fired" from the Depository

window, two others who "saw a rifle in this window immediately after the assassination," and "three

employees of the Depository, observing the parade from the fifth floor," who "heard the shots fired

from the floor immediately above them" (R61).

The Limousine

Discussed next is the presidential automobile (R76-77). On the night of the assassination, Secret

Service agents found two relatively large bullet fragments in the front seat of the car—one consisting

of the nose portion of a bullet, the other a section of the base portion. An examination of the

limousine on November 23 by FBI agents disclosed three very small lead particles on the rug beneath

the left jump seat, which had been occupied by Mrs. Connally, and a small lead residue on the inside

surface of the windshield, with a corresponding series of cracks on the outer surface. All of the

metallic pieces were compared by spectrographic analysis by the FBI and "found to be similar in

metallic composition, but it was not possible to determine whether two or more of the fragments

came from the same bullet." The physical characteristics of the windshield damage indicated that it

was struck on the inside surface from behind, by a bullet fragment traveling at "fairly high velocity."

Ballistics

In a crime involving firearms, the ballistics evidence is always of vital importance. This was

especially true of the ballistics evidence adduced by the Commission relating to the President’s

murder. As used in the Report, this evidence seems to have a clarifying effect, bringing together

loose ends and creating a circumstantial but superficially persuasive case. The relevant discussion is

summarized in the Report as follows, based on unanimous expert testimony:

The nearly whole bullet found on Governor Connally’s stretcher at Parkland Memorial Hospital [the President

and the Governor were rushed to this hospital after the shooting] and the two bullet fragments found on the front

seat of the Presidential limousine were fired from the 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth

floor of the Depository Building to the exclusion of all other weapons.

The three used cartridge cases found near the window on the sixth floor at the southeast corner of the building

were fired from the same rifle which fired the above-described bullet and fragments, to the exclusion of all other

weapons. (R18)

Here the Commission has related a rifle and three spent cartridge cases found at the scene of the

crime to a bullet found in a location presumably occupied by Governor Connally as well as to

fragments found in the car in which both victims rode. The circumstantial aspect of the ballistics

evidence presented by the Commission is this: it does not directly relate the weapon to a specific

shooter nor the bullet specimens to a specific victim’s body.

Autopsy

An autopsy is a central piece of evidence in violent or unnatural death. In the case of death by

gunshot wounds, an autopsy can reveal a wealth of information, indicating the type(s) of ammunition

used by the assailant(s), as well as the general relationship of the gun to the victim’s body. Bullets or

fragments found in the body can sometimes conclusively establish the specific weapon used in the

crime. The medical evidence used by the Commission emanated from (a) the doctors who observed

- 26 -

the President’s and the Governor’s wounds at Parkland Hospital, (b) the autopsy on the President

performed at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland, on the night of the assassination, (c) the

clothing worn by the two victims, and (d) ballistics tests conducted with the Carcano found in the

Depository and ammunition of the same type as that found in the hospital and the car. From this

information the Commission drew the following conclusions:

The nature of the bullet wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally and the location of

the car at the time of the shots establish that the bullets were fired from above and behind the Presidential

limousine, striking the President and the Governor as follows:

(1) President Kennedy was first struck by a bullet which entered at the back of his neck and exited through the

lower front portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily have been lethal. The President

was struck a second time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his head, causing a massive and fatal

wound.

(2) Governor Connally was struck by a bullet which entered on the right side of his back and travelled

downward through the right side of his chest, exiting below his right nipple. This bullet then passed through his

right wrist and entered his left thigh where it caused a superficial wound. (R18-19)

For each set of wounds, the Report cites ballistics tests in support of the notion that the injuries

observed were consistent with bullets fired from the Carcano (R87, 91, 94-95). In two instances it is

asserted that the tests further indicated that the wounds could have been produced by the bullet

specimens traceable to the specific Carcano found in the Depository, as opposed to merely being

consistent with a similar rifle firing similar ammunition (R87, 95).

The Trajectory

"The trajectory" is the next topic of discussion in the Report, which says: " . . . to insure that all

data were consistent with the shots having been fired from the sixth floor window, the Commission

requested additional investigation, including analysis of motion picture films of the assassination and

on-site tests" (R96). The films referred to by the Commission were those taken of the assassination

by spectators Abraham Zapruder, Orville Nix, and Mary Muchmore. Only Zapruder’s film, taken

from the President’s side of the street, provided a photographic record of the entire shooting.

(Zapruder’s position is shown in the sketch of Dealey Plaza.)

Motion picture footage is composed of a series of still pictures called "frames" taken in extremely

rapid succession which, when projected at approximately the same speed of exposure, create the

illusion of motion. The frames of the Zapruder film were numbered by the FBI for convenient

reference, and it is not until frame 130 that the President’s car appears in the film. From that point

on, this is basically what we see in terms of frames: The car continues down Elm for a brief period,

gradually approaching a road sign that loomed in Zapruder’s view. At frame 210, President Kennedy

goes out of view behind this sign. Governor Connally, also temporarily blocked from Zapruder’s

sight, first reappears in frame 222. At 225 the President comes into view again, and he has obviously

been wounded, for his face has a grimace and his hands are rising toward his chin. Within about ten

frames, the Governor is struck; he manifests a violent reaction. In the succeeding frames we see

Mrs. Kennedy reach over to help her husband, her attention temporarily diverted by Connally, who is

screaming. Finally, at frame 313, the President is struck in the head, as can be clearly seen by the

great rupturing of skull and brain tissues. Mrs. Kennedy scrambles frantically onto the trunk of the

limousine and is forced back into her seat by a Secret Service agent who had run to the car from the

follow-up vehicle. Subsequent to the head shot, the limousine accelerated in its approach toward the

underpass. Once the car is out of view, the film stops. The Nix and Muchmore films depict

sequences immediately before, during, and after the head shot.

- 27 -

Examination of Zapruder’s camera by the FBI established that an average of 18.3 film frames was

exposed during each second of operation; thus the timing of certain events could be calculated by

allowing 1/18.3 seconds for the action depicted from one frame to the next. Tests of the "assassin’s"

rifle disclosed that at least 2.3 seconds (or 41-42 film frames) were required between shots (R97).

The on-site tests were conducted by the FBI and Secret Service in Dealey Plaza on May 24, 1964.

A car simulating the Presidential limousine was driven down Elm Street, as depicted in the various

assassination films, with stand-ins occupying the general positions of the President and the Governor.

An agent situated in the sixth-floor window tracked the car through the telescopic sight on the

Carcano as the assassin allegedly did on November 22. Films depicting the "assassin’s view" were

made through the rifle scope (R97). During these tests it was ascertained that the foliage of a live

oak tree would have blocked a sixth-floor view of the President during his span of travel

corresponding to frames 166 through 210. An opening among the leaves permitted viewing the

President’s back at frame 186, for a duration of about 1/18 second (R98).

The Commission concluded that the first shot to wound the President in the neck occurred

between frames 210 to 225, largely because (a) a sixth-floor gunman could not have shot at the

President for a substantial time prior to 210 because of the tree, and (b) the President seems to show

an obvious reaction to his neck wounds at 225. Exact determination of the time of impact was

prevented because Mr. Kennedy was blocked from Zapruder’s view by a road sign from 210 to 224

(R98, 105).

The Report next argues that the trajectory from the sixth-floor window strongly indicated that a

bullet exiting from the President’s throat and traveling at a substantial velocity would not have

missed both the car and its occupants. No damage to the limousine was found consistent with the

impact of such a missile. "Since [the bullet] did not hit the automobile, [FBI expert] Frazier testified

that it probably struck Governor Connally," says the Report, adding, "The relative positions of

President Kennedy and Governor Connally at the time when the President was struck in the neck

confirm that the same bullet probably passed through both men" (R105). The evidence allegedly

supporting this double-hit theory is then discussed, and the Commission concludes that one bullet

probably was responsible for all the nonfatal wounds to the two victims (R19).

Number of Shots

"The weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots fired," declares the Report (R19).

This conclusion is based not so much on witness recollections as on the physical evidence at the

scene—namely, the presence of three cartridge cases (R110-11). The Commission reasons that,

because (a) one shot passed through the President’s neck and probably went on to wound the

Governor, (b) a subsequent shot penetrated the President’s head, (c) no other shot struck the car, and

(d) three shots were fired, "it follows that one shot probably missed the car and its occupants. The

evidence is inconclusive as to whether it was the first, second, or third shot which missed" (R111).

Time Span

Determination of the time span of the shots, according to the Commission’s theory, is dependent

on which of the three shots missed. As calculated by use of the Zapruder film, the time span from the

first shot to wound the President to the one that killed him was 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Had the missed

shot occurred between these two, says the Report, all the shots could still have been fired from the

Carcano, which required at least 2.3 seconds (or 42 frames) between successive shots. If the first or

third shots missed, the time span grows to at least 7.1 to 7.9 seconds for the three shots.

- 28 -

Thus, the Commission concluded

that the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired from the sixth-floor

window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository Building. Two bullets probably caused all

the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Since the preponderance of the evidence

indicated that three shots were fired, the Commission concluded that one shot probably missed the Presidential

limousine and its occupants, and that the three shots were fired in a time period ranging from approximately 4.8

to in excess of 7 seconds. (R117)

The Assassin

In a preface to its discussion of the evidence relevant to the identity of President Kennedy’s

assassin, the Report adds a new conclusion to those of its preceding chapter. Here it asserts not only

that it has established the source of the shots as the specific Depository window, but also "that the

weapon which fired [the] bullets was a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5-millimeter Italian rifle bearing the

serial number C2766" (R118). Although it had previously traced the found bullet specimens to this

rifle discovered in the Depository, the Report never specifically concluded that these bullets were

responsible for the wounds. Making such an assertion at this point provided the premise for

associating the owner of that rifle with the murder.

Who owned the rifle? The Report announces:

Having reviewed the evidence that (1) Lee Harvey Oswald purchased the rifle used in the assassination [although

the name under which the rifle was ordered was "A. Hidell," the order forms were in Oswald’s handwriting

(R118-119)], (2) Oswald’s palmprint was on the rifle in a position which shows that he had handled it while it

was disassembled, (3) fibers found on the rifle most probably came from the shirt Oswald was wearing on the day

of the assassination [although the Commission’s expert felt that these fibers had been picked up "in the recent

past," he could not say definitely how long they had adhered to the rifle (R125)]. The Commission never

considered the possibility that they were deposited on the rifle subsequent to Oswald’s arrest.], (4) a photograph

taken in the yard of Oswald’s apartment shows him holding this rifle [the photographic expert could render no

opinion as to whether the rifle shown in these pictures was the C2766 and not another rifle of the same

configuration (R127)], and (5) the rifle was kept among Oswald’s possessions from the time of its purchase until

the day of the assassination [The Commission cites no evidence that the specific C2766 rifle was in Oswald’s

possession.], the Commission concluded that the rifle used to assassinate President Kennedy and wound

Governor Connally was owned and possessed by Lee Harvey Oswald. (R129)

At this point the Commission has related Oswald to the President’s murder in two ways. It has

posited the source of the shots at a location accessible to Oswald, and has named as the assassination

weapon a rifle purchased and possibly possessed by Oswald. This, although circumstantial,

obviously laid the foundation for the ultimate conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. Now his

activities on the day of the shooting had to be considered in light of this charge.

In a section headed "The Rifle in the Building," the Report takes up the problem of how the

C2766 rifle was brought into the Depository. The search for an answer was not difficult for the

Commission. Between Thursday night, November 21, and Friday morning, Oswald had engaged in

what could have been construed as incriminating behavior. As the Report explains,

During October and November of 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald lived in a roominghouse in Dallas while his wife

and children lived in Irving, at the home of Ruth Paine, approximately 15 miles from Oswald’s place of work at

the . . . Depository. Oswald travelled between Dallas and Irving on weekends in a car driven by a neighbor of the

Paine’s, Buell Wesley Frazier, who also worked at the Depository. Oswald generally would go to Irving on

Friday afternoon and return to Dallas Monday morning. (R129)

- 29 -

On Thursday, November 21, Oswald asked Frazier whether he could ride home with him to Irving

that afternoon, saying that he had to pick up some curtain rods for his apartment. The Report would

lead us to believe that Oswald’s Irving visit on the day prior to the assassination was a departure

from his normal schedule. Adding further suspicion to this visit, the Report asserts "It would appear,

however, that obtaining curtain rods was not the purpose of Oswald’s trip to Irving on November

21," noting that Oswald’s apartment, according to his landlady, did not need curtains or rods, and no

curtain rods were discovered in the Depository after the assassination (R130).

By seeming to disprove Oswald’s excuse for the weekday trip to Irving, the Report establishes a

basis for more sinister explanations; they hinge on the assumption that the rifle was stored in the

Paine garage. Asserting that Oswald had the opportunity to enter the garage Thursday night without

being detected, the Report emphasizes that, by the afternoon of November 22 the rifle was missing

from "its accustomed place." The implication is that Oswald removed it (R130-31).

To top off this progression of hypotheses is the fact that Oswald carried a "long and bulky

package" to work on the morning of the assassination. As he walked to Frazier’s house for a ride to

the Depository, Frazier’s sister, Linnie May Randle, saw him carrying a package that she estimated

to be about 28 inches long and 8 inches wide. Frazier was the next to see the brown paper container,

as he got into the car and again as he and Oswald walked toward the Depository after parking in a

nearby lot. He thought the package was around 2 feet long and 5 or 6 inches wide, recalling that

Oswald held it cupped in his right hand with the upper end wedged in his right armpit. The Report

expresses its apparent exasperation that both Frazier’s and Mrs. Randle’s estimates and descriptions

were of a package shorter than the longest component of the Carcano which, when disassembled, is

34.8 inches in length. It asserts that "Mrs. Randle saw the bag fleetingly" and quotes Frazier as

saying that he paid it little attention, and concludes that the two "are mistaken as to the length of the

bag" (R131-34). Had they not been "mistaken" in their recollections, Oswald’s package could not

have contained the rifle.

"A handmade bag of wrapping paper and tape was found in the southeast corner of the sixth floor

along-side the window from which the shots were fired (R134)," says the Report, citing scientific

evidence that this bag was (a) made from materials obtained in the Depository’s shipping room, and

(b) handled by Oswald so that he left a palmprint and fingerprint on it. After connecting this sack

with the "assassin’s" window and Oswald, the Report attempts a further connection with the rifle by

asserting that some fibers found inside the bag matched some of those which composed the blanket in

which the rifle was allegedly stored, suggesting that perhaps the rifle "picked up the fibers from the

blanket and transferred them to the paper bag." This feeble evidence is all the Commission could

produce to suggest a connection between the rifle and the bag. A Commission staff lawyer, Wesley

Liebeler, called it "very thin."1 Likewise, the Commission asserts that Oswald constructed this bag,

while it presents evidence only that he handled it (R134-37).

One may indeed express concern that, on the basis of the above-cited evidence, the Commission

asserts, "The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusions that" Oswald: "(1) told the

curtain rod story to Frazier to explain both the return to Irving on a Thursday and the obvious bulk of

the package he intended to bring to work the next day," even though no explanation other than the

transporting of the rifle was considered by the Commission (e.g., that perhaps Oswald told the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. "Memorandum re Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report," written on September 6, 1964, by Wesley J. Liebeler, p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as

Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum. This document is available from the National Archives.)

- 30 -

"curtain rod story" to Frazier to cover a personal reason such as making up with his wife, with whom

he had quarreled earlier that week, bringing a large package the following morning to substantiate

the false excuse); "(2) took paper and tape from the wrapping bench of the Depository and fashioned

a bag large enough to carry the disassembled rifle," although no evidence is offered that Oswald ever

constructed the bag; "(3) removed the rifle from the Paine’s garage on Thursday evening," citing no

evidence that it might not have been someone other than Oswald who removed the rifle, if it was ever

there at all; "(4) carried the rifle into the Depository Building, concealed in the bag," even though, to

make this assertion, it had to reject the stories of the only witnesses who saw the package, and could

produce no direct evidence that the rifle had been in the bag; and "(5) left the bag alongside the

window from which the shots were fired," offering no substantiation that it was Oswald who left the

bag in this position (R137). The Commission’s conclusion from this evidence is that "Oswald

carried [his] rifle into the Depository building on the morning of November 22, 1963" (R19),

although the prefabrication of the bag demands premeditation of the murder, and the presence of the

bag by the "assassin’s" window implies, according to the Report, that Oswald brought the rifle to this

window.

Because its logic was faulty, the Commission’s interpretation of "the preponderance of the

evidence" loses substantial foundation. Not one of the five above-quoted subconclusions relating to

the rifle in the building is confirmed by evidence; a conclusive determination is precluded by

insufficient evidence. The most the Commission could fairly have asserted from the facts presented

is that, although there was no conclusive evidence that Oswald brought his rifle to the Depository,

there was likewise no conclusive disproof, that is, the state of the evidence could not dictate a

reliable conclusion.

As the Commission edged toward its ultimate conclusion that Oswald was the lone assassin, it

reached a comfortable position in having concluded that Oswald brought his rifle to the Depository.

It next had to consider the question of Oswald’s presence at the right window at the right time.

Assured that Oswald "worked principally on the first and sixth floors of the building," we learn that

"the Commission evaluated the physical evidence found near the window after the assassination and

the testimony of eyewitnesses in deciding whether Lee Harvey Oswald was present at this window at

the time of the assassination" (R137).

The Report presents only one form of "physical evidence"—fingerprints—asserting that a total of

four of Oswald’s prints were left on two boxes near the window and on the paper sack found in that

area. In evaluating the significance of this evidence,

the Commission considered the possibility that Oswald handled these cartons as part of his normal duties. . . .

Although a person could handle a carton and not leave identifiable prints, none of these employees [who might

have handled the cartons] except Oswald left identifiable prints on the cartons. This finding, in addition to the

freshness of one of the prints . . . led the Commission to attach some probative value to the fingerprint and

palmprint identifications in reaching the conclusion that Oswald was present at the window from which the shots

were fired, although the prints do not establish the exact time he was there. (R141)

The Report’s reasoning is that the presence of Oswald’s prints on objects present at the sixth-floor

window is probative evidence of his presence at this window at some time. Liebeler felt that this

evidence "seems to have very little significance indeed," and pointed out that the absence of other

employees’ fingerprints "does not help to convince me that [Oswald] moved [the boxes] in

connection with the assassination. It shows the opposite just as well."2 Both Liebeler and the Report

- 31 -

avoid the logical, and the only precise, meaning of these fingerprint data: the presence of Oswald’s

prints on the cartons and the bag means only that he handled them; it does not disclose when or

where. Oswald could have touched these objects on the first floor of the Depository prior to the time

when they were moved to their location by the "assassin’s" window, perhaps by another person.

Thus, this evidence does not connect Oswald with the source of the shots and is meaningless,

because Oswald normally handled such cartons in the building as part of his work.

"Additional testimony linking Oswald with the point from which the shots were fired was

provided by the testimony of Charles Givens," the Report continues, "who was the last known

employee to see Oswald inside the building prior to the assassination." According to the Report,

Givens saw Oswald walking away from the southeast corner of the sixth floor at 11:55, 35 minutes

before the shooting (R143). That Oswald was seen where he normally worked such a substantial

amount of the time prior to the shots connects him with nothing except his expected routine. That

"none of the Depository employees is known to have seen Oswald again until after the shooting," if

true, is likewise of little significance, especially since most of the employees had left the building to

view the motorcade.

In its next section relevant to the discussion of "Oswald at Window," the Report—best expressed

in colloquial terms—"pulls a fast one." This section is entitled "Eyewitness Identification of

Assassin," but contains no identification accepted by the Commission (R143-49). The first

eyewitness mentioned is Howard Brennan who, 120 feet from the window, said he saw a man fire at

the President. "During the evening of November 22, Brennan identified Oswald as the person in the

[police] lineup who bore the closest resemblance to the man in the window but said he was unable to

make a positive identification." Prior to this lineup, Brennan had seen Oswald’s picture on

television. In the months before his Warren Commission testimony, Brennan underwent some

serious changes of heart. A month after the assassination he was suddenly positive that the man he

saw was Oswald. Three weeks later, he was again unable to make a positive identification. In two

months, when he appeared before the Commission, he was again ready to swear that the man was

Oswald, claiming to have been capable of such an identification all along. Brennan’s vacillation on

the crucial matter of identifying Oswald renders all of his varying statements unworthy of credence.

The Report recognized the worthlessness of Brennan’s after-the-fact identification, although it

managed to use his testimony for the most it could yield:

Although the record indicates that Brennan was an accurate observer, he declined to make a positive

identification of Oswald when he first saw him in the police lineup. The Commission therefore, does not base its

conclusion concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan’s subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey

Oswald as the man he saw fire the rifle. . . . The Commission is satisfied that . . . Brennan saw a man in the

window who closely resembled . . . Oswald. (R145-46; emphasis added)

If the Commission did not base its conclusion as to Oswald’s presence at the window on Brennan’s

identification, upon whose "eyewitness identification of assassin" did it rely? Under this section it

presents three additional witnesses who saw a man in the window, all of whom gave sketchy

descriptions, and none of whom were able to identify the man. Thus, the Report, having rejected

Brennan’s story, could offer no eyewitness capable of identifying the assassin.

In pulling its "fast one," the Commission sticks to its justified rejection of Brennan’s identification

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. Ibid., p. 7.

- 32 -

for only 11 pages for, when the conclusion to the "Oswald at Window" section is drawn, his

incredible identification is suddenly accepted. Here the Commission concludes "that Oswald, at the

time of the assassination, was present at the window from which the shots were fired" on the basis of

findings stipulated above. One of these "findings" involves "an eyewitness to the shooting" who

"identified Oswald in a lineup as the man most nearly resembling the man he saw and later identified

Oswald as the man he observed" (R156). Through this double standard the Report manifests itself to

be no more credible than Brennan.

"In considering whether Oswald was at the southeast corner window at the time the shots were

fired, the Commission . . . reviewed the testimony of witnesses who saw Oswald in the building

within minutes after the assassination" (R149). Immediately after the shots, Patrolman M. L. Baker,

riding a motorcycle in the procession, drove to a point near the front entrance of the Depository,

entered the building, and sought assistance in reaching the roof, for he "had it in mind that the shots

came from the top of this building." He met manager Roy Truly, and the two ran up the steps toward

the roof. Baker stopped on the second floor and saw Oswald entering the lunchroom there. This

encounter in the lunchroom presented a problem to the Commission:

In an effort to determine whether Oswald could have descended to the lunchroom from the sixth floor by the

time Baker and Truly arrived Commission counsel asked Baker and Truly to repeat their movements from the

time of the shot until Baker came upon Oswald in the lunchroom. . . . On the first test, the elapsed time between

the simulated first shot and Baker’s arrival on the second-floor stair landing was one minute and 30 seconds. The

second test run required one minute and 15 seconds.

A test was also conducted to determine the time required to walk from the southeast corner of the sixth floor

to the second-floor lunchroom by stairway [Oswald could not have used the elevator.]. . . . The first test, run at

normal walking pace, required one minute, 18 seconds; the second test, at a "fast walk" took one minute, 14

seconds. (R152)

Thus, as presented in the Report, these tests could prove that Oswald was not at the sixth-floor

window, for had his time of descent been one minute, 18 seconds and Baker’s time of ascent been

one minute, 14 seconds, Oswald would have arrived at the lunchroom after Baker, which was not the

case on November 22. Recognizing this, the Report assures us that the reconstruction of Baker’s

movements was invalid in that it failed to simulate actions that would have lengthened Baker’s time.

Thus, it is able to conclude "that Oswald could have fired the shots and still have been present in the

second floor lunchroom when seen by Baker and Truly" (R152-53).

Here the Commission is playing games. It tells us that its reconstructions could support or destroy

the assumption of Oswald’s presence at the window. This point is crucial in determining the identity

of the assassin, for it could potentially have provided Oswald with an alibi. Instead of conducting the

tests properly, the Commission tells us that it neglected to simulate some of Baker’s actions, and on

the premise that its test was invalid, draws a conclusion incriminating Oswald. One of the factors

mentioned by the Report as influencing the conclusion that Oswald was at the window is that his

actions after the assassination "are consistent with" his having been there. Because the premise of an

invalid reconstruction makes debatable any inferences drawn from it, and because Oswald’s actions

after the shooting were consistent with his having been almost anywhere in the building, this aspect

of the Report’s conclusion is a non sequitur.

The Report ultimately attempts to combine its four logically deficient arguments in support of the

conclusion that Oswald was present during the assassination at the window from which the shots

were fired. The facts presented are not sufficient to support such a conclusion. The fingerprint

evidence does not place Oswald at that window, for the objects on which he left prints were mobile

and therefore may have been in a location other than the window when he handled them. That

someone saw Oswald near this area 35 minutes before the shots does not mean he was there during

- 33 -

the shots, nor does the alleged fact that no one else saw Oswald eliminate the possibility of his

having been elsewhere. The one witness who claimed to have seen Oswald in the window could do

so only at intervals, rendering his story incredible. Oswald’s actions after the assassination do not

place him at any specific location during the shots and might even preclude his having been at the

window.

The only fair conclusion from the facts presented is that there is no evidence that Oswald was at

the window at the time of the assassination.

At this point in the development of the Commission’s case, Oswald "officially" possessed the

murder weapon, brought it to the Depository on the day of the assassination, and was present at the

"assassin’s" window during the shots. There would seem to be only one additional consideration

relevant to the proof of his guilt: his capability with a rifle. This issue is addressed only after several

unrelated matters are considered.

The Commission’s conclusion that Oswald was the assassin is not based on a constant set of

considerations. The chapter "The Assassin" draws its conclusion from eight factors (R195). The

chapter "Summary and Conclusions" omits two of these factors and adds another. The eight-part

conclusion states that:

On the basis of the evidence reviewed in this chapter the Commission has found that Lee Harvey Oswald (1)

owned and possessed the rifle used to kill President Kennedy and wound Governor Connally, (2) brought this

rifle to the Depository Building on the morning of the assassination, (3) was present, at the time of the

assassination, at the window from which the shots were fired, (4) killed Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit in an

apparent attempt to escape, (5) resisted arrest by drawing a fully loaded pistol and attempting to shoot another

police officer, (6) lied to the police after his arrest concerning important substantive matters, (7) attempted, in

April 1963, to kill Major General Edwin A. Walker, and (8) possessed the capability with a rifle which would

have enabled him to commit the assassination. On the basis of these findings the Commission has concluded that

Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy. (R195)

Obviously, considerations 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not relate to the question of whether Oswald did or did

not pull the trigger of the gun that killed the President and wounded the Governor. In the alternate

version of the Commission’s conclusions, 4 and 5 are omitted from the factors upon which the guilty

"verdict" is based. Added in this section is the consideration that the Mannlicher-Carcano and the

paper sack were found on the sixth floor subsequent to the shooting (R19-20).

"In deciding whether Lee Harvey Oswald fired the shots . . .," says the Report, "the Commission

considered whether Oswald, using his own rifle, possessed the capability to hit his target with two out

of three shots under the conditions described in Chapter III [concerning the source of the shots]"

(R189). The Commission’s previous conclusions leave little room for an assertion other than one

indicating that Oswald had the capability to fire the assassination shots. If he could not have done

this from lack of sufficient skill, the other factors seeming to relate him to the assassination will have

to be accounted for by some other explanation.

First considered under this section is the nature of the shots (R189-91). Several experts are quoted

as saying that the shots, fired at ranges of 177 to 266 feet and employing a four-power scope, were

"not . . . particularly difficult" and "very easy." However, in no case did the experts take into account

the time element involved in the assassination shots. Without this consideration, Wesley Liebeler

could not understand the basis for any conclusion on the nature of the shots. He wrote:

The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the effect of a telescopic sight.

Several experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however, no consideration given here to the time

- 34 -

allowed for the shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy or hard unless he knows

something about how long the firer has to shoot, i.e., how much time is allotted for the shots.3

Liebeler’s criticism had no effect on the final report, which ignores the time question in evaluating

the nature of the shots. The evaluation of the shots as "easy" should therefore be considered void and

all inferences based on it at best questionable.

In considering "Oswald’s Marine Training," the Report deceives its readers by use of common and

frequent non sequiturs. First it includes, as relevant to Oswald’s rifle capability, his training in the

use of weapons other than rifles, such as pistols and shotguns. Of this Liebeler said bluntly, "That is

completely irrevelant to the question of his ability to fire a rifle. . . . It is, furthermore, prejudicial to

some extent."4 The Report then reveals with total dispassion Oswald’s official Marine Corps

evaluation based on firing tests: when first tested in the Marines, Oswald was "a fairly good shot";

on the basis of his last recorded test he was a "rather poor shot." A Marine marksmanship expert

who had absolutely no association with Oswald is next quoted as offering various excuses for the

"poor shot" rating, including bad weather and lack of motivation. No substantiation in any form is

put forth to buttress these "excuses." As the record presented in the Report stands, Oswald left the

Marines a "fairly poor shot." However, the unqualified use of the expert’s unsubstantiated

hypothesizing gives the impression that Oswald was not such a "poor shot." On the basis of this

questionable premise, the Report quotes more experts who, in meaningless comparisons, contradicted

the official evaluation of Oswald’s performance with a rifle and called him "a good to excellent shot"

(R191-92). One may indeed question the state of our national "defense" when "rather poor shots"

from the Marines are considered "excellent" marksmen.

In discussing "Oswald’s Rifle Practice Outside the Marines" (R192-93), the Report cites a total of

11 instances in which Oswald could be physically associated with a firearm. Most of these instances

involved hunting trips, six of which took place in the Soviet Union. However, as Liebeler pointed

out in his critical memorandum, Oswald used a shotgun when hunting in Russia. Liebeler’s concern

can be sensed in his question "Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun

under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of that?"5 The

latest time the Report places a weapon in Oswald’s hands is May 1963, when his wife, Marina, said

he practiced operating the bolt and looking through the scope on a screened porch at night. Liebeler

thought "the support for that proposition is thin indeed," adding that "Marina Oswald first testified

that she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly led into the only answer

that gives any support to this proposition."6 The Report evoked its own support, noting that the

cartridge cases found in the Depository "had been previously loaded and ejected from the

assassination rifle, which would indicate that Oswald practiced opening the bolt." Marks on these

cases could not show that Oswald, to the exclusion of all other people, loaded and ejected the cases.

In the end, the Commission was able to cite only two instances in which Oswald handled the

Carcano, both based on Marina’s tenuous assertions. It produced no evidence that Oswald ever fired

his rifle. Despite this and the other major gaps in its arguments, the Report concludes that "Oswald’s

Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience and his established familiarity with this

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

3. Ibid., p. 20.

4. Ibid., p. 21 .

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 22.

- 35 -

particular weapon show that he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination" (R195).

Because the Report offers no evidence to support it, this conclusion is necessarily dishonest.

Liebeler cautioned the Commission on this point but was apparently ignored. He wrote:

The statements concerning Oswald’s practice with the assassination weapon are misleading. They tend to

give the impression that he did more practicing than the record suggests he did. My recollection is that there is

only one specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this area, because the

Commission is going to have its work in this area examined very closely.7

That a shooter can be only as good as the weapon he fires is a much-repeated expression. In fact,

the proficiency of the shooter and the quality of his shooting apparatus combine to affect the outcome

of the shot. To test the accuracy of the assassination rifle, the Commission did not put the weapon in

the hands of one whose marksmanship was as "poor" as Oswald’s and whose known practice prior to

firing was virtually nil. Its test firers were all experts—men whose daily routines involved working

with and shooting firearms. Liebeler, as a member of the Commission’s investigatory staff, was one

of the severest critics of the rifle tests. The following paragraphs, again from Liebeler’s

memorandum, provide a good analysis of those tests as represented in the Report:

As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15 different sets of three shots were fired by

supposedly expert riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took

a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time

calculated is commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time it took to fire two

remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting the time

consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I recall that Chapter Three said that the minimum

time that had to elapse between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by

Frazier of the FBI.

The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire 3 shots with two hits in from 4.8 to 5.6

seconds. Of the fifteen sets of three shots described above, only three were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of

five sets, including the three just mentioned, were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The conclusion at its most

extreme states Oswald could fire faster than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in any

event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 out of their 15 tries. . . .

The problems raised by the above analysis should be met at some point in the text of the Report. The figure

of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot is used throughout Chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle

capability shows that expert riflemen could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts

managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts, were high and to the right of the target. The

fact is that most of the experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever be expected to be,

and the record indicates that fact.8

Despite the obvious meaning of Liebeler’s analysis, the rifle tests are used in the Report to buttress

the notion that it was within Oswald’s capability to fire the assassination shots (R195). The kindest

thing that can be said of this one-sided presentation of the evidence was written by Liebeler himself:

"To put it bluntly, that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and

credibility of the entire Report. . . . These conclusions will never be accepted by critical persons

anyway."9

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

7. Ibid., p. 21.

8. Ibid., p. 23.

9. Ibid., p. 25.

- 36 -

The only possible conclusion warranted by the evidence set forth in the Report is that Oswald left

the Marines a "rather poor shot" and, unless a major aspect of his life within a few months prior to

the assassination has been so well concealed as not to emerge through the efforts of several

investigative teams, he did not engage in any activities sufficient to improve his proficiency with his

weapon to the extent of enabling him to murder the President and wound the Governor unaided.

This is the official case, the development of the "proof" that Oswald, alone and unaided,

committed the assassination. To avoid the detailed discussion required for a rebuttal, I have assumed

that the source of the shots was as the Commission postulated—the sixth-floor window of the

Depository, from "Oswald’s rifle."

This was as far as the Commission could go in relation to the question of Oswald’s guilt.

Obviously, the use of his rifle in the crime does not mean he fired it. The Commission offers, in

essence, no evidence that Oswald brought his rifle to the Depository, no evidence that Oswald was

present at the window during the shots, and no evidence that Oswald had the capability to have fired

the shots. This is not to say that such evidence does not exist, but that none is presented in the

Report. That, for the scope of this chapter’s analysis, is significant.

The Commission’s conclusion that Oswald was the assassin is invalid because it is, from

beginning to end, a non sequitur. This analysis of the derivation of that conclusion, based solely on

the evidence presented in the Report, demonstrates that evidence to be without logical relationship,

used by the Commission in total disregard of logic. The Report’s continued fabrication of false

premises from which are drawn invalid inferences is consistent with one salient factor: that the

Commission evaluated the evidence relating to the assassin’s identity on the presumption that

Oswald alone was guilty.

- 37 -

2

Presumed Guilty: The Official Disposition

The discussion in chapter 1 did not disprove the Commission’s conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald

assassinated President Kennedy. It merely showed that, based on the evidence presented in the

Report, Oswald’s guilt was presumed, not established. The Commission argued a case that is logical

only on the premise that Oswald alone was guilty.

The official assurance is, as is to be expected, the opposite. In the Foreword to its Report, the

Commission assures us that it "has functioned neither as a court presiding over an adversary

proceeding nor as a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a fact finding agency committed to

the ascertainment of the truth" (Rxiv). This is to say that neither innocence nor guilt was presumed

from the outset of the inquiry, in effect stating that the Commission conducted a "chips-fall-wherethey-

may" investigation.

At no time after a final bullet snuffed out the life of the young President did any agency conduct

an investigation not based on the premise of Oswald’s guilt. Despite the many noble assurances of

impartiality, the fact remains that from the time when he was in police custody, Oswald was

officially thought to be Kennedy’s sole assassin. In violation of his every right and as a guarantee

that virtually no citizen would think otherwise, the official belief of Oswald’s guilt was shamefully

offered to a public grieved by the violent death of its leader, and anxious to find and prosecute the

perpetrator of the crime.

The Police Presumption

Two days after the assassination, the New York Times ran a banner headline that read, in part,

"Police Say Prisoner is the Assassin," with a smaller—but likewise front-page—heading, "Evidence

Against Oswald Described as Conclusive." The article quoted Captain Will Fritz of the Dallas Police

Homicide Bureau as having said, "We’re convinced beyond any doubt that he killed the President. . .

. I think the case is cinched."1

- 38 -

Other newspapers echoed the Times that day. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported: "Police on

Saturday said they have an airtight case against pro-Castro Marxist Lee Harvey Oswald as the

assassin of President Kennedy."2 On the front page of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was the headline

"Dallas Police Insist Evidence Proves Oswald Killed Kennedy."

Dallas police said today that Lee Harvey Oswald . . . assassinated President John F. Kennedy and they have

the evidence to prove it. . . . "The man killed President Kennedy. We are convinced without any doubt that he

did the killing. There were no accomplices," [Captain] Fritz asserted.

Police Chief Jesse E. Curry outlined this web of evidence that, he said, showed Oswald was the sniper.3

The following day, November 25, was the occasion for yet another banner headline in the Times.

In one fell swoop, there was no longer any doubt; it was no longer just the Dallas police who were

prematurely convinced of Oswald’s guilt. "President’s Assassin Shot to Death in Jail Corridor by a

Dallas Citizen," the headline proclaimed. There was no room for such qualifiers as "alleged" or

"accused." Yet, in this very issue, the Times included a strong editorial that criticized the police

pronouncement of guilt:

The Dallas authorities, abetted and encouraged by the newspaper, TV and radio press, trampled on every

principle of justice in their handling of Lee Harvey Oswald. . . . The heinousness of the crime Oswald was

alleged to have committed made it doubly important that there be no cloud over the establishment of his guilt.

Yet—before any indictment had been returned or any evidence presented and in the face of continued denials

by the prisoner—the chief of police and the district attorney pronounced Oswald guilty.4

It is unfortunate that this proper condemnation applies equally to the source that issued it.

Transcripts of various police interviews and press conferences over the weekend of the

assassination (which confirm the above newspaper accounts) demonstrate that, in addition to forming

a bias against Oswald through the press, the police made extensive use of the electronic media to

spread their improper and premature conclusion.

On Friday night, November 22, NBC-TV broadcast a press interview with District Attorney Henry

Wade, whose comments included these: "I figure we have sufficient evidence to convict him"

[Oswald] . . . there’s no one else but him (24H751). The next day, Chief Curry, though he cautioned

that the evidence was not yet "positive," said that he was convinced. In an interview carried by NBC,

Curry asserted, "Personally, I think we have the right man" (24H754). In another interview broadcast

by local station WFAA-TV, Curry was asked, "Is there any doubt in your mind, Chief, that Oswald is

the man who killed the President?" His response was: "I think this is the man who killed the

President" (24H764). In another interview that Saturday, Captain Fritz made the absolute statement:

There is only one thing that I can tell you without going into the evidence before first talking to the District

Attorney. I can tell you that this case is cinched—that this man killed the President. There’s no question in my

mind about it. . . . I don’t want to get into the evidence. I just want to tell you that we are convinced beyond any

doubt that he did the killing. (24H787)

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. New York Times, November 24, 1963, p. 1.

2. Philadelphia Inquirer, November 24, 1963.

3. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 24, 1963.

4. New York Times, November 25, 1963, p. 18.

- 39 -

By November 24, Curry’s remarks became much stronger. Local station KRLD-TV aired this

remark: "This is the man, we are sure, that murdered the patrolman and murdered—assassinated the

President (24H772)." Fritz stuck to his earlier conviction that Oswald was the assassin (24H788).

Now D.A. Henry Wade joined in pronouncing the verdict before trial or indictment:

WADE: I would say that without any doubt he’s the killer—the law says beyond a reasonable doubt and to a

moral certainty which I—there’s no question that he was the killer of President Kennedy.

Q. That case is closed in your mind?

WADE: As far as Oswald is concerned yes. (24H823)

The FBI Presumption

That same day the FBI announced, contrary to the police assertion, that the case was still open and

that its investigation, begun the day of the shooting, would continue.5 This continued investigation

climaxed after a duration just short of three weeks. In a series of contrived news "leaks," the Bureau

added to the propaganda campaign started by the Dallas Police.

The decision of the FBI and the Commission was to keep the first FBI Summary Report on the

assassination secret.6 However, even prior to the completion of this report, the newspapers carried

frequent "leaked" stories telling in advance what the report would contain. The Commission met in

executive session on December 5, 1963, and questioned Deputy Attorney General Nicholas

Katzenbach about these leaks. Katzenbach spoke bluntly. FBI Director Hoover, he related, denied

that the leaks originated within the FBI, but "I say with candor to this committee, I can’t think of

anybody else it could have come from, because I don’t know of anybody else that knew that

information."7

On December 9, Katzenbach transmitted the completed FBI Report to the Commission. In his

covering letter of that date, he again expressed the Justice Department’s desire to keep the Report

secret, although he felt that "the Commission should consider releasing—or allowing the Department

of Justice to release—a short press statement which would briefly make the following points."

Katzenbach wanted the Commission to assure the public that the FBI had turned up no evidence of

conspiracy and that "the FBI report through scientific examination of evidence, testimony and

intensive investigation, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald shot President

Kennedy."8

Although the Commission released no such statement, the conclusions of which the Justice

Department felt the public should be informed were widely disseminated by the press, through leaks

which, according to Katzenbach, must have originated with the FBI. On December 1, the

Washington Post in a major article told its readers that "all the police agencies with a hand in the

investigation . . . insist that [the case against Oswald] is an unshakable one."9 Time magazine, in the

week before the FBI report was forwarded to the Commission, said of the report, "it will indicate that

Oswald, acting in his own lunatic loneliness, was indeed the President’s assassin."10 Newsweek

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

5. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 24, 1963, p. 2.

6. Transcript of the December 5, 1963, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, pp. 10-11.

7. Ibid., p. 8.

8. Letter from Nicholas Katzenbach to Chief Justice Warren, dated December 9, 1963. This letter is available from the National Archives.

9. Washington Post, December 1, 1963.

- 40 -

reported that "the report holds to the central conclusion that Federal and local probers had long since

reached: that Oswald was the assassin."11 The New York Times was privy to the most specific leak

concerning the FBI report. On December 10 it ran a front-page story headed "Oswald Assassin

Beyond a Doubt, FBI Concludes." This article, by Joseph Loftus, began as follows:

A Federal Bureau of Investigation report went to a special Presidential commission today and named Lee H.

Oswald as the assassin of President Kennedy.

The Report is known to emphasize that Oswald was beyond doubt the assassin and that he acted alone. . . .

The Department of Justice, declining all comment on the content of the report, announced only that on

instruction of President Johnson the report was sent directly to the special Commission.12

All of these news stories, especially that which appeared in the Times, accurately reflect those

findings of the FBI report which Katzenbach felt should be made public. The FBI has long claimed

that it does not draw conclusions in its reports. The FBI report on the assassination disproves this

one of many FBI myths. This report does draw conclusions, as the press reported. In the preface to

this once-secret report (released in 1965), the FBI stated:

Part I briefly relates the assassination of the President and the identification of Oswald as his slayer.

Part II sets forth the evidence conclusively showing that Oswald did assassinate the President. (CD 1)

The Commission, in secret executive sessions, expressed its exasperation at the leak of the FBI

report. On December 16, Chairman Warren stated:

CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, to be very frank about it, I have read that report two or three times and I

have not seen anything in there yet that has not been in the press.

SEN. RUSSELL: I couldn’t agree with that more. I have read it through once very carefully, and I went

through it again at places I had marked, and practically everything in there has come out in the press at one time

or another, a bit here and a bit there.13

It should be noted here that even a casual reading of this FBI report and its sequel, the

"Supplemental Report" dated January 13, 1964, discloses that neither establishes Oswald’s guilt, nor

even adequately accounts for all the known facts of the assassination. In neither report is there

mention of or accounting for the President’s anterior neck wound which, by the night of November

22, was public knowledge around the world. The Supplemental Report, in attempting to associate

Oswald with the crime, asserts that a full-jacketed bullet traveling at approximately 2,000 feet per

second stopped short after penetrating "less than a finger length" of the President’s back. One need

not be an expert to discern that this is an impossible event, and indeed later tests confirmed that

seventy-two inches of flesh were insufficient to stop such a bullet (5H78). The Commission

members themselves, in private, grumbled about the unsatisfactory nature of the FBI report, as the

following passage from the December 16 Executive Session reveals:

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

10. Time, December 13, 1963, p. 26.

11. Newsweek, December 16, 1963, p. 26.

12. New York Times, December 10, 1963, p. 1.

13. Transcript of the December 16, 1963, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, p. 11.

- 41 -

MR. MC CLOY: . . . The grammar is bad and you can see they did not polish it all up. It does leave you

some loopholes in this thing but I think you have to realize they put this thing together very fast.

REP. BOGGS: There’s nothing in there about Governor Connally.

CHAIRMAN: No.

SEN. COOPER: And whether or not they found any bullets in him.

MR. MC CLOY: This bullet business leaves me confused.

CHAIRMAN: It’s totally inconclusive.14

Thus, by January 1964, the American public had been assured by both the Dallas Police and the

FBI that Oswald was the assassin beyond all doubt. For those who had not taken the time to probe

the evidence, who were not aware of its inadequacies and limitations, such a conclusion was easy to

accept.

The Commission Presumption

Today there can be no doubt that, despite their assurances of impartiality, the Commission and its

staff consciously planned and executed their work under the presumption that Oswald was guilty.

The once-secret working papers of the Commission explicitly reveal the prejudice of the entire

investigation.

General Counsel Rankin did not organize a staff of lawyers under him until early in January 1964.

Until that time, the Commission had done essentially no work, and had merely received investigative

reports from other agencies. Now, Rankin and Warren drew up the plans for the organization of the

work that the staff was to undertake for the Commission. In a "Progress Report" dated January 11,

from the Chairman to the other members, Warren referred to a "tentative outline prepared by Mr.

Rankin which I think will assist in organizing the evaluation of the investigative materials received

by the Commission."15 [see Appendix A — ratitor] Two subject headings in this outline are of

concern here: "(2) Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy; (3) Lee Harvey

Oswald: Background and Possible Motives."16 Thus, it is painfully apparent that the Commission

did, from the very beginning, plan its work with a distinct bias. It would evaluate the evidence from

the perspective of "Oswald as the assassin," and it would search for his "possible motives."

Attached to Warren’s "Progress Report" was a copy of the "Tentative Outline of the Work of the

President’s Commission." This outline reveals in detail the extent to which the conclusion of

Oswald’s guilt was pre-determined. Section II, "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President

Kennedy," begins by outlining Oswald’s movements on the day of the assassination. Under the

heading "Murder of Tippit," there is the subheading "Evidence demonstrating Oswald’s guilt."17

Even the FBI had refrained from drawing a conclusion as to whether or not Oswald had murdered

Officer Tippit. Yet, at this very early point in its investigation, the Commission was convinced it

could muster "evidence demonstrating Oswald’s guilt."

Another heading under Section II of the outline is "Evidence Identifying Oswald as the Assassin

of President Kennedy," again a presumptive designation made by a commission that had not yet

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

14. Ibid., p. 12.

15. "Progress Report" by Chairman Warren, p. 4, attached to "Memorandum for Members of the Commission" from Mr. Rankin, dated January 11,

1964.

16. The "Tentative Outline of the Work of the President’s Commission" was attached to the memorandum mentioned in note 15.

17. Ibid.

- 42 -

analyzed a single bit to evidence. The listings of evidence under this heading are sketchy and hardly

conclusive, and further reveal the biases of the Commission. Some of the evidence that was to

"identify Oswald as the assassin" was "prior similar acts: a) General Walker attack, b) General

Eisenhower threat."18 Thus we learn that Oswald was also presumed guilty in the attempted shooting

of the right-wing General Walker in April 1963.

Under the additional heading "Evidence Implicating Others in Assassination or Suggesting

Accomplices," the Commission was to consider only the possibility that others worked with Oswald

in planning or executing the assassination. The outline further reveals that it had been concluded in

advance that Oswald had no accomplices, for the last category under this heading suggests that the

evidence be evaluated for the "refutation of allegations."19

The Commission was preoccupied with the question of motive. According to the initial outline of

its work, it had decided to investigate Oswald’s motives for killing the President before it determined

whether Oswald had in fact been involved in the assassination in any capacity. At the executive

session of January 21, 1964, an illuminating discussion took place between Chairman Warren,

General Counsel Rankin, and member Dulles. Dulles wanted to be sure that every possible action

was taken to determine Oswald’s motive:

Mr. Dulles: I suggested to Mr. Rankin, Mr. Chairman, that I thought it would be very useful for us, if the rest

of you agree, that as items come in that deal with motive, and I have seen, I suppose, 20 or 30 of them already in

these various reports, those be pulled together by one of these men, maybe Mr. Rankin himself so that we could

see that which would be so important to us.

Chairman Warren: In other words, to see what we are running down on the question of motive.

Mr. Dulles: Just on the question of motive I found a dozen or more statements of the various people as to

why they thought he [Oswald] did it.

Warren: Yes.

Mr. Dulles: Or what his character was, what his aim, and so forth that go into motive and I think it would be

very useful to pull that together, under one of these headings, not under a separate heading necessarily.

Warren: Well, I think that that would probably come under Mr. [Albert] Jenner, wouldn’t that, Lee [Rankin],

isn’t he the one who is bringing together all the facts concerning the life of Oswald?

Mr. Rankin: Yes, yes. We can get that done. We will see that that is taken care of.

Warren: Yes.20

The staff, working under the direction of Rankin, was likewise predisposed to the conclusion that

Oswald was guilty. Staff lawyer W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum dated January 27

concerning the "timing of rifle shots." He suggested that:

In figuring the timing of the rifle shots, we should take into account the distance travelled by the Presidential

car between the first and third shots. This tends to shorten the time slightly during which Oswald would have had

to pull the trigger three times on his rifle.21 (emphasis added)

At this early point in the investigation, long before any of the relevant testimony had been adduced,

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Transcript of the January 21, 1964, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, pp. 10-11.

21. Memorandum from W. David Slawson to Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin, dated January 27, 1964, "SUBJECT: Time of Rifle Shots," located in the

"Slawson Chrono. File."

- 43 -

Slawson was positive that Oswald "pulled the trigger three times on his rifle."

Another staff lawyer, Arlen Specter, expressed the bias of the investigation in a memorandum,

dated January 30, in which he offered suggestions for the questioning of Oswald’s widow, Marina.

Specter felt that certain questions "might provide some insight on whether Oswald learned of the

motorcade route from newspapers." He added that "perhaps [Oswald] was inspired, in part by

President Kennedy’s anti-Castro speech which was reported on November 19 on the front page of the

Dallas Times Herald.22 The implication here is obvious that the President’s speech "inspired"

Oswald to commit the assassination. Again, it must be emphasized that until Oswald’s guilt was a

proven fact, which it was not at the time these memoranda were composed, it was mere folly to

investigate the factors that supposedly "inspired" Oswald. Such fraudulent investigative efforts

demonstrate that Oswald’s guilt was taken for granted.

Rankin had assigned teams of two staff lawyers each to evaluate the evidence according to the

five divisions of his "Tentative Outline." Working in Area II, "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of

President Kennedy," were Joseph Ball as the senior lawyer and David Belin as the junior.23 On

January 30, Belin wrote a very revealing memorandum to Rankin, concerning "Oswald’s knowledge

that Connally would be in the Presidential car and his intended target."24 This memorandum leaves

no doubt that Belin was quite sure of Oswald’s guilt before he began his assigned investigation. He

was concerned that Oswald might not have known that Governor Connally was to ride in the

presidential limousine because this "bears on the motive of the assassination and also on the degree

of marksmanship required, which in turn affects the determination that Oswald was the assassin and

that it was not too difficult to hit the intended target two out of three times in this particular

situation." The alternatives, as stated by Belin, were as follows:

In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally

and missed two of the three shots, two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both Kennedy and

Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second

bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.25

Belin could not have been more explicit: Three shots were fired and Oswald, whatever his motive,

fired them all. Of course, at that point Belin could not possibly have proved that Oswald was the

assassin. He merely presumed it and worked on that basis.

It is important to keep this January 30 Belin memorandum in mind when we consider the 233-

page "BALL - BELIN REPORT #1" dated February 25, 1964, and submitted by the authors as a

summation of all the evidence they had evaluated up to that point. The "tentative" conclusion

reached in this report is that "Lee Harvey Oswald is the assassin of President John F. Kennedy."26

However, Ball and Belin were careful to include here a new interpretation of their assigned area of

work. They wrote:

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

22. Memorandum from Arlen Specter to Mr. Rankin, dated January 30, 1964, concerning the questioning of Marina Oswald, p. 3.

23. "Memorandum to the Staff," from Mr. Rankin, dated January 13, 1964, p. 3.

24. "Memorandum" from David W. Belin to J. Lee Rankin, dated January 30, 1964. This document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold

Weisberg and was first presented in Post Mortem I, pp. 61-62.

25. Ibid.

26. "Ball-Belin Report #1," dated February 25, 1964, p. 233.

- 44 -

We should also point out that the tentative memorandum of January 23 substantially differs from the original

outline of our work in this area which had as its subject, "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President

Kennedy," and which examined the evidence from that standpoint. At no time have we assumed that Lee Harvey

Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy. Rather, our entire study has been based on an independent

examination of all the evidence in an effort to determine who was the assassin of President Kennedy.27

Although this new formulation was no doubt the proper one, the Warren Report makes it

abundantly clear that Ball and Belin failed to follow the course outlined in their "Report #1." As we

have seen, the only context in which the evidence is presented in the Report is "Lee Harvey Oswald

as the Assassin of President Kennedy," even though that blatant description is not used (as it was in

the secret working papers). Furthermore, that Belin a month before could write so confidently that

Oswald was the assassin completely refutes this belatedly professed intention to examine the

evidence without preconceptions. It would appear that in including this passage in "Report #1," Ball

and Belin were more interested in leaving a record that they could later cite in their own defense than

in conducting an honest, unbiased investigation. Indeed, Belin has quoted this passage publicly to

illustrate the impartiality of his work, while neglecting to mention his memorandum of January 30.28

The Warren Report was not completed until late in September 1964, with hearings and

investigations extending into the period during which the Report was set in type. Yet outlines for the

final Report were drawn up as early as mid-March. These outlines demonstrate that Oswald’s guilt

was a definite conclusion at the time that sworn testimony was first being taken by the Commission.

The first outline was submitted to Rankin at his request by staff lawyer Alfred Goldberg on

approximately March 14, according to notations on the outline.29 Under Goldberg’s plan, Chapter

Four of the Commission’s report would be entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin." Goldberg

elaborated:

This section should state the facts which lead to the conclusion that Oswald pulled the trigger and should

indicate the elements in the case which have either not been proven or are based on doubtful testimony. Each of

the facts listed below should be reviewed in that light.30

The "facts" enumberated [sic] by Goldberg are precarious. Indeed, as of March 14, 1964, no

testimony had been adduced on almost all of the "facts" that Goldberg outlined as contributing to the

"conclusion that Oswald pulled the trigger." Goldberg felt that this chapter of the Report should

identify Oswald’s rifle "as the murder weapon." Under this category he listed "Ballistics" and

"Capability of Rifle." Yet the first ballistics testimony was not heard by the Commission until March

31 (3H390ff.). Another of Goldberg’s categories is "Evidence of Oswald Carrying Weapon to Texas

School Book Depository." Here he does not specify which evidence he had in mind. However, the

expert testimony that might have supported the thesis that Oswald carried his rifle to work on the

morning of the assassination was not adduced until April 2 and 3 (4H1ff.). This pattern runs through

several other factors that Goldberg felt established Oswald’s guilt before they were scrutinized by the

Commission or the staff. To illustrate: "Testimony of eyewitnesses and employees on fifth floor"—

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

27. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

28. See "Truth Was My Only Goal," by David Belin in The Texas Observer, August 13, 1971, p. 14.

29. "Memorandum" from Alfred Goldberg to J. Lee Rankin, dated "approx 3/14, 1964.

30. "Proposed Outline of Report," attached to the memorandum referred to in note 29. This outline was discovered in the National Archives by Harold

Weisberg and is presented in Post Mortem I, p. 123.

- 45 -

this testimony was not taken until March 24, at which time the witnesses contradicted several of their

previous statements to the federal authorities (3H161ff.); "Medical testimony"—the autopsy

surgeons testified on March 16 (2H347ff.), and medical/ballistics testimony concerning tests with

Oswald’s rifle was not taken until mid-May (5H74ff.); "Eyewitness Identification of Oswald

Shooting Rifle"—only one witness claimed to make such an identification, and he gave testimony on

March 24 (3H140ff.) that was subsequently rejected by the Commission (R145-46).

On March 26, staff lawyer Norman Redlich submitted another outline of the final Report to

Rankin; in almost all respects, Redlich’s outline is identical with Goldberg’s. Chapter Four is

entitled "Lee H. Oswald as the Assassin," with the notation that "this section should state the facts

which lead to the conclusion that Oswald pulled the trigger. . . ."31 In general, Redlich is vaguer than

Goldberg in his listing of those "facts" which should be presented to support the conclusion of

Oswald’s guilt. However, he does specify what he considers to be "evidence of Oswald carrying

weapon to building." One factor, he wrote, is the "fake curtain rod story." Yet, when Redlich

submitted this outline, no investigation had been conducted into the veracity of the "curtain rod

story." The first information relevant to this is contained in an FBI report dated March 28 (24H460-

61), and it was not until the last day in August that further inquiry was made (CE2640).

The pattern is consistent. The Commission outlined its work and concluded that Oswald was

guilty before it did any investigation or took any testimony. The Report was outlined, including a

chapter concluding that Oswald was guilty, before the bulk of the Commission’s work was

completed. Most notably, these conclusions were drafted before the staff arranged a series of tests

that were to demonstrate whether the official theories about how the shooting occurred were

physically possible. A series of ballistics tests using Oswald’s rifle, and an on-site reconstruction of

the crime in Dealey Plaza were conducted in May; the Report was outlined in March. On April 27,

Redlich wrote Rankin a memorandum "to explain the reasons why certain members of the staff feel

that it is important" to reconstruct the events in Dealey Plaza as depicted in motion pictures of the

assassination. Redlich stated that the Report would "presumably" set forth a version of the

assassination shots concluding "that the bullets were fired by one person located in the sixth floor

southeast corner window of the TSBD building." He then pointed out:

As our investigation now stands, however, we have not shown that these events could possibly have occurred

in the manner suggested above. All we have is a reasonable hypothesis which appears to be supported by the

medical testimony but which has not been checked out against the physical facts at the scene of the

assassination.32

Thus, Redlich admitted that the Commission did not know if the conclusions already outlined

were even physically possible. But his suggestion of on-site tests should not be taken to indicate his

desire to establish the untainted truth, for he explicitly denied such a purpose in his memorandum.

Instead, he wrote:

Our intention is not to establish the point with complete accuracy, but merely to substantiate the hypothesis

which underlies the conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin.33

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

31. "Proposed Outline of Report (Submitted by Mr. Redlich)," attached to "Memorandum" from Norman Redlich to J. Lee Rankin, dated March 26,

1964. This document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg and is presented in Post Mortem I, p. 132.

32. "Memorandum" from Norman Redlich to J. Lee Rankin, dated April 27, 1964. This document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold

Weisberg and is presented in Post Mortem I, pp. 132-34.

33. Ibid.

- 46 -

This is as unambiguous a statement as can be imagined. The reconstruction was not to determine

whether it was physically possible for Oswald to have committed the murder as described by the

Commission; it was "merely to substantitate" [sic] the preconceived conclusion "that Oswald was

the sole assassin."

On April 30, three days after Redlich composed the above-quoted memorandum, the Commission

met in another secret executive session. Here Rankin added to the abundant proof that the

Commission had already concluded that Oswald was guilty. The following exchange was provoked

when Dulles expressed his well-voiced preoccupation with biographical data relating to Oswald:

Mr. Dulles: Detailed biography of Lee Harvey Oswald—I think that ought to be somewhere.

Mr. Rankin: We thought it would be too voluminous to be in the body of the report. We thought it would be

helpful as supplementary material at the end.

Mr. Dulles: Well, I don’t feel too strongly about where it should be. This would be—I think some of the

biography of Lee Harvey Oswald, though, ought to be in the main report.

Mr. Rankin: Some of it will be necessary to tell the story and to show why it is reasonable to assume that he

did what the Commission concludes that he did do.34 (emphasis added)

As late as the middle of May, long after the Commission and the staff had decided, in advance of

analyzing the evidence, that Oswald was guilty, Commission member McCloy expressed his feeling

that the conclusion as to Oswald’s guilt was not being pursued with enough vigor by the staff.

McCloy was not interested in a fair and objective report. This story was related by David Belin in

his memorandum of May 15, which described his trip to Dallas with certain Commission members,

McCloy included. One night in Dallas, Belin persuaded McCloy to read "Ball-Belin Report # 1,"

which by then was almost three months old. Belin recounts McCloy’s reactions:

He seemed to misunderstand the basic purpose of the report, for he suggested that we did not point up enough

arguments to show why Oswald was the assassin. . . . Commissioner McCloy did state that in the final report he

thought that we should be rather complete in developing reasons and affirmative statements why Oswald was the

assassin—he did not believe that it should just merely be a factual restatement of what we had found.35

As quoted at the opening of this chapter, the Warren Report asserted that the Commission

functioned not "as a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a fact finding agency committed to

the ascertainment of the truth." This statement is clearly a misrepresentation of the Commission’s

real position, as expressed in private by McCloy when he told Belin that he wanted a report that

argued a prosecution case, and not simply "a factual restatement."

The Dallas Police and the FBI both announced their "conclusion" before it could have been

adequately substantiated by facts and, in so doing, almost irrevocably prejudiced the American

public against Oswald and thwarted an honest and unbiased investigation. The Commission operated

under a facade of impartiality. Yet it examined the evidence—and subsequently presented it—on the

premise that Oswald was guilty, a premise openly stated in secret staff memoranda and reinforced

when the members met in secret sessions. Now, as the curtain of secrecy that once sheltered the

working papers of the investigation is lifted, the ugly and improper presumption of guilt becomes

obvious. Wesley Liebeler expressed the prejudice of the entire "investigation" when he argued to

Rankin in a once-secret memorandum that " . . . the best evidence that Oswald could fire as fast as he

did and hit the target is the fact that he did so.""36

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

34. Transcript of the April 30, 1964, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, p. 5891.

35. Memorandum from Mr. Belin to Mr. Rankin, dated May 15, 1964, p. 5.

36. Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum, p. 25.

- 47 -

PART II:

THE MEDICAL/BALLISTICS EVIDENCE

- 48 -

3

Suppressed Spectrography

In the final analysis, the Warren Commission had three pieces of tangible evidence that linked Lee

Harvey Oswald to the assassination of President Kennedy: (1) A rifle purchased by Oswald and three

empty cartridge cases fired in that rifle were discovered on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book

Depository, (2) a nearly whole bullet that had been fired from Oswald’s rifle was found on a stretcher

at Parkland Hospital, and (3) two fragments of a bullet or bullets that had been fired from Oswald’s

rifle were found on the front seat of the presidential limousine.

Yet, there is nothing in this evidence itself to prove either that Oswald’s rifle was used in the

shooting or, if it was, that Oswald fired it. The whole fault in the Commission’s case relating the

Mannlicher-Carcano rifle to the shooting is this: bullets identifiable with that rifle were found

outside of the victims’ bodies. Pieces of metal not traceable to any rifle were found inside the bodies.

The Report merely assumes the legitimacy of the specimens found externally and works on the

assumption that these bullets and fragments had once been inside the bodies, and thus were involved

in the shooting.

Obviously, bullets found outside the bodies are entirely circumstantial evidence, for although they

may be conclusively linked with a particular weapon, their location of discovery does not link them

with a particular victim. No matter how close to the victims or to the scene of the crime these bullets

were found, as long as they were not in the actual bodies when discovered, proof is lacking that they

were ever in the bodies at all. If Commission Exhibit 399, the nearly whole bullet found on a

stretcher at Parkland, had been removed from Governor Connally’s body, it could be asserted that it

had indeed produced his wounds. Likewise, if the identifiable bullet fragments found on the front

seat of the limousine had instead been located in President Kennedy’s head wound, we would have

the proof linking Oswald’s rifle to the fatal shot.

In the case of the assassination, there was an easy and conclusive way to determine whether the

bullet specimens found outside the bodies had ever been inside the victims, thus providing either the

proof or the disproof of the notion that Oswald’s rifle was used in the shooting. This conclusive

evidence is the spectrographic comparison made between the metallic compositions of the projectiles

found outside of the victims and the bits of metal removed from the wounds themselves.

Spectrography is an exact science. In spectrographic analysis, a test substance is irradiated so that

all of the elements composing it emit a distinct spectrum. These spectra are recorded on film and

- 49 -

analyzed both qualitatively (to determine exactly which elements compose the substance in question)

and quantitatively (to determine the exact percentage of each element present). Through such

analysis, two substances may be compared in extremely fine detail, down to the percentages of even

their most minor constituents.1

Comparative chemical analysis such as spectrography has long been a vital tool in crime solving.

The following are actual cases that illustrate the value of such comparison:

1. A deformed slug with some white metal adhering to it was found at the scene where a

man had been shot, but not wounded. The white metal was first suspected to be

nickel, which would have indicated a nickel-coated bullet, but was subsequently

tested and found to be silver from a cigarette case that had been penetrated. The slugs

in the cartridges taken from the suspect in the attack were analyzed and found to

differ in composition from the projectile used in the shooting; the suspect thus

escaped conviction.

2. In another case, a man escaped conviction because of dissimilarities in composition

found upon comparative analysis of the bullet removed from the wounded man and

bullets from cartridges seized in the suspect’s house. The former contained a trace of

antimony and no tin and the latter contained a comparatively large amount of tin.

3. A night watchman shot at some unidentified persons fleeing the scene of a robbery,

but all escaped. Blood found at the scene the next morning indicated that one of the

persons had been wounded and subsequently a man was arrested with a bullet wound

in his leg for which he could provide no plausible explanation. Analysis

demonstrated that lead fragments removed from the wound did not agree in

composition with the slugs in the watchman’s cartridges and the man was released.

The impurities present in the lead were the same in each case, consisting chiefly of

antimony, but the fragments from the wound contained much less antimony than the

watchman’s slugs.2

The identifiable bullets and fragments found outside the victims’ bodies are the suspect specimens

in the presidential assassination. The tiny pieces of metal found inside the bodies are, in effect, the

control specimens. All of the specimens—including those removed from the President and the

Governor—were subjected to spectrographic analysis. The results of these analyses hold the

conclusive answer to the problem that was the central issue in the question of Oswald’s guilt: Did

the bullets from Oswald’s rifle produce the wounds of the victims?

The spectrographic analyses could solve this central problem through minute qualitative and

quantitative comparison. If a fragment from a body was not identical in composition with a suspect

bullet, that bullet could not have entered the body and left the fragment in question. The

requirements for "identical" composition are stringent; if the exact elements are not present in the

exact percentages from one sample to another, there is no match and the samples must have

originated from two different sources. If a fragment is found to be identical in composition with a

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. See "Spectrography" in Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: William Benton Publishers, 1963), vol. 21, and "Photography" in vol. 17; Herbert

Dingle, Practical Applications of Spectrum Analysis (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1950), pp. 1-3, 74-75, 122-24.

2. A. Lucas, Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), pp. 265-66.

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suspect bullet, it is possible that the bullet deposited the fragment in the body. However, before this

can be conclusively proven, it must be demonstrated that other bullets manufactured from the same

batch of metal were not employed in the crime.3 Some of the major comparisons that should have

been made in the case of the President’s death are these:

1. The Commission apparently believed that the two large bullet fragments (one

containing part of a lead core) found on the front seat of the car and traceable to

Oswald’s rifle were responsible for the head wounds. Two pieces of lead were

recovered from the President’s head. The head fragments could have been compared

to the car fragment containing lead. Had the slightest difference in composition been

found, the car fragments could not have caused the head wounds.

2. The Commission believed that the two car fragments were part of the same bullet.

Spectrographic comparison might have determined this.

3. Copper traces were found on the bullet holes in the back of the President’s coat and

shirt. Since the Commission believed that bullet 399 penetrated the President’s neck,

the copper residues on the clothing could have been compared with the copper jacket

of 399 for a conclusive answer. Any dissimilarity between the two copper samples

would rule out 399.

4. The Commission believed that 399 wounded Governor Connally. Fragments of lead

were removed from the Governor’s wrist. These could have been compared with the

lead core of 399. Again, any dissimilarity would conclusively disassociate 399 from

Connally’s wounds. An identical match might support the Commission’s belief.

5. The lead from the Governor’s wrist could have been compared with the lead from one

of the identifiable car fragments to determine whether this might have caused

Connally’s wounds in the event that 399 did not. This could have associated

"Oswald’s" rifle with the wounds even if 399 had been proven "illegitimate."

6. The lead residue found on the crack in the windshield of the car could have been

compared with fragments from the two bodies plus fragments from the car in an effort

to determine which shot caused the windshield damage.

7. As a control, the lead and copper composition of 399 could have been compared to

that of the identifiable car fragments to determine whether all were made from the

same batches of metal.

The government had in its possession the conclusive proof or disproof of its theories. It is not

presumptuous to assume that, had the spectrographic analyses provided the incontrovertible proof of

the validity of the Warren Report’s central conclusions, they would have been employed in the

Report, eliminating virtually all of the controversy and doubt that have raged over the official

assertions.

But the complete results of the spectrographic analyses were never reported to the Commission;

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

3. Author’s interview with Dr. John Nichols on April 16, 1970. See also Nichols’s statement in the Dallas Morning News, June 19, 1970.

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there is no indication that the Commission ever requested or desired them; they are not in the printed

exhibits or the Commission’s unpublished files; no expert testimony relevant to them was ever

adduced; and to this day, the Department of Justice is withholding the complete results from

researchers.

On November 23, 1963, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a report to Dallas Police Chief Jesse

Curry summarizing the results of FBI laboratory examinations, including spectrographic analysis

(see 24H262-64). On the matter of composition, Hoover said only that the jackets of the found

specimens were "copper alloy" and the cores and other pieces, "lead." The element mixed with the

copper to form the "alloy" is not even mentioned. It is quite unlikely that the other specimens were

composed solely of "lead," for the lead employed in practically all modern bullets is mixed with

small quantities of antimony, bismuth, and arsenic.4 The only spectrographic comparison mentioned

in this report is meaningless:

The lead metal of [exhibits] Q4 and Q5 [fragments from the President’s head], Q9 [fragment(s) from the

Governor’s wrist], Q14 [three pieces of lead found under the left jump seat in the limousine] and Q15 [scraping

from the windshield crack] is similar to the lead of the core of the bullet fragment, Q2 [found on the front seat of

the car].

That two samples are "similar" in composition is without meaning in terms of the precise data

yielded through spectrographic analysis. The crucial determination, "identical" or "not identical," is

consistently avoided. Also avoided is the essential comparison between the "stretcher bullet," 399,

and the metal fragments removed from the Governor’s wrist.

The Commission sought virtually no testimony relevant to the spectrographic analysis. When it

did seek this testimony, it asked the wrong questions of the wrong people. FBI ballistics expert

Robert Frazier gave testimony about these tests on May 13, 1964. At this time, he told the

Commission and Arlen Specter, his interrogator, that the spectrographics examinations were

performed by a spectrographer, John F. Gallager (5H67, 69). Frazier, accepted by the Commission

only as a "qualified witness on firearms" (3H392), was not a spectrographic expert. His field was

ballistics and firearms identification, and while he might have supplemented his findings with those

from other fields, he was not qualified in spectrography, which entails expertise in physics and

chemistry. Gallagher, the expert, could well be called the Commission’s most-avoided witness. His

testimony, the last taken in the entire investigation, was given in a deposition attended by a

stenographer and a staff member the week before the Warren Report was submitted to President

Johnson. At this time, he was not asked a single question relating to the spectrographic analyses.5

(See 15H746ff.)

Neither Specter nor the Commission members can deny having known that Frazier was not the

man qualified to testify about spectrographic analysis; Frazier stated this in his testimony:

Mr. Specter: Was it your job to analyze all of the bullets or bullet fragments which were found in the

President’s car?

Mr. Frazier: Yes; it was, except for the spectrographic analysis of the composition. (5H68; emphasis added)

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

4. The Winchester-Western Ammunition Handbook (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1964), p. 120. (Hereinafter referred to as Winchester Handbook.)

5. First public attention drawn to the spectrographic analyses and their omission from the Commission’s record was by Harold Weisberg in Whitewash,

p. 164. Sylvia Meagher later discussed this topic in her book, pp. 170-72.

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Frazier added, "I don’t know actually whether I am expected to give the results of (the

spectrographer’s) analysis or not" (5H59). If this statement fails to make it clear that Frazier was not

prepared to testify about the results of the spectrographic analyses, an earlier statement by him leaves

no doubt: "[The spectrographic] examination was performed by a spectrographer, John F. Gallagher,

and I do not have the results of his examination here" (5H67). If Frazier did not have the actual

report of the results of the tests with him when he appeared before the Commission, there was

obviously no way of vouching for the accuracy of the findings to which he testified, whether he was

qualified as an expert in spectrography or not. Also, Frazier’s knowledge of the spectrographic

analysis was merely secondhand; he was aware of the results of these tests because the

spectrographer "submitted his report to me" (5H69). Thus, Frazier played no role in conducting this

analysis. His only "qualification" for giving testimony about the spectrographic analyses was that he

had read a report about them. Because this report is not part of the public records, we have no way of

determining whether Frazier accurately related the results of the analyses, or whether the report upon

which he based his testimony was competent, complete, or satisfactory. In short, we are asked to

take Frazier on his word when (1) he knew of these tests only secondhand, (2) he did not have the

actual results with him when he testified about them, and (3) he had no expertise in spectrography.

On this basis alone, Frazier’s testimony concerning the tests is not worthy of credence.

However, if we examine exactly what Frazier specified as the results of the spectrographic

analyses, it becomes apparent that his testimony, if true, is meaningless and incomplete. Frazier

spoke of essentially the same comparisons that Hoover did in his letter to police chief Curry,

repeating Hoovers meaningless designation that the ballistic specimens compared were "found to be

similar in metallic composition" (5H67, 69, 73-74). When the exact composition had been

determined to a minute degree and could be compared for conclusive and meaningful answers, there

was no legitimate reason to accept this testimony about mere "similarities" in composition.

Furthermore, Frazier offered his opinion that the spectrographic analyses were inconclusive in

determining the origin of certain of the ballistics specimens (5H67, 69, 73-74). However, because

Frazier was not a spectrographic expert and because the actual report of these tests is not available,

his interpretation of the test results is worthless. Even at that, Frazier and his Commission

interrogator, Arlen Specter, avoided mention of those comparisons affecting the legitimacy of bullet

399—namely, the copper from the President’s clothing and the lead from Governor Connally’s wrist

as compared with the copper and lead of 399.

Frazier was cross-examined at the New Orleans conspiracy trial of Clay Shaw. Here he was

pressed further on the spectrographic analysis. When asked about any "similarity" in the

compositions of the various ballistic specimens he replied, "They all had the same metallic

composition as far as the lead core or lead portions of these objects is concerned."6

This response prompts two inferences. First, Frazier specifically excluded as being the "same in

metallic composition" the copper portions of the specimens. If this omission was necessitated by the

fact that the copper of the recovered specimens did not match in composition, a significant part of the

Warren Report is disproved. Second, Frazier’s description of the lead as being the "same" in

composition is ambiguous. Did he mean that the elements of the composition or the percentages of

the elements were the "same"? In the former case, his testimony would again be meaningless, for

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

6. Transcript of court proceedings of February 21, 1969, in State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw, p. 40. (Hereinafter referred to as "Frazier 2/21/69

testimony.")

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what is contained in the metal is not so important as how much is contained. If the percentages were

the same, the Report could be confirmed.

Further questioning by Attorney Oser cleared up this ambiguity.

Mr. Oser: Am I correct in saying there is a similarity in metallic composition or they are identical?

Mr. Frazier: It was identical as far as the metallic elements are concerned.7 (emphasis added)

Here Frazier leaves no doubt that the individual elements in the various lead samples were identical.

What he avoids saying is that the percentages of those elements were identical throughout. This is

the crucial point. If anything, Frazier’s specification that the elements were identical (when

questioned about the composition) leads to the inference that the percentages of those elements were

not identical, hence the recovered specimens could not be related and the Warren Report is

necessarily invalid.

The Commission’s failure to obtain the complete spectrographic analyses and to adduce

meaningful expert testimony on them can be viewed only with suspicion. Here was the absolute

proof or disproof of the official theories. If truth was the Commission’s objective, there can be no

explanation for the exclusion of these tests from the record. If the Commission was right in its

"solution" of the assassination, for what reason could it conceivably have omitted the proof of its

validity? One is reasonably led to believe that the spectrographic analyses proved the opposite of

what the Commission asserted.

If the Commission’s failure to produce the spectrographic analyses was no more than a glaring

oversight, the remedy is indeed a simple one. The government need only release these tests to the

public. They cannot contain the gore that makes publication of the President’s autopsy pictures a

matter of questionable taste. They cannot be injurious to living persons as other classified reports

might be. They cannot threaten our national defense. They are merely a collection of highly

scientific data that could support or destroy the entire official solution to the assassination.

The government has to this day kept them squelched.

Harold Weisberg, the first researcher to recognize the significance of the spectrographic tests and

their omission from the record, has fought and continues to fight for access to the report detailing

these tests. In 1967, Weisberg wrote as follows of his efforts to obtain the tests:

On October 31, 1966, then Acting Attorney General Clark ordered that everything considered by the

Commission and in the possession of the government be placed in the National Archives. I had written [J. Edgar]

Hoover five months earlier, on May 23, 1966, asking for access to the spectrographic analysis of the bullet

allegedly used in the assassination and the various bullet fragments, clearly the most basic evidence, but not in

the printed evidence. He has not yet answered that letter. Since issuance of the Attorney General’s order, I have

on a number of occasions requested this evidence of the Archives. Hoover, as of March 1967, had not turned it

over. Once, in my presence, one of his agents deceived the Archives by falsely reporting this analysis was in an

FBI file that was accessible. Since then, silence, but no spectrographic analysis.8

Weisberg’s efforts have continued. In 1970, he made available to me all of his government

correspondence. I saw, over the signatures of then Attorney General John Mitchell and Deputy

Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, the government’s constant refusal to release the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

7. Ibid., p. 41.

8. Weisberg, Oswald in New Orleans, pp. 148-49.

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spectrographic analyses.9 Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Weisberg took the Justice

Department to court, suing for release under provisions of the "Freedom of Information" law. The

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against Weisberg in this case, Civil Action No.

712-70. Weisberg and his attorney appealed this decision, and the appeal, brief No. 71-1026, is

currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Without the spectrographic analyses, there is no evidence to associate Oswald’s rifle with the

wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Nothing was found in the body of

either victim that would suggest a connection between that specific Mannlicher-Carcano and the

wounds. The spectrographic tests might establish such a connection; they might also conclusively

dissociate that rifle from the wounds. However, omission of the exact spectrographic results from

the Commission’s evidence and the subsequent refusal of the government to release the

spectrographer’s findings do not leave one at all confident that these tests support the official solution

to the assassination.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

9. Weisberg’s attorney in this case, Bernard Fensterwald, requested that his client be furnished with the spectrographic analyses in a letter to Justice

Department lawyer Joseph Cella, dated October 9, 1969. Then Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst responded to this request in a letter

dated November 13, 1969; he refused to disclose the document, (These letters are a part of the public record. They are part of the set of exhibits

appended to the "COMPLAINT" dated March 11, 1970, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in the case of Harold Weisberg v.

U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State, Civil Action No. 718-70.)

Weisberg has attempted to obtain the report of the spectrographer through a series of written requests dated May 23, 1966, March 12, 1967,

January 1, 1969, June 2, 1969, April 6, 1970, May 15, 1970, and an official request form submitted on May 10, 1970. In a letter dated June 4, 1970,

then Attorney General John Mitchell personally denied Weisberg’s request for access. Richard Kleindienst, in a letter dated June 12, 1970, also

denied Weisberg’s request. (These letters are also a part of the public record. They are contained in the appendix to Appeal No. 71-1026, Weisberg

v. U.S. Department of Justice, filed by attorney for plaintiff-appellant in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.)

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4

The President’s Wounds

There is evidence independent of the spectrographic analyses that reasonably, although not

conclusively, disassociates Oswald’s rifle from the wounds inflicted on President Kennedy. Certain

aspects of the medical evidence strongly indicate that the President was not struck by bullets of the

type recovered and traced back to the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano purchased by Oswald. The

implication of this evidence as well as the evidence relating to Governor Connally’s wounds is that

the identifiable bullet recovered at Parkland Hospital and the bullet fragments found in the limousine

played no role in the wounding of either victim, and came to rest in their location of discovery by

some means other than that alleged by the Commission. More precisely, the significance of the

medical evidence is that it forces the conclusion that the items of physical evidence that implicate

Oswald in the murder—his rifle, the spent cartridge cases, and the bullets—were deliberately

"planted" for the purpose of implicating Oswald, although none played a role in the actual shooting.

We must recognize that the medical evidence in this case suffers severe limitations, to which

almost infinite discussion could be and has been devoted.1 Because the scope of this study does not

include an examination of the official investigation into the President’s wounds, including the

autopsy and other examinations, it must suffice here to say that most of the medical evidence

available today is not credible and precludes a positive reconstruction of the exact manner in which

President Kennedy was killed. There is currently enough solid information to say with some

precision what did not happen to the President, and it may, in fact, never be possible to say more than

that.

Respecting the limits of the medical evidence, I will make no effort to explain exactly how

President Kennedy was shot, from which directions, by how many bullets, and so on. Instead, I will

focus on one aspect of the wounds, namely, the type of ammunition that produced them. This is the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. The best published discussions of the limitations of the medical evidence may be found in the following sources: Weisberg, Whitewash, chap. 13;

Meagher, chap. 5; Cyril Wecht, "A Critique of President Kennedy’s Autopsy," in Thompson, pp. 278-84.

The most definitive expose of the medical evidence is contained in a three-part book by Weisberg called Post Mortem. This is a copyrighted

study based on Weisberg’s exhaustive research over a period of about eight years; however, it is not commercially published.

- 56 -

only aspect of the medical evidence that relates to the question of Oswald’s guilt, assuming, of

course, that at least some of the assassination shots originated from the rear. The question to be

answered is this: Could the President’s wounds have been caused by bullets of the type recovered

and traced to Oswald’s rifle?

The Head Wounds

The wounds to President Kennedy’s head can be briefly described as follows: There was a 15 by

6 mm. entrance wound situated at the rear top of the head. Most of the right half of the brain had

been blasted away by a bullet. Numerous tiny metal fragments were depicted on X-rays as being

located in the right-frontal portion of the head. Much of the skull and scalp in the right frontal area

had also been blasted away, creating a large, irregular defect from which lacerated brain tissue

oozed. Many lacerations of the scalp and severe fractures of the skull accompanied this large defect.

It can be said with reasonable certainty that a bullet struck the President’s head from the rear. The

evidence does not establish that it was the rear-entering bullet that produced the explosive wound to

the right-front of the head, nor is there currently any evidence to preclude the possibility that the

head was in fact struck by two separate bullets from different directions.

The Warren Commission made no serious effort to establish the type of ammunition that produced

the head wounds, and it failed to establish any connection between those wounds and the ammunition

allegedly used by Oswald. The Commission postulates that Oswald fired military ammunition. Such

bullets are constructed of a lead core chemically hardened and inserted into a jacket of copper alloy.2

The principal reason for this type of construction is to insure good penetrating ability by inhibiting

bullet deformation. Hard metal-jacketed military bullets can be deformed upon striking resistant

tissue such as bone. In such a case, the bullet is liable to become mangled and distorted in shape.

When such bullets undergo fragmentation, it is rarely extensive. Typically, the jacket may separate

from the core which, in turn, may break up into relatively large chunks, depending on the nature of

the resistant tissue and the force with which it was struck.3

The autopsy pathologists concluded that one bullet struck the head, entering through the small rear

entrance wound, and explosively exiting through the gaping defect in the right-frontal area of the

head. The conclusion that the rear wound was one of entrance was justified on the basis of the

information available. However, the pathologists could present no evidence to substantiate the

"conclusion" that the gaping defect was an exit wound. The unmistakable inference of the testimony

of Dr. James Humes, the chief autopsy pathologist, is that the doctors "concluded" this was an exit

wound solely because the only other external head wound was one of entrance (2H352). This

reasoning is in total disregard of any practicable medico-legal standards, and is worthless without

tangible evidence to buttress it.

Given the unsupportable premise that one bullet caused all the head wounds, Assistant Counsel

Arlen Specter was able to adduce worthless testimony from Dr. Humes about the type of ammunition

involved. First he asked Dr. Humes whether a "dumdum" bullet struck the head:

Dr. Humes: I believe these were not dumdum bullets, Mr. Specter. A dumdum is a term that has been used to

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. Winchester Handbook, p. 121, and A. Lucas, pp. 241-42.

3. Rowland H. Long, The Physician and the Law (New York, 1968), p. 239.

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describe various missiles which have a common characteristic of fragmenting extensively upon striking.

A . . Had [the entrance wound on the head] been inflicted by a dumdum bullet, I would anticipate that it

would not have anything near the regular contour and outline which it had. I would also anticipate that the skull

would have been much more extensively disrupted, and not have, as was evident in this case, a defect which quite

closely corresponded to the overlying skin defect because that type of missile would fragment on contact and be

much more disruptive at this point. (2H356)

Thus, the clean characteristics of the entrance hole led Dr. Humes to conclude that it was not caused

by a "dumdum" bullet. What such a bullet would produce upon striking the skull, according to

Humes, is in essence what appeared on the right side of the President’s head and was arbitrarily

designated an exit wound. The Commission never raised the proper question: Was the gaping head

defect really the "exit" wound or could it have been another entrance, caused by a "dumdum"?

The Commission members continued this line of questioning. First Mr. McCloy queried about

soft-nose ammunition having caused only the entrance wound:

Dr. Humes: From the characteristics of this wound, Mr. McCloy, I would believe it must have had a very

firm head rather than a soft head.

Mr. McCloy: Steel jacketed, would you say, copper jacketed bullet?

Dr. Humes: I believe more likely a jacketed bullet.

Allen Dulles joined in:

Mr. Dulles: Believing that we know the type of bullet that was usable in this gun ["Oswald’s" rifle], would

this be the type of wound that might result from that kind of bullet?

Dr. Humes: I believe so, sir. (2H357)

During his testimony, Col. Pierre Finck, who participated in the autopsy as a consultant to Dr.

Humes, was asked about the nature of the bullet’s fragmentation within the head. Commissioner

Gerald Ford, apparently feeling that he had asked one question too many, cut Finck off at the vital

point and did not permit him to elaborate:

Mr. Ford: Is it typical to find only a limited number of fragments as you apparently did in this case?

Dr. Finck: This depends to a great deal on the type of ammunition used. There are many types of bullets,

jacketed, not-jacketed, pointed, hollow-nosed, hollow-points, flatnose, roundnose, all these different shapes will

have a different influence on the pattern of the wound and the degree of fragmentation.

Mr. Ford: That is all. (2H384; emphasis added)

The Report does not cite any of the above-quoted testimony. Instead, it discusses ballistics which,

it asserts,

showed that the rifle and bullets identified above were capable of producing the President’s head wound. The

Wound Ballistics Branch . . . at Edgewood Arsenal, Md., conducted an extensive series of experiments to test the

effect of . . . the type [of bullet] found on Governor Connally’s stretcher and in the Presidential limousine, fired

from the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Depository. . . . One series of tests, performed on

reconstructed inert human skulls, demonstrated that the President’s head wound could have been caused by the

rifle and bullets fired by the assassin from the sixth floor window. (R87)

How could such tests "demonstrate that the President’s head wound could have been caused by"

bullets fired from a rifle traceable to Oswald? The tests, in fact, do not suggest any correlation

between the head wounds and "Oswald’s" rifle. When analyzed, they prove to be nothing more than

incompetent, meaningless, hence invalid simulations.

Used for these tests were old skulls, hard and brittle, having long lost the natural moisteners of

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living bone. These test skulls were filled and covered with a 20 percent gelatin solution, a standard

simulant for body tissues (5H87). Not simulated in the experiments was a vital determining

factor—the scalp. As the "expert" who conducted the tests admitted, the scalp of a living person

would serve to retain or hold together the bones of the cranium upon impact of a missile (5H89).

Obviously, this reconstructed "head" could not possibly respond to a bullet’s strike as would a

normal, living head.

Ten skulls were fired upon with "Oswald’s" rifle under conditions duplicating only those under

which Oswald allegedly fired. Only one skull was subsequently shown to the Commission; the

bullet that struck it "blew out the right side of the reconstructed skull in a manner very similar to the

head wound of the President" (R87). This persuaded the "expert" to conclude—contrary to his

beliefs nurtured by prior experience—"that the type of head wounds that the President received could

be done by this type of bullet" (R87).

The pictures of this test exhibit printed by the Commission show a gelatin-filled skull with the

bone of the entire right side missing (17H854). However, the gelatin underlying this missing bone is

completely intact, so utterly undisturbed that it still bears the various minute impressions of the skull

that once covered it. This gelatin was supposed to simulate the tissues within the skull (5H87). Yet

those tissues, according to the autopsy report, were "lacerated," "disrupted," and "extensively

lacerated" (16H981, 983). Obviously, even upon its entering the bony vault of the skull, the test

bullet was not capable of producing the extensive damage attributed to it by the Commission. As for

the disruption of the skull on the test exhibit, almost any force could have dislodged pieces of the

brittle skull not restrained by scalp. As forensic pathologist Dr. John Nichols confirmed to me, even

a blow with a hammer could have produced the damage shown on the test skull.4

The Commission adds a further note, again unjustly incriminating Oswald. Two large fragments

of the bullet that struck the test skull were recovered, a portion of the copper jacket near the base, and

a sizable piece of the lead core. The Commission had its "expert" compare these fragments with the

two similar fragments that were found in the front seat of the presidential limousine and identifiable

with "Oswald’s" rifle. The result of this comparison, as presented in the Report, is seemingly to

associate these traceable fragments with the head wounds. The expert is quoted as follows:

the recovered fragments were very similar to the ones recovered on the front seat and the floor of the car.

This to me, indicates that those fragments did come from the bullet that wounded the President in the head.

(R87)

These are the last words of the Report’s discussion of the head wounds. Since no qualifying

language follows, the reader is left with the impression that the "expert opinion" is valid in

associating the identifiable fragments with the wounds. Nowhere in the Report do we find the simple

fact that the fragmentation of both the test bullet and the found bullet pieces is not an exclusive

occurrence, as implied. The break-up observed is consistent with the normal fragmentation pattern

of full-jacketed military bullets. When such bullets break apart, the core usually separates from the

jacket.5 The Commission could have produced the same effect if it fired the bullet through a piece of

masonite.

Thus, for all its claims, the Commission was able to present no credible evidence associating

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

4. Author’s interview with Dr. John Nichols on April 16, 1970.

5. Author’s taped interview with Dr. Halpert Fillinger on January 14, 1970. (Hereinafter referred to as "Fillinger Interview.") See also Long, p. 239.

- 59 -

bullets from "Oswald’s" rifle, or even military bullets in general, with the President’s head wounds.

The nature of the bullet fragmentation within the President’s head actually disassociates military

bullets from the head wounds, and strongly suggests that some type of sporting ammunition struck

the head.

One essential fact about the entrance wound in the head was omitted from both the autopsy report

and the pathologists’ testimonies. It came to light in the following passage from a report released by

Attorney General Ramsey Clark in January 1969. (In February 1968, Clark secretly convened a

panel of three forensic pathologists and a radiologist to study and report on the photographs and X

rays taken of the President’s body during the autopsy. [This photographic material has been withheld

from the public for a variety of reasons.] Clark kept the report of his panel secret until January 1969,

when he released it as part of the Justice Department’s legal argument against New Orleans District

Attorney Jim Garrison’s attempt to have the pictures and X rays produced at the conspiracy trial of

Clay Shaw.) The passage reads:

Also there is, embedded in the outer table of the skull close to the lower edge of the [entrance] hole, a large

metallic fragment which . . . lies 25 mm. to the right of the midline. This fragment . . . is round and measures 6.5

mm. in diameter.6

The "Clark Panel" is describing a 6.5 mm. piece of metal that separated from the bullet upon entering

the skull and became embedded in the skull at the bottom portion of the entrance wound. This, the

key to the type of ammunition causing the wound, vitiates Dr. Humes’s previously cited testimony

that a "jacketed bullet" probably caused this entrance wound.

The bullet from which was shaved this substantial fragment upon entrance could not have been

covered with a hard metal jacket such as copper alloy. Such a fragment is, in fact, a not infrequent

occurrence from a lead bullet. Rowland Long, in his book The Physician and the Law, speaks of the

penetration of lead bullets into the skull and asserts: "Not infrequently a collar shaped fragment of

lead is shaved off around the wound of entrance and is found embedded in the surrounding scalp

tissues."7 Criminologist LeMoyne Snyder describes a similar phenomenon in his book Homicide

Investigation.8 Forensic pathologist Halpert Fillinger explained to me the principles that rule out

full-jacketed ammunition and suggest a lead bullet:

You can appreciate the fact that a jacketed projectile is going to leave very little on the [bone] margins

because it’s basically a hardened jacket, and it’s designed so that it will not scrape off when it goes through a

steel barrel. One can appreciate the fact that going through bone, which is not as hard as steel, may etch or

scratch it, but it’s not going to peel off much metal. In contrast to this a softer projectile might very well leave

little metallic residues around the margins.9

The Commission’s case against Oswald requires full-jacketed ammunition to have been used to

inflict the wounds of President Kennedy. The presence of the 6.5 mm. metallic fragment in the

margin of the skull entrance wound eliminates the possibility that a full-jacketed bullet entered

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

6. Report of the Ramsey Clark panel, p. 11.

7. R. Long, p. 231. This phenomenon is also described and illustrated in Thomas Gonzales, Milton Helpern, Morgan Vance, and Charles Umberger,

Legal Medicine, Pathology and Toxicology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), pp. 396 and 423.

8. LeMoyne Snyder, Homicide Investigation (Springfield, Mass., 1953), p. 132.

9. Fillinger Interview.

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through this hole. Such a fragment located at that site is indicative of a lead or soft-nosed bullet.

Most of the right hemisphere of the President’s brain had been shot away. The intact portions of

the right side were extensively disrupted, with laceration and fragmentation (see 2H356; The "Clark

Panel" Report, p. 8; R541, 544). However, when seen and photographed at the autopsy, the brain

was missing more tissue than had been blown out directly from the force of the missile. The

Zapruder film shows brain tissue oozing out of the gaping skull defect subsequent to the impact of

the fatal bullet. Similarly, the Parkland doctors who viewed the President shortly after he suffered

this wound reported that brain matter was slowly oozing out and becoming detached (R519, 521,

523, 530).

The loss of a substantial quantity of brain tissue becomes significant when we consider Dr.

Humes’s testimony that the X rays showed "30 or 40 tiny dustlike particle fragments" of metal in the

President’s head (2H353). Humes cautioned that the fragments that appeared to be "the size of dust

particles" (2H359) on the X rays would actually have been smaller because "X ray pictures . . . have

a tendency to magnify these minute fragments somewhat in size" (2H353). Secret Service Agent

Roy Kellerman saw the X rays during the autopsy and provided a similar description: " . . . the

whole head looked like a little mass of stars, there must have been 30, 40 lights where these little

pieces were so minute that they couldn’t be reached" (2H100).

The Clark Panel adds some details about the head fragments. It reports that the majority of these

fragments were located "anteriorly and superiorly" (toward the front and top of the head), and that

none were visible on the left side of the brain or below a horizontal plane through the anterior floor

of the skull.10 With such minute fragments scattered through the brain, we can infer that an

indeterminable amount of metal was evacuated from the head as brain tissue oozed out subsequent to

the President’s head being struck. From this it follows that (a) there were originally more fragments

in the head than are shown in the X rays and, (b) the pattern of distribution of these fragments as

illustrated by the X rays may not precisely represent the original distribution except to indicate that

the majority were situated toward the front of the head.

The only solid observation that can be made on the basis of fragmentation depicted in the head X

rays is that a bullet striking the head fragmented extensively, leaving pieces of metal, for the most

part "the size of dust particles," concentrated toward the frontal portion of the brain. This type of

fragmentation is not consistent with the type of full-jacketed military ammunition that the

Commission says was used. The construction and composition of full-jacketed bullets obviates any

such massive break-up. As noted previously, when military ammunition fragments, it is usually in

such a manner that the core separates from the jacket. The core may undergo further break-up,

although its metallic composition does not permit the creation of numerous dustlike particles.11 Dr.

Fillinger tells me that the fragments described in the President’s brain were not characteristic of a

military round, and, while he makes no absolute statement, he has expressed his skepticism that they

actually came from such a round. He feels that the break-up of the bullet is more consistent with a

hunting round.12

In addition to this extensive brain damage and the accompanying bullet fragmentation, a good

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

10. Clark Panel Report, pp. 10-11.

11. The lead used in most military projecticles is an alloy of antimony with small quantities of arsenic and bismuth added for hardening to resist

expansion. See Lucas, pp. 241-42.

12. Fillinger Interview.

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deal of scalp and skull in the right frontal and parietal area of the President’s head had been blasted

away by the bullet, creating a large, irregular defect. Associated with this gaping wound was

fracturing and fragmentation of the skull so extensive that the contours of the head were "grossly

distorted."13 Dr. Humes reported that in peeling the scalp away from the skull around the margins of

the head defect, pieces of skull would come "apart in our hands very easily" or fall to the table

(2H354). Dr. Humes stated also that "radiating at various points from the large defect were multiple

crisscrossing fractures of the skull which extended in several directions" (2H351). The Clark Panel

describes multiple fractures of the skull "bilaterally"—on both sides extending into the base of the

skull.14 Information recorded in contemporary autopsy notes indicates that the vomer (a bone in the

nose) was crushed, and that there was a fracture through the floor of the globe of the right eye

(17H46). Dr. J. Thornton Boswell, assistant to Dr. Humes at the autopsy, has confirmed to a private

researcher that a large area of skull damage was present in the mid- and low-temple region, although

none of these fractures had broken the skin.15

The size and extent of the gaping defect, and the associated fracturing and fragmentation of the

skull, are indicative of a high-velocity bullet’s having struck the head to produce this damage. Dr.

Fillinger has expressed to me his strong feeling that the extensive fragmentation of the skull is the

consequence of a high-velocity round.16 He stated that the presence of such massive fracturing

means that "there is a tremendous amount of force applied to the skull to produce all these fractures. .

. . This has been pretty well fragmented, as a matter of fact," he told me, "and again, it speaks for

some sort of high-velocity round."17

The gaping defect and accompanying extensive fragmentation of the skull are not consistent with

having been produced by the type of ammunition the Commission alleges was used which, despite

contrary claims, was of "medium" velocity.

The Commission asserts that the fatal shot was fired at a distance of 270 feet (R585). Although

the Report gives the average striking velocity of the bullets fired from "Oswald’s" rifle at other

distances as measured during the wound ballistics tests, it does not record the velocity for the head

shot tests at the proper distance. At 210 feet, the average striking velocity was 1,858 feet per second

(R584). Dr. Fillinger told me that he would consider an impact velocity of 2,000 f.p.s. "medium."18

Even Dr. Malcolm Perry of Parkland Hospital testified that he considered the Mannlicher-Carcano "a

medium velocity weapon" (3H389). FBI ballistics expert Robert Frazier called the velocity "low"

(3H414) although this would appear more of a comparative evaluation than an absolute statement,

since bullets can be fired as slowly as 800 f.p.s. or as fast as 4,100 f.p.s.

Because there was great damage to the head and extensive bullet fragmentation in the brain, Dr.

Fillinger was doubtful that the Mannlicher-Carcano could have produced these wounds. "To produce

this kind of effect," he told me, "you have to have a very high-velocity projectile, and the Carcano

will not stand very high bolt pressures."19 The massive defect corresponds perfectly to the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

13. Clark Panel Report, p. 7.

14. Ibid., p. 10.

15. Thompson, p. 110.

16. Fillinger Interview.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

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characteristics that Humes described in reference to bullets that "have a common characteristic of

fragmenting extensively upon striking," and that would have "extensively disrupted" the skull at the

point of impact (2H356). Such a bullet would most likely be that which is used for "varminting."

Bullets used in varmint hunting must be fired at very high velocities ranging upward from 2,700

f.p.s., and are designed so that they will smash apart immediately on impact. They commonly leave

pinhead-sized fragments scattered throughout the tissues.20

Without consideration of the question of whether the damage to the President’s head was the

consequence of a strike by one or two bullets, it can be said with a reasonable degree of certainty that

in no instance are any of the head wounds associable with full-jacketed military ammunition of the

type attributed to Oswald. The medical evidence relating to the head wounds is thus exculpatory of

Oswald, for his guilt hinges on the assumption that he fired full-jacketed military bullets from the

Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Depository and linked to him.

The Neck and Upper Thorax Wounds

The autopsy report concludes that a bullet struck the President in the upper thoracic region of his

back and penetrated his body on a slightly downward angle, exiting through the lower part of the

anterior neck. This theory has long been rendered incredible in numerous critical analyses.21

However, one piece of information in particular prevents anyone, whether or not he believes the

Warren Report, from asserting that a bullet went through the neck in the manner described in the

autopsy report. In order to substantiate the assumption of a continuous bullet track, that track must

be dissected at the autopsy. According to Drs. Fillinger and Wecht, there is no way to positively

identify a bullet path other than by dissecting it—taking it apart and following it through every

fraction of an inch of the tissue it penetrates.22 In his New Orleans testimony, Colonel Finck stated

explicitly, under oath, that the putative bullet track in the President’s neck was not dissected.23 This

failure to dissect is, according to Dr. Fillinger, "the most critical thing of the whole autopsy."24

Without such dissection, no one, including the autopsy pathologists, can be in a position to assert that

one bullet made a continuous path through the President’s neck.

There is one piece of information concerning the neck and upper thorax wounds that establishes

beyond any doubt that (1) the particular bullet traced to Oswald’s rifle and alleged by the

Commission to have penetrated the President’s neck could not have produced the damage attributed

to it, and (2) military ammunition of the general type attributed to Oswald could not have caused

these wounds. This information came to light in the report of the Clark Panel.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

20. Winchester Handbook, p. 123; C. E. Hagie, The American Rifle for Hunting and Target Shooting (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 69,

73, 83.

The possibility that a frangible bullet produced the massive head wound was first suggested by Vincent Salandria in an article that appeared in

Liberation magazine, March 1965, p. 32. The specification of a varminting bullet was first introduced to me by Dick Bernabei, who has done much

admirable and worthwhile work on the medical/ballistics aspects of the case.

21. See Weisberg, Whitewash, pp. 178-86; Meagher, pp. 139-59; David Welsh and David Lifton, "A Counter-Theory: The Case For Three Assassins,"

Ramparts, January 1967, section II: "The Bullet in the Back." Much of the original research can be found in Vincent Salandria, "The Warren

Report," Liberation, March 1965, pp. 14-22, Part I: A Philadelphia Lawyer Analyzes the President’s Back and Neck Wounds.

22. Fillinger Interview, and Thompson, p. 50.

23. Transcript of court proceedings of February 24, 1969, in State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw, p. 115. (Hereinafter referred to as "Finck 2/24/69

testimony.")

24. Fillinger Interview.

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Describing antero-posterior X-ray views of the lower neck region, the Panel Report declared,

"Also several small metallic fragments are present in this region."25 This observation by the Panel

vitiates Dr. Humes’s sworn testimony to the Commission that the X rays revealed no metallic

fragments in the neck region (2H361).

Detailed information concerning these fragments is scant. Of their number, the Clark Panel says

only that there are "several"; of their size, that they are "small." My requests to the Panel for more

specific designations have gone unanswered. The radiologist on the Panel, Dr. Russell Morgan, has

told me that the exact "region" in which these fragments appeared on the films was just lateral to the

tip of the right transverse process of the seventh cervical vertebra, which is located at the very base

of the neck.26 However, the back-to-front (or front-to-back) distribution of these fragments cannot

be determined because the inventory of X rays includes no lateral views of the neck. As I learned

from Dr. Fillinger, antero-posterior X-ray views can be very deceiving in depicting the front-to-back

distribution of X-ray densities. As a case in point, he showed me X rays of a boy shot in the chest

with shotgun pellets. The "A-P" view seemed to show the tiny "shot" particles in the same plane

within the chest. A lateral X ray, however, revealed that the particles were actually scattered

throughout the chest at various levels from front to back.27 Thus, all we can know about the

distribution of the fragments in the President’s neck is that they were at the level of the seventh

cervical vertebra.

Nevertheless, the knowledge that there were metallic fragments in the neck, regardless of their

number, size, or distribution, is sufficient to eliminate the possibility that military ammunition of the

type attributed to Oswald was responsible for the neck wounds.

As previously noted, full-jacketed military bullets are constructed so that they will not fragment in

soft tissue. Even if a bone in the neck region were struck (the official story is that no bone in

President Kennedy’s neck region was struck), it is unlikely that this military ammunition of medium

velocity could have produced "several small" fragments and no large ones. (There was no point on

the body from which a large fragment could have exited. The 5 mm. wound on the anterior neck,

alleged by the autopsy pathologists and the Commission to have been an exit wound, was entirely too

small and regular to have been caused by a large section of a bullet that had become deformed as a

result of fragmenting.)

That neither the head nor the neck wounds are attributable to the ammunition Oswald allegedly

used would seem to provide persuasive evidence that Oswald played no part in the shooting of the

President. In fact, the evidence of the neck fragments is clearly exculpatory, as is illustrated in an

actual case presented by LeMoyne Snyder in Homicide Investigation.28 Snyder relates the story of a

hunter found dead from a rifle wound in the chest. Investigation disclosed only two persons who

could have shot the man—one armed with a military rifle firing jacketed ammunition, the other with

a .30-calibre Winchester firing soft-nosed hunting bullets. According to Snyder, "The problem was

to try to determine whether the victim had been killed by jacketed ammunition or a soft-nosed

bullet." In reference to an X ray of the victim’s chest, Snyder writes: "Notice the numerous flecks of

lead scattered through the tissues, strongly indicating that the wound was caused by soft-nosed

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

25. Clark Panel Report, p. 13.

26. Letter to the author from Dr. Russell Morgan, dated November 12, 1969.

27. Fillinger Interview.

28. This case and the accompanying illustrations can be found in LeMoyne Snyder, pp. 135-39.

- 64 -

ammunition." The parallel to the assassination is striking, for the fragments scattered in the

President’s neck must "strongly indicate . . . soft-nosed ammunition," although the government’s

suspect allegedly fired jacketed bullets.

Snyder’s case ends justly; the guilty person is identified by the medical evidence, the innocent is

exculpated. Tests using the two suspect weapons demonstrated that the military ammunition would

have left no metal in the chest, while the soft-nosed bullet would have scattered numerous tiny

fragments, proving "that it was soft-nosed ammunition and not a jacketed bullet which killed the

man." In denying the Commission knowledge of the neck fragments, Dr. Humes denied Oswald the

possible proof of his innocence.

The presence of these fragments in the President’s neck further disassociates Oswald from the

crime because it establishes beyond any doubt that the specific bullet alleged by the Commission to

have penetrated the neck could not have produced the damage attributed to it. The Report never

directly identifies a particular bullet as having caused the neck wounds. However, it clearly implies

that the bullet that wounded Governor Connally had first penetrated the President’s neck. It asserts

that a whole bullet traceable to the Mannlicher-Carcano was found on Governor Connally’s stretcher

at Parkland Hospital (R79, 81), and expresses the belief that this bullet caused the Governor’s

wounds. Obviously, according to the theory that one bullet produced all the nonfatal wounds to both

men, it must be the Commission’s belief that the President’s neck was penetrated by the "stretcher

bullet," Commission Exhibit 399.

CE 399 could not have produced the President’s neck wounds, for the simple reason that it is

unfragmented. Several factors destroy the possibility that the bullet merely brushed some fragments

from its surface in passing through the neck, thereby leaving the metallic pieces observed on X rays.

The loss of fragments that might almost insignificantly have reduced the bullet’s mass would

certainly have created some irregularity of its surface. Yet an irregular missile of substantial size

could not have produced the small round wound in the throat upon exiting (see 6H5, 15).

In his testimony at the New Orleans conspiracy trial, FBI ballistics expert Robert Frazier

described the condition of CE 399 and the circumstances under which it could have deposited metal

fragments:

Mr. Frazier: In my opinion there was no jacketing missing, no discernible amount of jacket missing [from the

bullet].

Mr. Oser: . . . If such a pellet as Exhibit 399 is shot . . . during its travel what could possibly remove the

copper jacketing in order for the lead contained therein to be deposited into a particular target?

Mr. Frazier: The bullet would have to strike some object with sufficient force to rupture the jacket either from

striking head-on or if it were tumbling the striking of the side, or the other alternative would be if the bullet

tumbled in flight and wound up in a base-first attitude, then the lead would be exposed at the point of impact.

Mr. Oser: In Commission Exhibit 399, you found the copper jacketing intact, I believe you said?

Mr. Frazier: Yes.29

Because none of CE 399’s jacket was missing, the neck fragments could not possibly have come

from that area of the bullet. The only other means by which 399 could have lost fragments (since the

jacket was not ruptured) is if it somehow began tumbling in the neck, presenting its base to some

hard surface and scraping off fragments. Had 399 been tumbling in this manner, it would have

produced a massive and lacerated exit wound, which certainly did not occur on the President’s neck.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

29. Frazier 2/21/69 testimony, pp. 159-60.

- 65 -

Thus, there is no conceivable way in which 399 could have deposited metallic fragments in the

President’s neck.

Although the putative bullet track through the neck was never dissected, on the night of the

autopsy the pathologists were able to insert metal "probes" into the back wound to a depth of about

two inches.30 No path could be probed beyond this point and the pathologists speculated that the

bullet that entered the back might somehow have stopped short after this modest penetration and

fallen out of the wound prior to the autopsy.31 Although the pathologists abandoned this theory

when they were confronted with the anterior neck wound to be accounted for, others, including the

FBI and some critics of the Warren Report, have suggested that the "stretcher" bullet, CE 399,

penetrated the President’s back a very short distance and dropped out of the wound at Parkland

Hospital.32 This theory seems to offer an alternative by which a bullet fired from Oswald’s rifle

might be connected with the President’s wounds. However, to postulate that CE 399 or any other

bullet of the type allegedly fired by Oswald penetrated two inches of flesh and suddenly stopped

short is to beg for the ludicrous; as a theory, it is unworthy of serious consideration. I base this

assertion on the following considerations brought out to me by Richard Bernabei, a fellow researcher

who has made substantial contributions to the medical-ballistics aspects of this case.

General Principles. A cartridge, or round of ammunition, is composed of a primer, a cartridge

case, powder, and a bullet. The primer, a metal cup containing a detonatable mixture, fits into the

base of the cartridge case, which is loaded with the powder. The bullet fits into the neck of the

cartridge case. To fire the bullet, the cartridge is placed in the chamber of the firearm, immediately

behind the barrel, with its base resting against a solid support which, in a bolt-operated weapon, is

called the bolt face. When the trigger is pulled a firing pin strikes a swift, hard blow into the primer,

detonating the primer mixture. The flames from the resulting explosion ignite the powder, causing a

rapid combustion whose force propels the bullet forward through the barrel (R547).

Because the bullet is propelled by the pressure of the expanding gases in the cartridge case, the

bullet’s velocity will vary with the amount of pressure generated. This pressure not only expands the

sides of the case, but also drives the base back against the bolt face.33 The latter action flattens out

the base, and the degree of flattening plus the resultant depth of the firing-pin indentation provide a

very fair means of estimating whether the pressure was normal, high, or low, and thus whether the

bullet was fired at its standard velocity.34

Background. According to the Warren Report, three empty cartridge cases were found near the

alleged "assassin’s window," all of which were traceable to "Oswald’s" rifle owing to the

microscopic marks left on the bases (R79, 84-85). The presence of these expended cases weighed

heavily in the Commission’s conclusion that three shots were fired. The Report states: "The most

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

30. See CD 7, p. 284; 2H93; Thompson, p. 167.

31. See CD 7, p. 284, 2H367.

32. See the first FBI report on the assassination, CD 1, and the Supplemental Report, dated January 13, 1964; Thompson, pp. 165-70.

33. Sir Sydney Smith and Frederick Fiddes, Forensic Medicine (London: J. and A. Churchill, Ltd., 1955), p. 174.

34. Major Sir Gerald Burrard, The Identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1951), p. 51. The scheme I use in the

text is adapted from this book, p. 52.

- 66 -

convincing evidence relating to the number of shots was provided by the presence . . . of three spent

cartridges" (R110). Without making comment as to the soundness of this reasoning and assuming for

argument’s sake that the Carcano was used, I claim that it logically follows that bullet 399, if it is a

legitimate assassination bullet, was fired from one of the spent cases.

Drawback. Bullets fired from "Oswald’s" rifle into flesh simulants exhibited good penetrating

power, passing easily through more than 72 cm. of gelatin. These bullets struck a simulated neck

from a distance of 180 feet, traveling at approximately 1,904 f.p.s. and exiting from the simulant at

1,779 f.p.s. (R581-82). As ballistics expert Charles Dickey confirmed to me, bullets moving at such

speeds would not stop short in muscle, as is demanded by the theory placing CE 399 in the

President’s back.35

The only way a bullet such as CE 399 could have made a short penetration into muscle at a

distance of 50 yards is if its velocity had somehow been significantly retarded. Owing to the lack of

physical mitigants, the only explanation for such a tremendous slowing down is a "short-charge"

cartridge, whose explosive power is far less than standard.36 Dickey told me that this would be an

extremely unusual occurrence and that, despite the age of the alleged ammunition, the propellants

should have remained stable.37 In all the many times this ammunition has been test-fired subsequent

to the assassination, not one "short charge" has been reported.38

Disproof. As mentioned previously, a key indication of the velocity at which a bullet was fired is

found by the degree of flattening of the cartridge base and the depth of the primer indentation. Dick

Bernabei had told me that, from his own examination of the three found cartridge cases and two

others fired from the rifle for comparison purposes, the primer indentations on all the cases were

identical, proving that they had all been fired at the same velocity. To check this, I had the National

Archives prepare a photo illustrating the five bases all under similar lighting. This picture confirmed

Dick’s observations, indicating that the bullets fired from the suspect cases were fired at their normal

velocity.

Thus, from the unlikely to the impossible, neither bullet 399 nor any other bullet of that type fired

at standard velocity from the Mannlicher-Carcano could have lodged in the soft tissues of the

President’s back.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have endeavored to answer the question: Could the President’s wounds

have been caused by bullets of the type recovered and traced to Oswald’s rifle? The answer to that

question, to the most reasonably certain degree allowed by the limitations of the medical evidence, is

No. The nature of the bullet fragmentation observed within the President’s wounds strongly

indicates that he was not struck by military ammunition of the type attributed to Oswald’s rifle. In

every case, it is likely that the President’s wounds were produced by some type of sporting

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

35. Author’s taped interview with Charles Dickey at Frankford Arsenal. July 16, 1968. (Hereinafter referred to as "Dickey Interview.")

36. Thompson, pp. 167-68.

37. Dickey Interview.

38. E.G., see R193 and International Surgery 50, no. 6 (December 1968): p. 529.

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ammunition. It is possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific bullet, CE 399,

traced to Oswald’s rifle, did not penetrate the President’s neck, for there is no way in which that

bullet could have deposited the metallic fragments located in the neck region. Before any conclusions

can be drawn concerning whether CE 399 played any role in the shooting, we must first ask whether

it is possible for CE 399 to have produced the wounds of Governor Connally.

- 68 -

5

The Governor’s Wounds and the Validity of the Essential Conclusions

In the case of Governor Connally, it is not possible to determine the type of ammunition that

produced his wounds. Three bones in his body were struck by a bullet, two of them seriously broken

and fractured, and flecks of metal were observed in, and in one case removed from, his injuries. The

presence of these metallic fragments in the Governor’s wounds, however, does not specifically

indicate that he was struck by a type of sporting ammunition, because the force with which the bone

tissue was struck was sufficient for military ammunition to have deposited the fragments observed. It

is the Warren Commission’s belief that the Governor’s wounds were caused by the almost pristine

bullet, CE 399, fired from Oswald’s rifle (R95). Therefore, in this chapter I will deal not with the

general question of the type of ammunition, but with a specific bullet, CE 399. The question to be

answered is this: Did bullet 399 produce the wounds sustained by Governor Connally?

A bullet entered the back of the Governor’s chest to the left of his right armpit. This bullet struck

the fifth rib and shattered it, actually stripping away about 10 cm. of bone starting immediately below

the armpit (4H105; 6H86). The right lung was severely lacerated (6H88). The bullet exited from

the anterior chest, causing a large sucking wound about 5 cm. in diameter just below the right nipple

(6H85). There was an atypical entrance wound on the dorsal (back of the hand) side of the

Governor’s wrist and an atypical exit wound on the volar (palm) side (6H07; R93). The radius

(wrist bone) had been broken into about seven or eight pieces from the passage of the bullet (4H120).

There was a 1 cm. puncture wound located on the Governor’s left thigh some five to six inches

above the knee (R93). X rays revealed a small metallic fragment embedded in the left thigh bone,

the femur (6H106). This fragment was not surgically removed and still remains in Mr. Connally’s

femur.

It is probable that one bullet caused all of Connally’s injuries. In support of this hypothesis, the

Report paraphrases the Parkland doctors as follows:

In their testimony, the three doctors who attended Governor Connally expressed independently their opinion

that a single bullet had passed through his chest, tumbled through his wrist with very little exit velocity, leaving

small metallic fragments from the rear portion of the bullet; punctured his left thigh after the bullet had lost

virtually all of its velocity; and had fallen out of the thigh wound. (R95)

A footnote to this statement cites portions of the doctors’ depositions taken in Dallas on March 23,

- 69 -

before two of them were brought to Washington to testify for the Commission a month later. At this

time, they had not seen bullet 399 and spoke on a strictly hypothetical basis.

Dr. Tom Shires, who was involved in the Governor’s medical treatment, explained that, from the

discussion among Connally’s surgeons, "everyone was under the impression this was one missile—

through and through the chest, through and through the arm and the thigh." When asked if any of the

doctors had dissented from this consensus he replied, "Not that I remember" (6H110).

Dr. Charles Gregory, who attended to the Governor’s wrist wound, best explained the reasoning

behind the theory that one bullet caused Connally’s wounds:

Mr. Specter: Would you consider it possible, in your professional opinion, for the same bullet to have

inflicted all of the wounds which you have described on Governor Connally?

Dr. Gregory: Yes; I believe it is very possible, for a number of reasons. One of these—is the apparent loss

of energy manifested at each of the various body surfaces, which I transected, the greatest energy being at the

point of entry on the posterior aspect of the chest and of the fifth rib, where considerable destruction was done

and the least destruction having been done in the medial aspect of the thigh where the bullet apparently expended

itself.

. . . We know that high velocity bullets striking bone have a strong tendency to shatter bones and the degree

to which the fifth rib was shattered was considerably in excess of the amount of shattering which occurred in the

radius—the forearm.

. . . I think that the missile was continually losing velocity with each set of tissues which it encountered and

transected, and the amount of damage done is progressively less from first entrance to the thorax to the last

entrance in the thigh. (6H101-2)

The Report is entirely misleading, however, when it asserts that the doctors felt that the wrist

fragments were left "from the rear portion of the bullet" and that this bullet subsequently punctured

the thigh. In their original testimonies, the doctors did not postulate from what part of the bullet the

fragments had come. The intent of the Report is obvious, when we consider that the only possible

surface from which CE 399 could have lost fragments is its rear, or base, where the lead core was

naturally exposed. The thinking of the doctors, however, tended to rule out the possibility of CE

399’s having gone into the wrist at all, because they felt that this wound was the result of an irregular

or fragmented missile (6H90-91, 98-99, 102). Dr. Robert Shaw, who conducted the operation on the

Governor’s chest, was puzzled as to how the wrist wounds could have appeared as they did if a

whole bullet had caused them (6H91).

According to Dr. Shaw, it is not exactly correct to assert that a whole bullet entered the thigh. In

the portion of his original testimony cited by the Report, Dr. Shaw explained the theory of one

bullet’s causing all the Governor’s wounds in this way: "I have always felt that the wounds of

Governor Connally could be explained by the passage of one missile through his chest, striking his

wrist and a fragment of it going on into his left thigh" (6H91; emphasis added).

What the Report does not reflect is the substantial change in Drs. Shaw’s and Gregory’s opinions

when shown the bullet that allegedly produced the Governor’s wounds. The first indication of varied

opinions came through this exchange between Dr. Shaw and Commissioners Cooper, Dulles, and

McCloy. Dr. Shaw had been asked about the possibility that one bullet had caused the Governor’s

wounds:

Dr. Shaw: . . . this is still a possibility. But I don’t feel that it is the only possibility.

Sen. Cooper: Why do you say you don’t think it is the only possibility? What causes you now to say that it is

the location—

Dr. Shaw: This is again the testimony that I believe Dr. Gregory will be giving, too. It is a matter of whether

the wrist wound could be caused by the same bullet, and we felt that it could but but we had not seen the bullets

until today, and we still do not know which bullet actually inflicted the wound on Governor Connally.

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Mr. Dulles: Or whether it was one or two rounds?

Dr. Shaw: Yes.

Mr. Dulles: Or two bullets?

Dr. Shaw: Yes; or three.

Mr. McCloy: You have no firm opinion that all these three wounds were caused by one bullet?

Dr. Shaw: I have no firm opinion. . . . Asking me now if it was true. If you had asked me a month ago I

would have [had].

Mr. McCloy: Could they have been caused by one bullet, in your opinion?

Dr. Shaw: They could.

Mr. McCloy: I gather that what the witness is saying is that it is possible that they might have been caused by

one bullet. But that he has no firm opinion now that they were.

Mr. Dulles: As I understand it too. Is our understanding correct?

Dr. Shaw: That is correct. (4H109; emphasis added)

It might be regarded as highly culpable that Commissioners Dulles and McCloy, who professed

such a clear understanding of Dr. Shaw’s position, signed a report stating the opposite of what Dr.

Shaw had testified to, with a footnote referring to prior statements withdrawn by Shaw in their

presence. Dr. Shaw’s testimony is explicit that, prior to seeing the bullet in evidence, he felt that all

the Governor’s wounds were caused by one bullet; when shown the bullet, CE 399, which allegedly

did this damage, he retracted his original opinion. What was it about this bullet that caused such a

change of judgment?

Under questioning by Arlen Specter, Dr. Shaw summed up the indications that CE 399 did not

produce the Governor’s wounds. He had first been asked to comment on the possibility of a bullet’s

having caused the wounds:

Mr. Specter: When you started to comment about it not being possible, was that in reference to the existing

mass and shape of bullet 399?

Dr. Shaw: I thought you were referring directly to the bullet shown as Exhibit 399.

Mr. Specter: What is your opinion as to whether bullet 399 could have inflicted all the wounds on the

Governor then, without respect at this point to the wound of the President’s neck?

Dr. Shaw: I feel that there would be some difficulty in explaining all of the wounds as being inflicted by

bullet Exhibit 399 without causing more in the way of loss of substance to the bullet or deformation of the bullet.

(4H114)

CE 399 is a virtually undistorted, intact bullet. Its weight is approximately two grains below the

average weight of an unfired bullet of that type. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, none of

the copper jacket of 399 is missing. The nose and sides of this bullet—as shown in photographs and

as I saw in a personal examination—are without gross deformity. The base of 399 has been slightly

squeezed so that, in contrast to its rounded shaft, the tail end is slightly elliptical in shape. A small

amount of lead, which apparently has flowed from the open base, creates a slight irregularity of the

base.

Given the almost pristine condition of CE 399, it is understandable that Drs. Shaw and Gregory

were puzzled at the inference that this bullet had caused the Governor’s wounds. Before having seen

399, they imagined the bullet that penetrated Connally as being irregular or distorted, the natural

consequence of powerful impacts with two substantial bones. Dr. Shaw did not think the bullet could

even have remained intact (6H91). On the basis of the nature of the wrist wound, Dr. Gregory

thought that "the missile that struck it could be virtually intact, insofar as mass was concerned, but

probably was distorted" (6H99).

According to Dr. Gregory, the wrist wound showed characteristics of suffering the impact of an

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irregular missile (6H98, 102). In his testimony before the Commission, Dr. Gregory expounded on

the nature of this "irregular" missile:

Dr. Gregory: The wound of entrance (on the wrist) is characteristic in my view of an irregular missile in this

case, an irregular missile which has tipped itself off as being irregular by the nature of itself.

Mr. Dulles: What do you mean by irregular?

Dr. Gregory: I mean one that has been distorted. It is in some way angular, it has sharp edges or something

of this sort. It is not rounded or pointed in the fashion of an ordinary missile. (4H124)

Obviously, the condition of the bullet that produced the wrist wound, as described by Dr. Gregory,

does not match that of bullet 399, which is not "distorted" or "irregular." There is only one surface

on CE 399 that is the least bit "irregular," the base end where the lead core is naturally exposed.

When Arlen Specter asked Dr. Gregory about a possible correlation between CE 399 and the wrist

wound, the latter responded:

the only . . . deformity which I can find is at the base of the missile. . . . The only way that this missile could have

produced this wound, in my view, was to have entered the wrist backward. . . . That is the only possible

explanation I could offer to correlate this missile with this particular wound. (4H121)

Dr. Gregory admitted, in response to a hypothetical question from Counsel Specter, that the slight

irregularity in the base of CE 399 "could have" been sufficient to produce the lacerated wounds

observed on the Governor’s wrist (4H122).

Yet, Dr. Gregory’s only correlation of CE 399 to the wrist wound is not applicable to the

circumstances of the shooting. Dr. Gregory examined 399 in its spent state, long after it had been

fired and incurred its slight amount of damage. He related the bullet in this state to a bullet in flight

that had not suffered the full extent of its damage. The irregularity of 399’s base would have

occurred after it hit the wrist, as the Commission postulates. Certainly a base-first strike on the

radius would not have left the base in the same condition as it was prior to impact. Dr. Gregory’s

answer to Specter’s hypothetical question could not apply to the actual shooting.

Specter knew independently from wound ballistics experts that the condition of CE 399 was not at

all consistent with having struck a wrist. Two conferences that Specter attended were held during the

week prior to Dr. Gregory’s Commission testimony. The consensus of the first meeting was, in part,

that "the bullet recovered from the Governor’s stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a wrist."1

The expert opinion was more explicit at the next meeting, held the day of the Shaw-Gregory

testimony and attended by those doctors, the wound ballistics experts, Specter, McCloy, and others.

A memorandum of this conference reports that

in a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce (two wound ballistics experts from Edgewood Arsenal)

expressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets,

principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally’s stretcher could not have broken his radius

without having suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier (another wound ballistics expert) withheld a conclusion until

he has had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.2

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. "Memorandum for the Record," dated April 22, 1964, written by Melvin Eisenberg about a conference held on April 14, l964.

2. "Memorandum for the Record," dated April 22, 1964, written by Melvin Eisenberg about a conference held on April 21, 1964.

- 72 -

_______________________________________________________________________

photograph of 5 bullets:

g leftmost—virtually pristine

g 2nd from left—flattened length-wise but not squished vertically

g middle—top half missing/middle squished, bottom recognizable

g 2nd from right—"apparent" [misshapen] top of middle bullet

g rightmost—top 3rd of bullet is mushroomed into a "pancake"

_______________________________________________________________________

Fig. 4. CE 399 (far left) is beautifully preserved as compared to similar bullets fired from the Carcano:

(from left to right) CE 853, fired through a goat’s chest, CE 857 (in two pieces), fired into a human skull,

and CE 856, fired into a human wrist. Not one of the three, each of which did less damage than the

Commission attributes to 399, emerged as undistorted as 399. It is preposterous to assume that 399

could have struck so many obstructions and remained so undamaged. (This photograph was taken for

Harold Weisberg by the National Archives.)

Dr. Olivier’s tests, despite their shortcomings, demonstrated a very common ballistics

principle—that a bullet striking bone will usually suffer some form of distortion.

As is apparent from Figure 4, none of Dr. Olivier’s test bullets admitted into evidence matched

399, since all were grossly deformed by extreme flattening, indenting, or separation of jacket from

core (see also 17H849-51).

Although Dr. Olivier’s tests included shots through ten cadaver wrists, only one of the bullets

recovered from this series was admitted into evidence, CE 856 (see Fig. 4). The other bullets are not

in the National Archives, and until recently no researchers had seen them. On March 27, 1973, the

Archives declassified a once-"Confidential" report written in March 1965 by Dr. Olivier and his

associate, Dr. Arthur J. Dziemian. This report is entitled "Wound Ballistics of 6.5-MM Mannlicher-

Carcano Ammunition," and represents the final report of the research conducted for the Commission

at Edgewood Arsenal. This report includes photographs of four of the test bullets fired through

human wrists, published here for the first time ever (Fig. 5). The bullet marked "B" in Figure 5 is

apparently CE 856. However, the other three bullets, which produced damage similar to that

suffered by Governor Connally’s wrist, are even more mutilated than the one bullet that was

preserved for the record. These newly released photographs graphically reveal the degree of

mutilation that might be found on Mannlicher-Carcano bullets that had struck human wrists, and

make even more preposterous the Commission’s assertion that near-pristine 399 penetrated

Connally’s wrist.

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_______________________________________________________________________

photograph of 4 bullets lying horizontally: 2 bullets in 2 rows:

g top left—head mashed slightly down (1 to 2 centimeters?)

g top right—head mashed w/more deformity, (1-2 cms?)

g bottom left—head mashed, more deformity (3-4 cms?)

g bottom right—head mashed, extreme deformity (5-6 cms?)

______________________________________________________________________

Fig. 5. This photograph was considered "Confidential" by the government and withheld from

researchers for eight years. It depicts "6.5-MM Mannlicher-Carcano Bullets Recovered after being

Fired Through Distal Ends of Radii of Cadaver Wrists."

The obvious conclusion dictated by the nature of the Governor’s wounds is that CE 399 could not

have caused them. This is contrary to the Report’s assertion that "all the evidence indicated that the

bullet found on the Governor’s stretcher could have caused all his wounds" (R95). The

substantiating argument of the Report is that the total weight of the bullet fragments in the

Governor’s body does not exceed the weight lost by 399. This argument is nonsensical, for it ignores

the thoroughly nonstatistical nature of ballistics and the expected consequences of bullets striking

bone; such a line of reasoning attempts to replace imprecision with pseudo-exactness and

inapplicable mathematics.

It is therefore, in light of the well-preserved state of that bullet, preposterous to postulate that CE

399 caused Governor Connally’s wounds. Drs. Shaw and Gregory, barraged by the official

contention that 399 was discovered on the Governor’s stretcher and thus must have caused his

wounds, were reserved in expressing themselves on the unlikelihood of such a proposition. Other

experts have been more free in voicing their opinions. I have yet to find one expert who will concede

the likelihood of an occurrence such as the Commission assumes. When I spoke with ballistics

expert Charles Dickey at Frankford Arsenal, he cautioned me that he could not speak out directly

against the validity of the government’s beliefs relating to the assassination. Even he found it hard to

accept that 399 caused the Governor’s wounds.3 Among the many forensic pathologists who have

scoffed at this theory are William Enos,4 Halpert Fillinger,5 Milton Helpern,6 John Nichols,7 and

Cyril Wecht.8

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

3. Dickey Interview.

4. CBS News Inquiry: "The Warren Report," Part II, broadcast over the CBS Television Network on June 26, 1967, p. 18 of the transcript prepared by

CBS News.

5. Fillinger Interview.

6. Marshall Houts, Where Death Delights (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), pp. 62-63.

7. Nichols Interview and letter to author from Dr. John Nichols, dated September 5, 1969.

8. Thompson, p. 153.

- 74 -

The absence of gross deformity in bullet 399 contradicts the career of massive bone-smashing

attributed to it. However, as I learned from Dr. Fillinger and as Harold Weisberg pointed out several

years ago in a copyrighted study of the medical evidence, the most crucial aspect of 399’s state is its

absence of significant distortion detectable through microscopic examination.9

The barrels of modern firearms are "rifled," that is, several spiral grooves are cut into the barrel

from end to end. As the bullet is propelled through the barrel, these spiral grooves and lands (the

raised portions of the barrel between the grooves) set the bullet spinning around its axis, giving it

rotational as well as forward movement, thus increasing its stability in flight. The lands and grooves

consequently etch a pattern of very fine striated lines along the sides of the bullet, which will vary

from one weapon to another just as fingerprints vary from one person to another. Like fingerprints,

the lands and grooves scratched onto the surface of the bullet can be microscopically identified with a

particular weapon to the exclusion of all others, provided that they remain sufficiently intact

subsequent to impact (R547-48).

The very fine lands and grooves along the copper sides of CE 399 allowed the conclusive

determination that the bullet had been fired from "Oswald’s" rifle. FBI agent Frazier provided vital

testimony about the defacement of these microscopic markings on 399:

Mr. Eisenberg: Were the markings of the bullet at all defaced?

Mr. Frazier: Yes; they were, in that the bullet is distorted by having been slightly flattened or twisted.

Mr. Eisenberg: How material would you call that defacement?

Mr. Frazier: It is hardly visible unless you look at the base of the bullet and notice it is not round.

Mr. Eisenberg: How far does it affect your examination for purposes of identification?

Mr. Frazier: It had no effect at all . . . because it did not mutilate or distort the microscopic marks beyond the

point where you could recognize the pattern and find the same pattern of marks on one bullet as were present on

the other. (3H430)

From Frazier’s testimony it is apparent that the very slight "defacement" of 399’s lands and grooves

could be better termed a "displacement," for the microscopic marks were distorted only by an almost

insignificant change in the contour of the bullet as opposed to a disruption in the continuity of the

surface.

After closely examining 399 at a magnification of five diameters, I was convinced of the veracity

of Frazier’s testimony. I followed each set of lands and grooves on the bullet and saw that all were

continuous and without disruption, beginning just below the rounded nose and running smoothly

down to the tail end.

Dr. Fillinger emphasized to me that a jacketed bullet such as 399 could strike one bone and leave

its lands and grooves intact so far as visible to the naked eye. When I assured him that Agent Frazier

had found these marks still to be intact even through microscopic examination, Fillinger seemed

somewhat taken aback. "Well, this is unlikely," he said. "It’s very unlikely, as a matter of fact.

Even our own ballistics people here don’t get that kind of good luck."10 One can readily appreciate

that forceful contact with firm bone tissue is bound to disrupt the fine striations on a bullet’s surface,

even with a jacketed projectile.

If 399 wounded Governor Connally, then it was necessarily immune to the conditions that distort

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

9. Fillinger Interview; Weisberg, Post Mortem I, p. 25

10. Ibid.

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and deform other bullets of its kind. If it smashed through two substantial bones and rammed into

another one, it failed to manifest the normal indications of such a flight, those which marked other

bullets under even less stress. The theory that 399 wounded the Governor is valid only on the

premise that it was a magic bullet capable of feats never before performed in the history of ballistics.

Bullet 399 is not magic. It is just the typical mass of copper and lead that constitutes other bullets

of its kind. Governor Connally was likewise not magic. His flesh and bones would deform bullets as

would anyone else’s; his wounds showed very strong indications that the bullet causing them had, in

fact, become distorted and irregular.

The only tenable conclusion warranted by the evidence of the Governor’s wounds, the condition

of 399, and the laws of physics is that 399 did not wound Governor Connally.

The Search for Legitimacy

Did 399 figure in the assassination shots?

As we have seen, there is no possible way by which bullet 399 can be related to the President’s

wounds. The extensive fragmentation involving the fatal wounds rules out a missile left intact. The

presence of fragments in the President’s neck likewise rules out 399, for there is no possible

circumstance under which it could have deposited fragments in the neck and still account for the

other wounds, such as the tiny hole in the throat. Had the President sustained a back wound of short

penetration, it could not have been caused by a bullet whose penetrating power was as great as 399’s.

Governor Connally, to judge from the nature of his wounds and the predictable consequences of a

strike such as he endured, was hit by a missile that did not leave behind a very large percentage of its

substance but ended its flight in a distorted or mangled condition.

Thus, CE 399 can not be related to any of the wounds inflicted on either victim during the

assassination. From this it follows that 399 must have turned up at Parkland Hospital in a manner not

related to the victims and their treatment. It had to have been placed on the stretcher at some time,

manually and intentionally.

It can not be a legitimate assassination bullet.

The situation at Parkland on the afternoon of the assassination would have enabled almost anyone

to gain access to the area where 399 was discovered on the stretcher. A man identifying himself as

an FBI agent tried to enter the room in which the dead President lay at the hospital. The Secret

Servicemen who witnessed this incident and had to restrain the man with force reported that he

"appeared to be determined to enter the President’s room" (18H798-99 and 795-96). The

Commission apparently made no efforts to determine the identity of this man and sought no further

details from other witnesses.

Two witnesses were positive that they saw Jack Ruby at Parkland Hospital at about the time the

President’s death was announced (15H80; 25H216).

Harold Weisberg, in his book Oswald in New Orleans, reveals that a Cuban refugee of "disruptive

influence" was employed at Parkland at the time of the assassination. Pointing out that the

Commission’s best evidence indicated that 399 was a "plant," Weisberg finds it extremely suspicious

that no effort was made to identify this "political Cuban" when his existence was known to both the

Secret Service and the Commission.11 Such a man would have had access to the stretcher on which

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

11. Weisberg, Oswald in New Orleans, pp. 292-93.

- 76 -

399 was found and would not have attracted the least suspicion, since he was an employee of the

hospital.

Nurse Margaret Henchcliffe related an incident that illustrates how almost anyone could have

made his way to the area of the stretcher. She reported that a 16-year-old boy carrying a camera had

gotten into the Emergency Area, seeking to take pictures of the room in which the President had died

less than an hour before (21H240).

There is currently no evidence against the possibility that the two bullet fragments found in the

front seat of the limousine and traced to "Oswald’s" rifle were likewise "planted" after the victims

were taken to the hospital. We should recall from the discussion of the President’s head wounds that

the fatal damage was, in no instance, consistent with the damage produced by military ammunition of

the type attributed to Oswald. Photographs taken outside the hospital show substantial crowds in

proximity to the unguarded limousine.12 As in the case of the stretcher bullet, the circumstances did

permit incriminating evidence to be planted.

It cannot be said, and indeed I make no pretense of saying, that a phony FBI man, a "disruptive

Cuban," Jack Ruby, or a young boy with a camera planted bullet 399 at Parkland Hospital. The

thrust of this discussion has been that anyone could have gained access to the locations in which

evidence pointing to Oswald was found. This point may also be applied to the Book Depository,

where Oswald’s rifle and three spent shells were discovered. Within fifteen minutes of the

assassination, the Depository was swarming with unidentified people.13 The medical evidence, as the

discussion in this and the previous chapter demonstrates, disassociates military bullets from the

President’s wounds and proves that a specific bullet traced to Oswald’s rifle and found at Parkland

could not have wounded either victim in the assassination. The spectrographic analyses, the only

evidence that could correlate Oswald’s rifle with the wounds, was conspicuously avoided by the

Commission, and has been suppressed by the government so that no one to this day may know the

spectrographer’s findings. It is therefore not unreasonable to postulate, in accordance with the only

scientific evidence currently available, that the tangible evidence that implicates Oswald was

deliberately "planted," and did not figure in the actual shooting. The unmistakable inference from

the medical evidence is that the rifle, the cartridge cases, and the bullets had to have been planted.

The circumstances at the Book Depository and at Parkland Hospital indisputably could have enabled

a "conspirator" to plant evidence pointing to Oswald. The Commission has produced no evidence

that precludes the possibility of a "plant."

The discussion in this section has removed the very foundation of the official case against Oswald

by demonstrating, to the degree of certainty possible, that Oswald’s rifle was not responsible for the

wounds of President Kennedy and Governor Connally. The medical/ballistics evidence thus

exculpates Oswald and presents several unmistakable conspiratorial implications.

The Warren Commission claimed to have much evidence, apart from the medical/ballistics

findings, that proved or indicated that Oswald was the assassin. This additional evidence, and the

Commission’s treatment of it, I will consider in Part III.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

12. E.g., see Jesse Curry, Personal JFK Assassination File (Dallas: American Poster and Printing Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 34-37. The Dallas Morning

News of November 23, 1963, estimated that a crowd or 200 had gathered outside the hospital (p. 9).

13. See Weisberg, Whitewash II, p. 35.

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

single-bullet theory. (UPE Photo)

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

“Presumed Guilty” Pictures and Diagrams

- 80 -

PART III:

THE ACCUSED

- 81 -

6

The Rifle in the Building

The Mannlicher-Carcano C2766 rifle was brought into the Book Depository and taken to the sixth

floor in some way at some time prior to 1:30 P.M., November 22, when it was found hidden in a

stack of boxes near the sixth-floor stair landing. For the "lone assassin-no conspiracy" theory to be

valid, the only man who could have brought the rifle into the building is Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Commission’s conclusion that Oswald brought the rifle into the Depository demands

premeditation of the murder. According to the Report, Oswald deliberately lied to co-worker Frazier

about his reason for returning to Irving the day before the assassination and constructed a paper sack

on or before Thursday, November 21, for the purpose of carrying his rifle into the building (R137).

The prerequisite of premeditation in this case is prior knowledge of the motorcade route. If

Oswald did not know by Thursday morning that President Kennedy would pass his building, he

obviously could not have planned to shoot the President. The closest the Commission came to

considering the question of prior knowledge was to assert that Oswald could have known the

motorcade route as early as November 19, when it appeared in the Dallas papers (R40, 642). It never

established whether Oswald did know the route.

Despite the Commission’s assurances, on the basis of newspaper accounts neither Oswald nor any

Dallas resident could have known the exact motorcade route, for conflicting accounts were

published. The problem, as stated by the Report in its "Speculations and Rumors" appendix, is this:

Speculation. —The route shown in the newspaper took the motorcade through the Triple Underpass via Main

Street, a block away from the Depository. Therefore, Oswald could not have known that the motorcade would

pass directly by the . . . Depository Building. (R643).

The Report appears to dispel this speculation by asserting that the published route clearly indicated a

turn-off from Main onto Houston, and Houston onto Elm, taking the President directly in front of the

Depository as the procession approached the underpass. In dispelling this rumor, the Report quotes

incompletely and dishonestly from the relevant Dallas papers.

On November 16, the Dallas Times Herald reported that while the route had not yet been

determined, "the presidential party apparently will loop through the downtown area, probably on

Main Street" (22H613). Both the Dallas Morning News and the Times Herald carried the release of

the motorcade route on November 19, including the information about the turn onto Elm (22H614-

- 82 -

15). The next day, the Morning News carried another description of the route, saying the motorcade

"will travel on Mockingbird Lane, Lemmon Avenue, Turtle Creek Boulevard, Cedar Springs,

Harwood, Main and Stemmons Freeway," with mention of the Houston-to-Elm stretch omitted

(22H616). Not included in the Commission’s evidence but discovered and printed by Harold

Weisberg, is a map of the motorcade route that appeared on the front page of the Morning News of

November 22, the day of the President’s visit. The map shows the route as taking Main down to

Stemmons Freeway again, avoiding the cut-over to Elm.1

The Report never quotes those press accounts which did not include the Elm Street stretch,

leaving the impression that Oswald, in his premeditation, knew previously that the President would

pass directly before him, and therefore present an easy target (R40). The distinction is not major,

because either published route would have put the President within shooting range of the Depository.

It should be noted, however, that the Commission, in making its case, quoted selectively from the

record.

Before it can be stated that Oswald knew of any motorcade route, it must first be established that

he had access to a medium by which he could have been so informed. Roy Truly and Bonnie Ray

Williams thought that Oswald occasionally read newspapers in the Depository (3H218, 164). Mrs.

Robert Reid saw Oswald in the building some five to ten times and recalled that "he was usually

reading," although she did not specify what he read (3H279). Charles Givens provided the best detail

on Oswald’s reading habits during work. He testified that Oswald would generally read the previous

day’s paper: "Like if the day was Tuesday, he would read Monday’s paper in the morning." Givens

was certain that the editions of the paper Oswald read, the Dallas Morning News, were dated, for he

usually looked at them after Oswald finished (6H352).

Oswald’s sufficient access to the electronic media is not definitely established. Mrs. Earlene

Roberts, the woman who rented Oswald his small room on North Beckley, testified that he rarely

watched television: "If someone in the other rooms had it on, maybe he would come and stand at the

back of the couch—not over 5 minutes and go to his room and shut the door" (6H437). The police

inventory of materials confiscated from Oswald’s room reveals he had a "brown and yellow gold

Russian make portable radio" (24H343), although there is no information as to whether the radio was

usable, or used.

Although the evidence of Oswald’s accessibility to information relating to the motorcade route

does not establish whether he could have known anything about the exact route, there are indications

that he was, in fact, totally uninformed about and uninterested in the procession. The narrative

written by Marina Oswald when she was first put under protective custody leads one to believe that

Oswald knew nothing of the President’s trip. "Only when I told him that Kennedy was coming the

next day to Dallas and asked how I could see him—on television, of course—he answered that he did

now know," Marina wrote of the night before the assassination (18H638).2

More important information was provided by co-worker James Jarman, who met Oswald on the

first floor of the Depository between 9:30 and 10:00 on the morning of November 22. According to

Jarman, Oswald

was standing up in the window and I went to the window also, and he asked me what were the people gathering

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. Weisberg, Whitewash, p. 23.

2. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

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around the corner for, and I told him that the President was supposed to pass that morning, and he asked me did I

know which way he was coming, and I told him, yes; he probably come down Main and turn on Houston and

then back again on Elm.

Then he said, "Oh, I see," and that was all. (3H201)

Jarman first reported this incident on November 23, 1963, in his affidavit for the Dallas Police

(24H213).

Jarman’s story is subject to two interpretations. If Oswald spoke honestly, then he clearly

revealed his ignorance of the day’s events, knowing neither the reason for the crowds gathering

around the building nor the route of the motorcade. If Oswald knew the answers to the questions he

posed to Jarman, it would seem that he was deliberately trying to "plant" false information to indicate

his lack of interest in the motorcade, a good defense in case he was later apprehended in connection

with the assassination. However, as Sylvia Meagher has pointed out, if Oswald deliberately dropped

exculpatory hints to Jarman, why did he not later offer this to the police as part of the evidence in his

favor?3 In all the pages of reports and testimony relating to Oswald’s interrogation sessions, there is

no indication that Oswald ever mentioned the early morning meeting with Jarman.

Thus there is no basis for asserting that Oswald knew the exact motorcade route as of Thursday

morning, November 21. The newspapers, including the one Oswald normally saw a day late, carried

conflicting versions of the route, varying at the crucial juncture—the turn-off on Houston Street.

While there is no way of knowing whether Oswald had seen any of the published information

relevant to the motorcade, his actions indicate a total unawareness of the events surrounding the

procession through Dallas.

During October and November of 1963, Oswald lived in a Dallas rooming house while his wife,

Marina, and two children lived in Irving at the home of Ruth Paine, some 15 miles from the

Depository. In the words of the Report, "Oswald traveled between Dallas and Irving on weekends in

a car driven by a neighbor of the Paines, Buell Wesley Frazier, who also worked at the Depository.

Oswald generally would go to Irving on Friday afternoon and return to Dallas Monday morning"

(R129). On November 21, the day before the assassination, Oswald asked Frazier whether he could

ride home with him that afternoon to obtain "some curtain rods" for "an apartment." Sinister

implications are attached to this visit to Irving, which the Report would have us believe was

unprecedented. Assuring us that the curtain-rod story was a fabrication, and asserting that

"Oswald’s" rifle was stored in the Paine garage, the Report lays ground for the ultimate assertion that

Oswald returned to Irving to pick up his rifle and bring it to work the next day.

The Report’s explanation of Oswald’s return to Irving hinges on the assumption that the C2766

rifle was stored in the Paine garage. Of this there is not a single shred of evidence. The Commission

had one tenuous item that could indicate the presence of a rifle wrapped in a blanket in the Paine

garage; Marina testified she once peeked into this blanket and saw the stock of a rifle (R128). The

other evidence indicates only that a bulky object was stored in the blanket. Certainly no one saw the

specific C2766 rifle in the garage. As Liebeler has pointed out, "that fact is that not one person alive

today ever saw that rifle in the Paine garage in such a way that it could be identified as that rifle."4

The Report recounts in dramatic detail the police search of the Paine garage on the afternoon of

the assassination. When asked that day if her husband owned a rifle, Marina pointed to the rolled-up

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

3. Meagher, pp. 37-38.

4. Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum, p. 4.

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blanket, which the officers proceeded to lift. The blanket hung limp in an officer’s hand; it was

empty (R131). Although there was no evidence that the rifle had ever been stored there, the

Commission found the presence of the empty blanket on November 22 evidence that Oswald

"removed the rifle from the blanket in the Paines’ garage on Thursday evening" (R137). Had the rifle

been stored where the Commission assumed, anyone could have removed it at almost any time prior

to the afternoon of the shooting. The Paines apparently were not preoccupied with the security of

their home, as indicated on Saturday, November 23. While the police were searching the Paine

house that day, Mr. and Mrs. Paine drove off, leaving the officers completely alone (7H193).

With no evidence that Oswald ever removed the rifle from the Paine garage or that the rifle was

even stored there, the Commission’s case loses much of its substance, however circumstantial.

Further reducing the suspicion evoked by Oswald’s return to Irving is the fact that this trip was not

particularly unusual. Despite the Commission’s statement that he generally went home only on

weekends, Oswald kept to no exact pattern for visiting his wife during the short time he was

estranged from her. On the contrary, Oswald frequently violated the assumed "pattern" of weekend

visits. He began his employment at the Depository on October 16. That Friday, the 18th, he came to

Irving but did not return to Dallas the following Monday because his wife had given birth to a second

daughter that Sunday; he visited Marina on Monday and spent the night at the Paines’s. The next

weekend was "normal." However, there are strong indications that Oswald returned to Irving the

next Thursday, October 31. During the weekend of November 8, Oswald again spent Monday with

his wife in Irving, this time because it was Veteran’s Day. Furthermore, Oswald did not return at all

the following weekend, and he fought over the telephone with his wife that Sunday about his use of

an assumed name in registering at the roominghouse. The following Thursday, the 21st, he returned

to Irving (see R737-40).

The Report does not include mention of a visit by Oswald to Irving on any Thursday other than

November 21. But there is strong evidence of another such return, as was brought out by Sylvia

Meagher:

It does not appear that Oswald’s visit on Thursday evening without notice or invitation was unusual. But it is

not clear that it was unprecedented. An FBI report dealing with quite another matter—Oswald’s income and

expenditures—strongly suggests that Oswald had cashed a check in a grocery store in Irving on Thursday

evening, October 31, 1963 [CE 1165, p. 6]; the Warren Commission decided arbitrarily that the transaction took

place on Friday, November 1 [R331]. Neither Oswald’s wife nor Mrs. Ruth Paine, both of whom were

questioned closely about the dates and times of Oswald’s visits to Irving during October and November,

suggested that he had ever come there—with or without prior notice—on a Thursday. It is possible, though

implausible, that Oswald came to Irving on Thursday, October 31, 1963 solely to cash a check and then returned

to Dallas without contacting his wife or visiting the Paine residence. More likely, Marina and Mrs. Paine forgot

that visit or, for reasons of their own, preferred not to mention it. Either way, it is clear that Oswald’s visit to

Irving on Thursday night, November 21, may not have been unprecedented.5

Oswald’s excuse for his return to Irving Thursday was that he intended to pick up curtain rods for

"an apartment." The Report attempts to vitiate this excuse by noting that (a) Oswald spoke with

neither his wife, nor his landlady, nor Mrs. Paine about curtain rods, (b) Oswald’s landlady testified

that his room on North Beckley Avenue had curtains and rods, and (c) "No curtain rods were known

to have been discovered in the Depository Building after the assassination" (R130).

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

5. Meagher, p. 37.

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The source cited for the assertion that no curtain rods were found in the Depository after the

assassination is CE 2640. The Report neglects to mention that CE 2640 details an investigation

conducted on September 21, 1964, ten months after the assassination, when only one person, Roy

Truly, was questioned about curtain rods (25H899). Truly was "certain" that no curtain rods had

been found because "it would be customary for any discovery of curtain rods to immediately be

called to his attention." Aside from the ludicrous implication that the Depository had rules governing

the discovery of curtain rods, this "inquiry" was too limited and too late to be of any significance.

Apparently, the Commission’s request for this inquiry calculated its worthlessness. Rankin made

this request of Hoover in a letter dated August 31, 1964. The letter, which I obtained from the

National Archives, leaves little doubt that the result of the inquiry was preconceived to be against

Oswald. Rankin ordered that Truly be interviewed "in order to establish that no curtain rods were

found in the [Depository] following the assassination."6 This phraseology seems to instruct Hoover

not to conduct an objective investigation; otherwise, the letter would have read "in order to establish

whether any curtain rods were found."

The Commission accepted without question the landlady’s assurance that Oswald’s room had

curtain rods. Had it conducted the least investigation, it could easily have determined that the room

did need rods. Black Star photographer Gene Daniels followed many of the events in Dallas on the

weekend of the assassination. On Saturday morning, November 23, he went to Oswald’s rooming

house and obtained a fascinating set of pictures. Daniels explained the circumstances to me:

I went to the rooming house the following morning and requested permission to make the photograph from

the landlady. I’m not sure of her name but I don’t think she was the owner. We went into the room and she told

me she preferred not to have me take any pictures until she put "the curtains back up." She said that newsmen the

evening before had disturbed the room and she didn’t want anyone to see it messed up. I agreed and stood in the

room as she and her husband stood on the bed and hammered the curtain rods back into position. While she did

this, I photographed them or possibly just her I forget right now, up on the bed with the curtain rods etc.7

It seems doubtful in the extreme that the activity of newsmen the night before could physically

have removed curtain rods from the wall in Oswald’s room. A more reasonable possibility is that the

rods had not been up at all until November 23, when Daniels witnessed and photographed the

landlady and her husband hammering the rods into the wall.

This renovating of Oswald’s cubicle could not have come at a better time in the development of

the Dallas police case against Oswald. On the day of the assassination, Wesley Frazier filed an

affadavit for the police that included information about the curtain-rod story (24H209). At 10:30 on

the morning of November 23, police Captain Will Fritz asked Oswald if he had carried curtain rods

to work the previous day. According to Fritz, Oswald denied having told the curtain-rod story to

Frazier (R604). (This denial, in light of opposing testimony from Frazier and his sister, was

apparently a falsehood.)

Thus, the Commission is on shaky ground when it assumes Oswald’s excuse for returning to

Irving to have been false. The inferences drawn from the premise of a spurious excuse are likewise

weakened or disproved. This Commission, which seems to have become a panel of amateur

psychiatrists in conjuring up "motives" for Oswald, showed an appalling lack of sympathy and

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

6. Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated August 31, 1964, found in the Truly "K.P." (Key Persons) file.

7. Letter to the author from Gene Daniels, received March 19, 1970. Quoted by permission.

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understanding in "evaluating" the "false excuse."

In deciding whether Oswald carried a rifle to work in a long paper bag on November 22, the Commission

gave weight to the fact that Oswald gave a false reason for returning home on November 21, and one which

provided an excuse for the carrying of a bulky package the following morning. (R130)

The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald . . . told the curtain rod

story to Frazier to explain both the return to Irving on a Thursday and the obvious bulk of the package which he

intended to bring to work the next day. (R137)

The curtain-rod story may not have been false. However, there are several possible explanations

for Oswald’s Irving visit other than the one that had such appeal to the Commission—that Oswald

came to pick up his rifle. As Leo Sauvage has pointed out, Ruth Paine and Marina had their own

theory about Oswald’s return.8 In the words of the Report:

The women thought he had come to Irving because he felt badly about arguing with his wife about the use of

the fictitious name. He said that he was lonely, because he had not come the previous weekend, and told Marina

that he "wanted to make his peace" with her. (R740)

Sylvia Meagher, more understanding than the Commission, finds nothing suspicious in a man’s

trying to "make his peace" with his wife or visiting his two young daughters after not having seen

them for two weeks. She points out that if this were the reason for Oswald’s visit, it is unlikely that

he would have admitted it to Frazier, with whom he was not close. Oswald could very innocently

have lied about the curtain rods to Frazier to cover up a personal excuse, bringing a package the next

morning to substantiate his story and avoid embarrassing questions.9 (The Paine garage, stuffed

almost beyond capacity with the paraphernalia of two families, contained many packages that

Oswald could have taken on the spur of the moment.)

As the record now stands, Oswald’s actions on November 21 could well have been perfectly

innocent. The fact is that we do not know why Lee Oswald returned to Irving that Thursday, but the

trip is no more an indictment of Oswald than it is an element of his defense. However, official

misrepresentations allowed unnecessary and unfair implications to become associated with the

return. There is no reason to believe that Oswald knew anything about the November 22 motorcade.

His visit to Irving on a Thursday probably was not unprecedented. Since there is no proof that the

C2766 rifle was ever stored in the Paine garage, there is no basis for the theory that Oswald’s return

was for the purpose of obtaining that rifle. A number of innocent explanations for the visit present

themselves as far more plausible than the incriminating and unsubstantiated notion of the

Commission.

The Long and Bulky Package

At about 7:15 on the morning of the assassination, Oswald left the Paine home to walk to the

residence of Mrs. Linnie Mae Randle, Buell Wesley Frazier’s sister. Mrs. Randle and Frazier were

the only two people to see Oswald that morning before he arrived at the Depository; they were

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

8. Leo Sauvage, The Oswald Affair (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 363-67.

9. Meagher, p. 38.

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likewise the only two people who saw the long package that Oswald had brought with him to work.

Their accounts are critical in the whole case and deserve close scrutiny.

Standing at the kitchen window of her house, Mrs. Randle saw Oswald approaching. In his right

hand he carried "a package in a sort of heavy brown bag," the top of which was folded down. Mrs.

Randle specified that Oswald gripped the package at the very top and that the bottom almost touched

the ground (2H248). When Commission Counsel Joseph Ball had Mrs. Randle demonstrate how

Oswald held the package, he apparently tried to lead her into providing a false description for the

record; she corrected him:

Mr. Ball: And where was his hand gripping the middle of the package?

Mrs. Randle: No, sir; the top with just a little bit sticking up. You know just like you grab something like

that.

Mr. Ball: And he was grabbing it with his right hand at the top of the package and the package almost

touched the ground?

Mrs. Randle: Yes, sir.10 (2H248; emphasis added)

Mrs. Randle estimated the length of this package as "a little more" than two feet. When shown the

38-inch paper sack found near the alleged "assassin’s" window, she was sure this was too long to

have been the one carried by Oswald unless it had been folded down. In fact, she volunteered to fold

the bag to its proper length; the result was a 28 1/2-inch sack (2H249-50). Furthermore, the FBI, in

one of its interviews with Mrs. Randle, staged a "reconstruction" of Oswald’s movements in which a

replica sack was used and folded according to Mrs. Randle’s memory. "When the proper length of

the sack was reached according to Mrs. Randle’s estimate," states the FBI report of this interview,

"it was measured and found to be 27 inches long" (24H408) .

We must admire Mrs. Randle’s consistency in estimating the length of Oswald’s package despite

severe questioning before the Commission. Her recollection of the sack’s length varied by only one

and half inches in at least two reconstructions and one verbal estimate. If we recall her specific

description of the manner in which Oswald carried the sack (gripped at the top with the bottom

almost touching the ground), it is obvious that the package could not have exceeded 29 inches in

maximum length. (Oswald was 5 feet, 9 inches [24H7].)

Frazier first noticed the package on the back seat of his car as he was about to leave for the

Depository. He estimated its length as "roughly about two feet long" (2H226). From the parking lot

at work, Oswald walked some 50 feet ahead of Frazier. He held the package parallel to his body, one

end under his right armpit, the other cupped in his right hand (2H228). During his testimony before

the Commission, Frazier, slightly over 6 feet tall compared to Oswald’s 5 feet, 9 inches, held a

package that contained the disassembled Carcano. He cupped one end in his right hand; the other

end protruded over his shoulder to the level of his ear. Had this been the case with Oswald’s

package, Frazier is sure he would have noticed the extra length (2H243). Frazier’s Commission

testimony is buttressed by the original sworn affidavit he filed on November 22, 1963. Here he

estimated the length of the sack as "about two feet long," adding "I noticed that Lee had the package

in his right hand under his arm . . . straight up and down" (24H209). Furthermore, during another

"reconstruction," Frazier indicated for FBI agents the length occupied by the package on the back

seat of his car; that distance was measured to be 27 inches (24H409). Again, if we take Frazier’s

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

10. The first critical analysis of the questioning of witnesses Frazier and Randle appeared in Weisberg’s Whitewash, pp. 17-19.

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description of how Oswald held the package in walking toward the Depository, the maximum length

is fixed at 27 to 28 inches.

Frazier and Mrs. Randle proved to be consistent, reliable witnesses. Under rigorous questioning,

through many reconstructions, their stories emerged unaltered and reinforced: the package carried by

Oswald was 27 to 28 inches long. Both witnesses provided ample means for verifying their estimates

of length; on each occasion their recollections proved accurate. Frazier and Mrs. Randle both

independently described the package as slightly more than two feet long; they both physically

estimated the length of the package at what turned out to be from 27 to 28 1/2 inches; they both

recalled Oswald’s having carried his sack in a manner that would set the maximum length at about

28 inches. One could hardly expect more credible testimony. Perhaps it is true that the combined

stories of Frazier and Mrs. Randle, persuasive as they are, do not prove that Oswald’s package was

27 to 28 inches long. However, no evidence has been put forth challenging their stories, and until

such evidence can be produced, establishing a valid basis for doubt, we are forced to accept the 28-

inch estimate as accurate.

Not even the Commission could produce a single piece of evidence disputing Frazier and Mrs.

Randle. It merely believed what it wanted to believe and quoted what it wanted to quote, even to the

point of self-contradiction. Without comment as to the remarkably accurate aspects of Mrs. Randle’s

testimony, the Report dismisses her story entirely by asserting with no substantiation that she "saw

the bag fleetingly." It then quotes Frazier as saying he did not pay much attention to Oswald’s

package (R134). This, however, was not the full extent of what Frazier had said, as the selfcontradictory

Report had previously quoted. "Like I said, I remember I didn’t look at the package

very much," warned Frazier, " . . . but when I did look at it he did have his hands on the package like

that" (R133-34).

Accepting Frazier’s and Mrs. Randle’s stories would have aborted in its early stages the theory

that Oswald killed the President unassisted. The longest component of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle

when disassembled is 34.8-inches long (3H395). The Commission’s best and, in fact, only evidence

on this point said the package carried to work by Oswald was too short to have contained the rifle in

its shortest possible form, disassembled. Obviously, a 35-inch package strains the limits imposed by

the recollections of Frazier and Mrs. Randle. Such a sack would have dragged on the ground when

grasped at the top, protruded over Oswald’s shoulder when cupped in his hand (as Frazier himself

demonstrated), occupied more space on the back seat of Frazier’s car, and been perceptibly longer

than was consistently described by the two people who saw it. There is just no reason to believe that

the package was over 28 inches long, and every reason to believe that 28 inches was very close to its

proper length. The Commission could give no valid reason for rejecting that estimate; it merely

chose to disregard the stories of its only two witnesses. Any alternative would have entailed

admitting that Oswald did not carry the "assassination weapon" to work with him that morning.

The Report plays up its rejection of the Frazier-Randle testimony as if, virtually torn between

witness accounts and cold, hard, scientific fact, it gave in to the latter. In the words of the Report:

The Commission has weighed the visual recollection of Frazier and Mrs. Randle against the evidence here

presented that the bag Oswald carried contained the assassination weapon and has concluded that Frazier and

Randle are mistaken as to the length of the bag. (R134)

What evidence was "presented that the bag . . . contained the assassination weapon"?

"A [38-inch long] handmade bag of paper and tape was found in the southeast corner of the sixth

floor alongside the window from which the shots were fired. It was not a standard type bag which

could be obtained in a store and it was presumably made for a particular purpose," says the Report

(R134). Before any evidence relevant to this bag is presented, the Report draws an important

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inference from its location; "The presence of the bag in this corner is cogent evidence that it was

used as the container for the rifle" (R135). The Commission was unequivocal; the evidence meant

only what the Commission wanted it to mean—nothing more, nothing less. To take issue with the

inference read into the evidence: the presence of that bag in that corner is "cogent evidence" only

that someone placed the bag in the corner. Its location of discovery can not tell who made the bag,

when it was made, or what it contained. The Commission wanted it to have contained the rifle;

therefore, it must have.

Having attached a significance to this bag (CE 142) "cogent" only for the Commission’s

predisposition toward Oswald’s sole guilt, the Report presents what it labels "Scientific Evidence

Linking Rifle and Oswald to Paper Bag." There was no difficulty in linking Oswald to the bag; his

right palmprint and left index fingerprint were on it, proving that at some time, in some way, he had

handled it. Again, the Commission reads an improper inference into this evidence. Because the

palmprint was found at the bottom of the paper bag, says the Report, "it was consistent with the bag

having contained a heavy or bulky object when [Oswald] handled it since a light object is usually

held by the fingers" (R135). Not mentioned is the fact that, as Oswald walked to Frazier’s home, he

grasped his package at the top, allowing it to hang freely, almost touching the ground. According to

the Commission’s analysis of how people hold packages, it would seem unlikely that Oswald’s bag

contained anything "heavy or bulky." Nor is there any proof that Oswald was holding CE 142 when

he left prints on it. Had it been lying on a hard, flat surface, Oswald could have leaned against or on

it and left prints.

The Report quotes questioned-documents experts to show that CE 142 had been constructed from

paper and tape taken from the Depository’s shipping room, probably within three days of November

22 (R135-36). Here the Report explicitly states what it had been implying all along: "One cannot

estimate when, prior to November 22, Oswald made the paper bag." The bag was made from

Depository materials; at some time it was touched by Oswald. This does not prove or so much as

indicate that Oswald constructed the bag. The Commission assumed Oswald made it, offering no

evidence in support of its notion. It could not provide substantiation, for the evidence proves Oswald

did not make CE 142.

Troy Eugene West, a full-time mail wrapper at the Depository, worked at the same bench from

which the materials for the paper sack were taken. As Harold Weisberg points out in Whitewash,

"West had been employed by the Book Depository for 16 years and was so attached to his place of

work that he never left his bench, even to eat lunch. His only separation from it, aside from the

necessary functions of life [and this is presumed; it is not in his testimony], was on arrival before

work, to get water for coffee."11

Although West was the one man who could know if Oswald had taken the materials used in

constructing CE 142, he was never mentioned in the Report. In his deposition, he virtually obviated

the possibility that Oswald made the bag:

Mr. Belin: Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever help you wrap mail?

Mr. West: No, sir; he never did.

Mr. Belin: Do you know whether or not he ever borrowed or used any wrapping paper for himself?

Mr. West: No, sir; I don’t.

Mr. Belin: You don’t know?

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

11. West’s testimony was first noted by Harold Weisberg and published in Whitewash, p. 21.

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Mr. West: No; I don’t.

Mr. Belin: Did you ever see him around these wrapper rolls or wrapper roll machine, or not?

Mr. West: No, sir; I never noticed him being around. (6H360)

West brought out another important piece of information. Expert examination showed that one

long strip of tape had been drawn from the Depository’s dispenser and then torn into smaller pieces

to assemble the bag (R579-80). West told Counsel Belin that the dispensing machine was

constructed so that the dried mucilage on the tape would be automatically moistened as tape was

pulled out for use. The only way one could obtain dry tape, he added, was if he removed the roll of

tape from the machine and tore off the desired length (6H361). However, the tape on CE 142

possessed marks that conclusively showed that it had been pulled through the dispenser (R580).

Thus, the tape used in making CE 142 was wet as soon as it left the dispenser; it had to be used at

that moment, demanding that the entire sack be constructed at West’s bench.

The fabricator of CE 142 had to remain at or near the bench long enough to assemble the entire

bag. West never saw Oswald around the dispensing machines, which indicates that Oswald did not

make the bag. This contention is supported by those who observed Oswald during his return to

Irving on Thursday evening. Frazier never saw Oswald take anything with him from work (2H141),

despite the fact that, even folded, CE 142 would have been awkward to conceal. Likewise, neither

Ruth Paine nor Marina ever saw Oswald with such a sack on or before November 21 (1H120; 3H49;

22H751).

The Report thus far has done some rather fancy footwork with the paper sack, asserting without

basis that Oswald was its fabricator when the evidence allows the conclusion only that Oswald once

touched the bag. Next in line was the "scientific evidence" that the Commission promised would link

the "rifle . . . to paper bag."

When FBI hair-and-fiber expert Paul Stombaugh examined CE 142 on November 23, he found

that it contained a single, brown, delustered viscose fiber and "several" light-green cotton fibers

(R136). The Report does not mention Stombaugh’s qualification of the word "several" as indicating

only two or three fibers (4H80). It seems that these few fibers matched some composing the blanket

in which the rifle was allegedly stored, although Stombaugh could render no opinion as to whether

the fibers had in fact come from that blanket (R136-37). How does this relate the rifle to the paper

bag when it does not conclusively relate even the blanket to the bag? The Commission’s theory is

"that the rifle could have picked up fibers from the blanket and transferred them to the paper bag"

(R137).

Had the Commission not been such a victim of its bias, it could have seen that this fiber evidence

had no value in relating anything. The reason is simple: the evidence indicates that the Dallas Police

took no precautions to prevent the various articles of evidence from contacting each other prior to

laboratory examination. On Saturday morning, November 23, physical items such as the rifle, the

blanket, the bag, and Oswald’s shirt arrived in Washington, on loan from the police for FBI scrutiny.

It was then that Stombaugh found fibers in the bag (4H75). Prior to Oswald’s death, this evidence

was returned to the police. However, on November 26, the items remaining in police custody were

again turned over to the FBI. Before the second return, some of the items were photographed

together on a table (4H273-74). This photograph, CE 738, shows the open end of the paper bag to be

in contact with the blanket. Such overt carelessness by the police ruined the bag for any subsequent

fiber examinations. If this was any indication of how the evidence was handled by the police when

first turned over to the FBI, all the fiber evidence becomes meaningless because the various

specimens could have come in contact with each other after they were confiscated.

There is ample evidence that CE 142 never contained the Mannlicher-Carcano. James Cadigan,

FBI questioned-documents expert, disclosed an important piece of information in his testimony

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concerning his examination of the paper sack:

I was also requested . . . to examine the bag to determine if there were any significant markings or scratches

or abrasions or anything by which it could be associated with the rifle, Commission Exhibit 139, that is, could I

find any markings that I could tie to that rifle....And I couldn’t find any such markings. (4H97; emphasis added)

Cadigan added that he could not know the significance of the absence of marks (4H97-98).

There is, however, great significance, due to circumstances unknown to Cadigan. If Oswald

placed the rifle into CE 142, he could have done so only between 8 and 9 P.M. on November 21; he

simply did not have time to do it the following morning before going to work.12 Had he removed the

rifle immediately upon arriving at the Depository at 8 A.M., it would still have remained in the bag

for at least 12 hours. The bag likewise would have been handled by Oswald during a half-block walk

to Frazier’s house and a two-block walk from the parking lot to the Depository. It is stretching the

limits of credibility to assume that a rifle in two bulky parts (the 40-inch Carcano could have fit into

the 38-inch bag only if disassembled) in a single layer of paper would fail to produce obvious marks

after over 12 hours of storage and handling through two-and-a-half blocks of walking. More

significantly, Cadigan made no mention of oil stains having been found on the bag, but the rifle was

described by FBI Director Hoover as "well-oiled" (26H455). It is reasonable to conclude from the

condition of CE 142 that this sack, even if Oswald had made it, never held "Oswald’s" rifle.

CE 142 may be significant in two ways. Judging from the immediate impression received that this

sack had been used to transport the rifle (despite the lack of evidence that it did), it is not impossible

that it was made and left by the window with exactly that effect in mind, even for the purpose of

incriminating Oswald.

_______________________________________________________________________

photograph of flat paper bag on top

and disassembled rifle lying at bottom

(at least 9 discernable pieces)

_______________________________________________________________________

Fig. 6. The Commission says that all these pieces of the disassembled Carcano were carried in this bag

without leaving any identifiable marks or oil stains. There is no crease in the bag where it would have

been folded over had it contained the disassembled rifle. Oswald’s careless handling of his package is

not consistent with its having contained so many loose parts.

However, with all the trash scattered about the storage spaces in the building, it is conceivable that

CE 142 had been made for some unknown purpose entirely unrelated to the shooting and merely

discarded on the sixth floor. The evidence that Oswald neither made 142 nor carried it home the

evening of November 21 leads to the inference that the bag he did carry on the 22nd has never come

to light subsequent to the assassination. Likewise, it follows that the contents of Oswald’s package

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

12. According to Marina, Oswald overslept on the morning of the assassination and did not get up until 7:10, at which time he dressed and left

(18H638-39). Oswald arrived at Frazier’s home at 7:20 that morning (24H408). Thus, he had only ten minutes to get ready for work and walk to

Frazier’s, which would not have allowed him time to disassemble the rifle, place it in the sack, and replace the blanket.

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may never have been found. (There is evidence suggesting that Oswald, before entering the

Depository, may actually have discarded his package in rubbish bins located in an enclosed loading

dock at the rear of the building. Employee Jack Dougherty saw Oswald arrive for work, entering

through a back door. At that time, Dougherty saw nothing in Oswald’s hands [6H377].)

There is not the slightest suggestion in any of the evidence that Oswald carried his rifle to work

the morning of November 22. The indications are persuasive and consistent that Oswald carried

almost anything but his rifle. Oswald took little care with his package, hardly treating it as if it

contained the apparatus with which he later intended efficiently to commit murder. As he

approached Frazier’s house, he held the package at the top, "much like a right handed batter would

pick up a baseball bat when approaching the plate" (24H408), certainly a peculiar and dangerous way

for one to transport a package containing a rifle in two bulky parts. Every indication of the length of

Oswald’s sack consistently precludes its having contained the disassembled rifle. Interestingly

enough, Frazier had once worked in a department store uncrating packaged curtain rods. Having

seen the appearance of these, Frazier found nothing suspicious about Oswald’s package which, he

was informed, contained curtain rods (2H229).

It is no longer sufficient to say, as I did in the first chapter, that there is no evidence that Oswald

carried his rifle to work on the morning of the assassination. There is, as the evidence indicates, no

reason even to suspect that he did (based on the descriptions of the package he carried), that he

would have (based on the indications that he knew nothing of the motorcade route), or that he could

have (based on the total lack of proof that the C2766 rifle had been stored in the Paine garage). The

most reasonable conclusion—if any is to be drawn—is that Oswald did not carry his rifle to work that

morning.

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7

Oswald at Window?

Hard as the Commission tried to make tenable that Oswald carried his rifle to work on November 22,

it tried even harder to place him at the southeast corner window of the Depository’s sixth floor, the

putative source of the shots. This was the location at which a man with a gun had been seen, and to

which Oswald had unlimited access. In accordance with the official story, Oswald’s guilt hinges on

this one point, he had to have been at the window to have fired some or all of the shots.

The first evidence discussed in this section of the Report concerns the fingerprints left by Oswald

on two cartons located next to the "assassin’s" window. As was noted in chapter 2, the Commission

used this evidence to place Oswald at the window at some time. In doing this, it read an unfair and

improper meaning into limited data. The presence of Oswald’s prints on these objects indicates only

that he handled them and does not disclose exactly when or where he did so. I noted that Oswald

could have touched the cartons prior to the time they were moved to the southeast corner window.

The fingerprints were the only "physical evidence" the Commission could offer to relate Oswald to

that specific window (R140-41). Since the fingerprint evidence in fact does not relate Oswald to the

window, it is important to note that no physical evidence placed Oswald at the window at any time.

Oswald’s Actions Prior to the Shooting

On the morning of the assassination, a number of Depository employees had been putting down

flooring on the sixth floor. About 15 minutes before noon, these employees decided to break for

lunch. Going to the northeast corner of the building, they began to "race" the elevators down to the

first floor. On their way down, they noticed Oswald standing at the elevator gate on the fifth floor

(6H349), where he was shouting for an elevator to descend (3H168; 6H337).

One of the floor-laying crew, Charles Givens, told the Commission that upon returning to the sixth

floor at 11:55, to get his cigarettes, he saw Oswald on that floor (6H349). The Report attaches great

significance to Givens’s story by calling it "additional testimony linking Oswald with the point from

which the shots were fired" (R143). No testimony was needed to link Oswald with the sixth floor; he

worked there. However, the Report adds that Givens "was the last known employee to see Oswald

inside the building prior to the assassination," unfairly precipitating a bias against Oswald by

implying that he remained where Givens saw him for the 35 minutes until the assassination.

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It is necessary to note, although admittedly it is not central to Oswald’s possible involvement in

the shooting, that there are many aspects of Givens’s story that cast an unfavorable light on its

veracity.1 It seems illogical that Oswald would have gone up to the sixth floor after yelling for an

elevator down from the fifth; even at that, such "jumping" between floors is consistent with the type

of work Oswald did: order filling. In addition, police Lieutenant Jack Revill and Inspector Herbert

Sawyer both testified that Givens was taken to city hall on the afternoon of the shooting to make a

statement about seeing Oswald on the sixth floor (5H35-36; 6H321-22). However, the police radio

log indicates that Givens was picked up because he had a police record (narcotics charges) and was

missing from the Depository (23H873). Givens himself told the Commission he was picked up and

asked to make a statement, but not in reference to having seen Oswald (6H355). Indeed, the affidavit

he filed on November 22, 1963, makes no mention of either his return to the sixth floor or his having

seen Oswald there (24H210).

The previous information forms a basis for doubting Givens’s story. There is one other

consideration that strongly suggests this entire episode to be a fabrication: it was physically

impossible for Givens to have seen Oswald as he swore he had done. From Givens’s testimony, it is

clear that his position on the sixth floor when he claimed to have seen Oswald was somewhere

between the elevators at the northwest corner of the building to about midway between the north and

south walls. Either way, he would have been along the far west side of the sixth floor (6H349-50).

However, Givens said he observed Oswald walking along the east wall of the building, walking away

from the southeast corner in the direction of the elevators (6H349-50). Dallas Police photographs of

the sixth floor (CEs 725, 726, 727, 728) show that such a view would have been obscured by columns

and stacks of cartons as high as a man. If Givens saw Oswald, then there must be a major flaw in his

description of the event. As the record stands, Givens could not have seen Oswald on the sixth floor

at 11:55.

We should recall that when Oswald was seen on the fifth floor at about 11:45, he was shouting for

an elevator to take him down. Apparently this is exactly the course Oswald pursued, if not by

elevator, then by the stairs. Bill Shelley was part of the floor-laying crew that left the sixth floor

around 11:45. He testified unambiguously that after coming down for lunch he saw Oswald on the

first floor near the telephones (7H390). Mention of this fact is entirely absent from the Report.

The Commission seized upon Givens’s story because, according to the Report, he was the last

person known to have seen Oswald prior to the shots. The Report strongly implies that Oswald must

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. It was Sylvia Meagher who brought the shortcomings of Givens’s story to light in her book, pp. 64-69.

Since her initial disclosure in 1967, Mrs. Meagher has discovered several unpublished documents in the National Archives that leave little doubt

that Givens’s story of seeing Oswald on the sixth floor was fabricated and that staff lawyer David Belin knew this when he took Givens’s testimony.

The documents tell a shocking story, which Mrs. Meagher incorporated in an impressive article published in the Texas Observer, August 13, 1971.

When Givens was interviewed by the FBI on the day of the assassination, he not only failed to mention having seen Oswald on the sixth floor,

but he actually said he saw Oswald on the first floor at 11:50, reading a newspaper in the domino room (CD 5, p. 329). On February 13, 1964, Police

Lt. Jack Revill told the FBI "he believes that Givens would change his story for money" (CD 735, p. 296). A lengthy memorandum by Joseph Ball

and David Belin dated February 25, 1964, acknowledges that Givens originally reported seeing Oswald on the first floor reading a paper at 11:50 on

the morning of November 22 (p. 105). On April 8, 1964, Givens testified for Belin in Dallas and said for the first time that he saw Oswald on the

sixth floor at 11:55 when he returned for his cigarettes (Givens had never before said that he returned to the sixth floor) (See 6H346-56). Belin twice

asked Givens if he ever told anyone that he "saw Lee Oswald reading a newspaper in the domino room around 11:50 . . . that morning?" On both

occasions, Givens denied ever making such a statement (6H352, 354). Finally, on June 3, 1964, when the FBI reinterviewed him, Givens "said he

now recalls he returned to the sixth floor at about 11:45 A.M. to get his cigarettes . . . [and] it was at this time he saw Lee Harvey Oswald" (CD 1245,

p. 182; emphasis added).

Belin apparently found nothing unusual in Givens’s failure to mention the sixth-floor encounter until he testified in April 1964, contradicting a

previous statement that he denied making. Givens’s denial does not prove he actually never made his early statement, although for Belin the pro

forma denial was sufficient, despite the caution of Lt. Revill that Givens would change his story for money. The Report (R143) mentions only the

later Givens story and says nothing of the original version. This is consistent with the constant suppression of evidence exculpatory of Oswald.

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have remained on the sixth floor, since no one subsequently saw him elsewhere. But Oswald was

both inconspicuous and generally unknown at the Depository; he always kept to himself. Likewise,

most of the other employees had left the building during this time. It would have been unremarkable

if no one noticed his presence, especially then. However, if someone had noticed Oswald in a

location other than the sixth floor after 11:55, his story would have been all the more important by

virtue of Oswald’s inconspicuousness.

The Report makes two separate assurances that no one saw Oswald after 11:55 and before the

shots, first stating "None of the Depository employees is known to have seen Oswald again until after

the shooting" (R143), and later concluding, "Oswald was seen in the vicinity of the southeast corner

of the sixth floor approximately 35 minutes before the assassination and no one could be found who

saw Oswald anywhere else in the building until after the shooting" (R156). A footnote to the first

statement lists "CE 1381" as the source of information that no employee saw Oswald between 11:55

and 12:30 that day.

CE 1381 consists of 73 statements obtained by the FBI from all employees present at the

Depository on November 22, 1963. In almost every instance, the particular employee is quoted as

saying he did not see Oswald at the time of the shots. A few people stated they either had never seen

Oswald at all or had not seen him that day (see 22H632-86). This collection of statements does not

support the Report’s assertion that no employee saw Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30, for it almost

never addresses that time period, usually referring only to 12:30, the time of the shots.

I have learned that General Counsel Rankin, in requesting these statements from the FBI,

deliberately sought information relating to Oswald’s whereabouts at 12:30 only, never considering

the 11:55 to 12:30 period. The Report then falsely and wrongly applied this information to the

question of Oswald’s whereabouts between 11:55 and 12:30.

I obtained from the National Archives a letter from J. Lee Rankin to Hoover dated March 16,

1964, in which Rankin requested that the FBI "obtain a signed statement from each person known to

have been in the Texas School Book Depository Building on the assassination date reflecting the

following information:" Rankin then listed six items to be included in each statement: "1. His name

. . . [etc.], 2. Where he was at the time the President was shot, 3. Was he alone or with someone else.

. . ?, 4. If he saw Lee Harvey Oswald at that time?," plus two other pieces of information.2 Clearly,

Rankin desired to know whether any employee had seen Oswald at the time of the shots. There is no

reason to expect that the agents who obtained the statements would have sought any further detail,

and the final reports reveal that indeed none was sought. Even Hoover, in the letter by which he

transmitted CE 1381 to the Commission, reported, "Every effort was made to comply with your

request that six specific items be incorporated in each statement" (22H632).

Why did Rankin, when he had the FBI go to such extensive efforts in contacting all 73 employees

present that day, fail to request the added information about the time between 11:55 and 12:30, the

period that could hold the key to Oswald’s innocence had he been observed then in a location other

than the sixth floor?

The Commission knew of at least two employees who had seen Oswald on the first floor between

12:00 and 12:30. It suppressed this information from the Report, lied in saying that no one had seen

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated March 16, 1964, in the "Reading File of Outgoing Letters and Internal Memoranda."

This letter was based on a request for additional investigation by staff lawyers Ball and Belin. In their lengthy "Report #1," dated February 25,

1964, they suggested that "everyone who had a reason to be in" the Depository on November 22, 1963, be interviewed. "Each of these persons

should be asked: 1) to account for his whereabouts at the time the President was shot. . . . 3) if he saw Lee Oswald at that time" (p. 125).

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Oswald during this time, and cited an incomplete and irrelevant inquiry in support of this drastic

misstatement.

Depository employee Eddie Piper was questioned twice by Assistant Counsel Joseph Ball. During

one of his appearances, Piper echoed the information he had recorded in an affidavit for the Dallas

Police on November 23, 1963, namely, that he saw and spoke with Oswald on the first floor at 12:00

noon (6H383; l9H499). Piper seemed certain of this, and he was consistent in reporting the

circumstances around his brief encounter with Oswald. Clearly, this is a direct contradiction of the

Report’s statement that no one saw Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30. The Report, never mentioning

this vital piece of testimony, calls Piper a "confused witness" (R153). This too was the opposite of

the truth. Piper was able to describe events after the shooting in a way that closely paralleled the

known sequence of events (6H385). There was, in fact, no aspect of Piper’s testimony that indicated

he was less than a credible witness.

While Piper’s having seen Oswald on the first floor at 12:00 does not preclude Oswald’s having

been at the window at 12:30, it is significant that this information was suppressed from the Report,

which makes an assertion contrary to the evidence. One aspect of Piper’s story could have weighed

heavily in Oswald’s defense. In his November 23 affidavit, Piper recalled Oswald as having said

"I’m going up to eat" during the short time the two men met (19H499). In his testimony, Piper

modified this quotation, expressing his uncertainty whether Oswald had said "up" or "out" to eat

(6H386). Despite the confusion over the exact adverb Oswald used, the significant observation is

that he apparently intended to eat at 12:00. He would most likely have done this on the first floor in

the "domino" room or in the second-floor lunchroom. Oswald consistently told the police that he had

been eating his lunch at the time the President was shot (R600, 613). The suppression of Piper’s

story was, in effect, the suppression of an aspect of Oswald’s defense.

The Commission had other corroborative evidence of a probative nature. Oswald’s account of his

whereabouts and actions at and around the time of the shooting cannot be fully known, for no

transcripts of his police interrogations were kept—a significant departure from the most basic

criminal proceedings (see 4H232; R200). Our only information concerning Oswald’s interrogation

sessions during the weekend of the assassination is found in contradictory and ambiguous reports

written by the various participants in the interrogations—police, FBI, and Secret Service (R598-636).

The interrogation reports are generally consistent in relating that Oswald said that he had been

eating his lunch at the time of the shots. In three of these reports a significant detail is added, in three

partially contradictory versions. Captain Fritz thought Oswald "said he ate lunch with some of the

colored boys who worked with him. One of them was called ‘Junior’ and the other was a little short

man whose name he didn’t know" (R605). FBI Agent James Bookhout wrote that "Oswald had eaten

lunch in the lunchroom . . . alone, but recalled possibly two Negro employees walking through the

room during this period. He stated possibly one of these employees was called ‘Junior’ and the other

was a short individual whose name he could not recall but whom he would be able to recognize"

(R622). Secret Service Inspector Thomas Kelley recalled that Oswald "Said he ate lunch with the

colored boys who worked with him. He described one of them as ‘Junior,’ a colored boy, and the

other was a little short negro [sic] boy" (R626).

These versions are consistent in reporting that Oswald had been eating lunch (probably on the first

floor) when he saw or was with two Negro employees, one called "Junior," the other a short man. It

is possible that Oswald was in a lunchroom (the domino room) during this time, although we cannot

be certain that Oswald directly stated so to the police. Likewise, it is possible that Agent Bookhout

correctly reported that Oswald ate alone and merely observed the two Negro employees, while Fritz

and Kelley misconstrued Oswald’s remarks as indicating that he ate his lunch with these two men.

James Jarman was a Negro employed at the Depository; his nickname was "Junior" (3H189;

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6H365). On November 22, Jarman quit for lunch at about 11:55, washed up, picked up his sandwich,

bought a coke, and went to the first floor to eat. He ate some of his lunch along the front windows on

the first floor, near two rows of bins; walking alone across the floor toward the domino room, he

finished his sandwich. After depositing his refuse, Jarman left the building with employees Harold

Norman and Danny Arce through the main entrance (3H201-2).

Harold Norman, another Negro employee, was of rather modest height, fitting the description of

the man Oswald thought had been with Jarman on the first floor (see CE 491). On November 22,

Norman ate his lunch in the domino room and "got with James Jarman, he and I got together on the

first floor." According to Norman, Jarman was "somewhere in the vicinity of the telephone" near the

bins when the two men "got together." This would define a location toward the front of the building.

Norman confirmed Jarman’s testimony that the two subsequently left the building through the main

entrance (3H189).

There is no firm evidence pinpointing the exact time Jarman and Norman left the Depository.

Their estimates, as well as those of the people who left at the same time or who were already

standing outside, are not at all precise, apparently because few workers had been paying much

attention to the time. The estimates varied from 12:00 as the earliest time to 12:15 as the latest (see

3H189, 219; 6H365; 22H638, 662; 24H199, 213, 227). Twelve o’clock seems a bit early for

Jarman and Norman to have finished eating and to be out on the street; the time was probably closer

to 12:15. It was most likely within five minutes prior to 12:15 that Jarman and Norman "got

together" near the front or south side of the first floor and walked out the main entrance together.

Jarman and Norman appeared together on the first floor again, about ten minutes after stepping

outside. Because the crowds in front of the Depository were so large, the two men went up to the

fifth floor at 12:20 or 12:25. To do this, they walked around to the back of the building, entering on

the first floor through the rear door and taking the elevator up five stories (3H202).

Obviously, Oswald could not have told the police that "Junior" and a short Negro employee were

together on the first floor unless he had seen this himself.3 For Oswald to have witnessed Jarman and

Norman in this manner, he had to have been on the first floor between either 12:10 and 12:15 or

12:20 and 12:25. The fact that Oswald was able to relate this incident is cogent evidence that he was

in fact on the first floor at one or both of these times. If he was on the sixth floor, as the Commission

believes, then it was indeed a remarkable coincidence that out of all the employees, Oswald picked

the two who were on the first floor at the time he said, and together as he described. Since this is a

remote possibility that warrants little serious consideration, I am persuaded to conclude that Oswald

was on the first floor at some time between 12:10 and 12:25, which is consistent with the previously

cited testimony of Eddie Piper.4

Buttressing the above-discussed evidence is the story of another employee, who claimed to have

seen Oswald on the first floor around 12:15. Mrs. Carolyn Arnold, a secretary at the Depository, was

the crucial witness. Her story was omitted not only from the Report but also from the Commission’s

printed evidence. It was only through the diligent searching of Harold Weisberg that an FBI report

of an early interview with her came to light.5 She spoke with FBI agents on November 26, 1963,

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

3. The episode with Jarman and Norman was first brought to light by Harold Weisberg in Whitewash, p. 73. Sylvia Meagher later discussed the issue

in more detail in her book, p. 225.

4. The Report mentions this incident in a context other than one of Oswald’s defense. It assures that Jarman neither saw nor ate with Oswald at the

times involved (R182). This in no way disproves the validity of Oswald’s claim that he saw Jarman, for it would not have been unusual for Jarman

or any other employee not to have noticed Oswald.

5. Harold Wesiberg, Photographic Whitewash, pp. 74-75, 210-11.

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only three days after the assassination. The brief report of the interview states that

she was in her office on the second floor of the building on November 22, 1963, and left that office between

12:00 and 12:15 PM, to go downstairs and stand in front of the building to view the Presidential Motorcade. As

she was standing in front of the building, she stated that she thought she caught a fleeting glimpse of LEE

HARVEY OSWALD standing in the hallway between the front door and the double doors leading into the

warehouse, located on the first floor. She could not be sure this was OSWALD, but said she felt it was and

believed the time to be a few minutes before 12:15 PM. (CD5:41)

As Weisberg cautioned in his book Photographic Whitewash, where he presents this FBI report,

"This is the FBI retailing [sic] of what Mrs. Arnold said, not her actual words."6

Mrs. Arnold was never called as a witness before the Commission; absolutely no effort was made

to check her accuracy or obtain further details of her story. If what she related was true, she provided

the proof that Oswald could not have shot at the President. The Commission’s failure to pursue her

vital story was a failure to follow up evidence of Oswald’s innocence.

Mrs. Arnold was reinterviewed by the FBI on March 18, 1964, in compliance with Rankin’s

request to Hoover for statements from all Depository employees present at work November 22

(22H634). In accordance with the deliberate wording of Rankin’s items to be included in the

statements as discussed earlier, Mrs. Arnold was not asked about seeing Oswald before the shooting,

as she earlier said she did. Instead, she provided the specific information requested in item (4) of

Rankin’s letter: "I did not see Lee Harvey Oswald at the time President Kennedy was shot." "At the

time" of the assassination obviously is not the same as "before" the assassination. If Rankin for some

specific reason avoided asking about any employee who had seen Oswald right before the shots, he

could have had no better witness in mind than Mrs. Arnold.

In her March 18 statement, Mrs. Arnold wrote: "I left the Texas School Book Depository at about

12:25 PM." The report of her first interview states that she left her office on the second floor between

12:00 and 12:15 and saw Oswald from outside the building at "a few minutes before 12:15." The

important distinction between these two estimates is that one is in Mrs. Arnold’s words, the other but

a paraphrase. Of the people who left the Depository with Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Donald Baker recalled

having left at about 12:15 (22H635), Miss Judy Johnson at about 12:15 (22H656), Bonnie Rachey

also at 12:15 (22H671), and Mrs. Betty Dragoo at 12:20 (22H645).

It is perfectly reasonable to assert that Mrs. Arnold saw a man whom "she felt" was Oswald on the

first floor anywhere between a few minutes before 12:15 and, at the latest, 12:25. The actual time

probably tended toward the 12:15 to 12:20 period. The significance of this one piece of information

is startling; the "gunman" on the sixth floor was there from 12:15 on. If Mrs. Arnold really did see

Oswald on the first floor at this time, he could not have been a sixth-floor assassin.

Arnold Rowland is the first person known to have spotted a man with a rifle on the sixth floor of

the Depository. The time of this observation was, according to Rowland, who had noted the large

"Hertz" clock atop the Depository, 12:15 (2H169-72). Rowland provided an even more accurate

means for checking his time estimate:

there was a motorcycle parked just on the street, not in front of us, just a little past us, and the radio was on it

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

6. Ibid., p. 74.

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giving details of the motorcade, where it was positioned, and right after the time I noticed him (the man on the

sixth floor) and when my wife was pointing this other thing to me . . . the dispatcher came on and gave the

position of the motorcade as being on Cedar Springs. This would be in the area of Turtle Creek, down in that

area. . . . And this was the position of the motorcade and it was about 15 or 16 after 12. (2H172-73; emphasis

added)

Rowland could not have had access to the police radio logs. However, every version of these logs in

the Commission’s evidence shows that the location of the motorcade described by Rowland was in

fact broadcast between 12:15 and 12:16 PM (17H460; 21H390; 23H911). We must note also that

while Rowland first noticed this man before hearing the broadcast at 12:15, it is possible that he had

been there for some period of time prior to that.

The difference between Mrs. Arnold’s earliest estimate of the time she possibly saw Oswald on

the first floor and the time Rowland saw the sixth-floor gunman is but a few minutes, hardly enough

time for Oswald to have picked up his rifle, made his way to the sixth floor, assembled the rifle, and

appeared at the appropriate window. If Mrs. Arnold’s later estimates are accurate, then Oswald was,

in fact, on the first floor while the "assassin" was on the sixth.

Without elaboration from Mrs. Arnold, we can draw no conclusions based on the brief FBI report

of her first interview. At this late date, I feel that Mrs. Arnold can not honestly clarify the

information reported by the FBI, either through fear of challenging the official story or through

knowledge of the implication of what she knows. It was the duty of the Warren Commission to seek

out Mrs. Arnold to obtain her full story and test her accuracy, if not in the interest of truth, certainly

so as not posthumously to deny Oswald the possible proof of his innocence.

The Commission failed in its obligation to the truth for the simple reason that it (meaning its staff

and General Counsel) never sought the truth. The truth, according to all the relevant evidence in the

Commission’s files, is that Oswald was on the first floor at a time that eliminates the possibility of his

having been the sixth-floor gunman, just as he told the police during his interrogations.

Identity of the Gunman

The Commission relied solely on the testimony of eyewitnesses to identify the source of the shots

as a specific Depository window. The presence of three cartridge cases by this window seemed to

buttress the witnesses’ testimony. The medical findings, although not worth credence, indicated that

some shots were fired from above and behind; still, that evidence, even if correct, cannot pinpoint

the precise source "above and behind" from which certain shots originated. It was the people who

said they saw a man with a gun in this window who provided the evidence most welcome to the

Commission.

The Commission’s crew of witnesses consisted of Howard Brennan and Amos Euins, both of

whom said they saw the man fire a rifle; Robert Jackson and Malcolm Couch, two photographers

riding in the motorcade, who saw the barrel of a rifle being drawn slowly back into the window after

the shots (although neither saw a man in the window); Mrs. Earle Cabell, wife of the city’s mayor,

who, also riding in the procession, saw "a projection" from a Depository window (although she could

not tell if this was a mechanical object or someone’s arm); and James Crawford, who saw a

"movement" in the window after the shots but could not say for sure whether it was a person whom

he had seen (R63-68). Two additional witnesses are added in the Report’s chapter "The Assassin."

They are Ronald Fischer and Robert Edwards, both of whom saw a man without a rifle in the window

shortly before the motorcade arrived.

Two other "sixth-floor gunman" witnesses didn’t quite make it into the relevant sections of the

Report—one, in fact, never made the Report at all. Arnold Rowland saw the gunman 15 minutes

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before the motorcade arrived at the plaza. However, at this time, the man was in the far southwest

(left) window. Rowland told the Commission that another man then occupied the southeast corner

(right) window. The Commission, whose legal eminences knew that another man on the sixth floor

at this time satisfied the legal definition of conspiracy, sought only to discredit Rowland, rejecting his

story under a section entitled "Accomplices at the Scene of the Assassination" (R250-52). Mrs.

Carolyn Walther saw the gunman in the right window, shortly before the procession arrived.

However, she too saw a second man on the sixth floor, although the "accomplice" she described was

obviously different from Rowland’s (24H522). Rowland sprang his information on the Commission

by surprise, none of the various reports on him having ever mentioned the second man. Mrs. Walther

told of a second man from the beginning and was totally ignored by the Commission.

While the testimony indicates the presence of a man holding a rifle in the southeast-corner sixthfloor

window, there is no evidence that this rifle was fired during the assassination. Under

questioning by Arlen Specter, Amos Euins, a 16-year-old whose inarticulateness inhibited the

effectiveness with which he conveyed his observations, said he saw the Depository gunman fire the

second shot (2H209). However, Specter never asked Euins what caused him to conclude that the gun

he saw had actually discharged, that is, that the gunman was not merely performing the motions of

firing that gave the impression of actual discharge when combined with the noises of other shots, but

was fully pulling the trigger and shooting bullets.

The Report cites the testimony of three employees who were positioned on the fifth floor directly

below the "assassin’s" window, one of whom claimed to have heard empty cartridge cases hitting the

floor above him, with the accompanying noises of a rifle bolt (R70). However, there is nothing about

the testimony of any of these men to indicate that the shots came from directly above them on the

sixth floor. As Mark Lane points out in Rush to Judgement, the actions of these men subsequent to

the shooting were not consistent with their believing that any shots came from the sixth floor; one of

the men even denied making such a statement to the Secret Service7 (3H194). The stories of the

fifth-floor witnesses, if valid, indicate no more than the presence of someone on the sixth floor

operating the bolt of a rifle and ejecting spent shells.

Howard Brennan was the Commission’s star witness among those present in the plaza during the

assassination. His testimony is cited in many instances, including passages to establish the source of

the shots and the identity of the "assassin." Brennan was the only person other than Euins who

claimed to have seen a gun fired from the Depository window (R63). Yet, in spite of Brennan’s

testimony that he saw the sixth-floor gunman take aim and fire a last shot, there is reason to believe

that the man Brennan saw never discharged a firearm. Brennan was asked the vital questions that

Euins was spared.

Mr. McCloy: Did you see the rifle explode? Did you see the flash of what was either the second or the third

shot?

Mr. Brennan: No.

Mr. McCloy: Could you see that he had discharged the rifle?

Mr. Brennan: No . . .

Mr. McCloy: Yes. But you saw him aim?

Mr. Brennan: Yes.

Mr. McCloy: Did you see the rifle discharge, did you see the recoil or the flash?

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

7. Mark Lane, chap. 6.

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Mr. Brennan: No.

Mr. McCloy: But you heard the last shot?

Mr. Brennan: The report; yes, sir. (3H154)

If Brennan looked up at the window as he said, his testimony would strongly indicate that he saw a

man aim a gun without firing it. When the Carcano is fired, it emits a small amount of smoke

(26H811) and manifests a recoil (3H451), as do most rifles. That Brennan failed to see such things

upon observing the rifle and hearing a shot is cogent evidence that the rifle Brennan saw did not fire

the shot.

Thus, the Commission’s evidence—taken at face value—indicates only that a gunman was present

at the sixth-floor window, not an assassin. This distinction is an important one. A mere gunman

(one armed with a gun) cannot be accused of murder; an assassin is one who has committed murder.

A gunman present at the sixth-floor window could have served as a decoy to divert attention from

real shooters at other vantage points.8 While we cannot know surely just what the man in the sixthfloor

window was doing, it is vital to note that evidence is entirely lacking that this gunman was, in

fact, an assassin.

To the Commission, the gunman was the assassin, no questions asked. The limitations of the

evidence could not be respected when the conclusions were prefabricated. By arbitrarily calling a

gunman the "assassin," the Commission, in effect, made the charge of murder through circumstances,

without substantiation.

As was discussed in chapter 1, the Commission had no witness identification of the "assassin"

worthy of credence. Of the few who observed the gunman, only Brennan made any sort of

identification, saying both that Lee Harvey Oswald was the gunman and that he merely resembled the

gunman. The Commission rejected Brennan’s "positive identification" of Oswald, expressed its

confidence that the man Brennan saw at least looked like Oswald, and evaluated Brennan as an

"accurate observer" (R145).

Many critics have challenged the Report’s evaluation of Brennan as "accurate."9 Evidence that I

have recently discovered indicates that Brennan was not even an "observer," let alone an accurate

one.

One of the main indications of Brennan’s inaccuracy is his description of the gunman’s position.

Brennan contended that in the six-to-eight-minute-period prior to the motorcade’s arrival, he saw a

man "leave and return to the window ‘a couple of times.’" After hearing the first shot, he glanced up

at this Depository window and saw this man taking deliberate aim with a rifle (R144). The Report

immediately begins apologizing for Brennan:

Although Brennan testified that the man in the window was standing when he fired the shots, most probably

he was either sitting or kneeling. . . . It is understandable, however, for Brennan to have believed that the man

with the rifle was standing. . . . Since the window ledges in the Depository building are lower than in most

buildings [one foot high], a person squatting or kneeling exposes more of his body than would normally be the

case. From the street, this creates the impression that the person is standing. (R144-45)

The Report’s explanation is vitiated by the fact that Brennan claimed to have seen the gunman

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

8. The possibility that the sixth-floor gunman was a decoy was first suggested by Sylvia Meagher in her book, p. 9.

9. E.G., see Weisberg, Whitewash, pp. 39-42, and Lane, chap. 5.

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standing and sitting. "At one time he came to the window and he sat sideways on the window sill,"

swore Brennan. "That was previous to President Kennedy getting there. And I could see practically

his whole body, from his hips up" (3H144). Thus, Brennan should have known the difference

between a man standing and sitting at the window, despite the low window sill. Had the gunman

been standing, he would have been aiming his rifle through a double thickness of glass, only his legs

visible to witness Brennan. Had he assumed a sitting position—on the sill or on nearby boxes—he

would have had to bend his head down below his knees to fire the rifle out the window (see

photographs taken from inside the window, at 22H484-85).

From November 22 until the time of his Commission testimony, Brennan said he was looking at

the sixth floor at the time of the last shot. His November 22 affidavit states this explicitly (24H203)

and it can be inferred from his later interviews. In observing the Depository, Brennan contended that

he stopped looking at the President’s car immediately after the first shot (3H143-44). Obviously,

then, he could not have seen the impact of the fatal bullet on the President’s head, which came late,

probably last, in the sequence of shots. However, Brennan’s observations were suddenly augmented

when he was interviewed by CBS News in August 1964 for a coast-to-coast broadcast. As was aired

on September 27, 1964, Brennan told CBS "The President’s head just exploded."10 Unless Brennan

lied to either CBS or the federal and local authorities, it must now be believed that he saw the sixthfloor

gunman fire the last shot, then turned his head faster than the speeding bullet to have seen the

impact of that bullet on the President’s head, then turned back toward the window with equal alacrity

so as to have seen the gunman slowly withdraw his weapon and marvel at his apparent success.

Unless, of course, Brennan had eyes in the back of his head—which is far more credible than any

aspect of his "witness account."

Brennan’s identification of Oswald as the man he saw (or said he saw?) in the sixth-floor window

weighed heavily in the Commission’s "evaluation" of the "evidence." As was discussed in chapter 1,

the Commission first rejected Brennan’s positive identification in discussing the evidence, and

subsequently accepted it in drawing the conclusion that Oswald was at the window. Without

Brennan, there would have been not even the slightest suggestion in any of the evidence that Oswald

was at the window during the shots. No one else even made a pretense of being able to identify the

sixth-floor gunman.

On November 22, 1963, Brennan was unable to identify Oswald as the man he saw in the window,

but picked Oswald as the person in a police line-up who bore the closest resemblance to the gunman.

Months later, when he appeared before the Commission, Brennan said he could have made a positive

identification at the November 22 lineup,

but did not do so because he felt that the assassination was "a Communist activity, and I felt like there hadn’t

been more than one eyewitness, and if it got to be a known fact that I was an eyewitness, my family or I, either

one, might not be safe." (R145)

The Report continued that, because Brennan had originally failed to make a positive identification,

the Commission did "not base its conclusion concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan’s

subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the man he saw fire the rifle." Through

the Report, the Commission expressed its confidence that "Brennan saw a man in the window who

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

10. CBS News Extra: "November 22 and the Warren Report," broadcast over the CBS Television Network, September 27, 1964, p. 20 of the transcript

prepared by CBS News.

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closely resembled Lee Harvey Oswald, and that Brennan believes the man he saw was in fact . . .

Oswald" (R146).

The Commission accepted Brennan’s observations and assurances without question. However,

the excuse Brennan offered for not originally making a positive identification was falsely and

deliberately contrived, as the evidence reveals. As Brennan is quoted, he felt that he had been the

only eyewitness and feared for his family’s security should his identity become known. Contrary to

this sworn statement, Brennan immediately knew of at least one other witness who had seen the

sixth-floor gunman. Secret Service Agent Forrest Sorrels spoke with Brennan in Dealey Plaza within

twenty minutes after the shooting, at which time he asked Brennan "if he had seen anyone else, and

he pointed to a young colored boy there, by the name of Euins" (7H349). Sorrels testified that

Brennan also expressed his willingness to identify the gunman. On the afternoon of the

assassination, before he attended the line-up, Brennan filed an affidavit with the police (3H145;

7H349) in which he again made it known that he could identify the man if he were to see him once

more (24H203). This contradicts Brennan’s testimony that he could have identified Oswald on

November 22 but declined to do so for fear of its becoming known.

Thus, Brennan originally indicated a willingness to identify the gunman, saw Oswald in a line-up

and declined to make a positive identification, and subsequently admitted lying to the police by

saying that he could have made the identification but was afraid to.

However, even Brennan’s identification of Oswald as the man who most closely resembled the

gunman is invalid, since prior to the line-up, Brennan twice viewed Oswald’s picture on television

(3H148). Brennan again contradicted himself in speaking of the effect that seeing Oswald’s picture

had on his later identification of Oswald.

On December 17, 1963, Brennan spoke with an FBI Agent to whom he confided "that he can now

say that he is sure that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was the person he saw in the window." At this

time, Brennan began offering his many excuses for not having originally made a positive

identification. One of these

was that prior to appearing at the police line-up on November 22, 1963, he had observed a picture of OSWALD

on his television set at home when his daughter asked him to watch it. He said he felt that since he had seen

OSWALD on television before picking OSWALD out of the line-up at the police station that it tended to "cloud"

any identification of OSWALD at that time. (CD5:15)

On January 7, 1964, Brennan’s "clouded identification" was further lessened, for he told another FBI

Agent that seeing Oswald’s picture on television "of course, did not help him retain the original

impression of the man in the window with the rifle" (24H406). Finally, on March 24, Brennan could

no longer tell just what seeing Oswald prior to the line-up had done. On this date, Brennan testified

before the Commission:

Mr. Belin: What is the fact as to whether or not your having seen Oswald on television would have affected

your identification of him one way or the other?

Mr. Brennan: That is something I do not know. (3H148)

As his earlier interviews demonstrate, Brennan "knew" but was not saying. It seems obvious that

seeing Oswald’s picture on television prior to the line-up not only would have "clouded" and "not

helped" the identification, but would also have prejudiced it.

The best that can be said of Howard Brennan is that he provided a dishonest account that warrants

not the slightest credence. He contradicted himself on many crucial points to such a degree that it is

hard to believe that his untruths were unintentional. He was warmly welcomed by the unquestioning

Commission as he constantly changed his story in support of the theory that Oswald was guilty. This

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man, so fearful of exposure as to "lie" to the police and possibly hinder justice, consented to talk with

CBS News for a coast-to-coast broadcast before the Warren Report was released,11 and allowed

himself to be photographed for the October 2, 1964, issue of Life magazine, where he was called by

Commissioner Ford "the most important witness to appear before the Warren Commission."12 His

identification of Oswald, incredible as it was through each of his different versions of it, was

worthless, if for no other reason than that he saw Oswald on television prior to the police line-up.

Through twenty pages of repetitious testimony, Howard Brennan rambled on about the man he

saw and who he looked like, interjecting apologies, and inaccurately marking various pictures. The

Commission could not get enough of Brennan’s words, for he spoke the official language: "Oswald

did it." Yet, when Brennan offered one meaningful and determinative fact, he was suddenly shown

the door. Commission Counsel David Belin had been showing Brennan some of Oswald’s clothing

when Brennan interjected:

Mr. Brennan: And that was another thing that I called their [the police’s] attention to at the lineup.

Mr. Belin: What do you mean by that?

Mr. Brennan: That he [Oswald] was not dressed in the same clothes that I saw the man in the window.

Mr. Belin: You mean with reference to the trousers or the shirt?

Mr. Brennan: Well, not particularly either. In other words, he just didn’t have the same clothes on.

Mr. Belin: All right.

Mr. Brennan: I don’t know whether you have that in the record or not. I am sure you do.

Mr. Dulles: Any further questions? I guess there are no more questions, Mr. Belin.

Mr. Belin: Well, sir, we want to thank you for your cooperation with the Commission.

Mr. Dulles: Thank you very much for coming here. (3H161)

The Commission had no witness-identification-by-appearance that placed Oswald in the window

at the time of the shots. No one, including Brennan, could identify the sixth-floor gunman.

However, Brennan’s statement that the gunman wore clothes different from those that Oswald wore

on that day might indicate the presence of someone other than Oswald in the window.

If there is anything consistent in the testimonies of those who observed a man on the sixth floor, it

is the clothing descriptions. Rowland recalled that the man wore "a very light-colored shirt, white or

a light blue . . . open at the collar . . . unbuttoned about halfway" with a "regular T-shirt, a polo shirt"

underneath (2H171). Brennan described light-colored, possibly khaki clothes (3H145). Ronald

Fisher and Bob Edwards described an "open-neck . . . sport shirt or a T-shirt . . . light in color;

probably white" (6H194), and a "light colored shirt, short sleeve and open neck" (6H203),

respectively. Mrs. Carolyn Walther saw a gunman "wearing a white shirt" (24H522).

In each case, these witnesses have described a shirt completely different from that worn by

Oswald on November 22. That day Oswald wore a long-sleeved rust-brown shirt open at the neck

with a polo shirt underneath. At least two witnesses described such attire on Oswald before he went

to his rooming house within a half hour after the shots (see 2H250; 3H257), and a third provided a

similar but less-complete description (R159). From the time of his arrest until sometime after

midnight that Friday, Oswald was still wearing this shirt, as is shown in many widely printed

photographs.13 Although it seems likely that he wore the same shirt all day long, Oswald told police

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

11. Ibid. At page two of the transcript, Walter Cronkite specifies that CBS interviewed various witnesses a month before the release of the Report.

12. Life, October 2, 1964, pp. 42, 47.

13. E.G., see CEs 1769, 1797, 2964, 2965; CD 1405 (reproduced in Photographic Whitewash, p. 209); Curry, pp. 72, 73, 77; Life, October 2, 1964, p.

48.

- 105 -

he changed his shirt during a stop at his rooming house at 1:00 P.M. that afternoon, having originally

been wearing a red long-sleeved buttondown (see R605, 613, 622, 626). However, Oswald did not

possess a shirt of this description (see CEs 150-64).

The Commission never sought to determine if Oswald had worn the same shirt continually that

day or if he had changed prior to his arrest. Apparently it was not going to risk the implications of

Brennan’s testimony that the clothing worn by Oswald in the line-up (Oswald wore the rust-brown

shirt during the line-ups on November 22 [7H127-29, 169-70]) differed from that of the sixth-floor

gunman. Indeed, when shown the shirt in question, CE 150, Brennan said the gunman’s shirt was

lighter (3H161).

The testimony of Marrion Baker, a police officer who encountered Oswald right after the shots, is

somewhat illuminating on this point. When Baker later saw Oswald in the homicide office at police

headquarters, "he looked like he did not have the same [clothes] on" (3H263). However, the reason

for Baker’s confusion (and Baker was not nearly so positive about the disparity as was Brennan) was

that the shirt Oswald wore when seen in the Depository was "a little bit darker" than the one he had

on at the police station (3H257; emphasis added).

The crux of the matter is whether Oswald was wearing his rust-brown shirt all day November 22,

or if he changed into it subsequent to the assassination. While there is testimony indicating that he

wore the same shirt all along, the nature of the existing evidence does not permit a positive

determination. Had Oswald been wearing CE 150 at the time of the shots, it would seem that he was

not the sixth-floor gunman, who wore a white or very light shirt, probably short sleeved. While it can

be argued that Oswald may have appeared at the window in only his white polo shirt, he was seen

within 90 seconds after the shots wearing the brown shirt.14 As will be discussed in the next chapter,

there was not enough time, had Oswald been at the window, for him to have put on his shirt within

the 90-second limit.

The Commission had no evidence in any form that Oswald was at the sixth-floor window during

the shots; its only reliable evidence placed Oswald on the first floor shortly before this time. The

Commission concluded that Oswald was at this window because it wanted, indeed needed, to have

him there. To do this, it put false meaning into the meaningless—the fingerprint evidence and

Givens’s story—and believed the incredible—Brennan’s testimony. Through its General Counsel, it

suppressed the exculpatory evidence, and claimed to know of no evidence placing Oswald in a

location other than the sixth floor when its only evidence did exactly that. The conclusion that

Oswald was at the window is simply without foundation. It demands only the presumption of

Oswald’s guilt for acceptance. It cannot stand under the weight of the evidence.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

14. Baker testified to this at 3H257. In December 1963, Truly, who also saw Oswald within 90 seconds after the shots, said that Oswald had been

wearing "light" clothing {and} a T-shirt (CD 87, Secret Service Control No. 491)

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8

The Alibi: Oswald’s Actions after the Shots

The first person to see Oswald after the assassination was Dallas Patrolman Marrion Baker, who had

been riding a motorcycle behind the last camera car in the motorcade. As he reached a position some

60 to 80 feet past the turn from Main Street onto Houston, Baker heard the first shot (3H246).

Immediately after the last shot, he "revved up that motorcycle" and drove it to a point near a signal

light on the northwest corner of Elm and Houston (3H247). From here Baker ran 45 feet to the main

entrance of the Book Depository, pushing through people and quickly scanning the area. At the main

entrance, Baker’s shouts for the stairs were spontaneously answered by building manager Roy Truly

as both men continued across the first floor to the northwest corner, where Truly hollered up twice

for an elevator. When an elevator failed to descend, Truly led Baker up the adjacent steps to the

second floor. From the second floor, Truly continued up the steps to the third; Baker, however, did

not. The Report describes the situation:

On the second floor landing there is a small open area with a door at the east end. This door leads into a small

vestibule, and another door leads from the vestibule into the second-floor lunchroom. The lunchroom door is

usually open, but the first door is kept shut by a closing mechanism on the door. This vestibule door is solid

except for a small glass window in the upper part of the door. As Baker reached the second floor, he was about

20 feet from the vestibule door. He intended to continue around to his left toward the stairway going up but

through the window in the door he caught a fleeting glimpse of a man walking in the vestibule toward the

lunchroom. (R151)

Baker ran into the vestibule with his pistol drawn and stopped the man, who turned out to be Lee

Harvey Oswald. Truly, realizing that Baker was no longer following him, came down to the second

floor and identified Oswald as one of his employees. The two men then continued up the stairs

toward the Depository roof.

"In an effort to determine whether Oswald could have descended to the lunchroom from the sixth

floor by the time Baker and Truly arrived," the Commission staged a timed reconstruction of events.

The Commission knew that this encounter in the lunchroom such a short time after the shots could

have provided Oswald with an alibi, thus exculpating him from involvement in the shooting. The

reconstruction could not establish whether Oswald was at the sixth-floor window; it could, however,

tell whether he was not. In the interest of determining the truth, it was vital that this reenactment be

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faithfully conducted, simulating the proper actions to the most accurate degree possible.

From beginning to end, the execution of the reconstruction was in disregard of the known actions

of the participants, stretching—if not by intent, certainly in effect—the time consumed for Baker to

have arrived on the second floor and shrinking the time for the "assassin’s" descent.1

To begin with, the reconstruction of Baker’s movements started at the wrong time. Baker testified

that he revved up his motorcycle immediately after the last shot (3H247). However, Baker’s time

was clocked from a simulated first shot (3H252). To compare the time of the assassin’s descent with

that of Baker’s ascent, the reconstruction obviously had to start after the last shot. Since the time

span of the shots was, according to the Report, from 4.8 to over 7 seconds, the times obtained for

Baker’s movements are between 4.8 and 7 seconds in excess.

Although Baker testified that he was flanking the last "press" car in the motorcade (3H245), the

record indicates that he was, in fact, flanking the last camera car—the last of the convertibles

carrying the various photographers, closer to the front of the procession than the vehicles carrying

other press representatives. Baker said he was some 60 to 80 feet along Houston Street north of

Main when he heard the first shot (3H246). Those in the last camera car were also in this general

location at the time of the first shot (Jackson: 2H158; Couch: 6H156; Dillard: 6H163-64;

Underwood: 6H169;). During the reconstruction, Baker drove his motorcycle from his location at

the time of the first shot a distance of 180 to 200 feet to the point in front of the Depository at which

he dismounted (3H247). However, since Baker had revved up his cycle immediately after the last

shot on November 22, the distance he traveled in the reenactment was entirely too long. Since the

motorcade advanced about 116 feet during the time span of the shots, the distance Baker should have

driven in the reconstruction was no greater than 84 feet (200 - 116 = 84). This would have placed

Baker near the intersection of Elm and Houston at the time he revved up his cycle, not 180 feet from

it as was reconstructed. Likewise, the men in the last camera car recalled being in proximity to the

intersection at the time of the last shot (Underwood: 6H169; Couch: 6H158; Jackson: 2H159).

With 116 feet extra to travel in a corresponding added time of 4.8 to 7 seconds, Baker was able to

reach the front entrance of the Depository in only 15 seconds during the reconstruction (7H593).

Had the reenactment properly started at the time of the last shot, it follows that Baker could have

reached the main entrance in 8 to 10 seconds. Did Baker actually consume so little time in getting to

the Depository on November 22?

The Commission made no effort to answer this question, leaving an incomplete and unreliable

record. Billy Lovelady, Bill Shelley, Joe Molina, and several other employees were standing on the

steps of the Depository’s main entrance during the assassination. Lovelady and Shelley testified that

another employee, Gloria Calvery, ran up to them and stated that the President had been shot; the

three of them began to run west toward the parking lot, at which time they saw Truly and a police

officer run into the Depository (6H329-31, 339). This story is contradicted by Molina, who

contended that Truly (he did not notice Baker) ran into the main entrance before Gloria Calvery

arrived (6H372). Mrs. Calvery was not called to testify, and the one statement by her to the FBI does

not address this issue. From her position just east of the Stemmons Freeway sign on the north side of

Elm (22H638), it does not seem likely that she could have made the 150-foot run to the main

entrance in only 15 seconds. Yet, adding to this confusion is an affidavit that Shelly executed for the

Dallas Police on November 22, 1963. Here he stated that he ran down to the "park" on Elm Street

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. The first critical analysis of these reconstructions appeared in Whitewash, pp. 36-38.

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and met Gloria Calvery there (24H226). Obviously, the issue cannot be resolved through these

witnesses.

While Molina felt that Truly ran into the Depository some 20 to 30 seconds after the shots

(6H372), Lovelady and Shelley estimated that as much as three minutes had elapsed (6H329, 339).

When Counsel Joe Ball cautioned Lovelady that "three minutes is a long time," Lovelady partially

retracted because he did not have a watch then and could not be exact (6H339). Supporting Molina’s

estimate, Roy Truly told the Secret Service in December 1963 that Baker made his way to the front

entrance "almost immediately" (CD87, Secret Service Control No. 491); almost a year later Truly

said on a CBS News Special that Baker’s arrival "was just a matter of seconds after the third shot."2

I was able to resolve the issue concerning Baker’s arrival at the Depository through evidence

strangely absent from the Commission’s record. Malcolm Couch, riding in the last camera car

(Camera Car 3), took some very important motion-picture footage immediately after the shots.

Couch, whose car was almost at the intersection of Elm and Houston when the last shot sounded,

immediately picked up his camera, made the proper adjustments, and began filming (6H158). Others

in Camera Car 3 related how their car came to a stop or hesitated in the middle of the turn into Elm

to let some of the photographers out (2H162; 6H165, 169). Couch’s film begins slightly before the

stop, just as the car was making the turn (6H158). From Couch’s testimony and the scenes depicted

in his film, in addition to the testimony of others in the same car, it can be determined that Couch

began filming no more than 10 seconds after the last shot.3

The first portion of the Couch film depicts the crowds dispersing along the island at the northwest

corner of Elm and Houston. The camera pans in a westerly direction as the grassy knoll and Elm

Street come into view. In these beginning sequences, a motorcycle is visible, parked next to the

north curb of Elm, very slightly west of a traffic light at the head of the island. Baker testified that he

parked his cycle 10 feet east of this signal light (3H247-48). The position of the motorcycle in the

Couch film is not in great conflict with the position at which Baker recalled having dismounted; it is

doubtful that Baker paid much attention to the exact position of his motorcycle in those confused

moments. It would appear that this cycle, identical with the others driven in the motorcade, must

have been Baker’s, for it is not visible in any photographs taken during the shots, including footage

of that area by David Weigman,4 and no other motorcycle officer arrived at that location in so short a

time after the shots. No policeman appears on or around the cycle depicted in the Couch film.

Thus, photographic evidence known to, but never sought by, the Commission proves that Officer

Baker had parked and dismounted his motorcycle within 10 seconds after the shots. Corroborative

evidence is found in the testimony of Bob Jackson, also riding in Camera Car 3. Jackson told the

Commission that after the last shot, as his car hesitated through the turn into Elm, he saw a

policeman run up the Depository steps, toward the front door (2H164). This is entirely consistent

with Baker’s abandoned motorcycle’s appearing at this same time in the Couch film.

During the Baker-Truly reconstructions, Baker reached the second floor in one minute and 30

seconds on the first attempt and one minute, 15 seconds on the second (3H252). Since Baker’s

simulated movements up to the time he reached the main entrance consumed 15 seconds (7H593),

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. CBS News Extra: "November 22 and the Warren Report," p. 28.

3. To my knowledge, the Couch film is not commercially available. I was fortunately able to obtain numerous stills made from individual frames of a

copy of the Couch film, which was originally obtained from the Dallas television station for which Couch worked. Due to the legalities involved,

these pictures can not be reproduced here.

4. I obtained numerous frames from the Weigman film in the same manner as described above. These can not be reproduced either.

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the actions subsequent to that must have been reenacted in a span of one minute to about 75 seconds.

However, since Baker actually reached the main entrance within 10 seconds on November 22, the

reconstructed time is cut by at least five seconds. Further reductions are in order.

Officer Baker described the manner in which he simulated his movements subsequent to

dismounting his motorcycle:

From the time I got off the motorcycle we walked the first time and then we kind of run the second time from

the motorcycle on into the building. (3H253)

Baker neither walked nor "kind of" ran to the Depository entrance on November 22. From his own

description, he surveyed the scene as he was parking his cycle, and then "ran straight to" the main

entrance (3H248-249). Billy Lovelady also swore that Baker was running (6H339). However, Truly

provided the most graphic description of Baker’s apparent "mad dash" to the building:

I saw a young motorcycle policeman run up to the building, up the steps to the entrance of our building. He ran

right by me. And he was pushing people out of the way. He pushed a number of people out of the way before he

got to me. I saw him coming through, I believe. As he ran up the stairway—I mean up the steps, I was almost to

the steps, and I ran up and caught up with him. (3H221; emphasis added)

Thus, walking through this part of the reconstruction was, as Harold Weisberg aptly termed it,

pure fakery, unnecessarily and unfaithfully burdening Baker’s time.5 The Report, on the other hand,

assures us that the time on November 22 would actually have been longer, because "no allowance

was made for the special conditions which existed on the day of the assassination—possible delayed

reaction to the shot, jostling with the crowd of people on the steps and scanning the area along Elm

Street and the Parkway" (R152-53). Had the Commission directed any significant effort to obtaining

as many contemporaneous pictures as possible—including those taken by Couch—it could not have

engaged in such excuse-making. Even at that, how could the Commission dare go to all the efforts of

staging a reconstruction and then admit—to its own advantage—that it deliberately failed to simulate

actions? As was discussed in chapter 1, this child’s play was inexcusable as an effort bearing such

weight in deciding Oswald’s guilt. The Couch film eliminates the possibility that the factors

mentioned in the Report could have slowed Baker down. As for "jostling with the crowd of people

on the steps," the Report neglected to mention other disproof of this as a slowing factor. As Truly

testified,

when the officer and I ran in, we were shouldering people aside in front of the building, so we possibly were

slowed a little bit more coming in than we were when he and I came in on March 20 (date of the reconstruction).

I don’t believe so. But it wouldn’t be enough to matter there. (3H228; emphasis added)

Once in the building during the reconstruction, the two men proceded [sic] to the elevators "at a

kind of trot . . . it wasn’t a real fast run, an open run. It was more of a trot, kind of" (3H253). This,

again, was not an accurate simulation of the real actions. While Truly admitted that the

reconstruction pace across the first floor was "about" the same as that of November 22, he described

the former as a trot and the latter as "a little more than a trot" (3H228). Baker himself said that once

through the door, he and Truly "kind of ran, not real fast but, you know, a good trot" (3H249), not

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

5. Weisberg, Whitewash, p. 37.

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the "kind of trot" he described during the reconstruction. A swinging door at the end of the lobby in

the main entrance was jammed because the bolt had been stuck. Apparently, the pace on November

22 was of sufficient speed for Truly to bang right into this door and Baker to subsequently collide

with Truly in the instant before the door was forced open (3H222). Likewise, Eddie Piper, a firstfloor

witness, had seen the two men run into the building, yell up for an elevator, and "take off" up

the stairs (6H385).

In walking through part of the reconstruction, which should have been conducted running and was

begun at least five seconds early, Baker and Truly managed to arrive on the second floor in one

minute, 30 seconds. In the reconstruction, equally begun too early but staged at a pace closer to,

though not simulating that of November 22, the time narrowed to a minute and 15 seconds. While

Baker and Truly felt that the reconstructed times were minimums (3H228, 253), it would seem that

the opposite was true. Subtracting the extra seconds tacked on by including the time span of the

shots reduces even the maximum time to one minute, 25 seconds. The understandably hurried pace

of November 22 as manifested in all the evidence would indicate that Truly and Baker reached the

second floor in under 85 seconds, and the Couch film introduces the possibility that it may have taken

as little as 70 seconds, since Baker parked and abandoned his motorcycle within ten seconds of the

last shot.

The second part of the reconstruction was supposed to have simulated the "assassin’s" movements

from the sixth-floor window down to the second-floor lunchroom. Here the figurative lead weights

tied to Baker and Truly during the reconstruction of their movements are exchanged for figurative

roller skates, to shorten the time of the "assassin’s" descent.

Secret Service Agent John Howlett stood in for the "assassin." He executed an affidavit for the

Commission in which he described his actions:

I carried a rifle from the southeast corner of the sixth floor northernly along the east aisle to the northern corner,

then westernly [sic] along the north wall past the elevators to the northwest corner. There I placed the rifle on the

floor. I then entered the stairwell, walked down the stairway to the second floor landing, and then into the

lunchroom. (7H592)

This test was done twice. At a "normal walk" it took one minute and 18 seconds; at a "fast walk,"

one minute, 14 seconds (3H254). This reconstruction also suffered from most serious

ommissions.[sic]

The "assassin" could not just have walked away from his window as Howlett apparently did. If

the gunman fired the last shot from the Carcano as the official theory demands, a minimum time of

2.3 seconds after the last shot must be added to the reconstructed time since the cartridge case from

that shot had to be ejected—an operation that involves working the rifle bolt. Furthermore, witnesses

recalled that the gunman had been in no hurry to leave his window (2H159; 3H144).

There were also physical obstructions that prevented immediate evacuation of the area.

Commission Exhibit 734 shows that some stacks of boxes nearest to the "assassin’s" window did not

extend far enough toward the east wall of the building to have blocked off the window there

completely. However, as Commission Exhibits 723 and 726 clearly show, other columns of boxes

were situated behind the first stacks; these formed a wall that had no openings large enough for a

man to penetrate without contortion. Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney discovered three cartridge cases

by this window. He had to squeeze "between these two stacks of boxes, I had to turn myself

sideways to get in there" (3H285). The gunman would have had to squeeze through these stacks of

boxes while carrying a 40-inch, 8-pound rifle. Considering these details, we must add at least six or

seven seconds to the Commission’s time to allow for the various necessary factors that would slow

departure from the window.

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To simulate the hiding of the rifle, Howlett "leaned over as if he were putting a rifle there [near the

stair landing at the northwest corner of the sixth floor]" (3H253). The Commission did not do justice

to its putative assassin who, as the photographs reveal, took meticulous care in concealing his

weapon. The mere act of gaining access to the immediate area in which the rifle was hidden required

time. This is what Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone went through before he discovered the rifle:

As I got to the west wall, there were a row of windows there, and a slight space between some boxes and the

wall. I squeezed through them. . . . I caught a glimpse of the rifle, stuffed down between two rows of boxes with

another box or so pulled over the top of it. (3H293)

Luke Mooney "had to get around to the right angle" before he could see the rifle (3H298). Likewise,

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman reported that "it was covered with boxes. It was very well

protected as far as the naked eye" (7H107). Another Deputy Sheriff, Roger Craig, recalled that the

ends of the rows between which the rifle had been pushed were closed off by boxes, so that one could

not see through them (6H269).

Photographs of the area in which the rifle was found (e.g., CE 719), and a bird’s-eye view of the

hidden rifle itself (e.g., CE 517), corroborate what these men have described and add other

information. CE 719 shows that the rifle was found amid clusters of boxes that did not permit easy

access. CE 517, in particular, is very revealing. It shows that the rifle had been pushed upright on its

side between two rows of boxes that partially overlapped on top, thus eliminating the possibility that

the rifle had merely been dropped down between the stacks. CE 517 also demonstrates that both

ends of the rows of boxes were partially sealed off by other boxes, indicating a possibility never

pursued by the Commission—namely, that boxes had to be moved to gain access to the weapon.

When interviewed by CBS News, Seymour Weitzman inadvertently admitted this fact:

I’ll be very frank with you. I stumbled over it two times, not knowing it was there. . . . And Mr. Bone [sic]

was climbing on top, and I was down on my knees looking, and I moved a box, and he moved a carton, and there

it was. And he in turn hollered that we had found a rifle.6

Hence, the concealment of the rifle required much maneuvering. In addition to squeezing in

between boxes, the gunman had to move certain cartons filled with books. The rifle itself had been

very carefully placed in position. Doubtless this would have added at least 15, perhaps 20, seconds

to the reconstructed time even if the hiding place had been chosen in advance (of which there is no

evidence either way).

If we take the Commission’s minimum time of one minute, 14 seconds (giving the advantage to

the official story) and add the additional six or seven seconds needed just to evacuate the immediate

area of the window, plus the 15 to 20 seconds more for hiding the rifle, we find that it would have

taken at least a minute and 35 seconds to a minute and 41 seconds for a sixth-floor gunman to have

reached the second-floor lunchroom, had all his maneuvers been planned in advance. Had Oswald

been the assassin, he would have arrived in the lunchroom at least five to eleven seconds after Baker

reached the second floor, even if Baker took the longest time obtainable for his ascent—a minute, 30

seconds. Had Baker ascended in 70 seconds—as he easily could have—he would have arrived at

least 25 seconds before Oswald. Either case removes the possibility that Oswald descended from the

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

6. CBS News Inquiry: "The Warren Report," Part I, p. 9.

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sixth floor, for on November 22 he had unquestionably arrived in the lunchroom before Baker.

The circumstances surrounding the lunchroom encounter indicate that Oswald entered the

lunchroom not by the vestibule door from without, as he would have had he descended from the sixth

floor, but through a hallway leading into the vestibule. The outer vestibule door is closed

automatically by a closing mechanism on the door (7H591). When Truly arrived on the second floor,

he did not see Oswald entering the vestibule (R151). For the Commission’s case to be valid, Oswald

must have entered the vestibule through the first door before Truly arrived. Baker reached the

second floor immediately after Truly and caught a fleeting glimpse of Oswald in the vestibule

through a small window in the outer door. Although Baker said the vestibule door "might have been,

you know, closing and almost shut at that time" (3H255), it is dubious that he could have

distinguished whether the door was fully or "almost" closed.

Baker’s and Truly’s observations are not at all consistent with Oswald’s having entered the

vestibule through the first door. Had Oswald done this, he could have been inside the lunchroom

well before the automatic mechanism closed the vestibule door. Truly’s testimony that he saw no

one entering the vestibule indicates either that Oswald was already in the vestibule at this time or was

approaching it from another source. However, had Oswald already entered the vestibule when Truly

arrived on the second floor, it is doubtful that he would have remained there long enough for Baker to

see him seconds later. Likewise, the fact that neither man saw the mechanically closed door in

motion is cogent evidence that Oswald did not enter the vestibule through that door.

One of the crucial aspects of Baker’s story is his position at the time he caught a "fleeting

glimpse" of a man in the vestibule. Baker marked this position during his testimony as having been

immediately adjacent to the stairs at the northwest corner of the building (3H256; CE 497). "I was

just stepping out on to the second floor when I caught this glimpse of this man through this

doorway," said Baker.

It should be noted that the Report never mentions Baker’s position at the time he saw Oswald in

the vestibule (R149-51). Instead, it prints a floor plan of the second floor and notes Baker’s position

"when he observed Oswald in lunchroom" (R150). This location, as indicated in the Report, was

immediately outside the vestibule door (see CE 1118). The reader of the Report is left with the

impression that Baker saw Oswald in the vestibule as well from this position. However, Baker

testified explicitly that he first caught a glimpse of the man in the vestibule from the stairs and, upon

running to the vestibule door, saw Oswald in the lunchroom (3H256). The Report’s failure to point

out Baker’s position is significant.

Had Oswald descended from the sixth floor, his path through the vestibule into the lunchroom

would have been confined to the north wall of the vestibule. Yet the line of sight from Baker’s

position at the steps does not include any area near the north wall. From the steps, Baker could have

seen only one area in the vestibule—the southeast portion. The only way Oswald could have been in

this area on his way to the lunchroom is if he entered the vestibule through the southernmost door, as

the previously cited testimony indicates he did.

Oswald could not have entered the vestibule in this manner had he just descended from the sixth

floor. The only way he could have gotten to the southern door is from the first floor up through either

a large office space or an adjacent corridor. As the Report concedes, Oswald told police he had eaten

his lunch on the first floor and gone up to the second to purchase a coke when he encountered an

officer (R182).

Thus, Oswald had an alibi. Had he been the sixth-floor gunman, he would have arrived at the

lunchroom at least 5 seconds after Baker did, probably more. It is extremely doubtful that he could

have entered the vestibule through the first door without Baker’s or Truly’s having seen the door in

motion. Oswald’s position in the vestibule when seen by Baker was consistent only with his having

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come up from the first floor as he told the police.

Oswald could not have been the assassin.

The Commission had great difficulty with facts, for none supported the ultimate conclusions.

Instead, it found comfort and security in intangibles that usually had no bearing on the actual

evidence. Amateur psychology seems to have been one of the Commission’s favorite sciences,

approached with the predisposition that Oswald was a murderer. This was manifested in the Report’s

lengthy chapter, "Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motives" (R375-424).

To lend credibility to its otherwise incredible conclusion that Oswald was the assassin, the

Commission accused Oswald of yet another assassination attempt—a shot fired at right-wing Maj.

Gen. Edwin Walker on April 10, 1963 (R183-87). Thus, Oswald officially was not a newcomer to

the "game" of political assassination. Although I am not in accord with the conclusion that Oswald

shot at Walker, I find it illuminating that the Commission did not follow its inclination for

psychology in its comparison of Oswald as the Walker assailant to Oswald as the Kennedy assailant.

Having just torn open the head of the President of the United States, as the Commission asserts,

how did Oswald react when stopped by a policeman with a drawn gun? Roy Truly was first asked

about Oswald’s reaction to the encounter with Baker:

Mr. Belin: Did you see any expression on his face? Or weren’t you paying attention?

Mr. Truly: He didn’t seem to be excited or overly afraid or anything. He might have been a little startled,

like I might have been if someone confronted me. But I cannot recall any change in expression of any kind on

his face. (3H225)

Officer Baker was more explicit under similar questioning:

Rep. Boggs: When you saw him [Oswald] . . ., was he out of breath, did he appear to have been running or

what?

Mr. Baker: It didn’t appear that to me. He appeared normal you know.

Rep. Boggs: Was he calm and collected?

Mr. Baker: Yes, sir. He never did say a word or nothing. In fact, he didn’t change his expression one bit.

Mr. Belin: Did he flinch in anyway when you put the gun up . . .?

Mr. Baker: No, sir. (3H252)

Sen. Cooper: He did not show any evidence of any emotion?

Mr. Baker: No, sir. (3H263)

This "calm and collected" "assassin" proceeded to buy himself a coke and at his normal "very slow

pace," was then observed by Depository employee Mrs. Robert Reid walking through the office

space on the second floor on his way down to the first floor (3H279). Presumably he finished his

coke on the first floor. Documents in the Commission’s files (but omitted from the Report, which

assumes Oswald made an immediate get-away) indicate very strongly that, at the main entrance after

the shots, Oswald directed two newsmen to the Depository phones (CD354).

According to the evidence credited by the Commission, Oswald was not such a cool cucumber

after his first assassination attempt. Here the source of the Commission’s information was Oswald’s

wife, Marina, and his once close "friends," George and Jeanne De Mohrenschildt. The incident in

question is described in the Report as follows:

The De Mohrenschildts came to Oswald’s apartment on Neely Street for the first time on the evening of April

13, 1963 (three days after the Walker incident), apparently to bring an Easter gift for the Oswald child. Mrs. De

Mohrenschildt then told her husband, in the presence of the Oswalds, that there was a rifle in the closet. Mrs. De

Mohrenschildt testified that "George, of course, with his sense of humor—Walker was shot at a few days ago,

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within that time. He said, ‘Did you take a pot shot at Walker by any chance?’" At that point, Mr. De

Mohrenschildt testified, Oswald "sort of shriveled, you see, when I asked this question . . . made a peculiar face . .

. (and) changed the expression on his face" and remarked that he did target-shooting. Marina Oswald testified

that the De Mohrenschildts came to visit a few days after the Walker incident and that when De Mohrenschildt

made his reference to Oswald’s possibly shooting at Walker, Oswald’s "face changed, . . . he almost became

speechless." According to the De Mohrenschildts, Mr. De Mohrenschildt’s remark was intended as a joke, and

he had no knowledge of Oswald’s involvement in the attack on Walker. Nonetheless, the remark appears to have

created an uncomfortable silence, and the De Mohrenschildts left "very soon afterwards." (R282-83)

De Mohrenschildt further testified that his "joking" remark "had an effect on" Oswald, making him

"very, very uncomfortable" (9H249-50). In another section, the Report adds that Oswald "was

visibly shaken" by the remark (R274).

The Commission certainly chose a paradoxical assassin. We are asked to believe, according to the

Commission, that Oswald was guilty of attacking both Walker and Kennedy. Yet, this man who

officially became markedly upset when jokingly confronted with his attempt to kill Walker did not

even flinch when a policeman put a gun to his stomach immediately after he murdered the President!

The Commission begged for the charge of being ludicrous in drawing its conclusions relevant to

Oswald and the assassination; it insulted common sense and intelligence when it asked that those

conclusions be accepted and believed.

- 115 -

9

Oswald’s Rifle Capability

The lunchroom encounter was Oswald’s alibi; it proved that he could not have been at the sixth-floor

window during the shots. The Warren Commission falsely pronounced Oswald the assassin. In so

doing, it alleged that Oswald had the proficiency with his rifle to have fired the assassination shots.

Obviously, in light of the evidence that proves Oswald innocent, his rifle capability has no legitimate

bearing on the question of his involvement in the shooting. In this chapter I will examine the

Commission’s handling of the evidence related to Oswald’s rifle capability. It will be demonstrated

that the Commission consistently misrepresented the record in an effort to make feasible the assertion

that Oswald was the assassin.1

The first consideration germane to this topic is the nature of the shots, assuming theoretically that

all originated from the sixth-floor window by a gunman using the Mannlicher-Carcano. For such a

rifleman, "the shots were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade in virtually a straight

line with the alignment of the assassin’s rifle, at a range of 177 to 266 feet" (R189). According to the

Commission, three shots were fired, the first and last strikes occurring within a span of 4.8 to 5.6

seconds; one shot allegedly missed, although the Commission did not decide whether it was the first,

second, or third. While the current analysis ignores evidence of more than three shots from more

than one location, I can make only a limited departure from reality in working under the

Commission’s postulations. My analysis of the wounds proved beyond doubt that the President and

the Governor were wounded nonfatally by two separate bullets. This demands, in line with the

Commission’s three-shot-theory, that all shots hit in the car. The Zapruder film reveals that the first

two hits occurred within a very brief time, probably shorter than the very minimum time needed to

fire two successive shots with the Carcano, 2.3 to 3 seconds. The fatal shot came about four seconds

after the one that wounded Connally.

The Report repeatedly characterizes the shots as "very easy" and "easy." However, the experts

who made these evaluations for the Commission did not consider two essential factors that cannot be

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

1. Analyses of the nature of the shots and related topics have appeared in Whitewash, chap. 4; Lane, chap. 9; Epstein, chap. 9; Meagher, chap. 4.

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excluded from any hypothesizing: 1) the President was a living, moving target, and 2) the shots had

to be fired in a very short period of time. First quoted in the Report is FBI ballistics expert Frazier:

From my own experience in shooting over the years, when you shoot at 175 feet or 260 feet, which is less

than 100 yards, with a telescopic sight, you should not have any difficulty hitting your target. (R190)

Frazier testified at the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, where he modified his previous Commission

testimony. How would the added consideration of a moving target affect his previous assessment?

it would be a relatively easy shot, slightly complicated, however, if the target were moving at the time, it would

make it a little more difficult.2

The next "expert" quoted is Marine Sgt. James A. Zahm, who was involved in marksmanship

training in the Marine Corps:

Using the scope, rapidly working the bolt and using the scope to relocate your target quickly and at the same time

when you locate that target you identify and the crosshairs are in close relationship to the point you want to shoot

at, it just takes a minor move in aiming to bring the crosshairs to bear, and then it is a quick squeeze. (R190)

Zahm never used the C2766 Carcano; his comments related to four-power scopes in general as aids

in rapid shooting with a bolt-action rifle. Another expert, Ronald Simmons, was directly involved in

tests employing the Carcano. Although this is not reflected in the Report, he told the Commission

that, contrary to Zahm’s generalization of a "minor move" necessary to relocate the target in the

scope, such a great amount of effort was needed to work the rifle bolt that the weapon was actually

moved completely off target (3H449). There is yet another factor qualifying Zahm’s evaluation.

This was brought out during Frazier’s New Orleans testimony:

Mr. Oser: . . . when you shoot this rifle . . . can you tell us whether or not in rebolting the gun you had to

move your eye away from the scope?

Mr. Frazier: Yes, sir, that was necessary.

Mr. Oser: Why was that necessary?

Mr. Frazier: To prevent the bolt of the rifle from striking me in the face as it came to the rear.3

At best, the Report drastically oversimplified the true nature of the shots. It is true that shots fired

at ranges under 100 yards with a four-power scope are generally easy. However, the assassination

shots, in accordance with the Commission’s lone-assassin theory, were fired in rapid succession

(indeed the first two would have occurred within the minimum time needed to operate the bolt) and

at a moving target. The difficulty of such shots becomes apparent when it is considered that

operation of the bolt would have thrown the weapon off target and caused the firer temporarily to

move his eye from the sight.

One is prompted to ask what caliber of shooter would be required to commit the assassination

alone as described above. Simulative tests conducted by the Commission, while deficient, are quite

illuminating.

The Commission’s test firers were all rated as "Master" by the National Rifle Association (NRA);

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

2. Frazier 2/21/69 testimony, p. 67.

3. Ibid., p. 148.

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they were experts whose daily routines involved working with and shooting firearms (3H445). In the

tests, three targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet respectively from a 30-foot-high tower.

Each shooter fired two series of three shots, using the C2766 rifle. The men took 8.25, 6.75, and 4.60

seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00, 6.45, and 5.15 for the second (3H446). In the first

series, each man hit his first and third targets but missed the second. Results varied on the next

series, although in all cases but one, two targets were hit. Thus, in only two cases were the

Commission’s experts able to fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as Oswald allegedly did.

None scored three hits, as was demanded of a lone assassin on November 22.

These tests would suggest that three hits within such a short time span, if not impossible, would

certainly have taxed the proficiency of the most skilled marksman.4 In his testimony before the

Commission, Ronald Simmons spoke first of the caliber of shooter necessary to have fired the

assassination shots on the basis that only two hits were achieved:

Mr. Eisenberg: Do you think a marksman who is less than a highly skilled marksman under those conditions

would be able to shoot within the range of 1.2 mil aiming error [as was done by the experts]?

Mr. Simmons: Obviously, considerable experience would have to be in one’s background to do so. And with

this weapon, I think also considerable experience with this weapon, because of the amount of effort required to

work the bolt. (3H449)

Well, in order to achieve three hits, it would not be required that a man be an exceptional shot. A proficient

man with this weapon, yes. But I think with the opportunity to use the weapon and to get familiar with it, we

could probably have the results reproduced by more than one firer. (3H450)

Here arises the crucial question: Was Lee Harvey Oswald a "proficient man with this weapon,"

with "considerable experience" in his background?

While in the Marines between 1956 and 1959, Oswald was twice tested for his performance with a

rifle. On a scale of expert-sharpshooter-marksman, Oswald scored two points above the minimum

for sharpshooter on one occasion (December 1956) and only one point above the minimum

requirement for marksman on another (May 1959)—his last recorded score. Colonel A. G. Folsom

evaluated these scores for the Commission:

The Marine Corps consider that any reasonable application of the instructions given to Marines should permit

them to become qualified at least as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of

the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons firing can become so

qualified. Consequently, a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor "shot" and a sharpshooter

qualification indicates a fairly good "shot." (19H17-18)

There exists the possibility that Oswald’s scores were either inaccurately or unfairly recorded,

thus accounting for his obviously mediocre to horrendous performances with a rifle. However, there

is other information independent of the scores to indicate that Oswald was in fact not a good shot. In

his testimony, Colonel Folsom examined the Marine scorebook that Oswald himself had maintained,

and elaborated on his previous evaluation:

Mr. Ely: I just wonder, after having looked through the whole scorebook, if we could fairly say that all that it

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

4. See also the excerpts from the Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum as discussed in chap. 1.

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proves is that at this stage of his career he was not a particularly outstanding shot.

Col. Folsom: No, no, he was not. His scorebook indicates . . . that he did well at one or two ranges in order

to achieve the two points over the minimum score for sharpshooter.

Mr. Ely: In other words, he had a good day the day he fired for qualification?

Col. Folsom: I would say so. (8H311)

Thus, according to Folsom, Oswald’s best recorded score was the result of having "a good day";

otherwise, Oswald "was not a particularly outstanding shot."

Folsom was not alone in his evaluation of Oswald as other than a good shot. The following is

exerpted [sic] from the testimony of Nelson Delgado, one of Oswald’s closest associates in the

Marines:

Mr. Liebeler: Did you fire with Oswald?

Mr. Delgado: Right; I was in the same line. By that I mean we were on the same line together, the same

time, but not firing at the same position . . . and I remember seeing his. It was a pretty big joke, because he got a

lot of "maggie’s drawers," you know, a lot of misses, but he didn’t give a darn.

Mr. Liebeler: Missed the target completely?

Mr. Delgado: He just qualified, that’s it. He wasn’t as enthusiastic as the rest of us. (8H235)

The Report tried desperately to get around this unanimous body of credible evidence. First

Marine Corps Major Eugene Anderson (who never had any association with Oswald) is quoted at

length about how bad weather, poor coaching, and an inferior weapon might have accounted for

Oswald’s terrible performance in his second recorded test (R191). Here the Commission scraped the

bottom of the barrel, offering this unsubstantiated, hypothetical excuse-making as apparent fact.

Weather bureau records, which the Commission did not bother to check, show that perfect firing

conditions existed at the time and place Oswald last fired for qualification—better conditions in fact,

than those prevailing during the assassination.5 As for the quality of the weapon fired in the test, it is

probable that at its worst it would have been far superior to the virtual piece of junk Oswald allegedly

owned and used in the assassination.6 Perhaps Anderson guessed correctly in suggesting that Oswald

may have had a poor instructor; yet, from the time of his departure from the Marines in 1959 to the

time of the assassination in 1963, Oswald had no instructor.

For its final "evaluation," the Report again turned to Anderson and Zahm. Each man is quoted as

rating Oswald a good shot, somewhat above average, as compared to other Marines, and an

"excellent" shot as compared to the average male civilian (R192). That the Commission could even

consider these evaluations is beyond comprehension. Oswald’s Marine scores and their official

evaluation showed that he did not possess even "a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons

firing." If this is better than average for our Marines, pity the state of our national "defense"! The

testimonies of Folsom and Delgado—people who had direct association with Oswald in the

Marines—are not mentioned in the Report.

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, "Local Climatological Data," for San Diego, California, May 1959, and Los Angeles, California,

May 1959.

6. I have seen this rifle at the National Archives and it does appear rather dilapidated. Fingerprint expert Latona called it "a cheap old weapon" (4H29).

Ballistics expert Robert Frazier went into more detail on the condition of the rifle:

Mr. Eisenberg . . . . How much use does this weapon show?

Mr. Frazier. The stock is worn, scratched. The bolt is relatively smooth, as if it had been operated several times. I cannot actually say how

much use the weapon has had. The barrel is—was not, when we first got it, in excellent condition. It was, I would say in fair condition. In other

words, it showed the effects of wear and corrosion. (3H394)

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Thus, Oswald left the Marines in 1959 as a "rather poor shot." If he is to be credited with a feat

such as the assassination, it must be demonstrated that he engaged in some activity between 1959 and

1963 that would have greatly developed his rifle capability and maintained it until the time of the

shooting. The Report barely touched on the vital area of Oswald’s rifle practice. In a brief twoparagraph

section entitled "Oswald’s Rifle Practice Outside the Marines," the Report painted a very

sketchy picture, entirely inadequate in terms of the nature of the issue (R192-93). In all, Oswald is

associated with a weapon eleven or twelve times, ending in May 1963.

Let us examine each of the Commission’s assertions from this section of the Report:

1. During one of his leaves from the Marines, Oswald hunted with his brother Robert, using a

.22 caliber bolt-action rifle belonging either to Robert or Robert’s in-laws.

A footnote to this statement refers to Robert Oswald’s testimony at 1H327, where essentially the

same information is found.

2. After he left the Marines and before departing for Russia, Oswald, his brother, and a third

companion went hunting for squirrels and rabbits. On that occasion Oswald again used a boltaction

.22 caliber rifle; and according to Robert, Lee Oswald exhibited an average amount of

proficiency with that weapon.

Here again the Report cites Robert Oswald’s testimony at 1H325-327. Although Robert did say

that Lee showed "an average amount" of proficiency (1H326), his other descriptions of the occasion

would indicate that none of the men showed any proficiency at all that day. This excursion took

place in a "briar patch" that "was very thick with cottontails." Among the three men, eight rabbits

were shot, "because it was the type of brush and thorns that didn’t grow very high but we were able

to see over them, so getting three of us out there it wasn’t very hard to kill eight of them." Robert

further illuminated the proficiency of the shooting when he revealed that it once took all three men

firing to hit one rabbit.

3. While in Russia, Oswald obtained a hunting license joined a hunting club and went hunting

about six times.

As mentioned in chapter 1, Liebeler criticized the inclusion of this statement in the Report, for

Oswald hunted with a shotgun in Russia. Wrote Liebeler, "Under what theory do we include

activities concerning a shotgun under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to

advise the reader of that?"7 The sources given for the above-quoted statement are CEs 1042, 2007,

and 1403 (which establish Oswald’s membership in the club) and 1H96, 327-28, and 2H466. The

latter references to the testimony do not support the Report’s implication that Oswald’s Russian

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

7. Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum.

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hunting trips helped to further his marksmanship abilities.

In the portion of her testimony cited (1H96), Marina Oswald said that Oswald hunted only once

during the time she knew him in the Soviet Union. This prompted a brief exchange not

complimentary to Oswald’s performance with his weapon during the hunt:

Mr. Rankin: Was that when he went hunting for squirrels?

Mrs. Oswald: If he marked it down in his notebook that he went hunting for squirrels, he never did.

Generally they wanted to kill a squirrel when we went there, or some sort of bird, in order to boast about it, but

they didn’t.

Robert Oswald testified that Lee hunted "about six times" in Russia (1H327-328). He too revealed

the poor nature of Oswald’s performance:

We talked about hunting over there, and he said that he had only been hunting a half dozen times, and so forth,

and that he had only used a shotgun, and a couple of times he did shoot a duck.

The third reference to testimony is most revealing. The source is Mrs. Ruth Paine, who related what

Marina had told her:

She quoted a proverb to the effect that you go hunting in the Soviet Union and you catch a bottle of Vodka, so

I judge it was a social occasion more than shooting being the prime object. (2H466)

Information not mentioned or cited in the Report corroborates the informal nature of Oswald’s

hunting in Russia as well as his usual poor performance with his weapon. CD 344 contains the

transcript of a Secret Service interview with Marina recorded Sunday night, November 24, 1963, at

the Inn of the Six Flags Motel at Arlington, Texas. This was Marina’s first interview conducted

while she was in protective custody. When asked about Oswald’s membership in the hunting club,

she made this response through an interpreter:

While he was a member of this hunting club, he never attended any meetings. He simply had a card that

showed his membership. She said Lee enjoyed nature and as a member of the club he was entitled to free

transportation in an automobile which enabled him to go out of town.8

Marina added that Lee owned "a hunting gun" in Russia but "he never used it."

Other information came from Yuri I. Nosenko, a Soviet KGB staff officer who defected in

February 1964 and apparently participated in or knew of the KGB investigation of Oswald in Russia.

CD 451 contains an interview with Nosenko, but it is currently withheld from research. Liebeler,

who saw CD 451 during his Commission work, composed a staff memorandum on March 9, 1964,

repeating some of the information obtained from Nosenko. According to the memorandum, "Oswald

was an extremely poor shot and it was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to

provide him with game."9

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

8. CD 344 was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg and is discussed in Whitewash II, pp. 15-19.

9. This memorandum was shown to Epstein by Liebeler. References to it may be found in Inquest, p. 146, and the Saturday Evening Post, April 6,

1968, p. 72.

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4. Soon after Oswald returned from the Soviet Union he again went hunting with his brother,

Robert, and used a borrowed .22 caliber bolt-action rifle.

Robert Oswald is again the source of this information. The hunting trip in question took place at

the farm of Robert’s in-laws. However, according to Robert, "we did just a very little bit [of

hunting]. I believe this was on a Sunday afternoon and we didn’t stay out very long" (1H327).

5. After Oswald purchased the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, he told his wife that he practiced

with it. Marina Oswald testified that on one occasion she saw him take the rifle, concealed in a

raincoat, from the house on Neely Street. Oswald told her he was going to practice with it.

Marina Oswald is the source of this above-quoted information. The footnote in the Report refers

to 1H14-15; CE 1156, p. 442; CE 1404, pp. 446-48.

Marina’s progression of statements relevant to Oswald’s rifle practice is truly amazing. The

Report quotes her incompletely and dishonestly, choosing only those statements which support the

belief that Oswald practiced with the Carcano. The following is a chronological listing of Marina’s

relevant words:

12/3/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: "MARINA said she had never seen OSWALD practice with

his rifle or any other firearm and he had never told her that he was going to practice." (22H763)

12/4/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: " She cannot recall ever hearing Oswald state that he was going

to fire the rifle in practice or that he had fired it in practice." (22H785)

12/4/63, Secret Service report of interview with Marina: "The reporting agent interviewed Marina Oswald as

to whether she knew of any place or of a rifle range where her husband could do some practicing with a rifle, and

whether she ever saw her husband taking the rifle out of the house. She said that she never saw Lee going out or

coming in to the house with a rifle and that he never mentioned to her doing any practice with a rifle." (23H393)

12/10/63, Secret Service report of interview with Marina: "Marina Oswald was asked if she ever saw her

husband doing any dry practice with the rifle either in their apartments or any place else, and she replied in the

negative." (23H402)

12/16/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: "She cannot recall that [Oswald] ever practiced firing the rifle

either in New Orleans or in Dallas." (22H778)

2/3/64, Marina makes her first appearance before the Commission:

Mr. Rankin: Did you learn at any time that he had been practicing with the rifle?

Mrs. Oswald: I think he went once or twice. I didn’t actually see him take the rifle, but I knew he was

practicing.

Mr. Rankin: Could you give us a little help on how you knew?

Mrs. Oswald: He told me. And he would mention that in passing . . . he would say, "Well, today I will take

the rifle along for practice." (1H14-15)

2/17/64, FBI report of interview with Marina: "MARINA advised OSWALD had told her after the

WALKER incident that he had practiced with his rifle in a field near Dallas. She said further that in the

beginning of January, 1963, at the Neely Street address, he on one occasion was cleaning his rifle and he said he

had been practicing that day. [The rifle was not mailed until the end of March 1963.]

"MARINA was asked if she had ever seen OSWALD take the rifle from the house and she replied that she

had not. She was asked if she had ever known the rifle to have been gone from the house at the same time

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OSWALD was gone from the house. She replied that she could not recall any such incident. She was then asked

if it were true then that she had never seen OSWALD take the rifle from the house nor knew any occasion when

he might have had the rifle at a place other than at home. She then admitted that she did know of such an

occasion. She said this occasion occurred on an evening in March, 1963. On this evening, she and JUNE [their

daughter] and OSWALD left the house at about 6:00 PM. OSWALD had his rifle wrapped up in a raincoat. . . .

When OSWALD returned about 9:00 PM, he told her he had practiced with his rifle." (22H197)

2/18/64, FBI report of interview with Marina: "She advised she had been mistaken on February 17, 1964,

when she said she had recalled OSWALD cleaning his rifle at Neely Street, at which time he made the statement

he had been practicing. She said she is now able to place the date . . . as being shortly before the WALKER

incident. . . . At one of the four or five times that she observed OSWALD cleaning his rifle at their home on

Neely Street . . . he told her he had been practicing with the rifle but he did not say when he had practiced. On

the other occasions of his cleaning the rifle . . . he did not say he had been practicing. MARINA deduced that he

might have been practicing with the rifle." (22H785)

6/11/64, Marina again testifies before the Commission:

"Lee didn’t tell me when he was going out to practice. I only remember one time distinctly that he went out

because he took the bus. I don’t know if he went to Love Field at that time. I don’t—after all this testimony,

after all this testimony, when I was asked did he clean his gun a lot, and I answered yes, I came to the conclusion

that he was practicing with his gun because he was cleaning it afterwards." (5H397)

Sen. Cooper: Did he ever tell you that he was practicing with a rifle?

Mrs. Oswald: Only after I saw him take the gun that one time. (5H398)

Thus Marina, until three months after the assassination, denied any knowledge whatsoever of

Oswald’s rifle practice; he never told her he practiced, and she knew of no practice. When she first

appeared before the Commission, her story changed. She suddenly knew of one or two instances

when Oswald mentioned he was going to practice, although she never saw him take the rifle from the

house. Subsequent to her testimony, she changed her story again. After telling the FBI she saw

Oswald clean the rifle before he even ordered it, she "admitted" an incident in which she saw Oswald

remove the rifle concealed in a raincoat to practice at night. The following day her memory

conveniently improved as she retracted her statement that she had seen Oswald with the rifle as early

as January 1963. She added at this time that although Oswald had actually admitted practicing only

once, she "deduced" he had practiced other times. This, essentially, was the final version of her

story.

Marina was an entirely incredible witness. No honest jury could have believed any of her

statements; for everything she said, there almost always existed a contradictory statement that she

had made earlier. The Commission merely chose her most "juicy" descriptions of rifle practice and

cited them, ignoring completely the other statements. The official use of Marina’s testimony could

best be described in Aldous Huxley’s words, "You pays your money and you takes your choice."

6. According to George De Mohrenschildt, Oswald said he went target shooting with that rifle.

The footnote to this assertion refers to portions of the testimonies of George De Mohrenschildt,

the Oswalds’ "friend" in Dallas, and his wife, Jeanne. The combined stories of the De

Mohrenschildts are so ridiculous as to make Marina’s appear reliable and consistent.

In his testimony, George De Mohrenschildt had been relating the incident in which he and his

wife paid a late-night visit to the Oswalds shortly after the Walker incident (as described in the

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previous chapter). De Mohrenschildt described how his wife had seen a rifle in the closet and offered

"facts" unsubstantiated by any of the Commission’s evidence:

Mr. De Mohrenschildt: And Marina said "That crazy idiot is target shooting all the time." So frankly I

thought it was ridiculous to shoot target shooting in Dallas, you see, right in town. I asked him "Why do you do

that?"

Mr. Jenner: What did he say?

Mr. De Mohrenschildt: He said, "I go out and do target shooting. I like target shooting." (9H249)

Despite the lack of corroborative evidence, De Mohrenschildt’s story might have remained

plausible had his wife not attempted to substantiate it. In the portion of her testimony cited but not

quoted in the Report, she revealed—to the exasperation of staff member Jenner—the details of the

incident ad absurdium:

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: I just asked what on earth is he doing with a rifle?

Mr. Jenner: What did she [Marina] say?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: She said, "Oh, he just loves to shoot." I said, "Where on earth does he shoot?

Where can he shoot?" when they lived in a little house. "Oh, he goes in the park and shoots at leaves and things

like that." But it didn’t strike me too funny, because I personally love skeet shooting. I never kill anything. But I

adore to shoot at a target, target shooting.

Mr. Jenner: Skeet?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: I just love it.

Mr. Jenner: Didn’t you think it was strange to have someone say he is going in a public park and shooting

leaves?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: But he was taking the baby out. He goes with her, and that was his amusement.

Mr. Jenner: Did she say that?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: Yes; that was his amusement, practicing in the park, shooting leaves. That wasn’t

strange to me, because any time I go to an amusement park I go to the rifles and start shooting. So I didn’t find

anything strange.

Mr. Jenner: But you shot at the rifle range in these amusement parks?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: Yes.

Mr. Jenner: Little .22?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: I don’t know what it was.

Mr. Jenner: Didn’t you think it was strange that a man would be walking around a public park in Dallas with

a high-powered rifle like this, shooting leaves?

Mrs. De Mohrenschildt: I didn’t know it was a high-powered rifle. I had no idea. I don’t even know right

now. (9H316)

The Commission did not see fit to include in the Report the fact that the extent of the De

Mohrenschildts’ knowledge of Oswald’s "rifle practice" was that he fired at leaves while walking his

baby daughter through public parks. Had this been included, no one could have believed the De

Mohrenschildts.

7. Marina Oswald testified that in New Orleans in May of 1963, she observed Oswald sitting

with the rifle on their screened porch at night, sighting with the telescopic lens and operating the

bolt.

For this the Report cites Marina’s testimony at 1H21-22, 53-54, and 65 and CE 1814, p. 736.

However, CE 1814 has nothing to do with Marina Oswald, or rifle practice (23H471).

Marina’s testimony about the bolt-working sessions on the porch of the Oswald’s New Orleans

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home was another spectacle of blatant self-contradiction, again none of which was reflected in the

Report. In three days, Marina gave three opposing accounts represented in the Report as consistent.

On February 3, Marina said:

I know that we had a kind of a porch with a—a screened-in porch, and I know that sometimes evenings after dark

he would sit there with his rifle. I don’t know what he did with it. I came there only by chance once and saw him

just sitting there with his rifle. I thought he is merely sitting there and resting . . .

Mr. Rankin: From what you observed about his having the rifle on the back porch, in the dark, could you tell

whether or not he was trying to practice with the telescopic lens?

Mrs. Oswald: Yes. (1H21-22).

On February 4, Marina offered a version of the porch practice different from that put forth in the

Report:

Mr. Rankin: Did you ever see him working the bolt, the action that opens the rifle, where you can put a shell

in and push it back—during those times [on the porch]?

Mrs. Oswald: I did not see it, because it was dark and I would be in the room at that time. But I did hear the

noise from time to time—not often. (1H54)

Finally, on February 5, Marina reached the height of her confusion and merely retracted the

statement attributed to her in the Report:

Mr. Rankin: You have told us about his practicing with the rifle, the telescopic lens, on the back porch at

New Orleans, and also his using the bolt action that you heard from time to time. Will you describe that a little

more fully to us, as best you remember?

Mrs. Oswald: I cannot describe that in greater detail. I can only say that Lee would sit there with the rifle and

open and close the bolt and clean it. No, he didn’t clean it at that time. Yes—twice he did clean it.

Mr. Rankin: And did he seem to be practicing with the telescopic lens, too, and sighting the gun on different

objects?

Mrs. Oswald: I don’t know. The rifle was always with this. I don’t know exactly how he practiced, because

I was in the house, I was busy. I just knew that he sits there with his rifle. I was not interested in it. (1H65)

It is important to note that Marina originally denied any such New Orleans porch practice to the

FBI. An FBI report of an interview with Marina on December 16, 1963, states that "She never saw

[Oswald] clean [the rifle] nor did he ever hold it in her presence [in New Orleans] as best as she can

recall" (22H778).

If Marina’s stories of porch practice are true (and here the reader may believe whichever version

he likes), then Oswald practiced sighting with his rifle in total darkness on a screened porch. If this

call be called "practice," it certainly cannot be applied to normal daylight firing.

The seven assertions as quoted above from the Report constitute the known extent of "Oswald’s

Rifle practice." Only one had substantiation. The others are either misrepresentations of the

evidence or are merely unsupported altogether. Oswald performed badly on the hunts in which he

participated. He did not even use a rifle in Russia although, to the Commission, intent on associating

Oswald with a rifle as frequently as possible, a shotgun was the same as a rifle. Marina’s assertions

that Oswald practiced with the Carcano are rendered invalid by her earlier statements that Oswald

never practiced. Even if the one incident she finally conceded was true, Oswald would have had a

total of 64 minutes to practice (26H61). The De Mohrenschildts’ description of Oswald’s target

shooting at leaves in the park warrants no serious consideration. As Marina admitted to the

Commission, she did not know what Oswald did with the rifle when he sat with it on the porch of

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their New Orleans home (if he ever did this at all, as Marina originally denied).

Taking the issue further than did the Commission, we can be reasonably certain that Oswald

engaged in no rifle practice in New Orleans during the summer of 1963 or in Dallas up until the time

of the assassination.

If Marina was consistent in any of her statements, it was her denial that Oswald practiced with the

rifle in New Orleans. While she recalled no such incident, she felt that Oswald could not have

practiced without telling her.

because as a rule he stayed home when he was not working. When he did go out, she did not see him take the

rifle. (22H778)

Marina told this to the FBI on December 16, 1963. She stuck to this story before the Commission,

saying she knew "for sure" Oswald did not practice in New Orleans (1H21).

More reliable information relating to possible New Orleans practice comes from Adrian Alba, a

New Orleans garage owner who spoke with Oswald about rifles during the summer of 1963. On

November 25, 1963, Alba told the FBI that

he knew of no rifle practice which OSWALD had engaged in while in New Orleans, adding that from his

conversation with OSWALD he did not believe that OSWALD belonged to any of the local gun clubs. He added

that it would have been almost impossible for OSWALD to practice with a rifle around New Orleans unless he

belonged to a gun club. (CD7:203)

Alba repeated this information in his deposition before staff member Liebeler. He explained why

Oswald could not have practiced in New Orleans unless he belonged to a gun club (which he did

not). According to Alba, if someone attempted to practice in the only possible regions other than the

clubs, "they would either run you off or arrest you for discharging firearms" (10H224).

There is no credible evidence in any form to indicate that Oswald practiced with his rifle after

moving back to Dallas from New Orleans in October 1963. If the rifle was stored in the Paine garage

as the Commission asserts (though proof of this is lacking), then the possibility that Oswald could

have taken the rifle for practice is virtually nil. Likewise, Marina was emphatic that Oswald never

practiced during the time she lived with the Paines. For what little reliance, if any, can be put in her

testimony, I quote her relevant words:

he couldn’t have practiced while we were at the Paine’s, because Ruth was there. But whenever she was not at

home, he tried to spend as much time as he could with me—he would watch television in the house. (1H53)

There is no evidence indicating that the rifle was in Oswald’s possession during this period. The

woman who cleaned his small room on North Beckley never saw it there, although she did not go

into the drawers of the "little wooden commode or closet" in the room (6H440-441). While several

witnesses thought they had seen Oswald practicing at a rifle range in Dallas throughout September to

November 1963, the evidence strongly indicates that the man observed neither was nor could have

been Oswald, as the Report admits (R318-30). Various FBI and Secret Service checks failed to turn

up any evidence of rifle practice by Oswald in the Dallas area (see CEs 2694, 2908, 3049).

And this was Oswald the marksman—from the time he received his first weapons training in the

Marines, where he went from a fairly good to a rather poor shot, to his few hunting trips with Robert

Oswald, where he manifested his lack of skill with a rifle, to his presumed hunting in the Soviet

Union with other than a rifle but the same absence of any proficiency, to the time of his assumed

possession of the rifle, when no credible evidence indicated that he ever engaged in practice.

This obviously was not the caliber of shooter defined by expert Simmons as necessary to have

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pulled off the assassination alone. The presumed lone assassin, according to Simmons, had to have

"considerable experience" in his background, especially "considerable experience with" the Carcano,

and had to be "a proficient man with this weapon." Oswald was none of these. The only reliable

evidence now known demonstrates that he was simply a poor shot who never did a thing to improve

his capability.

As we have seen, the Commission consistently misrepresented the evidence relevant to Oswald’s

rifle capability. In its conclusion to this section of the Report, it retained its propensity for conjuring

up what it wanted without regard to evidence. It concluded this:

Oswald’s Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience and his established familiarity with this

particular weapon show that he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination. (R195)

The Commission, in essence, told the public that "rather poor shot" Oswald did what shooters in

the NRA Master classification, the highest rating, could not do. It must have caused great concern

among those who spend hours of concentrated practice each day trying to maintain proficiency with a

rifle to learn that Oswald outdid the best and "established familiarity" with his rifle by never

practicing, probably never even playing with his rifle!

Oswald did not have the capability to fire the assassination shots as the official theory proclaims.

That he was a competent marksman is a pure myth created by the Commission in flagrant disregard

of the evidence.

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Conclusion

Throughout twelve hours of interrogation over the weekend of the assassination, Lee Harvey

Oswald steadfastly denied that he had shot the President (R613, 627). He repeated that denial before

hundreds of newsmen crowded into the narrow corridors of the police headquarters: "I’m just a

patsy," he exclaimed (20H362, 366). Even as he lay dying on a stretcher, the police pressed him for

a final confession. But Oswald merely shook his head; he would die protesting his innocence

(12H185).

Oswald’s plea was ignored amid the clamor of official voices, which hastened to assure the public

of Oswald’s guilt.

The Dallas Police wasted no time in announcing their verdict. Of course, it is preposterous to

assume that even the most competent police force could have solved one of the century’s most

complex crimes overnight. Yet this was precisely the claim made by the Dallas Police when, on the

day after the assassination, they told the world that Oswald was beyond doubt the lone assassin.

Two weeks later the FBI claimed that it too had conclusively determined that Oswald was the lone

assassin. This was indeed an unwarranted conclusion since, in its "solution" of the crime, the FBI

failed to account for one of the President’s wounds and a shot that missed the car. The FBI seems

never to have anticipated that concerned citizens would probe its thoroughly flawed report. It made

sure that everyone knew the conclusion reached in the report by leaking to the press everything it

wanted known. The report itself, however, the FBI decided to keep secret.

The FBI’s ploy had one salient effect: it preempted the Warren Commission and left the

Commission little choice but to affirm the FBI’s conclusions. The alternative was for the

Commission to conduct a genuinely independent investigation and announce that the FBI had erred.

In 1964, given the FBI’s reputation as the greatest law-enforcement investigative agency in the world

and the pervasive, although then unspoken fear of J. Edgar Hoover’s power, this was an unthinkable

alternative for the conservative Commission members. The choice was made to rely on the FBI—in

effect, to let the FBI investigate itself.

Thus, from the very beginning of its investigation, the Commission planned its work under the

presumption that Oswald was guilty, and the staff consciously endeavored to construct a prosecution

case against Oswald. One Commission member actually complained to the staff that he wanted to

see more arguments in support of the theory that Oswald was the assassin. There could have been no

more candid admission of how fraudulent the "investigation" was than when a staff lawyer secretly

wrote, "Our intention is not to establish the point with complete accuracy, but merely to substantiate

the hypothesis which underlies the conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin." In its zeal to

posthumously frame Oswald—and falsify history—the staff often considered ludicrous methods of

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avoiding the facts—as in the suggestion of one staff lawyer that "the best evidence that Oswald could

fire as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so."

The Commission, in presuming Oswald guilty, abdicated its responsibility to the nation. But did

the Commission, in spite of its prejudices, arrive at the truth? Does the evidence establish that

Oswald was the assassin?

The medical evidence actually disassociates Oswald’s rifle from the wounds suffered by President

Kennedy and Governor Connally. The nature of the bullet fragmentation within the President’s

wounds rules out full-jacketed military bullets such as those allegedly fired by Oswald. Bullet 399,

discovered at Parkland Hospital and traced to Oswald’s rifle, could not, in any conceivable way, have

produced any of the President’s wounds. Likewise, 399 could not have produced the Governor’s

wounds without having suffered some form of mutilation; bullets simply do not smash through two

or three bones and emerge in the condition of 399, with no apparent distortions and no disruption of

their microscopic markings.

The medical evidence leads one to believe that Oswald’s rifle played no role in the shooting and

that all the evidence that seems to link Oswald to the shooting was in fact planted. The only

evidence that might conclusively show whether bullet 399 and the two fragments traced to Oswald’s

rifle were actually involved in the wounding of either victim is the spectrographic and neutron

activation analyses, and they are withheld from the public. One need not be an expert analyst to

deduce that the government would hardly suppress this evidence if it corroborated its account of the

assassination. The only credible explanation for the suppression of this crucial scientific evidence is

that it must establish conclusively what the medical evidence established to but a reasonable

degree—that Oswald’s rifle played no role in the shooting.

The evidence of the rifle, the cartridge cases, and the bullets is significant because it creates the

powerful assumption that Oswald was the assassin. The medical evidence, in disassociating

Oswald’s rifle from the crime, makes it apparent that unknown persons deliberately planted the

recovered ballistic items with the intention of leaving evidence that would point to Oswald as the

murderer. Such planting of evidence does not necessarily imply an enormous conspiracy, as some of

the Commission’s defenders have suggested. Two accomplices, one at the Book Depository and one

at Parkland Hospital, are all that would have been required. Conditions at both sites were so chaotic

at the time that such accomplices could easily have escaped detection.

Once it is established that Oswald’s rifle was not involved in the shooting, there is not a shred of

tangible or credible evidence to indicate that Oswald was the assassin. The evidence proves exactly

the opposite.

The circumstantial evidence relating to Oswald himself is almost entirely exculpatory. Every

element of it was twisted by the Commission to fit the preconceived conclusion of Oswald’s guilt. I

have documented that, through its staff and its Report, the Commission:

1. Drew undue suspicion to Oswald’s return to Irving on November 21, although the

evidence indicated that Oswald did not know the motorcade route and broke no set

pattern in making the return;

2. Ignored all evidence that could have provided an innocent excuse for Oswald’s visit;

3. Wrongly discredited the reliable and consistent testimony of the only two witnesses

who saw the package Oswald carried to work on the morning of the assassination;

because their descriptions meant that the package could not have contained the rifle,

the Commission claimed to have made this rejection on the basis of "scientific

evidence," which did not exist;

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4. Concluded that Oswald made a paper sack to conceal the rifle, citing no evidence in

support of this notion and suppressing evidence that tended to disprove it;

5. Concluded that the sack was used to transport the rifle, although its evidence proved

that the sack never contained the rifle;

6. Used the testimony of Charles Givens to placed [sic] Oswald at the alleged source of

the shots 35 minutes too early, even though Givens described an event that physically

could not have taken place;

7. Claimed to know of no Depository employee who saw Oswald between 11:55 and

12:30, basing its claim on an inquiry in which it (through General Counsel Rankin)

had the FBI determine whether any employee had seen Oswald only at 12:30,

completely suppressing from the Report three distinct pieces of evidence indicating

Oswald’s presence on the first floor during the period in question.

8. Failed to produce any witness who could identify the sixth-floor gunman as Oswald;

both rejected and accepted the identification of one man who admitted lying to the

police, who constantly contradicted himself, and who described physically impossible

events; and ignored evidence of clothing descriptions that might have indicated that

Oswald was not the gunman;

9. Reconstructed the movements of Baker and Truly in such a way as to lengthen the

time of their ascent to the second floor;

10. Reconstructed the movements of the "assassin" so as to greatly reduce the time of his

presumed descent; a valid reconstruction would have proved that a sixth-floor

gunman could not have reached the second-floor lunch-room before Baker and Truly;

11. Misrepresented Baker’s position at the time he saw Oswald entering the lunchroom,

making it seem possible that Oswald could have just descended from the third floor,

although, in fact, the events described by Baker and Truly prove that Oswald must

have been coming up from the first floor (as Oswald himself told the police he did);

12. Misrepresented the nature of the assassination shots by omitting from its evaluation

the time factor and other physical obstacles, thus making it seem that the shots were

easy and that Oswald could have fired them;

13. Misrepresented the evidence relevant to Oswald’s rifle capability and practice,

creating the impression that he was a good shot with much practice, although the

evidence indicated exactly the opposite. The conclusion dictated by all this evidence

en masse is inescapable and overwhelming: Lee Harvey Oswald never fired a shot at

President Kennedy; he was not even at the Depository window during the

assassination; and no one fired his rifle, the Mannlicher-Carcano, on that day.

Beyond any doubt, he is innocent of the monstrous crime with which he was charged

and of which he was presumed guilty. The official presumption of his guilt

effectively cut off any quest for truth and led to the abandonment of the principles of

law and honest investigation. At all costs, the government has denied (and, to judge

from its record, will continue to deny) Oswald’s innocence and perpetuated the myth

of his lone guilt.

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With this, a thousand other spiders emerge from the walls.

It can now be inferred that Oswald was framed; he was deliberately set up as the Kennedy

assassin. His rifle was found in the Depository. We know that it had to have been put there; we also

know that it was not Oswald who put it there. Someone else did.

We know that a whole bullet traceable to Oswald’s rifle turned up at Parkland Hospital; we also

know that this bullet was never in the body of either victim. Someone had to have planted it at the

hospital. The same applies to the two identifiable fragments found in the front seat of the President’s

limousine.

We know that someone shot and killed President Kennedy; we also know that Oswald did not do

this. The real presidential murderers have escaped punishment through our established judicial

channels, their crime tacitly sanctioned by those who endeavored to prove Oswald guilty. The afterthe-

fact framing of Oswald by the federal authorities means, in effect, that the federal government

has conspired to protect those who conspired to kill President Kennedy.

It is not my responsibility to explain why the Commission did what it did, and I would deceive the

reader if I made the slightest pretense that it was within my capability to provide such an

explanation. I have presented the facts; no explanation of motives, be they the highest and the purest

or the lowest and the most corrupt, will alter those facts or undo what the Commission indisputably

has done.

The government has lied about one of the most serious crimes that can be committed in a

democracy. Having lied without restraint about the death of a president, it can not be believed on

anything. It has sacrificed its credibility.

Remedies are not clearly apparent or easily suggested. Certainly, Congress has an obligation to

investigate this monumental abuse by the executive. But first and foremost, the people must

recognize that they have been lied to by their government and denied the truth about the murder of

their former leader. They must demand the truth, whatever the price, and insist that their government

work honestly and properly.

Until then, the history of one of the world’s most democratic nations must suffer the stigma of a

frighteningly immoral and undemocratic act by its government.

- 131 -

Appendix A

Tentative Outline of the Work of the

President’s Commission

Author’s note: This "Tentative Outline" was attached to a "Progress Report" dated January 11,

1964, from Commission Chairman Earl Warren to the other Commission members, and reveals the

extent to which the Commission’s conclusions were formulated prior to its investigation.

I. Assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963 in Dallas

A. Trip to Texas—Prior to Assassination

1. Initial plans for trip

a. relevent dates [sic]

b. itinerary

c. companions

d. motorcade to luncheon

e. other

2. Events of morning of November 22

a. arrival at airport—time, etc.

b. motorcade—crowds, time, etc.

B. Assassination (based on all available statements of witnesses, films, photographs, etc.)

1. Shots

a. number of shots fired

b. time elapsed during shots

c. direction of shots

d. location of car at time

2. Postures and apparent injuries to President Kennedy and Governor Connally

a. President Kennedy

b. Governor Connally

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C. Events Immediately Following the Shooting

1. Treatment at hospital

2. Activities of Dallas law enforcement

3. Return of entourage to Washington

a. President Johnson’s trip to airport

b. trip of Mrs. Kennedy with body of late President to airport

c. swearing-in

4. Removal of President Kennedy’s body to

Bethesda Naval Hospital

5. Removal of car to Washington—condition and repairs

D. Nature and Extent of Wounds Received by President Kennedy (based on examinations in

Dallas and Bethesda)

1. Number of individual wounds received by President Kennedy

2. Cause of death

3. Time of death

4. Evaluation of medical treatment received in Dallas

II. Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy

A. Brief Identification of Oswald (Dallas resident, employee of Texas School Book

Depository, etc.)

B. Movements on November 22, 1963 Prior to Assassination

1. Trip to work

a. time

b. package

c. other significant facts, e.g. any conversations, etc.

2. Entry into Depository

a. time

b. package

c. other significant facts

3. Activities during morning

a. nature of his work

b. location of his work

c. other significant facts, e.g. any conversations, etc.

4. Movements immediately prior to 12:29 P.M.

C. Movements after Assassination until Murder of Tippit

1. Presence within building

a. location

b. time

c. encounter with police

d. other relevant facts

2. Departure from building

a. time

b. direction of movement

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c. other relevant facts, e.g. crossing police line, etc.

3. Boarding of bus

a. time and place of boarding

b. duration of ride

c. other relevant facts, e.g. dress, appearance, conversations, etc.

4. From bus to taxi

a. time and place

b. distance and route of cab

c. time to destination

d. other relevant facts obtained from cab driver or other witnesses or sources

5. Arrival at rooming house

a. time

b. actions within rooming house

c. departure and direction

6. Route until encounter with Tippit

a. time

b. distance

D. Murder of Tippit

1. Encounter of Oswald and Tippit

a. time

b. location

2. Evidence demonstrating Oswald’s guilt

a. eyewitness reports

b. murder weapon

c. autopsy and ballistics reports

d. paraffin tests

e. other, e.g. statements (if any)

E. Flight and Apprehension in Texas Theater

1. Movement until entry into theater

a. time

b. actions, e.g. reloading weapon

c. other relevant facts, e.g. recovery of jacket

2. Apprehension in theater

a. movements of Oswald in theater

b. notification and arrival of police

c. arrest of Oswald

d. removal to station

F. Oswald at Dallas Police Station

1. Interrogation

a. time, manner and number of interrogation sessions

b. persons present

c. persons responsible

d. results

2. Other investigation by Dallas police

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a. line-ups and eyewitness identification

b. seizure of Oswald’s papers

c. other

3. Denials and other statements by Oswald

4. Removal to County Jail on November 24, 1963

5. Killing of Oswald by Ruby

G. Evidence Identifying Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy

1. Room of Texas School Book Depository identified as source of shots

a. eyewitness reports

b. trajectory of shots

c. evidence on scene after assassination

d. other

2. Oswald placed in Depository (and specific room?)

a. eyewitness reports

b. fingerprints on objects in room

c. facts reviewed above

3. Assassination weapon identified as Oswald’s

a. discovery of rifle and shells

b. obtaining and possession of gun by Oswald

c. whereabouts of gun on November 21 and November 22

d. prints on rifle

e. photographs of Oswald and rifle

f. General Walker ballistic report.

4. Other physical evidence

a. clothing tests

b. paraffin tests

5. Prior similar acts

a. General Walker attack

b. General Eisenhower threat

6. Permissible inferences from Oswald’s:

a. flight from Depository

b. statements on bus

c. murder of Tippit

H. Evidence Implicating Others in Assassination or Suggesting Accomplices

1. Evidence of shots other than from Depository?

2. Feasibility of shots within time span and with use of telescope

3. Evidence re other persons involved in actual shooting from Depository

4. Analysis of all movements of Oswald after assassination for attempt to meet associates

5. Refutation of allegations

III. Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motive

A. Birth and Pre-school Days

1. Family structure (death of father; statements of persons who knew family; interviews

of mother, brother, and members of family)

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2. Where family lived (statements as to childhood character of Oswald from neighbors who

recall family and child)

3. Standard of living of family (document factors which would have bearing upon development)

B. Education

1. Schools (reports from each school attended regarding demeanor, grades, development,

attitude to fellow students, activities, problems, possible aptitude for languages,

sex life, etc.)

2. Reports of fellow students, associates, friends, enemies at each school attended

3. Reports from various neighbors where Oswald lived while attending various schools

4. Special report from juvenile authorities in New York City concerning Oswald.

a. report of case worker on Oswald and family

b. psychiatrist who examined him, treatment and results, opinion as to future development

C. Military Service

1. Facts regarding entry into service, assignments, stations, etc. until discharge

2. Reports of personnel from each station regarding demeanor, character, competence,

activities, sex life, financial status, attitude, etc.

3. Report on all activities while in Japan

4. Report and document study of Russian language

a. where and when

b. books used

c. instruction or self-taught

d. any indication of degree of accomplishment

- 136 -

Appendix B

Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

from David W. Belin

Author’s note: This memorandum by staff lawyer Belin speaks for itself. A month later, on February

25,1964, Belin wrote in another memorandum, "At no time have we assumed that Lee Harvey Oswald

was the assassin of President Kennedy." See chapter 2.

MEMORANDUM January 30, 1964

TO: J. Lee Rankin

FROM: David W. Belin

SUBJECT: Oswald’s knowledge that Connally would be in the Presidential car and his intended

target.

According to the Secret Service Report, Document No. 3, page 11, the route of the motorcade was

released on the evening of November 18 and appeared in Dallas newspapers on November 19 as

shown in Exhibits 6D and 6E (Document No. 3 is the December 18 Secret Service Report).

In examining these exhibits, although the general route of the motorcade is shown, there is

nothing that shows that Governor Connally would be riding in the Presidential car.

In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting

at Connally and missed two of the three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was

shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was

shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.

If there was no mass media coverage that Connally would be riding in the Presidential car, it

would tend to confirm the third alternative that Kennedy was the only intended target. This in turn

bears on the motive of the assassination and also on the degree of markmanship [sic] required, which

in turn affects the determination that Oswald was the assassin and that it was not too difficult to hit

the intended target two out of the three times in this particular situation.

In any event, I believe it would be most helpful to have the FBI investigate all newspaper,

television and radio reports from November 18 to November 22 in Dallas to ascertain whether or not

in any of these reports there was a public announcement that Connally would be riding in the

Presidential car. If such public announcement was made, we should know specifically over what

media and when.

Of course, there is another element of timing: If Connally’s position in the motorcade was not

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released until the afternoon of November 21, then when Oswald went home to get the weapon, he

would not have necessarily intended Connally as the target.

Finally, we would like to know whether or not there was any release to the public news media that

Connally would ride in any car in the motorcade, regardless of whether or not it was the Presidential

car.

Thank you.

- 138 -

Appendix C

Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

from Norman Redlich

Author’s note: This is one of many similar outlines of the Warren Report, drafted long before the

Commission’s "investigation" ended, and before virtually all of the relevant testimony was taken. It

proves that the Commission worked to substantiate a preconceived conclusion naming Oswald as the

sole assassin.

MEMORANDUM March 26, 1964

TO: J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Norman Redlich

SUBJECT: Proposed Outline of Report

I attach a proposed outline of our final report. This plan envisages a main report and

supplementary materials to be published as one volume. This will be followed by appendixes to be

published when prepared. These appendixes will contain the supporting material for the report such

as the transcript of testimony, important underlying investigatory material, and photos of important

exhibits not published with the original report.

I have listed the staff members who I feel should have responsibility for the particular sections of

the report. Although I have assigned small sections of the report to Mr. Williams, Mr. Eisenberg,

and myself, the major responsibility lies with other members of the staff. I am assuming that Mr.

Williams as your Administrative Assistant, and I as your Special Assistant, together with Mr.

Eisenberg, will have responsibility for review, editing, avoidance of duplication, and other technical

details of putting a report into publishable condition.

With your permission, I would like to distribute this outline to the staff.

PROPOSED OUTLINE OF REPORT

(Submitted by Mr. Redlich)

I. Statement of Objectives and Standards (Mr. Rankin)

(The Report should start with a brief statement setting forth the Commission’s view of its

objectives and standards used to achieve them. It is important to clarify the Commission’s

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position as a fact-finding body and to indicate wherein our findings differ from a judicial

determination of criminal guilt.)

II. Brief Summary of Major Conclusions (Redlich and Willens)

(The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a short statement of our major conclusions

without having to read through the entire document.)

A. Basic Facts Concerning Assassination of President Kennedy and Shooting of Governor Connally

B. Identity of the Assassin

C. Conclusions Concerning Accomplices

D. Conclusions Concerning Motive

E. Ruby’s Killing of Oswald and Conclusion as to Possible Link to Assassination

III. The Assassination—Basic Facts (Adams and Specter)

A. Physical Setting

1. Description of Motorcade

2. Description of Area where Shooting Occurred

B. Shooting

1. Number of Shots

2. Medical Effect of Each Shot

3. Point from which Shots Fired

4. Statistical Data

a. Elapsed time of shooting

b. Distance travelled by Presidential car

c. Speed of car

d. Distance travelled by each bullet

5. Events Immediately following Shooting

a. Reaction of Secret Service

b. Trip to Parkland

c. Events in Parkland

d. Trip to Love Field

e. Return to Washington

IV. Lee H. Oswald as the Assassin (Ball and Belin)

(This section should state the facts which lead to the conclusion that Oswald pulled the trigger and

should also indicate the elements in the case which have either not been proven or are based on

doubtful testimony. Each of the factors listed below should be reviewed in that light.)

A. Identification of Rifle as Murder Weapon

B. Oswald’s Ownership of Weapon

C. Evidence of Oswald Carrying Weapon to Building

1. Fake Curtain Rod Stroy [sic]

2. Buell Frazier’s Story

3. Possible Presence in Paine’s Garage on Evening of November 21, 1963

D. Evidence of Oswald on Sixth Floor

1. Palm Prints on Carton

2. Paper Bag with Oswald Print

E. Eyewitness Testimony

F. Oswald After Assassination—Actions in Building

G. Oswald After Assassination—Actions up to Tippit Shooting

- 140 -

H. Shooting of Tippit and Arrest in Theatre

1. Eyewitnesses

2. Gun as Murder Weapon

3. Oswald’s Ownership of Gun

I. Statements After Arrest

J. Prior Actions

1. Walker Shooting

2. Possible Nixon Attempt

3. Practice with Rifle

K. Evidence of any Accomplices in Assassination

L. Appraisal of Oswald’s Actions on November 21 and 22 in Light of Assassination

(This will be a difficult section, but I feel we must face up to the various paradoxical aspects of

Oswald’s behavior in light of his being the assassin. I suggest the following items for

consideration.)

1. Did He Have a Planned Escape?

2. Why did he pass up the Opportunity to get money on November 21 when he returned to Irving?

3. Discussion with Marina about getting apartment in Dallas

4. Asking fellow employee, on morning of November 22, which way the President was coming.

V. Possible Motive (Jenner, Liebeler, Coleman, Slawson)

A. Brief Biographical Sketch of Oswald (Fuller Biography in Supplement)

B. Any Personal Animosity Toward Kennedy or Connally

C. Do his Political Beliefs Furnish Motive

D. Link to Domestic Left-Wing Groups

1. Fair Play for Cuba

2. Communist Party

3. Conclusions to be Drawn from such Links

E. Link to Right-Wing Groups

F. Possible Agent of Foreign Power

G. Possible Link to Underworld

VI. Killing of Oswald by Ruby (Hubert and Griffin)

A. Facts of the Killing

1. Actions of Ruby starting with November 22

2. Description of Events on November 24

B. Discussion of Possible Link with Assassination of President Kennedy

C. Other Possible Motives

1. Brief Biographical Sketch (Fuller Sketch in Supplement)

2. Ruby as Self-styled Patriot, Hero, Important Man

3. Possibility of Ruby being Mentally Ill

SUPPLEMENT TO BE PUBLISHED WITH REPORT

A. Visual Aids To Help Explain Main Body of Report (All Staff Members Concerned)

B. Organization and Methods of Commission (Willens)

C. Security Precautions to Protect Life of President (Stern)

1. What Was Done on This Trip

2. Broader Recommendations in This Area

- 141 -

(I recognize that this area has been the subject of extended discussion and it might be desirable

to move this section to the main body of the Report)

D. Detailed Facts About President’s Trip up to Assassination (Adams, Specter, Stern)

E. Biography of Oswald (Jenner, Liebeler, Coleman, Slawson)

F. Biography of Ruby (Hubert and Griffin)

G. Oswald Relationship with U.S. Government Agencies (Redlich, Stern, Coleman, Slawson)

H. Discussion of Widely Circulated Theories (Redlich and Eisenberg)

I. Other Important Documents We May Wish to Publish as Part of Supplement, I suggest the following:

1. Autopsy Reports

2. Summary of Testimony of Experts on Physical Evidence (Eisenberg)

3. Charts and Other Data Presented by Experts (Eisenberg)

4. Reports of Medical Examination on Governor Connally

5. Report of FBI and Secret Service on Location of President’s car at Time of Shots (Redlich and

Eisenberg)

- 142 -

Appendix D

A Later Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

from Norman Redlich

Author’s note: This memorandum by staff lawyer Redlich explicitly states that the object of the

investigation was not to determine the truth as far as it could be known, but rather to substantiate a

preconceived conclusion.

MEMORANDUM April 27, 1964

TO: J. Lee Rankin

FROM: Norman Redlich

The purpose of this memorandum is to explain the reasons why certain members of the staff feel

that it is important to take certain on-site photographs in connection with the location of the

approximate points at which the three bullets struck the occupants of the Presidential limousine.

Our report presumably will state that the President was hit by the first bullet, Governor Connally

by the second, and the President by the third and fatal bullet. The report will also conclude that the

bullets were fired by one person located in the sixth floor southeast corner window of the TSBD

building.

As our investigation now stands, however, we have not shown that these events could possibly

have occurred in the manner suggested above. All we have is a reasonable hypothesis which appears

to be supported by the medical testimony but which has not been checked out against the physical

facts at the scene of the assassination.

Our examination of the Zapruder films shows that the fatal third shot struck the President at a

point which we can locate with reasonable accuracy on the ground. We can do this because we know

the exact frame (no. 313) in the film at which the third shot hit the President and we know the

location of the photographer. By lining up fixed objects in the movie fram [sic] where this shot

occurs we feel that we have determined the approximate location of this shot. This can be verified by

a photo of the same spot from the point were Zapruder was standing.

We have the testimony of Governor and Mrs. Connally that the Governor was hit with the second

bullet at a point which we probably cannot fix with precision. We feel we have established, however,

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with the help of medical testimony, that the shot which hit the Governor did not come after frame

240 on the Zapruder film. The Governor feels that it came around 230 which is certainly consistent

with our observations of the film and with the doctor’s testimony. Since the President was shot at

frame 313, this would leave a time of at least 4 seconds between two shots, certainly ample for even

an inexperienced marksman.

Prior to our last viewing of the films with Governor Connally we had assumed that the President

was hit while he was concealed behind the sign which occurs between frames 215 to 225. We have

expert testimony to the effect that a skilled marksman would require a minimum of time of 2 1/4

seconds between shots with this rifle. Since the camera operates at 18 1/3 frames per second, there

would have to be a minimum of 40 frames between shots. It is apparent therefore, that if Governor

Connally was hit even as late as frame 240, the President would have to have been hit no later than

frame 190 and probably even earlier.

We have not yet examined the assassination scene to determine whether the assassin in fact could

have shot the President prior to frame 190. We could locate the position on the ground which

corresponds to this frame and it would then be our intent to establish by photography that the assassin

could have fired the first shot at the President prior to this point. Our intention is not to establish the

point with complete accuracy, but merely to substantiate the hypothesis which underlies the

conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin.

I had always assumed that our final report would be accompanied by a surveyor’s diagram which

would indicate the appropriate location of the three shots. We certainly cannot prepare such a

diagram without establishing that we are describing an occurrence which is physically possible. Our

failure to do this will, in my opinion, place this Report in jeopardy since it is a certainty that others

will examine the Zapruder films and raise the same questions which have been raised by our

examination of the films. If we do not attempt to answer these questions with observable facts,

others may answer them with facts which challenge our most basic assumptions, or with fanciful

theories based on our unwillingness to test our assumptions by the investigatory methods available to

us.

I should add that the facts which we now have in our possession, submitted to us in separate

reports from the FBI and Secret Service, are totally incorrect and, if left uncorrected, will present a

completely misleading picture.

It may well be that this project should be undertaken by the FBI and Secret Service with our

assistance instead of being done as a staff project. The important thing is that the project be

undertaken expeditiously.

- 144 -

Appendix E

Report of the FBI’s First

Interview with Charles Givens

Author’s note: This is the actual report of the FBI’s first interview with Charles Givens. Givens is

reported as saying nothing about the alleged encounter with Oswald on the sixth floor that he was to

describe to the Commission much later. Rather, he is reported to have told the FBI on the day of the

assassination that he saw Oswald on the first floor at the same time he later told the Commission he

saw Oswald on the sixth floor. This FBI report was not published by the Commission or mentioned

in the Warren Report.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 11/23/63

CHARLES DOUGLAS GIVENS, 2511 Cochran Street, advised he was employed by the Texas

School Book Depository, Houston and Elm Street, from October 1, 1963, to present time. GIVENS

said he has worked at this same position as a wrapper on several occasions prior to this employment.

On November 22, 1963, GIVENS worked on the sixth floor of the building until about 11:30 A.M.

when he used the elevator to travel to the first floor where he used the restroom at about 11:35 A.M.

or 11:40 A.M. GIVENS then walked around on the first floor until 12 o’clock noon, at which time he

walked onto the sidewalk and stood for several minutes, then walked to the Classified Parking Lot at

Elm and Records Street. GIVENS then walked to Main Street to watch the parade and after the

President and the group had passed, he walked back to the parking lot, at which time he heard several

shots fired from the direction of the building at which he is employed. He attempted to return to

work but was told that he had been released for the balance of the day.

GIVENS advised that a white male, known as LEE, was employed in the same building and

worked as a wrapper or order filler. He said he saw this same person’s picture on television on the

afternoon of November 22, 1963, who was supposed to have been the person being investigated for

the shooting of the President. LEE worked on all floors of the building, and on November 22, 1963,

GIVENS recalls observing LEE working on the fifth floor during the morning filling orders. LEE

was standing by the elevator in the building at 11:30 A.M. when GIVENS went to the first floor.

- 145 -

When he started down in the elevator, LEE yelled at him to close the gates on the elevator so that he

(LEE) could have the elevator returned to the sixth floor. GIVENS said that during the past few days

LEE had commented that he rode to work with a boy named WESLEY.

GIVENS said all employees enter the back door of the building when JACK DOUGHERTY, the

foreman opens the door at about 7 A.M. On the morning of November 22, 1963, GIVENS observed

LEE reading a newspaper in the domino room where the employees eat lunch about 11:50 A.M.

________________________________________________________________________________

on ___1_1_/2_2_/_6_3___ at ___D_a_l_la_s_,_T_e_x_a_s____ File # __D__L__8_9_-4_3___

by Special Agent ___W__I_L_L__H_A__Y_D_E__N__G_R_I_F_F_E_N____ and

BARDWELL D. ODUM (HM)

Date dictated__1_1_/2_3_/_6_3__

- 146 -

Appendix F

FBI Report on Mrs. R. E. Arnold

Author’s note: The Warren Commission stated in its Report that it knew of no Book Depository

employee who claimed to have seen Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30 on the day of the

assassination. This was false, as this FBI report from the Commission’s files reveals. The Warren

Report never mentions Mrs. Arnold and this FBI document was omitted from the Commission’s

published evidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 11/26/63

Mrs. R. E. ARNOLD, Secretary, Texas School Book Depository, advised she was in her office on

the second floor of the building on November 22, 1963, and left that office between 12:00 and 12:15

PM, to go downstairs and stand in front of the building to view the Presidential Motorcade. As she

was standing in front of the building, she stated she thought she caught a fleeting glimpse of LEE

HARVEY OSWALD standing in the hallway between the front door and the double doors leading to

the warehouse, located on the first floor. She could not be sure that this was OSWALD, but said she

felt it was and believed the time to be a few minutes before 12:15 PM.

She stated thereafter she viewed the Presidential Motorcade and heard the shots that were fired at

the President; however, she could furnish no information of value as to the individual firing the shots

or any other information concerning OSWALD, whom she stated she did not know and had merely

seen him working in the building.

________________________________________________________________________________

on ___1_1_/2_6_/_6_3___ at ___D_a_l_la_s_,_T_e_x_a_s____ File # __D__L__8_9_-4_3___

by Special Agent __R_I_C_H_A__R_D__E_._H__A_R_R__IS__O_N_/_r_m_h__

Date dictated _1_1_/_2_6_/_6_3_

- 147 -

Bibliography

Books

Belin, David. November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973.

Bishop, Jim. The Day Kennedy Was Shot. New York: Funk and Wagnall, 1968.

Bonner, Judy. Investigation of a Homicide. Anderson, S.C.: Drake House, 1969.

Buchanan, Thomas. Who Killed Kennedy? New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1964.

Burrard, Major Sir Gerald. The Identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics. London: Herbert

Jenkins, 1951.

Central Broadcasting System. CBS News Inquiry: "The Warren Report." Parts I-IV, broadcast over

CBS Television Network June 25-28, 1967.

______. CBS News Extra: "November 22 and the Warren Report," broadcast over CBS Television

Network September 27, 1964.

Chapman, Gil and Ann. Was Oswald Alone? San Diego: Publisher’s Export Co., 1967.

Curry, Jesse. Personal JFK Assassination File. Dallas: American Poster and Printing Co., Inc.,

l969.

Cutler, R.B. The Flight of CE 399: Evidence of Conspiracy. Manchester, Mass.: R.B. Cutler, 1969.

Dingle, Herbert. Practical Applications of Spectrum Analysis. London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd.,

1950.

Epstein, Edward J. Inquest. New York: Viking Press, 1966.

______. Counterplot. New York: Viking Press, 1969.

Fiddes, Frederick and Smith, Sydney. Forensic Medicine. London: J. and A. Churchill, Ltd., 1955.

Flammonde, Paris. The Kennedy Conspiracy. New York: Meredith Press, 1969.

Ford, Gerald and Stiles, John. Lee Harvey Oswald: Portrait of the Assassin. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1965.

Fox, Sylvan. The Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy’s Assassination. New York:

Award Books, 1965.

Garrison, Jim. A Heritage of Stone. New York: Putnam, 1970.

Gonzales, Thomas, Helpern, Milton, Vance, Morgan, and Umberger, Charles. Legal Medicine,

Pathology and Toxicology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954.

Hagie, C. E. The American Rifle for Hunting and Target Shooting. New York: The Macmillan Co.,

1946.

Houts, Marshall. Where Death Delights. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.

Jay, David, ed. The Weight of the Evidence: The Warren Report and Its Critics. New York:

Meredith Press, 1968.

- 148 -

Joesten, Joachim. Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy? New York: Marzani and Numsell Publishers,

1964.

Jones, Penn Jr. Forgive My Grief I. Midlothian, Tex.: Midlothian Mirror, Inc., 1966.

______. Forgive My Grief II. Midlothian, Tex.: Midlothian Mirror, Inc., 1967.

______. Forgive My Grief III. Midlothian, Tex.: Midlothian Mirror, Inc., 1969.

Kaiser, Robert Blair. RFK Must Die. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1970.

Kirkwood, James. An American Grotesque. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Lane, Mark. Rush To Judgement. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

______. A Citizen’s Dissent. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

Lewis, Richard and Schiller, Lawrence. The Scavengers and Critics of the Warren Report. New

York: Dell Books, 1967.

Lifton, David. Document Addendum to the Warren Report. El Segundo, Calif.: 1968.

Long, Rowland H. The Physician and the Law. New York: 1968.

Lucas, A. Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation. New York: Longmans, Green

and Co., 1935.

Manchester, William. The Death of a President. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

Marcus, Raymond. The Bastard Bullet. Los Angeles, Calif.: Rendell Publications, 1966.

Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories After the Fact: The Warren Commission, The Authorities and The

Report. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967.

______. Subject Index to the Warren Report and Hearings and Exhibits. New York: Scarecrow

Press, 1966.

Morin, Relman. Assassination: The Death of President John F. Kennedy. New York: Signet

Books, 1968.

Nash, George and Patricia. Critical Reactions to the Warren Report. New York: Marzani and

Munsell, 1964.

National Broadcasting Company. There Was a President. New York: Random House, 1966.

Newman, Albert. The Assassination of John F. Kennedy: The Reasons Why. New York: Clarkson

N. Potter, Inc., 1970.

Popkin, Richard. The Second Oswald. New York: Avon Books, 1966.

Roberts, Charles. The Truth About the Assassination. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1967.

Sauvage, Leo. The Oswald Affair. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1965.

Smith, Merriman, et al. Four Days. New York: United Press International and American Heritage,

1964.

Snyder, Le Moyne. Homicide Investigation. Springfield, Mass.: 1953.

Sparrow, John. After the Assassination: A Positive Appraisal of the Warren Report. New York:

Chilmark Press, 1967.

Thompson, Josiah. Six Seconds in Dallas. New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1967.

Warren, Earl, et al. Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President

Kennedy. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964.

______. Hearings Before the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964.

Weisberg, Harold. Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report. Hyattstown, Md.: Harold

Weisberg, 1965.

______. Whitewash II: The FBl-Secret Service Cover-Up. Hyattstown, Md.: Harold Weisberg,

1966.

______. Photographic Whitewash: Suppressed Kennedy Assassination Pictures. Hyattstown, Md.:

Harold Weisberg, 1967.

- 149 -

______. Oswald in New Orleans. New York: Canyon Books, 1967.

______. Post Mortem. Frederick, Md.: Harold Weisberg, 1971.

______. Frame-Up: The Martin Luther King/James Earl Ray Case. New York: Outerbridge and

Dienstfrey, 1971.

Winchester-Western Ammunition Handbook. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1964.

Articles

Bickel, Alexander. "The Failure of the Warren Report. Commentary (October 1966).

Epstein, Edward J. "The Final Chapter in the Assassination Controversy." New York Times

Magazine (May 20, 1969).

Fonzi, Gaeton. "The Warren Commission, the Truth, and Arlen Specter." Philadelphia Magazine

(August 1966).

Ford, Gerald. "Piecing Together the Evidence." Life (October 2, 1964).

Garrison, Jim. "Playboy Interview: Jim Garrison." Playboy (October 1967).

Jackson, Donald. "The Evolution of an Assassin." Life (February 21, 1964).

Kempton, Murray. "Warren Report: Case for the Prosecution." The New Republic (October 10,

1964).

Knebel, Fletcher. "A New Wave of Doubt." Look (July 12, 1966).

Lane, Mark. "Playboy Interview: Mark Lane." Playboy (February 1967).

Lattimer, John K. and Jon. "The Kennedy-Connally Single Bullet Theory: A Feasibility Study."

International Surgery (December 1968).

Lifton, David and Welsh, Robert. "A Counter-Theory: The Case For Three Assassins." Ramparts

(January 1967).

Lynd, Staughton and Minnis, Jack. "Seeds of Doubt: Some Questions About the Assassination." The

New Republic (December 21, 1963).

MacDonald, Dwight. "A Critique of the Warren Report." Esquire (March 1965).

"A Matter of Reasonable Doubt." Life (November 25, 1966).

Meagher, Sylvia. "The Curious Testimony of Mr. Givens." The Texas Observer (August 12, 1971).

"November 22, 1963, Dallas: Photos by Nine Bystanders." Life (November 24, 1967).

______. "The Warren Commission’s Private Life." The Texas Observer (April 3, 1970).

Olson, Don and Turner, Ralph. "Photographic Evidence and the Assassination of President John F.

Kennedy." Journal of Forensic Sciences (October 1971).

Oswald, Robert L. "Oswald: He was my Brother." Look (October 17, 1967).

Salandria, Vincent. "The Warren Report." Liberation (March 1965).

______. "The Impossible Tasks of One Assassination Bullet." The Minority of One (March 1966).

"Truth About Kennedy Assassination: Questions Raised and Answered." U.S. News and World

Report (October 10, 1966).

Turner, William. "The Inquest." Ramparts (June 1967).

______. "The Garrison Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy." Ramparts (January

1968).

Welsh, David. "In the Shadow of Dallas." Ramparts (November 1966).

Wise, David. "Secret Evidence on the Kennedy Assassination." Saturday Evening Post (April 16,

1968)

- 150 -

[The index has been included verbatim from the original book. Although

the page numbers are not correct for this copy of the book, it was felt

the subjects noted here would still be useful as reference —ratitor]

Index

Accessories after the fact in assassination 33

Accomplices in assassination, 81- 82

Accountability of government, 24, 41

Aebersold, Paul C., 19

Alba, Adrian, 244-45

Alibi for Oswald, 221, 225

Ammunition. See Military ammunition; Sporting ammunition

Anderson, Eugene, 231

Arce, Danny, 183

Archives. See National Archives

Arnold, Mrs. Carolyn, 184-87, 276-77

Assassin’s rifle. See Rifle

Atomic Energy Commission, 19, 20, 21, 23

Autopsy on President Kennedy, 37, 121

Autopsy photos and Xrays, 37-39, 115, 117, 121-22

Bag. See Paper bag

Baker, Mrs. Donald, 186

Baker, M. L., 63, 199, 201-9, 213, 218-21, 252-53

Ball Joseph 84-86, 163, 181, 205

Ballistics evidence, 48

Ballistics tests, 50; simulating head wounds, 111-14

Belin, David, 29-30, 84-86, 90, 169, 196, 197-98, 222, 288-89

Bernabei, Richard, 126, 129, 283

Blanket, 170-71

Boggs, Hale, 17, 26, 80, 222

Bolt practice by Oswald, 242-43

Bookhout, James, 182

Boone, Eugene, 212, 213

Boswell, Dr. J. Thornton, 118-19

Brandeis, Louis, 41

Brennan, Howard, 61-62, 188, 190-98,199

Bullet fragments, 19-20, 21-22; in car, 98, 107, 114, 146, 254;

- 151 -

from Governor Connally, 99-100, 103, 131, 132; in President

Kennedy’s head, 38-39, 117; in President Kennedy’s neck, 121-25,

145

Bullet 399, 22, 95-96, 99-101, 103, 121, 124, 128, 129, 131, 133,

134, 136-45, 250; planted, 253

Bullet wounds 50, of Governor Connally, 131-45, of President

Kennedy’s anterior neck, 79, 123,125,145; of President Kennedy’s

back, 126, 145; of President Kennedy’s head, 108-20; of

President Kennedy’s neck, 120-29

Bullets. See also Military ammunition; Sporting ammunition

Bullets and fragments, 48

Bullets, high-velocity, 119

Cabell, Mrs. Earle, 188

Cadigan, James, 171-72

Calvery, Gloria, 204-5

Cartridge cases, 37, 49, 69, 107, 127-28, 129, 147

Castro, Fidel, 29, 30

CBS News, 193,197, 205, 213

Central Broadcasting System. See CBS News

Central Intelligence Agency. See CIA

CIA, 29, 30, 38

CIA, President’s Commission on domestic activities of, 29-30, 39

Clark, Ramsey, 105,114-15; panel assembled by, 37, 39, 115, 117,

118, 121

Clothing: description, 288; worn by gunman, 198-99; worn by

President Kennedy, 20, 99, 103; worn by Oswald, 198-99

Cohen, Jacob, 281

Congress, 9, 11, 30-31, 40, 255

Connally, John, 25, 84

Cooper, Sen. John Sherman, 26 80, 134-35, 222, 238

Couch, Malcolm, 188, 203, 205, 208, 209, 289

Craig, Roger, 212

Crawford, James, 188

Cuban refugee at Parkland Hospital, 146

Curry, Jesse E., 74, 100

Curtain rods, 56, 146, 158-60, 174; story about, 58, 88

Dallas Morning News, 152-53, 154

Dallas police, 37, 74, 90, 160, 171, 180-82, 195, 199, 205, 248;

line-ups of, 195, 199, 200; radio logs of, 187

Dallas Times Herald, 83, 152

Daniels, Gene, 159-60

Dealey Plaza, 46

Deception, political, 10-13

Delgado, Nelson, 230-31, 232

De Mohrenschildt, George, 223, 239-41, 244

- 152 -

De Mohrenschildt, Jeanne, 223 240-41, 244

Department of Justice, 78; withholding of spectographic analysis by,

22, 100, 106

Dickey, Charles, 128, 142

Dillard, Tom, 203

Dissection: lack of at autopsy, 121

Dolce, Dr. Joseph, 139

Dougherty, Jack, 173-74

Dragoo, Mrs. Betty, 186

"Dumdum" bullet, 110

Dulles, Allen, 15, 16-17, 26, 82, 89, 111, 134-35, 137, 198

Dziemian, Dr. Arthur J., 140

Edgewood Arsenal, 112

Edwards, Don, 30

Edwards, Robert, 189, 198

Eisenberg, Melvin, 20, 143, 229

Eisenhower, Dwight, 10

Ely, John Hart, 230

Enos, William, 142

Epstein, Edward Jay, 28, 31, 35-36

Euins, Amos, 188, 189-90, 195

Executive sessions of Warren Commission: 12/5/63, 77; 12/16/63, 18,

79-80; 1/21/64, 82-83; 1/22/64, 15, 16; 1/27/64, 17, 19;

4/30/64, 89

"Eyewitness identification of assassin," 61

FBI, 15-23, 30, 37, 76-77, 90, 163, 171, 179-80, 181, 185, 196, 204,

239, 243, 244, 248-49; "agent" at hospital, 145-46; ballistics

findings of, 18; report on assassination, 76 77, 249

Federal Bureau of Investigation. See FBI

Fensterwald, Bernard, 284

Fiber evidence, 170-71; in bag 58; on rifle, 55

Fillinger, Halpert, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 142, 144

Finck, Col. Pierre, 111, 121

Fingerprints: on boxes, 60, 65, 175; on paper bag, 167-68

Fischer, Ronald, 191, 198

Folsom, Col. A. G., 229-30, 232

Ford, Gerald, 26, 29, 36, 111, 197

Fox, Sylvan, 28

Fragments. See Bullet fragments

Frankford Arsenal, 142

Frazier, Buell Wesley, 56-57, 58, 151, 156, 160, 162, 163-67, 170,

174

Frazier, Robert, 23, 53, 70, 101-4, 119, 125, 143, 226-27

Freedom of Information Act, 22-23, 106

- 153 -

Fritz, Will, 74, 160, 182

Full-jacketed bullets. See Military ammunition

Gallagher, John, 20, 101-2

Garrison, Jim, 28-29, 34-35, 115

Givens, Charles, 61, 153, 176-78, 252, 274-75, 287-88

Goldberg, Alfred, 86

Gregory, Dr. Charles, 133, 137-38, 142

Gregory, Dick, 29, 34

Hart, Philip, 278-79

Helpern, Dr. Milton, 142

Henchcliffe, Margaret, 146

"A. Hidell," 55

High-velocity bullets. See Bullets

Hoover, J. Edgar, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21-22, 30, 77, 100, 105, 159, 172,

179, 185, 249

Howlett, John, 210, 212

Humes, Dr. James J., 109-11, 115, 118, 124

Hunt, E. Howard, 29

Hunting rounds. See Sporting ammunition

Huxley, Aldous, 239

Interrogation sessions of Oswald, 182-83, 248

Irving, Texas, 56, 58, 156, 157-58, 161-62, 251

Jacketed bullets. See Military ammunition

Jackson, Robert, 188, 203, 206

Jarman, James, 154, 185-86, 288

Jenner, Albert, 82, 240-41

Johnson, Miss Judy, 186

Johnson, Lyndon B., 25, 26, 78

"Junior," 182-84

Justice Department. See Department of Justice

Katzenbach, Nicholas, 77

Kellerman, Roy, 117

Kelley, Thomas, 182

Kennedy, Edward, 278

Kennedy, John: Bay of Pigs, 10

Kleindienst, Richard, 106, 282

Landlady of Oswald’s rented room, 160

Lands and grooves, 143-44

Lane, Mark, 28, 31, 33-35, 190

Lawyers, 11, 13

Liebeler, Wesley, 58, 60, 67, 68, 69-71, 91, 156, 231, 233, 235, 245

- 154 -

Life magazine, 197

Light, Dr. F. W., 139

Limousine: examination of, 47; at hospital, 147

Lineups. See Dallas Police

Loftus, Joseph, 78

Long, Rowland, 115

"Long and bulky package," 162-74

Lovelady, Billy, 204-5

Lumumba, 30

Lunchroom, on second floor, 202

McCloy, John J., 17,18, 26, 80, 90, 110-11, 134-35, 139, 191

Mannlicher-Carcanco. See Rifle

"Marksman" rating of Oswald, 230

Meagher, Sylvia, 28, 31, 33, 155, 158, 161-62, 287

Media. See Press

Medical evidence: limitations of, 107-8 ; meaning of, 107, 249-50

Military ammunition, 109, 114, 116, 117-18, 120, 121, 122, 123-24,

129, 131, 147

Miller, Herbert J., 19

Missed shot, 37, 249

Mitchell, John, 106, 284

Molina, Joe, 204-5

Mooney, Luke, 211, 212

Morgan, Dr. Russell, 122

"Motive" of Oswald, 82, 84

Motorcade: prior knowledge of route of, 151-55; position of at

12:15, 186-87

Muchmore, Mary, 51

National Archives, 15, 105, 129, 140, 159, 179

Neutron Activation Analysis, 19-23, 250

Newsweek, 78

New York Times, 74, 78

Nichols, Dr. John, 113, 142

Nix, Orville, 51

Nixon, Richard, 29

Norman, Harold, 183-84

Nosenko, Yuri I., 235

Note to FBI from Oswald, 30

Olivier, Dr. Alfred G., 139-40

On-site tests. See Reconstruction of shots

Oser, Alvin, 104, 125, 227-28

Oswald, Marina 68, 83, 154, 156 157-58, 161, 170, 223, 233-46

Oswald, Robert, 232-33, 234-35, 246

Outline of Warren Commission work, 80-82, 257-63

- 155 -

Outlines of Warren Report, 86-88, 266-70

Paine garage, 245

Paine home: police search of, 157

Paine, Ruth, 56, 156, 158, 161, 170, 234, 245

Palmprint: on bag, 57-58; on rifle, 55

Paper bag, 57-58, 151, 163, 167-73, 251; prints on, 57-58, 167-68

Paraffin casts, 21

Parkland Memorial Hospital, 25 107, 145, 146, 251; Cuban refugee

employed at, 146; doctors employed at, 116, 132; "FBI agent" at,

145-46

Patsy, Oswald as, 248

Perry, Dr. Malcolm, 119

Philadelphia Inquirer, 74

Photograph of Oswald with rifle, 55

Piper, Eddie, 180-81, 209

"Planted" evidence, 147-48, 251, 254

Police. See Dallas Police

Popkin, Richard, 28, 36

Presidency, 10

Press, 9, 11-13; reaction to Warren Report, 27; suspicious of

Warren Report criticism, 29; presumption of Oswald’s guilt by, 75

Psychology, 221

Rachey, Bonnie, 186

Radio: in Oswald’s possession 154

Randle, Linnie Mae, 57, 162-64, 165-66

Rankin, J. Lee, 16-17, 19, 23, 26, 80, 82-83, 89, 91, 159, 179-81,

185, 234, 237, 242-43, 252

Reconstruction: of assassin’s movements, 209-14; of movements

after the shots, 64, 202-21, 252; of shots, 52, 88-89, 271-73

Redlich, Norman, 33, 87-89

Reid, Mrs. Robert, 153, 222-23

Revill, Jack, 177

Rifle, 18, 49, 50, 52, 54-55, 56-57, 58, 95, 106, 107, 151, 156, 162,

167, 170-72, 191, 210, 225, 227 235-39, 246, 249-50, 253, 289;

ammunition for, 140; capability of, 66; capability tests with

228-29; disassembled, 164, 166; fibers on, 55; hiding of,

212-16, palmprint on, 55; photograph of Oswald with, 55; test

firing for accuracy, 70-71; practice with by Oswald, 232-46

Roberts, Mrs. Earlene, 154

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 10

Rowland, Arnold, 186-87,189,198

Ruby, Jack, 25, 27, 146

Russell, Sen. Richard, 17, 26, 79

Russia: hunting by Oswald in, 233-35, 243, 246

- 156 -

Salandria, Vincent, 27, 283

Sauvage, Leo, 27, 161

Sawyer, Herbert, 177

Secret Service, 16, 181, 190, 234

"Sharpshooter" rating of Oswald, 230

Shaw, Clay: trial of, 28-29, 35, 103, 115, 226-27

Shaw, Dr. Robert, 134-37, 142

Shelley, Bill, 178, 204-5

Shires, Dr. Tom, 133

"Short charge," 128

Shotgun practice by Oswald, 233-35

Shots: as "easy," 67; nature of, 225-28; number of, 53; time span

of, 54

Simmons, Ronald, 227, 229, 246

Single-bullet theory, 53, 226

Sirica, John, 14

Slawson, W. David, 83

Snyder, LeMoyne, 115, 123

Soft-nosed ammunition. See Sporting ammunition

Sorrels, Forrest, 195

Soviet Union. See Russia

Specter, Arlen, 83, 101-3, 110, 133, 136, 138-39, 189

Spectographic analyses, 18-19, 22, 47, 95-106, 147, 250, 284

Sporting ammunition, 114, 116, 118, 123-24, 129, 131

Staff of Warren Commission, 15, 18, 21, 26, 34, 35, 40, 188, 249

St.Louis Post-Dispatch, 74

Stombaugh, Paul, 170

Sturgis, Frank, 30

Tape from Depository dispenser, 169

Texas School Book Depository, 47, 56, 147, 151, 251; discovery of

curtain rods in, 159

Thompson, Josiah, 28, 36-37

Time, 77

Tippit, J. D., 25, 32, 38, 66, 81

Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 34

Trujillo, 30

Truly, Roy, 63, 153, 159, 201-9, 216-20, 222, 252-53

"Twenty-six volumes," 27

Underwood, Jim, 203

Varminting bullets, 120

Vestibule on second floor, 202, 214, 217

Wade, Henry, 75

Walker Edwin A.: shot fired at, 66, 81, 221, 237, 240

- 157 -

Walther, Mrs. Carolyn, 189, 198

Warren, Earl, 18, 26, 32, 34, 79, 80, 82-83

Washington Post, 13, 77

Watergate, 9, 13, 29

Weberman, A. J., 29

Wecht, Cyril, 37-39, 121, 142, 280-81

Weigman, David, 206

Weisberg, Harold, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22-23, 28, 31-33, 36, 105-6, 142,

146, 153, 168, 184-85, 208, 284

Weitzman, Seymour, 212, 213

West, Troy Eugene, 168-70

Williams, Bonnie Ray, 153

Window, evidence near, 59-60

Witnesses of sixth-floor gunman, 47

Wounds. See Bullet wounds

Zahm, James A., 227, 231

Zapruder, Abraham, 51; film by, 36, 51, 54, 116, 226

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